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
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# The American Catholic quarterly review





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# THE

# **AMERICAN**

# CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW

Under the Direction of MOST REV. PATRICK JOHN RYAN, D. D.

ASSOCIATE EDITORS  $\left\{ egin{array}{ll} RT. & REV. & MGR. & JAMES F. & LOUGHLIN, D. D. RT. & REV. & MGR. & JAMES P. & TURNER, D. D. \end{array} 
ight.$ 

Bonum est homini ut eum veritas vincat volentem, quia malum est homini ut eum veritas vincat invitum. Nam ipsa vincat necesse est, sive negantem sive confitentem. S. AUG. EPIST. ccxxxviii. AD PASCENT.

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# THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC

# QUARTERLY REVIEW

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(Extract from Salutatory, July, 2890.)

## VOL. XXXVI.—JANUARY, 1911—No. 141.

### HERBERT, CARDINAL VAUGHAN.

"The Life of Cardinal Vaughan," by J. G. Snead-Cox, 2 vols. London: Herbert & Daniel, 1910.

→ INCE its foundation nearly sixty years ago by Pius IX. the See of Westminster has had as august a history, in proportion to its years, as any primatial see in Christendom, at any period of the Church's life-always excepting, of course, the great patriarchates. For close on 300 years, from the death of Reginald, Cardinal Pole, in 1558, to the appointment of Nicholas, Cardinal Wiseman, in 1850, no Primate of All England exercised a lawful jurisdiction over the Christian people of that land. The venerable titles, the revenues, the civil dignities of the Archbishop of Canterbury were indeed retained; there was in this sense continuity betwen the great Cardinal Archbishop and Dr. Matthew Parker; but for the rest a chasm for which no modern controversial astuteness can find a bridge lies between them. It is the chasm that separates the king from the usurper who wears the king's crown and plays with his sceptre. The centuries passed away; the Church still lived in England, insignificant in numbers, but mighty through the blood of her martyrs with the promise of the future; Vicars Apostolic exercised their rule as immediate representatives of the Holy See; the persecution that made Englishmen outlaws because they were loyal to their faith as well as their country was replaced, after generations of delay, by a wide measure of liberty; but not till the memorable year of the restoration of the hierarchy did Reginald Pole find a successor in his spiritual dignities and office. Canterbury was, for Catholics, no more than an august name, but

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Westminster was the heir of all the rights of St. Augustine and St. Theodore, St. Dunstan and St. Elphege, St. Anselm and St. Thomas the Martyr; in the person of Nicholas Wiseman, of glorious memory, an English Archbishop and Primate once more took his place in the sacred hierarchy; and like his immediate predecessor of nearly three centuries before, he, too, wore the imperial purple. He entered on his rule amid a storm of fanaticism as absurd as it was outrageous; he lived to see the Church in England firmly established on the restored foundations which he had done so much to lay; and in the judgment of all educated Englishmen there were few of their countrymen who held a place of such honor as the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster. He had done what probably no other living ecclesiastic could have done; an Englishman to his very marrow, he had lived for many years in the Eternal City, and he brought to his Catholic countrymen, still cramped in feeling by the fetters of the penal statutes, but recently struck from their limbs, the free atmosphere and the large and generous thought of Rome.

His successor was in many respects a complete contrast to himself. Henry Edward Manning was a convert clergyman who had held a dignified office in the Established Church; an Oxford scholar of repute, though lacking the wide learning of Cardinal Wiseman. Both were great men beyond all dispute; one had to secure for the faith and the Church the recognition and respect of the governing and highly intellectual classes of English society; the other's special work lay in bringing home to Englishmen that all truly national interests were the interests of the Church and her pastors. that to every class the Church had a sacred mission. She was no longer to be looked upon as belonging to a few great country houses or a handful of Irish poor in London or Manchester. Cardinal Manning came into touch with the great middle class of the country, with the skilled artisan, with the unskilled laborer. marvel that he left behind him the noble title of "The People's Cardinal."

The third Archbishop of Westminster, the story of whose life Mr. Snead-Cox has given us in two volumes of entrancing interest, was yet again of a type entirely distinct. He represented the old aristocratic families that had held loyally to the Catholic religion—those households that were the very salt that kept all England from corruption in her darkest days. He was neither a great scholar like Wiseman nor a great statesman like Manning; he had not the long Roman training of the first, nor the wide experience of the other. But if there ever was a great "all-round" ecclesiastic, a "man of men," as his biographer well terms him, a force for all

that was good and strong, an ideal priest in his personal life, that man was Herbert Vaughan. Perhaps the chief impression left by the study of his character is its simplicity—in the sense of the oculus simplex of our Lord's words. The things that to most men are the clamant interests of life—politics, literature, art, social intercourse—were to him side issues that possessed a value solely because of their relation to and in the light of his one master interest—the glory of God in the salvation of souls. He had the passionate love for souls that we recognize in St. Paul, St. Francis of Assisi or St. Francis Xavier; nothing was unimportant, no effort was too great, if a single soul was in the balance: nothing had real and permanent significance apart from this supreme end.

If Mr. Snead-Cox has been happy in the subject of the two handsome volumes that lie before us, the Cardinal has unquestionably been happy in his biographer. The story of a noble life is set forth not only with that true literary chill which you know is there because you are not tried by its absence, but with a broad and discerning sympathy. In his preface Mr. Snead-Cox writes: "I have tried to write an absolutely candid book, without reserves and without suppressions, describing the man as he was, in his strength and in his weakness, with his gifts and his limitations." There is no attempt to hide the fact that the biographer is enthusiastic in his affection for his subject, but it is with a sane enthusiasm that never warps his judgment.

Such a home as "Courtfield," where for 350 years the Vaughans have been settled, was calculated to develop a boy in the best traditions of an English Catholic and an English gentleman. Everything that makes the delight of an English country house surrounded him, while religion of the most practical and earnest kind not only colored, but permeated the whole family life. Both his parents were more than mere ordinary good-living Catholics; his mother, who was a convert, prayed continually that all her children might be called to serve God in the priesthood or the religious life; and of her eight sons no less than six became priests, while the other two tried their vocation in ecclesiastical seminaries; all her five daughters became nuns.

The natural gifts of the future Cardinal were such as pointed to his succession in due time as master of "Courtfield;" he was the very highest type of the heir to an English estate, beloved by all who knew him, possessing the keenest interest in all that concerns country life and an excellent sportsman. We cannot wonder that when Herbert's vocation to the priesthood was made clear to him that his father, admirable Catholic as he was, felt his eldest son's decision a sore disappointment to all his hopes and plans for the

future. No thought of opposition ever entered his mind, but his pain found expression in a natural impatience at the supernatural trial that had come to him. "Well," he said, "if Herbert goes, all the rest may go, too." Some forty years later, when nominated Archbishop of Westminster, an amusing appreciation in the National Observer spoke of Dr. Vaughan, with keen insight, as "English in the most native sense. There is the blood of an English squire in his veins, and, entrusted with a different destiny, it might have been his to retrieve a shattered fortune, to repurchase old lands and old dwellings, to fill a Herefordshire valley with the indications of his own energy and enterprise, to hunt and ride with the best, to sit in local judgment. . . . He is by nature and grace a Tory." At the same time, he was certainly no ardent politician; he was prepared to approve or disapprove of any party or any measure in proportion as such promoted or hindered the highest interests of mankind-Christian faith and Christian life. But in politics, as such, he took no interest. He lived in a sphere that transcended all mere worldly considerations; his manifold natural gifts were all directed to a supernatural end; his very singleness of purpose at times made him misunderstood and judged as hard and deficient in human sympathy. Such a judgment was to the last degree ignorant and absurd; but it is true that his whole mind was so possessed with the command, Quærite regnum Dei et justitiam Eius, that subordinate interests seemed to have no place in his scheme; and he expected others, at times no doubt to their dismay, to take his own high level of thought and effort.

Such a man was sure to make his mark on the men of his time; and at every step of Herbert Vaughan's ecclesiastical career we see him displaying a power and energy which almost compelled others, nolentes volentes, to become his followers and his fellowworkers. In one sense he was not so public a man as either Wiseman or Manning; his work and sympathies lay not more, but more exclusively, among directly religious interests. It is not possible to think of him, a savant among savants, addressing the Royal Society or acting as arbiter between the London "dockers" and their employers. He was not so unique a personality as either of his predecessors in the metropolitan see; but in him what might be considered ordinary gifts were raised to an extraordinary degree. We may say with safety that history will place his name among the highest of the English wearers of the sacred purple.

Herbert Vaughan's career, after its introduction of home life at "Courtfield" and school life at Stonyhurst, Downside, and Brugelette, falls inevitably into three great chapters. The first begins with his years as a student in Rome, and after his ordination at

Lucca on October 28, 1854, shows him as vice president of St. Edmund's, Old Hall, as the founder of St. Joseph's Missionary College, Mill Hill, and as Archbishop Manning's devoted aide-decamp at Westminster. Like many another great prelate, he was never a parish priest. Yet the two great enthusiasms of his life were the raising of the secular clergy to a high standard of devotion and efficiency and the conversion of the heathen world. If he had been immersed in the ordinary cares of a great parish he certainly could never have accomplished what he did for either of these mighty aims. At the same time, lack of parochial experience makes it difficult, if not impossible, for a Bishop to enter into the peculiar stuggles and the unending problems that beset a priest who works on the mission in a country where the faith, though free from all legal disability, is handicapped by a thousand social and financial odds. This is to be borne in mind when we find it recorded that the Cardinal Archbishop failed in some degree to gain the general affection of the clergy in the metropolitan archdiocese; partly this fact and partly a certain aloofness owing to his absorption in great schemes for the good of the whole Church made an apparent barrier which was certainly not the result either of lack of sympathy on his part or lack of loyalty on theirs.

One of the most romantic episodes in Herbert Vaughan's life is the story of the foundation of the great missionary college that year by year is sending forth a continuous stream of men pledged for life to the foreign mission field. Until the establishment of St. Joseph's, England had practically borne no part for centuries in the work of bringing pagan lands to the light of the Catholic faith. The undoubting faith and personal devotion of one young priest has wiped out whatever of reproach there was in this state of things. One of Cardinal Wiseman's latest acts was to give his encouragement and blessing to a scheme which was, indeed, the realization of what for many years had been his own heart's desire. Father Vaughan further obtained the approbation of almost the whole English hierarchy, laid his plan before the great Catholic Council at Mechlin, where a resolution approving it was carried by acclamation, and then went to Rome to obtain the solemn blessing of the Supreme Pontiff, which Pius IX. gave with all paternal readiness. In December, 1863, he sailed from Southampton on a begging expedition to North and South America. The Civil War then raging in the United States led him to proceed first to Colon, and, after crossing the Isthmus, to take steamer from Panama to San Francisco. In spite of scanty encouragement from the ecclesiastical authorities, he received a hearty welcome and substantial aid from the Catholics of California, and after five months'

stay took boat again to Panama and on to Peru. Here and in Chile he collected a great sum for his proposed college, and finally, sailing around Cape Horn, ended his long and arduous journey by weeks of labor in Brazil. In the summer of 1865 he returned to England, after an adventurous and exhausting travel of twenty months, with £11,000 in hand for the new foundation.

All through his life Dr. Vaughan kept up the closest relations with the college, from the day of its opening, under the humblest conditions, with one student, until his death there on June 19, 1903. For many years he was himself the president of the institution; he corresponded, with a regularity and frequency that seems almost phenomenal in the Bishop of a great and populous see, and yet more so in the Metropolitan of England, with the ever-growing number of old students of St. Joseph's who had gone out on the foreign missions. Their first work, undertaken at the request of Pope Pius IX., was amongst the Negro population of the United States, whither Father Vaughan and four missionaries sailed in November, 1871. Five years before the Plenary Council of Baltimore had made a special appeal to Europe for help in this work; and to this appeal the response had now come. The Archbishop of Baltimore assigned to the new mission a house with sixty acres of land, and the work was begun. Father Vaughan himself undertook a tour in the Southern States for the purpose of studying the difficult problem of the Colored race, and his notes on the subject are full of a wide sympathy, a deep insight and an invincible charity. Probably few Englishmen have entered so thoroughly into a subject that is only too apt to be treated with superficial ignorance. Herbert Vaughan had an almost passionate devotion to the Negro race, whose sufferings appealed to him with extraordinary force, and whose spiritual condition cried out for help and pity. At the same time, he entered into the peculiar difficulties of the question arising from a long-continued state of matters that had only recently passed away. While every Catholic agrees that there is no race disqualification within the fold of the Church, good men may no doubt take different lines as to practical conduct in certain ways. instance, while Father Vaughan was horrified to see Catholic Negroes debarred from taking their place near the sanctuary in churches where a "mixed" congregation worshiped, he states his conviction that, for practical purposes, and for the sake of the Colored people themselves, it is good that they should have their own churches, into which whites should not be encouraged to enter. Perhaps an Englishman, even after months of earnest consideration, is not to be taken as an authority, in any sense, on such a matter; but at least he was able, unlike too many would-be reformers, to

look all round the question and to regard it from the point of view of all the interests concerned in it.

Early in 1875 the Bishop of Salford, as he had then become, visited America for the last time, in company with Canon Benoit, whom he had appointed to succeed him as Superior of St. Joseph's College, and a number of missioners from the college. This, his last visit to the States, only lasted a few days, but served still further to strengthen the bonds that so heartily united the English dignitary with his countless friends across the sea.

The second period of Herbert Vaughan's ecclesiastical life consists of the twenty years during which he held the See of Salford, to which he was nominated by brief received on October 16, 1872. Perhaps at no time do we see more clearly the man as he really was than as at this time he stands revealed to us in the pages of his diary, which he never dreamed would reach other eyes than his own. Under the date mentioned above he writes:

"To-day I received the brief nominating me to be Bishop of Salford. This is the will of God, blessed for ever. I am grateful for the inspiration to take it at once and lay it upon the altar before the tabernacle and to take it from our Lord. I then placed it in the hands of the statue of the Immaculate and received it from her, and finally laid it at the feet of St. Joseph and took it thence. I have promised to propagate devotion to the Blessed Sacrament, to our Lady and St. Joseph, and under them I place myself and my whole work of the future."

About the same time he draws out for himself the likeness there must be between a Christian Bishop and our Divine Lord ("Princeps Pastorum") in His Passion. One sentence serves to give the keynote of this extract, so full at once of absolute humility and real courage:

"He died, poor, for all, forgave all, loved all, in the midst of all. He was a light on the mountain-top, visible to all, an encouragement, a consolation, a Saviour for all. Such should be the Bishop."

And such, Deo adjuvante, was Herbert. Bisher of Salford, Archbishop of Westminster, Metropolitan of England and Prince of the Church. Such he lived and such he died.

The simplicity of the man comes out in his arrival at Salford. "Presenting himself, the day before his consecration, at the Cathedral House, with a carpet bag in his hand, he was met by one of the resident clergy, who asked who he was and what he wanted. 'Oh,' was the reply, 'I'm Herbert Vaughan, and I have come to be consecrated.'"

Seldom had a twenty years' English episcopate included such a multiplicity of works as were crowded into his tenure of the

densely populated northern diocese. He loved the Lancashire folk, as do all who know them intimately. Manchester quickly came to recognize him as one of her foremost citizens, and gave him ungrudging confidence and admiration. His clear vision, his uncompromising grasp of principle and his mental vigor were evident to all with whom he came in contact; but few, if any, suspected the strength of the hidden life and the humble, mortified character that lay behind the quick, determined, perhaps somewhat imperious exterior. It has been well said that his biography is a revelation. We knew he was a great ruler and a devoted shepherd of souls; we are coming to learn that the picture of the real man bears the lineaments of a saint.

From the immense number of his undertakings at Salford three stand out with special prominence. First, the "finishing seminary" attached to the Cathedral, designed not in the least as a diocesan seminary in the Tridentine sense, but as a collegiate institution where on their ordination priests might spend a year under the Bishop's eye, become known to him and each other and be instructed in parochial work before having their special post on the mission assigned to them. The supply of priests was lamentably deficient when he came to the diocese, and for many years this seminarium acted as a feeder until the demand was overtaken by the supply, and after many years of successful work the institution became no longer necessary.

In 1876 another work of vast importance was undertaken. During his extensive travels Dr. Vaughan had been struck with the efficiency of the commercial schools of America and the Continent, and he was determined, if possible, to supply English Catholics with a college that would fulfill for them the ends of the écoles de commerce of France and the realschulen of Germany. splendid institution known as St. Bede's College was begun in a very humble way, a Baptist chapel having been bought as its first pied à terre; soon afterwards, however, a fine site near Alexander Park, Manchester, was purchased; the neighboring Aquarium, which had proved a financial failure, was bought, and a most amusing story is that of the Bishop's courageous endeavor to carry it on as a place of intellectual recreation and of the lack of interest commercial Manchester still continued to take in what the advertisements termed "the finny monsters of the deep." It proved, however, a valuable nucleus for the new collegiate buildings, which it served and still serves as a central hall and museum. Some years later the Salford Grammar School was incorporated with St. Bede's, and the history of the college up to the present time has been one of enormous usefulness and unqualified success.

The third great work undertaken by Dr. Vaughan at Salford was the inauguration of the Rescue and Protection Society on behalf of the thousands of poor and neglected Catholic children of the city and diocese who were, to the number of several thousands each year, in danger of losing their faith. As a cause of this terrible state of matters, to the death, neglect and destitution of many parents, was added the proselytizing zeal of various anti-Catholic philanthropic societies. To meet the need was a herculean task, but the Bishop, aided by a devoted clergy and enthusiastic lay workers, was equal to the emergency, and the Protection and Rescue Society is doing its beneficent work to-day, animated by the spirit of its holy founder, with undiminished vigor, to the salvation of countless little ones and the confusion of all attempts to draw them from their religious faith and duty.

It would be interesting to discuss the Bishop's literary labors, especially as proprietor and editor-in-chief of the Tablet: and also to trace the controversy, first between himself and the Society of Jesus, on the question of opening a school in Manchester without episcopal sanction and then with regard to the whole relations between the regular clergy in England and the Bishops—a matter which had become involved in a good deal of difficulty in consequence of the abnormal conditions of the days of persecution. But space imperatively forbids an excursion along either of these attractive paths; the second subject would, indeed, almost require an article to itself. It should be noted in passing that while Dr. Vaughan was successful in his personal controversy and the Bishops won almost all along the line as to the general question, the cordial relations between the Bishop of Salford and the Jesuit Fathers were never disturbed. He loved to make his retreat at that magnificent home of learning and devotion. Stonyhurst College; on his accession to the metropolitan see he invited the society to assist him in the educational work of the archdiocese; and he chose one of the fathers for his director (the first and only help he sought in this way) towards the end of his life.

Cardinal Manning died on January 14, 1892. For many years he had been recognized as by far the greatest ecclesiastical personage in Great Britain, and the gap he left was an intensely difficult one to fill. But there was no doubt from the first as to his successor; the name of the Bishop of Salford stood first on the terna sent to Rome, and in spite of a characteristic letter, full of genuine humility and self-distrust, in which he implored the Holy Father to spare him this burden, the early spring saw Herbert Vaughan Archbishop of Westminster. On the 16th of August following he received the pallium at the Oratory, South Kensington, Mgr.

Stonor, Archbishop of Trebizond, acting as apostolic delegate, and an eloquent sermon, worthy of the occasion, being preached by Abbot Gasquet. It was the first time since Cardinal Pole's reception of it at Bow Church in 1556 that an English Archbishop had received the sacred pall on English ground, instead of journeying to Rome for the purpose. A few months later Archbishop Vaughan was created Cardinal, with the title of "San Gregorio in Monte Cœlio," which Manning had held before him.

The story of Herbert Vaughan's ten years' primacy belongs to such recent years that its noble proportions and widespreading energies will be seen still more clearly when time has provided the necessary perspective. But, as at Salford, a cursory glance at the manifold activities of his years at Westminster discloses three outstanding subjects to which his most earnest thoughts, his deepest anxieties and his most strenuous efforts were directed. These were: the fight for the Catholic schools, the question of "Corporate Reunion" and Anglican ordinations and the building of Westminster Cathedral.

The position of the "non-provided" or voluntary schools of England had long been an outrage on justice and a strange commentary on the supposed fairness of English legislation. Under cover of undenominationalism in the provided schools—the "simple Bible teaching" that may mean anything or nothing—the Nonconformists had been provided with a system of religious instruction which satisfied their demands and for which they paid nothing, except indirectly like all the other ratepaying citizens. All "non-provided" schools-Catholic, Anglican, Wesleyan or Jewish-were penalized, not only by their supporters having to build and furnish them without assistance from the Government, but by receiving a less grant from the Treasury, no matter what their efficiency and no help whatever from the rates. What made the situation still more grotesque was that the "non-provided" schools taught several hundred thousand more children than the Board or "provided" schools. was not to be wondered at that hundreds of Anglican schools fell in the unequal struggle; but to the glory of the Church not one Catholic school was closed in spite of the unfair conditions under which the elementary education of our children had to be carried on. Cardinal Vaughan threw himself with all his accustomed vigor into the conflict on behalf of the children of the Church, and had the happiness, after years of struggle, of seeing a substantial reform established by the Education Act of 1902—a measure which, though open to serious criticism, put an end to the glaring unfairness of the preceding thirty years. The Cardinal recognized that our demand was for no indulgence or special treatment, but for elementary justice. "A fair field and no favor" has been supposed to express the English ideal; history tells us that to make the words really applicable to English minds and English ways we should, in too many cases, have to add: "except for the followers of the ancient faith of England."

A final solution has not been reached, however, by the Act of 1902. The absurd Kenyon-Slaney clause, which assigned two out of the six managers of an "unprovided" school to the nomination of the educational authority of the district, has in it the seeds of more than possible trouble. No reasonable person would object to one or two outsiders in religion being associated with the management of a school, if a certain number of non-Catholic children were among the scholars, and if the secular instruction alone was under the purview of the whole board of management. In fact, no rational Anglican or Nonconformist would dream of interference with the religious teaching of a Catholic school, any more than a Catholic in possession of his senses would desire to have a say in the religious instruction of Protestant school children. But we have not alway to deal with reasonable men. And the fundamental difficulty lies in the fact that the real managers of every elementary school are now the County Council, the nominal "managers" of a denominational school having no control except over the religious teaching. In the case, therefore, of a Catholic being placed by the Council on the "management" of a Protestant school or an Anglican on that of a Nonconformist school or vice versa, such a manager would find himself absolutely without a voice in the school affairs. except with regard to the religious instruction. And a sensible man does not care to be either a nonentity or a nuisance.

If a general sense of justice with regard to the claims of denominational schools is growing in England—and recent years have made it fairly plain that such is the case—the influence of Cardinal Vaughan may be gratefully reckoned as one of the causes of this better spirit. In any case, the most Nonconformist Parliament since the Great Rebellion, dissolved not twelve months ago, signally failed, in spite of an overwhelming majority on the Government benches, to pass an education bill on the lines desired by the Puritan agitators. Three Education Ministers had to retire defeated from the fray. They were—two of them at least—able men, who though Nonconformists had no special turn for intolerance or the crushing of a minority; but they miscalculated the real feeling of the country and fancied that the majority in the House of Commons reflected an equal majority among the electors. There is likely to be an educational truce in England for a long period, neither political party caring to burn its fingers in stirring up again the embers of so fierce a fire. The country as a whole is very far from being Catholic; it has only a very partial confidence in Anglicanism, with its many shades of contradictory belief; but Puritan tyranny it will not have at any price.

During the closing decade of the last century the idea of "corporate reunion" was much in evidence. For the first time since the Stuarts' days a certain number of Englishmen had begun to ask themselves whether a closer rapport between the Catholic Church and the Anglican Established Church was not possible; an altogether new element in the situation was, however, that a few French ecclesiastics had taken up the question and were convinced that, at least the Anglican position required further examination and that the ordinations of Anglican clergy, albeit utterly schismatic, might, under such scrutiny, turn out to be either valid or at least not certainly invalid. This is not the place to enter into a detailed resumé of what is common knowledge to all students of the ecclesiastical life of that period, but it is owing to Cardinal Vaughan's memory to realize the part he played in a story as to which his action was both misunderstood and misinterpreted. No one could long more earnestly for the visible union, under the shadow of Peter's throne, of all who bore the name of Christian: but his intensely truthful nature would admit of no compromise, and his farseeing judgment saw danger in the line certain good and able men were taking. The action of the French ecclesiastics was the key of the whole position; Rome would certainly not have moved in the matter otherwise, nor would Anglicans have made any advance of a practical nature. It was the meeting of Lord Halifax -a name to be honored by all religious Englishmen of whatever creed—with the Abbé Fernand Portal during the winter of 1880-00 that really started the movement. The good abbé heard for the first time of English non-Catholics who avowed themselves Catholic in belief, who devoutly held the truths of the Real Presence of Christ in the Most Holy Sacrament, of the Sacrifice of the Mass and the Sacrament of Penance; who were earnest clients of our Lady and invoked the saints; who had restored the religious life both for men and women; and who even regarded the Apostolic See with sincere reverence and desire for restored communion. No wonder he listened with amazement and believed that something should be done to bring about a rapprochement between Catholics and these "other sheep" who seemed so near the fold. No wonder such eminent men as Mgr. Duchesne, editor of the Liber Pontificalis, and Mgr. Gasparri, professor of canon law in the Catholic Institute of Paris, took up the matter; no wonder that their zeal was communicated to some notable ecclesiastics in Rome, including Cardinal

Rampolla, then Pontifical Secretary of State. No wonder that even the Holy Father himself made anxious and hopeful inquiries with regard to what seemed at least the dawn of a new day of hope for England.

But the English Cardinal and his suffragans knew better than French clergy, however learned and pious, how matters really stood. They knew that the Anglicans represented by Lord Halifax were not in any sense representative of the Established Church, or even of the High Church section. A very few Bishops, at the most two or three thousand clergymen, and perhaps twenty or thirty thousand laymen, would be all who, in the twenty-five millions of Anglicans throughout the world, really desired union with the Holy See on even quasi-Catholic grounds. And even these represented a perfectly new movement and a total reversal of the belief and practice of more than 300 years; at the very most, the tradition of better things had filtered down the centuries as an almost invisible thread, and when it had appeared above the surface had been banned alike by Anglican Bishops and by public opinion. There was no hope that any corporate movement would respond to a paternal approach on the part of the Holy See, if such were made. And the question of Anglican ordinations, on which it was hoped a basis for some rapprochement might be found, was not a happy one to have chosen; on the one hand there was the invariable practice of the Holy See, on the other the fact that Anglican opinion as a whole had always strenuously denied the Catholic character of such ordinations. Only a few thousands of those who held these orders wished them to be orders in any real sense. Cardinal Vaughan's words at the Catholic Conference at Preston in 1895 sum up the position for himself and for all English Catholics:

"Would that our Anglican friends could prove to us, would that we could recognize, the validity of their orders; not, indeed, for any benefit they could be to them outside the unity of the Church, but because they believed their conversion would be rendered easier" [by such recognition].

But from the first the Cardinal was convinced that the Protestant ordinal, in view of its history, was an insufficient form for the conferring of the Sacrament of Order, and on this sole ground Anglican ordinations were condemned by the Bull Apostolicæ Curæ on September 13, 1896. The hopes of the advanced men in the Established Church had run high, and the blow was an unexpected as well as a severe one. But the letter of the Anglican Archbishops to the Supreme Pontiff, full of courtesy, and even reverential courtesy, as it was, proved how wise was the line taken by the Archbishop of Westminster. In this publication their Graces

of Canterbury and York really made the whole claim for the recognition of Anglican ordinations a futile one, inasmuch as they explained away the supreme end for which the priesthood is conferred. They asserted a "sacrifice" of the Eucharist in unmistakable terms, but explained the "sacrifice," in a cloud of Latin verbosity, to be the oblation of prayer and thanksgiving, of bread and wine, of the worshipers themselves-of anything, in fact, but of the Divine Oblation of the Lamb of God Himself. They remained silent when challenged to say whether they believed this truth or not. The Cardinal and Bishops contented themselves with a brief "Vindication of the Bull." Indeed, except among High Churchmen, the pronouncement of the Holy Father raised no indignation, but rather gained approval from Protestants in general. It is more than possible, however, that Nonconformist jealousy of the Established Church was a sensible factor in this feeling of satisfaction. For Anglicans represented by Lord Halifax there is something very pathetic in the result of the inquiry; but in the long run the cause of truth must gain by absolute plain speaking when a definite issue is raised.

Before passing to the last great work of Cardinal Vaughan, mention should be made of his efforts to obtain the modification of the blasphemons declaration made by English sovereigns on their first meeting with Parliament, repudiating in horrible terms the doctrine of Transubstantiation and the practice of the invocation of our Lady, attributing to the Pope a dispensing power for the taking of such an oath and by implication declaring the sovereign himself a probable villain of the deepest dye! The accession of King Edward VII. had reminded Englishmen of a scandal that had been buried for two generations. All respectable politicians desired the repeal of the oath, in the sense of its modification so as no longer to violate Catholic feeling; the Canadian Parliament spoke in the strongest terms on the subject; not only Catholics, but Eastern schismatics and Anglican High Churchmen, were outraged in their deepest beliefs by it; yet such was the pitiful vacillation and stupidity of the Conservative Government that nothing practical was done. It was reserved for Mr. Asquith, a Radical Nonconformist. to sweep away, only a few weeks ago, by an enormous majority, endorsed by the unanimous vote of the House of Lords, this "blot on the statute book," as Lord Salisbury called the declaration. All honor to the Premier who has listened to the voice of reason and of religious tolerance, and who has saved King George V. from the choice between a horrible insult to the faith and to millions of his loyal subjects and a grave constitutional crisis. One of the most earnest hopes of Herbert Vaughan has thus happily come to fruition.

We must devote the remaining pages of this article, and that as briefly as may be, to the third great undertaking that bulks promimently in the full, unresting life of Westminster's third Cardinal Archbishop. That the metropolitical see of England should have its Cathedral had for many years been a hope and desire among English Catholics: even in Cardinal Wiseman's time the idea had been mooted, and Dr. Manning, as Archbishop-designate, had presided over a great public meeting, held with a view to further the project, in May, 1865. Other more pressing claims, however, blocked the way of the scheme, and it was not until 1882 that the present site was purchased. It seemed then that the Cathedral would soon be an accomplished fact, as in that year it was announced that an anonymous benefactor, not himself a Catholic, and understood to be Sir Tatton Sykes, a Yorkshire baronet of wellknown piety and generosity, had offered to defray the cost of building the mother church of Westminster. The beautiful Votiv Kirche at Vienna, built in 1853 as an act of thanksgiving for the Emperor of Austria's escape from assassination, was to be the model of the new building. It cannot yet be explained why this munificent offer was withdrawn, but in some way the plan fell through, and nothing more was done until Herbert Vaughan came to Westminster ten years later. With a faith and courage that can only be called stupendous, and which were fully justified by the result, he set himself to the task. Mr. John F. Bentley was eventually selected to be the architect of the great church, which was to be built on the model of Old St. Peter's in Rome, i. e., was to be a Roman basilica, but with Byzantine constructive improvements. This decision naturally raised a host of objectors, but the Cardinal was convinced that for the purpose designed such a style was the most fitting, and had the obvious advantage of not challenging comparison with the neighboring Abbey. There are many critics who to this day regret that Westminster Cathedral is basilican and not Gothic in design; but none can refuse to recognize that without Herbert Vaughan's enthusiasm there would not have been a Westminster Cathedral at all in our time. The foundation-stone was laid in June, 1805, and in the extraordinarily short space of eight years the vast building was ready for the divine service.

The area of Westminster Cathedral is twice that of the Abbey; even in height the 109 feet of the Cathedral just exceed the 105 of the Abbey and considerably the 93 of York; the span of nave and aisles exceeds by many feet that of any of the great English cathedrals, even the 110 feet of York Minster being far outspanned by the 150 of Westminster.

The Cardinal's intention at first was to place the choir services

of the Cathedral in the hands of the Order of St. Benedict, and with this view he communicated with the Abbot of Solesmes, who entered warmly into the plan, which would have restored to the order something of the rights which they lost through the robbery of Elizabeth. The difficulties, however, proved too great; it would have been an unwieldy and probably unworkable arrangement to have a double authority at Westminster—to have had the Cathedral administered by a secular chapter, while the singing of the Mass and office were in the hands of a religious community. Therefore, the Cardinal fell back, for the music of the Cathedral, as for all else connected with it, on his secular clergy, and, as time has proved, with the happiest results. The Cathedral Choir School, with its eminent director, Mr. R. R. Terry, is the admiration of London and of England. On May 7, 1902, the eve of Ascension Day, the divine office was first sung by the Cathedral choir, and, as Mr. Snead-Cox remarks with pardonable pride, not a sentence has been omitted from that day to this. Eighteen chaplains, who are responsible for the daily High Mass and office, are attached to the Cathedral. But the great basilica was not opened for more than a year after the daily services were begun in the temporary building. It had been intended to have a great and solemn function for its inauguration; but when the time was nearly come for this the Cardinal Archbishop's work was over. On the feast of the Sacred Heart, June 19, 1903, having made on the previous day his solemn profession of faith, the Metropolitan of England passed to his rest at St. Joseph's College, Mill Hill. His body was brought to the new Cathedral for the Solemn Requiem, and that, and no other, was the opening of the glorious pile which for ages to come will be his enduring memorial in the heart of the mighty city he served so faithfully and so well.

Those who, like the present writer, were privileged to take part in the magnificent functions of the nineteenth Eucharistic Congress, held two years ago at Westminster, can realize something of what the Cathedral is, not only to London and to Great Britain, but to the whole of Western Christendom. Never, even in her days of faith, had England seen such a gathering of Princes of the Church, Archbishops and Bishops, as, under the presidency of a Papal Legate, then assembled around the present venerated occupant of the metropolitical see. And the wonderful scenes enacted last June on the occasion of the consecration of the Cathedral and the commemoration of the restoration of the hierarchy to England sixty years before set the final seal, as it were, to Herbert Vaughan's great work. His successor has achieved another work of no less importance, in that, within seven years of his appointment, his

labors have freed the vast church from every vestige of debt and made the Cathedral of the Precious Blood the undisputed freehold of the Catholic Church in our country.

And with the thought of that splendid heritage we pay our homage to the memory of one of the heroic figures of our own race and our own time—to the great Englishman and great churchman who was called to be the third in the restored succession of England's hierarchical chiefs—to the brave, simple, loving soul of Herbert Vaughan.

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### "REUNION FROM AN ANGLICAN POINT OF VIEW."

HE events at Brighton, England, culminating in the submission of two parish clergymen and three assistants to the Catholic Church, in search, as they themselves profess, of authority for doctrines and practices which they had long held and taught, marks a very distinct stage in the Reunion movement. And for this reason, that these Brighton clergymen, while more advanced in matters of public devotion than some, even, of their own leaders were prepared to approve as expedient, under the circumstances and conditions prevailing, were in no degree more advanced, in respect of doctrine, than many of their clerical brethren.

The growth, indeed, of "devetion to the Blessed Sacrament," of plain, unhesitating insistence on "the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation," and the tacit toleration, by episcopal superiors, of the practice of "Reservation," is one of the most remarkable phases of a movement which only yesterday, as one may say, became clearly conscious of its own destiny—reunion, by submission, with the divinely appointed Centre of Catholic unity, the See of Peter. It was only because the Brighton vicars, under the indubitable guidance, as we now see, of the Holy Spirit, insisted, logically, on public devotion as the necessary complement of "Reservation of the Blessed Sacrament," and read in, or into, the Bishop's prohibition of the former, a tacit denial of the "Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation," that they were led, inevitably, to seek the only authority which proclaims all three to be of faith, doctrine, reservation and public devotion, the divine authority of the Catholic Church.

It would be as unjust, however, as it would be rash and uncharitable, to attribute to those who have neither approved, as expedient, the public devotions practiced by the Brighton vicars,

nor followed their example of individual submission, any less fervor of devotion to our Blessed Lord "in the Divine Sacrament of the Alatar," as they hold it to be, any less logical and consistent belief in public devotion to "the Eucharistic God," as the due complement of Reservation, than those whom it has pleased the Good Shepherd, of His mere grace and favor, to bring into the visible fold of His true Church. It was a question in the minds of Reunionists, as already indicated, of the present expediency of certain unfamiliar and "distinctively Roman" public devotions, and it is only right and just that their case, such as it is, should be presented in a Catholic magazine.

That case, in respect of the Brighton vicars, was briefly this, that they were imperiling, for the sake of personal "views," the hardly won concession—toleration would, perhaps, be the better word—of Reservation, and giving to unsympathetic Bishops, harassed by a moribund but still militant Protestant party, an excuse for forbidding reservation attogether. As, it may be noted in passing, the Bishop of Ely has done, in his latest charge to his clergy.

Thus presented, the case against "public devotions to the Blessed Sacrament" seems, given the present position of the Reunion movement in the Anglican communion, not wholly unreasonable. It is well to insist, once more, that those who held these devotions to be premature, under the prevailing conditions and circumstances of their "English Church," are no whit less fervent in their love and devotion to our Lord "in the Blessed Sacrament" than those in whose case this devotion has been so abundantly and, as we may surely venture to say, so fittingly rewarded.

The matter, culminating as it has done, raises once more, however, the whole question of individual submission as distinguished from that "corporate submission" to which Reunionists, among devout Anglicans, look forward so confidently, and for which they pray so earnestly. No sincere Reunionist would, indeed, resent an individual submission to an authority which he recognizes, in a certain sense, and "under normal conditions," to be divine and infallible, much less would he put obstacles in the way of a step which, as yet, he is conscientiously unable to take, and which he regards as merely "moving from one room to another." Plainly speaking, it is in that last phrase, "conscientiously unable;" that the whole essence of the Reunionist position, humanly expressed, may be said to consist.

c. Certain information, therefore, we bal and printed, gathered, during a recent visit to England, from those eminently qualified to impart it, may not, at this stage of the movement, be without interest

to Catholic readers. It may be well, moreover, to begin with the phrase above indicated as being the gist of the Reunionist position, the conscientious inability under which many, we may say, most of them labor, of taking any step that is not, clearly and distinctly, marked out for them by the conscious guidance of the Holy Spirit, That, surely, is not an attitude of mind with which the Catholic, and, still less, the convert, pervaded as he must be with St. Paul's humility gratia Dei sum id quod sum, can presume to find fault. Asked by a Catholic friend, as man to man, "What is it that keeps so many of you from an act of submission you are prepared to make some day?" the answer of one leader of the movement certainly deserves attention and respect: "The conviction that we are in the place where God has put us, and are doing the work He gives us to do." While that conviction remains, and that it is a conviction, their lives give evidence, is it not their plain duty, to God and their own souls, to stay where and as they are?

It is only, moreover, as we realize this conscientious inability, on the part of so many devout souls, truly and sincerely Catholic in all but outward union with the visible communion of the Church, to take the step which to them, no less than to us, seems the logical and inevitable issue of their whole spiritual experience, as it is the sole rationale and justification of the whole movement, that we shall come to realize, at the same time, the nature and the limits of our true duty in regard to them. That duty may be expressed in two words: Prayer and sympathy. Catholics, if a layman may presume to quote the words of a devout Anglican Reunionist, no other, indeed, than Lord Halifax himself, are, or seem to him to be, prone to insist on the aspect of the Church as an ecclesiastical government—to be obeyed, and to lose sight of her aspect as the Mystical Body of Christ-with which all Christ-lovers must desire and strive to be in conscious union. It is not, as he was careful to insist, that ecclesiastical government is not as necessary as it is, divine; it is, rather, that, for an Anglican, the duty of union with Christ, and with His Mystical Body—with the soul of the Church? comes, as he earnestly believes, before outward submission. "Union," he continued, "as you and I alike desire it, can only come in and through Christ. When every one of us, Roman and Anglican, realizes his personal union with our Lord, visible union will, come of itself,"

It was, indeed, along such lines as these, the seeking to get at, the heart and true meaning of such terms, as union, unity and submission to the divine authority of the Church, that Lord Halifax discussed a point often supposed to be a stumbling block in the way of reunion, the question of Anglican orders. "Rome's recog-

nition of our orders," he said in effect, "would not alter our position in regard to her; we should still be schismatics in her estimation. When the time for Reunion comes," he continued, "the question of orders will settle itself."

The preceding, for which the present writer can assure his readers that he has ample authority, surely makes a very distinct stage in the Romeward course of the Reunion movement. Beati pacifici; it is in the realization of our true oneness with our Lord that we shall find, speaking with all reverence, the true secret of Reunion, of the return to the one fold of the One Shepherd of those "other sheep" of whom He has said: "Them also must I bring, and they shall hear My voice." But it must be He who shall bring them, in His own time, and in His own way. Our part is to pray, and to await both.

In other matters, more or less intimately connected with "the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation," there has been a marked advance, a very distinct gain, during the last few years. For ritual, as it is the fashion to call it, is, after all, only the expression of certain beliefs, and has no meaning or reason apart from the truths it symbolizes. And it is, of course, just for this very reason that the enemies of "Catholicism," even, or especially in its Anglican form—controversy aside, it is, in a very real sense, Catholicism—direct their chief efforts against the outward symbols, hoping thereby, it is to be presumed, to eradicate the "errors" which underlie them.

Taking a date not yet twelve years ago, 1899, the following record is not without its interest for Catholics. In that year the two Anglican primates, at certain more or less informal "hearings"—all that an Erastian state would allow—absolutely condemned the use of incense, "reservation of the Blessed Sacrament" for the sick and dying and the use of processional lights.

Of these three, the second was, and is, of course, infinitely the most important; the others have no meaning apart from it. How important it has since proved, and is likely to prove, has been already shown. "Those unacquainted with the strength of the Catholic Movement," my informant continued, "thought that in these respects the end had already come." It shows, indeed, the present writer may be permitted to add, both the vitality and the Catholicity of the principles at issue that they should have survived, in an environment so apparently inauspicious as that of Anglicanism, all that officialism and militant Protestantism could devise for their elimination and destruction.

Let us follow the matter in some detail, as not unworthy of Catholic attention, on either side of the Atlantic; more perhaps

on the western than on the eastern, where the conditions here dealt with are, probably, more familiar than to most American or Canadian readers of the CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW.

"The full use of incense," to revert to my kind informant, "has been restored wherever it was used before, and it is used in a great many more churches, in some form or other, than was the case in 1899, when its use was unreservedly condemned." To be born Catholic, perhaps even to the convert of recent or long standing, it seems necessary, at this point, to insist that here is no question of mere ritual, still less of conflict with constituted authority, as it is too much the fashion to allege. It needs only a moment's consideration of the history of the liturgical use of incense in the Catholic Church, of its intimate connection, once it became liturgical, with belief in and adoration of, the Real Presence of our Blessed Lord in the Divine Sacrament of the Altar, in order to see that its use, in Anglican churches marks, and can mark, nothing else than a growing and ever clearer belief in that Presence, even though its reality, as we know, be lacking to them. And since it is, speaking with all reverence, devotion to our dear Lord in his Adorable Sacrament, to His Real Presence, even if only desired and not attained, that, more than all else, is the seal and sign of His true lovers, shall not we, to whom this Presence is daily vouchsafed, pray that all His lovers, led by His Blessed Mother, first and chief of His adorers in the Blessed Sacrament, His first tabernacle, may find, in the odor of incense, the path that leads to Him? Oleum effusum Nomen Tuum ideo animae dilexerunt Te nimis.

"In regard to Reservation"—I return to my kindly informant— "it is noteworthy," as he said, that in spite of condemnation by the supreme "spiritual" tribunal—set up by the State and presided over by a layman—the Court of Arches, "it goes on increasingly under episcopal regulations." The statement, which brings us back to the Brighton vicars, with whom we began, is certainly worthy of note. "Reservation," more perhaps than, certainly as much as, public devotions, marks, for an Anglican, a distinct phase of his belief in the Real Presence of our Blessed Lord in the Divine Sacrament of the Altar. Public devotions apart, he is led, by an inevitable spiritual logic, if one may say so, from Reservation to adoration of his "present Lord." It was, indeed, just because they believed the prohibition of public devotion necessarily signified a doubt of the reality of that Presence, and, consequently, a prohibition of the adoration due to It, that the Brighton vicars, as we have seen, found the step they have taken plain and unavoidable.

In this case, however, as we have been led back to it, it is only fair to give the side of those who, differing from the Brighton

vicars as to the expediency of public devotions to the "Reserved Sacrament," still find themselves conscientiously unable to take the step it has been given to the former to take. The statement shall be given in my informant's own words:

"The trouble at the two churches in Brighton," he said, "is that should have been avoided. The Bishop [of Chichester] has finally laid it down that the question at issue is not Reservation for the sick and dying, but the use of the Reserved Sacrament in extra-liturgical services [Benediction] which have not his sanction. He claims that such prohibition is vested in his office, and has nothing to do with belief or acts touching the nature of the Blessed Sacrament or the Adoration due to our Lord therein."

Now, whatever force there may or may not be, even from an Anglican point of view, in the foregoing contention, and, given a real belief in the validity of the Anglican episcopate, there is much to be said for it; it may at least serve to account, in no small degree, for the conscientious inability of those who hold it to follow their belief to its logical conclusion, and to seek, in the Church of God, authority for a devotion which official Anglicanism disapproves and discourages, even when it does not openly condemn it.

If there is any one secondary doctrine, as, presumably, it may be called among those held as de fide, which is dearer to Catholics than perhaps any other, it is that Invocation of Saints which follows, naturally, on belief, both in the communion and in the nutual intercession of saints. "This question," my informant proceeded, "will very likely occupy some attention in the near future." Even the partial vision of the Church to which devout Anglicans have attained, has, that is to say, entailed what we may justly hold to be its inevitable spiritual consequences, "Church of England people," according to the same authority, "who are informed on the subject, are very firm in holding that they cannot part from the rest of Christendom in this respect."

The use of the term "Christendom," in the foregoing paragraph, as evidently connoting Catholic Christendom, and Catholic Christendom only, is worthy of note, as indicating precisely that attitude of mind which is the natural result of any, even partial, realization of communion, actual or desired, with the one Church of Christ. In other words, a man cannot believe himself to be a Catholic, a member of a Church now, or to be, an integral portion of Catholic Christendom, without coming to realize, in even larger, and fuller, measure, the obligations, as well as the privileges and graces, which such fellowship entails, as of spiritual necessity. Dayout Anglicans, therefore, who, beginning with, or rather arriving at, the "Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation," put their belief, more or Jess openly.

into practice, come by the most inevitable of Divine processes to understand that on no doctrine held as of faith can they consistently "part from the rest of (Catholic) Christendom."

The point is, of course, only one more illustration of the "spiritual inevitableness" of the whole Reunion movement; given the two indispensable factors, good will and the grace of God. It is not without interest, therefore, to students of hymnology especially, and to those familiar with the use and influence of this most ancient vehicle of popular devotion and instruction, to learn that it is to certain hymnals that the growth of Invocation of Saints among Anglicans may, humanly speaking, be said to be due.

The place and the work of the laity have been, even among ourselves, subjects of much discussion during recent years. The "Representative Church Council," however, consisting of Bishops, clergy and laymen, is an institution peculiarly Anglican. And while, rates" is a purely "clerical" policy. Here, at all events, is direct carefully guarded, and it cannot meddle with doctrine or discipline," there can be no doubt, as he proceeded to show, that "those among the Bishops and particular clergy whose sympathies are more Erastian than Catholic, thought that this Council would be a kind of breakwater against the advancing tide of the Catholic movement."

The Anglican episcopate, that is to say, unpleasantly it is dimly aware that in sanctioning certain "ritual divergencies," and, most of all, "devotion to the Blessed Sacrament," they have let loose a force which they are spiritually unable to comprehend or control, the force of a living, active belief, and of a definite end to be attained, have endeavored, more suo, to oppose the vis inertice of "safe churchmanship," of the respectable lay variety, especially, to a movement which, to their consternation, they find to be growing popular with the laity, and not merely a fad of "irresponsible curates." The success which has attended their efforts may be gathered from certain observations to be quoted, presently, from the authority to whom I am so greatly indebted. It may here be remarked in passing that neither moderation nor safe churchmanship, being constitutionally timid, could be expected to withstand the onward march of men who, having become conscious of their heritage, and within sight of their goal, are returning "with songs to Zion,"

The question actually at issue between the Reunionists in the Church Council, the "Catholic party" and Erastian authority being one of vital interest to ourselves, no applogy need be offered for a detailed account of this phase of it. Continuing from his allusion to a breakwater, my informant proceeded to the effect that the

Erastian party "have been most grievously disappointed, as was demonstrated when the question of compromising with the State over the religious instruction in the schools came before the Council." Not merely on points of ritual, therefore, or even of doctrine, are the "Catholic party" in the Anglican communion engaged in an inevitable and irreconcilable "conflict with authority," but also in respect of the very existence and preservation of dogmatic Christianity among the children of the nation. It surely follows that our sympathies in this matter also will necessarily be with those whose aim is akin to ours, no less than the principles on which they seek to attain it.

"The policy of surrender and compromise advocated by the Archbishops and a great majority of the Bishops," my informant went on, "was defeated by the vote of the laymen by three to one." It is a common assertion that the attempt "to put religion on the rates" is a purely "clerical" policy. Here, at all events, is direct proof to the contrary. The Bishops, true to their traditions as Court officials, whether under Constantine, Henry VIII, or Louis XIV., were prepared, as usual, to compromise anything or anybody, even to the souls of the children, "for the sake of peace;" it was the ordinary clergy who, by a vote of two to one, and the laity, by a majority of three to one, defeated this policy of betrayal. When the chief shepherds err, where shall the flock find guidance? And if they err on so vital a point as this, what confidence shall the flock continue to have in them? It is not, surely, claiming too much to assert that this also must be looked upon as a vital and most marked stage in the Reunion movement. Conflict with authority, even with an authority nominally spiritual, was, we may say, never so abundantly justified as in this instance. It was characteristic of the Times that it should attribute this victory to the English Church Union.

Nor will the following, under the circumstances indicated, elicit any surprise on the part of those who know something of the force of ideas and of enthusiasm. "Attempts have since been made"—I continue my quotations—"by various means, to weaken the Catholic character of the Council." Naturally, authority does not look favorably on revolt, least of all on religious revolt, however strong the provocation, nor do Anglican Bishops, still less English politicians, approve of "insubordination," whether of the lower clergy or of the laity. And being aware of the motives, the "Catholic principles" underlying the revolt, authority, episcopal and constitutional, to say nothing of journalistic, set itself to ecraser l'infame, "Catholicism," to wit, in the stronghold it had captured.

"The Council," my informant proceeded, "has met once since

the election of the last Houses of Convocation and the last Houses of Laymen. Those who take an interest in its work looked forward with some interest as to what the Council would be like after the election. The Catholic party carried their resolution *nem con*." Is it too much to say, in view of all this, that the "Catholic party" having become the strongest in the Anglican communion, the Reunion movement has entered upon a new and very important phase. If the laity are losing, or have lost confidence in their Bishops over so vital a matter as the religious instruction of the young, who shall presume to say to what end that want of confidence, in the Providence of God, must eventually lead them?

Next only in the hearts of Catholics to the Invocation of Saints which is, as already said, the inevitable outcome of belief in the Communion of Saints, is the "pious practice of praying for the dead," which, likewise, springs trom the same belief, and is founded on it. "Attempts to stop this practice (in the Church of England) have," according to my informant, "failed utterly," and he instanced, in support of this, the change of public attitude toward "requiem services" in the all-too-few years that elapsed between the death of Queen Victoria and that of King Edward VII. The logic of Catholic doctrine and practice has, we may say, in this respect also, begun to appeal, ever more and more forcibly to devout hearts in the wilderness of Anglicanism. Here, also, they cannot afford to "part from the rest of (Catholic) Christendom." The cry of souls beyond the veil, of souls robbed for three long, bitter centuries of Masses, alms and suffrages, is making itself heard in the land that was once Mary's Dowry. Shall it not enter, also, into the ears of the Lord of Hosts, and, with Mary's prayers, the prayers of England's saints and martyrs, restore England to that unity which so many of her best and most pious sons and daughters long for, pray for and labor for?

The printed matter in connection with this subject is, as may be supposed, very considerable, but does not, except in certain details, to be here more or less briefly referred to, add in any important respect to the foregoing verbal information. It may be noted, then, that since the English Church Union, by the admission of its opponents, has played a large part of late years especially, in transforming the spirit and changing the outlook of Anglicanism, it is not without interest to learn that it increased, by over four thousand members, between January, 1909, and January, 1910. These additional members may justly be taken as supporters of the Union's policy, herein referred to, a policy which may be summed up as one of defense of "Catholic doctrine and practice," even in cases where such defense open and active "conflict with episcopal

authority." It is a policy which, however inconceivable in the case of Catholics, is not in the conditions and circumstances of the Anglican communion, by any means without excuse and apparent justification. Most especially is this true where authority goes astray, from whatever motive, on so vital an issue as religious instruction in elementary schools. There is, then, and can be, no possible question of a disputed or disputable interpretation of sixteenth century formulas, no question, even in the ordinary sense, of dogma, but the one supreme issue of God's place in the training and education of the young.

"The aim of Anglo-Catholics," it is stated, in one of the pamphlets sent me, "is this and nothing else—The restoration of spiritual religion." To the Catholic who knows that only in and by the sacramental system of God's Church can the spiritual life of the human soul be rightly nourished, strengthened and developed in its true, Christlike perfection, an aim so stated by those who, however imperfectly, are set on attaining it on Catholic principles, cannot but be a subject of interest and prayerful sympathy. "England and Scotland," the writer continues, "are alike suffering unspeakably from the lack of spiritual religion. ..., A sense of sin . . . is gone." That, we may add, is but the inevitable consequence of the revolt against the divine authority of God's Church, and if "Anglo-Catholics," working, as has been just now said, however imperfectly, on Catholic principles, shall take their share of restoring all things in Christ, who shall say them, nay? "He that is not against us is on our part."

With some references to a speech by Lord Halifax, the president of the English Church Union, at the beginning of the jubilee year of that society (June, 1909), we may fittingly bring this account of "Reunion from an Anglican point of view" to a conclusion. Passing over his remarks on the education question, the spoliation of the Welsh dioceses and the marriage laws, we note, in reference to Prayer Book revision, that while "there are changes in the Prayer Book we should all like to see effected," and while, "it would also be of incalculable advantage to the Church of England, if the use of the First Prayer Book of Edward VI. could be more generally permitted.

These are not the changes that have been proposed. Nor is this the time to attempt what would be in itself desirable."

But it is with Lord Halifax's views on Reunion that we are here chiefly concerned, bearing always in mind that his views are to

This book may be studied with advantage as indicating the scope of His Lordship's "Catholicity." Also Bishop Gasquet, "Edward VI and the Book of Common Prayer."

all intents and purposes, those of the Union over which for more than forty years he has exercised as president such incalculable and unquestioned influence. The whole passage<sup>2</sup> is of such intense interest that I have ventured, in the subjoined note, to recommend my readers to procure it and study it for themselves. "We have come to see," he says, that "when two truths we acknowldege appear to contradict one another, it is not our business to attempt a reconciliation of them by a modification of either;" a statement which may perhaps serve to explain the speaker's loyalty to his own communion, while admitting, to a very large, if not to the fullest extent, the claims de jure divino of the Holy See. "It is in the recognition," he proceeds, "of the truth of both claims, and our consequent duties in "regard to both of them, that we shall most effectually pave the way for that future reunion of Christendom which is the unceasing object of our prayers."

... "Our desire for reunion," he says in a later passage, "and our sense of its importance must (obviously) be largely dependent on our conception of the Church, and our belief as to what constitutes the Church." Since, therefore, it is still the fashion, in some quarters, to charge Lord Halifax and his friends with holding the "branch theory of Christendom," the following is deserving of careful attention. "The first thing that I would wish to suggest," he continues, "in reference to our conception of the Church, is how completely certain theories have broken down ... which certainly implied the existence of more than one Church. Now, apart from the fact that those who recite the Creed are bound to believe in one Church and one Church only, such theories inevitably lead to disaster, as all theories must which are not founded upon facts." That, surely, seems a long way from the ordinarily received view of the "branch" theory. But the passage of greatest and most immediate interest, the passage that sums up the whole philosophy, if one may call it so, of Reunion from an Anglican point of view, is the following: "The essence of the Church, he says, "is not in its submission to a certain form of government, or even in its profession of a certain faith; it is in its relation to a Person, and as such it depends on our relation to that Person, and our union with Him." Leaving it to the theor logians to decide the force or lawfulness of the above contention, which returns, as will be seen, to an earlier, and less formal, statement of a similar vature, it is plain to the merest layman that here is a conception which—so far as Lord Halifax and his friends are concerned needs only to be rightly realized, on true Catholic prin-

<sup>\*</sup> Address of 1909, p. 17, squ. (E. C. U., 31 Russell Square, London, English and viroure) climb as well state appropriate the appropriate the most with which the appropriate the most substitute of the square of the state of th

ciples, in order to make the outward reunion of all souls conscious of their union, whether sacramental or otherwise, with our Blessed Lord, a divine and inevitable necessity. Ille enim est Pax noster.

FRANCIS W. GREY.

Ottawa, Ontario.

Note.—The following pamphlets, which may be obtained from the secretary of the English Church Union, 31 Russell Square, London, England, may be consulted with advantage: "The Reunion of Christendom," 1895; "Addresses," by Lord Halifax, 1902, 1907, 1909, etc.; 1902, "Catholic Unity," is especially valuable.

## BALLAD INFLUENCE ON MIRACLE PLAYS.

It is impossible that anything should be universally tested and approved by a multitude, though they are only the rabble of a nation, which has not in it some peculiar aptness to please and gratify the mind of man.—Addison.

I UMAN emotion has had many and varied modes of revealing itself. The communal dance with its clang of rude musical instruments was an early attempt to give adequate expression to the tribal mind. Joy, grief and hatred had each its appropriate dance-manner, and in response to it the hearts of all were made glad, sorrowful or aflame.

With advancement in civilization this outward manifestation was gradually limited to individual actors, who by dance and song exposed the innermost feelings, aspirations and ideals of the community. They repeated the songs which were dear to all, with such variations as might be ratified by the common taste. This necessity of popular approval established at once the distinctive racial character of early song. Individual expression blended with the dominant note of general appreciation, or, rather, it never rose out of the common din as a separate emotional force.

In those days each listener found a full realization of his emotional tendencies in some part of the general manifestation. The expression was so artless, so natural and so spontaneous that it awoke a ready response in the untutored minds of peoples not yet developed in musical perception. It must be remembered, too, that even the earliest songs were the prototypes of the popular ballad of more advanced civilization, and that the success of the latter was due largely to the scope it gave to the play of the purely emotional quality unimpeded by the check of intellect. Emotion is to-day, as it was then, the initial force of all art, but there is this difference, that while formerly the appreciation of music was merely kaleido-

scopic—a sudden impulsive flash without intellectual action—it is now permanent and subject to critical analysis.

The present essay is not concerned with this later development. Neither can it enter into the much disputed question of the origin of folk-song, except to point out when necessary the conclusion of scholars who have made this particular phase an object of special investigation. Folk-tales, whether in verse or prose, took their rise in the demand for a reawakening of past experiences in the progress of the hunt or in the heat of battle. This fondness for the vivid recollection of past deeds of valor explains the popularity of the war song and accounts for the fascination of the fireside narrative. In both the element of rhythm was doubtless introduced as an aid to memory. It was the preponderance of the rhythmic which gradually differentiated the ballad from folk-tale, allowing the latter to dilate upon the incidents of its story and weave about the lives of its heroes whatever of glory or of shame might add to the effectiveness of the recital.

It may be that these recitals were fragments of national epics, but since it required a Homer to unite them, they retained a separable individuality as pieces of ballad literature. As such they were subjected to the varying influences which effect the literary expression of nations. Literature, whether clothed in the form of prose or poetry, is always the handicraft of imagination, rather than of reflection. It aims to give the greatest possible pleasure to the national taste and appeals to the general rather than particular and specialized knowledge. The science of literary development rests on the fundamental principles of social evolution, individual growths and the influence of environment upon the communal and individual life of a people.

Social evolution expresses the many recorded facts which prove a progress of human society from smaller and less organized to larger and more complex social systems. It does not mean that this progress has had everywhere similar or anywhere an orderly and continuous advance. Fixity, retrogression and disorder have each a place in the history of human society. Nevertheless, there has been a distinctive advance from primitive to more complete and adequate adjustment as the march of civilization pressed on. In this movement the clan took the initial step. Through the amalgamation of many communal interests there was formed a more or less complex social system embracing in a central government not only those bound by ties of kinship, but even those affected merely by local contiguity. Fortunately, it is not necessary to insist upon an exact social classification, for it would be found that the groups which form society do not possess a perfectly defined out-

line any more than the scientific classifications of biology or geology. every literature, and particularly so in the early stages of folk-song formation. The relativity of literature must be considered in the light of social evolution. Together they are able to search out the mystic bond which unites the varying expression of a nation's development. So great has been this diversity of self-expression that the very definition of literature assumes new aspects as the periods of social, mental and spiritual growth unfold. In this gradual upbuilding all the nice discriminations relative to time and sound have been incorporated to show forth beauty and strength in the attractive garb of fitly chosen language.

Since the Renaissance the theory of literary continuity has been growing rapidly, and it is now quite generally agreed that literature is but the expression of a nation's soul. Carlyle made bold to say that the nations awoke to song as does the world when sunrise breaks upon it, but few have followed his dictum. It is true that the creative genius must be found to give expression to a nation's thought, but whether he be seer or poet, much has been given him from the overflowing treasury of the nation's life. outside influence have been put forth in an attempt to show that little can be expected in a literary way without the perils of war and the far-famed heroism of defense. Thus it is argued that the Crusades gave rise to the scenic representation of the play cycles, that the songs of Celtic bards were heard by Caedmon in his lowly cowshed. To mark out with dogmatic precision the supposed stages of literary development has become the pleasant occupation of a host of theorists who are ready to champion anything which still retains the fascinating character of the exceptional. To say that the tribal battle ballad existed for centuries in the wild gesticulations of a savage throng as yet unable to vocalize their emotion; that it passed through such and such periods of lingual modifications before reaching the rhythmic elements may be consistent with the evolutionary theory of Mr. Gummere, but it can hardly convince one who listens to the crooning of primitive motherhood or to the grief wail of tribal mourning.

It is generally conceded that the makers of early song were the unconscious instructors of the great host of writers, whether in prose or poetry, which took up later the gigantic task of registering the throbbing heartbreaks of an awakening world. The clansmen who "spake with naked hearts together" found in the cadence of tribal song a fascinating and often a reforming influence. It expressed those deeper emotions which their individual powers had refused to voice in a satisfactory or adequate manner. In doing

<sup>1 &</sup>quot;Critical and Miscellaneous Essays," Vol. II., p. 275.

Yet it is true that each of these social units has left its mark in so it laid the foundation for epic grandeur in the souls of coming nations.

The pleasure of rhythmic song and the excitement consequent upon the communal dance were not, of course, the first leasing passions experienced by untutored peoples. A constant proportion may be braced in the development of a nation between multiplicity of desire and advance in civilization. In the beginning physical needs take precedence over all others. Hunting expeditions in the hope of procuring food hold the first place. With this secured, all their wants seem satisfied. A return of hunger will demand other hunting exploits, the inclemency of the weather and the attacks of wild beasts will force them to seek shelter in some rude-fashioned huts; but not until the tribe has realized a feeling of security and occasional respite from the fatigue of the chase and the accidents of war will there come the more elevated pleasures which music inspires.

It is here that students of the popular ballad often part company; some to follow the theory of gradual development, others to enter the less restricted region of poetic spontaneity. Perhaps a middle course can be taken which will not outrage either the laws of mental and moral progress or the possibilities of poetic impulse. It is too much to say that the gleemen contributed their share of festive occasions by singing snatches of stolen song, that they were compelled to wait through weary years of slow development before they produced an adequate expression of life's aspirations.

Whatever the origin of the ballad, there is little room to doubt that its acceptance by the people was due to the element of truth which each contained. Fiction has never held the popular mind to any extent. Even the learned verse had to give way to recitals of deeds of valor and exploits of daring which came nearer the hearts of the people and gave a dignity to the happenings of an everyday life. So when the bureau at Shiffnal yielded up into the hands of Dr. Percy its precious folio volume of ballads the common people of England but came to their own.

The Reliques of Ancient English Poetry focused the attention of the literary world at once. Following close upon the rigid formality of the classical age, they won enthusiastic admiration on account of their direct diction and simple verse forms. They were not without strong, natural pathos, and the romantic incidents which they narrated appealed to the public taste. The editions of Scott, contributed to the general interest. Scott's collection, which he appropriately styled "The Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border," bore evident traces of the editor's poetic talent, but these emenda-

tions were undoubtedly happy, inasmuch as they made presentable what must have appeared rude and distasteful to the literati of that day.

Percy's collection, however, has held its place as the most renowned edition owing to the fact that its publication effected such a revolution in literary taste. The alterations which he made out of deference to the prevailing standard passed for some time unnoticed, and it was not until Coleridge, Southey and Wordsworth had readjusted public sentiment that the alterations were suspected.

The English and Scottish ballads took their rise from certain poetic forms already existing. England had had the sacred lyrics of the religious play cycle, and it may be supposed that some verses heard during the pageant days were adapted to meet the demand for less reverential song. This is but a conjecture, but since the Latin hymns of the Church were often subjected to such modifications, it seems more than likely that the less sacred songs used in the miracle plays received similar transformations. In thus departing from the strictly religious purpose of the mediæval play cycle the popular versifiers aimed to incorporate the patriotic and romantic elements of English history. The exploits of King Horn and the Romance of Havelok were among the most popular, but these soon gave place to more wonderful accounts, which were far beyond the measure set by the old chroniclers and sanctioned by popular tradition.

The reason for this change is to be found in the fact that the more imaginative mind of the French Court had been called upon to invent new viands for the delectation of English readers. Thus we have the Round Table series, written from the Court of Henry II. of France, by Englishmen, with a view to delight the nobility and having as an effect the strengthening of England's martial spirit. When the common people refused to listen to these, written as they were in prose, the ballad singers made the stories serve the general taste by converting them into broadsides. In response to the popular demand the ballad gradually turned to the narration of incidents connected with famous persons well known to the populace and possessing some characteristic trait which met the universal approval of the people. The Robber Knight of Sherwood Forest was easily the leader in popular fancy, and the story of his expeditions found a ready sympathy in the hearts of toiling England.

The ballads of England are too genuine in rude sentiments to be ranked with the exaggerated fabliaux of the troubadours; rather are they to be likened to the stronger Sagas of the Norseland. Entirely lacking in that decorous sublimity which so well reflected Spanish sense of religious fervor, the English ballad bears a contrasted relation to the great body of Spanish romance. Their place in ballad poetry may be for these reasons but secondary. They represent the ideals of the English nation in rapidly moving scenes of vigorous activity, unhampered by epic prolixity or softened by a too frequent occurrence of lyric melody.

Since the time of Aristotle the great types of poetry have been referred to as epic, lyric and dramatic. Not that any one contends that there are examples of each which can be called pure specimens of its class, for all concede that poetry blends so easily with the varied hue of genius as to cause at times a momentary departure from the prevalent form. In order, then, to rightly classify a poem we must discover the purpose of the author. We must know what relation it has to his personality, what materials are represented in the poem itself, and, finally, what literary form has been chosen for the expression of the contents.

Dramatic effect postulates the complete submersion of the author's personality. The drama is concerned with things objective. In this it is in direct contrast to the lyric which sings of thoughts which lie close to the heart of the writer. The epic narrates the deeds of others: 'tis the record which an impersonal reporter presents.

It is to be noticed that the drama is concerned with the subject matter which constitutes the epic. Every epic has the seeds of many small dramas bound up in folds of narrative action. needs but the portrayal of character through the actors themselves, with added rapidity of action, more frequent change of scene, less protracted suspense and greater climatic effect. Then, too, the drama presents a present picture, one on which the actors speak for themselves in words or actions. The dramatic form has for its characteristic features scenic arrangement and dialogue. Whether drama be in prose or poetry, the latter at least must be considered an essential. It is dialogue which clothes scenery with a special meaning and saves action from being mere pantomime.

The Church had found that it was impossible to extirpate the deeply rooted love for show and scenic display, and so a concession was made in favor of the popular sentiment. For this purpose the Church introduced the ecclesiastical plays which we meet with in mediaeval Europe up to the eleventh century, in England, France, in mediæval Europe up to the eleventh century, in England, France, the people by scenic representations interesting to the taste of the time, were hailed as welcome auxiliaries of the Church in her combat with heathen influence.

It was a happy thought to thus educate an unlearned people



<sup>2 &</sup>quot;Ballad Stories of the Affections." 3 "Poetics," p. 60.
Columbus, Ohio.

through their senses. The duty of preaching was always recognized, but it extended now to more than a verbal discourse. Dramatic performances, which were within the comprehension of all, made the historical events of the life of the Saviour more intelligible to rude minds. As time went on not only episodes from the life of Christ, but also many from the lives of the saints were added and represented on certain festivals. The plays embraced the whole history of Christ and His Church. They were written in Latin at first, but as they grew in popular favor the vernacular was substituted. In form and points of development the plays were almost the same in all countries, yet as the difference in language became more marked the plays themselves assumed a different shape and character according to the place in which they were produced. The Church strove to retain the essential religious atmosphere when the plays became popular, but relinquished her direct control. The drama passed into the open market-place and began a new life in its purpose to spread a knowledge of the Scripture narrative throughout the world.

It must not be supposed that mediæval drama took its rise solely from religion. In England especially many other factors must be considered. The war spirit and the feudal lord had their share. While religion aimed at religious and moral instruction, the populace, represented by their landlords, the leaders in war and festive cheer, demanded greater laxity of discipline, and thus the humorous element found so frequently in the ballads of a later day were introduced.

This lessening of the serious didactic element was in response to the original heart-call of the people. Led away for a time into the solemn sanctuary of religious contemplation by the presentation of purely sacred scenes, the less devout became restless under the restraint and called out for more amusement. This demand revealed the fact that the old folk-song spirit still survived, that the time was near at hand when the popular taste would welcome the versified stories which had been told in language dear to the common heart by the long neglected "Knitters in the Sun." With the revival of the folk customs came the burlesque, mimicries of the Festa-Jocularia, a series of entertainments in which was found more of the ludicrous than would be considered decorous in this our own day.

It cannot be doubted that the religious plays of the early mediæval period has a marked influence in fostering the dramatic instincts of the English people. With this aspect accepted, one may expect to find a distinctive dramatic element in the popular pastimes which accompanied the play cycles.

The ballad affords a satisfactory realization of this expectation.

It has in full measure the distinguishing character of the impersonal. The Child collection, if we accept the Robin Hood cycle, may be said to be wholly impersonal. Of course, in the purely historical and mythical ballads the writer is more frequently present than in those which are concerned with romantic adventures and the weird manifestations of the preternatural. Even when the ballad begins with some sort of appeal to the audience, such as calling for respectful interest in the theme of the singer, there is not brought forth an individuality sufficiently pronounced to attract attention away from the plot. There is no suggestion of an author separate and distinct from the main story in which all are concerned. This is evident in the absence of special elaboration particular to individual art. Essentially dramatic, then, is the ballad in all that relates to impersonal presentation.

The subject matter of the ballad has a similar dramatic note. The action is always concerned with the deeds, hopes and aspirations of men. In this arena conflicting interests battle for supremacy, and the outcome, though in the beginning evenly doubtful and sometimes uncertain well on throughout the action, is in the end satisfactorily complete and decisive. The impetuous rapidity of the action is a distinctive mark of the dramatic movement. Little or no attention is given to the details; all the field is alive with great deeds and momentous results. In the typical ballad a main line of action is preserved and the principal characters occupy the attention constantly. In the best the unities are observed and the story goes on to a successful denouement, unimpeded by the ornate prolixity of the epic. Buchanan<sup>2</sup> makes mention of the strong climactic effect when in the Danish ballad. The Twin Sisters, the daughters appear in the scene with the murderer of their father. Perhaps the most touching of dramatic scenes found in ballad poetry is that pictured in Lord Randal when the curse descends upon the deceiving stepmother. In this, as in the other ballads with strong dramatic leanings, there is a startling alignment of hostile interests.

The dramatic form is at once discernible in many popular ballads. The ballad Germine is in dialogue throughout and affords at least five scenes, each with well-defined settings. Scenic structure is apparent in such ballads as The Laird of Warriston, Mary Hamilton, Hind Horn and many others. While the monologue is extensively made use of, the more vivid effects are brought out by means of direct and often impassioned dialogue. All this must mean that the dramatic is essentially a well-defined characteristic of most ballad poetry and that when the heart of a people is voiced in folksong it is sure to remain true to its dramatic impulses.

As a consequence, dialogue can be found in almost every ballad. If it does not open the action, it is introduced after the objective narrative has prepared its way. Even though the incidents are related, care is exercised to introduce the hero in monologue that the dramatic effect may not be omitted.

Whether or not the ballad singers really acted the several parts indicated by the lialogue is conjectural. By force of hypothesis, Mr. Gummere, should hold that they did, though he denies this to the ballads of Lord Randal and Edward.\* For when one considers that ballad poetry presents elements of dialogue narrative, scenic situations and character portrayal, it is hard to understand how some relationship to the drama can be denied to this particular species of popular expression. In the case of the Battle of Chevy Chase and that of Otterbourne patriotic pride supplies a motive; the great families of Douglas and Percy with their retainers contribute the living, active, fiercely passionate dramatis personæ, and as to effect, the moon-lit fields, with their honored dead, speak louder than the most eloquent declamation. The opening words of both poems bespeak a contest, and in the passion of accumulated wrongs it is evident at the outset that action, rapid and decisive, is to occupy the centre of the stage. Just enough dialogue is used to save the dramatic character. In the fury of such contests long speeches are out of place, since they would of necessity impede the progress of the fight.

The most characteristic feature of these two ballads, and the one which makes most for dramatic effect, is the constant appeal to the feud spirit of the borderland. Throughout each this thought seems uppermost and gives a distinctively dramatic tone to the ballads.

That diversity and intensification may contribute their share to the dramatic effect of a composition it is necessary that special stress be laid on some leading thought, with constantly recurring but always varying conditions. In music this is secured by the control of symphonic themes within the strict limits of harmonic environment. That this be successfully accomplished in the less constrained domain of poetry, some repetition, either expressed or implied, must demand the attention of the reader. In the confessedly dramatic ballad, *The Nut-brown Maid*, this quality is secured by the anticipation of the constantly recurring lines:

For in my mind, of all mankind I love but you alone.

The comprehensiveness of the story-contest of *Chevy Chase* and the *Battle of Otterbourne*, which enfolds the whole arsenal of border warfare, is certainly most striking when one remembers

that relativity of interests is not lost, but even strengthened by the wide scope indudged in by the respective writers. This situation is well sustained throughout these two ballads and gives to them the quality of suspense which is an ever-present characteristic of the drama. The outcome of the contest is the cause of the suspense in each case. In selecting what would surely produce the greatest suspense, the ballad writers followed the first and best instincts of the true dramatist. Perhaps no better differentiation can be made distinguishing literary forms such as the lyric, ballad and romance than one based upon the absence or relative presence of suspense. The pure lyric type has nothing of suspense, since it is concerned with subjective moods. The ballad knows suspense as an aid to dramatic effect, while the romance welcomes it as the interest-holding element of its narrative.

Chevy Chase and the Battle of Otterbourne are plainly the result not of discursive reasoning, but of emotion. They are the rapid, passionate expression of national patriotism and orderly, consistent revelation of racial strife. In them the processes of dramatic emotion unfold with cumulative violence. The devotion which binds every man to Douglas is equaled by the trusting faith which surrounds Percy. Equal in fealty, they are not found deficient in valor, and the greatest triumph of the singers is manifestly this, that foeman met a worthy foe and that victory for one meant nothing of dishonor for the other.

From the lives of men such as these there flowed a constant stream of soul-stirring incidents which filled up the hearts of the people and gradually found an outlet in the ballads. The writers of Chevy Chase and the Battle of Otterbourne kept well within the domain of dramatic impulse when they chose to limit the action to the most frequent cause of border warfare. Conflict is the main feature of the dramatic action. In this the ballad writers but followed the accepted diction of all drama. Œdipus, who battled with the contending forces of an unrelenting fate; Hamlet set about with conflicting circumstances, restless between resolve and execution; the clash of governmental principles worked out to a tragic consummation in Julius Cæsar—all these go to prove that that which has the leading emphasis in the ballads is a quality which will be found essential to all dramatic forms.

The nature of this quality of conflict is singularly complex in these border ballads. The struggle has its roots in national pride, but from this it branches out until, coincident with defense of country, the whole range of family and private interests has been covered. It is this which secures for both ballads a dramatic unfolding of incidents. At first the interest centres upon the com-

petitive valor of the opposing forces. Gradually the attention is called away from the general contest to the combat of the leaders who fight with spectacular fierceness. It is at this point that the unexpected is introduced with consummate skill, for when the opposing hero falls, instead of his misfortune ending the battle, the victor turns from blood to sentiments of highest chivalry, and that which was a moment ago a field of uncontrolled passion is transformed for a time into a pathetic tableau of genuine emotion.

This rapid transition from passion to considerate regard has special signification when it is remembered that it was an exact interpretation of border life. This harmony with the habits of the people constituted the strongest claim for popular appreciation which the ballads possessed and emphasized in a marked degree the approval given them. The daily experience of the borderland was graphically outlined in the progress of the ballad narrative. The fact that it was made grander and of more remarkable consequence did not in any way lessen its attractiveness in the eyes of the people. It but placed in successful execution the hopes which filled the turbulent breast of the borderland—that the foe might be humbled and one party rule triumphant over the marshlands.

The debt which drama owes to the ballad has been acknowledged by Horace in a line which Dryden thus adapts:

Thespis, the first professor of our art, At country wakes sung ballads from a cart.

Putting aside the evident anachronism in regard to the portable stage, the testimony of Horace to the effect that the ballad yielded enough of the dramatic to satisfy the needs of the Father of the Drama is enough to justify the ballad writers in the full use of dramatic elements.

Judged by the then existing standards, the course of the two ballads, Chevy Chase and the Battle of Otterbourne, was kept within the bounds of reasonable retaliation. Nothing of dramatic soundness gives place to theatrical effect, since the progress of the action, even when most ferocious, has always a miniature counterpart in the previous experience of the people. Every mind was a battle-field, every thought a slaughter. Above the clash of the battle-axe was heard the cry of patriotism, giving to the contestants the character of martyrs and to the cause for which they fought a dignity which is in perfect keeping with the best specimens of dramatic art.

Francis O'Neill. O. P.

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## ST. NICOLAS HERMANSON.

HE last Swedish saint to be canonized was St. Nicolas Hermanson,\* the holy Bishop of Lincoping, who lived during the latter half of the fourteenth century, but was so celebrated for his sanctity and for the number of miracles reputed to him, that his cause was brought before Pope Martin V. thirty-six years after his death.

He was born at Skening, a small town in Sweden, not very far from Wadstena, where stood the great Bridgettine monastery, that in the middle ages was the centre of Catholic life in Sweden. Skening was also the birthplace of another very holy man, a contemporary of Nicolas Hermanson, Father Peter Olafson, the friend and confessor of St. Bridget of Sweden.

The parents of Nicolas were not rich, but they were pious people, and seem to have sent their son to school to some monastery within reach of their home, for we are told the boy was so studious and so fond of his books that he sometimes forgot to eat his dinner and supper, and that his mother was so indignant with him for so doing that she often punished him for it. It was evidently a day school to which the future Bishop was sent, and his mother possibly, like other ignorant people, despised learning as waste of time. Most of the monasteries and cathedrals in Norway and Sweden and also in Denmark had schools attached to them in the middle ages, to which the boys of the neighborhood were sent to be educated by the monks. If the pupils showed a vocation for either the religious life or the priesthood, they were either received in these monasteries as novices or sometimes the monks or canons encouraged the clever ones to go to some university, very often to Paris and when Cambridge was founded to Cambridge.

Nicolas may have had another reason for neglecting his meals; perhaps it was not only love of study that made him do so, for very early in life he developed a great love of fasting and other austerities, which won him the respect of his neighbors and companions.

When he had finished his education he was made tutor to the sons of St. Bridget of Sweden, and he went to Upland to live in her husband's, Prince Ulf, beautiful castle, where the life must have been a great contrast to that of his own modest home. At this time Ulf and St. Bridget, who had a large family, lived in great state and had a large retinue of servants and courtiers, for every Swedish noble had at that time a court of his own and administered justice to his servants and dependents, who included most of his neighbors of less rank than the nobility.

De Vita Sancti Nicolai, edited by Henrik Schuck. Harleian MSS.

Prince Ulf was very fond of hunting and gave large hunting parties, and both he and St. Bridget entertained a great deal, all of which must have been very distasteful to the quiet, devout, studious tutor, but he had a congenial friend in St. Bridget, who also despised the pleasures of the world and spent a great deal of her time in prayer and in visiting the poor and tending the sick, and fasted quite as strictly as even Nicolas Hermanson could have wished.

He could not have failed to have been edified at the life led by St. Bridget, who although in the world was not of it, and who brought up her children devoutly, taking the little girls with her to visit the poor and sick. St. Nicolas' two pupils were the two elder sons, Charles and Birger; they were very different in character. Charles was a very handsome, high-spirited, harum-scarum youth, fond of horses and hunting and caring little for study, very selfwilled and passionate and utterly spoiled by his father, Prince Ulf, who was proud of his handsome son and of his manly tastes. Birger, on the other hand, was plain and of a very devout and studious disposition, devoted to his mother and amenable to discipline, while his elder brother no doubt gave the young tutor a good deal of trouble. One day Nicolas asked St. Bridget to pray to our Lord for him, that he might know what His will was for him, and the saint afterwards told him that it had been revealed to her by our Lady in prayer that he would one day be Bishop of Lincoping, and would be the first to introduce her new order into the monastery of Wadstena. Nicolas could not believe that such a dignity was in store for him, but St. Bridget used laughingly to call him "her Bishop," although at the time he was not in holy orders. As Father Peter Olafson was parish priest of Skening, Nicolas must often have been to confession to him, and no doubt told St. Bridget what a holy man he was, for she afterwards chose. him as her director and took him with her on her travels to Rome and the Holy Land.

After a few years Nicolas was sent to Paris to the University to study the liberal arts, as they called secular education then, but he soon had himself transferred to the other side and took up sacred theology and canon and civil law and made quick progress and took his degree; but, says his biographer, "what honors he achieved was never known until his death, when his diplomas were discovered in a secret drawer containing his hair-shirt and the bull of his confirmation as Bishop, in which some people had hoped certainly to find he had left his money." Soon after his return from Paris he was made Canon of Upsala and of Lincoping also, and distinguished himself in a dispute between the Friars Minor at Stockholm and the Archbishop of Upsala, who was Nicolas' uncle, in the presence

of a large gathering of prelates and magnates, before whom he silenced the friar who was sent to plead for his religious brethren. He was then promoted to the archdeaconry of Lincoping and now practiced great austerities; every Friday he fasted on bread and salt and water, and sometimes he tasted nothing from dinner on Thursday till dinner on the following Saturday, and when one of his clergy who lived with him said to him: "It is dangerous to fast as you do," he replied that he was very strong and that nothing hurt him. He very rarely took supper on the days on which it was allowed, unless some guest among his friends arrived. He wore hair-cloth continually. He was most generous in almsgiving and constantly entertained the poor, especially in Lent, and he was greatly beloved by rich and poer alike.

Besides other mendicants, he was accustomed to feed six poor scholars, who would have blushed to beg their bread, and but for his charity would have had either to do so or to starve. His counsel was much sought after, and all thought themselves happy who could obtain an interview with him, for he was most kind to all. He was never idle for a moment, but always engaged in some useful or devout occupation or in works of mercy. He was celebrated for his hospitality, which he delighted in exercising, so that it was commonly said of him: "This Archdeacon shows more hospitality than any of the Bishops," and when any one remonstrated with him for his liberality he used to say "it was better to spend the means God had given him in entertaining than to leave material behind him for his successors to go to law about." He showed maternal tenderness to the afflicted, and was frequently moved to tears and sighs at the sight of sufferings he was unable to relieve. Yet in spite of this tenderness he was very firm also, and after he was made vicar in spiritual affairs to his predecessor in the See of Lincoping, nothing, neither fear nor love, could make him swerve from justice, and he underwent many persecutions from some of the tyrannical nobles, who were very powerful and avariclous, on this account.

On one occasion, in order to help the Bishop in saving the ecclesiastical property belonging to him from the King and the kingdom, he shut himself up in the Cathedral of Lincoping to guard the valuables it contained from some of the tyrannical nobles, who watched outside to prevent any food being taken to him, hoping that hunger would compel him to leave. But a certain widow lady named Catherine de Korsnes went backwards and forwards, acting as mediatrix between the Archdeacon and the nobles and managed to smuggle food in to him. The King of Sweden at this time was Magnus Smek, who with his son Haakon, King

of Norway, then a young man, and led away by his father, were seizing the property of the Church to pay some of Magnus' debts and enable him to raise soldiers to oppose Albert of Mecklenberg, whom the Swedes desired to set upon the Swedish throne in place of Magnus, who had disgusted them by his extravagance and by the heavy taxes he levied on the people. It was in the beginning of the war with Albert of Mecklenberg that these two monarchs, anxious to raise funds to carry it on, seized on property belonging to the Church, for Haakon, though weak and easily led, was at other times generous to the Church, and both he and Magnus were careful in their religious observances, as we learn from some of the diplomatic registers. In these more than once mention is made of letters sent by Magnus and Haakon to the Pope, asking for permission to have a portable altar when they were in camp, and also for leave to have Mass said in places that were under an interdict.

Twice during the time Magnus and Haakon were robbing the Church to support the sinews of war Nicolas Hermanson had his furniture and eatables taken away from him, not necessarily or even probably by the Kings themselves, but their satellites. The Bishop of Lincoping, however, was subject to so much persecution by the Kings that he was obliged to take flight and go into exile, leaving our saint as his suffragan. Nicolas then was the only person, except some of the canons of Lincoping, who dared to oppose the Kings, and he at once excommunicated them and their accomplices; he also sent letters to the Archbishop of Upsala and his suffragans asking for assistance, for he was determined to protect the property of the Church even at the risk of his life. Magnus and Haakon then came to Skening, which is near Lincoping, and cited the Archdeacon Nicolas and one of the canons of the Cathedral to appear before them in the presence of all the barons, soldiers and military knights and the principal citizens. The two clerics appeared before this august assembly, and when the Kings had insulted them with much abuse, they demanded to know why the Archdeacon had dared to excommunicate them. "I have not excommunicated you myself. But I read a certain letter which contained your sentence of excommunication," said Nicolas, which was true. Both the monarchs then threatened him with severe punishment. "Here I stand before you," said Nicolas. "My body is in your power. Do what you like with that; my soul you are unable to touch."

Magnus and Haakon, seeing his constancy and respecting it, mitigated their avaricious demands. They, however, attempted to extort from him that when they came to Lincoping he and the

canons and some of the citizens should come out to meet them bearing lighted tapers in their hands, and with ropes round their necks and with naked feet to testify to all the people their guilt in having pronounced sentence against their majesties. When the Archdeacon and the canon with him refused to do anything of the kind, Magnus ordered them to go back to Lincoping and wait there till they came to judge what punishment should be meted out to them. A few days after, when the Kings came to Lincoping, they sent to the Cathedral, demanding that acolytes should be sent to meet them bearing lighted wax candles, Nicolas told the messengers to go back to their masters and tell them that they were not worthy to have tallow candles burned before them, much less wax. He sent this not very polite message three times, for the messengers were afraid to deliver it in its original form. When at length the Kings received it they were so furious that they sent officers to seize Nicolas the Archdeacon and burn him alive. The canons and all the other clergy of Lincoping on hearing this sent to implore the Kings not to carry out this wicked and cruel sentence, representing to them that the death of Nicolas would be a great loss to the Church. This argument had some good result, for both Magnus and Haakon were well aware in what great veneration the Archdeacon was held, and how he was reputed to be a saint, but they still insisted on his being brought before them, and Nicolas yielded so far to his clergy that he gave permission to the acolytes to carry candles before the Kings. As Nicolas entered the court of the Kings the men who had been commanded to seize and take him to the stage also entered, but as they did so by one door he managed to escape by another, and although messengers were sent on horseback to overtake him, they failed to do so, and returned worn out with fatigue after a fruitless chase. Possibly Magnus and Haakon had repented of their cruel intention and gave orders he was not to be hurt.

When Albert of Mecklenberg was elected King of Sweden, the exiled Bishop of Lincoping returned for a time to his see, but he mixed himself up in the dissensions which arose between Albert and the nobles of Sweden, for which the Archdeacon reproved and tried to correct him, but failing in his endeavor, he withdrew entirely from the Bishop, who, finding himself bereft of his support, fled into Norway and carried his case to the Apostolic See and was deposed and translated to another church. The Bishop, who seems to have been rather a weak man, was succeeded by a Dominican friar named Godscalcus, who, when he had passed scarcely a year in the episcopate, was assailed by tyrants fighting for the liberty of his Church and killed. Nicolas was then elected by the chapter

of Lincoping in his stead in the year 1374. The year before his election the news of the death of St. Bridget, who had died in Rome in July, 1373, reached Sweden, and must have grieved Nicolas Hermanson greatly, as he had known her so well, and when he was elected Bishop he must have remembered the prophecy of the saint concerning it. At first he resisted, but at length he gave his consent to his election, and went to Avignon, where the Papal Court then was, for his confirmation. The Pope at that time was Gregory XI., formerly Cardinal Roger de Beaufort, the last of the Avignon Popes, who at the instance of St. Catherine of Siena four years later moved the Papal Chair back to Rome. The Swedish nobles, knowing how strongly Nicolas Hermanson would defend the property of the Church from their avarice, were strongly opposed to his election and sent letters to the Pope to impede his consecration. But the Cardinals were so much impressed by his humility and by his eloquence in explaining that he did not desire the see for his own advancement, but only because he believed it to be for the advantage of the Church, that at length, after keeping him at Avignon six months or more, they and the Pope confirmed the appointment, and he was consecrated. He was just a year too soon in Avignon to see the great Dominican saint. Catherine of Siena, who did not arrive there to remonstrate with the Pope till the beginning of 1376. On his return to Lincoping, Nicolas, who had led a very severe life before, redoubled his austerities and also his prayers and vigils and his almsgiving.

His biographer says that on the eves of all feasts he so often fasted on bread and water only that hardly any of his servants dare ask him if he wished in fasting to abstain also from fish, and on one occasion when one of his prebends of Lincoping who looked after his temporal affairs asked him on a fast day whether he wished to abstain from fish or not, the Bishop with "pious indignation rebuked him," saying: "It is your business to have the food prepared, not to inquire what I am going to eat." For very often when the food which he had ordered was prepared and set before him he would only take bread and water. He never took more than one meal a day, nor would he sit at the common table at supper, but would go to his dormitory, even when making a visitation, and have something to drink sent him there, eating nothing. His bed was most often a bearskin spread on the floor, and frequently he slept on the bare earth, with something under his head for a pillow. Many nights he did not go to bed or lie down at all, but sitting at his books he gave himself a little sleep. He disliked putting on his episcopal robes, saying what was the use of putting on grand clothes to a body that was to be the food of worms, and that if it were open to him to choose, he would wear the roughest instead of fine clothing. He was no respecter of persons; he sternly rebuked both the great Oueen Margaret and King Albert as well as Magnus and Haakon. It was during the war between Albert the usurper and the great Danish Queen that Nicolas came into contact with them. The district round Lincoping was all affected by this war, and the battle of Falkoping, in which Margaret won such a splendid victory over her great enemy, took place if not actually in the diocese of Nicolas, at no great distance from it. The scene between him and Albert occurred in the Church of St. Olaf, Lincoping, in the presence of a great crowd of soldiers and clerics. The Bishop advanced to the King and before them all thus exhorted him: "Give us peace and justice in our land. You are our King, and it belongs to you to do this, and if you do not do so, you will be driven with shame from the kingdom. Correct yourself first, for you are unjust, a heretic and an evil liver." The King was so furious with this plain speaking that he snatched up his spear and advanced to slay the Bishop, but Nicolas, baring his breast, said: "Behold, I am ready. Strike! I have told you the truth;" and as it turned out he had, for Albert was taken prisoner in the following battle, and after spending seven years shut up in the Castle of Lindholm was forced to return to Mecklenberg and leave Margaret Oueen of the three kingdoms, which by the Union of Calmar were united under one crown.

It was most likely after this battle of Falkoping that the interview beween Nicolas and Margaret took place when Margaret was perhaps at Lincoping, or, at any rate, in the neighborhood. It seems that at some place in the diocese of Nicolas, Margaret had sent a prefect to rule over the inhabitants who was said to be the captain of a band of robbers, and the people of the place, infuriated with this man's government, rose up and slew him and sixteen of his followers. Margaret was so angry when she heard of it that she threatened to send a body of soldiers to avenge their deaths, and Nicolas, hearing of this, took the part of the inhabitants and, going to the Queen, remonstrated with her. Margaret said that no matter how hardly the prefect had treated the people they had no business to rise up and assassinate those whom she had set over them, and that they deserved punishment. The Bishop replied: "If you do this, I will excommunicate you and place your kingdom under an interdict. You send tyrants and robbers to rule over the poor, and then when they rebel you propose to destroy them utterly." The Queen, knowing that at this juncture it would be very unwise to run the risk of excommunication, eventually desisted from her purpose. We read that the good Bishop when he dined

with the great men of the kingdom, as his office sometimes compelled him to do, never then or at any other time indulged in foolish talking or joking or joined in any vain conversation, and although he never exceeded in eating or drinking, yet if out of charity to others he remained when entertaining his friends longer than usual at table, he would say, lest any one should be scandalized at the length of the meal: "Don't, my friends, follow my pernicious example and remain longer than is necessary at table." He always kept strict silence at his own table, and after the reading was finished he would exhort the traveling clergy or pilgrims or magnates, whom he frequently invited to dine with him, to make good use of the time granted them here below. When he gave a feast to the poor, though he was a Bishop, he did not hesitate before he sat down to his own food to go round and wait upon his humble guests. Frequently he would gird himself with a towel and wash the feet of the poor before he ate and then give them a large alms. He bore patiently every kind of trouble that came to him. sickness, although he sometimes suffered great pain, he was most patient, never by word or gesture showing the least irritability. When he suffered any temporal loss, as by fire, which in his day was of frequent occurrence, owing to the buildings in Sweden being built mostly of wood, he gave thanks to God that it had happened to him, who had means to repair the damage, and not to the poor, who could not have done so, but would possibly have been so impoverished that they would have starved.

He wrote many lives of the saints, particularly of St. Anne, whose cultus in the fourteenth century was very popular, especially in the north, and of Archbishop Ansgar, who first preached Christianity in Sweden, and of St. Bridget, who was canonized shortly before he died. It seems to have been the custom for the lives of the saints to have been chanted or monotoned in the church in his day, for the lives he wrote were intoned in the Cathedral of Lincoping and accepted by many other churches in many dioceses for the same purpose. By this means in days before printing was introduced the lives of the saints were published among the people. When he made his visitations and received the tithes he was most particular that his officials should not take the smallest coin, or when paid in kind the least portion more than was strictly due to him. He said his office most devoutly, and was often favored with the gift of tears during the celebration of Mass, and when he preached on the Passion he was often completely overcome by his emotion. But although he enjoyed great spiritual consolation, probably because he did, for the two go together commonly, he also suffered temptations which in those days of intense faith were attributed to the direct work of the devil, in his case said to manifest himself by noises and other external ways, which in our rationalistic and scientific time would be attributed to subjective causes such as nervous breakdown.

Whatever the terrors that beset the good Bishop may have been. whether natural or supernatural in their origin, they were sufficient to give him many sleepless nights. One instance of this given by his old biographer is so naturally and simply told that we must quote it and leave the solution of the mystery to the reader. It seems that one night the Bishop was sleeping next door to his chancellor, a canon of Lincoping named Gudherus, who from the sequel appears to have been a very sound sleeper, for he heard nothing of what disturbed our Bishop. He was awakened in the silence of the night by such a frightful noise and terrible sound of smashing in his dormitory, that all the walls seemed to tremble from the roof to the floor, and he was seized with a horrible fright. But thinking that the whole house would be shaken down, he got up and, making the sign of the cross, went out to see what had happened and from what such a terrible commotion could have proceeded. He found nothing amiss and nothing to account for what he had heard, so he attributed it to the devil, and the next morning told the canons who had not been disturbed, and said it was evident to him what the cause of the disturbance was.

In his last illness, though he was in danger of death and suffered from fever and from pain, he scarcely ever remained in bed, but went to table with his friends, and although unable to eat or drink, he would sit and talk to them of holy things. During this illness his old pupil, Birger, the son of St. Bridget, and another noble knight named Ulf Johnson, came to visit him. When at length he felt death was imminent, he asked to be carried outside his house and placed where he could see his beloved church more clearly, and there he remained for an hour weeping bitterly and silently commending his beloved Cathedral to Almighty God, the Blessed Virgin and the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul, to whom it was dedicated. He then was taken back to his house and passed quietly away to his eternal rest on the 6th of May, 1391, in the sixty-fifth year of his age and the seventeenth of his pontificate. The miracles he is reputed to have worked are so numerous that they occupy sixtyeight large pages appended to the old Latin biography of him from which the above account is partly derived. These miracles were collected to be sent to Rome for examination when his cause was introduced, and resulted in his canonization.

F. M. STEELE.

England.

## ENGLISH MONASTICISM: HOW IT PERISHED.

I HERE is probably no question over which more ink has been spilled or more misrepresentation expended than that as to the character and condition of the religious houses of England whose inmates were martyred or dispersed by Henry VIII. while their possessions were confiscated. The vileness of the excuses alleged for these acts of tyrannous persecution are well known and need not be gone into detail. It will suffice to recall that both monks and nuns were accused of indulging in all kinds of superstitious devices for the purpose of imposing on the credulity of the ignorant, with a view to their own enrichment; of having lived in idleness and luxury and, in some instances, even in immorality; and of having accumulated great stores of treasure, while the poor went unfed. Falsehoods such as these have ever since been constantly repeated by libelers of Catholicity, and this so pertinaciously that it is even probable that some Catholics may have been induced to believe-seeing that the Church has a human as well as a spiritual nature—that there must have been at least some foundation for the allegations described. Over and over again, however, when charges of this kind have been adequately investigated, they have been disproved in the most conclusive fashion. Nevertheless, the falsehoods have been repeated, and perhaps nowhere with greater virulence than in America. It is, therefore, matter for satisfaction that once again a witness to the truth has arisen and that his evidence can be shown to be corroborated by proofs, still available for inspection, put on record by the very men who perpetrated the sacrilegious confiscations which were the forerunners of the formal perversion of England from the true faith to heresy. This testimony is fully set forth in a work lately published by the firm of Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, Limited, London, entitled "The Dissolution of the Monasteries," written by Mr. Francis Aidan Hibbert, M. A., of St. John's College, Cambridge. Mr. Hibbert sought to ascertain the exact truth, absolutely without prejudice in favor of one side or the other, with the result that he has produced a volume of permanent value, containing a mass of information of which Catholics, at any rate, have no reason to be ashamed.

That the monasteries throughout England were dissolved is matter of common knowledge, but Mr. Hibbert has not been foolish enough to enter upon a general investigation of the facts connected with the whole crime. This would have been the labor of a lifetime, and even a lifetime would scarcely suffice for full accomplish-

ment. With knowledge of this fact before him, Mr. Hibbert determined to confine his first examination to one county or district, namely, Staffordshire. Into what happened in this locality he has made full search, setting out exactly the total amount of the revenues of the monks and nuns before the dissolution and the proceeds of the confiscation which was carried out for the benefit of the Tudor tyrant and his unscrupulous minions. In his preface Mr. Hibbert explains the policy on which he has acted, saying: "I desired to investigate the history without being influenced by prepossessions and prejudices, and I have accordingly tried to work with a perfectly open mind. I have looked first at the facts, which have been obtained nearly always at first hand, and only then have I drawn deductions." Even Catholic historians seem to have fallen into error as to the extent of the wealth and landed possessions of the religious orders before the period when Wolsey-through good motives enough-set the example which his unscrupulous master was prompt to follow for his own profit and the aggrandizement of the greedy nobles and courtiers whose loyalty to himself he purchased by the partnership he allowed them in the fruits of his sin. Mr. Hibbert says:

"The vast possessions of the monasteries, their enormous wealth, the large immunities from taxation which they enjoyed, their robbery of the parish churches, have all been dilated upon for three centuries and a half. The monastic income, where figures have been given, ranges from Speed's £171,300 to Burnet's £131,607. Abbot Gasquet says the monastic lands amounted to two million acres. A Jacobite pamphleteer of 1717 asserted that the monks possessed seven-tenths of the whole land: more sober writers have estimated less extravagantly. J. R. Green said it was a fifth, and Dr. Gairdner says a third. Writers have often told of 'hordes of idle men and women' in the religious houses. Dr. Gasquet affirms that the number was 8,081, with 'more than ten times that number of people who were their dependents or otherwise obtained a living in their service:' the total population of England being some four millions, this gives a proportion of one in forty-three."

All these estimates appear to be wildly wide of the truth. The resources of the religious houses, if Mr. Hibbert is not completely in error, were very much less than they describe them as being. Even such an authority on English economics as Thorold Rogers states that the rentable value of land at the time of the dissolution varied from sixpence to eightpence per acre, and even allowing for the alteration in the value of money which has taken place since, it is obvious that the rentals received by the monks and nuns, considering the important place they occupied in the social system,

cannot have been excessive. The services they rendered were comparatively poorly requited, if the fact is borne in mind that they did all the work now discharged by the hugely expensive organization maintained in connection with workhouse and outdoor relief of paupers nowadays. The monks and nuns must have had little enough to live on for themselves. Mr. Hibbert takes the average rentable value of the land they held at sevenpence per acre and shows how this would work out, under either of the diverse estimates of the extent made by Speed and Burnet. The result is as follows: "£171,300 (Speed)  $\div$  7d. = 5,873,143 acres, or about two-elevenths of the whole; £131,607 (Burnet)  $\div$  7d. = 4,512,240 acres, or more than one-seventh of the whole. A similar calculation for Staffordshire (748,433 acres) would give the following results: Gross total monastic income, £1.874 os. 1\(^1\)2d.  $\div$  7d. = 64.251 acres. or more than one-eleventh of the whole county; net monastic income, £1,608 5s. 2%d.  $\div$  7d. = 55,140 acres, or more than onethirteenth of the whole county."

The difference between the gross and net incomes is explained by the fact that "all sorts of deductions and allowances have to be made from the rent before the net income is obtained." Every one who knows anything about the management of either land or house property even nowadays will agree with this statement. It has never been charged that the monks and nuns were harsh or rapacious landlords. If they had been, their tenants would have been the first to revolt, but these seem to have had no ground for complaint until they became the serfs of the confiscators.

Many of these were prompt to get rid of their ill-gotten possessions to minor landgrabbers, who were, of course, the most exacting in their treatment of the occupiers of the soil. Mr. Hibbert gives examples of what took place: "There was subletting to a bewildering extent. The process went on for years, and all sorts of people obtained grants and leases of the monastic property, often in quite small portions. In 1540 John Smythe, a Yeoman of the Guard, obtained a grant for life of most of the possessions of the Dominican Friars at Newcastle, while in the following year Francis, Earl of Shrewsbury, is found negotiating for a single messuage and lands in Rocester which had belonged to the abbey there, and at the opposite end of the social scale we find a butcher of Stone. named William Plante, obtaining lands in Walton which had belonged to Stone Priory. Again and again lands are no sooner obtained than they are re-sold. For instance, Trentham was only surrendered in 1536, yet in 1538 the Duke of Suffolk procured a license to alienate; James Leveson secured Rushton Grange from the spoils of Hulton Abbey in 1539, and immediately sold it to Biddulph of Biddulph; in 1541 Sir John Gifford obtained license to alienate the rectory and advowson of Milwich, which had belonged to Stone Priory. In March, 1541, Sir John Dudley obtained a grant in fee of most of the possessions of Dudley Priory: in a couple of months he received a license to alienate part."

Thus the unholy traffic went on, the original robbers probably foreseeing that a Catholic restoration might imperil the safety of their own tenure. As a matter of fact, one of the first steps which had to be taken, after the accession of Queen Mary, was to obtain the sanction of the Holy See for recognition of the status of the holders of the properties taken from the religious houses. An accomplished fact had to be legitimatized, in order to avoid greater evils through the production of social chaos. Indeed, a restoration of the older order of things would have been as impossible as it would be to-day in Ireland, wherein hundreds of thousands of tenant purchasers now hold lands originally the property of the Church, grabbed by the ancestors of the landlords from whom they have bought their holdings.

It must not be supposed that Staffordshire was singular in the upright character or small wealth of its religious houses, although there were establishments more rich than any of those within its limits. It was simply a fair example of the state of things existing in the majority of the counties of England. Mr. Hibbert makes this plain, saying that the Staffordshire monasteries were by no means all of one type. "They represented the four great orders of monks: Benedictine, Austin, Cluniac and Cistercian, and there were houses of Dominican and Franciscan Friars, as well as of the later Austin Friars. Burton Abbey was a house large enough to be involved in national politics; Calwich was so insignificant that the Government was able to suppress it illegally without protest or remark. Between these were some dozen houses, small enough to come within the scope of the act for the dissolution of the lesser monasteries, yet nearly all able to purchase exemption from its provisions. Some, like Stone, stood close to busy highways; some, like Croxden, in its secluded valley, lay remote from towns and even villages; others stood near the well-to-do market towns of Stafford, Leek and Lichfield. They had originated in various ways. St. Modwen's Abbey at Burton-on-Trent was the foundation of Wulfric Spot, patriot and soldier, in 1004; where the road crossed the Trent he founded and richly endowed the Benedictine abbey on a site which already had sacred associations. Beside it grew a flourishing town. In its scriptorium was compiled one of the most valuable of the English monastic chronicles. Kings and prelates lodged within its walls. Burton Abbey played a part in

national history more than once. Another Benedictine house arose before the Norman Conquest. Burchard, the third son of Algar, whose other sons were the traitors Edwin and Morcar, accompanied Archbishop Aldred to Rome when he went to fetch his pallium and to obtain Papal authorization for the privileges of the Confessor's new abbey at Westminster. Returning, Burchard fell ill at Rheims, and, dying, was buried within the precinct of the Abbey of St. Remigius there. In gratitude Algar gave to St. Remigius the 'villa' of Lapley in Staffordshire, and a priory was built there as a cell dependent on the house at Rheims. In acknowledgment of the help which the Norman invaders had received from the prayers of the Norman monks, Henry de Ferrers established near his castle at Tutbury a priory dependent on the great Abbey of St. Peter-sur-Dive." There was absolutely nothing exceptional in the case of Staffordshire. What had occurred there was merely typical of what had occurred elsewhere. There was neither more nor less reason for the seizure and confiscation of its religious houses than for the seizure and confiscation of those in other countries. This is what gives real value to Mr. Hibbert's painstaking investigations.

It is necessary to remember that the great spoliation perpetrated by Henry VIII. and his unscrupulous agent, Thomas Cromwell, had precedents, although these were on a minor scale. Some of these were prompted by good motives, but the mere fact that they had been created tended to weaken a great principle and to familiarize the public mind with the doctrine that the property of the Church was not always inviolable. "The suppression, in 1312, of the Knights Templars, who had a preceptory in Staffordshire at Keele, was the first great destruction of a religious order, and it must not be forgotten that it was the work of the Papacy. century later Henry V., for financial and political reasons, suppressed the alien priories, Lapley, in Staffordshire, among them. During the following hundred years, which intervene before we arrive at the time with which we are more immediately concerned, such great ecclesiastics as Wykeham, Chichele, Waynflete, Fisher and Alcock had all laid hands on monastic wealth for educational purposes." Wolsey, a Cardinal Prince of the Church, against whom no taint of heresy or schism can be alleged, with the reluctant consent of the reigning Pontiff, had pursued a similar course for the endowment of his college at Oxford and the advancement of higher education. Greedy as the Cardinal was of power, there is no doubt that his purpose throughout was a lofty one and that, enormous though the revenues he possessed were, they were expended to the last penny for the benefit of religion and of learning. When he was dismissed from his once high estate because of his failure to achieve the impossible, by obtaining a divorce for Henry from the Pope, he fell forthwith from affluence to poverty. That he was ambitious and self-seeking in the matter of personal dignities is undeniable, but it is abundantly evident that he cared nothing for aggrandizement of a merely pecuniary kind, and that he must have borne a weight of labor and responsibility from which an ordinarily selfish man would have shrunk. His ambitions were not merely insular in scope. Twice he cherished hopes of filling the Papal chair and twice strove hard to attain his proud purpose. That it was defeated was only one of the many evidences of divine protection of the Church to be found in its history. Had Wolsey become Pope, who can now say what might have occurred at the time of the divorce negotiations with the Holy See? A disruption far worse than that actually witnessed might have occurred, because Wolsey undoubtedly loved England with a great love and would have gone far to avert open rebellion on the part of her ruler whom he had served so well during the greater part of his life. Placed in such a position, however, it is quite possible that he would have proved worthy of his trust and stood as fast by principle as did the reigning Pontiff when the time of trial came. Indeed, there is nothing in the story of his career to justify serious doubt as to what his action would have been, however far he was induced by opportunist motives to go in endeavoring to secure for the King the annulment of his marriage which he sought.

At the time when Wolsey\* sought and obtained authority from the Holy See to examine into the affairs of certain English monasteries, with a view to the diversion of their resources to educational purposes, it must be remembered that Oxford University was not

Of Wolsey, Dr. Lingard says in his "History of England," Vol. VI., pp. 58, 59; "His love of wealth was subordinate only to his love of power. As Chancellor and Legate he derived considerable emoluments from the courts in which he presided. He was also Archbishop of York; he farmed the revenues of Hereford and Worcester, sees which had been granted to foreigners; he held in commendam the Abbey of St. Alban's with the Bishopric of Bath, and afterwards, as they became vacant, he exchanged Bath for the rich Bishopric of Durham, and Durham for the administration of the still richer church of Winchester. To these sources of wealth should be added the presents and pensions which he received from foreign princes. Francis settled on him an annuity of twelve thousand livres, as a compensation for the Bishopric of Tournay, and Charles and Leo granted him a yearly pension of seven thousand five hundred ducats from the revenues of the Bishoprics of Toledo and Valencia, in Spain. In justice to his memory it should, however, be observed that if he grasped at wealth, it was to spend, not to hoard it." The Cardinal was in very truth a great and generous Prince. His state was that of royalty; his retinue was that of a monarch, and his benefactions bounded only by the means at his disposal.

only essentially but exclusively a Catholic institution. There was not, therefore, any question of plundering religion, but rather of employing its available endowments to the best advantage. Moreover, as the result of olden usurpations, the secular power, represented by the King, had come to possess a degree of authority in the affairs of the monasteries which proved a prolific source of abuses. For this the Church was not to blame. Time after time the Popes had protested against the intrusion of English sovereigns into a domain in which they had no right to trespass. It was for opposing such inroads that an a'Becket had been martyred and an Anselm driven into exile. The position was a curious one, but it was not the creation of Wolsey, though it must, we fear, be admitted that he was only too willing to leave things as he found them. Mr. Hibbert states the case quite fairly when he says that the Cardinal "became Chancellor in 1515 and sought from the Pope visitatorial power over the English monasteries. Such authority for a royal official was little of a novelty. The King had always claimed to have considerable power in the religious houses, and had often exercised it. The royal license was necessary before a new superior could be elected, and during the vacancy the temporalities were taken over and administered by royal officials. The election, when made, required the royal assent. In all sorts of ways the royal power made itself felt in the religious houses. It was continually interfering in their internal affairs, as we shall see fully when we approach the time of the general dissolution. It was able to bring such considerable influence to bear in elections that requests were made for headships just as for other appointments which were properly in the gift of the Government. The right of nominating to corrodies, always claimed and constantly exercised, would of itself insure the presence of representatives of the King and his opinions in the religious houses." It must be admitted that as soon as Wolsey received the Papal authorization to suppress certain religious houses, in order to utilize their possessions for the endowment of his college at Oxford, he went about his work in no half-hearted fashion. Clement VII. issued his bull on September 11, 1524. It permitted the transference of endowments, previously devoted to maintenance of cloistered life, to the value of 3,000 ducats. "On the 13th of January, 1526, letters patent were signed at Greenwich and delivered at Westminster on January 20, granting to Wolsey the sites, etc., of St. Mary's, Sandwell, and St. Giles', Canwell, with lands in Staffordshire at Sandwell, West Bromwich, Dudley, Tipton, Magna and Parva Bar, Harborne, Wernell, Coston, Wombourn, Wednesbury, Feccham, Canwell, Drayton, Hyns, Wyfford, Packington Bittertone, Tamworth, Whittington, Elford and Farysley. Canwell was worth £10 in spiritualities and £15 os. 3d. in temporalities. No time was lost. On February 10 the houses were transferred to John Higden, dean of Cardinal's College, the grant being sealed with Wolsey's seal, which, enclosed in an iron case at the foot of the vellum, remains to this day a splendid impression." This is merely an example of the process adopted by the Cardinal in many similar cases. However defensible his action may have been on the grounds we have already suggested, the fact remains that he was not only teaching the King and his nobles the lesson that wealth could be obtained by suppressing monasteries, but also accustoming the lower orders to witness such suppression carried out by the highest representative of the Church in the realm. The right hand man of Wolsey in carrying through this work was his secretary, Thomas Cromwell, afterwards his successor in the office of Chancellor and the unscrupulous agent of the King in his campaign of confiscation against the religious establishments of the

In October, 1529, Wolsey was dismissed from all his high offices and the restraining influence he had previously exercised over Henry ceased to exist. The Tudor tyrant was determined to, so far as he could, wreck the Church whose Sovereign Pontiff had refused to pander to his will. Henceforth the King could rely on obsequious courtiers of the stamp of Cromwell, who found profit in executing his behests, without fear of the great Cardinal, whom all men regarded as already dead, as he was in fact already ruined. Henry's only thought now was as to how he could wreak vengeance on the Pope, and the only way in which he could do this was by assailing the servants of religion within his own dominions and by assuming to himself spiritual jurisdiction, in addition to that which he already possessed as temporal sovereign of the realm. Mr. Hibbert supplies an admirably comprehensive summary of the course of events which we cannot do better than quote. In the course of this he writes as follows: "When the assembly, which has gained for itself the name of the Reformation Parliament, met, the air was full of rumors of attacks upon the clergy. The French Ambassador reported: 'It is the intention, when Wolsey is dead or destroyed, to get rid of the Church and spoil the goods of both.' Parliament assembled on November 3, 1530. . . . Before the end of January (1531) the Convocation of Canterbury had been compelled to vote the enormous sum of £100,000 in atonement for the fault which had been committed in acknowledging Wolsey's legatine authority. The Abbot of Croxden was too ill to attend the session. The Northern Convocation subsequently voted an additional £18,840. The ease with which these huge amounts were raised was to have unsuspected effects. The clergy were also compelled to acknowledge the King 'their singular protector, only and supreme lord, and, as far as the law of Christ allows, even Supreme Head,' though it must be remembered that Henry took pains to explain that he understood the expression in no blasphemous sense. Next, it was required that the convocations should enact no new canons without royal license. They made a vain attempt to retain some of their powers. On May 8 (1532) a deputation was appointed to wait upon the King to try to induce him to retain clerical immunities." Several members of this deputation were time-servers and self-seekers, who were willing to betray all the interests confided to their keeping in order to please the King, from whom they hoped for future favors.

More aggressions were to follow—aggressions, too, facilitated by the subserviency of not a few among the clergy. Henry's base mind could not conceive the idea of any man ranking spiritual interests and religious principles above the possession of money and power. He knew how onerous were the demands upon the Papacy. and he confidently counted on being able to bring the Pontiff to submission by cutting off the supplies His Holiness and his predecessors had long received from England. At the same time he was become more and more enamored of Anne Boleyn and proportionately furious at the impossibility of making her a rightful Queen. "The Annates Bill, empowering the King to deprive the Pope of his revenues from England, was passed, for diplomatic reasons, on March 19. It was at once a threat and a bribe to the Papacy, and its object was to secure the annulling of Katherine's marriage. A post was sent to Rome 'to frighten the Pope about the Annates,' but it failed in achieving its object. Clement VII. stood firm; but early in 1533, as was afterwards alleged, the King went through a form of marriage with Anne Bolevn. Among those who were variously stated to have performed the ceremony was Roland Lee. The alienation from the Papacy became much more pronounced as the news of the marriage leaked out, and the passing of the Annates Bill into law became inevitable. The royal letters patent, which made it effective, were issued on July 9. In the same session the Act in Restraint of Appeals to Rome was passed, springing from the same unsavory origin, and requiring more management in Parliament. Exceptional steps were taken to make sure that the King's party should be well represented. Both the House of Lords and the House of Commons were unscrupulously packed. The Act of Succession was passed in 1534. This measure was the cause of the martyrdom of Blessed Sir Thomas More, who refused to accept the oath of supremacy it enjoined, recognizing the supreme authority of the King in Church and spiritual affairs. At the same time definite steps were taken to bring the religious houses of the country under the royal authority, with a view to putting into operation a scheme of wholesale spoliation. "In January, 1535, Cromwell procured a royal commission appointing himself vicar general and visitor general of all churches and monasteries, with authority to delegate agents. He set to work in the exercise of his new power with characteristic promptness. On January 30 commissions were issued for each county, to make the necessary investigations for discovering the whole amount of ecclesiastical property for the purpose of levying the tenths. The Staffordshire Commissioners had Bishop Roland Lee for chairman, but he was the only ecclesiastic among them. The others were Sir John Talbot, Sir John Gifford, George Audeley, John Vernon, Walter Wrottesley, George Gresley, William Bassett. Edward Lyttleton, Thomas Gifford, Thomas Holte, Walter Blounte, John Grosvenor and Thomas Moreton." The deathknell of the ancient monastic system of England had sounded, but even in our time we are witnessing its glorious reëstablishment. Many of the olden religious orders now again work and pray where their members worked and prayed well nigh four hundred years ago.

We have pointed out more than once already that Mr. Hibbert's volume is concerned only with what took place in one county, to wit, Staffordshire. In this district the total revenue of the religious houses was only £1,608, or, roughly, some \$8,040. The net income of the Bishop and secular clergy therein was as follows:

Rural Deaneries—			
Lapley and Trysull	£536	16	21/2
Newcastle and Stone	887	4	8 17-84
Leek and Alton	594	12	1%
Deanery-Tamworth and Tutbury	854	15	4'*
Bishop of Lichfield (Staffs. only)	845	7	81/4
Lichfield Cathedral—	•	•	- /8
Dean and Chapter	58	14	1
Prebends	272	- 3	Ā
Choristers	16	18	101/6
Vicars Choral	187	17	6/2
Priests Vicars	114	Ġ	ě
Clerks	51	ŏ	61/4
Chantry Priests	6	17	· 1/4
Chantries	106	18	į
St. John's Hospital, Lichfield		15	ā
Tutbury Priory	199	14	10
Burton Abbey	412	ă	'n
Tanworth Collegiate Church	66	1	ŏ
remanding Constant Charen			
	0.4.424		A

The work of spoliation was pressed forward. There were many eager to share in the profits. Some good folk tried to save the monasteries by buying back the possessions granted by pious ancestors and thus enabling the monks to continue the cloistered life. Others offered bribes to the King's officers to secure the same end. Such attempts practically all ended in failure. "On April 2, 1536, Sir Simon Harcourt wrote to Cromwell: 'I am informed that it is

enacted in Parliament that certain religious houses shall be dissolved. There is a little house of canons in Staffordshire, called Ronton. built and endowed by my ancestors, to the intent they might be prayed for perpetually, and many of them are buried there. I would gladly be a suitor for it to the King, but I dare not, as I know not his pleasure. I beg you will be a mediator to the King for me, that the same house may continue, and he shall have £100 and you £100 if you can accomplish it, and £20 fee out of the said house. If the King is determined to dissolve it, I desire to have it, as it adjoins such small lands as I have in that county, and I and my heirs will pay so much as the rent of assize cometh to, and give you 100 marks." Sir Simon Harcourt evidently realized the state of affairs thoroughly well, and equally thoroughly understood the sort of man to whom he was writing. Sincerely as he desired the continuance of the burial place of his ancestors, he knew that Cromwell would recognize no such filial sentiments, so he boldly offered him the large bribe of £100. But a more powerful suitor was in the field. On April 27 Henry Lord Stafford wrote urging his claims. 'I beg you will use means with the King that I may have the farm of the abbey of Rantone if it be dissolved. It is within four miles of my house, and reaches my park pale, and I will give as much for it as any man. I heard that the Queen had moved the King to have me in remembrance for it, and he was content, saying it was alms to help me, having so many children on my hands. I heard that George Blunt endeavors to obstruct my suit.' Next day he wrote to the Earl of Westmoreland begging him to use his influence with the secretary on his behalf, and, failing Ronton, he asks for the house of the White Ladies at Brewood, urging 'it is only £40 rent by year, and is in great decay.' "Stafford obtained the grant he craved, probably because—unlike Harcourt he intended to banish the religious and make their property his own. The poorest of the religious houses were suppressed as ruthlessly as the richest. All brought at least some grist to the King's mill and some share of profit to his creatures. "On February 6, 1538, Dr. Ingworth, the renegade prior of the richest house of the Black Friars in England, and lately made Suffragan Bishop of Dover, was commissioned to visit all the friaries, and he rapidly carried out his work. We have very full particulars of his campaign in Staffordshire, and some remarkable details. On August 7 he was at the house of the Grey Friars at Lichfield, on August 9 he decided the fate of both the friaries at Stafford, and next day he was equally effective at Newcastle-under-Lyme; and this in spite of the fact that he was obliged to confess that 'the friars in these parts have many favorers, and great labor is made for their continuance. Divers trust to see them set up again, and some have gone up to sue for them.' But he tells Latimer (on August 23) that such strong expressions of popular opinion had had no terrors for him; he had visited eighteen places, including Lichfield, Stafford and Newcastle, and had only left one house standing." Yet, when all the goods and lands of the monasteries and nunneries came to be sold, exact inventories having been taken by the royal commissioners previously, all men were astonished at the smallness of the result. No hidden hoards were found; the religious had mostly lived from hand to mouth, putting more into the mouths of others than into their own. There were found none of the reserves of wine and beer of which modern novelists and authors tell us so much, and this at a time when such liquors were the common beverages of all save the very poorest. Mr. Hibbert gives the precise details of the sales, as recorded by the royal commissioners, and these alone are sufficient to show how cruelly false were the pretenses under which the monasteries were suppressed. WILLIAM F. DENNEHY.

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#### CONTRACT AS THE ORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT.

#### PART III.

HEN Suarez assured James I. of England that by his doctrine he was safeguarding the real kingship of kings, at least he did not pretend to set its divinity as high as Bossuet did later in the interests of le Grande Monarque, Louis XIV. The Bishop of Meaux in his Politique Tirée de l'Ecriture that the royal person was anointed and sacred, and that while kings Sainte took as his example of kingship that of Solomon, and argued on the whole should be most kind to their people, they nevertheless had over them absolute power. L'autorité Royale est absolue: le prince ne doit rendre compte à personne de ce qu'il ordonne: quand le prince a jugé, il n'y a point de force coactive contre le prince: mais les rois ne sont pas pour cela affranchis des lois. Another extreme royalist was Peter de Marca, who declared the civil power to be like the ecclesiastical—one that is special and divinely instituted, not something arising by natural law from the very constitution

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Liv. II., Article I.

of human society within the body of a people who confer the right on their ruler.<sup>2</sup> Such doctrine failed to win common acceptance.

The theory that princes hold power through their people is often connected with the names of Bellarmine and Suarez, though these authors were not singular in their view and were not propounding a doctrine that was peculiarly Jesuitic. About the word "immediate," it is to be noted that there are two senses in the present controversy, one rejected, the other open to discussion. What is denied is that a king like James I. of England, who was a foremost champion of "divine right" in its highest sense as immediately and as individually appointed by God, as was Saul or David or St. Peter. What is left disputable is whether, supposing temporal authority to come through the people to the prince, the people really transfer it, so that the sovereign receives it immediately through them, or else merely designate and qualify the person upon whom God immediately bestows the authority. Suarez, presupposing not an indiscriminate multitude, but an aggregated people as one body potestas non resultat donec homines in unam communitatem perfectam congregantur et politice uniantur<sup>3</sup>—speaks of the authority as really resting upon such a community—suprema potestas civilis immediate data est a Deo hominibus in perfectam communitatem congregatis.4 But he does not leave this statement unqualified, for he adds that the common opinion "seems to be that men, as it were, dispose the matter, while God, as it were, bestows the form." However, he dares to use the phrase that the power is "transferred" from people to prince—translata potestate in regem per illam communitatem, efficitur superior etiam in regno quod illam dedit, quia dando illam se subjecit et priore libertate se privavit.º Balmes makes quite clear the distinction between the two theories on this point when he writes: "One party thinks the political power comes to the ruler in a mediate way; the other party says in an immediate way. Practically the two views are one." For all agree that the people have not the power in a usable way till they choose a government. Nevertheless, in recent utterances both the German Emperor and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> E collatione duarum potestatum egregie conficitur regiam aeque a Deo institutam fuisse, neque principatum politicum a Deo per insitam naturae legem manasse quidem sed ita ut populo concederetur primum et eorum de inde suffragiis in reges conferatur. (De Concord. Sacerdot. et Imper., Lib. II., Cap. II.) The exaggeration of divinity in kings was the apotheosis of rulers before or after death, and independently of their personal merits, as was the case with the Roman Emperors and other potentates.

<sup>\*</sup> De Legibus, Lib. III., Cap \$, n. 5.

<sup>4</sup> Defens. Fid., Lib. III., Cap. 2, n. 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> De Leg., Lib. III., Cap. 8, n. 2.

<sup>• 1016,</sup> n. 6. Bellarmine calls God's action "not immediate" (De Laicis, L4b. III., c. 6) in reference to the mediation of the people, who transfer what they have immediately received.

one of his spokesmen have denied that the contract theory finds historic exemplification in the origin of the Prussian monarchy, which therefore they hold to be derived straight from God.

Two important points are noticeable in the correct account of the contract theory; one is that as regards the institution of a civil government, while the form is free, the substance is obligatory, and not left optional—a multitudinous people must have a government. The other point is that the self-subjection of ruled to rulers is real, and cannot be recalled except for some extremity, and not with the ease asserted by Rousseau. This does not mean that the persons may not be changeable, as we see in the case of the American President and many of his assessors, while the Constitution remains unaltered, and even unalterable, by any means normally contemplated. Petavius speaks strongly of the inalienability of the grant once it has been made: "When a people has once conveyed the power to its chosen ruler, it retains no longer a hold upon it and cannot recall the grant." But St. Thomas had provided for a right of withdrawal in case of "the pact," as he calls it, being substantially violated-"pact" being a term which St. Augustine 10 had used incidentally. In various ways St. Thomas had shown his moderation by firmly asserting the regal power as against the levity of revolutions, while carefully guarding against the not unlikely lapses into tyranny: laborandum est diligenti studio ut sic multitudini provideatur de rege ut non incident in tyrannum (l. c.). In his comment upon St. Paul, "All power is from God" (Rom. xiii., 1), he shows that ordinary kingship is not simple theocracy: "All power is from God; that is, the power itself, not the possession of it." He speaks of the dominion which arises ex jure humano (2da 2da, Q. x., A. 10); of the power of legislators in quality of representatives for the whole people (1a 2dae, Q. xc., A. 3. Cf. Q. xcvii., A. 3). At the same time he is not neglectful of that other derivation of kingship which arises in some persons from a native qualification to rule over others.11 If this is occasionally one determinant of the individual who is to be king, at least it is not the only one possible. The contract theory, rightly interpreted, has its legitimate place, and was



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> Small, simple communities, like Esquimos, may live without a formal government—some tribes choose leaders just for emergencies.

De Eccles. Hierarch., Lib. III., c. 14.

<sup>\*</sup>De Regin. Princip., Lib. L., c. 6. Nec putanda est multitudo infideliter agere tyrannum destituens, etiamsi eidem in perpetuo se ante subjecerat; quia hoc ipse meruit in multitudinis regimine se non fideliter gerens, ut exigit regis officum quod ei pactum a subditis non reservetur. Of. 2 Sent D. 44 A. 2.

<sup>10</sup> Generale pactum est societatis humanae obedire regibus suis. Confesa. III., 8.

<sup>11</sup> In Aristotelis Polit., Lib. III., Lect. 8.

sanctioned by our recent Pontiff, Leo XIII., in the form which Suarez says is the more commonly received: "By the choice of the people the prince is designated. They do not confer the princely powers, but they settle who he is to be that is to bear the rule." 18

Those who regard the kingship as an outcome from the patria potestas, when the family has grown so as to become a tribe or nation needing a form of general government, should be on their guard against supposing that thereby no specific difference is newly brought in by development. Political power is other than a mere extension of the domestic. Again, Heller errs by another kind of oversight in supposing the power of the sovereign to be an enlargement of that found over property, whereas Aristotle had correctly insisted on a specific distinction (Polit. I., c. 1). "A government," says Heller, "has no distinct nature of its own; it is a mere overflow or extension of mastership of proprietorship." Such a principle would favor slavery, and the notion that the sovereign held office for his own benefit, not for that of the people. Dominus was a title rejected by the Emperor Augustus because it suggested a slavemaster. An amalgamation between several business companies into a "big combine" may be the way to make "a corner," but not a civil sovereignty.

To readers of English history it will be interesting to hear how Father Parsons, who had previously thought that religious necessity demanded the deposition of Oueen Elizabeth, stated his case in the principles which he laid down in 1594 with a view to the exclusion of James I. "There can be no doubt," he urged, "that the commonwealth hath power to choose their own fashion of government. and also to change the same upon reasonable causes; also to limit the same with what laws and conditions they please; also to put back the next inheritors<sup>18</sup> upon lawful considerations, and to dispossess those who have been lawfully put into possession if they fulfill not the laws for which and by which their dignity was given."14 It will be seen that in his general grounds Parsons stood where writers of reputation had stood, while as to his particular application of received principles his friends would urge, even if they did not finally accept his policy, that Queen Elizabeth was in a position very different from that of Queen Victoria in our day. Queen Elizabeth was a bastard under circumstances of notorious crime—circumstances which at least strongly prejudiced her succession. She turned against the religion which had long been con-

<sup>14 &</sup>quot;On the Succession to the Crown of England."



<sup>12</sup> Encycl. 1881, Junii die 29.

<sup>18</sup> Parsons considered the change less revolutionary because Philip II. of Spain was descended from John of Gaunt, and so was of the royal lineage of England.

sidered the official creed of the crown and a condition of its tenure; she was excommunicated; she was ready to persecute those of the old faith who would not join her in her new creed, or rather church policy.

The further question of tyrannicide Parsons did not introduce into his defense. It is, however, a point closely annexed to his subiect, upon which we will deliver no doctrine, but record as mere history some of the views that have received prominence in the course of ages. The classic authors have bestowed some highly rhetorical praises on certain tyrannicides, and these laudations were often repeated afterwards, especially during the Renaissance period, when the imitative instinct was so strong both in sentiment and its expression. John of Salisbury, treating of a usurper, gave approval to the extreme measure, so that, according to him, "in many cases the tyrant should be put to death"18 as a course which was not only allowable, but also "meet and just"—aequum et justum.16 He takes a wider survey (Lib. VIII., c. 20) considering the tyrannicides mentioned in the Old Testament, with the deduction justum esse occidi tyrannos; nevertheless, in practice he recommends patience and prayer.

Subsequent authors who carry on the investigation distinguish from the legitimately established prince (a) the prince who after usurpation has secured recognition, (b) the usurper not yet recognized, and (c) the invader in the act of usurping. The last named comes under the principles for resisting the unjust aggressor in his act, even to the extreme of taking his life, with the additional circumstance here to be considered that the attack is not individual, but national in its extent of interests involved. Discussion upon such distinctions was needed, as the decree issued by the Council of Constance (Sess. 15) concerning the point started by Jean Petit was too wide to satisfy requirements of greater precision in details.

If we look at the theologians we find that St. Thomas regards as not consistent with St. Peter's teaching (2 Pet. ii., 18) the doctrine of some, that when the yranny becomes unbearable, any one may, alleging Scriptural examples in the Old Testament, remove its author by death. The people ought to put up with even great injustice and never to act with extreme violence against government if thereby only greater confusion is likely to result to the country. Still, in the last resort the people have the right of deposition (tyrannum destituere).<sup>17</sup> This doctrine is confirmed in other places (2da 2 dae, Q. xliii., A. 2; ad 3, Q. lxix., A. 4), but St. Thomas cannot be quoted expressly for tyrannicide as that measure was

<sup>18</sup> Polycrat, Lib. III., c. 7.

<sup>16</sup> Ib., c. 15.

<sup>17</sup> De Regimine, Lib. I., c. 6.

defended by some later writers. He goes as far as forcible deposition for very grave abuses which can be thus only remedied.

Suarez tries to rest his case on the doctrine of St. Thomas, adding a few details of his own. He allows self-defense and defense of the public18 to one who is actually suffering invasion, so that he may resist according to the principles usually laid down for the treatment of the unjust assailant of life and property, with the special circumstance to be taken into account that the harm to the public must be balanced against the gain to the individual, when the offender is a prince or is aiming at principality. Suarez also considers the special application of the usual doctrine about selfdefense, but this is not explicitly the case of political tyrannicide. To that Suarez comes in his discussion with James I. of England, whom he tells that as regards legitimate princes no private person on his own decision can rightfully put them to death for abuse of Principem propter tyrannicum regimen vel propter quaevis crimina, non posse ab aliqua privata auctoritate juste interfici; assertio est communes.10 He touches on the question of personal aggression in the usual terms, with an appeal to St. Thomas,20 who says that the abuse of power is not from God.

A special case can be illustrated from clerical life, in which an offender may first be laicized and then subjected to a penalty from which his previous rank exempted him. Emmanuel Saa similarly holds that a very grievously offending prince may be authoritatively deposed, after which it may be allowed, if there is no better means available, for any individual who can to execute the sentence of the law 21

As regards Jesuit teaching at large on tyrannicide, if we except the case of Mariana, there is no peculiarity to be detected. Jesuits, as Sebastian Heiss states, taught, in common with many other theologians, that except in the case of legitimate defense, under personal assault, no private person as such may kill a tyrannous sovereign. But Mariana's book22 was peculiar. Its primary purpose was to deter kings from tyrannizing, and individually the young Philip III. from ruling so ill as to challenge resistance on the part of the people. The first edition was published 1500, the second 1605. Philip III. succeeded to the throne 1598. Everything was urged by Mariana down to minute points of discipline for the nursery, in order to provide the best education for the young princes.

<sup>18</sup> Se et rempublicam vindicare. De Fide Spe et Charitate Disp. xili., sec. 8. Tract De Bello.

<sup>19</sup> Defens. Fed., Lib. VI., c. 4. De Bello, Disp. xiii., sect. 8, n. 2.

<sup>20</sup> Lib. I., Sent. Dist. 44, Q. L. A. 2.

<sup>21</sup> Aphorism Confessar, s. v. Tyrannos.

22 De Rege et Regis Institutione. Written at the request of the tutor to the Spanish Infanta.

The special doctrine on tyrannicide had some sort of warrant from The author gives his view on his own responsibility, but subject to correction from better judgments. Whether his book was published without due authorization of his order, to whose teaching it formed an exception, is not here discussed. Where his doctrine is most important is in the passages that treat of the legitimate monarch who has turned tyrant-not tyrannus in usurpatione, but in regimine, in abusu regiminis. Concerning him Mariana proceeds by steps in his theory: (1) Bad government must be borne patiently while it is tolerable; (2) when it goes beyond endurance, the tyrant must be warned; (3) if after warning he remains as cruel as ever, the states of the nation may declare his position forfeited and proceed forcibly to dethrone him; (4) if such regular action is impossible, then, provided that the judgment of the country is known to warrant the deed, an individual may look upon himself as interpretatively authorized to attack the tyrant and, where that is the only effective means of success, to kill him. This last point forms Mariana's chief offense. These are principles which some retrospectively might apply to Henry III. of France, who had murdered the Duke and the Cardinal of Lorraine, had allied himself with Henry of Navarre and the Huguenots against the Church, and had been pronounced to have forfeited his throne by the Sorbonne and by the Catholic league. The Pope also had excommunicated him. As a fact, however, Mariana did not give his explicit approval to the act of Jaque Clement, the regicide. In quoting the double set of opposing writers Mariana in his second edition left out the words facinus memorabile, aeternum Gallice decus, ut plerisque visum est, which had been applied to the assassination.

In the leaders of the reform Mariana had patrons who went beyond himself in the scope they gave to tyrannicide; also jurists like Grotius<sup>22</sup> and Barclay lent him some countenance. No subsequent Jesuit can be shown to have gone the way of a follower to Mariana; that was guarded against by a prohibition issued by the general of the order, Father Acquaviva, 1610, which has not been proved to have been substantially disobeyed: "We ordain in virtue of holy obedience, under pain of excommunication and of inability to hold any office whatever, that no religious of our society shall henceforth, in public or private lectures or in secret advice, presume to assert that it is allowed to any individual, under any pretext, to kill tyrant kings or princes." The Parliament of Paris

<sup>28</sup> Grotius, De Jur. Bell. et Pacis., Lib. I., nn. xii.-xx. Qui principes sub populo sunt, si peccant in leges et rempublicam, non tantum vi repelli possunt sed, si opus sit, puniri morte. Mariana follows John of Salisbury in prohibiting poison as a means, but makes the curious distinction between food as a necessary article and furniture and clothing as not so necessary.

also condemned Mariana's book, but not with very good grace, for it had itself, some years before, approved, in union with the University of Paris, the sentence of outlawry against Henry III., and was afterwards moved by the assassination of Henry IV., which took place on different grounds, to condemn Mariana for the principles which they themselves had previously sanctioned. Mariana's book offered no justification for Ravaillac's deed of murder, which it was declared to have prompted, and so to call for official reprobation.

The only way to avoid the extravagances of absolutism on the one side and of a licentious freedom on the other is to find a mean in well-balanced reason. It is clear that the first formation of monarchism in Europe after the break-up of the mediæval polity, and after the revolt of the Reformation, set going a system of stern rule, in part necessitated by the turbulence of the peoples, yet a rigorism that could not very long endure. The absolutist Hobbes, in dealing with tyrannicide, shows us principles which call for a temperate modification. "The third seditious doctrine," he says, "springs from the previous act of taking upon ourselves to judge of good or evil; it is that tyrannicide is lawful. At this day it is by many divines, as of old by all the philosophers-Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch and the rest of the maintainers of the Greek and Roman unarchies—held not only lawful, but worthy of the greatest praise. Now, he whom men require to be put to death commands either by right or without right. If without right, he is an enemy, and will by right be put to death. If by right, then the divine interrogation takes place: 'Who hath told thee that he is a tyrant? Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat? For why dost thou call him a tyrant whom God hath made a king, except that thou, being a private person, usurpest to thyself the knowledge of good or evil?' How pernicious this opinion is to all governments, but especially to those which are monarchical, we shall discern—namely, that by it every king, whether good or ill, stands exposed to be condemned by the judgments and slain by the hand of every murderous villain."24 Hobbes could be very Scriptural when it suited his theory. In the present instance there is much of truth in his application, but his developments in detail throughout the course of his work are not temperate.

To-day the reaction against absolutism is in danger of becoming an attack on the supreme authority of God. The democratic spirit seeks to extend the power of the people in State concerns to religious and moral ideas. These are cut loose from all fixed standards; they

<sup>24</sup> De Cive, Chap. XII., n. 8. Bossuet will not allow that the tyranny of the prince justifies forcible resistance. Op. oit, Leo VI., Prop. 5 et 6, Article II.

are subjected to a merely evolutionary process of instincts, conceptions, aspirations and interests, all within the cosmic range, with no reference to God transcending rature. The divinity is the power immanent in mankind and ruling its concerns, on the whole, to higher and higher evolution of conduct. The God of Christianity is compared to the Eastern despot, as contrasted with the democratic government which popular election appoints. Orientals bowed before one not of the people, but wholly above it, whereas Westerns nowadays are self-governing through removable representatives. What is preferred in politics is preferred also in religion, and the God is turned only into the ideal of the national morality, developed through experience of the conduct which has proved most useful, dignified, beautiful and reverend—a fluctional development to which there is no finality, no absolute term of reference, such as is the immutable God of Theism.

The development of constitutional monarchy has taken much of the interest away from the old theory of contract. A modern people can afford to regard their king as inviolable while they can make his Ministers responsible for all acts of government and of misgovernment done in the royal name. Yet even this system may end in failure.

in failure.

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## A FOURTH CENTURY CONVERT EXPOUNDS THE TRINITY.

I.

O PLACE our forefinger on the pulsing wrist of our Christian brother of the fourth century; to illustrate how deeply spiritual and liberally educated Christians once were, and therefore may again become nowadays; to show from example how charming a Catholic a convert may make, that is the object of this paper.

Speaking not relatively to those in lands afar, but absolutely few, if any, fair, capable judges will deny that the ordinary American Catholic of the twentieth century is rather shallowly instructed and grounded in his faith. That he has a working knowledge, may sometimes know, or once upon a time years ago did know, his little two-cent catechism, word for word probably, one in three or four Catholics may be able to boast. Of this one-third or one-quarter of the American Catholic population perhaps one in a dozen can give a philosophical, Scriptural and intelligent reason for the faith that is in us.

Am I too severe? Think a while, and I believe those capable of judging will say that it is not exaggerated.

And if this is true state of Christian souls, something radical is lacking. We have vast numbers, but lack elevation, grasp, depth, breadth of conception of our Christian faith; we are but children playing and not mastering our task at school. Besides numbers, we have also wealth, and often influence, and sometimes position socially, and a certain refinement and a fair share of respect in the eyes of the world. But after these things do the heathens seek. But the understanding of the height and depth and length and breadth of the great truths of Christianity and eternity, these things are not explained in our common public schools, daily papers, in the popular monthlies, the theatres, the moving-picture shows, and therefore—shamefully repeat it, therefore—many do not understand them.

And yet when one has these truths imbedded in his soul and can explain them to others he is to himself, to his favored familiars, to the Church a treasure indeed, a sheet anchor in the storms that swamp feeble, sickly souls and lay waste homes and blast lands where faith should blossom as the rose. Where can such jewels be found? They should be the product chiefly of our great characterfactories—the Catholic home and the Catholic high schools and universities. And no doubt they often are. Yet the supply does not equal the demand, for in all commodities the very best articles are always eagerly sought after by connoisseurs. And hence foreign articles, fabrics from afar, the products of other lands are imported and decorated and perfected, finished off in the Church. I refer to those fairly numerous, yet all too few, honest, brave seekers after the truth who, not satisfied with the dim haze outside the Catholic Church, somewhere long, long since, have heard that "the light shineth in the darkness:" that "the Word was made flesh and dwelt amongst us," and they have long prayed to see "His glory, the glory, as it were, of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth." These men, these angels, these converts, these Baltimores, Setons, Brownsons and a long list of worthy followers—these are often fields well sown with the good wheat of knowledge, and need only the early and late rains of grace to make them yield, some thirty, some sixty and some a hundred-fold. Already their roots are struck deep into the earth, and hence they quickly shoot upward when the warm spring sun of clear, energizing faith shines fair and full upon them.

Such a convert, such an example, lived in old Rome in the latter half of the fourth century, and he is known only in inverse ratio to the deserts of his worth and writings. II.

Caius Fabius Marius Victorinus, like Augustine, was born in Africa, but for some years taught "rhetoric" and oratory at Rome in the days of Constantius. As Victorinus became a Christian only in extreme old age, he had already composed many works on non-Christian subjects. Several of these writings, on logic, rhetoric and kindred subjects, are still extant, though probably more are lost.

His conversion, as told by St. Augustine,<sup>2</sup> caused a stir of joy among the Christians of Rome, and while the exact date is not sure, it was prior to A. D. 361. For some years before though in heart and soul inwardly a Christian, yet he seems to have continued to teach rhetoric as of old. But when, in A. D. 362, Julian the Apostate forebade Christians to be public teachers of literature and oratory, which then meant practically all higher education, Victorinus, put to the test, preferred to leave the school of words for the *Word* of God.

It is true that his success as a teacher had merited a statue in the forum of Trajan, yet this "most learned old man, most accomplished in all the liberal arts, who had read and weighed and expounded so many words of philosophers," and had been "the teacher of so many noble Senators," this pagan, under the persuasion of Simplician, later Bishop of Milan, began thenceforth to read Sacred Scripture and most patiently and thoroughly scrutinized all Christian literature.

At length Victorinus declared to Simplician, his Christian friend: "Now I am a Christian." But Simplician, twitting him with his tardiness, if not positive fear of ostracism by his pagan friends, answered that he would not believe him to be a Christian till he should see him within the very walls of a Christian church, when, with sublime repartee, Victorinus rejoined: "Do walls make a Christian?"

However, the mills of God were grinding, slowly indeed, yet finely, till this portion of the pagan harvest was transformed and made "one bread, one body," and Victorinus, like Cardinal Newman, at last suddenly, and when Simplician least expected it, entered the walls of the Church.

Though offered the privilege of a private baptism, to avoid notoriety and comment, Victorinus chose rather the regular public profession of faith and baptism before the assembly of Christians.

Even if quite old at his conversion, yet his writings in Migne's edition of the Fathers show that the score or so of years of life as a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Jerome, "De Viris Illustr."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Confess., Bk. VIII., 2-5.

Aug. Confess., Bk. VIII., Ch. II., 8-4.

Christian were far from being idly spent. From column 993 to column 1,310 in the eighth volume of the "Patrologia Latina"—that is, over 150 pages—may be found Victorinus' compositions, including one book to Justin the Manichean, against the two principles of Manicheism and on the true flesh of Christ; another on the "Words of Scripture"—"and it was evening and morning one day;" one book on the "Generation of the Divine Word;" four books against Arius; on accepting the "Homoousion;" three hymns on the Trinity; two books on St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians; one book on St. Paul's Epistle to the Philippians; two books on St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians; one book on Physics.

Being now specially concerned with only Victorinus' "Third Hymn to the Trinity," and having been often puzzled, not to say "nonplused," at the text of the hymn—as found in Migne, the following passage somewhat consoled me, and will be a partial justification for patent weaknesses in my translation: "All these writings [of Victorinus, except his commentaries] are intensely obscure. His intense obscurity in treating theological subjects of themselves recondite, aggravated by the extremely corrupt condition of the text as hitherto edited, the barbarous mixture of Greek and bad Latin in which he often writes, his prolixity and repetitions have been the cause of his being ignored more than is at all justified by his substantial merits. He has wearied the very people who have tried to read him beyond their patience, and they have almost wholly missed his significance. Those who have read him have mostly done nothing but complain of him."

Yet, on the other hand, Thomassin, whose theological judgment is a weighty one, speaks of him as a man 'inferior to none in the profundity of his insight into the inmost mysteries' of the Divine Being and the relation of the Persons of the Trinity to one another."

Indeed, Victorinus himself, though he modestly declares that "it is needless to suppose that while we are almost unknown to ourselves, we should have either the capacity or the leave to investigate what lies beyond ourselves and the world," yet he confesses he was charmed by and loved to delve into the most profound subjects. Doubtless his education and long life of keen reasoning as a rhetorician were responsible for this lifelong intellectual tendency.

III.

More particularly the last of his three "Hymns to the Trinity" is a "mystic and original conception of Christian poetry . . .

<sup>4</sup> Gore, in Smith & Wace's Dictionary of Christian Biography.

<sup>6</sup> Gore, codem loco.

<sup>6</sup> Ad Justin, IL, col. 1,009.

and it is surprising that this curious attempt has escaped the notice of the historians of Christian poetry."

It is a song of triumph in honor of the Most Blessed Trinity, consisting of sixty verses, or rather short paragraphs, not in metre or rhythm, addressing each Divine Person in varying ways. Its resemblance to the Athanasian Creed will at once be apparent. At some few passages the theologian's eyebrows are likely to arch, and he will warn us against a literal, verbal translation of Victorinus' expression of "triple substance" in the Trinity, or against the expression "make" or "create," instead of "beget" or "generate."

Save two or three passages, the effort has been made to give a quite close literal translation. Several misprints have been presumed, and the translation is then but tentative. In the twenty-fourth and forty-sixth paragraphs the text from the "Maxima Bibliotheca Veterum Patrum" (twenty-seven vols., folio, Lyons, 1677, Victorinus' Third Hymn covering about two and a half columns in Vol. IV.) has been preferred as less obscure.

#### IV.

#### HYMN THE THIRD.

God Lord, Holy Spirit: O Blessed Trinity!
Father, Son, Paraclete: O Blessed Trinity!
Source, Minister, Distributer: O Blessed Trinity!

Spirit of operations, Spirit of ministries, Spirit of graces: O Blessed Trinity!

One Principle, both the Second with the First and always the Third with the Second: O Blessed Trinity!

Of what substance the Father is, of that substance the Son is, and of that substance the Spirit is, but a triple substance [Person]: O Blessed Trinity!

Perfect Father, perfect Son from perfect Father, perfect Holy Spirit from perfect Son: O Blessed Trinity!

Fountain, Stream, Watering: O Blessed Trinity!

Triple Similarity in the Three, but one action: O Blessed Trinity!

Existence, Life, Knowledge: O Blessed Trinity! Love, Grace, Communication: O Blessed Trinity!

Love is God; Grace, Christ; Communication, Holy Spirit: O Blessed Trinity!

If there is love, there is grace; if love and grace, there is communication; hence All are in Each, and One in Three: O Blessed Trinity!

Hence the Apostle Paul says of God (II. Cor. xiii, 13): "The grace

Morceaux, "Hist. Litt. de L'Afrique Chrétienne," Vol. IIL, p. 410.

of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communication of the Holy Spirit be with you:" O Blessed Trinity!

Unbegotten, Only-begotten, Proceeding-begotten: O Blessed Trinity! Generator, Generated, Regenerating: O Blessed Trinity!

True Light, True Light of Light, True Enlightening: O Blessed Trinity!

Immanence, Progression, Regression: O Blessed Trinity!

Invisibly-invisible, Invisibly-visible, Visibly-invisible: O Blessed Trinity!

Infinite Power, Infinite Action, Infinite Knowledge: O Blessed Trinity!

Impassibly-impassible, Impassibly-passible, Passible-impassible: O Blessed Trinity!

Seed, Tree, Fruit: O Blessed Trinity!

All things from One, all things through One, all things in One:
O Blessed Trinity!

One simple [Being], one One and only one, and only and ever One. The Other, one, one same One from One, and All One Uniter of all, the Power of One, doing one thing, that all things may be: O Blessed Trinity!

Unbegotten from all eternity, Begotten from all eternity, Begotten that all things may be eternal: O Blessed Trinity!

Thou commandest to be created, Thou createst, Thou re-createst created things: O Blessed Trinity!

Thou, Father, art the foundation to all, Thou art the life of the Son, Thou art the salvation of the Spirit: O Blessed Trinity!

The substance is the Life itself, the Life itself is He who is, is the eternal salvation; therefore the Father is the Son, and the Holy Spirit: O Blessed Trinity!

Thou art the source of being to All, the form of the Son, the reformation of the Spirit: O Blessed Trinity!

Thou, God, art Father of the Infinite and Definite: O Blessed Trinity!

Thou, O Son, because Thou art Life, are infinite; because Thou callest back life into the dead, art definite; Thou art Father both of the infinite and of the definite: O Blessed Trinity!

Thou also, O Holy Spirit, because Thou art salvation, art definite, and because the Determiner in that Thou containest what is infinite, Thou art Father both of the infinite and of the definite:

O Blessed Trinity!

If therefore Unity is thrice Father, yet all are from Thee, O God, Paternity, both one God and omnis Paternity: O Blessed Trinity!

- Thou, O God, hast created [begotten] the Word, hence God is Father, and because the Word is created [begotten] by Thee, and because Thou Thyself art in Him, the Logos is God. These two Thou hast made one by the Holy Spirit; Thou art therefore made one and simple in three, Spirit, Word, God: O Blessed Trinity!
- The First, Being, the Second, Being, the Third, Being, and the Three Simple: O Blessed Trinity!
- The entire Being is substance, the enformed Being is substance; the enformed substance is known either to Itself alone or to the Others, or to Itself and to the Others: O Blessed Trinity!
- The Substance is God; the Form, the Son; the Notion, the Spirit: O Blessed Trinity!
- Thou, God, art the first Being, the true Being: therefore Thou, God, art the whole and entire substance: O Blessed Trinity!
- The second Being, all form, is Christ; but the entire substance, since it is entire, is form and substance: therefore, since it is form, Christ is also God.
- The third Being is the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit is the Demonstration of the entire existence. Yet demonstration demonstrates only what is known. But in things divine, to know is to have. For knowledge is itself likewise substance. Therefore the Holy Spirit contains God, contains Christ, Whom He demonstrates: O Blessed Trinity!
- Thou art the boundless, infinite, invisible God, but immense, infinite to others, and to others invisible: to Thyself bounded, to Thyself finite, to Thyself visible. Hence therefore Thou hast also form, hence also Word: Thou art the same, because the Word is the form: and because the form, Thou art the exemplar for Thyself, and the exemplar is the Holy Spirit: therefore the same thing is God, and Word, and Holy Spirit: O Blessed Spirit!
- Thou, O visible Son, art universal and the form of all: for since Thou vivifiest all, form is produced from life: yet the form is always in the substance and the form is all knowledge: therefore in substance Thou art God, in form the Word, in knowledge the Holy Ghost: O Blessed Trinity!
- Thou also, Holy Spirit, are the notion: for every notion of the form is also the notion of the substance: therefore Thou knowest God and has the form of God: and therefore Thou art God, and Son, and Holy Spirit: O Blessed Trinity!
- To be Thou art God; to be a spirit, Christ; to appear that Thou are a spirit, the Paraclete: O Blessed Trinity!
- Hence the Father sent Christ, Christ the Paraclete, that Christ might

- appear by the Paraclete, the Father by Christ: O Blessed Trinity!
- God is a secret and hidden substance: Thou art, O God, a secret and hidden form! God is a secret and hidden notion: hence, O God, Thou art the architype of beings: O Blessed Trinity!
- Thou, O Word, art now a known and evident substance: and because known and evident, but yet a form, because Thou art the form of the Father, hence Thou hast substance. Therefore the Father is in Thee, because the Father is substance. And the same substance, for there is not any other substance. If therefore the Word is evident form, the form is substance: and the evident form and the evident substance is the notion: Thou art the same—Word and God and Holy Spirit: O Blessed Trinity!
- Every notion is knowledge, all knowledge is substance, and knowledge itself is the very form: therefore, O Holy Spirit, Thou art the known form, and the evident substance, but the saving and regenerating, not the immanent or generating substance: O Blessed Trinity!
- Therefore one substance is God, Word and Spirit, abiding in Three, and existing thrice in all Three, and this is both form and substance, thus each Simple singularity is tripled: O Blessed Trinity!
- Thou, O Unknown God, Thou art an incomprehensible God, yet
  Thou art the God of the unknown and incomprehensible, as if
  a form exists without a form. Hence for a Being with being,
  Thou art called rather cessation and rest. Hence the form of
  lessening knowledge is [the form] of understanding: (?) O
  Blessed Trinity!
- Thou, O Word, since Thou art the form, art the form of the Father: and therefore Thou art the Image of the Father. And as Thou art the form of the Father, Thou hast form and substance too, because both form and substance are the same: hence the Father is in Thee, and Thou in the Father. And because Thou art form, there is notion, therefore, also substance known to Thee, from this the Father also is known. Truly since Thou art begotten of Him in His breast, therefore Thou too art truly true Being—the Being of Being; but the entire Being is always in the Three: O Blessed Trinity!
- Thou, Holy Ghost, art the bond: now a bond is whatever joins two: so that Thou mayest join all things, first Thou joinest Two, and art that third Bond of the Two, and that bond is nothing separate from any one, since Thou makest Two One: O Blessed Trinity!

Three therefore are One, and therefore a Trinity: and therefore the Trinity is that Three are One: O Blessed Trinity!

Hence the most high Father sends forth the Word; being sent He creates and ministers all things, taking up flesh and the holy cross for our salvation, returning in triumph to the Father, and sent another Being to us to save us: O Blessed Trinity!

Christ is always with God according to substance: for He is always
Life. But since He is Life, action begins in order that He
may act, that is Christ is born: yet from all eternity God and
Christ act: from eternity therefore the God-Christ is born: O
Blessed Trinity!

He Who ascended into heaven is Christ: He Who descended from heaven is the same. Therefore Christ is not from man, but is Christ for man: O Blessed Trinity!

He is our God, He is the One God, He is the one and only God:
O Blessed Trinity!

Him we all adore, and Him alone, one Father and Son and Holy Spirit: O Blessed Trinity!

Pardon our sins, grant us eternal life, give us peace and glory: O Blessed Trinity!

Free us, and save us, justify us: O Blessed Trinity!

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# NUMBERS: IN THEIR RELATION TO SCIENCE, MYSTERY OR FATALITY.

metic, algebra or mathematics, nor the accountant adding up his double, treble or quadruple columns of figures, nor the millionaire intent on counting his coupons or his rentals, has any conception of the mystery involved in numbers, and still less of the force attributed to them in the superstitions, the mystic religions and occult philosophies of the past. So unaccountable and puzzling to the common intellect are the canons governing numbers, and so surprising or bewildering are the results of innumerable calculations and problems, so whimsical the alliances shown to exist between certain numbers and certain names, or persons or historical events, that it would be strange if the mass of mankind, especially in unenlightened times, had not conceived a superstitious awe and fear of these familiar and everyday signs and numerals. To minds

educated in numbers and in numeration there are many problems, answers and results of undoubted correctness, which they cannot fathom or explain, and even mathematicians have to concede much in their own minds in order to arrive at an explanation acceptable to themselves.

Among philosophers and founders of the religious schools of the ancients, who associated numbers with the most hidden mysteries of their philosophy, or the most sublime secrets of their religion, or who undertook to solve and explain the theories of the creation, of life and of society by numbers, the most learned, mysterious and plausible was Pythagoras. He traveled much in pursuit of learning, and he thus visited Egypt, Arabia, Phœnicia, India, Babylonia, Gaul and far off India. From these countries he returned to Greece with a mind stored with arithmetical and mathematical learning. From Aristotle we learn that Pythagoras built up the essences of all things upon numerical relations, that all existences find their principle in numbers, and that the world subsists by the rhythmical order of its elements. Nature is possessed universally of two essential elements, the finite and the infinite, and hence we have the fundamental opposites, one and many, odd and even, right and left, male and female, good and bad, and so on indefinitely. He regarded unity as the essence of numbers, containing in itself the universal germ and identical with Deity. It was he who conceived the notion of Trinity, for unity proceeding from itself begets duality, and returning upon itself begets trinity, a theory bearing a striking resemblance to the Christian view of the Divine Trinity.

Proceeding in this method of reasoning, Pythagoras contended that unity "added to itself produces the line; a third point placed on the other two gives the surface, and a fourth point placed on the other three gives the pyramid or solid. The quadrate or tetractys and the decade are like unity, sacred numbers and first principles." Still further proceeding, the Pythagorians applied the principle of numbers to every development of the universe, and to every moral and intellectual principle; and thus they "called justice a square number, intending by this to express the correspondence between action and suffering or retribution; each of the four elements, earth, fire, air, ether, had its proper representative in his system." The earth was represented by the cubes, fire by the pyramid, air by the octohedron, water by the icosahedron and ether by the dodecahedron. Even the learned and illustrious Frederick von Schlegel, a Christian philosopher of the nineteenth century, alludes, not without approbation, to the Pythagorian theories of numbers, and thus writes: "But with regard to the notion and its object, it is unquestionably of the highest importance to determine whether it be absolutely simple or

compound. If the latter, it may suggest many questions. If double, it may fall into an intrinsic contrariety, or be involved in a twofold want of harmony. If it numbers three constituents, we may have to inquire whether, in its triple energy, it enjoys a living unity of operation. Or if possessed of four opposite directions, it may be involved in binary contrarieties and double discord. Or again, we might have to inquire whether the essential accession of some fifth element forms the living centre to hold together and reunite the four, which otherwise are divergent or apart; or whether the whole, in triple couplets, or a double trine, forms a six; or whether seven arises from a union of a trine and quatrain, either in the world of thought, or the realities of life and outward experience. And again, eight may be a double square in the one of the other relation. Or yet once more, we may have to inquire whether, in the still advancing inward reckoning and development of life, nine arise from a thrice repeated triple energy. And lastly, whether all these first elementary numbers are in various ways perfected and combined together in the decade."

That so learned a man as Pythagoras should have attributed to numbers qualities of a religious, social, political, medicinal and fatalistic nature, assigning to each number its own peculiar characteristics and powers, in an age so enlightened, and that he should have more or less been followed by others of the most enlightened philosophers, would seem incredible to this utilitarian and commercial age. We will let his writings speak for themselves.

The unit or monad is the principle and end of all; it is this sublime knot which binds together the chain of causes; it is the symbol of identity, of equality, of existence, of conservation and of general harmony. Having no parts, the monad represents Divinity; it announces also order, peace and tranquillity, which are founded on unity of sentiments; consequently O N E is a good principle.

"The number Two, or the dyad, the origin of contrasts, is the symbol of diversity, of inequality, of division and of separation. Two is accordingly an evil principle, a number of bad augury, characterizing disorder, confusion and change.

"Three, or the triad, is the first of unequals; it is the number containing the most sublime mysteries, for everything is composed of three substances; it represents God, the soul of the world, the spirit of man.

"Four, or the tetrad, as the first mathematical power, is also one of the chief elements; it represents the generating virtue, whence come all combinations; it is the most perfect of numbers; it is the root of all things. It is holy by nature, since it constitutes the Divine essence, by recalling His unity, His power, His goodness

and His wisdom, the four perfections which especially characterize God. Consequently, Pythagorians swear by the quartenary number, which gives the human soul its eternal nature.

"The number *Five*, or the pentrad, has a peculiar force in sacred expiations; it is everything; it stops the power of poisons and is redoubled by evil spirits.

"The number Six, or the hexad, is a fortunate number, and it derives its merit from the first sculptors having divided the face into six portions, but according to the Chaldeans, the reason is because God created the world in six days.

"Seven, or the heptad, is a number very powerful for good or for evil. It belongs especially to sacred things.

"The number Eight, or the octad, is the first cube, that is to say, squared in all senses, as a die, proceeding from its base two, or even number; so is man four-square, or perfect.

"The number Nine, or the ennead, being the multiple of three, should be regarded as sacred.

"Finally, Ten, or the decad, is the measure of all, since it contains all the numeric relations and harmonies. As the reunion of the four first numbers, it plays an eminent part, since all the branches of science, all nomenclatures, emanate from and retire into it."

So, too, Aristotle, Plato and the ancient philosophers generally, expended great study and thought on the intricate theories and analyses of numbers. But modern philosophers have made the subject as clear as human genius can render it, without, however, solving the apparent mysteries still popularly attributed to numbers. How near the transcendental must not that remarkable thought and saying of St. Augustine, Malebranche and the whole Platonic school approach that numbers perceived by the pure understanding are something superior to those perceived by the senses.

All agree that unity, or one, is no number, but is the first and most essential element of numbers, for all numbers, however immense, are reducible to their units. The invention of the signs, or figures, by which numbers are represented is important beyond ordinary conjecture, and without them, strange as it may seem, it would be almost impossible to count at all. Condillac has pointed out the impossibility of counting beyond three or four without the aid of signs to represent the numbers. Balmes in his Fundamental Philosophy says: "If, indeed, we had no sign but that of unity, we could readily count two, saying one and one. But it is not so easy to be certain of the exactness of our repetition when we have to count three, by saying one and one and one; still, this is not difficult. It is more so to count four and next to impossible to go as high as ten. If we undertake to abstract the signs, we shall find that

it is impossible to form an idea of ten by repeating one; and that it will be alike impossible, if we employ no sign, to make sure that we have repeated one exactly ten times." This profound scholar then proceeds to demonstrate how the mind is aided by the signs of numbers, and our own experience shows how easy it is, with the aid of signs representing numbers, to count millions, and how the skilful accountant in one of our banks can count up and put down the result of several columns of figures at one and the same time. But what would our philosophers have thought had they seen, as we have, a natural and untutored arithematician solving mentally and instantly the most difficult problems in numbers? In most cases the process in the mind is aided by the conventional figures, and even by the names of the different numbers, which latter are in fact but signs standing for the numbers, signs which we now represent by the more convenient signs of the Arabic figures in universal use. In confirmation of this may be cited the method of teaching arithmetic to the blind, which is called palpable arithmetic, in which the figures representing numbers are taught by means of cards or other surfaces having the figures raised or relieved on them.

There are sacred numbers in the traditions of all early nations, especially in the Asiatic races. The number three plays an important part in the traditions of Asia and in the philosophy of the Platonic school, because it was almost universally regarded as the image of the attributes of God. Seven also was universally regarded as a sacred number.

In the Scriptures,

One, the symbol of Unity, is regarded as a symbol of love and of unity of the Godhead.

Two represents the hypostatic union, the union of Christ's human mature to the hypostesis of person of God the Word.

Three is a number of great sacredness. The sacred candlesticks had three branches; the height of the altar was commanded to be three cubits; "the mighty ones" of the Scripture were three; so the Lord also called the three Kings; so, too, were three tabernacles mentioned in St. Luke and St. Mark; in I. Corinthians are mentioned the three theological virtues of Faith, Hope and Charity; and this number is held especially sacred as the representative of the Trinity; and the followers of Brahma regarded Three as a sacred number.

Four is a number frequently mentioned in sacred writings; such as the four quarters of the globe; the four winds of heaven. Lazarus laid in the grave four days; the soldiers made four parts of the seamless garment of Christ. So also we have the four evangelists, the four sins crying to heaven for vengeance, and the four cardinal virtues of Prudence, Justice, Fortitude and Temperance.

Five also is a noted number; for Benjamin gave five changes of raiment and presented five of his brethren to Pharaoh; the thief was required to restore five oxen for the one ox stolen; five rams constituted a sacrifice of peace-offerings; David took five smooth stones for the combat with the giant; and of the golden candlesticks five stood on the right side and five on the left; so there were five loaves that miraculously fed the multitude of five thousand in the desert; the pool of Bethesda had five porches; there are five Books of Moses; and the five Sacred Wounds of Christ.

Six is noted as the number of fingers Samson had on both his hands and of the toes on his feet; there were six cities of refuge; the prince was required to offer to the Lord six lambs without blemish; six boards formed the sides of the tabernacle; six branches on several occasions came out of the sacred candlesticks; there are six commandments of the Church, and six is the number of the sins against the Holy Ghost.

Seven is the number of the greatest sacredness. It is used in the Scriptures as the number of perfection, and in the history and religion of the Jews the greatest number of events and mysterious circumstances are represented by this number. God consecrated the Seventh Day, on which He ceased from the work of Creation. and in the Epistle to the Hebrews the Apostle likens the seventh day of rest to the rest eternal. Not only do the Jews honor this day throughout the world, but also every seventh year is consecrated to the rest of the earth as the sabbatical year, and the seven times seventh year is the year of the Jubilee. The week contains seven days, and often in prophetic style signifies seven years Jacob served his father-in-law, Leban, seven years for each of his daughters; and the dream of Pharaoh was full of sevens. The golden candlesticks also on other occasions had seven branches; seven trumpets. seven priests that sounded them, and seven days to surround the walls of Jerico. In the Revelation are the seven churches, seven candlesticks, seven spirits, seven stars, seven lamps, seven seals, seven angels, seven vials, seven plagues and a great many other sevens; and indeed seven stands for an indefinite number and frequently thus means several.

In the Christian dispensation we have the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, the seven dolors of the Blessed Virgin Mary. Also among the sects there are the Seven Day Adventists and the Seven Day Baptists. Milton writes:

Of every beast, and bird, and insect small, Come sevens and pairs.

And the sevenfold and seven-score are expressions most frequently met with.

The figure Eight frequently occurs in Scripture, but the most remarkable one is the eight days allowed before circumcision, and in the New Testament we have the Eight Beatitudes.

The figure *Nine* derives its sacred character from the sacred *Three*, of which it is a multiple, and nine was the number of animals ordered to be sacrificed on special occasions in the Old Testament. The number *Nine* was also consecrated in the Buddhist religion, and is regarded with reverence by Moguls and Chinese, the latter of whom bow nine times on entering the presence of their Emperor, who is a sacred person.

Ten represents the number of years Abraham dwelt in Canaan; Joseph's brethren were ten, and this number is frequently the measure of sacrificial victims, of historical events in Scripture, history and, more important than all, is the number of the Commandments.

Eleven is a frequent Scriptural number from Jacob's eleven sons to the eleven Apostles left after the loss of Judas. "But Peter standing up with the eleven said to them," etc.

The number Twelve has the preëminence of representing the twelve Apostles.

Thirteen is regarded as an unlucky number, because the thirteenth at the Last Supper was Judas, who betrayed his Master. The present writer once sat down at dinner with an educated company at the table of a distinguished Ambassador at Washington, and as soon as it was discovered that there were thirteen guests at table the banquet was suspended and a messenger was sent in search of another guest, who was soon brought. On the other hand, a Thirteen Club has been in operation several years in New York city, having for its object to overcome this superstition by dining always with thirteen at table and on the thirteenth day of the month. These two numbers, Twelve and Thirteen, bear a special relation to each other which will be mentioned below.

Fourteen has proved itself in history to be an eventful number for some of the Kings of France, and especially of Henry IV., and with other royal Henries. Thus the 14th of May, 1029, Henry I. of France was consecrated and on the 14th of May, 1610, Henry IV. was assassinated by Ravaillac, who seeing the King's carriage becoming locked with a cart, on account of the narrowness of the street, took advantage of the accident and stabbed him to death. Fourteen letters form the name of Henri de Bourbon, and he was the fourteenth King bearing the titles of France and Navarre. The 14th of December, 1533, making fourteen centuries, fourteen decades and fourteen years after the birth of Christ, Henry IV. was born,

the ciphers of that year 1553, when added up, give the number fourteen. The 14th of May, 1554, King Henry II. gave orders for the enlargement of the Rue de la Ferronnierie. The failure to carry out this royal command caused the death of Henry IV. in the same street four times fourteen years afterwards. The 14th of May, 1552, was the date of the birth of Marguerite de Valois, wife of the same King, Henry IV. On the 14th of May, 1588, Paris and the Parisians revolted against Henry III, at the instigation of Henry of Guise. On the 14th of March, 1500, Henry IV. gained the Battle of Ivry. On the 14th of May, 1590, the same Henry was repulsed from the Fauxbourgs of Paris. On the 14th of November, 1500, the Sixteen took the oath to die rather than serve Henry IV. On the 14th of November, 1502, Parliament registered the Papal Bull giving power to the Legate to nominate another King of France in place of Henry IV., who had violated his coronation oath and proved no longer worthy of the throne. On the 14th of December, 1500, the Duke of Savov was reconciled with Henry. On the 14th of September, 1606, the Dauphin of France, afterwards Louis XIII., was baptized. Henry IV. lived four times fourteen years, fourteen weeks and four times fourteen days, which equals fifty-six years and five months as recorded in his life. On the 14th of May, 1643, Louis XIII., son of Henry IV., died; this was not only the same day of the same month his father died, but the date, 1643, when its ciphers are added together, gives the number fourteen, just as the ciphers of the date of his father's birth gave fourteen.

Fourteen was also a lucky or an unlucky number for some of the Louises of France. Louis XIV. ascended the French throne in 1643, and add the ciphers of this date together and the result is fourteen. He died in the year 1715, and by adding the ciphers of this date together again we have fourteen. He lived seventy-seven years; now add these ciphers together and again we have fourteen. Louis XV. ascended the French throne in the same year; he died in 1774, a date in which two fourteens occur, the one made by the two extremes brought together, 1+4, making 14, and the sum of the two means 7+7=14. Louis XVI. had reigned fourteen years when he convoked the States General, which was to bring about the French Revolution. The number of years between the assassination of Henry IV. and the dethronement of Louis XVI. is divisible by fourteen. Louis XVII. died in 1794; the extreme digits of the date are fourteen, and the first two digits give his dynastic number, seventeen. The restoration of the Bourbons occurred in 1814, in which date the two extremes are fourteen, and the sum of all the digits is fourteen.

Several others of the Kings of France have their dynastic numbers singularly marked with strange numerical results, as is seen by adding the ciphers composing the year of the birth or of the death of some of the Kings of the third race, and the result in each case will be the titular or dynastic number of the King. Of this singular rule we will give a few examples. Louis IX. was born in 1215; now by adding together the four ciphers of this date you have IX. Charles VII. was born in 1402; now the sum of 1+4+2 makes VII. Louis XII. was born in 1461, and again 1+4+6+1=XII. Henry IV. died in 1610, and again 1+6+1 is twice IV. Louis XIV. was crowned in 1643, 1+6+4+3=XIV. He died in 1715, 1+7+1+5=XIV. His age was 77, 7+7=XIV. Louis XVIII. was born in 1755, 1+7+5+5=XVIII. It is, further, a singular feature of these numbers that the last XVIII. is double the titular number of King Louis IX., to whom it first applies, and as there are six Kings to whom this rule has applied, the last titular number, XVIII., is three times VI.

History seems to present the most curious results of numbers to such as have the ingenuity and industry to work out the calculations which historical dates and events afford. Coincidences of the most singular character are thus discovered, and these have confirmed many believers in the fatality of numbers. Now here is a calculation of strange consequences to Robespierre, Napoleon and Charles X. Robespierre fell in 1794, Napoleon in 1815 and Charles X. in 1830. The strange coincidence resulting from these dates is the sum of the digits composing them, which added to the dates themselves give the date of the successor to power. Robespierre fell in 1794. Now we have 1+7+9+4=21, and 1794+21=1815, the date of the fall of Napoleon. Napoleon fell in 1815. Now we have 1+8+1+5=15, and 1815+15=1830, which last is the date of the fall of Charles X.

Not even the Popes have escaped historical calculations of the supposed fatality of numbers, for by certain calculations, based on their titular numbers, the length of the reigning Pope's life was supposed to be determined, but the operation of this rule is singularly confined to the first half of a century. For solving this problem add the titular number of the Pope to that of his predecessor and to this add ten, and the result will be the year of the Pope's death. Examples: Pius VII. succeeded Pius VI.; 6+7=13, to which add 10, and the result is 23; Pius VII. died in 1823; Leo XII. succeeded Pius VII.; 12+7+10=29; Leo XII. died in 1829; Pius VIII. succeeded Leo XII.; 8+12+10=30; Pius VIII. died in 1830. The next Pope, Gregory XVI., escaped this rule; for by it he should have died in 1834, whereas it was not until 1846. Pius IX. and

Leo XIII. are Pontiffs of the second half of the century, and they escape the rule. The number three is also a noted one at the coronations of the Popes; for then they wear for the first time the tiara, the mitre with three crowns; three times a bundle of flax is burned before the Pope in the procession, and the admonition three times uttered: "Holy Father, thus passeth away the glory of the world;" and the new Pope gives to all present the triple benediction.

The death of Pius IX. was confidently predicted as destined to occur before the 23d of August, 1871, for there had never been a Pope who had reigned twenty-five years, two months and seven days, and it had become a tradition of the Papacy that no Pope would ever reach those reigning days. Pius IX. was told that he would not reach the days of Peter, but he greatly exceeded them and reigned longer than any of the Popes. Pope Leo XIII. exceeded Peter's reign by two months and ten days; Hadrian I., who reigns of Popes after St. Peter were those of Pius VI., who reigned twenty-four years, six months and fourteen days; Hadrian I., who reigned twenty-three years, ten months and seventeen days; Pius VII., who reigned twenty-three years, five months and six days; Alexander III., who reigned twenty-one years, eleven months and twenty-three days; St. Sylvester I., who reigned twenty-one years and four days; Pius IX., who reigned thirty-one years, seven months and twenty-two days; Leo XIII., who reigned twenty-five years, four months and seventeen days. So that it was said by the biographer of Pius IX. that future Popes should be warned that they would not reach the days of Pius IX. The custom is now dropped.

History also furnishes us with the following extraordinary numerical curiosity. In 1830 the French Chamber of Deputies contained 402 members and was divided into two opposing parties; the larger party was composed of 221 members and was commonly called La queue de Robespierre, and the small party was composed of 181 members, and was called Les Honnêtes Gens; the former advocated the Revolution of July, while the latter favored no change; and the result was the restoration of order after the three memorable days of July. How it happened that our numbers entered into a conspiracy with the alphabet to produce the remarkable freak we are going to mention is not for us to say, and it is a problem beyond the explanation of mathematicians or arithematicians. Now assign to the letters of the alphabet from A to Z a number for each letter from I to 25; then write La queue de Robespierre and Les Honnêtes Gens in two vertical lines; then write the number belonging to each letter to the right of it, and the sum of each column will be the number of members belonging respectively to the two aforesaid parties in the Chamber of Deputies at that time.

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The number 13 has played some curious freaks in history. Louis XIV., whose title before his accession to the throne was Loys de Bourbon, was married to Anne of Austria, Infanta of Spain, on October 25, 1615. Now, the name Loys (or Louis) de Bourbon contains thirteen letters and the name of Anne d' Autriche contains the same number. Louis and Anne were both thirteen years old when their marriage was decided upon; he was the thirteenth King of France bearing the name of Louis, and she was the thirteenth Infanta of Spain bearing the name of Anne of Austria. But numbers gifted or possessed with fatal qualities have crossed the Channel and the Pyrrenees, invading England and Spain. Skakespeare died on April 23, 1616, and Cervantes, the great Spanish poet, died on the same day of the same month in the same year. The 20th of May was associated with the greatest events in the life of Charles II., who was born on the 29th of May, 1630, was restored to the English throne on May 29, 1660, his fleet was defeated by the Dutch on May 29, 1672, and the Rebellion of the Covenanters broke out on May 29, 1679.

But it would hardly seem strange if the good but unfortunate Louis XVI. had his fatal numbers. He was married at Vienna by sending the ring on April 21, 1770; on June 21, in the same year, occurred the fatal festivities of his marriage; on January 21, 1781, the birth of the Dauphin was celebrated by a grand fête at the Hotel de Ville; on the 21st of June, 1791, took place the flight to Varennes, and on January 21, 1793, he was executed on the scaffold. So also is December 2 a noted day in the history of the Bonapartes. On December 2, 1804, Napoleon I. was crowned; on December 2, 1805, he won his greatest victory at Austerlitz; on December 2, 1851, Napoleon II. made himself master of France, and on December 2, 1852, he was proclaimed Emperor.

There is also a mediæval tradition that the number 3 is a fatal number for the English monarchs and that there shall not be more than three sovereigns in succession without a revolution. reigns of William I., William II. and Henry I. were followed by the revolution of Stephen. The reigns of Henry II., Richard I. and John were followed by the invasion of Louis, Dauphin of France, who claimed the throne. Next came Henry III., Edward I. and Edward III., the last of whom was dethroned and put to death. The reigns of Edward III. and of Richard II. were followed by the dethronement of the latter. The reigns of Henry IV., Henry V. and Henry VI. were followed by the passage of the crown to the house of York. The reigns of Edward IV., Edward V. and of Richard III. were followed by the claim and winning of the crown by Henry Tudor. The reigns of Henry VII., Henry VIII. and of Edward VI. were followed by the usurpation of Lady Jane Grey. The reigns of Mary I. and of Elizabeth were followed by the passage of the crown to the House of Stuart. The reigns of James I. and Charles I. were followed by the Revolution. The reigns of Charles II. and of James II. were followed by the invasion of William of Orange. The reigns of William of Orange and Mary II. and of Anne were followed by the arrival of the House of Brunswick. The reigns of George I., George II. and of George III. were followed by the American Revolution in the reign of the last. George IV., William IV. and Victoria; the reign of Victoria was extraordinarily long and prosperous and the Prince of Wales, as we have seen, as Edward VII. ascended the throne in a time of profound peace and amidst the plaudits of his people. The spell was broken.

Saturday, the seventh day of the week, has proved an unlucky day to the English Kings of comparatively late dates; William of Orange died on Saturday, March 18, 1702; Anne died on Saturday, August 1, 1704; George I. died on Saturday, June 10, 1727; George II. died on Saturday, October 25, 1760; George III. died on Saturday,

urday, January 30, 1820, and George IV. died on Saturday, June 26, 1830.

Passing from the coincidences of numbers and their historical fatality, there are certain qualities of numbers which cannot fail to impress the uninitiated with a feeling of surprise, if not of superstition. The number 9, for instance, possesses the property of producing always from the digits the product 9 when 9 is multiplied by 2, by 3, by 4, by 5, by 6, etc.

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2 \times 9 - 18, and 1 + 8 = 9

3 \times 9 - 27, and 2 + 7 = 9

4 \times 9 - 36, and 3 + 6 = 9

5 \times 9 - 45, and 4 + 5 = 9

6 \times 9 - 54, and 5 + 4 = 9

3 \times 9 - 63, and 6 + 3 = 9

3 \times 9 - 72, and 7 + 2 = 9

3 \times 9 - 81, and 8 + 1 = 9

10 \times 9 - 90, and 9 + 0 = 9
```

When we multiply  $9 \times 11$  it makes 99, the sum of the digits being 18 instead of 9, but even here the sum of the digits 1+8=9. After this we can resume the multiplications to any length, and the product is always 9.

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    9 × 12 = 108, and 1 + 0 + 8 = 9
    9 × 15 = 185, and 1 + 3 + 5 = 9

    9 × 13 = 117, and 1 + 1 + 7 = 9
    9 × 16 = 144, and 1 + 4 + 4 = 9

    9 × 14 = 126, and 1 + 2 + 6 = 9
    9 × 17 = 153, and 1 + 5 + 3 = 9
```

The foregoing property of numbers was discovered by W. Green, who died in 1794; but M. de Maivan discovered another singular property of numbers, as follows: If the order of the digits expressing a number be changed, and this number be subtracted from the former, the remainder will be 9, and, being a multiple, the sum of its digits will be 9. Take, for instance, the number 21, reverse the digits and you have 12; subtract 12 from 21, and the remainder is 9. Take 63, reverse the digits and you have 36, subtract 36 from 63 and you have 27, a multiple of 9, and also 2+7=9.

Also the number 13, which is the reverse of 31; the difference between these numbers is 18, which is twice 9.

The same property found in two numbers thus changed is to be found in the same numbers raised to any power. Take 21 and 12; the square of 21 is 441, and the square of 12 is 144; subtract 144 from 441, and the remainder is 297, a multiple of 9; also, the digits expressing these powers added together give 9. The cube of 21 is 9261, and that of 12 is 1728; their difference is 7533, which is also a multiple of 9.

There are other numbers which possess extraordinary properties, such as 37. This number, when multiplied by 3, or a multiple of 3 up to 27, gives the product of three digits precisely similar. The knowledge of this property makes the multiplication of 37 quite easy, by multiplying merely the first cipher of the multiplierad, by the first cipher of the multipliers; it is thus unnecessary to proceed further, it being sufficient to write again twice to the right hand

he cipher obtained, so that the same digit will stand in the unit, tens and hundreds places. This quality of 37, and the facilitated method of multiplying it, are both illustrated in the following table:

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37 multiplied by 3 gives 111, and 3 times 1 is equal to 87 multiplied by 6 gives 222, and 8 times 2 is equal to
37 multiplied by 9 gives 333, and 3 37 multiplied by 12 gives 444, and 3
                                                                         times 3 is equal to
                                                                         times
                                                                                         is
                                                                                               equal
                                                                                                            to 12
37 multiplied by 15 gives 555, and 3 times 37 multiplied by 18 gives 666, and 3 times 37 multiplied by 21 gives 777, and 3 times 37 multiplied by 24 gives 888, and 3 times 37 multiplied by 27 gives 999, and 3 times
                                                                       times
                                                                                               equal to 15
                                                                                         is equal to 18
                                                                         times
                                                                                     7 is equal to 21
                                                                                         is
                                                                                                equal
                                                                                                             to
                                                                                                equal
                                                                                     9
                                                                                          is
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The formation of magical squares, though accountable on principles well known to great arithematicians and mathematicians, whereby numbers the most different, when added, produce the same sum, has attracted considerable astonishment and wonder among ordinary mortals. Even great arithematicians and mathematicians have written intricate, ingenious and exhaustive treatises on the subject. The following examples of magical squares will suffice to illustrate the subject:

2	7	6	1	2	8	4	1	7	18	19	25
9	5	1	2	8	2	8	18	24	5	6	12
4		8	. 4	1	4	1	10	11	17	28	4
			8	4	1	2	23	3	•	15	16
							14	20	21	2	

Not only will the numbers added up give the same result from horizontal and vertical lines, but also if the two diagonal lines of numbers are added up.

The late Herbert Spencer, one of the profoundest of thinkers, in writing shortly before his death on the most desirable kinds of knowledge, enumerates as high among them that "telescopic" range of eye and perception acquired by men leading an outdoor life in contact with danger or in pursuit of prey, and that practiced capacity of eye and mental acumen enabling the accountant to add up several columns of figures simultaneously.

We have shown how the greatest men have stood aghast, yet fascinated, by this mystery. We have cited Pythagoras, Aristotle and Plato among pagan philosophers; St. Augustine, Origen and Von Schlegel among Christian mystics, students of symbolism; the power of numbers over the destinies of nations, dynasties, kings, queens, emperors, republics and Popes; their effect on births, deaths, families, races, coronations, calendars, centuries, years, months, weeks, days, hours, minutes, seconds; have shown their freaks and sports with destiny.

Numbers exert to-day a greater influence over and are of greater

necessity and utility in all the interests of civilized life than any other factor. What do they represent? What do they not represent? In their legitimate sphere they are infallible in sciences and commerce and in all human dealings.

The solution may not be sought in the doctrine of chances; nor in a delusion of the mind; nor in a superstition of the soul; nor in occult mystery. Supposed mysteries are vanishing every day before modern science like mists before the sun. Thus, perhaps, may yet be cleared up a problem which Pythagoras, Aristotle and Plato left unsolved.

A brief further notice of the numbers 12 and 13 seems necessary in conclusion in order to present them in their true historical light, freed from all legendary or erroneous impressions. These two numbers are so associated historically that they had best be considered together.

While the Apostles were selected by our Saviour in His life time, twelve in number, the Divine Founder of the Church finally constituted the Apostolic College thirteen. On the apostasy and suicide of Judas Iscariot, the Apostolic College was recruited again to twelve by the election of St. Matthias. In Acts i., 25-26, we read: "To take the place of this ministry, and apostleship, from which Judas hath by transgression fallen, that he might go to his own place. And they gave them lots, and the lot fell upon Matthias, and he was numbered with the eleven Apostles." He who had a first appointed the Apostles twelve, after His ascension into heaven, raised the number to thirteen by the miraculous conversion of St. Paul, and calling him with His Divine voice, and his subsequent appointment as the Apostle of the Gentiles, for in Acts i., 21, we read: "And He said to me: Go; for unto the nations afar off will I send thee." Christianity thus began its mission to a pagan world, and conquered. Thus the number 13 became the most lucky of numbers. As Christians we hail it as such.

Again, the number 13 has an immense civic prestige. Our country was founded with original colonies, thirteen. Our nation was founded by thirteen independent States. Our national flag and coins make the number thirteen our national and emblematic number. In the earliest days of the American Revolution the flags and emblems used and displayed were as various as local prevailing sentiments suggested. No two were alike.

The number 13 as thus used is traceable to the custom of many of the newspapers of that day in displaying at their head cuts representing a snake divided into thirteen parts, each bearing the abbreviation of one of the thirteen colonies, with the motto beneath "Join or Die," and the snake was generally represented

with thirteen rattles, and it was sometimes depicted on a field of thirteen alternate red and white or red and blue stripes. The snake evidently represented the thirteen colonies turning upon their oppressor. The motto "Join or Die" was the announcement of the Union. Commodore Esek Hopkins about this time or before displayed on his ship a yellow ensign bearing the device of a rattle-snake in the attitude of striking, with the motto, "Don't tread on me."

At Cambridge, General Washington first raised the flag called the "great union" on January 2, 1776, consisting of thirteen alternate red and white stripes of our present national flag, but with the crosses of St. George and St. Andrew emblazoned on the blue canton in place of the stars, for the colonies were still a part of the British Empire. This flag was also hoisted on the west bastion of Fort Moultrie on June 28, 1776.

The colors of the thirteen stripes are supposed to have been suggested by the red flag of the army and the white flag of the navy previously in use, but the thirteen stripes are believed to have been first used on a banner presented in 1774 or 1775 to the Philadelphia troop of light horse by Captain Abraham Markoe, which is still reverently preserved by that troop. Although the emblems of the Colonial Union with Britain became inappropriate after the Declaration of Independence, in 1776, they were singularly retained until the following year; but the thirteen stripes were always in the On June 14, 1777, Congress regulated and prescribed the legal American flag by enacting "that the flag of the thirteen United States be thirteen stripes, alternate red and white; that the union be thirteen stars, white in a blue field, representing a new constellation." The thirteen stars, though not so required by the law, were arranged in a circle. Laws were passed from time to time providing for an additional star as new States were admitted to the Union. It was not, however, until 1817-1818, when a permanent design for the flag was suggested by Captain Samuel C. Reid, a distinguished naval officer, famed for his defense of the brig General Armstrong against a superior British force in Fayal Roads in 1814, who recommended that the stripes be reduced to the original thirteen, and the adoption of stars equal to the number of the States, formed into the shape of one large star, and that a new star be added on the 4th of July after the 4th of July succeeding the admission of each new State. This suggestion of Captain Reid became the law of the flag on April 4, 1818, with the exception of the plan of arranging the stars, and although this law did not go into effect until the following 4th of July, 1818, such was the national veneration for the number 13 that there was a universal demand for unfurling the new flag on the first 13th of a month thereafter occurring, and the flag so suggested by Captain Reid and adopted by Congress was hoisted on the House of Representatives at Washington on April 13 of that year, the first unfurling of our present national emblem. Without going through the details of law or custom, it is now an invariable rule to add another star to the flag every time a new State is admitted to the Union. But the original thirteen are still there. In 1859 Congress passed a vote of thanks to Captain Reid, the designer of the flag. In the original flag there were thirteen original stars representing the original thirteen States.

Those thirteen States, united in one nation, have been the fruitful mother of many additional States of to-day. But the thirteen stripes remain and will endure in the flag with the life of the Republic. Surely, no American can consider 13 an unlucky number, since the States have increased from thirteen to forty-six, with new States awaiting admission.

If this cherished number 13 is thus honored and preserved in our national flag, it is still more remarkably and reverently honored in the national coins. On our larger coins the obverse side has the head of the figure of Liberty crowned with an olive branch containing thirteen leaves, and the coin is encircled with thirteen stars. On the reverse side there are thirteen stars encircling the eagles' head; the streamer containing the motto held in the eagle's beak, "E Pluribus Unum," contains thirteen letters; the right talon of the eagle holds an olive branch with thirteen leaves; the left talon of the eagle holds a cluster of thirteen arrows; and the bars on the eagle's shield number thirteen; and the smaller cross bars at the top of the shield also number thirteen, so that the shield contains the number 13 twice.

Regarding the coin with its number 13 as an emblem of the nation's increased and ever-increasing wealth and population, can any American regard the number 13 as otherwise than a most lucky number?

I will conclude by finally mentioning another striking circumstance endearing the number 13 to Americans; in the third volume of *Irving's Life of Washington* there is an engraving of Hudson's celebrated statue of Washington, erected at the Capitol at Richmond, the capital of Virginia, with the inscription on the pedestal, "Geo. Washington," which was also a favorite signature of his name used by Washington; this signature also contains therteen letters.

We do not in this twentieth century resort to Pythagoras, Aristotle or Plato to explain these interesting features of numbers or by recourse to the schools of mystic or occult philosophy anciently

prevailing in Egypt, Arabia, Phœnicia, India or Babylonia; they may have been mere coincidences at first, then matters of choice or habit, finally historical and thus becoming a part of the cherished traditions of a patriotic nation.

RICHARD H. CLARKE.

New York City.

#### SIR WILLIAM HINGSTON.

Note.—Most of the material for this sketch was supplied to me through the kindness of Lady Hingston and Father Hingston, S. J., Sir William's son. Before publication it was submitted to the Hingston family, who suggested certain corrections and some additions that were made. In spite of this, there are doubtless some inaccuracies in it, for which the writer assumes full responsibility.

HE RECENT Eucharistic Congress in Montreal gave to the many visitors who came within her walls an excellent idea of the metropolis on the Royal Mount as a great Catholic city. The event was, of course, most notable in the history of Catholicity in this country. It was felt, however, that the background on which it was seen was eminently appropriate, and that the union of two great Catholic nationalities, the French and the Irish, for each of the peoples has retained its own national characteristics to a great degree, was a fitting testimony to the consolidating power of the old yet ever new Catholic Church. The popular interest in the affairs of the congress was felt at every step, and the thoroughgoing sympathy of all the citizens of whatever race or creed could not but be appreciated. While no formal recognition of the congress was enacted, everything was arranged for the most happy conditions of the various celebrations. This was especially manifest in the procession of the children, in the great outdoor Mass on Saturday morning and, above all, in the culminating ceremonial, the procession on Sunday.

Catholics from the United States could scarcely help but feel the atmosphere of Catholicity with which they were surrounded, so different from that to which they are accustomed and such a striking contrast to that which may be remembered by many of our citizens, whose memories need not go back many decades. To many minds there must have come the question, Do Catholics influence the municipal government and the politics of Montreal to the extent which they ought as its most important and numerous body of citizens? and, above all, Have they given manifestations of the power of their faith to influence men for what is best in them, so that municipal government is really a thing of and for the people?

To answer these questions would take too much space and time, but it has seemed to me that an answer incomplete, it is true, yet quite satisfying in itself and eminently suggestive, might be given to these questions by a sketch of the life of one of Montreal's great citizens, who died but a few years ago, and whose career furnishes a typical example of what Catholic influences, properly yielded to and carefully fostered, may make of a man in his civic and political relations. That man was Sir William Hingston, twice elected Mayor of Montreal, the second time by acclamation, and who was one of the best loved, most respected citizens of the Canadian metropolis.

It so happened that during the last years of his life I had the privilege of an acquaintance with him, which, while it did not approach the intimacy of the friends who had known him for many years, was because of our community of profession and scientific and historical interests enough to enable me to appreciate very thoroughly the character of the man and the work that he had done. In one of his letters Erasmus said: "It is the friendship of such men that I am accustomed to count as a principal part of the happiness of life." My relations with Sir William Hingston made me feel the truth of this aphorism of the old Renaissance humanist very deeply. Our first meeting was at a dinner given to Dr. Thomas Addis Emmet on his seventy-fifth birthday, but it was not until at the meeting of the British Medical Association at Toronto, about five years ago, that I came to feel that I knew enough of his personality so as to appreciate something of his true worth. The next one was at the Toronto meeting of the British Medical Association, and was to prove for me the precious opportunity to become a little intimate with a great, simple Catholic scientist and scholar.

About once every score of years the British Medical Association, which consists of physicians in all parts of the British Empire, holds its regular annual meeting in Canada. The annual session is usually considered the most interesting event in the English-speaking medical year. In 1906 it was held in Toronto. At that meeting there was a very striking, tall, spare figure, with white hair and perfectly white side whiskers, with a marvelous, taking face and a courteous, dignified manner that probably attracted more attention from those who were attending a meeting of the British Medical Association for the first time than any other present. There is no doubt at all that Sir William Hingston, whose description I have just tried to give, had a very attractive, handsome personality that shone forth from behind clear, penetrating eyes, with a look of power mingled with

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Talium enim virorum amicitiam in praecipua felicitatis parte numerare soleo. Erasmi Op. De Linguae Usu Atque Abusu.



gentleness that never failed to catch the attention. I know that he was more remarked by Americans, of whom there were several hundred in attendance, and all intent on seeing the British notabilities in medicine, than any other one at the meeting.

The Toronto meeting of the British Medical Association was held in August, 1906. Sir William died at his home in Montreal just six months later, on Tuesday, February 19, 1907, in the seventyeighth year of his age. He had been one of the leaders of the medical profession not only in Canada, but in the English-speaking world for more than a quarter of a century. As a young man he had been a friend of Sir James Y. Simpson and of Syme, of Edinburgh, when they were considered the leaders in the surgical world. Sir James Y. Simpson accorded him a privilege seldom granted to any one, that of visiting some of his private patients with him, and wanted to keep him as his assistant. Young Dr. Hingston preferred to return to his native country, where within a few years his success in surgical practice justified the distinguished consideration and friendship of his great Edinburgh professor. Besides being a great surgeon, Sir William had been a great citizen. He had been the Mayor of Montreal during one of the most stormy times that has come to the city in the last half century, and his tact and firmness and wise moderation won him the special thanks of the Governor General, the great Lord Dufferin, and the acknowledgments of the British Government, with the veneration of his fellow-citizens. In the midst of all his honors, professional and political, for he was later made a Knight by Oueen Victoria and a Senator of Canada by Lord Aberdeen, he remained one of the staunchest of Catholics and one of the kindliest, simplest and best hearted of men.

It was my privilege during the meeting at Toronto to have a good long talk with him about many things. He was kind enough to say that he had been very much interested in some of my articles on great contributors to science, and especially to medicine, who had been devoted Catholics. His discussion gave me the opportunity to realize very clearly all the depth of faith that was in the man and how much that influenced all the actions of his life. A little later on, after the publication of some books, he took occasion to write me several letters, in which he expressed his pleasure that these stories of the lives of great Catholics who had also been great scientists should be put into permanent form. He was not overconfident that the books would influence those outside of the Church much, for he realized that it is almost impossible "to pierce the coriacious hide of ignorance, prejudice and indifference," but he hoped that "writing so plain and unpretentious, yet so forceful and

<sup>&</sup>quot;Catholic Churchmen in Science and Makers of Modern Medicine."

convincing," might do something. At least they would encourage Catholics. These personal relations made me feel that I knew the man, personally, much better than many who had been acquainted with him much longer. It is this that makes me venture to write the story of his career.

During the months after the congress at Toronto I had, as has been said, several letters from him with regard to books and medical matters, and then came the sad news of his sudden death. At once a series of biographies appeared in the medical journals of this country and of England, as well as in the lay press, all of which showed how deeply Sir William had impressed himself upon his generation, not only in a professional way, but also as a man and a citizen. The man who thus succeeded in making for himself a place had been born in poverty, had had to begin to earn his own living as a boy of fourteen, had educated himself under what would be considered extremely difficult circumstances, yet had succeeded in life far beyond those who apparently have every opportunity. Though a strenuous climber, he had not only retained his pristine faith, but had indeed been a most devout Catholic, known and loved by all as such and recognized as the greatest lay representative of the Church in Canada. Evidently his life is well worth the while telling for our generation.

Sir William Hingston was born in the little village of Hinchinbrook, near Huntington, in the Province of Quebec, June 29, 1829. His father was at the time a lieutenant colonel of militia, and had formerly occupied the rank of lieutenant and adjutant in the Royal One Hundredth Regiment, the "Dublins," who took part in the War of 1812 against the United States. His ancestors were Irish, and his father, born in Ireland, had come to America with the English army. He was related to such families as the Cotters, of Cork; the Latouches, of Dublin, and the Hales. This latter name became Sir William's middle name. At the conclusion of the war with the United States a reduction of the forces took place, and Colonel Hingston settled upon a grant of land that had been made him for his military services at Hinchinbrook, on the Chateaugay River. Here he brought his second wife, Eleanor McGrath, of Montreal, and here their first son, William Hales Hingston, was born. His biographer in the Montreal Medical Journal, March, 1907, sums up the situation that now developed for the family. He says:

"This Colonel Hingston feared God and honored the King, but he was not noted for success in the management of his property. He wore his uniform habitually, and during the time he could spare from the hunting field conducted his farming operations as he would a piece of military tactics. Consequently when he died, in 1831,

there were debts to be paid, and he left instructions that the property was to be sold for that purpose. Even if the property had been sold, the debts would not have been fully paid, and it occupied the widow fifteen years to complete the task."

With her infant boy, eighteen months old at his father's death, Colonel Hingston's widow brayely faced a most trying situation. She was literally a heroic mother, and there is no doubt at all that to her Sir William Hingston owed his magnificent character, though his struggle up from poverty doubtless refined it in every way so as to make it the foundation of as charming a disposition, yet with ever awakened initiative, as was ever seen. Judge Daly, in New York, once said to me that he thought that the best education that a boy could have was to have to help his widowed mother keep the wolf from the door while responding to her ambition for him to make as much out of himself as he could. The Judge spoke from the depth of an experience that surely should have enabled him to judge. It was just this way that himself and his brother, Augustine, were left, and no two boys ever took any finer advantage of opportunities for education than did these two, who succeeded in impressing themselves so deeply on their generation in New York. Sir William Hingston had this same good fortune. He had to help support his widowed mother as soon as he possibly could, but she was ambitious for him, and he responded nobly to her inspiration.

By the strictest economy his mother was enabled to give her boy his education at the little grammar school in the town, conducted by John Rose, afterward Sir John Rose. Sir William was as fortunate in his first teacher as in his mother. To his early years on the farm Dr. Hingston owed much. He was tall and thin, never what would be called a robust man, but the hard outdoor work and his long walks to school brought him health and physical strength and, above all, the rugged vital energy which enabled him to continue his occupation until almost the very morning of his death. example and precept of his mother were all that were needed in order to complete the proper development of her boy. She was noted for her firmness of will, her deep but thoroughly sensible affection, her self-sacrifice and fine economy. When these were combined with deep Christian faith, and the boy was brought up under the influence of them, it is no wonder that he came out of it about as perfect a man as could be wished, and that his character took its form for all time. Men are much more what they feel and do than what they know, and the magnificent training of young Hingston through his feelings and his actions was the finest possible kind of an education.

His mother was profoundly Catholic, so that to look forward with

solicitous anticipation to the possibility of her son becoming a priest still further roused her ambition to give him every possible educational opportunities. At the age of thirteen he was sent to the well-known college of the Sulpicians in Montreal. Here he soon gained a reputation for both talent and industry. At the end of his first year he carried off a prize in every subject. Before two years had passed, however, the boy, not yet fifteen, had decided that it did not seem to be his vocation to be a priest, and so he gave up his college course. There was some question of lack of funds being one of the motives for this sacrifice, but the masters having realized how talented he was, offered him a free education. This neither his mother nor himself considered themselves at liberty to accept under the circumstances, and so young Hingston had to face the problem of making his own living. For this purpose he entered the employ of R. W. Rexford, a druggist in Montreal, first as an apprentice and afterwards as a clerk. Here his conscientious industry, his thoroughgoing occupation of mind with all the interests of his business won him the good will of his employer, while his genial good nature and his serious, straightforward character made many friends for him.

It is characteristic of the man that the slight flavor of classical literature obtained during his brief year and a half of college life gave him an enduring love for the classics. Everything seemed against his ever having more than a smattering of them, yet the best was the only thing in any line that would satisfy him. Whatever pocket money he earned as a drug clerk from fifteen to seventeen, was spent in obtaining classical private lessons from one of his old tutors. In after years he became a scholarly, deeply educated man, with wide knowledge of the classics of Latin and even of Greek and of the classic authors of English, German and French. All this obtained as the result of the initiative derived from scarcely more than a single course at college. It is evident that it is not the opportunities afforded to men that count in education, but their own capacity to respond to the incentive that all may receive if they will. Many a man has spent his seven years at the classics, only to forget them entirely and to wonder why they should have been inflicted on him—and this is especially true for those who have the leisure and the means to keep up some study of the classics if they would, while this drug clerk of fifteen obtained for himself that firmest of foundations for a broad, liberal education—a taste for the classics, in spite, apparently, of lack of time and of opportunity.

Young Hingston's ambition to be something more than a drug clerk was soon awakened, and then he saved his money in order to take a course in medicine in McGill University, which he entered

in 1847. It is an illustration of one of the saddest traits of human nature to learn that his employer, the druggist, appreciated his diligent services so much that, not wishing to lose them, he put every obstacle in the way of the young student, and even piled much more work than usual on him, in order to make it impossible for him to secure his medical education. Sir William himself used to tell in later years that it was only by feigning to be so sleepy that he could not possibly be expected to stay further at the store that he was able to secure even a few hours for study every day. Discouraging as were these conditions, they did not deter the young medical student in his ambition, and in 1851 he graduated from McGill, and the future looked brighter before him.

One might expect that immediately after his graduation at McGill young Dr. Hingston, anxious to get on, would settle down to practice and to the making of money. That was not his idea, however, of the road to success. While paying his medical fees and working in the drug store he had succeeded in saving ninety-six pounds sterling—let us say, on a fair valuation, \$465. With the small wages that were paid at this period, especially when we recall that he was helping his mother at the same time, some idea of the careful economy he must have practiced may be obtained.

Young Hingston resolved to use this sum, small as it would seem to us, and utterly inadequate for the purpose, to secure for himself a post-graduate training in some of the best medical schools in Europe. By the most rigid economy he was able to accomplish his purpose. His passage did not cost him much, as it was taken on a small sailing vessel, and he at once proceeded to Edinburgh, where he took up the serious study of surgery. At this time the best surgical teaching in the world was probably being done at Edinburgh, and two of the greatest professors there, Sir James Y. Simpson and Syme, were attracting students from all over the world.

Young Hingston won his way to the heart of both of them, Scotch though they were and little likely to give their hearts to a stranger. Simpson frequently took Hingston, as I have said, to visit even his private patients, an almost unheard of privilege accorded to but few others. At the completion of his course in Edinburgh, when he got the laureate degree of the faculty, he asked him to stay with him as his assistant. Syme was scarcely less kind. Young Hingston had other ideas, however. He wanted the experience of touch with others who were doing good surgery elsewhere, so from Edinburgh he went to London and attended St. Bartholomew's Hospital. Cheap as were the student lodgings around the hospital, he found that he could live even more economically far out in West Brompton, and so he took his lodgings out there

at a time when the transportation problem in London had not been solved at all. Every morning the young doctor walked his five miles, returning on foot in the evening. After getting all that he could in London, he went to Dublin, where he worked for some months under the distinguished heads of the great Irish school of medicine, Stokes and Graves and Corrigan.

Somehow during the intervals of his medical study in Edinburgh. London and Dublin he had acquired a working knowledge of medical German at least. His life in Montreal had given him a good command of French. His ambition tempted him to go to the Continent and see the work of the great teachers in surgery and get an inkling of their methods and of their most recent developments in their specialty. Accordingly he spent some time in Paris, Berlin, Heidelberg and Vienna, attending for some time at least the clinics of all the famous men of the time and deriving some special benefit from each of them and at the same time attracting attention by his earnestness and his striking appearance in nearly all of them. All this, it must be remembered, was accomplished on the original ninety-six pounds sterling on which he started. He had no convenient letter of credit and no fund to draw on. He knew that when his money was exhausted he must go home. The detailed story of this time would be a fine thing to put into the hands of young men of ambition handicapped by conditions. Only by depriving himself of all but the bare necessities of life was Hingston able to do it. His diet at times consisted of little more than bread and water, but he succeeded in giving himself a post-graduate education second to none obtained, I venture to say, by any American medical student of the nineteenth century, no matter what his opportunities due to money or influence.

At the end of two years, still anxious to learn, but at the end of his funds, Dr. Hingston returned to Montreal and opened an office on McGill street. His material progress and the development of his practice can be very well appreciated from the successive migrations of his office, first to Bonaventure street and then to Beaver Hill, then to Union avenue and finally to Sherbrooke street, where the offices of the most prominent physicians of Montreal were all situated. At the beginning his practice was mainly among the poor, and though he was himself absolutely without means and struggling along under serious difficulties, he was never known to refuse to attend a poor person because no fee would come to him. The poor soon learned to appreciate this, and while his knowledge of men would not permit them to impose upon him, he did so much for charity that it is no wonder that he became the beloved friend as well as the venerated physician of the poor of Montreal.

The year after he began practice Montreal had a cholera epidemic. Cholera has now become one of the disease of which we have very little fear, since it can be effectively quarantined against by simple precautions. Hamburg had an epidemic of it in 1892, and some cases of the disease succeeded in finding their way into New York, but no epidemic resulted, because the patients were carefully isolated, and above all, there was no question of the bacillus getting into the water supply, which is the usual avenue of distribution. During the first half of the nineteenth century, however, cholera epidemics occurred in all the large cities of this country a number of times, and always carried off large numbers of the population. Boston, New York and Philadelphia were scourged by them. Every one knew the danger of the disease, and this danger was even magnified, because it was thought that the infection could be communicated directly from person to person through the air, and Koch's demonstration that the bacillus must find its way into the intestinal tract, with old Professor Petenkoffer's famous confirmation of it by control experiments on himself, had not as yet been made. The disease raged mainly among the poor, and many physicians refused to attend patients suffering from it.

In Montreal the disease in its severest manifestations and worst epidemicity was confined almost entirely to Griffintown and Point St. Charles, portions of the city largely peopled by the poorest class of emigrants, most of whom came from Ireland. It was here that young Dr. Hingston spent many of his days and nights for charity sake in the care of cholera patients. The poor found that he would come any hour of the night or day as often as he was called, and more than one poor family found him willing to sleep on the floor beside his patient in the hope to give all the benefit of his skill, though in many cases there could be no reasonable expectation of remuneration. It was no wonder that these people grew to love him and almost to worship him. Perhaps there was more cause for wonder that this was ever remembered gratefully, for sometimes people forget actions of this kind and gratitude seems to become too heavy a burden. Many of these emigrant families, however, became in a few years thriving, prosperous inhabitants of Montreal, and then Dr. Hingston had almost the sole call for whatever professional services they required. Every year after this his practice grew in numbers and in respectability, until he became the busiest practitioner of medicine in Montreal. For thirty-five years the income from his practice constantly increased, until he was in easy circumstances and might very well have been even a very wealthy man, only that he did not care enough for money to give himself up to money making, and he cared too much for his fellows to sacrifice opportunities of doing good among them because there might be more money in doing other things.

Fortunately for Sir William, some of the habits acquired in early life stood him in good stead when he was called on for the exhausting professional work he often did. From very early in life exercise and outdoor sports of various kinds had a place in his life, and he maintained his interest in them almost until the end of his career. We have spoken of his long walks in London in order to save the extra money that he would have to pay for rent and board if he lived nearer St. Bartholomew's Hospital; but what he did from necessity then he followed up for pleasure and for the good that it did him later on in life during all his busiest years. His favorite form of exercise was walking or riding, though walking seemed to be preferred. Walks of thirty or forty miles in the day were not unusual with him in vacation time, and on one occasion he covered over fifty-five miles in twenty-four hours. Rowing was another favorite exercise of his, and even at the age of sixty-five he used to row alone to his country house, fifteen miles down the river. A lover of horses all during his life, he often rode to hounds and kept up his pastime as a favorite sport far beyond the years when men ordinarily think that they have to give it up. It was not until he was past seventy that he gave up the saddle, and during the Guibord affair, of which we shall have something to say later. his riding ability was a portion of the power of the man over the crowd which had assembled and might have done serious damage.

In 1860 he was named one of the surgeons to the Hotel Dieu, the oldest hospital in Montreal, and then began a surgical career that made him distinguished not only among his professional colleagues of this country, but also of Europe. For forty-seven years he continued to serve at the hospital in this capacity, almost never missing his duties. There were hopes that he would live to celebrate his golden jubilee of active service as a regular surgeon on the staff, for until the very end he continued to make regular visits. The very day of his death they were waiting for him at the hospital, and he was never known to disappoint unless something unexpected absolutely necessitated a change of programme for the day. The telephone message announcing his death came as a shock to people who were expecting to talk with him in the course of the next hour. As he himself would surely have wished, he died literally in harness, active until the very last twenty-four hours of life.

How satisfying were his relations with the Sisters at the hospital during this nearly fifty years will be best appreciated from the memorial which they drew up and sent to Lady Hingston after his death, in which is told how much Sir William had done for them and for the hospital and how much his loss would surely mean to them. There has probably never been so long a hospital service with less friction in any and every way than this of Sir William at the Hotel Dieu, and the record of it shows the gentle courtesy of the man for his forgetfulness of self and his thoughtfulness for others.

How suitable from a professional standpoint was Dr. Hingston's appointment to the staff of the Hotel Dieu at this time, though he was only just past thirty years of age, can be appreciated from the account of the first operation that he performed. His thorough training enabled him to do things in his own way. The first patient that came under his care was a woman suffering from a tuberculous disease of the elbow, which had been supurating for a long time, and though treated in many ways, had utterly failed to heal. Dr. Hingston successfully performed a resection of the joint and obtained an excellent result. At this time this operation had only been comparatively recently introduced in Europe and had never before been done in Canada. During the course of his hospital service he did a number of other operations that had never before been performed in this country, and all of them with remarkable success. In 1872 he removed in one operation the tongue and the lower jaw. This is the first recorded operation of this kind ever done, and his colleagues who saw its performance concluded that the nationt would surely die. He survived, however, and a year later was shown to the Montreal Medico-Chirurgical Society, to the intense surprise of the members and, above all, those who had seen the case before and knew the seriousness and the extent of the operation. On this occasion Dr. Hingston planned a little surprise for his colleagues that was meant to impress them with the advisability of not being overhasty in anticipation. He described the operation as he had performed it, the patient meanwhile remaining out of sight behind a curtain. As there was apparently no patient present, it was generally concluded by his audience of physicians that this was because he was in a better world. When Dr. Hingston had finished his description of the difficulties of the operation and its dangers, a colleague who was present asked, a little maliciously perhaps: "But what became of the patient?" And one of his other colleagues in smiling comment said: "Oh! he is dead!" Just then Dr. Hingston pulled back the curtain and disclosed his patient, not only alive, but in very good health considering the serious operation that had been done.

For Catholics there is an interesting feature of this case and that seems to deserve to be recalled here. The patient was a very

pious man who went to Communion every day. After the removal of his tongue and jaw swallowing was difficult, and in the mornings particularly his mouth needed to be moistened thoroughly to enable him to swallow. The patient had accordingly formed the custom after his operation to take a drink of water early every morning. So long as he was in danger of death he was allowed to take Communion as a Viaticum even after this drink of water. As he grew stronger, however, the question of giving up the water, so that he might not break his fast, was discussed, and Dr. Hingston was consulted in the matter. He declared that it would be impossible for the man to swallow properly without the water, and so a dispensation was obtained to allow him to take it. The Archbishop of Montreal was glad to agree with Dr. Hingston's opinion.

One of the most interesting features of Dr. Hingston's medical career was his constant effort for professional uplift. For this purpose he interested himself very much in all that concerned the affairs of the medical profession, and especially in medical societies, because he realized that no single factor in medical life is so important for advance in medicine itself, and especially medical practice, as the benefit derived from the intellectual intercourse of doctors, while their social relations make professional life ever so much better than it would otherwise be and lifts it out of the realm of a mere trade. In 1865 Dr. Hingston was, with a few others, instrumental in reviving the Montreal Medico-Chirurgical Society, which had been dead since 1851 and whose absence had been felt very much in the professional life of Montreal. The meeting for the reestablishment was called by a circular signed by Dr. R. P. Howard, Dr. Hector Peltier and Dr. Hingston. Of the new society Dr. Hingston became the vice president, the presidency going to his old teacher. Professor G. W. Campbell, of whom Dr. Hingston thought so much and who is associated in his mind with such distinguished foreign professors as James Y. Simpson and Syme. At the annual meeting the following year Dr. Hingston was elected president, because it was felt that he more than any one else would make the society the success that it was hoped it would be.

Dr. Hingston was reëlected president in 1873 and again in 1880. It was always felt that he was one of the main props of the society. He frequently read papers before it, often presented specimens and cases, and when present seldom failed to take part in discussions of subjects in which he had any special interest and never failed to contribute interesting material to discussions. It has been well said that his name was met with in nearly every page of the minute book of the first twenty years, and his lively interest did much

to make the society a vital factor in the medical life of Montreal. Nothing gave him more prestige among his fellows than this interest in medical progress and professional uplift, and it was always understood that Sir William at any time in life would be ready to sacrifice some of the time that might be considered so precious to him for the sake of his own and the medical education of others. Professor Osler has well declared that on medical society meetings and the interest in them professional dignity and the progress of medical practice depend more than on any other single factor. Before this expression of the distinguished Regius Professor at Oxford, Sir William Hington had exemplified the precept very thoroughly, and his example in this regard meant much for medicine in Montreal.

After the death of Sir William the community of the Hotel Dieu Hospital, as we have already said, wrote for Lady Hingston an account of her husband's service as it had appealed to them during the nearly fifty years that he had been in active attendance at the hospital. This document constitutes a tribute the like of which has seldom been paid to any professional man, and it gives the best possible idea of the character of Sir William as these religious saw him every day in his professional work at the hospital. As a middle-aged man the doctor had often said that he owed much of his formation of character to the beautiful example of humble service and utterly unselfish care for others which he saw in the Sisters. He even did not hesitate to declare jokingly that if he were not a rascal, it was because he owed it to the good hospital Sisters, who had showed him by the contrast of their lives the defects of his own. He even used to tell with no little gusto a story of how one of the older Sisters took down his conceit when he was a young man and gave him a precious lesson in humility that was of service to him for all the rest of his life.

He used to tell the story that one day when he was still a young man he arrived at the hospital, accompanied by one of his colleagues, in his carriage drawn by two horses. Proud of his turnout, he entered the apothecary shop and invited the Sister pharmacist, an old friend, to view his horses and carriage from the window, so as to tell him what she thought of them. "At this suggestion, though rather indifferently, she cast a glance at what had rendered me so proud," he used to say, "and then she said very seriously: 'I think I can understand now why it took two horses to bring you to the hospital to-day. One would never have been enough.' The reply was like a douche of cold water on my youthful vanity," he added, "and from that time on a new and salutary influence for humility was felt in my life." The experiment of making such a remark would probably have been dangerous with any other than Dr.

Hingston himself. Most men would have taken it just the wrong way. Certainly few of them would have found anything more than a joke in it, or would have seen that what was said, probably more than half in jest, was also more than half in earnest, and that the old religious was teaching a precious lesson in her own way.

It is from this document written by the Sisters that we can get the best idea of the personality of Sir William Hingston. Fortunately, Lady Hingston has furnished me with a copy of it. Every trait of his character is precious in the light thrown on it by these clear-eyed Sisters, who saw his relations to their patients, and knowing how hard it was always to be courteous with them, declared they never saw Sir William fail in gentle courtesy. Perhaps the most striving trait of his charm of character was with regard to the old. In the hospital, as a rule, old people are the most demanding and yet the least interesting to their physician, for so little can be done really to benefit them. It is for these, therefore, that the doctor needs especially to exert all his gentlemanliness. Among the old the poor were particularly his favorites. They returned it to him in evidences of gratitude that became almost veneration. The Sisters declare "Our good Irish patients of St. Patrick's ward could almost be said to prostrate themselves before him when they met him." "Ah!" said Sir William once, looking at an old woman in rags who gave him marks of profound respect, "how I feel humiliated at being the object of such demonstrations. I sometimes think that I am not worthy to untie the shoelaces of some of these people."

Dr. Hingston was always a man whose character impelled him to impart information to others, and so it is not surprising to find that he had a teaching career eminently successful for some fifty years. From 1860, without a formal appointment, he had been giving clinical lessons in surgery. When in 1870 the Medical School of Bishop's College was founded, Dr. Hingston was named professor of clinical surgery and head of the faculty. Unfortunately, he found before long that the duties of this position and that of the Hotel Dieu were incompatible, and he had to resign. In 1882 he was named professor of clinical surgery at the Montreal School of Medicine, which was affiliated with Victoria University. Five years later he became the dean of that school, and occupied that position till the consolidation of Victoria and Laval, in 1801. From then until the time of his death he occupied the chair of clinical surgery in Laval University, looked upon as probably the most distinguished member of its faculty and recognized as one of the great teachers of surgery in this country.

Besides his success as a physician and teacher of medicine, Sir

William Hingston succeeded in making a notable place for himself also in financial circles in Montreal. This is so unusual for professional men, and above all for physicians, that it seems worth while devoting some space to it, as it is one of the traits that indicate what a thoroughly all-round man he was. In middle life he was the vice president of the City Passenger Railway Company, which has since become the Montreal Street Railway System. Besides, he was president of the Montreal City and District Savings Bank and a director of the Montreal Trust and Deposit Company. During the panic in 1893 there was a run on the Montreal City and District Savings Bank, as there was on many another savings institution at that time, because the people had lost confidence. The implicit faith of the poorer classes of Montreal in Sir William was thoroughly manifested at this time, for after he took his place on the steps of the bank and assured the crowds who had assembled that he would stake his faith and credit that every one of the depositors would receive every cent of money on deposit, the crowd melted away, and this proved the beginning of the restoration of confidence in the other financial institutions of the city.

There is a very prevalent impression not only among the public, but even among physicians themselves, that a physician should not take any interest in politics, but should devote himself exclusively to his professional work. There is even an idea, indeed, in many people's minds that a physician is all the better for not having any other intellectual interests except medicine. As a matter of fact, in the history of medicine physicians who have done great progressive work and have made our great discoveries for us have all had many other besides medical interests, and usually have made their mark in at least one other phase of intellectual work. Above all, however, it would be unfortunate if physicians should be considered excluded by their profession from taking an active interest in political affairs. Few men are educated so well in the sense of knowing so much about men as human beings as are physicians. They should be able to recognize great abuses in human life and to help their correction sanely at all times. We have some distinguished examples of physicians who as administrative officials made a magnificent success of their positions. We know that as advisers to royalty they have often proved their worth. We need go no further than Baron Van Swieten, of the eighteenth century, the great physician-counsellor of the Empress Maria Theresa of Austria, to show how fortunate may be the combination of medical knowledge and experience with a high post in government.

Sir William Hingston had no prejudice with regard to a physician's duty as a citizen of the State and the municipality in which

he lives. He felt that he was as much bound as any one else to see that government should be well conducted, and, accordingly, when in 1875 he was called upon practically by popular acclamation to become Mayor of Montreal, he accepted the position. He received very nearly ten votes to every one given his opponent, and in the statetment after the election he said: "Without having spent one moment of time or one shilling of money to obtain the position which no one should strive for, but which coming as it did no one is at liberty to decline." His Mayoralty was an eminent success, as might have been expected from a man of his character and ideals, who was at the same time a thoroughly practical man of affairs, with a sharp eye for the abuses that might slip into municipal government. The success of his administration can be best judged from the fact that he was reëlected by acclamation without any opposition at all and that his fellow-citizens wished him to accept a third term, but he declined.

It might be thought that possibly his success as a Mayor was due to a great extent to the fact that in a comparatively small town as we know cities now in America, where the powers of graft are not organized and where the good will of the citizens was a striking characteristic, there was little needed in order to make a successful Mayoralty. As a matter of fact, however, the administration of the city under Dr. Hingston had to meet one of the stormiest crises that have ever come to an American city, and it was the Mayor's conduct during this stormy time that stamped him as a great administrator as well as a distinguished professional man. It was during his Mayoralty that the famous Guibord affair took place. In its own way the affaire Guibord attracted as much attention in Montreal, created as many enmities and promised almost as serious results as the affaire Drevfus in Paris. It will not be difficult to understand this once it is appreciated that the cause for the agitation was the decision of the Government requiring the burial of the body of M. Guibord in the consecrated ground of the Catholic Cemetery of Montreal, though he had died excommunicated and though the highest courts of Canada had declared that the laws gave no right to such burial. The Privy Council saw fit to reverse this judicial decision, and then the trouble began.

This whole subject was summed up very well by a writer in the Ave Maria on March 16, 1907, shortly after Sir William Hingston's death. The writer, whose initials, "A. T. S." (Miss Sadlier), alone are given, evidently knew Sir William very well and was thoroughly in touch with the events in Montreal which she describes: "Sir William Hingston was elected to the Mayoralty in 1875, and it was fortunate that the metropolis was presided over just then by so

firm, prudent and resolute a Chief Magistrate; for his term of office included the stormy period of the Guibord agitation. By a decree of the Privy Council, reversing the judicial decision of the highest court in Canada, the body of Guibord was to be interred in the Catholic Cemetery, despite the excommunication which he had incurred as a member of the society condemned by the Bishop. The whole population was stirred by the event. Mayor Hingston conferred with the late Archbishop Bourget, agreeing with him that the law must be obeyed and asking that prelate to have a pastoral read from the pulpit urging the people to refrain from violence. This was done, and all might have been well but that some officious persons, in opposition to the judgment of the Mayor, caused the military to be ordered out. This was as a spark to a mine. Tyranny, as the lower orders exclaimed, was to be enforced by arms.

"It was a pouring wet day. Sir William rode at the head of the troops, with his characteristic physical courage, completely ignoring all personal risk and overcoming his own distaste to the office. When the melancholy procession arrived at the cemetery a crowd of malcontents had assembled within, holding the gates closed and uttering cries and threats. As matters stood thus one of the gates fell. Instantly Sir William urged forward his horse, and, leaping the prostrate gate, arrived in the very midst of the indignant multitude. Almost simultaneously there arose from their ranks a cheer. which was echoed by those without. The funeral was permitted to enter, and Guibord was buried. The piece of ground was subsequently deconsecrated by the Archbishop, and is still shown to the visitor, lonely, dreary and neglected. The Marquis of Dufferin, then Governor General of Canada, thanked the Chief Magistrate in a personal letter for the service which he had that day done to his country; and a debt of thanksgiving was likewise due from his fellow-Catholics, whom he had saved from the reproach which might have resulted from imprudent and deplorable action on the part of misguided individuals."

After the Mayoralty many other honors came to him, all unbidden, as marks of the appreciation of his fellow-citizens and of his colleagues throughout the world. At the Nottingham meeting of the British Medical Association in 1892 Dr. Hingston was invited to deliver the address on "Surgery," the first time that honor was conferred on one living outside of the British Isles. On a number of occasions academic honors were conferred on him, and he accepted invitations to deliver many addresses. He had honorary degrees from three universities, and in 1900 he received the honorary fellowship of the Royal College of Surgeons in England. These academic honors were crowned by his creation as Knight Bachelor

by Queen Victoria in 1895. The following year he was appointed to the Senate of Canada, and in this upper legislative chamber made his influence felt for all legislation that was for the benefit of the people and for the development of the country.

Sir William Hingston secured the respect and even the affectionate regard of his colleagues in the Senate not by political affiliations nor by legislative machinations, but by the breadth of his views, the thoroughgoing candor and sincerity of his character and his recognition that great principles must underly legislation and not political convenience if lawmaking is to be a real benefit to the country. The writer in The Standard (Montreal) for Saturday, February 23, whom we have placed under contribution several times, said of this: "In the Senate he was mostly silent, because he found that the time was chiefly occupied in the discussion of banalities; but when he spoke the Senate listened. It was felt that here was a man who had something of worth to say. The question was a large one. It had relation to the whole country. For Sir William had the statesmanlike quality. He could have constructed a great measure, he could have led a great party, if politics were a philosophical science and not a party game."

Perhaps the most interesting feature of Dr. Hingston's social life is his relation to the different races and nationalities with which he was associated in Montreal. Nowhere does national spirit run higher, yet Dr. Hingston was a favorite with all. The son of an Irishman, it is not surprising that he should have been always intensely Irish in feeling and sympathy. He was ever ready to associate himself with any movement, political or social, for the welfare of the old land. More than one biographer said of him that he was deservedly regarded as the acknowledged leader of the Irish people in Montreal. Over and over again, as many passages of this sketch of him show, he was quite ready to sacrifice himself for the benefit even of the poor among his fellow-countrymen, with no thought of self, but only in order to save them from suffering and death as far as he could. While entirely loyal to Great Britain and an upholder of the British Empire as representing a great force for civilization and the good of man, as indeed his elevation to knighthood by Queen Victoria would indicate, he did as much for Ireland as probably any other Irishman in Canada, or indeed any other anywhere on the American continent. That he should have been able to do this without awakening harsh feelings among English friends, of whom he had many, is only another striking evidence of the tactfulness and gentle courtesy of the man even while fulfilling a duty that might be unpleasant to others.

Living among the French in Montreal and as ardent a Catholic

as any of them, it is not surprising that he should have horoughly appreciated his French fellow-citizens and been in turn appreciated by them. The French Canadians of the country districts, because of their simple straightforwardness, their lively faith and their unsophisticated attitude of life, were special favorites of his, and were often the subject of his praise, especially to those whose opportunities to know them had not been so great as his own. The French papers of Canada after his death expressed themselves in a term of glowing eulogy of him, and above all, spoke of Sir William Hingston as being one of the advocates and promoters of the interests of the French Canadians so that their rights might be maintained under an English government. Indeed, their panegyrics of him would make one who did not know the man think that he must surely have been one of themselves. Such indeed he was, for he was identified with them by community of faith and by his power to make himself all things to all men for their good, that his success in this matter is not surprising.

How much his French compatriots thought of Sir William Hingston will be readily appreciated from a tribute paid to him on the day of his death by La Patrie, the principal organ of the French population of Montreal. The editor declared that "Sir William Hingston had been one of the most eminent personalities of the whole medical world, but was not less remarkable for his magnificent qualities as a man and a private citizen. Generous and affable, he was loved and revered by all those who had the privilege of knowing him."

In addition to what has been said of his relations to the Irish and the French in Canada, it is interesting to note that when he died the Germans of Montreal publicly proclaimed that they had lost one of their best friends. Evidently he was a man above and beyond all narrow nationalism—a true fellow-citizen to all of every race and tongue. During his medical studies Dr. Hingston had learned German very well, and his facility for language was such that later in life he became a fluent speaker of German and constantly kept up the language by association with Germans and attendance on German societies. The day of his death the Montreal Daily Witness declared: "In the death of Sir William Hingston the German Society of Montreal loses a staunch and loyal friend. It was only two years ago that the society presented Sir William with a complimentary address upon his having completed fifty years as an honorary member of the society. He spoke the German language fluently and was regular in his attendance at the annual meetings of the German Society, as well as giving his patronage to any German celebration under the auspices of the local society."

There was a special tribute to him from the Jews of Montreal, who felt that they had lost in him a sincere friend, to whom their race owed much because of his absolute lack of all narrow prejudice and great-hearted recognition of all their rights as citizens in the community.

The position occupied by Dr. Hingston in the estimation of those who disagreed with him in religious faith will be best appreciated from the notice of him which appeared in many papers having little sympathy for Catholicity in Canada. The day after his death the Daily Witness of Montreal had an enthusiastic sketch of his career. in which toward the end it declared that while in religious belief he was a Roman Catholic and one of the most devoted members of St. Patrick's Church, Sir William Hingston was always ready to help forward any religious work, irrespective of denomination. In beginning its account of him, the Witness had said: "Sir William Hingston was a distinguished member of the medical profession, and probably there was no man in Montreal who had such a courtly presence as he. Although seventy-eight years of age, his figure preserved the suppleness and grace of youth, to which his white hair and refined and thoughtful countenance added the dignity of age. In appearance he was an aristocrat of the old school. His white side whiskers and clean shaven upper lip and chin gave him an Old World air, which was often accentuated in the summer by gray frock coats and gray top hat."

The lofty consideration in which Sir William was held by his colleagues in the Canadian Senate will be readily understood from the tributes to him which were paid on the floor of the Senate immediately after the telegram had been received that he was dead. This was within a few hours of his death, and these unstudied tributes, straight from the hearts of men who had known him while working with him for many years in the Legislature, constitute the best possible summing up of his life and character, and above all the value of his services as a legislator. Our source for this material is the "Senate Debates for the Third Session of the Tenth Parliament at Canada, Number 25, Tuesday, February 19, 1907:"

"The Speaker—'Hon. Gentlemen: It is with profound regret that I have to announce to the Senate the sudden death of one of our most esteemed colleagues. A telegram just received conveys the sad news of the demise of Sir William Hingston.

"'I was yesterday for an hour in the company of the late Senator, who seemed to be in good health and in his usual good spirits.

"'The country mourns the loss of one of its best, its truest and most valuable citizens. He shed lustre on his profession. His name and reputation were known beyond the seas. He was beloved by

all for his many virtues and his ideal Christian spirit. A good friend and wise counsellor has gone. We had met at the threshold of my life and our contact had never ceased. As he departs this world it is my sad duty and my privilege to bid an official farewell unto one who welcomed me into his life.

"'Our sympathies go forth to his family in their bereavement." "Hon. Mr. Scott, Government leader in the Senate: 'I am sure I speak the views of every honorable gentleman present when I say we all heartily concur in the very beautiful tribute just read by the Speaker on the death of our distinguished friend, the late Sir William Hingston. It was, I am sure, a great shock to every member of this body, as it was to myself, when at about the hour of twelve o'clock to-day the wires communicated to us the sad intelligence that our friend was no more. It seemed hard to realize that one of our colleagues, who sat at one of the desks within my view just before the adjournment, should now be in the other world. Although in his seventy-eighth year, he had a well-preserved constitution, and it seemed that there was a long future still open to him. His life had been well cared for. He did not seem to be affected by any malady, and for that reason the shock was all the more severe. His death reminds us of the saying of Burke, "What shadows we are and what shadows we pursue." Certainly no one would have anticipated the death of Sir William Hingston when they saw him in his seat the day before adjournment of this house. As has been observed by the Speaker, he stood in the first rank of his profession. He might be called, as far as the medical profession is concerned, a citizen of the world, having held diplomas not only to us, and his words were, I might say, always full of wisdom. To of hasty udgment. He deliberated on what he proposed to submit in the mother country, but in France, Austria, Germany and many other parts of Europe. We all remember his carefully worded addresses in the chamber when he spoke. It was no expression myself his death is a very great loss. I had, like many other Senators probably, a personal attachment to Sir William Hingston. He was a very lovable man. All we can do now is to tender our deepest sympathy to a sorrowing wife and to his children, who loved their father so deeply.'

"Hon. Mr. Lougheed: 'I am sure that every member of the Senate will fully agree in the remarks which have been made by the honorable leader of the Government with reference to the death of our late colleague, Sir William Hingston. The sentiments which he has so very fitly expressed in so sympathetic a manner I am sure will be the sentiments of every honorable member present. Death is always sad, sad when it comes to those whom for some time it may

have made its imprint, but particularly sad when it suddenly extinguishes a life that gives promise of future years of usefulness and service. Few men were better known in Canada than the late Sir William Hingston. Few have been more closely associated with the interests of the metropolitan city of Canada, Montreal, than our late colleague. There was scarcely a phase of the life of that city with which he was not prominently identified. In its civic, its social, its professional and its religious life Sir William Hingston was ever found occupying a very prominent position. In the religious and benevolent institutions of that city he stood in the foremost rank as one of the most useful and sincere members. In the professional and in the scientific life of that great city he occupied an advanced position. In the financial interests not only of Montreal, but of Canada, he always occupied a most commanding place. For many years he was closely identified with the municipal institutions of Montreal, and the people of that city as evidence of their appreciation of his ability and worth elected him to the office of Chief Magistrate, the duties of which he discharged with the sagacity, ability and dignity which few others have manifested. For many years he was a prominent member of this chamber, and I am satisfied that the Senate of Canada has sustained a very severe loss through his death. experience in the many public interests with which he was connected, his counsel, his dignity, his affability, his uniform kindness, his courtly bearing to all, could be equaled by few, and I am sure that these particular characteristics will be remembered and missed by those of us who for many years have had the good fortune to be associated with him. Every member of the Senate will agree with me when I say that the Parliament of Canada, through the death of Sir William Hingston, loses one of its most worthy and esteemed members.'

"Hon. Mr. Cloran: 'I feel sure that this honorable house will bear with me for a moment while I attempt to lay a flower of gratitude upon the cold brow of our departed colleague. Dr. Hingston has been known to me since my babyhood and into manhood. He has saved me from many a physical pain and from death about four years ago. He has saved and prolonged the lives of many members of my family, and it was with a great deal of feeling that I heard to-day that he is no longer on earth. His body is, but his spirit is gone. I have now known him fully fifty years, since I was a baby, and have always known him to be a man of constant kindness, a man who has during the past half century played a rôle which does credit not only to the city and the province from which he came and in which he died, but to the Dominion at large. His rôle has been a notable one from every point of view.

It has been to show to this country what a devout Christian can be and can do; what a noble citizen can do for his fellow-man, and what a conscientious scientist can do in the face of the divine ideal. Sir William Hingston has gone to his grave with the tears of thousands shed over his bier to-day. He was a friend of the poor, of the lame and of the halt. He was the friend of one of the largest charitable institutions on this continent, probably in the world. He was the soul of that famous institution, nay, the life of Hotel Dieu, Montreal, which cares for the poor, for the maimed, for the diseased and for the suffering. For the past half century and more he has given all his services as man, as medical practitioner, as scientist, free of charge. He was beloved, I may say adored, by all those who came in contact with him suffering. They had confidence in his skill and conscientiousness, and that is why I say he was a living example of a devout Christian, of a citizen who had every trait of nobility in his character, and of a scientist who was not afraid, as others are, to admit that science can advance and prosper, and man can work out the enigmas of nature without refusing to believe that there is a Supreme Being guiding this world. Sir William Hingston has left behind him footprints which will last, which are impressed not in the sand, but on the hearts of his fellow-countrymen, which will remain in the pages of our history as those of a citizen without a superior, and I may say without an equal. His sun has suddenly set, but it has set behind a mountain of noble deeds and bright example, and I quite agree with the honorable Speaker of this house when he says this country has lost an illustrious citizen, one in every sense of the word whom the poor deplore, one whom science regrets, one of whom the citizens will say, "Would that we mad more to give honor and dignity to this Canada of ours."'

"Hon. Mr. Sullivan: 'I take this opportunity of addressing a few words to this honorable house, because I am a member of the profession to which the honorable Senator belonged, and because I am intimate with his history, professional and public, for the last forty years. I am sure that the honorable gentlemen share with me the sudden and painful surprise which the announcement of his death has occasioned. He left this house on the previous meeting apparently in his usual health, erect and dignified as formerly and no one anticipated that such a sad event was to occur. The records of this Senate are full of the names of noble men, of men who have won fame and honor on the political field, of men who have won fame and honor in other walks of life; but probably there are not so many of those who were honored for their deeds in the professional and other life with equal benefit to their countrymen, as well as political. In the discussions we have had about the uses of the

Senate, among other uses suggested was this, that from time to time citizens who have done honor to the country by their intellectual power of their achievements in the arts and sciences, who had shed a lustre on their country and been beneficial to their fellow-citizens. might be called on, as the House of Lords is honored by the presence of Lord Kelvin and others. If any man representing this class were to be placed in the Senate, there was no mistake made when Sir William Hingston was appointed. The circumstances under which he was called to the Senate I have nothing to do with, but I say the gentlemen who appointed him have reason to be proud of their choice, for no more honored name is on the records of this house than that of Sir William Hingston. I only wish to speak now of his great merits as a physician and surgeon. He occupied the highest rank in the profession, and was looked up to in every scientific treatment. His opinion was listened to with the greatest respect and his efforts on behalf of science were of greatest value. He was honored not only in this country, but in the United States. There, at the conventions of the highest bodies of the medical profession, he always received the highest honors they could confer. The medical and surgical profession of Great Britain invited him to address them on the important subject of surgery at one of its open meetings. He obtained also the highest honor that a member of the medical profession can receive, namely, a fellowship in the Royal College of Surgeons in England. He had obtained other honorary degrees, but these only serve to show that his fame was not confined to his own country, but had spréad into other lands. I think that he was worthy of all these honors. No man wore them with greater dignity and more to the gratification and satisfaction of his countrymen than he did. His honors now are not of much avail to him; his fellowships and doctors of canon law and doctors of literature can be of no benefit to him, but they will be a benefit and an honor to his family. What will be an honor and a benefit to him will be the thousands of patients whom he attended—the thousands of poor people whose wants he listened to and whose diseases he alleviated or relieved. They are the only degrees that he may look for now, and these will be the only ones that will be of benefit to him. He has these in abundance and we need not, therefore, be any way doubtful as to what his future will be. In the announcement which the housekeeper made to me of his sad death he mentioned to me one panegyric which was more comprehensive than any I heard. It was: "From the crown of his head to his toes he was a gentleman." That word "gentleman" applied in its truest sense to him-in the sense of the unselfish man, a man who values his own honor and character, who takes every possible precaution

not to see it sullied, and who resents in the most prompt and determined manner any insult. At the same time, he was ever willing to grant to others the rights which belonged to them, always willing to assist the humble and those in want. Sir William Hingston possessed those qualities without any modification or qualification whatever. He was a gentleman in the fullest sense of the word, and I trust that the great gifts which he possessed, and which were so honorable to him, will be as nothing compared with the reward which we are sure he will attain—which he has already attained to in a better world.'

"Hon. Mr. Ferguson: 'I do not usually rise on an occasion of this kind, but I feel impelled to add a word, not in the way of eulogy of our late lamented colleague's career—that has been so well and ably treated by the honorable gentlemen who have preceded me-but to say a word with reference to his demeanor and conduct and service in this house. I have heard him on many occasions make speeches that were well prepared and thoroughly thought out, and have no hesitation in saying that any who will go back through our debates and read these speeches will find them well worthy of perusal and well worthy of reperusal. A short time ago he mentioned to me that he contemplated making a speech on a suitable occasion in this house with regard to the maintenance of dignity and decorum of the Senate. I know he had that speech prepared. He consulted me about delivering it in this house, I think, the second last day he was here, but it was considered that the day was not opportune, and it was not delivered. I regret, as I am sure every honorable gentleman who hears me make the statement does, that that speech was not delivered, because coming from a man like Sir William Hingston, it would have been beneficial to every one of us. We have not heard that speech, but we have his example before us. We can remember that magnificent example during the time he was a member of the house, and we will do well if we follow it."

The depth and sincerity of Sir William Hingston's character was demonstrated especially in his domestic relations, for in the family circle he was ever the charming, courteous gentleman that other people saw on special occasions. In the midst of the hurry and bustle of what even we of the United States would be quite willing to concede as a strenuous life he was placid and thoughtful of others and unruffled even by the trivialties of life. In 1875, when Mayor of Montreal, he married Margaret Josephine MacDonald, daughter of the Hon. Donald A. MacDonald, Lieutenant Governor of Ontario. Those who know her appreciate how worthy she was to be the wife of one of the great men of the past generation. Their domestic life was such as makes one realize how much of happiness and

incentive a suitable marriage may mean and how much it adds to the depth and breadth and worth of life in every way for husband and wife.

A writer in the Standard of Montreal for February 23, 1907, the Saturday after his death, pays tribute to this noteworthy feature of Sir William Hingston's life in words which deserve to be recalled here, because they show how those who were nearest to him appreciated him. He says: "In the death of Sir William Hingston one of the last of a courtly generation passes from view. It was one of the most beautiful things in life to observe his manner to those he loved in the familiar intercourse of the home. To Lady Hingston he was lover, and cavalier and husband. The loving way he addressed her, the tenderness he showed to his daughter in ordinary intercourse, was part of that rich endowment which came to him from a day when manners were the mark of the gentleman and which was as considerate of the humble widow as of the highest in the land."

One of the apparent sacrifices that Sir William had to make as a father proved one of the most satisfying of consolations as life verged towards its termination. A biographer, evidently an intimate friend of the family, has told the story:

"Sir William was called upon to make a great sacrifice in giving up his eldest son to become a Jesuit. His profound and lively faith, no less than his intimate, friendly relations with the Fathers of the Society of Jesus, to whom he had been many years physician and whom he regarded with the greatest veneration and affection, aided him to sustain this loss. The event became in the sequel his pride and joy. By a happy coincidence the Rev. William Hingston, S. J., was stationed at Loyola College, Montreal, hard by the paternal residence, and was thus enabled to be with his beloved parent at the end. As the young scholastic bent and kissed his father's forehead the mother whispered in the latter's ear the familiar name. The dying eyes were opened, and the lips faintly murmured 'Willie!' And that was the last word."

All those who knew him knew what the wellspring of his life's activities had been. All were impressed with the fact that to his religion Sir William Hingston owed the best motives of his career and the unalloyed success which crowned his life. A friend who knew him intimately is quoted in the obituary of him which appeared in the Montreal Medical Journal just after his death, as follows:

"To those who knew him well it was apparent that all his actions were regulated by some governing force, some strong, unbending principle. This was his high conception of duty, his trust in God, his faith in his religion. His sense of duty, guided by a clear sense

of right and wrong, had for foundation his strong faith in his Master. He tried to do his duty for duty's sake, and because he felt that was what his Master required of him. The feeling never left him that he and all others were points moving towards eternity and that the short time given to him here should be well spent. This love of duty for higher motive pervaded everything in his life. It was that which made him so trusted by his patients.

"To his patients he applied the same principless and rarely missed a chance of offering them counsel. He considered that his profession required it of him. In religion he was a staunch, uncompromising, but never aggressive Catholic; many of his intimate friends were ministers of other creeds. This deep sense of religion and duty, which to him were the same, is the key to his life. By it he accomplished what he did, occupied a position it will be hard to fill, and when he died called forth so large a tribute of sorrow and praise."

A beautiful tribute from Archbishop Bruchesi serves to voice the unanimous sentiment arising from priests and religious everywhere, of sorrow at his loss, of gratitude, reverence and affection: "His death means to me the loss of a dear personal friend, whom I had known almost from childhood; to the Church in this city it means a loss of one of our most devoted children; and the whole population of Montreal have to regret the death of a leading citizen, a brilliant and successful worker in his chosen profession and a man of simply boundless charity."

This tribute from one who, after all, knew him so very little may seem but the result of the charm of the personal manner of Sir William and the circumstances in which he was seen as the dean of Canadian surgery and one of the great leaders of the medical profession of America at a meeting of the English-speaking physicians from all over the world. Those who knew him for long years, however, spoke even more emphatically than I do of his striking personal appearance and of his gentle, beautiful courtliness of manner. A writer in the Montreal Standard for Saturday, February 23, 1907, in the feuilleton of the end of the week of his death, under the caption "A Courtly Gentleman is Dead," began his tribute to Sir William Hingston in these words: "The man is always of more significance than his profession, and eminent as was the late Sir William Hingston as a physician and surgeon, it will be as a noble-hearted, pure, lofty gentleman that he will be the most lastingly and gratefully remembered. Rarely could it be said of any public man as completely and truthfuly as it might be said of Sir William Hingston that he 'wore the white flower of a blameless life.' Indeed, he realized in a truculently commercial age something of the ideal which King Arthur and the 'Knights of his Table Round' set before them for imitation. Before all things Sir William Hingston was the gentleman. In him was that delicate spirit which would scorn to

"Blend his pleasure or his pride With sorrow of the meanest thing that feels."

JAMES J. WALSH.

New York, N. Y.

## DANCING: ECCLESIOLOGICAL.

O ENTER into the history of dancing and its most ancient origin is not my present purpose: suffice it is to note that it existed in the same time as the art of speaking and singing; that saltation is considered by some to be even older than music, Cahusac remarking that "ce langage est anterieur a toutes les conventions et naturel a tous les êtres qui respirent sur terre." So it may be of interest to view its place in the Christian Church, that in the Jewish being too well known to all Biblical scholars to require comment thereupon. Cahusac further remarks: "In fact, the dance has been from all time a sign of adoration, an external demonstration of the dependence of creatures, a primitive expression of gratitude. Dancing presented itself naturally before the minds of the early Christians as a means of enlivening their feasts, of beautifying their ceremonies and of rendering their worship more imposing."

Primitive dancing was at first encouraged and used by the Church, mysteries celebrated in the churches being accompanied by dances and hymns, just as the Jews before them had done. Dancing in the cemeteries in respect for the dead was also countenanced. Thoinot Arbaud says: "In the primitive Church the custom, lasting until our own times, has been to sing our church hymns with dancing and swinging of the arms, customs still observed in many places." Père Ménestrier, of the Society of Jesus, who in 1682 wrote a very interesting book on the subject of dancing, mentions having himself witnessed a custom dating from the eleventh century of an Easter Day—doubtless to the hymn, "O Filii et Fila"—dancing taking place in the church: "I myself have seen the canons take the choir boys by the hand in some churches on Easter Day and dance in the church, singing hymns of thanksgiving, to say nothing of the scandalous customs, introduced by the simplicity of past centuries, but so corrupted by libertinage that not only have severe laws been necessary for their suppression, but much care and zeal on the part of most of our prelates to banish these dangerous abuses from their dioceses."

As a matter of fact, the custom had the approval of the Fathers of the Church, as witness the letter of St. Gregory Nazianen to Julian: "If it pleases you to dance and you are attracted to these fêtes you seem to like, dance as much as it pleases you, for I consent. But why revive before our eyes these dissolute dances of Herodias and of pagans? Execute rather the dance of David before the Ark, for these exercises of place and piety are worthy of an emperor and a Christian."

"Divine service," writes Père Ménestrier, "of his time was composed of psalms, hymns and canticles, because men sang and danced the praises of God as they read His oracles in those extracts from the Old and New Testaments which we still know under the name of Lessons. The place in which those acts of worship were offered to God was called the choir, just as those portions of comedies and tragedies in which dancing and singing combined to make up the interludes were called the choruses. Prelates were called in the Latin tongue præsules a præsiliendo, because in the choir they took that part in the praises of God which he who led the dances, and who was called by the Greeks Choregus, took in the public games.

Scaliger confirms these words by stating that the name prasules was given to the first Bishops, because on great and solemn occasions they themselves led the dances.

The Council of Trent was distinguished by the ballet given in honor of the son of Charles V. Cardinals and Bishops took part in it, and it was opened by Cardinal Ercole, of Mantua.

"One of the greatest itinerant ballets ever seen was that organized by the Church itself in Portugal, in 1609, on the occasion of the beatification of St. Ignatius Loyola. This latter represented the capture of Troy. It was also danced in Paris, where its first act, performed before the Church of Notre Dame de Lorette, introduced the famous horse, an enormous mass of wood, set in motion by a secret mechanism around this and that, dancers acted various episodes of the siege. Then the troupe, followed by the gigantic horse, moved on to the ancient Place St. Roch, where was the church of the Jesuits.

"Scenery set up round the Place represented the city of Troy, with its towers and high walls, all of which fell down upon the approach of the horse. Then the Trojans advanced among the ruins, performing a martial dance like the Pyrrhic of Greece, surrounded by fireworks, while the flanks of the horse poured forth

<sup>1</sup> Père Ménesteier, "Des ballets anciens et modernes."

rockets upon the smoking city. A most beautiful spectacle," says Père Ménestrier, "was the simultaneous discharge from eighteen trees, all loaded with similar fireworks."

A modern writer says that next day the ballet was continued in the second act by a nautical fête, wherein appeared four brigantines decorated richly with gold and with flags, on which were stationed choirs of singers. It was terminated by a grand procession, in which three hundred horsemen, dressed in the antique fashion, escorted Ambassadors from the four quarters of the world to the college of the Jesuits, and the four quarters of the world were themselves represented in a final scene.<sup>2</sup>

"Having arrived," says Père Ménestrier, "at the Place de la Marine (at Lisbon, I suppose), the Ambassadors descended from the brigantines and mounted certain superbly ornamented cars. Upon these they advanced to the college, preceded by several trump-After which various persons, clothed in the manner of different countries, performed a very agreeable ballet, forming four troupes or quadrilles, to represent the four quarters of the world. The kingdoms and provinces represented by so many genii marched with these various nations and peoples before the cars of the Ambassadors of Europe, of Asia, of Africa and of America, each of whom was escorted by seventy cavaliers. The troupe of America was the foremost, displaying among other dances a very whimsical one of young children disguised as apes, monkeys and parrots. Before this car rode twelve dwarfs upon ambling nags. The car of Africa was drawn by a dragon. Variety and richness of apparel was not the least among the attractions of this fête, some persons wearing precious stones to the value of over two hundred thousand crowns."

In Spain many most charming and correct dances took place, the pela being one of them. This was a kind of religious dance, which took place on the feast of Corpus Domini by a very tall man who, carrying a beautifully dressed boy on his shoulders, danced at the head of the procession, which took place in Galicia.

In Roussillon, Catalonia, and many other provinces of Spain mysteries in which religious dances occurred took place even as late as the seventeenth century.

A few words on Seville Cathedral taken from a recent work by Calvert on that subject may well preface the description of the far-famed dances of the choir boys, thus alluded to by Lady Herbert, who in her "Impressions of Spain" records the dance of the choir boys before the Host on the feast of Corpus Domini in Seville Cathedral, done in remembrance of the dance of David before the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Gaston Vuillier.

Ark of the Covenant. So devout is this pious dance that Lady Herbert says it cannot be witnessed without emotion, and those who assisted at it in recent years—Catholic and Protestant alike—speak of it as exquisitely beautiful, impressive and devotional.

Calvert writes: "The almost complete destruction of Seville Cathedral in 1401 resulted in a stupendous effort which an earnest preband characterized in the words: 'Let us build a church so great that those who come after us may think us mad to have attempted it;' so the great church now known came into being after one hundred and twenty years which was spent in the building. This largest of all Gothic churches ranks third as to size among the sacred buildings of the universe. Theophile Gautier thus expresses his impression of it: 'The most extravagant and most monstrously predigious Hindoo pagodas are not to be mentioned in the same century as the Cathedral of Seville. It is a mountain scooped out, a valley turned topsy-turvy; Notre Dame de Paris might walk erect in the middle nave, which is of frightful height; pillars with the girth of towers and which appear so slender that they make you shudder rise out of the ground or descend from the vaulted roof like stalactites in a giant's grotto."8

Another writer whose admiration was extreme says: "The first view of the interior is one of the supreme moments of a lifetime: the glory and majesty of it are almost terrible. No other building surely is so fortunate as this in what may be called its presence."

It is in this marvelous building that the Cathedral choir boys even now carry on the tradition of the old rapresentaciones and dansas which in mediæval Spain formed a part of the Corpus Christi processions, the special dance of the Seises being authorized by a Bull of Pope Eugenius IV. There was an attempt to put them down by Don Jayone de Palafox, Archbishop of Seville, but the Cathedral chapter, chartering a boat, took the Seises, with their choirmaster leading them, to Rome, where they were successful in convincing the Pontiff that the solemn measures of their dignified dances, besides the beauty of their costumes, could only enhance the grandeur of religious ceremonies.

"The Seises," says Baron Davillier, "are generally the children of artisans or workmen. They must be under ten years of age on admission. They are easily to be recognized in the streets of Seville by their red caps and their red cloaks, adorned with red neckbands, their black stockings and shoes with ornamental buttons. The full dress of the Seises is exactly the same as that worn by their predecessors of the sixteenth century. The hat, slightly conical in

A. F. Calvert, "Seville."

<sup>4</sup> Dancing choir boys.

shape, is turned up on one side and fastened with a bow of white velvet, from which rises a tuft of blue and white feathers. The silk doublet is held together at the waist by a sash and, surmounted by a scarf, knotted on one side. A little cloak, fastened to the shoulders, falls gracefully about half way down the leg. Lace cuffs, most characteristic feature of the costume is the golilla, a sort of lace ruff, starched and pleated, which encircles the neck. Lace cuffs, slashed trunk hose or calzoncillo, blue silk stockings and white shoes with rosettes complete the costume, of which Doré made a sketch when he saw it in Seville Cathedral. The dance of the Seises attracts as many spectators to Seville as the ceremonies of Holy Week, and the immense Cathedral is full to overflowing on the days when they are to figure in a function."

In his excellent book on Portugal, Mr. Oswald Crawford, C. M. G., alludes to this ceremony thus: "During the great religious functions of the Holy Week at Seville there is danced before the high altar at the Cathedral a solemn and elaborate figure dance by youthful acolytes habited in the gold and silver-laced court dresses of three centuries ago. It is in the nature of a quadrille, with slow minuet movements and posturings, and it is danced to music that has much of the character of the austere sarabands of the Composer Corelli. This religious enjoyment of the dance is quite consonant with Peninsular feeling on the subject, and watching the Portuguese dancing, it has sometimes seemed to me to possess almost the seriousness and sanctity of a rite."

It may be of interet to read what the same author says anent dancing in Portugal: "If the ground under the vine trellis is the parlor of the peasant, the threshing floor is his ballroom. In the long May evenings a young man with his mandolin will take his way, strumming careless chords and snatches of those strange airs in the minor key which the Portuguese call Fados, and which are of lineal descent from music of old Moorish times. As he passes along, the girls and lads stop their labor to accompany him; lovers will interrupt their love-making to follow, too, or continue their courting to the rhythmic tinkling of the mandolin. When the music and its following arrive at the dancing place and the partners are all arranged in a circle, the dance will begin with the strangest, slowest, most old-fashioned steps, the like whereof has not been danced under a civilized roof for centuries. The musician, or the three or four of them whose mandolins make the orchestra, dance in the round with the others, and when the time in the dancing arrives turn and set to their partners like the other dancers. this to be possible it may be supposed that the Portuguese peasants'

<sup>&</sup>quot;Round the Calendar in Portugal."

dancing is not an active, capering movement, of the nature of our Northern hornpipes and reels, nor any of those extraordinarily jerky and most undignified performances of Central Europe, the mazurka and polka. These peasants' dancing is of a purely Oriental kind; it is sedate in time, correspondent to a slow musical key. It is not a series of pirouettes and entrechats, like the artificial dancing of the French, nor a shuffling of the feet, like the vile Hungarian dance, nor is it akin to the manlier swing-dance of the solemn German. It is a slow, rhythmic movement of the whole body, less of the feet than of the arms and hands. It is, in short, Oriental in character, not European, and something like it is danced along a whole belt of the earth's surface where the Oriental invader has moved, from Teheran and Cashumen in the extreme east line to Oporto by the Atlantic Ocean's edge.

The Portuguese of the North are among the lightest-hearted people in the world, but they are never gay when they dance. It is no laughing matter with them, and in Sterne's admirable description of a Provençal dance with its accompaniment of "Viva la joia, fidon la tristessa," he struck, as I think, a false note when he spoke of its gayety and its joyousness, for the Provençal dancing, like that of the Peninsula, has the stamp of Oriental seriousness in it. It is an act that stirs deep emotions in the dancer that are in no way akin to merriment."

With respect to the proscription of dancing in churches in consequence of many abuses, Odo, Bishop of Paris, in the twelfth century proscribed dancing in churches and processions, and especially the funeral dances which were wont to be held at night in the cemeteries. Much later, September 3, 1667, we find a decree of the Parliament of Paris forbidding religious dances in general—the public dances of January and May, the torch dances of the first Sunday in Lent, and those which were held round bonfires on the vigil of St. John, and the same writer also notes:

"Religious dances, however, like all dances, whether among the Greeks or among the Romans, degenerated. In 554 King Childebert proscribed them all in his territories, and in 744 a rescript issued by Pope Zacharias forbade any ribald dances (danses baladoires)—the latter being more like national dances accompanied by old-time songs.

Although Spain—most Catholic of countries—has always retained religious dances, we read that in the good old days of St. Thomas of Villaneuva, Bishop of Valentia, dances used to take place in the Cathedral of Seville, besides those first described, To-



<sup>6</sup> Oswald Crawfurd, C. M. G.

<sup>7</sup> Gaston Vuillier.

redo, Jeres and Valencia, this prelate, noted for his holiness, encouraging and supporting them in spite of the fact that Pope Zacharias had forbidden them.

Besides Spain, in the Middle Ages pieces called farsas santas y piadosas—holy and pious farces—used to be performed in monasteries and churches, many being the abuses that crept in, though the compositions were themselves of a pious kind, "ribald interludes and licentious dances" being conspicuous. Finally they had to be done away with, just as was necessary with the Agape, or love feast, and the kisses of peace exchanged by the faithful in the churches.

"For the same reason many churches gave up music and instruments, and several Bishops wisely forbade the chanting of the Lamentations of Jeremiah on the three last days of Holy Week, in order to prevent the disorders that used to occur on such holy days, owing to the great number of persons who were attracted by the orchestra and the fine voices rather than by piety."

De Mémi says, anent dancing in churches considered as an exterior manifestation of worship, that "the choir, an elevated platform before the altar in churches, takes its name from a Greek word meaning chœur de danse," and he notes that it was there until the seventeenth century; that in Spain until the seventeenth century the Autos Sacramentales, kinds of religious mysteries, took place, and he instances the dancing of the choir boys of Seville, which, as we know, exists to this day.

Among the religious dances of Spain, that taking place during the Mozarabic rite was most singular, for the tambourines were struck to guide the dancing taking place in the choir. This rite, being celebrated in the seven churches of Toledo, was left to the Christians by the Arabs.

After many struggles, the Roman rite for the celebration of Mass took the place of the Mozarabic rite, after the taking of Toledo by Alfonsus the Brave, though at the end of the fifteenth century the latter was, with dancing, reestablished by Cardinal Ximenes de Cisneros.

Translating from Michelet's "History of France," we see:

"All the fetes of the Middle Ages took place in the church, 'ce domaine du peuple.' The canons played at ball in the cathedrals until 1538. After the game came the dance and the banquets. In the choir as well as on the parvis all the rejoicings took place. In Paris, on the Place Notre Dame, Easter hams were sold, these being eaten in the church itself, the meals being followed by dances. The Church loved the people, and lent itself to these childish joys.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Gaston Vuillier.

<sup>•</sup> Space in front of a cheeron or cathedral.

From this originated all the festivals of the Middle Ages. The Fête de l'âne and Fête des Foux were celebrated at Aixerre until 1307."

"These fêtes," he says, "were," as he explains, "in imitation of pagan orgies, tolerated by Christianity as the farewell of man to the sensuality which he was abjuring—fêtes where man, recognizing that the lower nature—bestialité—was in him exposed in these extravagancies, symbolisms of his misery and infirmity." 10

It is to a little French book, dated 1751, on the Fête des Foux that I am indebted for details of this curious merrymaking, half serious, half burlesque-the pagan origin of which undoubtedly was the Saturnalia, solemn feasts in honor of Saturn, which used to take place on the sixteenth of the Kalends of January—i. e., on the 17th of December-which were established antecedent to the foundation of Rome, varying in length from one to five or seven days. As in the days of the Saturnalia, when slaves acted as masters, having permission to say what they pleased, so the least important of the clergy officiated publicly and solemnly during certain days consecrated by usage to the veneration of some of the great mysteries of the faith, so much so that in France the name given to the time was that of Fêtes des sous Diacres, festivities so marked by debauch, etc., as would have been more honored in the breach than in the observance, and of which, let us thankfully note, the Church never as a body approved, which many Bishops only tolerated while using every effort to have them abolished when they perceived how frequently they caused the violation of temperance and modesty, causing prayers, processions and fasts to take place with that end in view.

Baronius, A. D. 956, tells us of all that was endured for many centuries in Constantinople when, during the festivities of Christmas, New Year and Epiphany, the clergy and the people joined in dances and buffooneries and in *mille abominations* in church before the sanctuary.

The usual plan was as follows: In the cathedral churches a "Bishop or Archbishop of Fools" being elected, the fact was confirmed by merriment in the way of farce, after which the soi-disant prelates were made to officiate pontifically, even to giving solemn public benediction to the people, the mitre and archiepiscopal cross being borne before them. A mock Pope was elected (unum Papani fatuorum), he being given, with great derision, all the insignia of the Papacy, so that he could act and officiate in imitation of the Holy Father. These ecclesiastics, being assisted by clerics and priests, were masked or dressed in women's clothes or in masquer-

<sup>10</sup> Du Tilliot.

aders' costumes, while impiety as well as folly characterized their behavior during the divine service. Obscene songs were sung as they entered the choir dancing; the deacons and sub-deacons not infrequently ate boudin<sup>11</sup> and ausages under the very nose of the celebrating priest. They played there cards and dice, put into the thurible pieces of old slippers, so that he should inhale a bad odor. Many of the libertines, dressed as monks and nuns, mixed among the clergy, and so monstrous were the impieties and scandalous scenes that indeed the time can only be characterized as the abomination of desolation in holy places, as well as persons belonging to a sacred calling; this not in one, but in many localities.

Père Perry, Jesuit, in his history of the town of Châlors-sur-Saone, notes that in the time of Bishop Cyrus de Thiard some of the festivities were abolished, among them being a festival of very ancient origin, in which, however, neither propriety nor modesty were in any way violated, though to our modern eyes it would have presented a strange sight. He says that the Compline of Pentecost being over, the dean and canons, with the congregation, came out of the cathedral in procession, going then into the little cloister and thence into the midddle of the courtyard, each one proceeding to take hold of each other's surplice and dancing round a mound of stones which stood there, chanting as they did so some of the responses of the Whit Sunday services, the popular name of this festivity being "the Dance of the Canons." The Bishop and chapter united in abolishing this custom.

It would be beyond the space at my disposal alike to describe the shocking abuses to which the merriment at church festivals ran, even were it desirable, and for the same reason it is impossible for me to enumerate even a few of the more severe condemnations from high quarters of the disgraceful conduct which gave not alone a bad example, but which conduced to libertinage and behavior which transgressed the laws of decency and respect alike to their holy office, to the sanctity of the place and, above all, to the presence of Him who, though hidden under the sacramental veil, is His Majesty, King of kings and Lord of all.

Councils and synods alike issued stringest commands, to be obeyed in some instances under pain of excommunication. "Les Status Synodaux de l'eglise de Lyon (n) en 1566 et en 1577 défendent avec beaucoup de rigeur les insolences de la Fête des Foux. Voici comment ils parlent. Es jours de Fête des Innocens et autres l'on ne doit souffrier ès Eglises jouer jeux, tragédies, farces, et exhiber spectacles ridicules avec masques, armes et tambourines, et autre choses indecentes qui se font en icelles, sous peine d'excommunica-

<sup>11</sup> Black pudding.

tion. . . . Défendront les Cures, disent-ils ailleurs, sur peine<sup>12</sup> d'excommunication, de mener danses, faire Bachanales et autres insolences ès Eglises ou ès Cimetieres."

The Parliamentary Decree of Dijon, dated 19 January, 1552, abolishing the Feast of Fools, can be seen in the treasury of the Sainte Chapelle du Roi of the town itself.

Monsieur du Tilliot concludes his most interesting little volume on this subject by quoting the words of the Abbé Fleury, here translated: "There are abuses which the Church has always condemned, such as absurd spectacles which they have dared to induce even into the churches, and which were forbidden in the Council of Bâle, such as the profane rejoicings at the feasts, of which we see the remains at Martinmas, Epiphany, at the patronal feasts in the villages and the banalities of the carnival, which could be caused only by regret of entering into Lent.

". . . Holy and good Christians are always brought up against these profanations. One knows how St. Charles censured them, and how he labored to bring back the spirit of antiquity even into the smallest details of religion. The Council of Trent and those of others which have been held to see it enforced in the provinces express nothing else."

In spite of all condemnations and prohibitions, enforced as far as possible, at the end of the twelfth century, these travestied solemnities—solennites burlesques, as de Ménil terms them—in which dancing had its assigned place, were actually practiced still in France in 1444, as well as in England about a century later. The great fears of the an mil, 12 when the end of the world was prophesied, being forgotten, the people celebrated their rejoicings at being still alive by grand but coarse follies and amusements.

The reason suggested by de Ménil for having the dances in nated with paganism, tried to sanctify the profane dances by parodies of its mysteries, the faithful of both sexes mixing with the clergy and balloient devostement, this practice bringing in its train the desecrations already touched upon.

We have the words of Michelet, in which he says: "The black plague, the dance of St. Guy, the Flagellants, the Sabbat, these carnivals of despair. . . ." And de Ménil writes very charitably as well as understandingly on the subject: "The Middle Ages had need to rejoice in the midst of so much misery; at least the mendicant friars had given them the example," and that is how our great historian, well understood, thus explains.

"The true artists of the thirteenth century, orators, comedians,



<sup>12</sup> Tit de Eccles, etc., cap. 15.

<sup>18</sup> Year 1000.

mummers, jugglers, were the beggars. These spoke of love in the name of love, having taken the words of St. Augustine literally: 'Love and do what you like.' Logic, which had had such influence in the time of Abelard, no longer sufficed them. The world, tired of this rough path, preferred to rest with St. Francis and St. Bonaventura under the mystic shade of the Canticle of Canticles, or to dream with another St. John of a new faith and a new Gospel. This, then, is the formal explanation of the religious debauches of the time."16

Even as late as the eighteenth century dancing obtained in convents and monasteries, religious giving in their own parlors masked balls to people of the town, themselves assisting behind the grille of the cloister, as they had no right to mix with the dancers.18

To de Ménil I am again indebted for the following particulars about religious dances, which were found all over Europe.

At Venice a procession of the Rosary used to take place, when the dancers represented a triple chaplet, while young men dressed as devils also danced round young girls in costumes of angels.

In Spain and Portugal, on feasts of Our Lady, girls assembled in the evening before the doors of the churches dedicated to her, spending the night dancing in rounds while singing hymns and pealms. An annual procession, which has even taken place recently on Whit Tuesday at the tomb of St. Willibrod, Bishop of Utrecht, consisted of dancing in honor of this saint, who had by his intercession stopped a plague which was devastating the cattle.

The Sabbat is considered by him to be a vestige of the worship of the Bonne D esse, or Druidical rites, on the isle of Sein, for a fuller description of which one can refer to "Le Satanisme et la Majie," by Jules Bois.

This true Sabbat is not to be confounded, as Michelet explains, with the Sabbat des Hallucinées, where poor hysterical creatures, victims of unwholesome dreams and fancies, imagined themselves transported into the air on magic brooms.

In the sixteenth century, in the Church of St. Leonard at Limoges, there were dances on the feast of St. Martial, and as they danced the faithful used to say this prayer in Limousin patois: "San marceau prija pernoû, e noû épioran per voû.16

The Disciplinants, a kind of Flagellants, used to chastise themselves in dancing en cadence, with disciplines made of small cords, decorated, if such a word can be used, with balls of wax, on which bits of glass formed an incrustation, and "these devout follies ended with nocturnal debauches."

<sup>14</sup> Cesare Negri, "Histoire du Concile de Trente."
15 "Mémoires de Casanova."
16 "Saint Martial, pray for us, and we shall dance for you."

In Portugal—so it seems—danses baladoires first occurred. These were imitations in public places of the dances of the priests which then obtained in cathedrals, the custom being also much found in Italy during the days of Savonarola, where the people were in an access of "dévotion monacale," dancing on the public squares in circles, singing ridiculous hymns and crying "Vive Jesus!"

It is de Ménil who alludes to the Flagellants of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries as performing a dance "religious and mystic" as part of their wonderful processions, "Sombre Carnevals de désespoir," which, originating in Germany, went through the Low countries, Flanders, Picardy and France, until they reached the Alps, "where Italian sensualism opposed the most insurmountable barrier," yet later on we are told that they really began in Perugia.

This remarkable movement obtained its name from the scourges (flagella) which the members carried when in procession, applying them to bare shoulders and arms. "They first appeared," says a reliable writer, "in the thirteenth century, an age when Christian architecture reached a height of glory and perfection never since equaled, and extraordinary sanctity revealed marvels of grace and divine power before unsuspected, but in which also, the reign of law being but imperfectly established, the world was often startled from its propriety by the apparition of monsters of cruelty and lust, like Eccelin da Romano and his brother, whose touch was contamination and their very existence a curse.

"No human arm seemed able to reach far enough or strike hard enough to punish a twentieth part of the crimes that were committed. God appeared to be the one refuge left. Numbers of persons-men, women and children-collected together; they veiled their faces and uncovered their shoulders in each town that they entered, forming a melancholy procession. They sought by tears, groans and voluntary penance, singing penitential songs the while, to appease the divine wrath. The sound of the lash was continual, and blood flowed abundantly. The first associations of Flagellants appeared at Perugia in 1260. The sympathy and agitation which their proceedings at first excited would almost surpass belief; everywhere they were joined by crowds of fervent neophytes. The rule of the association was that every person should remain a member of it for thirty-three days, in honor of the thirty-three years of the life of our Lord. A contemporary writer (quoted by Dean Milman in his "Latin Christianity") says that "whatever might be alleged against them, nevertheless by this means many who were at enmity were reconciled and many good things were done."

"The secular governments after a time, observing that the Holy

<sup>17</sup> Michelet.

See and the Bishops in general did not encourage the movement, began to prohibit the Flagellant processions. After the Black Death, 1348, the Flagellants again appeared." Europe at that date was in a frantic state of terror at this awful plague, which fear gave a fresh impetus to the craving for extreme mortifications, pursued with such intemperance that as soon as there was less to dread the same persons gave themselves up to amusement, so that by this frivolous means the time of the terrible visitation might be forgotten."

The Danse macabre, or Dance of Death, was essentially characteristic of these strange and wonderful Middle Ages-many reasons, more or less probable, being given by historians, alike for its original purpose and for its name. In explanation of its object it is said to be a kind of reaction against the religion in which the flesh justified itself, the new era manifesting a desire to purify itself by mortifications. Here the presentment of death in this semigrotesque dance at least insisted on the truth of the laws of the king of terrors, who places on an equality "master and slave, the victim and the executioner." like a fiddler who by the imperative sound of his violin draws, whether they will or no, those of all ages. of all states of life, to follow in his train. Monsieur Van Praet informs us that the name of this weird dance comes from the Arabic Magabir, Magabarag (cemetery), while some give it an English derivation, Make-break, to cause to be broken, a word which suggests the rubbing together and breaking of bones. "At the end of the fifteenth century it was believed that Macabre was the name of a man, "but close investigation disproved this assertion, showing that he had nothing to do with the dance of this name. There are, besides, other conjectures, amongst them that Macheria meant "wall" in low Latin, because these pictures of this dance were often painted on walls of churches and cemeteries.

Holbein and Durer, etc., have immortalized the *Macabre* by their pencils, and in churches, etc., are paintings answering to the main idea. Some skeletons moving amongst some people are seen in an engraving before me—one bearing a coffin on his shoulders, others touching the monk, the student, the young man, who drops his flowers at the deadly touch; the musician, who lays down his fiddle; the reaper his scythe as these deathly beings, with their grinning skulls and emaciated figures, link their arms in theirs, evidently to carry them off, for the picture, which exists in the Church of the Chaise Dieu (Haute Loire), is named "La danse des morts."

Whether these dances actually took place is a moot point with several students, who believe them to have existed only in books, paintings or in representations, the text being somewhat amphibological, permitting of the doubt. However, de Ménil offers this as his interpretation: "Villeneuve-Bargemont, in his history of René d'Anjou, records a procession which passed through the streets of Paris under the name of 'danse macabre.'" He continues by reminding us that this custom spread throughout Europe. "In 1510 a masquerade of death, which circulated through Florence, was organized by the artist Pietro di Casimo, composed of cars representing tombs, which at given times opened and let pass skeletons singing the 'Miserere.'" This, indeed, was a specimen of the kind of "savage gaieties of the Renaissance," as he justly observes.

Don Quixote mentions a troupe of walking comedians who represented the tragedy of "the states of death," the devil being the chief actor. Michelet considered that the painting really only depicts what actually happened.

De Ménil in his history of the dance—to which work I am greatly indebted for much of the interesting fact on this question—considers all these dances, which took place during several centuries by peoples crushed and overwhelmed with misery as an audacious defiance thrown by the Middle Ages at all their oppressions and tyrannies, a mark of impregnable faith, which, terrible and crude in its manifestations, had its fanatics, but also its noble confessors and its army of martyrs.

As Plato described dancing briefly as a "rhythmic movement of the body," so supernaturalized in the beautiful mind of the angelic painter, there was nothing to accord ill with the visions which Fra Angelico's brush produced for the joy of ages in the "Dance of the Redeemed," nor in the sculptured marble of Donatello in his "Dancing Angels," all in both cases being fit and consonant with dignity, beauty of religious ideals and actions.

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## CRITICISMS IN KANT.

## KANT AND AGNOSTICISM.

Reason" is to descredit reason in its proofs for the existence of God. To establish the existence of a Supreme Being from reason alone is, he tells us, beyond the powers of reason. Singularly enough, however, while he maintains that on its speculative side reason is powerless to demonstrate the existence of God, he has no hesitation in assuring us that, on its practical side, reason is quite competent to accomplish what is impossible to her in the field of speculation. This inconsistency may be passed over here, however, since it would distract us from our present purpose.

Kant's method in his attempt to discount the proofs of the existence of God is insidious and sophistical in the extreme. He is an adept in all arts of the sophist, and he uses them here to the best advantage. One of his supreme "tricks"—to use a favorite expression of his own in relation with sophistry—is isolation. From a sheaf of principles, or concepts, or ideas, he selects a single one sometimes a group—and often wholly without justification, which he marks out for special favor or special reprobation. Is there a special concept which can be made to serve his purpose? It is isolated forthwith and placed in a class by itself. Is there one that is marked for utter extermination? The scapegoat is instantly singled out from the flock, the seal of condemnation and the stigma of obloquy are immediately affixed and it is no longer allowed to herd with its lawful companions. It is sent out into the desert of doubt and agnosticism, a homeless exile expelled from the haunts of human reason. It is so with his ideas of space and time, and with the categories on the one hand. It is so with the idea of a Supreme Being-with all ideas that cannot be met with in experience—on the other. But above and before all is it bold, glaring, indefensible and inconsistent in his isolation of what he calls the transcendental ideas. Rational psychology, rational cosmology, transcendental theology—these are, with what might be properly termed the most profound inconsistency, mercilessly reasoned out of the pale of reason altogether. Indeed, on this particular point Kant boasts that he has distanced all other philosophers.

"All transcendental ideas," he tells us, "can be arranged in three classes: the first containing the absolute (unconditioned) unity of the thinking subject; the second of the absolute unity of the series of conditions of phenomena; the third the absolute unity of the condition of all thought in general. . . . Thus it is pure reason which supplies the idea of a transcendental science of the soul

(psychologia rationalis), of a transcendental science of the world (cosmologia rationalis), and, lastly, of a transcendental science of God (theologia transcendentalis)." In this isolation Kant takes an especial pride. "For the present," he says, "we have achieved what we wished to achieve by removing the transcendental concepts of reason, which in the systems of other philosophers are generally mixed up with other concepts, without being distinguished even from the concepts of the understanding, out of so equivocal a position, by being able to determine their origin and thereby at the same time their number, which can never be exceeded, and by thus bringing them into a systematic connection, marking out and enclosing thereby a separate field for pure reason." This "separate field for pure reason" is nothing more or less than Kant's slaughter house of all transcendental ideas from which they are never expected to come out alive. Immurement in its precincts is as surely fatal as consignment to the Tower of London proved to be in the case of the victims of Crooked-back Richard. What Kant, however, with all his acuteness and penetration failed to perceive was thatas we hope to show at the proper time—the wholesale slaughter of these transcendental ideas necessarily involves the annihilation of all knowledge with them, and that Kant, when he acts in the capacity of the Lord High Executioner of them, has simply betrayed us into the empirical idealism of Berkeley.

Kant then proceeds to deal with these three transcendental victims in order. Having exhausted all the weapons of his peculiar warfare in the extermination of rational psychology—an extermination, by the way, of which he soon seems to repent and which he practically recants in his famous second edition—he opens the batteries of his metaphysics on cosmology and transcendental theology. These two philosophical scapegoats are henceforward linked together, become henceforth partners in a common lot, and are made to share a final common fate. The warfare against these two is carried on in a twofold fashion—by way of antinomy and by way of attempt at direct overthrow. It is very certain, however, that his confidence in the antinomies was not very robust, for after devoting one hundred and twenty pages to the work of proving that the arguments pro and con are of equal value, he finally finds himself forced to leave the field of so-called antinomy altogether and to take his arguments against the conclusions of rational cosmology and transcendental theology from an entirely different quarter. Meanwhile, before taking a final leave of his antinomies, he sits him down in the seat of judgment and, with much self-complacency. authoritatively and judicially decides the finely balanced contention of their respective opposing claims. Here is the judicial decree:

"Nothing seems clearer than that, if one maintains that the world has a beginning and the other that it has no beginning, but exists from all eternity, one or the other must be right. But though this be so, yet as the arguments on both sides are equally clear (?) it remains still impossible ever to find out on what side the truth lies, and the suit continues, although both parties have been ordered to keep the peace before the tribunal of reason. Nothing remains, therefore, to settle the quarrel once for all, but to convince them that although they can refute each other so eloquently, they are really quarreling about nothing, and that a certain transcendental illusion has mocked them with a reality where no reality exists. We shall now enter upon this way of adjusting a dispute which cannot be adjudicated."

It is, of course, Kant himself who constitutes both combatants in the debate. It is he who from the depths of his own genius furnishes the arguments on both sides—for and against the existence of God; for and against the eternity of the world; for and against the simplicity of the soul, and for and against the · freedom of the will. It is these disputants (Kant himself) that "can refute each other so eloquently;" and it is on these disputes of Kant with himself-and it may be added colored in every instance with his own sophistry—that Kant now passes sentence as judge. This facetious decision on the part of the court interests us in the final sentence which is to settle forever the contention in so strange a case, and makes us somewhat curious to learn what may be the new Solomon's "way of adjusting a case which cannot be adjudicated." The manner of adjustment proves to be worthy of Dogberry. The argument by which Kant arrives at his final decision is worthy of a place alongside his "nothing manifold by the side of each other and combined to a unity." Here is his method of adjustment in all its high, serene, transcendental wisdom. We give it in full. It will perhaps give an added interest to the reader to know that the "adjustment" is but a remote attack on the proofs from reason for the existence of God-a forcing of the outposts of the defense, so to speak.

"If two opposite judgments presuppose an inadmissible condition," he says, "they both, in spite of their contradiction (which, however, is no real contradiction), fall to the ground, because the condition fails under which alone either of the propositions was meant to be valid."

This may be permitted to pass for the present. He immediately adds by way of proof rather than of illustration:

"If somebody were to say that every body has either a good or a bad smell, a third case is possible, namely, that it has no smell at

all, in which case both contradictory propositions would be false. If I say that it is either good smelling or not good smelling (vel suaveolens vel non suaveolens), in that case the two judgments are contradictory, and the former only is wrong, while its contradictory opposite, namely, that some bodies are not good smelling, comprehends those bodies also that have no smell at all. In the former opposition (per disparata) the contingent condition of the concept of a body (smell) still remained in the contradictory judgment and was not eliminated by it, so that the latter could not be called the contradictory opposite of the former."

This is somewhat crudely and not very correctly put; but let that pass. Kant immediately proceeds to add another case which he supposes parallel with this, but which is very far from it. He proceeds:

"If I say, therefore, that the world is either infinite in space or not infinite (non est infinitus), then if this former proposition is wrong, its contradictory opposite, that the world is not infinite, must be true. I should thus only eliminate an infinite world without affirming another, namely, the finite. But if I had said the world is either infinite or finite (not infinite), both statements may be false. For I then look upon the world, as by itself, determined in regard to its extent, and I do not only eliminate in the opposite statement the infinity, and with it, it may be, its whole independent existence, but I add a determination to the world as a thing existing by itself, which may be false, because the world may not be a thing by itself, and therefore, with regard to its extension, neither infinite nor finite."

And he deduces therefrom a principle for future philosophical use (!) telling us:

"This kind of opposition I may be allowed to call dialectical, that of real opposition, the analytical opposition. Thus, then, of two judgments opposed to each other dialectically both may be false, because the one does not contradict the other, but says something more than is requisite for a contradiction."

This, then, is Kant's argument. The parentheses and italics are Kant's own. Any one who wishes to get the full force of the argument can omit the few words of comment which we have interposed between the sections. They will thus have the argument precisely as it appears in Kant's volumes.

It is difficult at the first reading to convince ourselves that Kant could ever have penned these words. Here are sophisms for which a schoolboy should be whipped palmed off on an unoffending and unsuspecting world as sound logical truth. Nay, what is more; sound logical truth is assailed in their behalf, discredited and re-

jected, while the usurper with a false title is forcibly thrust into their seat. It seems incredible that such an argument should be put forward by any philosopher whose knowledge of common logic was up to the ordinary standard. It is still more incredible that any one should regard it as unanswerable. But there can be no mistake in the matter. The text, the context, the argument, the conclusion; nay, the principles which he has attempted to establish as based upon them—all go to show that Kant intended that they should stand in all their naked and shallow absurdity. As far, too, as we are aware, with all its absurdity, it has never been answered. Let us examine his words at close range.

Plainly, what Kant wishes to establish here is the somewhat absurd proposition that there is no "real contradiction" between the notion of an infinite world and that of a finite one. He wants to show that the opposition is merely what he calls a "dialectical" one, and, therefore, that it is by no means "real." He says that "if two opposite judgments presuppose an inadmissible condition, they both, in spite of their contradiction (which, however, is no real contradiction) fall to the ground, because the condition fails under which alone either of the propositions was intended to be valid." In the illustration of this proposition—which is intended also as a proof—he tells us very truly "if somebody were to say that every body has either a good or a bad smell, a third case is possible, namely, that it has no smell at all, in which case both contradictory propositions are false." The truth of this statement no one will question. A body may exist without any smell at all. In this case it is quite evident that in order to have the two opposite judgments of good smelling and bad smelling really ccontradictory—that is, destructive of each other-it is necessary to "presuppose" the "condition" that every body has a smell of some kind. Only under this condition are the two judgments mutually destructive of each other. Even this statement of Kant's is not exactly true or logically correct, for there is such a thing as a smell that is neither good nor bad. However, the proposition of Kant may be permitted to pass for the sake of argument; its truth in a general way may be passed over without question.

In this case the "presupposed inadmissible condition" which "fails" is that all bodies have a smell of some kind; and this presupposed condition may be false.

When, however, we come to the second instance of the application of the principle, we find a very different state of affairs. Kant says: "If I had said the world is either infinite or finite (not infinite), both statements may be false. For I then look upon the world as by itself determined in regard to its extent, and I do not

only eliminate in the opposite statement the infinity and with it, it may be, its whole independent existence, but I add a determination to the world as a thing existing by itself, which may be false, because the world may not be a thing by itself, and therefore with regard to extension neither infinite nor finite." Kant evidently imagines that he has here a case which is exactly parallel with that of the first illustration. But in the first case, as we have seen, the "presupposed inadmissible condition," owing to whose failure the two opposite judgments of good smelling and bad smelling can both fall to the ground and may both be at the same time false, was that every body has a smell of some kind. This presupposed condition may be false, and yet the body—the subject—may remain. But when we come to the two opposing judgments: that the world is either infinite or finite, and claim that, as in the former case, both judgments may be at the same time false, we must, of course, look here also for the "presupposed inadmissible condition," the failure of which is to justify us in saying that the world may be neither infinite nor finite. Here, however, we are confronted with a very different state of things. In this latter case we find that the "presupposed condition" is that there is no world at all. Only in the case of the world's failure to exist can we say that it may be neither infinite nor finite. It is only when we deny the existence of the world that we can say with truth that the world is neither infinite nor finite. And this is about as foolish a proposition as a wise philosopher could construct. Indeed, Kant himself seems to see this plainly; but he seems totally to fail to perceive its significance. He tells us: "For I then look upon the world, as by itself, determined in regard to its extent, and I do not only eliminate in the opposite statement the infinity and with it, it may be, its whole independent existence (italics ours), but I add a determination to the world as a thing existing by itself, which may be false, because the world may not be a thing by itself (italics ours), and therefore, with regard to its extension, neither infinite nor finite." Here, then, it is plain-nay, insisted upon by Kant—that in order to be able to say with truth that the world is neither infinite nor finite, we must eliminate the world from existence altogether. All Kant's circumlocution amounts to nothing more or less than this. But it is very plain that if there be no world existing there is nothing left to dispute about; and it is equally certain that if we once admit the condition, that the world exists, Kant cannot deny that in the proposition the world is either infinite or finite the predicates are really contradictory, and that if one be false, the other must necessarily be true and vice versa. But by hypothesis the very statement of the proposition includes an existing world. It is about the world that exists the whole discussion centres—not about a world that does not exist. If we take away the existence of the world the contention itself has no meaning of any kind. It is then of the existing world only that there is anything predicated as to infinity; and of this existing world, in spite of Kant's sophistry, nay, according to his own statements, it can and must be predicated that it must be either infinite or finite. And this judgment remains true, whether Kant takes the world as existing by itself, as existing as a congeries of phenomena, or as existing—as Kant sometimes would have us believe it—merely in our own concept. The judgment holds true, whatever the form of existence we assign to the world; and if we deny it existence, the result is that either there is nothing to dispute about; in other words, Kant hands us over to the empirical idealism of Berkeley.

Thus far we have followed Kant's own method of reasoning; but perhaps this may be made clearer in another way. Wherein does Kant's error lie? This is not very far to seek. There is just enough ambiguity in the terms infinite and finite to blind weak vision. When Kant is dealing with affirmative propositions and the direct negation of them, he sees matters clearly enough; it is only when he comes to the terms infinite and finite that he becomes confused and seems to lose his way completely. When he tells us that in the statement: every body is either good smelling or not good smelling, there is a real contradiction, his vision is clear and unclouded. In like manner he has no difficulty in perceiving the truth when he states the proposition that: the world is either infinite in space or is not infinite. He at once tells us that "if the former proposition is wrong, its contradictory opposite, that the world is not infinite, must be true." Here he perceives things clearly. The negation is direct and the wayfaring man cannot err in his conclusion. It is only when he comes to deal with the infinite and the finite that his vision fails him. There is a semblance of the positive in both terms-infinite and finite; and this prevents Kant from perceiving that in them we have direct and real contradiction. Let us examine the propositions at close range.

It is quite evident that when we say that every body is either good smelling or not good smelling, the real contradiction lies in—or rather is proved by—the fact that we cannot remove both predicates at the same time without removing the subject also with them. We cannot say that a body is neither good smelling nor not good smelling unless we remove the subject—the body—at the same time. It is quite manifest that if we can say with truth that a body is neither good smelling nor not good smelling, it is only because there is no body at all to emit any kind of smell or to withhold it. In this case the removal of both predicates necessitates the removal

with them of the thing itself; that is, of the subject. Hence the true test of a real contradiction in two opposing statements is the fact that we cannot remove both predicates without at the same time removing the subject with them. The same is true of Kant's other statement: The world is either infinite or not infinite. It is plain that we cannot say: The world is neither infinite nor not infinite without removing the world altogether. If there be a world at all, it must be either one or the other. Kant himself admits that there is here a real contradiction also; and he practically admits, too, that the real contradiction lies in the fact that we cannot remove both predicates without at once removing the subject with them. The principle, however, he fails to perceive; although he does virtually admit it when he says: "I should thus only eliminate an infinite world without affirming another, namely, the finite." That is, he cannot remove both predicates without at the same time removing the subject—the world—with them. Consequently, it is perfectly plain, and virtually admitted by Kant, that in order to prove the truth of a real contradiction we have only to try to remove both predicates and see whether the subject also disappears with them. If the subject remains, there is no real contradiction. If the subject also is removed, the contradiction is real. This will become at once evident, per contra, if we take the disjunctive proposition first introduced by Kant where the contradiction is not real; viz., that every body is either good smelling or bad smelling. In this case there is no real contradiction, as we have seen, for the reason that a body may have no smell at all; consequently, in this case we may remove both predicates, "good smelling" and "bad smelling;" but in so doing we do not remove the subject—the body. That subject—the body may yet remain; for it may have no smell at all-consequently, may be neither good smelling nor bad smelling.

Now when we come to the proposition that the world must be either infinite or finite it is also quite evident that we can only remove both predicates when we remove the subject—the world—with them. We cannot say that the world is neither infinite nor finite, if we are to speak of an existing world at all. Hence it is quite plain that the contradiction between the two opposites, finite and infinite, must be a real contradiction; for we cannot remove them both from the world at the same time without removing the world—the subject—with them. There can be only one conclusion from this fact; viz., that the contradiction between the terms finite and infinite, as predicated of the world, is not merely a so-called dialectical opposition or contradiction, but a real contradiction—a contradiction which, unlike that existing between the predicates good smelling and bad smelling, is not a mere opposition, but a contradiction as

direct, as mutually destructive of each other's existence and as real as that which exists between the terms good smelling and not good smelling. But even this, true and irrefragable and wholly subversive of Kant's entire argument as it is, is not necessary for the overthrow of Kant's argument on this point. For this, all that is necessary is to show that in order to maintain his argument Kant is forced to part with the world as an existence of any kind. In order to prove the truth of his contention that the world is neither finite nor infinite, Kant is forced to deny that the world exists at all! But it is of an existing world that Kant is philosophizing. It is the world in which we live and of which we form a part that Kant has been trying to explain. If, then, there is no world at all existing, there is nothing to explain, and all Kant's arguments are but wasted energy. Kant and his "Critique of Pure Reason" are constituent parts of the world about which he is contending; and if Kant is forced to gamble away the existence of the world in order to save his argument, we are, of course, perfectly reconciled. If, as is unquestionable, and as Kant himself admits-nay, even contends—we cannot remove from the world the predicates of finity and infinity without removing the subject with them; and if we cannot remove the subject without removing the world; and if we cannot remove the world without removing with it Kant and his "Critique of Pure Reason," with all its absurdity and sophistry, Kant's claim, could he validate it—which he cannot—might, perhaps, in the long run, prove to be a blessing in disguise.

If we arrange Kant's propositions in a tabular form the results will at once be apparent.

- (1) Every body is either good smelling or not good smelling. (Real contradiction.) Here the subject—a body—must be removed if we remove both predicates.
- (2) Every body is either good smelling or bad smelling. (No real contradiction.) Both predicates can be removed, yet the subject—a body—remains.
- (3) The world is either infinite or not infinite. (Real contradiction.) The subject—the world—is removed if we remove both predicates.
- (4) The world is either infinite or finite. (Real contradiction.) The subject—the world—here, too, is removed if we remove both predicates.

In numbers (1) and (3) there is no doubt about the reality of the contradiction which is expressed by the word "not." The contradiction is real and we cannot remove both predicates at the same time without removing the subject with them. That is, we cannot say that a body is neither good smelling nor not good smelling, if we are to have a body at all; for every body must be either one or the other—good smelling or not good smelling. In the same way in (3) we cannot say that the world is neither infinite nor not infinite without removing the world; for the world must be either one or the other—infinite or not infinite.

On the other hand, when we come to examine (2) where the contradiction is not real, we find that we can remove both predicates at the same time; but the subject—a body—still remains; for a body may exist without either a good or a bad smell; that is, without any smell at all. Hence we may say that a body is neither good smelling nor bad smelling, but the subject does not disappear.

But when we come to (4) where the contradiction, although real, is not expressed by the word "not," we find that the removal of the predicates produces not the effect which we have seen in (2), but the effect which we have witnessed in (1) and (3); that is, we cannot remove both predicates without removing the subject—the world—with them; that is, we cannot say the world is neither infinite nor finite without removing the world altogether.

Kant was either deceived or wished to deceive others by the absence of the little negative word "not" in the fourth (4); and because of its absence believed, or affected to believe, that proposition (4) was exactly like proposition (2), in which the negative particle is also absent. But it is manifest that (4), instead of being a parallel with (2), where the contradiction is not real, is a parallel with (1) and with (3), where the contradiction is real. It seems hardly credible that Kant could be deceived—and there are indications that he was not; but that he was simply sophisticating—but it is passing strange that the lurking-place of the fallacy has never before been exposed.

It is on this very point that the shallowness of Kant is deserving of the same reproof as the schoolboy's thoughtlessness. He fails to realize that he is rushing from a supposed danger into a real one. Indeed, throughout his entire famous work he is ever between what is for him and his contention a Sylla and Charybdis. In his mad haste to get away from the conclusions of solid reason he fails to see that he is running headlong into Pyrrhonism. Indeed, all unconsciously his contention regarding a finite and an infinite world rests on Berkeleyism, and in it only does he find a final escape. The underlying conviction throughout his whole contention here is that he can in the long run take refuge in a denial of the real existence of the world; and this denial he is forced finally and flatly to make. He concludes the preceding argument in this way:

"If we regard the two statements that the world is infinite in extension, and that the world is finite in extension, as contradictory

opposites, we assume that the world (the whole series of phenomena) is a thing by itself; for it remains whether I remove the infinite or the finite regressus in the series of its phenomena. But if we remove this supposition, or this transcendental illusion, and deny that it is a thing by itself, then the contradictory opposition of the two statements becomes purely dialectical, and as the world does not exist by itself (independently of the regressive series of my representations), it exists neither as a whole by itself infinite, nor as a whole by itself finite. It exists only in the empirical regressus in the series of phenomena, and nowhere by itself."

Here Kant calls the existence of the world as a thing by itself a mere "supposition," a "transcendental illusion;" and in order to validate his argument, actually denies the existence of the world. In other words, in order to prove his proposition, he is obliged to remove the subject of his judgment out of existence altogether. Nay, he even denies the existence of the world; for he says: "and as the world does not exist by itself (independently of the regressive series of my representations), it exists neither as a whole by itself infinite, nor as a whole by itself finite." Here Kant plainly denies existence to the world. He holds—as in his parenthesis—that it has no existence outside our representation; or as he puts it, "independently of the regressive series of my representations." This, however, is a mere quibble; and even so cannot help his case at all. For we can ask him whether he regards his "representations" of the world as either true or false. If true, and "my representations," being true, represent it as existing, it follows that the world exists and that, therefore, the "two statements that the world is infinite in extension, and that the world is finite in extension," must be "contradictory opposites," and consequently that the world must be either one or the other. If on the other hand, Kant should tell us that "my representations" of the world are false and that the world—or my representation of it—is a mere "transcendental illusion," then does Kant betray us and betray all philosophy into the empirical idealism of Berkeley. He is welcome to whichever horn of the dilemma he prefers. Indeed, it is quite plain that Kant would have little hesitation as to his choice and that he would instantly follow Berkeley, whom he pretends to combat. Before leaving the discussion he attempts to give a supplemental argument for the transcendental ideality of phenomena -in order to bolster up his contention on this point in his transcendental æsthetic-and his conclusion in behalf of this wholly different doctrine is: "It is false, therefore, that the world (the sum total of all phenomena) is a whole existing by itself!" And he adds: "Hence it follows that phenomena in general are nothing outside our representations, which was what we mean by their transcendental ideality."

There is, throughout it all, however, a certain peculiarity which should not be overlooked. It is the fierce earnestness with which Kant pursues a contention which, if he believes his own conclusions to be sound, is the very quintessence of absurdity. If there be no world at all—as Kant so frantically maintains—why not say so flatly and candidly? Why not make the existence or non-existence of the world the real subject of the contention? If Kant really believes his own contention, viz., that the world does not exist, is it not the height of madness to make the infinity or the finity of this nonexistent world the bone of contention? Why argue about the properties or determinations of what has no existence? Indeed, the fact that Kant denies the existence of the world and at the same time maintains a deafening clatter as to whether that world—that does not exist-can be declared neither finite nor infinite, does not offer much warrant for the sanity of the philosophy that constitutes this portion of the "Critique." Is it not supreme folly to waste our energies in arguing about the attributes of a world whose existence even, according to Kant, is not yet established? Why not first show whether it really exists or not? It will be ample time to decide the question as to whether it is infinite or finite, or both—or neither. as Kant contends—when we have ascertained whether or no there is a world at all to contend about. This duty, however, devolves on Kant; for only himself and Berkeley-whom he has undertaken to refute-deny its existence. But doubtless it will be said that Kant does not really deny the existence of the world—which, in spite of all his absurd statements to the contrary, is, doubtless, the truth. Very well, then. The moment the existence of the world in any form is admitted, in that instant it can be predicated of that world, whose existence is in any sense admitted, that it must be either infinite or finite, and Kant's contention that it is neither infinite nor finite falls completely to the ground. He admits himself that existence once admitted the world must be either infinite or finite. It is only in the absence of its existence that the world can be said to be neither infinite nor finite, as Kant finds himself compelled to admit. Hence no matter how we take the question, Kant remains either on one or the other horn of the dilemma.

That any sane man could have adopted this line of argument as sound; that it could have been printed between the covers of a book and given to the world as a philosophy of things, and especially of knowledge; that men should be found who could swallow such arguments without a single grimace or qualm of reason; but above and before all, that men should be found who would undertake to

extol this—and arguments like it—as the highest achievement of human genius, is one of the staggering problems of human reason, both pure and empirical. That the whole agnostic world should be built on such rubbish-heaps of thought is one of the marvels which confronts with its mystery the student of the history of philosophy. It was George Eliot who said that nothing is so trying as to be sane in this insane world; and this is especially true in some regions of the world of philosophy. Kant's argument here furnishes a striking proof of this truth. The secret of his sophistry here, however, lies in the fact that for him neither the objective reality of phenomena nor its unreality is fixed or stable. His views on this subect are as facile as a swivel.

Indeed, we are here face to face with one of the prime difficulties in dealing with Kant. This difficulty consists not so much in ascertaining his meaning as in finding that meaning fixed and firm, invariable and unchangeable. On certain points in his teaching no weathervane is more fickle or uncertain. It is nothing unusual to find Kant arguing now from one set of principles which for the time he holds to be the only true ones, and again arguing quite as strenuously from exactly the opposite ones—ust as occasion requires. Especially on the subject of reality or existence is Kant vague, shadowy, shifty, inconstant, inconsistent and contradictory. Nor is it merely that he is vacillating; he is simply unscrupulous. When driven to bay he stoutly maintains his doctrine. But when he finds himself in a difficulty he is not very punctilious about the means of extricating himself. Any port in a storm seems to be his motto. And his prime principle seems to be: the rule of expediency is the rule of philosophy. He claims that one of his principal objects in the "Critique of Pure Reason" is to refute the idea of Berkelevism: but when narrowly cornered he has no hesitation in fighting under Berkeley's standard and using as his weapon the very doctrine he is supposed to be refuting. We have an example of it in this particular case.

In the foregoing argument, in order to maintain his contention that the world may be ueither infinite nor finite, he is forced, as has been seen, to do so at the sacrifice of the existence of the world. This, however, does not stagger him for a moment. He simply steps over to the ranks of Berkeley without qualm or regret, and admits, nay, argues, in order to carry his foolish point, that the world does not exist at all. But this he will not do openly. He covers the banner of Berkeley with a circumlocution which he thinks will hide his desertion of his own colors, and under this disguise essays to argue his point. The ruse is successful in its deception. The sophism seems to impose even upon himself. The Berkeleyism is there, how-

ever, all the same. Having told us that "as the world does not exist by itself (independently of the regressive series of my representations), it exists neither as a whole by itself infinite, nor as a whole by itself finite," he does not wish to leave us under the impression that he has thus abolished an existing world. He manifestly saw that he had betrayed himself into Berkeleyism; and so he adds: "It exists only in the empirical regressus in the series of phenomena, and nowhere else. Hence, if that series is always conditioned, it can never exist as complete, and the world is therefore not a conditioned whole, and does not exist as such, either with infinite or finite extension." Under cover of this mask he tries to hide the empirical idealism contained in the words; and while he denies existence to the world, he attempts to do it in such a way that he will appear—at least in some fashion—to redeem the world from its precarious position. We have, of course, seen that this is a futile attempt: for the moment he admits for the world existence of any kind, in that instant he is forced to admit that it must be infinite or finite. But the ruse is unsuccessful in its operation; for since, as he tells us, the world "exists only in the empirical regressus in the series of phenomena, and nowhere by itself," it may be asked whether this regressus is a mere logical process—and therefore purely mental; that is, an exercise of the imagination—or whether it is objective perception of the phenomena in the different series? If the former, then there is no world existing outside the imagination. If the latter, then the world must be existing, and if it exists, it must be, as has been seen, either infinite or finite.

Kant's whole difficulty here arises from the manner in which he juggles with phenomena. Indeed, there is nothing more discouraging than an attempt to discover what were really Kant's views regarding the objective reality of phenomena. Surprised and shocked when we first discovered Kant's strange vacillation and the unfixed character of his views on this point, we took pains to make note of his principal inconsistencies and various views on the subject. Here is what we have found. He has given us several distinct theories on the question, each of which he espouses fully for the time At one time phenomena have, we are told, no objective reality; they are within us and within us only, and can never exist outside of us. At another we are told that they possess objective reality. While yet again we are told that they are real when they are given in experience, but not real apart from experience. And we have besides these several various shadings of these three different theories. The riddle of the Sphinx is therefore a simple one compared with Kant and his views about phenomena. It would, we think, be difficult for any other man to crowd so much clotted nonsense or so many contradictory statements into so small a space as Kant has managed to introduce into three consecutive paragraphs—just fifty-seven lines in all—in his brief exposition of his own transcendental idealism. This may seem strong language, but we shall let the reader judge for himself. And the bewildering feature of it all is that Kant will argue from the standpoint of each contradiction when it suits his contention. He begins his exposition of his transcendental idealism in these words:

"It has been sufficiently proved in the transcendental Æsthetic that everything which is perceived in space and time, therefore all objects of an experience possible to us are nothing but phenomena, that is, mere representations which, such as they are represented, namely, as extended beings, or series of changes, have no independent existence outside our thoughts. This system I call Transcendental Idealism."

Now, if words mean anything, it is quite evident from this that Kant, in his transcendental idealism, holds that the world, which is the sum total of all external phenomena, does not exist outside our own thought; and that it is consequently in our minds only. "It has no independent existence outside our thoughts;" therefore, there does not exist a real world at all. But, perhaps alarmed at the sound of his own terms, he instantly perceives that there is nothing to redeem such a doctrine from Berkeleyism, and he hastens to withdraw the plain, unequivocal statement. After shuddering for a moment on the brink of Berkeleyism he forthwith and directly repudiates empirical idealism, and then tells us:

"Our own transcendental idealism, on the contrary, allows that the objects of external intuition may be real (italics ours), as they are perceived in space, and likewise all changes in time, as they are represented by the internal sense."

It will be perceived that even in the short distance traveled Kant has already begun to recant. In the preceding paragraph "phenomena had no independent existence outside our thoughts;" here, however, we are told that "the objects of external intuition (phenomena) may be real." This "may," however, we find changed to "must" in the very next sentence, so that the evolution of his opinion is very rapid. He continues, as if trying to set himself right:

"For as space itself is a form of the intuition which we call external, and as there would be no empirical representation at all, unless there were objects in space, we can and *must* (italics ours) admit the extended beings in it as real; and the same applies to time."

Here, then, within the limit of a few brief sentences Kant gives three distinct opinions on the reality of phenomena—and conse-

quently of the world; first, that it has no existence outside our minds; secondly, that it "may have" an existence outside them, for it "may be real;" and thirdly, that it "must have" an existence (outside our minds). And in proof of the last, he says, "there would be no empirical representation at all, unless there were objects in space;" and therefore "the extended beings in it" must be real. But scarcely have we begun to rejoice that the light of true reason has begun to dawn on Kant, in spite of the metaphysical fog which he has created around him, when we find that he immediately repents of these concessions to common sense. In the very next sentence he upsets everything again and tells us:

"Space itself, however, as well as time, and with them all phenomena, are not things by themselves, but representations, and cannot exist outside our mind."

And so we are back in the selfsame spot from which we started. Kant relapses into his old besetting sin and the hopes that he raised are destined to perish immediately. Indeed, if there ever existed a muddled philosopher, it is Kant in this particular instance. Here in this last sentence he fully recants his common sense and tells us that since "phenomena are not things by themselves, but representations," they "cannot exist outside our mind;" whereas, in the preceding sentence he tells us that it is precisely because they are representations that we must admit that they are real beings, and therefore exist outside our minds. "As there would be no empirical representation at all," as he puts it, "unless there were objects in space, we can and must admit the extended beings in it as real." That is, Kant tells us in those two sentences, one of which immediately follows the other, that because phenomena are representations they must be extended beings, having a real existence in space; and again that because phenomena are representations they "cannot exist outside the mind." Possibly no philosopher, since or before Kant's time, has ever attempted to impose such rubbish on the world in the name of philosophy. Comment on the confused galimatias would be wholly superfluous.

But Kant does not stop here. He again perceives the yawning gulf of Berkeleyism with its jaws wide open to receive him, and drawing back from the danger in new alarm, he tells us:

"In space and time, however, the empirical truth of phenomena is sufficiently established, and kept quite distinct from a dream, if both are properly and completely connected together in experience, according to empirical laws."

With these words of wisdom he endeavors to assure himself that no sleeping ghosts of Berkeleyism or empirical idealism in any form can arise.

Kant here finds himself forced to call into requisition another of the palmary tricks on which he so frequently relies to rescue him from his numberless difficulties; that is, he resorts to language which has no meaning for the reader, and which can have none for Kant. It is one of his main devices. When unable to find his way in thought he begins to juggle with language. Here he wishes to find a middle way for objective reality of phenomena, somewhere between existence and non-existence. Not being able to discover the impossible, he attempts to reconcile the two contradictory terms. Consequently, he invents a new phrase which he imagines will mean neither the one thing nor the other; and, instead of reality or nonreality of phenomena, he gives us the statement, "the empirical truth of phenomena is sufficiently established." He dare not again say that the reality of phenomena is sufficiently established, for it is the reality of phenomena he is all along attempting to overthrow; nor can he wholly reject this reality, knowing as he does that the only alternative is Berkeleyism. He imagines, however, that he has discovered a way out of the difficulty by introducing a new phrase which will imply the reality of phenomena without actually admitting it. Thus we have the new term, "the empirical truth of phenomena." But this is simply the tactics of the ostrich. For this "empirical truth of phenomena" means either that phenomena have a real existence outside the mind or that they have not; and Kant finds himself back in the old dilemma from which he imagined he was escaping. The new phrase is a circumlocution for reality or it is nothing. No doubt all this meaningless verbiage sounds very profound and learned, and is as awe-inspiring to Kant's followers as the crashes of stage thunder were once to the rustic. Such verbiage no doubt splits the ears of the philosophic groundlings. But Kant had even another purpose in view. The new phrase is the precursor of still another theory on the subject of the objective reality of phenomena. This new view seems to be that phenomena have objective reality in perception only; that is, phenomena exist only when the mind perceives them. Kant proceeds:

"The objects of experience are therefore never given by themselves, but in our experience only, and do not exist outside it. That
there may be inhabitants in the moon, though no man has ever seen
them, must be admitted; but it means no more than that, in the
possible progress of our experience, we may meet with them; for
everything is real that hangs together with a perception, according
to the laws of empirical progress. They are therefore real, if they
are empirically connected with any real consciousness, although they
are not therefore real by themselves, that is, apart from that progress
of experience."

The italicizing of the first four words is Kant's own; all the rest is ours. The wonderful verbiage of this overstrained expression betrays the extraordinary stress of mind under which Kant was laboring, as well as the desperate straits to which he found himself reduced. The philosophical results, however, are still more startling. The inhabitants in the moon seem to have led Kant far into the regions of lunar philosophy. To follow Kant's new view along the different avenues of philosophical thought which it opens up to us would prove an amusing but endless task. All that we shall say here is that it gives us still a new theory of the objective reality of phenomena—wholly different from the preceding ones professed by Kant. It is quite manifest that Kant did not have here the courage of his ideas—we will not say convictions, because he has none on the subject. According to this new theory—Kant's fourth, inside of two pages—the mind is the creator of phenomena. Phenomena are real, he tells us, "if they are empirically connected with any real consciousness." But "they are not real by themselves, that is, apart from"-Kant does not dare to say: apart from such "consciousness," and so he resorts to his favorite trick of the circumlocutory phrase, and says instead: "apart from that progress of experience."

It follows plainly, then, from Kant's own words, that when there is a mind perceiving them, phenomena exist—they become real. But the moment the perceiving mind ceases they become non-existent; they cease to be; they are no longer real. Consequently the mind must be the creator of phenomena. There is no escape from this conclusion. And, of course, as the sum total of phenomena constitutes the world, it follows that it is our minds that create the world also. Nay, what is more, the mind annihilates as well as creates phenomena. If we take any particular phenomenon and apply to it the reasoning of Kant, we shall find that it can have a succession of existences and non-existences, according as it is perceived and not perceived by the mind. Hence, although there lies before me as I write an absurd volume of philosophy called Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," the volume would not be there at all if I were not here to perceive it; so that it is my mind that gives existence to the book. And each time I succeed in ridding my consciousness of the book and its absurdities, the book itself ceases to have existence; so that again and again, as often as I am conscious or unconscious of the book, I create or annihilate the precious volume before me with all its precious nonsense. For be it well understood that, by "the perception of any real consciousness," Kant does not by any means mean the divine consciousness-which would ensure permanent existence—but our consciousness. "They exist in our experience only," we are told; that is, in the consciousness of men who are seeking knowledge concerning phenomena. Kant distinctly tells us that the experience must be "ours;" that "to hang together with a perception, according to the laws of empirical progress" is necessary to the existence of a phenomenon; all of which means that it must take place in "our experience," and must consist in a hanging together of space and time, our perceiving mind, andwhatever the mind happens to create. This is so absurd a notion that it seems incredible that Kant could have thus understood it; but the words admit of no other meaning. They are there in their awful absurdity. Berkelevism itself becomes respectable alongside of such drivel. Yet there can be no doubt that Kant so understood it. Later—in the very next paragraph—he removes all doubt on this point; for he tells us: "For that it (a phenomenon) existed by itself, without any reference to our senses and possible experience, might no doubt be said when we speak of a thing by itself. We are here speaking, however, of a phenomenon in space and time, which are not determinations of things by themselves, but only of our sensibility. Hence that which exists in them (phenomena) is not something by itself, but consists in representations only, which, unless they are given in us (in perception) exist nowhere." Here, then, is the proof that we have not misinterpreted Kant when we said that the mind creates phenomena—even repeatedly. He admits that things by themselves might no doubt exist without any reference to our senses or to experience. But he not only denies that phenomena are things by themselves, but he declares that even that which underlies phenomena is not a thing by itself. Nay, he denies that phenomena are determinations, even of things by themselves; they are mere determinations of our sensibility, he informs us. These representations have nothing whatever to do with things by themselves or anything by itself. They are representations which are given in us only, and exist nowhere else, either as phenomena, as determinations of things, or as things by themselves. Therefore, when in our experience we meet with a phenomenon of any kind, that phenomenon exists solely in the mind. It has nothing to do with anything else but the mind; it is a determination of the mind only; hence the mind is the creator of all phenomena and of the sum total of all phenomena; that is of the world. Hence the world, too, is not constant or permanent. It exists while we are conscious of it; when we are not conscious of it, it does not exist at all. This is the wisdom of Kant and his followers. But Kant in his desperate situation confuses all these notions hopelessly. In the paragraph from which we have last quoted and which is but the continuation of the other two paragraphs—which we have also quoted—the confusion becomes worse confounded. It would be difficult to find its fellow. He says:

"Nothing is really given to us but perception, and the empirical progress from this to other possible perceptions. (Mark the next brilliant sentence.) For by themselves phenomena, as mere representations, are real in perception only, which itself is nothing but the reality of an empirical representation; that is, phenomenal appearance. (The state of mind which produced such a sentence must have been one of extreme desperation.) To call a phenomenon a real thing before it is perceived means either that in the progress of experience we must meet with such a perception, or it means nothing. For that it existed by itself, without any reference to our senses and possible experience, might no doubt be said when we speak of a thing by itself. We are speaking, however, of a phenomenon in space and time, which are not determinations of things by themselves, but only of our sensibility. Hence that which exists in them (phenomena) is not something by itself, but consists in representations only, which, unless they are given in us (in perception), exist nowhere."

Here in the sentence above indicated he tells us plainly that "phenomena, as mere representations, are real in perception only," which, if it means anything at all, means that they are real only while we are perceiving them. But he undertakes to explain what is meant by this "perception." "It is nothing," he says, "but the reality of an empirical representation." Here perception and the reality of empirical representation are but one and the same thing; that is, phenomena are not real unless in representation—just like the stars on a night of flying clouds; only with this difference, that with Kant the stars would be real stars while we perceive them, but the moment a cloud concealed them from our view they would cease to be real when visible, only then are they real; for only then are they in perception; and, according to Kant, they are real in perception only. Again, when visible, only then are they real; for only then are they the reality of an empirical representation; and it is the reality of an empirical representation that constitutes perception. But he proceeds to explain what is meant by this "reality of an empirical representation," and he tells us it means "phenomenal appearance." Perception "itself is nothing but the reality of an empirical representation; that is, phenomenal appearance." Thus we see that this extraordinary rhetoric covers a still more extraordinary logic. He undertakes to inform us about the objective reality of phenomena. and here is how he does it. He starts out to speak of phenomena "by themselves," although everywhere and under all circumstances he insists they are never by themselves and are nothing by themselves. They are never and they are nothing apart from the mind—and this he maintains even in this most wonderful sentence. He then tells us that phenomena are real in perception only; that perception is but the reality of empirical representation, and that this empirical representation is phenomenal appearance. Consequently, according to this lucid exposition, phenomena are phenomenal appearance. And so we find ourselves, after traveling around the circle of philosophical folly, back again at the point from which we started—phenomena; for, according to Kant, phenomena are only appearances, and consequently phenomenal appearance can be nothing but phenomena. And this is the wisdom of the greatest philosophical genius that ever trod the earth! And this is a leading sample of the philosophy which is the highest achievement of the human mind!

This, then, is Kant's wisdom when he deals with the subject directly; we have four different and distinct views on the question, whether phenomena have or have not objective reality. When, however, he happens to treat of the subject incidentally, we find a still more surprising condition of things. Treating of the casuality of freedom, he tells us-for no other reason that we can perceive than that it is necessary for his contention—in the plainest language: "For as all phenomena, not being things by themselves, must have for their foundation a transcendental object, determining them as mere representations, there is nothing to prevent us from attributing to that transcendental object, besides the quality through which it becomes phenomenal, a causality also, which is not phenomenal. although its effect appears in the phenomenon" (italics Kant's). Here we find Kant, with the most serene self-complacency, flatly contradicting himself not only on the ideality of phenomena, but even on the subordinate notions by which he arrived at his transcendental idealism, such as it is. Here he tells us that phenomena must have transcendental objects "determining them as representations; so that, according to this mood of Kant, phenomena have determinations; whereas, when treating of his transcendental idealism, he tells us point blank that it is not phenomena or anything else but our own sensibility, that can boast of the luxury of determinations. This contradiction is, however, a mere bagatelle with Kant, who is ever ready to argue from any standpoint and to take his stand on any given point of the compass on any given question, when it happens to serve his purpose. But here he also tells us further that "phenomena, not being things by themselves, must have for their foundations a transcendental object." And, not content with the declaration that they must have a transcendental object for their foundation, he even attributes to this transcendental object a causality; nay, he even tells us that the effect of this causality

appears in the phenomenon. With this new view we could be quite content had he not told us already—on the preceding page, in fact that he wished "to remark that as the unbroken connection of all phenomena in the context (woof) of nature is an unalterable law, it would necessarily destroy all freedom if we were to defend too obstinately the reality of phenomena." Eheu! This metaphysical pirouetting of Kant is too giddy a pace for the ordinary brain, and one is liable to become dizzy in the mad chase. The four different kinds of nothing was solid wisdom compared with this wild dance of metaphysical delirium. Sed nondum est finis. The giddy pace still proceeds. In explaining why, in natural science, there are many conjectures to which satisfactory answers cannot be expected, he tells us that in many instances the answer cannot be found at all. And why? "Because natural phenomena are objects given to us independent of our concepts, and the key to them cannot be found within our own mind, but in the world outside us!" Nor can it be pleaded that the "natural phenomena" of which Kant speaks belong to the realm of physical science, and that therefore they do not admit of a philosophical solution. Not at all. Even were we to admit that Kant was dealing here with the investigations of physical science, the fact would still remain that natural phenomena are included in the general term phenomena of which Kant speaks; and consequently, according to Kant's transcendental idealism (which is his professed philosophy on the subject), can have no existence outside the mind. Here, then, in direct contradiction to all his teaching on the subject, are phenomena "given to us independent of our concepts, and the key to them cannot be found within our own mind, but in the world outside us." Let us simply place this statement alongside of his statement in the deduction of the categories, where he tells us: "For, being phenomena, they form an object that is within us only, because a mere modification of our sensibility can never exist outside us;" or alongside of this: "The very idea that all these phenomena, and therefore all objects with which we have to deal (natural phenomena necessarily included), are altogether within me, or determination of my own identical sense:" or even alongside of what we have already quoted from his transcendental idealism: "Everything which is perceived in space and time, therefore all objects of an experience possible to us, are nothing but phenomena, and have no independent existence outside our thoughts." True it is that all this jugglery contradicts common sense. And if some one should say that nothing can be more absurd than the notion that the investigations of natural science are not to be carried on except outside the mind—the key to it lies not within us, but without us; we answer: Precisely; but be sure to put the blame of the absurdity where it rightly belongs, viz., on the absurd philosophy which tells us that all phenomena (natural phenomena necessarily included) are within us, not without us. Indeed. it is difficult at times to restrain a just indignation at the manner in which Kant-utterly regardless of truth-presumes to palm off on the world his endless contradictions and manifest absurdities. Sophist is a respectable name compared with the term which rises spontaneously to the lips, as we place side by side the various contradictions with which he endeavors to debauch truth. Intellectual profligacy of this nature merits the severest censure. It is playing fast and loose with the hallowed name of philosophy to treat it with such utter recklessness. And for what? The answer is not so easy. At times it seems to be out of sheer wantonness. Again it seems to be in a Mephistophelian spirit—to make a mere mockery of truth. Again it seems to be an insane ambition to force his philosophical absurdities upon the world. But throughout it all there is the insult to common intelligence in the fact that he presumes to impose on the world his glaring absurdities, confident in the hope that in the abstruseness of the subject his contradictions will remain undetected. For it is not, we think, for a moment to be supposed that Kant was himself deceived. There are, it is true, occasions when what is said of famous falsifiers seems to be true also of Kant. There are times when Kant really seems to believe himself. But Kant was not by any means a dunce. He was an intellectual adventurer, utterly unscrupulous as to the means by which he accomplished his end. And if any one should ask why does Kant contradict himself so frequently, so flatly and so directly, the only answer that we can see is because he found it necessary for the contention which he happened to have on hand at the time. He relied on "the misunderstandings inherent in abstractions" to cloak his inconsistencies. He took his chances that reason in abstract speculation would "not soon become aware of its errors." We have already seen six different views of Kant on the subject of the objective reality of phenomena, each of which he maintained at his own convenience. We shall close with a seventh.

This refers to the objective reality of the sum total of all phenomena; that is, to the world. Here we have the same contradictory views—held to suit the occasion—which we have in the general term. As this question lies at the root of his theory of knowledge, we shall postpone a full treatment of the subject until we deal directly with that theory. Here we wish merely to show his inconsistencies on this point. As it suits his argument, this sum total—this absolute whole—of phenomena exists sometimes within us, sometimes without us. In his transcendental aesthetic he tells us

"that what we call external objects are nothing but representations of our senses, the form of which is space, and the true correlative of which—that is, the thing by itself—is not known nor can be known by these representations, nor do we care to know anything about it in our daily experience." And again, on the contrary, he savs: "Phenomena require to be explained so far only as the conditions of their explanation are given in perception, but whatever may exist in them, if comprehended as an absolute whole, can never be a perception. Yet it is this very whole the explanation of which is required in the transcendental problems of reason." Here Kant admits the objective reality not only of phenomena, but also of the absolute whole of phenomena. Nevertheless, in the very next breath he tells us of this "object"—of this "absolute whole." "Your object exists in your brain only, and cannot possibly exist outside of it." The fluctuation of values, however, does not rest here; it is repeated later when he tells us: "An object of the senses can be completely determined only when it is compared with all phenomenal predicates, and represented by them affirmatively or negatively." Here it will be noticed that the "object of the senses" it is that is "determined." although, as we have already seen, he has told us that nothing can be determined but our sensibility, so that even on this point Kant cannot refrain from jugglery. In the very next sentence he argues that "that which constitutes the thing itself (as a phenomenon) namely, the real-must be given, and as without this the thing could not be conceived at all, and as that in which the real of all phenomena is given is what we call the one and all-comprehending experience, it is necessary that the material for the possibility of all objects of our senses should be presupposed as given in one whole, on the limitation of which alone the possibility of all empirical objects, their difference from each other and their complete determination is founded."

Kant here practically retracts everything that he has said regarding the transcendental ideality of phenomena. He not only tells us that phenomena must have objective reality, but even that this reality "must be given;" nay, that without it the thing could not be conceived at all. Further, he tells us that as the reality of the sum total of phenomena cannot be included in a perception, it must be presupposed as one given whole; that on its reality depends the possibility of all empirical objects, and that upon its reality depend the difference of these objects from each other and also their complete determination. That is, he completely overturns everything that he has written on the subject of his transcendental idealism. And he goes on to add: "And since no other objects can be given us than those of the senses, and nowhere but in the context of a

possible experience, nothing can be an object to us if it does not presuppose that whole of all empirical reality as the condition of its possibility." Here he tells us that "nothing can be an object to us"—consequently not even phenomena—unless we presuppose "the whole of all empirical reality;" although, as we have seen in the first part of this article, Kant has attempted to deny even the existence of the world—which he now finds necessary for the very existence of phenomena themselves. But that is not our point here. Our point is, as has been quoted above, that it is of this absolute whole he has already told us emphatically: "Your object exists in your brain only, and cannot possibly exist outside it."

But we have exhausted the reader's patience as well as our own in pursuing Kant through these contradictory views and random statements. We could fill many pages with similar examples of the slipperiness of Kant in his views on many questions of paramount importance. We are satisfied, however, that enough has been quoted to show how utterly unreliable is Kant in his wildcat philosophy. He has no fixed notions on the objective reality of phenomena—no convictions to which he will cling when in a difficulty. And as this is one of the pivotal questions in all philosophy, and particularly in Kant's, it follows that, since this is floating, we can have no fixed points in philosophy at all. On this question the opinions of Kant are in a state of continual flux. He blows hot and cold with the same mouth. Objective reality of phenomena is with him a Chinese rotatory calabash. It boxes the compass of all situations. It is a wheel of fortune-and you never can guess at what point it is going to rest. He argues that phenomena have objective reality, and he argues that they have no objective reality. He argues that they are wholly within the mind and cannot exist without it, and he argues that they are wholly outside the mind. He argues that they are determinations of our sensibility only, and he argues that they are determinations of things outside us. He argues that they have no real existence at all, and he argues that they exist while the mind perceives them. And if any one should ask why Kant changes his views so frequently and adopts opinions so contradictory, the only answer-as far as we can see-is that he does so because he finds it necessary in order to be able to maintain the argument which he may happen to have on hand at the moment. But that he has used one view and adopted it as his own, is no reason with Kant why he may not take up the contradictory opposite of that view in the very next paragraph, take his stand upon it, and from this position argue his point or plead his cause quite as strenuously as if he had not argued a few moments before that the opinion which he is now defending was false.

But what is to be thought of all this wild, senseless juggling with truth? Is truth of so little account that, like a football, it is to be kicked about the entire field of thought for the sake of giving a momentary triumph to the wildest and most extravagantly reckless athlete? No wonder that pragmatism has taken the cue from Kant and treated truth in this fashion. But what of the truth of philosophy or metaphysics? What, above all, of agnosticism, that rests solely on Kant's theory of phenomena? Kant has told us that the only knowledge we possess is the knowledge of phenomena, and agnosticism has taken possession of the notion and will have no other kind of knowledge. What, then, is this knowledge with such a shifting foundation? It all simply leads to the conclusion that we have no knowledge of any kind whatever. If phenomena are so fluctuating, so shifting, so unstable in their meaning, what can be the nature of the knowledge based on them and on them alone? Nay, what is more, if there be one of his many views about phenomena for which Kant has a weakness, it is that of their mere ideality. Out of the confusion of tongues which he has given us on the subject it is quite manifest that he leans strongly towards the view that phenomena have no existence outside our minds. To this he devotes a special section. He also devotes special arguments to it throughout his work, and he finally tells us that it is not safe to defend obstinately the reality of phenomena. In one of his arguments he concludes thus: "It is false, therefore, that the world (the sum total of phenomena) is a whole existing by itself," and adds: "Hence it follows that phenomena in general are nothing outside our representations." Hence the world is nothing outside our mind. In other words, we are landed in the empirical idealism of Berkelev. Hence when the agnostic takes Kant's estimate of the knowledge which we possess as the true one, and that knowledge is wholly within us, it follows that all our knowledge is a mere illusion. If we want to learn its value precisely, let us listen to what empirical idealism or Pyrrhonism really is. We think no one has put it so briefly and at the same time so clearly as Pascal. He tells us:

"No one has any assurance (proof), outside of faith, whether he is waking or sleeping, seeing that during sleep we believe as firmly that we are awake as when we are actually awake. We think we see places and figures and movements. We perceive time gliding by; we measure it; in a word, we act precisely in the same way as when we are awake. So that since during the portion of our time passed in sleep we have no idea of truth, although it seems to us that we have, while all our sensations are but mere illusions, who knows but that this other portion of life in which we think we are awake is not a sleep a little different from the other out of which we are

waking when we think we are sleeping? Just as we often dream that we dream, heaping illusion on illusion."

This, then, is where Kant's views on the reality of phenomena land us; for who will say that this is not his transcendental idealism exactly? Nor can this doctrine be dismissed with a mere shrug. There is no question but that this notion has had weight with many philosophers, and that in any theory of knowledge it must claim its proper share of attention. This does not mean that we must accept it, but rather that we must refute it. Turgot said: "He that has never doubted the existence of matter may be assured that he has no aptitude for metaphysical inquiries." Emerson claimed that "intellectual science has been observed to beget invariably a doubt of the existence of matter." And there is no question but that his claim is also true, that we are utterly impotent to test the authenticity of the report of our senses. Yet this is the abyss into which Kant's theory of phenomena—when he seems to have a fixed one—inevitably leads. He maintains that all our knowledge is our knowledge of phenomena, yet in the whirligig of his opinions as to the reality of phenomena the only point at which they seem inclined to rest is at this idealism which makes phenomena nothing but a dream—an illusion. What, then, is all our knowledge? Is it nothing more substantial than the fabric of the dream which I had last night? Yet this is where Kant's theory leads us inevitably. This is the last word on the meaning of the knowledge which the philosophy of Kant brings us. It is on this the entire fabric of agnosticism is based. According to agnosticism, then, all the knowledge which we have is nothing more than a fallacy, an illusion, a fancy, a dream.

But, it may be argued, Kant does not admit empirical idealism. Certainly not—that is, at least in word. But what, pray, is the difference between his theory and Pyrrhonism? Does not Kant doubt the existence of matter? Does he not claim again and again that phenomena have no existence outside the mind? Nay, does he not argue that the world does not really exist? In the contention of Kant—with which we commenced this article—that the world may be said with truth to be neither infinite nor finite, does not the burden of his so-called proof rest solely on the fact that with him the world does not exist at all? It is only by such a claim that he can at all defend the strange thesis that the world may be neither infinite nor finite. He says this is true because the world does not exist at all; and no one will deny that if that be the case, his contention would be true. But in that case what becomes of Kant and his philosophy, of man and his knowledge? Nevertheless, he does not hesitate to give his final word in this contention in these terms which we have already quoted: "It is false, therefore, that the world (the sum total of

phenomena) is a whole existing by itself. Hence it follows that phenomena in general are nothing outside our representations." Kant has told us that the question of philosophy is, what can we know? His answer to it is that we can know only phenomena. But phenomena, he tells us in turn, have no existence outside our minds, therefore we have no knowledge of an external world at all. The phenomena which constitute it are mere notions of the mind or illusions, therefore not essentially distinguishable from a dream. Therefore all that we can know is but mere illusion, and we can have no real knowledge of anything. We wish the followers of Kant much joy of their stupendous discovery. The agnostic intellect that tried to plume itself on superior knowledge finds all that knowledge to be only illusion. But, it will be insisted, Kant did not fully embrace idealism. It is the only thing he did embrace. He has devoted a section to the explanation, as we have seen, of what he calls "our own transcendental idealism." It is true he recoiled in horror when he realized that he was on the verge of the abyss, but, in spite of all this, all his arguments throughout the cosmological problem rest in the main on Berkleyism. But even in the view that Kant was unsettled as to what he should think about the subiect at all, and that his mind was constantly vacillating between various theories on the question of the reality of phenomena, what follows? The simply logical answer is that the agnostic claims that all our knowledge is our knowledge of phenomena; and if we follow Kant, we do not know what we should think about phenomenanot even whether it is existing at all. Therefore all our knowledge consists in this: that we do not know whether we know anything. In limiting our knowledge, then, to our knowledge of phenomena, the agnostic world-with Kant as its leader-does not seem to have reached a very high point of either knowledge or intellectuality.

But to return to Kant's cosmological problem, in which he claims to have proved that the world may be neither infinite nor finite, we have seen that he cannot maintain his contention at all if he is to admit the existence of the world. This, however, is the basis of his attack on the transcendental ideas of the contingency of the world and the existence of God. It is the entering wedge for his direct arguments. The contingency of the world and its finite existence—these are the outposts of the defense for the existence of God which he assails in such fatuous fashion. On such folly is founded his antinomies, in which he imagines that he has given equally strong proofs for and against the contingency of the world; for and against the existence of God; for and against the immortality of the soul. They are all based upon this particular argument. He tells us: "What has here been said of the first cosmological idea—namely,

that of the absolute totality of extension in phenomena—applies to the others also. . . . The same applies to the series of causes, one being prior to the other, and to the series leading from conditioned to unconditioned necessary existence, which can never be regarded either by itself finite in its totality or infinite, because, as a series of subordinated representations, it forms a dynamical regressus only, and cannot exist prior to it as a self-subsistent series of things or by itself." That is, he thinks his argument (which we have analyzed) against a finite world is equally strong against a first cause and against the existence of God.

Thus absurd as Kant's contention is, it was intended by him to be sweeping and far-reaching in its processes and results. fact is that on his wretched sophism Kant establishes a new false principle concerning the nature and effects of a dialectical contradiction, and from this false principle he hatches out an entirely new brood of fallacies; and thus it goes on to the end. Indeed, we are here at the very root of Kant's gigantic sophistication in his famous antinomies. His contention, on the one hand, that the opposition between the propositions, the world is infinite and the world is finite, is merely a dialectical one, constitutes for him the full adjustment of the dispute between the opposing sides, while, on the other hand, he assures us that in his transcendental idealism we have "the key to the solution of the cosmological dialectic"—that is, the key to the antinomies. The dialectical opposition or contradiction, then, is the grand gateway, without which there is no entrance whatever, into this vast field of Kantian speculation; while the key which unlocks the portals is his transcendental idealism. Hence both the glaring fallacy which we have exposed in the earlier part of this article and the variously contradictory and shifting views regarding the objective reality of phenomena lie at the very basis of one of the most important sections of the entire Kantian claim. It is not merely that we have here one of the huge bulwarks by which he tries to buttress his vast structure; we have here the very foundation itself on which is erected not indeed the entire structure, but that entire section of it in which are lodged the boasted metaphysical splendors of the world-renowned antinomies. We have one of the magnificent aisles—and this the most brilliant and dazzling—of the vast edifice resting entirely on those foundations. Take away the foundation and this vast, imposing section, with all its metaphysical curiosities. ingenious inventions and strange emblazonments—which have made it a shrine of special attraction to the devotees of Kant-tumbles to the ground. There is no other portion of his work in which Kant has displayed so much originality, ingenuity and skill, or on which he has lavished so unsparingly the wonderful peculiarities of his

strange abnormal powers as in the construction of this special section. This is one of the superstructures, and few, if any, are bedecked with so many bizarre, eccentric and startling figures or reveal so many sensational spectacles and situations—all of which, on close examination, prove to be nothing but so many glistening fallacies and brilliantly arranged sophisms. The antinomies cover a vast territory. The whole of Chapter II. of Book II., with its nine different sections, many of them containing numerous sub-divisionsone hundred and thirty-eight pages in all of his precious superstructure, styled the transcendental dialectic-is devoted to the antinomy of pure reason; and, as we have seen, rests on this flimsy foundation. With this foundation gone, all the elaborate splendor goes for nought. Those one hundred and thirty-eight pages are as though they were never written. A few ornaments and finials here and there may remain by the mere force of the masonry until directly thrown down, but the foundation gone, nothing else can long remain. It seems hardly credible that Kant should have erected so large a portion of his edifice on such a flimsy foundation, but possibly Kant himself thought that his position here was secure. The fact is there was an astonishing admixture of shrewdness and shallowness, of subtlety and sophistry, of readiness of thought and recklessness of reasoning in Kant's mental constitution, if we are to judge him by his "Critique of Pure Reason." However that may be, there can be no doubt that Kant has built this, the most brilliant section of his entire structure, on this worthless foundation. This is what he calls "the adjustment of a contention that cannot be abjudicated." Let us see whether we are here claiming too much.

As is well known to every student of Kant who at all understands him, the entire section of his work devoted to the antinomies is simply an endeavor to prove the soundness of his contention in his fourfold thetic and antithetic of pure reason. That is, he maintains that it can be proved with equal clearness and conclusiveness both that the world had a beginning in time and that it had no beginning in time (as well as the kindred propositions that the world is finite in space and that the world is infinite in space); that the soul is one and simple, and that the soul is divisible and compound; that the human will is free, and that the human will is under the necessity of all nature; that there exists a supreme cause of the universe, and that the universe has no cause, but is self-existent. Kant devotes many pages in his special arguments to prove that the opposing propositions on each side of each question are both equally true, and that "the arguments on both sides are equally clear." He tells us "every one of them is not only in itself free from contradiction, but can point to conditions of necessity in the nature of reason itself, only that, unfortunately, its opposite can produce equally valid and necessary grounds for its support." It is this conflict between what he calls the truth of these opposing propositions that he calls the antinomy of pure reason. It is this conflict which he has in mind when he says he is going "to settle the quarrel once for all, and to the satisfaction of both parties." This is the cause which cannot be abjudicated, and to the adjustment of which Kant, in consequence, applies the powers of his misdirected genius. It must not be forgotten for a moment that Kant maintains that the proofs on each side are equally strong, equally clear and equally convincing; nay, that he expended much time and labor on the task of proving them so to be. When he believes that he has awed his reader into an acceptance of the strange anomaly, he condescends to allow his disciples a slight insight into the palmary trick of the juggler's art and to show him how it is all done-all the while, however, maintaining that the arguments on both sides are of equal value. In other words, he undertakes to show how the opposing arguments on both sides in his antinomies are at the same time true. This is what he means when he says: "We shall now enter upon this method of adjusting a dispute which cannot be abjudicated."

Now, what is this "way of adjusting the dispute?" It is, as has been already seen, simplicity itself. Kant tries to persuade us that there is no contradiction between the propositions on the opposite sides of the antinomies at all, or, more correctly, that the opposition between them does not amount to a real contradiction, but is merely what he calls a dialectical one. This, then, is the key to the enigma, if we are to believe Kant. In attempting to make this curious statement appear plausible, Kant adopts the method of ex uno disce omnes. He takes the first of his antinomies—that the world is both infinite and finite—and with this as an object-lesson proceeds to show that the contradiction here is not a real contradiction at all; that it is merely dialectic, as he calls it, and that just as we may say that a body may be neither good smelling nor bad smelling without any contradiction, so we may say with equal truth that the world is neither infinite nor finite. The contradiction in the latter proposition, he maintains, is no more real than in the former. And thus we have the famous dispute adjusted to the satisfaction of everybody, but especially of Kant. This proposition, however, is but a sample, a model. All the other propositions of the fourfold antinomy are to be solved in the same way. Kant tells us: "What has been here said of the first cosmological idea . . applies to the others also. . . The same principle applies to the series of causes." And finally he tells us that "the antinomy of pure reason with regard to its cosmological ideas is removed by showing that it is dialectical only."

Hence when we laid special stress on the value and importance of the distinction between the real and dialectical contradiction, as introduced by Kant, we by no means exaggerated the real nature of the case or of the momentous issues dependent on them. As we have seen, however, ordinary common sense can perceive the wide difference between the character of the propositions which Kant claims to be similar; just as it can also perceive that it is only the sheerest sophistry that can claim that there exists no real contradiction between the propositions—the world is infinite and the world is finite. The true test of the nature of the contradiction is to predicate both terms of the world by saying the world is either infinite or finite, then try to remove both these predicates at the same time by saying the world is neither finite nor infinite, and examine whether the subject is not removed with both the predicates. But even a back seat pupil should be soundly whipped for the monstrous assertion put forward by Kant, viz., that the proposition that every body is either good smelling or bad smelling and the proposition that the world is either infinite or finite involve precisely the same kind of contradiction.

There is another feature of the case which deserves especial notice here also. It is that in his special proofs of the antinomies resulting from this dialectical contradiction Kant has succeeded in proving too much. With all his astuteness and ingenuity, Kant has here, too, overreached himself. Let us, with Kant, confine ourselves to the first antinomy. We shall here make use of Kant's term, "dialectical," in his own sense—that is, as opposed to a real contradiction. Now, it is perfectly plain that this dialectical contradiction does not by any means justify us in saying that the two opposing statements of a disjunctive proposition may be both at the same time true. What it does justify us in saying—and what alone it justifies us in saying—is exactly the converse of this, viz., that neither of the two opposing statements may be true. In other words, that neither predicate may be true of the subject, but that nevertheless the subject may still remain. To use Kant's model proposition of this dialectical contradiction, the statement that every body is either good smelling or bad smelling does not imply that a body may be both good smelling and bad smelling at the same time. Not at all. It is dialectical merely for the reason that we may say that a body may be neither good smelling nor bad smelling, but not by any means that it can be both. Now, when we come to the statement: the world is either infinite or finite, in which Kant maintains that the contradiction, like that in the statement, a body is either good smelling or bad smelling, is merely dialectical, we find that what Kant tries to prove-indeed, what he thinks he has proved-is not that the world is neither infinite nor finite, but that it is both infinite and finite, and that the opposing arguments maintaining that it is both, are equally clear and conclusive. It is indeed true that in his special proofs on both sides of his antinomies the proof in each case is effected by the disproof of the opposite; that is, in the thesis he pretends to disprove the antithesis, and in the antithesis he thinks he has disproved the thesis; and that in this way, included in the proofs that both thesis and antithesis are true, we find also the proofs that neither is true. For example, he shows that the world is infinite by proving that it cannot be finite; and he proves that the world is finite by showing that it cannot be infinite, so that, taking all his proofs on the opposite sides together (if he has shown anything at all), he has shown both that the world is neither infinite nor finite, and that it is both infinite and finite at the same time; which, as has been said, is proving altogether too much, and which shows also that his contradiction between an infinite world and a finite one is not what he imagined it to be—a merely dialectical one. This will become at once evident if we return to the model proposition of Kant's dialectical contradiction—that a body must be either good smelling or bad smelling. It would be the height of absurdity to say that because there is a mere dialectical contradiction between the terms of the proposition we would be justified in arguing on both sides in such a way that we could conclude that a body not only may be neither good smelling nor bad smelling, but also that it may be both good smelling and bad smelling at the same time. Yet that is what Kant has actually done in his famous antinomies. The inconsistency, however, seems to have escaped Kant's notice as well as that of his critics completely.

There is still another curious inconsistency here of which Kant does not seem to have had even the most remote suspicion, glaring and ridiculous though it is. It lies in the fact that while he is endeavoring to effect his famous "adjustment" by demonstrating that the opposition in the proposition; the world is either infinite or finite, does not constitute a real contradiction; all his special arguments in proof of the truth on both sides proceed on the supposition that the contradiction is a real one; that any efficacy they may happen to have rests on this suggestion; and that if the supposition be false, all his proofs on both sides fall completely to the ground. That is, the proof that the world is infinite proceeds to show that the world cannot be finite-and that therefore it must be infinite; while the proof that the world is finite proceeds to show that the world cannot be infinite, and that therefore it must be finite; and so onward throughout the fourfold antinomy; so that if the terms finite and infinite be not real contradictories, nothing whatever is proved. Yet

of this ridiculous feature Kant seems never to have dreamed. That is, while claiming that the contradiction is merely dialectical, he argues from the assumption that it is real; indeed, proves that the contradiction is merely dialectical, because it is real. Indeed, we know of nothing that is better calculated to undermine faith in the conclusions of human reason than an acquaintance with Kant's methods, combined with the fact that men have hailed Kant as the new and true apostle of reason. We are strongly of opinion, however, that the homage paid to Kant comse from those who fail to understand him.

Just a word should be said here on the fact that Kant regarded his transcendental idealism as "the key to the solution of the cosmological dialectic." If this key, as we have learned from Kant's own words, be not one, but sevenfold, it may well be asked which of the seven keys will give us the solution? By his transcendental idealism Kant would have us understand the views which he holds regarding the objective reality of phenomena. We have already seen the number and variety of these views: which of those views will furnish us the key? Is the key to be found in the view that phenomena have no objective reality? Or in the view that they possess an objective reality? Or in the view that phenomena are wholly within us? Or in the view that they are wholly without us? Or in the view that they may have reality? Or in the view that they must have it? Or in the view that they have reality while they are being perceived only, and at no other time? Or in any of the other views adopted in turn by Kant when it happened to suit his contention? If transcendental idealism be the key to the cosmological difficulty, who will furnish us the key to transcendental idealism? Indeed, nothing is more difficult than to have patience with Kant in his mad, reckless career, in which he runs amuck through the whole realm of philosophy, and where he demoralizes every single truth upon which he touches. His random argument, his wretched quibbles, his dishonest evasions, his unscrupulous adoption-when it suits him-of principles which he rejects, his bold, shameless and reckless inconsistencies have demoralized all philosophy since his day, and proved a foul stain on the once proud name of metaphysic.

It must ever remain a problem to just what extent Kant had faith in his own arguments and the conclusions arising from them, or how far he succeeded in imposing upon himself. Few things are more striking than the awful stress and strain under which Kant is for the most part laboring in nearly all of his contentions in order to make his conclusions appear at all plausible. The fierce and fearful violence to reason which he is forced at times to use, as well as the desperate shifts to which he finds himself compelled to resort, in order to make the parts of his extraordinary edifice fit and dovetail into each other, remind us of the builder who, incompetent for the work which he undertakes, is unable to make his materials meet the plan, and who makes his joints, his mortices, his roofs, his dormers, his finials fit by main force, regardless of either the solidity or the safety of the building. Contrasted with the calm, clear, smooth, serene movement of the intellect of Aristotle or that of Aguinas, where everything glides along with the placidity of a majestic river. the jerking philosophy and jumping-jack logic of Kant-such as we have shown in this article—are nothing short of intellectual distortions. Should Kant's method of argument come into vogue, there is no proposition so absurd that it could not be proved to be absolute truth. It is not at all improbable that Kant fully understood this; but he relied on the obscurity of his subject to hide his glaring fallacies. Indeed, Cook's discovery of the pole seems to be an exact counterpart of Kant's discovery of the pole of philosophy. There is the same impenetrability of region, the same difficulty of proceeding, the same fatal exposure to illusion and delusion. Kant, like Cook, evidently trusted to the pathlessness of the region to hide his imposture. And unfortunately, too, like Cook, Kant has had his Copenhagen University. One thing, however, remains—his philosophy. Here Kant has left a complete record, and by that his teachings can and must be judged.

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## OUR PROFESSIONS AND OUR ACTION TOWARD "LATIN AMERICA."

HE great share which the United States Government has had in the institution of an International Tribunal at The Hague for the arbitration of perplexing juridical problems between differing countries has gained for this one the warm approval of the better part of Christian mankind, who look at war as an awful blot upon civilization and a survival of primal barbarism, the penalty of human frowardness toward God. The world's opinion, shocked at the enormous injustices visited upon innocent peoples and tribes, in the pursuit of policies called imperial, had made it plain that neither the excuse of the need of "a scientific frontier," as imagined by a Disraeli or a Roberts, nor the pretense of a desire for the uplifting of downtrodden outside peoples or

colonies, while there existed downtrodden peoples and misgoverned colonies or provinces, crying aloud for just treatment, at home, could excuse wars of aggression begun under an altruistic shibboleth. Wars of aggression have been usually begun as wars of vengeance for petty outrage or real or imaginary slight-as in the case of the Franco-Prussian War and our own war upon Spain. The spectacle of thousands of innocent lives being sacrificed and thousands and thousands of widows and orphans flung helpless and despondent upon an unfeeling world, as a consequence of dynastic jealousies and political and ministerial ambitions, had become too sickening for the general conscience. Hence the establishment of the International Tribunal in Holland. The need begat the institution—a singular proof that in the moral realm, as in the natural, automatic laws are latent and ready to manifest their readiness as natural resources the moment the desire for their service has arrived in the march of mundane events.

It is, beyond all dispute, premature to hope for the millennium of a world-wide treaty of peace. With the best intentions in all international dealings, the best governments may find themselves at times unable to resist the pressure of popular anger or the atavism of the primordial impulses of conscious strength of muscle or camaraderie in dangerous undertakings. In monarchical countries this danger is less menacing than in republics; but, whether in monarchy or republic, the danger exists. How to deal with it so that it may be lessened in time, and eventually be extinguished, is the great problem that awaits solution at the Amphyctionic Council board at The Hague.

Mr. Andrew Carnegie, who has borne the cost of erecting the hall where that international tribunal meets, has enunciated a very admirable fundamental principle in the premises. His dictum is that, as no man has a right to be a judge in his own cause, so no nation shall assume that she is in the right in beginning hostilities against another nation without having appealed to the universal sense of justice. If all nations can be got to subscribe to this basic rule of international ethics, then the ground will have been cleared for the making of a roadway to the millennium. The rash power that would attempt to break away from such a solemn engagement would soon be made to feel the gravity of its offense. But the question is beset with the gravest difficulties. There is a most formidable one in the natural disposition of man himself. Deep down in the human heart is a feeling that seems to be ineradicable that personal honor is a matter over which no outside opinion has any right, in the last resort, and that to maintain it unsullied and in flawless integrity, even life itself must be a secondary consideration. This is not the teaching of the Christian law, but it is human nature; and it widens out at times from the individual to the nation. Mr. Carnegie is optimistic enough to hope that even this fundamental obstacle may with patient labor be overcome; and doubtless the experience of the Geneva award in the Alabama damages cases and the recent one of the Newfoundland fisheries, with its boundary entanglements and other perplexing side issues, goes far to justify his confidence in a final triumph for the friends of peace at any price. There is a new element in the question of a final renunciation of the principle of the "ultima ratio regis." The dreams of centuries over the mastery of the air by the daring mind and hand of man are at length taking on substantial shape among the realities of time. They are working out toward the bright goal of a future in which the sky will prove the great healer of the earth's greatest curse and heaven itself the authority to forbid to nations the drawing of the sword from the scabbard in defense of an ex parte decision to fight for one's own hand, like Hal-o'-the-Wynd in Scott's novel. It has been demonstrated beyond the power of cavil that fire from heaven can be rained down for the destruction of forts and fleets, and even whole cities and armies; and so the dream of the fabled Prometheus may be realized without the tragic fate of the daring dreamer following as a consequence.

While it is true that an immense advantage for the cause of peace has been achieved by the establishment in Washington of the International Bureau of South American Republics, it is not the less of a verity that there is a very lax observance of the law of nations in regard to the prevention of revolutionary conspiracies in neighboring States with which the relations are peaceful. Were it not that men and munitions of war are to be had at all times. almost without a question as to their destination, those oft-recurring "revolutions" that we sneeringly refer to in the newspapers and magazines would hardly be found profitable to their contrivers. The share which Wall street speculators have in nearly every one of those shortlived enterprises is not a secret matter by any means; it is rather one of world-wide notoriety. It is hardly less notorious that similar selfish interests are behind the campaign of calumny at present going on in the press over the condition of Mexico. What makes this matter the more remarkable was the public profession of amity given in the official meeting of the Presidents of the two Republics a few months ago, and the many protestations of friendship toward the various South American countries that celebrated the centenary of their independence about the same time. Of course it will be claimed that the principle of liberty for free speech in the press demands immunity for the contrivers of such

campaigns, but it can hardly be doubted that were a similar campaign to be started in the South American countries, with this country as the target, it would not be long ere a demand would be made from Washington that the offenders be made to feel that they were acting in a very reprehensible way. Wars on land or sea are usually begun in the press—at least all the wars of the present day have been initiated so.

The fatal gifts of beauty and riches are the portion of several of those countries of South America which attract the world's attention so often by reason of their recurrent revolutions and their earthquakes. To this fact is to be found some explanation of the immense interest taken in their affairs in the latitude of Wall street. Mexico, to take one example, embraces within her confines some of the most beautiful scenery as well as a vast deal of the richest agricultural and mineral-stored soil in all the world. dangerous natural dower when in close propinguity to a people of restless and not over-scrupulous temperament, and so it proved when President Polk declared war on Mexico on the trivial pretext of some of those chronic disorders that form a picturesque fringe to the history of life of all borderlands. We may regard the case of Polk as a typical one in the matter of dealings with the aboriginal inhabitants of the American continent. He was a very respectable man in his private capacity, but when he saw outsiders in possession of what he considered advantageous to the United States, he believed himself justified in getting it somehow. He left a Diary, and thereby laid the present age under a deep obligation because of the help such records afford in the search for the hidden springs of political action as well as the standards of political morality entertained by those who are called upon to fill high office in the constructive and developing periods of young colonies. The Evening Post (of New York) sums up his character as revealed in the Diary, and as it was regarded by his contemporaries, in a fashion that savors slightly of sarcasm, intentional or unconscious. We may transpose the order of the passages of this estimate for the purposes of this glance at the methods of American statesmen of an earlier period of the Republic:

"He had industry, patience, capacity in detail, good judgment, fairness to his associates and loyalty to party. He was an excellent husband, a faithful churchgoer, with Methodist inclinations, and a gentleman in both public and personal affairs. Courage, or pertinacity, was his strongest quality. He was not mentally broad, he knew not how to dominate others, and he showed little magnanimity. He had the ordinary human virtues and the ordinary human failings. He was President through accident, but in the period

from Jackson to Lincoln there was not a larger man at the head of the Government."

A curious medley enough, it would seem, yet by no means phenomenal. Stranger amalgams have been presented in more recent political life. Now for the offset:

"The 'Diary' throws little new light on the Mexican War, but it proves that Polk was not an ardent pro-slavery man. He was an expansionist and a nationalist. He wanted California to complete our Pacific coast line. He would purchase it, if he could, and fight for it if he must. In the same way he desired Cuba. . . Like other expansionists, ancient and modern, he was not scrupulous in his methods."

Polk may have been scrupulous in his churchgoing or his Methodism, but this virtue and "methods" in politics would not seem to the writer to demand any rule of congruity. A statesman's conscience may be stowed away in a bureau for six days in the week, and taken out on Sundays to be carried to church. There was a good deal of piety in evidence over the close of the late war with Spain, but it was held in reserve until Admiral Dewey had reported upon the imperial value of the Philippine Archipelago, strategic and monetary, when it was gravely proclaimed that Providence had thrown the prize into our hands and the solemn responsibility of keeping it in indeterminate trust and tutelage lay upon our shoulders. If we cared to look up the files of the newspapers of Polk's day we might find that Lowell's sarcasms over the Mexican War and the California and Texan grab were not wholly unjustified.

There is just now going on an insurrectionary movement in a remote portion of Mexico-the Province of Chihuahua is chiefly affected by it. It is led by a man named Madero, an opponent of President Diaz and an aspirant for his office. The preparations for the outbreak were made in Texas. Arms were gathered and men were collected, and when all were in readiness the expedition went boldly across the border. Little, if any, care was taken, for all the public know, to prevent the breach of international law, so far as either the Federal or the State authorities are concerned. insurrection dragged on for several weeks, and while it was going on a brother of the leader was in Washington endeavoring to get the State Department to help the rebels in their object of severing Chihuahua from the body of Mexico and getting it recognized as a separate and independent republic. In this wild and discreditable scheme the rebels found a precedent in the case of Panama and the State of Colombia. It did not consume much time to have the "barrack-room revolution," as the outbreak in Panama was very fittingly described, to have the rebellion crowned with success and the mushroom and pigmy "republic" recognized by the United States, because the construction of the Panama Canal demanded some arrangement with the inhabitants of the "Zone," and Colombia had not proved very complaisant in the matter of terms. This remarkable transaction had all the daring character of one of the great Corsican's coups d'état. It was sudden, swift and clean-cut. The presence of a couple of United States warships prevented any effort of the Colombians to chastise the rebels and retain their sovereignty over Panama—a daring violation of all international law. The Colombians were completely helpless, and had nothing to do but to protest. But who heeds the protest of a petty State against the actions of a mighty power?

A process somewhat analogous to the Panama intrigue is now going on in another of the South American weak States—Nicaragua. There after months of coddling the rebels, the revolters against President Madriz have been successful. They got not only encouragement in Washington, but got men and munitions of war in abundance, and now the official head of our Government endorses the policy of perseverance in rebellion by recognizing the leader of the revolt in Nicaragua, General Estrada, as President of the Nicaraguan Republic. It was no wonder that a satirical English poet expressed a bitter sense of moral wrong at beholding the subversion of justice in such cases, in ironical verse:

Treason is ne'er successful: what's the reason? Because when 'tis so, none dare call it treason.

When the Bureau of South American Republics was formed at the suggestion of Mr. John Barrett there was much reason to hope for an improvement in the relations between those countries and the United States. The visit of Mr. Elihu Root, then Secretary of State, had a very decided effect for a betterment of these relations. It was intended that he should be the spokesman and the harbinger of peace—a permanent peace—between South America and North America. The speeches which he made at banquets and other functions were eminently serviceable in reassuring the people of the South, whose suspicions were very naturally aroused over the transaction in Colombia and Panama, as well as the highhanded proceedings in both Venezuela and Nicaragua. But when Mr. Knox succeeded Mr. Root the scene underwent an immediate change. The sudden dismissal of the Nicaraguan Minister and the language of the Secretary in giving him his congé were again reminders of the Napoleonic tradition in diplomacy. The Secretary's feelings as an American were inflamed over the execution of two American filibusters by order of President Zelaya, and he for the nonce appeared to lose his sense of the official in the individual Our Professions and Our Action Toward "Latin America." 173

citizen. The language of the letter dismissing the Nicaraguan Minister at Washington was violent beyond precedent, and it aroused the deepest indignation. This feeling found expression a short time ago in the course of an "interview" given to the press by the Vice Consul of Nicaragua in Belgium, Mr. J. S. H. Hirtzel. He said, inter alia:

"Under the Roosevelt administration there was nothing but peaceful and friendly feelings between the United States and these Central American republics. Former Secretary Root was exceedingly popular in Central American countries on account of his attitude toward the internal strifes in those countries. The present Administration and Secretary Knox have pursued a policy which he described as one of duplicity.

"The duplicity of the Government of the United States was manifest when France was induced by them not to recognize the circulation of the shares of the Nicaraguan loan at the very time when Secretary Knox, at a banquet, raised his glass congratulating the envoy of Zelaya in Washington.

"All the circumstances in which General Zelaya has had to abandon power and exile himself from his country under not only the moral but also the material pressure of the United States raise important questions as to the right of nations or international law."

In discussing the death of Cannon and Groce, Mr. Hirtzel said that the two men were convicted at a trial in which a full hearing was given and no legal formality was omitted:

"These men were revolutionists, as the American Government officially affirms in the note of the Secretary of State, and they figured as principal chiefs of the movement to which they lent the efficient combinations of their activity and intelligence, directing the scientific operations of draughting topographical and fortification plans, and being besides the only ones charged with arranging infernal apparatus for explosive mines, which did such damage in the mancevres of the regular Nicaragua forces."

If the case be correctly stated in this description of the Nicaraguan representative, any general or naval commander of the United States would have acted in a precisely similar way toward any filibuster carrying on irregular war against the armed forces of the United States. We have not the least doubt that such would be the case.

A course of a similar character was pursued toward Cipriano Castro, the President of Venezuela. Because he was insistent on maintaining the rights of that country against an American asphalt company—a company that did not hesitate to foment a rebellion in Venezuela with the object of overthrowing Castro's rule—he was

driven out of the country by the agencies set in motion by the wirepullers in Washington, and has by the same agencies been prevented from returning. Castro was exasperatingly defiant, and wanting in diplomacy, no doubt, but that fact hardly warranted such action as that which was taken in his regard. He was undoubtedly justified in resisting the audacious attempt of the asphalt company and punishing the promoters of rebellion against his Government in the severest manner open to him. To do so was a public service to all the world, since the maintenance of authority is the fundamental essential in every civilized age. The very same restless and avaricious spirit that underlay the asphalt company's intriguing is manifesting itself again to-day. In Honduras there is disquiet and apprehension over the efforts of ex-President Bonilla, aided by an American engineer named Christmas, to start a fresh revolution and force himself again on the people. It is quite easy, apparently, to get up a "revolution," and it is the fashion in the United States to sneer at the South American republics because of the oft-recurring revolts that mar their prosperity. This is certainly cynical, in view of the fact, so often demonstrated, that the most energetic leaders in the disturbances are men of American nation-Filibustering has, from long habit, obtained recognition as a respectable sort of occupation for a man in both Great Britain and the United States—just like demi-mondeism in France for a woman. Ever since the days of Walker in America and "Rajah" Brooke in Borneo this has been the case. It requires only a limited stock of money, when accompanied by unlimited audacity, to begin a "revolution" and carry it on, so far as men and munitions of war are concerned, by the unofficial assistance of the United States. A vessel called the Hornet, which was known to be engaged in getting war materiel for Honduras, was allowed to slip off and discharge her cargo and return to get more, and few steps were taken apparently to interfere with her movements, so far as the United States authorities were concerned. There is in these modern cases a seemingly studied laxity in vigilance like that which marked the early movements in Europe against the Papacy. The frontier lines were no obstacles to the passage of conspirators from one State to another, and there was no difficulty about the conveyance of arms when men familiar with the hilly country were engaged in the work of furnishing the "ways and means." When all things were in readiness, with the mine well laid, the outbreak of disorders, along the frontier and in the territory of the Patrimony of Peter furnished the specious pretext that had formed part of the elaborate plan. Piedmontese troops were rushed over the borders and into the Pope's territories, the cunning Ministers assuring the

outside governments that the only object of such action was to restore order and ensure the tranquillity of the Peninsula. being done, it was added, the Piedmontese would be withdrawn. But the footprints of the invaders were rarely found to be turned backward. "Nulla vestigia retrorsum," the old Roman motto, seemed to have been secretly adopted by the Piedmontese plotters. that when the rioting broke out in Mexico City on the receipt of of Perugia and Castelfidordo. It is a very ominous coincidence.

Another striking analogy is to be found in the fact that campaigns of calumny, in either case, invariably preceded the military aggressions. Every forward step against the Papacy and its possessions was heralded by Vesuvian eruptions in the whole British press. The Times, which usually led off in this game of bluster, seems to have acquired its nom de guerre, "The Thunderer," by reason of its frequent bellowings against the government of the Papal States. It kept up for many years a continuous indictment, as full of malign calumny as the articles on "Barbarous Mexico" that recently disgraced the American press. We may hope that here the analogy shall cease to hold good. If these attacks on a friendly State be followed by action against that State similar to the aggression against the Papal States, it would be a lamentable outcome in both North and South America, for every one except the arch-plotters against the world's peace.

Much mutual benefit was hoped for by the friends of peace on either side as a result of the holding of the recent Pan-American Congress in Buenos Aires. But the hope was doomed to disappointment, chiefly because of the proceedings in Paraguay and the interference of the United States in the affairs of that State. These proceedings proved plainly enough that while a great country may be grandiloquent in professions of amity it may be secretly making preparations to maintain an undue ascendency in the councils of weaker States, and to sustain the claims of men who endeavor, by the power of foreign capital, to exploit the material resources of such States for selfish commercial purposes. Venezuela and Nicaragua are melancholy examples of this tendency. Latin America can hardly be blamed if she be disposed to regard them as instances of what the old Roman people described as "Punica fides." In fact, the ground would seem to be already carefully prepared for the cultivation of a crop of ill feeling between the United States and Mexico, and in other States of the South, too. Mr. W. E. Carson, the author of a new book on "Mexico, the Wonderland of the South," gives a lively picture of the conditions which the influx of Americans has brought about in the capital. These conditions, we may be sure, are not peculiar to the capital alone, but are to be found duplicated, in lesser degree, in other

centres of Mexican life. What he saw and observed during his sojourn in the country he graphically summarizes:

"Americans seemed to swarm everywhere—in the streets, in stores, in offices, and likewise in the drinking places; for several American bars have lately been started in the central district. These are popular meeting places for a large class of Americans who come down to Mexico in search of employment or to embark in business in a small way. In one short street I saw an Americanized barber's shop, an American grocery store, an American drinking saloon, an American billiard room, an American bootblack's stand; and encountered so many Americans that it was difficult to realize that I was in Mexico City, and not in Chicago or New York."

This frequency of the American citizen would not be any cause for uneasiness or alarm had all our people the savoir faire of President Taft and Mr. Elihu Root when he was Secretary of State. But it is unfortunately the case that many are brusque and take a delight in referring contemptuously to Latin Americans as "greasers." For that reason the latter retort by referring to the swaggering Ancient Pistol-like class as "gringoes"—a word suggestive of habits which are irrespective of soap and the uses of the bath. Mr. Carson continues, on this point:

"Most Americans have a firm impression that Mexicans love the United States and that ill will towards us has practically disappeared. Impartial observers have, however, assured me that a strong anti-American feeling exists in some quarters, for which there are several reasons. In the first place, many Americans in Mexico are much given to boasting that American capital is getting control of all the best mines and otherwise acquiring a great hold on the country. To this is added the bragging of the low-class American—only too common in Mexico—who calls the Mexican 'a greaser,' and is always asserting that a few hundred Americans could beat the Mexican army and conquer the land. . . . Mexicans, in fact, are becoming so jealous and suspicious of Americans that it is likely that this alone may prevent any serious revolution occurring after the retirement or death of President Diaz. United States has about \$750,000,000 invested in Mexico; Great Britain has probably \$500,000,000; France, Germany and other countries also have large sums at stake. If civil war broke out in Mexico, the United States, to protect its capitalists and Americans resident in the country, and to prevent any other power from taking coercive measures in defiance of the Monroe Doctrine, would undoubtedly march an army into Mexico to restore order. Intelligent Mexicans realize this very thoroughly, and are anxious that such a thing shall never take place."

"March an army into Mexico to restore order!" This predicate has a very ominous sound, when taken in conjunction with what was given out by Count Cavour when the Piedmontese troops were ordered to move across the Papal States borders before the battles of Perugia and Castelfidordo. It is a very portentous coincidence that when the rioting broke out in Mexico City, on the receipt of news that a Mexican had been burned to death by lynchers in Texas, an attempt at revolution was immediately begun in the province of Chihuahua. President Diaz, it would seem, began to lose popularity because he did not immediately proclaim war against the United States at the demand of the students of the Mexican University, who were the ringleaders in the riots.

Americans resident in Mexico-men of the better sort-recognize the tendency of the average visitor from the United States to look down upon and sneer at the ways of the Mexicans, even in their own country—just as the English did with regard to the Irish in the centuries of the Pale, when it was made a statutory offense to dress like an Irishman or speak the language of the "mere Irish," and when, moreover, it was decreed that it was no crime at law for an English resident of the Pale to kill a mere Irishman whenever one was so minded. Doubtless on the Texan border the killing of a "greaser" is regarded in much the same light—a blessing to the world at large rather than a sin against society. During the period of excitement which ensued upon the lynching of the man Rodriguez some Americans who know Mexico and the Mexicans wrote to the Sun and other leading New York papers, with the laudable view of allaying the rising tide of mutual animosity, when the hot-headed and thoughtless on either side were beginning to shout for war. Some of these letters were extremely valuable at that time, and the sudden cessation of the cry on the American side must have been in a great measure due to the sobering influence which their timely appearance created. One of these letters, written by Mr. Frank Autschul, clearly laid the blame for the hostility of Mexicans at the door of the American colony in the country. The writer wound up his testimony by saying:

"The Mexicans are not friendly toward the Americans here—and it is entirely the Americans' fault. From the moment of their arrival they adopt a condescending attitude and indulge in free and liberal criticism of native customs and institutions. They have no wish to learn the language; they have no desire to associate with Mexicans; they do not wish in any way to become a part of this great and growing country. They are here admittedly for one of two reasons; either because they want to make money, make it quick and get away; or because they made money, made

it quick and got away. Consequently the American colony keeps to itself and finds the doors of Mexican society barred. The Mexicans are wounded in their pride and naturally enough resent the American standpoint.

"But if one comes here in a different spirit and honestly desires to make friends, if one shows a moderate interest and wish to view sympathetically foreign ideas, then one finds the Mexicans the most courteous and charming of hosts, in every way willing to grant that in Mexico as in the United States there are all sorts and conditions of men. This has been the experience of countless visitors."

The name of "Christian Reid" is familiar to the great majority of American Catholic readers. She has lived much in Mexico and among the people. Her testimony as to their civilization. their politeness, their many estimable traits, was embodied in a work called The Land of the Sun, published about a decade and a half back, and may have been one of the works which induced Mr. Lummis to go from the abode of New England Puritan narrowness and see for himself what the "greasers" were like in their own proper habitat. The book is in its way as reliable and charming a guide as the more famous one of Miss Jackson's, Ramona, dealing with the Californians—people who in their time were quite as much slandered and hated as the Mexicans of to-day are by the low-class Americans, the gold-brick diggers of the Southland. Another writer, resident in Washington, D. C., gave in the Sun corroborative testimony as to the merits of the case in dispute last November, saying, inter alia:

"I visited Mexico in 1875, in 1880, in 1887 and 1888. On every one of these occasions I encountered the same phenomena of American boorishness and ostentatious condescension. Except in rare instances, they regarded the Mexicans as inferior persons, with low tastes and instincts, and took no trouble to conceal their opinion. Most of them were trying to sell gold bricks to the Mexican Government, and these were especially bitter on account of failure, and both their attitude toward the people of Mexico and their recorded utterances when they returned to 'the States' were calculated to fan the flame kindled by original misunderstanding and carefully educated prejudice.

"It was my fortune to visit Mexico under native auspices and to spend my time with Mexicans. In this way I came to know the Escandons, the Barrons, the Mexias, the Martinez del Rio, the Rubins, the Camachos, the Romero Rubios, the Escobedos and many other families. I visited their homes, enjoyed their hospitalities and saw them at the opera, at the jockey club, in their

Sunday social gatherings, at the pavilion, in the Alameda and their drives on the Paseo de la Reforma; and a more cultivated, charming and delightful people I have never met in any part of the world. Their customs differ from ours. Whether it is a climatic or a racial matter I do not know, but I remember very well that I undertook to transplant my whisky drinking habit from New Orleans to the Mexican plateau-8,400 feet elevation-and I remember with equal distinctness that within a week or so I had to abandon the habit and live as the Mexicans did, practically without alcohol. This I did very prosperously, to the great ease of my liver and the visible improvement of a degenerate complexion. When I first heard from its secretary that the jockey club, with 400 or 500 members, had sold only \$9 worth of whisky during the preceding month I was amazed. When I consulted my own experience I understood."

With our long experience of missionary ways in Catholic countries, we need not feel any surprise at finding the missionary trail in every case wherein international relations are placed in a delicate position. There is a silent partnership between the commercial agencies and the missionary agencies in most of the Catholic countries which have been selected as the theatre of missionary enterprise; indeed, the missionary often combines in his own person the dual function of the trader and the evangelist. When such men return to England or the United States they are often found contributing their quota to the fund of mutual dislike by the impressions they bear away and reproduce for home consumption from the regions wherein they have been working like thrifty ants for future emergencies. It was the present writer's fortune some years ago to be present at a lecture, given with the usual stereopticon accessories, on "Mexico and the Mexicans" by a commercial gentleman who, if he were not himself connected with a missionary enterprise, carried in his mind sufficient of the odium theologicum to stock a large one. He undertook, amongst other charitable objects, to enlighten the respectable audience who listened to him in the Drexel Institute, Philadelphia, on the relations between priests and people in the State founded by Cortez. In that State now, as in several other South American republics, there exists no longer the same close connection between the spiritual and the civil power that was established there under the old Spanish monarchy. Nevertheless, the Church still retains so great a hold upon the people and its demands are so onerous, the lecturer told his hearers, that if a workingman or a laborer in the State of Mexico earned—he put it by way of hypothetical illustration—two dollars a week, he was compelled, by reason of Church demands, to hand

over one dollar and a half to the priest. This statement was put forward quite seriously and was received in all seriousness as a Gospel fact by that audience of seemingly educated people as one of the reasons why the missionary was badly needed in the priest-ridden City of Mexico, which owns a cathedral, the lecturer went on to say, which has altar rails of solid silver, while the oppressed working classes are famishing on starvation diet owing to the terrible exactions of the priest. This system of gratuitous calumny-for system it deserves to be called, and no other word in English describes it so appropriately—is of very long standing. We have before us a book on Mexico and South America by "A Citizen of the United States" (name withheld), published in New York by H. Huntington, Jr., as far back as 1826, in which we find calumnies just as ridiculous and palpable gravely placed before the public of that period and no doubt accepted as incontrovertible The statements about the conversion of the natives and the greed and depravity of the Spanish clergy sent out for the purpose are in every respect identical with the fables put into circulation a few years ago with regard to the religious orders in the Philippines. Whenever the subject is Spain and her ancient colonial empire, and the Catholic religion as established under Spain's rule, a common rabies seems to seize upon all non-Catholic missionaries who have visited those parts of the world. appear to have eaten of the insane root—most of them—and so to have become constitutionally incapable of testifying truthfully on the subject.

A favorite taunt of such accusers is that of the enforced ignorance which they fastened, as it was charged, upon the people whom the Spanish colonists brought into the ambit of civilization. Some silly statements on this subject recently appeared in the French publication which M. John Lemoinne for many years made pre-eminently famous, the Revue les Deux Mondes, in connection with the centenary of Argentine independence. In the course of a spirited reply to these vacuities, a writer in America (October 8 last), J. B., S. J., gives these refutations:

"It is incomprehensible that such a misstatement of facts should have been permitted to display itself in this once great Review. Its credit will surely suffer when the edition of July 15, 1910, shall have found its way to the countries of Latin America, from Mexico to Buenos Aires. For if there is any reproach to make against the clergy of that part and that period of the world it is not that they prevented or neglected the education of the people, but that they were too prodigal of imparting it. They assumed the whole burden of education and did it with a magnificence

altogether out of proportion with the numerical importance and social condition of their scholars. Just as the Church in Europe had covered every country with a profusion of institutions of learning, in which, be it noted, all instruction was gratuitous and not, as after the French Revolution, making classical training the special privilege of the bourgeoisie, so all through Latin America, Spanish and Portuguese alike, the religious orders built numberless colleges, universities and common schools. The Jesuits alone, at the time of the destruction of the Society in that part of the world. namely, in 1767, had in the Spanish colonies 78 colleges, of which 15 were in Peru, 10 in Chile, 9 in New Granada, 23 in Mexico, 10 in Paraguay and 11 in Ecuador. The old catalogues are there to prove it. Besides this there were eighteen ecclesiastical seminaries, some of them annexed to the colleges and some independent. In Brazil, which was under the dominion of Portugal, they had nine colleges and one seminary; that is to say, a grand total in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies of eighty-seven colleges and nineteen seminaries.

"But they were not the only ones engaged in this work of education. The Dominicans and Franciscans were establishing their houses everywhere, and with such success that as the result of their joint labors Latin America could boast of nineteen university cities. Lima alone, the capital of Peru, had its University of St. Mark, with its faculties of theology, law and medicine, besides its two Jesuit colleges, its diocesan seminary and six other colleges directed by different religious orders.

"All these establishments, with very rare exceptions, were the work of the clergy, and the clergy only. The Government and the lay element kept themselves altogether aloof from the work of education. 'The Universities of Mexico and Lima,' if we may quote M. du Dézert, 'were of royal creation, and dated back to 1551, but after that the king lost all interest in the matter and left a free hand to the monastic orders.' The unpleasant writer in the *Deux Mondes* admits that 'Charles III. shut up eighty-seven Jesuit colleges,' but adds, 'I do not find that any one reopened them.' The oldest university of Argentina is that of Cordoba de Tucuman."

The anonymous author of the *History of Mexico*, to which reference has been made, after dwelling upon the ignorance, superstition, etc., of the population, went on to say that a better prospect was in sight, inasmuch as the Order of Freemasonry had just then been introduced into the benighted country—a presage, in his opinion, of the advent of a new aurora. In a similar optimistic spirit the heads of the various missionary bodies, both in the United States and Great Britain, had indulged in roseate visions of con-

quests in South America, immediately after the various States had shaken loose from the yoke of the home government. The Morning Chronicle gave a report of a meeting of the British and Foreign Bible Society in London in September, 1824, at which Dr. Ryder, Bishop of Lichfield and Coventry, congratulated the meeting on the prospect opening before the missions in the State of Colombia. and "contrasted the progress which the society was now making in that newly formed government with the spirit of bigotry and persecution that disgraced the first introduction of Christianity among the people." The term "Christianity," as used by that Bishop, is employed to convey that Catholicism, which had been and still is the religion of the Colombians, is either the anthithesis of Christianity or spurious Christianity; and this is the view which most of the non-Catholic missionaries who descend on South America to-day still insist upon and emphasize in the press and on the platform. Colombia, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Venezuela, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Brazil-all, or nearly all, of South America, in fact—have been open for a hundred years to the enterprise of the British and American missionary bands, and what have they to show in the way of value for the vast sums of money poured into their treasuries for the diffusion of their "true Christianity?" Little or nothing, so far as gains among the natives are concerned; a few rallying places in big seaports for English and Yankee visitors and settlers; and a bumper crop of ridiculous inventions at annual conventions—some of which make missionary efforts a laughing-stock for the whole world—like the famous pretended letter of the Bishop of Caracas to his clergy and the bogus "encyclical" from the Cardinal Secretary of State to the Cardinal Archbishoo of Chile—a country that never had a Cardinal! These forgeries and absurdities were more than once exposed and traced to their source by the Catholic press of the United States, yet they are still, even to this day, being resurrected and circulated by the missionary press as genuine news of the time, fit for pious non-Catholic Sunday schools, so that the children may learn how shocking are the morals of the Catholic clergy in South American countries and how necessary it is for godly missionaries from the United States and Great Britain to enter in and take possession of the fields which the good Bishop of Lichfield and Coventry, above referred to, described as "white with the harvest." The story about the "encyclical" addressed by "the Papal Secretary of State to the Cardinal Archbishop of Chile," after having lain quietly in a sarcophagus, not a grave, as it should have had on getting its death blow, is now reproduced in a slightly altered setting, and being offered as Sunday school pabulum to the non-Catholic children

of Philadelphia. In a paper published there called Young People there appeared some months ago a Sunday "prayer-meeting topic" on The Tarrying of the Dawn in South America, in which occurred these passages:

"From the time of its introduction the (Catholic) religion deteriorated rather than improved; for in many cases the forms of Catholicism were merely grafted on to heather worship. As the Indian idea of God was of motherhood, images of Mary were easily substituted for their idols and cathedrals for their chapels. There was no Protestantism to spur on the Catholics by competition. As a rule, the most worthless priests were sent to South America as a means of getting rid of them, and the immorality to which they sank cannot be described. The saying 'Like priest, like people' will suggest what must have been the condition of the masses. 4 large proportion of whom are as yet untouched even by this crude and shameful adulteration of Christianity.

"That the teachings of the Church had gone beyond the limit of endurance of the Pope and his best advisers may be seen from the words of Pope Leo XIII., speaking of Chile, in 1897: 'In every diocese ecclesiastics break all bounds and deliver themselves up to manifold forms of sensuality, and no voice is lifted up imperiously to summon pastors to their duties.' Speaking of priests in Bolivia, the ruling Bishop of Cochabamba wrote: 'They have no idea of God, nor of the religion of which they are the professed ministers; they are always the same brutal, drunken traducers of innocence, without religion and without conscience; better would the people be without them."

It must be borne in mind that the alleged pronouncements here referred to had been proved by the whole Catholic press of the United States to be wicked and baseless concoctions. The name "Pope Leo" had been dragged in when it was discovered that the previous vague reference to "the Pope" did not satisfy conscientious Protestants, after men like Mr. Speer had used it when challenged to quote his authority for the libels on the episcopate, clergy and people of Chile. We repeat that this frightful concoction has been frequently shown to be what it is by the Catholic press, and yet it is calmly issued in printed form by the great publishing house on Chestnut street, Philadelphia, known as "The American Baptist Publication Society," in order to show how base is the Catholic religion of South America and how pure that of the concocters of such infamies of slander!

But as often happens with the schemes of such plotters, they are found overreaching themselves rather than those whom they seek to injure, by inadvertence. As the old proverb has it, "liars need good memories." Here is a piquant case in point: On the back of the very page of Young People from which we have quoted is another paper on the subject of The City of Alamo, giving a narrative of its foundation and of the terrible battle that was fought there between the Americans and the Mexicans in 1836. On one side of the sheet we read that "the most worthless priests were sent to South America as a means of getting rid of them" (by Spain and Portugal), and on the other this remarkable test of the truth or sincerity of that abominable charge:

"The checkered and romantic history of San Antonio de Bexar, as it was called from its foundation by the friars of Queretaro, two centuries ago, is a marvelous tale of heroism, perseverance and pathos.

"In 1715 Don Romingo Ramon, with a company of soldiers and Franciscans, was deputized by the Viceroy of Mexico to establish a line of forts on the northeastern border of that country for protection against invasion, and on this expedition he located the first military post of San Antonio, on the western side of the San Pedro or San Antonio River.

"In 1718 a band of Franciscan monks from the college of Queretaro came to the fort and under its protecting care began the establishment of the mission of San Antonio de Valero, the first of the missions and the one whose career was destined to be the most eventful, for it afterwards became the mission of the Alamo.

"The pious monks founded a number of these missions, the last of which, extending south from San Antonio, was the mission of San Francisco, about nine miles away. Afterwards some of these missions were abandoned for lack of military force to protect them in their efforts to convert the savage and hostile Indians, by whom they were surrounded. In 1793 all the forts were united and called the town of San Fernando and Fort of San Antonio de Bexar.

"The modern city is called from the name of the fort, San Antonio. It is through these old missions that it gets the name of 'The City of Missions' as well as 'The City of Alamo.'"

We doubt if any country known to modern civilization could point to the equal of the work of the Franciscan monks and the religious orders generally in South America in civilizing millions of savage pagans; and we doubt, also, if any country in the world could produce a system of cold-blooded and deliberate defamers and belittlers of such work like unto the concocters of those transparently stupid libels upon them and their work—libels which are, moreover, shown to be merely libels by some of the co-religionists and co-workers of the libelers.

The author of the History of Mexico which we have quoted

makes it a ground of grievous complaint against the Spaniards who conquered the aborigines of South America that they intermarried with them and so founded the race called "mestizos!" The charge is well established by the fact of these people's existence to-day, while the aborigines of the Northern continent were kept aloof by the more civilized Anglo-Saxons and driven to the wilderness or turned into "good Indians" by the process familiar to readers of modern definitions.

So much for the ethical side of the sourness that has arisen between the Mexican Republic and our own. Something is happening now on the practical political side. Stirred to action at length by the urgent representations of the Mexican Government, the State authorities in Washington have aroused themselves to the necessity of enforcing the neutrality laws in regard to the Mexican frontier. Orders were sent to the commandants at the various border forts to send troops to guard the passes and prevent the shipment of arms and ammunition over the line of the Rio Grande. Then a very remarkable condition of affairs was disclosed. Only two men, it was given out by the Department of Justice in Washington, had been on duty on the whole line of frontier between Brownsville and El Paso, a distance of sixteen hundred miles. Not less astonishing was the revelation that the revolt in Mexico was being directed in the United States. President Diaz informed a representative of big American interests in Mexico that Madero, the leader of the rebels, was last seen in San Antonio, Texas, and that he was in constant communication with the American who was known to be the fiscal agent of the revolutionists. Moreover, Diaz was able to find that sixteen thousand stand of arms for the revolutionists had been bought in Fishkill, New York, and were being loaded on railway cars and shipped for transmission to Mexico. It was not until these damaging facts had been made public by the representative of the endangered American interests that any intimation of their existence was given out either by the Governmental press organs or unofficial newspaper correspondents. The silence of the latter class, in view of the dangerous nature of the political situation as between the two countries bore a specially sinister significance. Some powerful influence must have been exerted to preserve silence and keep a veil over the whole situation along the Mexican borderland until such time as the preparations for a grand coup against the Diaz Government had been brought to completion. In view of all the startling developments since the cordial interview between the President of the United States and the President of the Mexican Republic on the bridge over the border river, it can hardly be wondered at that a

representative of one of the South American States should consider the policy of the Northern Republic to be "deceptive." Certainly appearances have been against it. There ought to be no hatch in the big gateway of the temple of Janus when it is kept shut. If a rigid adherence to the law of fair dealing as between independent sovereign States were always observed by civilized governments, there would be very little need for a Peace Temple at The Hague.

The covert policy of the State Department had gone a long way toward undoing all the good work of the Pan-American Congress ere the mischievous work could be brought to a halt. Powerful influences had to be invoked in order to prevent the uprising in Mexico from assuming the dimensions of a civil war instead of a mere filibustering enterprise, as it looked at the outset. There was no cloaking of the relations between our Government and some of the South American ones, once the various uprisings began to take a serious turn. News agencies in the capital make no secret of the facts.

It is now known that the American Government was interfering, and very actively interfering, with the internal affairs of certain South American Governments—encouraging revolts in several of them in pursuit of its undeclared but very palpable policy of having men favorable to its own designs, whatever these were, placed at the head of affairs in each of the disturbed countries. It must be owned that the methods employed cannot seem to outsiders the most creditable sort for an irresistibly powerful nation to adopt toward weak ones. No deference was paid to South American remonstrances against intermeddling until Great Britain had thrown her sword into the scale, it is hardly an exaggerated figure of speech to say, against the attack on the rights of Honduras and the American holders of Mexican stocks against leaving the whole northern frontier line open to American soldiers of fortune and Mexican conspirators. It looked like a repetition of the prologue to the former war against Mexico, which General Grant once emphatically stigmatized as a "great crime."

Vigorous as the belated measures to protect neutrality apparently were, it is now plain that they were ridiculously inadequate to meet the necessities of the case. It is only necessary to revert to some of the press dispatches from the frontier to show that no effective barrier had been reared along the line of danger. For example, here are a couple of the items of news forwarded in a dispatch from El Paso on the 8th of February last:

"Alanis was camped last night twelve miles east of here on the Mexican side of the Rio Grande, at a hamlet called Sargosa. Ammu-

aition was taken across the river at this point, and this morning Alanis and his men had disappeared. A search of the hills in that vicinity failed to disclose his whereabouts, but he and his men are now virtually a part of Orozco's forces.

"United States soldiers and national guardsmen detained a total of twenty-seven Mexicans who were attempting to cross the river to the rebel camp. The troops here are numerically inadequate to the task of guarding the entire river front. It would require several regiments to accomplish the task. One wishing to cross with arms or ammunition has but to hunt a spot where there are no khaki-clad men; the rest is easy."

It may appear to many thinking minds that the problems involved in the relations between the two Americas are difficult beyond the capability of human ingenuity to resolve and deal with. A similar argument might have seemed to hold good with regard to the relations between Canada and the United States a century ago when there was also a foreign factor in the equation, but a different one—the French. The French were at that time a hundred times more abhorred of the British than the Spaniards. The hatred between Roman and Carthaginian of old was brotherly love itself as compared with the sentiments which animated Frenchmen toward the "nation of shopkeepers," and these latter toward that of the "frog-eaters" and "sans-culottes." That sentiment is now only a memory. There has never been anything between the Yankees of the North and the "Latin-Americans" below the Rio Grande to leave a legacy of unappeasable hate on the part of either race. The old war with Mexico stirs no more ill feeling now on either side than the war between the United States and Great Britain in 1812. All that is needed to insure a lasting peace between North and South is the cultivation of a healthy public opinion on either side. The United States Government cannot put the branks on the mouth of a mischief-making missionary like Mr. Speer, but it can do what would be as effectual as any forcible jaw-lock. It can cease to give its countenance to the aggressive tactics of such breeders of enmity and aloofness, as it has done through its official heads on more than one occasion in recent years. Although religion is none of its business, under the provisions of the Constitution, it cannot help noting the fact that religion plays the most important part of any determining influence in the whole category of influences in the affairs of mankind. Nor can it help noting, if it observes what is going on in the sphere of religion here and elsewhere, that while the Catholic religion and its ministers are constantly held up to odium by the missionaries whom some of its prominent officials ostentatiously take under their patronage, the

Catholic clergy rigorously abstain from following the uncharitable example, contenting themselves with the care of their own flocks and the conscientious discharge of their onerous ministerial dutiesunless, indeed, some of the wretched apostates whom the missionaries are so eager to snatch up exceed the limits of human endurance by attacking everything that a Catholic prizes higher than life. And such occasions, it is painful to say, are not seldom—for where there is money to be had there are also to be found apostates in need of it. "Pas d' argent, point de Suisse." When the newspapers and magazines of Latin America present proofs of the trail of ill will that missionaries of the Speer type leave behind them, such proofs ought not to be ignored, as they now habitually are, by those responsible for the peace of the two continents. It would seem that one of the most conspicuous needs of the United States in its higher function of directive statesmanship, Government is a Minister capable of dealing with those "Latin" fellow republics —a Minister who should be able to sympathize with the predilections and allow for the prejudices of a vast Catholic population, of a different strain of blood from that of North America. There ought to be no great difficulty in finding such a man-and it would be all the better if, when one was found, it turned out to be that he was of the Catholic faith himself.

The census shows that in those countries which we designate by the confusing title of "Latin America" there are now sixtyseven millions of people. The fact that for nearly all of those people the religion to which they belong is cherished as the only true one in all the world ought not to be regarded as a reason for reproach or dislike, but rather for profound respect and admira-The intensity and fervor of their attachment to the spirit of that religion is embodied in the colossal statue they have placed on the topmost cone of the Cordilleras—the statue of the Prince of Peace who gave out the precept that man resent not a blow, but forgive and pray for his enemy and do good to him that hates him. The lesson of that majestic statue, standing in its awful beauty of loneliness beneath the blue dome of the southern sky, is audible from afar, even though it be beyond the range of ear and vision. It speaks in the silent chambers of the heart as well as in the desert air that encompasses it, and will keep on speaking until the last cannon shall have been cast and the last Dreadnought equipped for destruction in the name of Peace, which shall never thenceforward be broken.

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Philadelphia

### Book Reviews

LE SCHISME DE PHOTIUS, par J. Ruinaut, 1 vol. in 16 de la collection Science et Religion, No. 558. Prix, 0 fr. 60. Bloud et Cie, 7 place Saint-Sulpice, Paris.

The study of the schism fomented by Photius in the ninth century does not afford much field for theological research or discussion. The religious question was only seized upon as a pretext, under which many far-reaching and profound differences existing between those of the East and those of the West broke forth to the eyes of the world. Irreconcilable differences of manners, of culture, of civilization and also keen rivalry as regards political influence gave rise to the quarrel. In the spiritual order we find the growing strength of the Roman primacy which thwarted the aims and humbled the pride of the patriarchs of Constantinople at the same time that it consecrated the supremacy of the Western Church in the eyes of the Greeks. This explains why and how a lasting harmony could never subsist between the Greeks and the Papacy, and why less than a century after the fall of Photius the schism originated by him was once again resumed, to become thenceforth permanent and irreparable. To these leading causes M. Ruinault attributes the fatal schism, but in addition he mentions some particular causes also, such as the unruly passions of men, the vengeance of a Bardas, the unbridled ambition of a Photius, the vile complacency of a Michael the Third, the intrigues of a Santabaren. The book is truly a learned exposition of the history of this important event of religious and political history.

VEN. P. LUDOVICI DE PONTE, S. J. Meditationes de Praecipuis Fidei Nostrae Mysteriis. De novo in lucem datae curia Augustini Lehmkuhi, S. J. Pars VI., 12mo., pp. 572. Sumptibus Herder, S. Ludovici Americae.

De Ponte's Meditations have been so long and so favorably known that to mention them is to recommend them. And yet even to those who have used them at some time, though not constantly, they reveal new excellencies each time they are approached.

This is particularly true of this new edition, which has been coming from the Herder Press for some time and has now reached the sixth volume, which treats of the attributes of God and their exercise in favor of man. There is probably no other course of meditations so complete and so exhaustive as these. They teem with quotations from the Sacred Scriptures—both Old and New Testament, and with references to St. Thomas. They may be said to be built on these two foundations, although quotations from other

sacred writers and theologians are not wanting. There is an unction about the meditations which is their chief charm, and they must advance those who use them in spirituality. These are especially suitable for priests, fitting them to lead others to heaven by advice, instruction and preaching, while at the same time bringing about their own sanctification.

L'EVANGILE EN FACE DU SYNCRETISME PAIEN, par Bernard Allo, professeur à l'Université de Fribourg, 1 vol. in 16 (collection Études de philosophie et de critique religieuse). Prix, 3 francs. Bloud et Cie, 7 place Saint-Sulpice, Paris.

Amongst certain men of pretended culture and so-called enlightenment the theory is maintained and even held as an axiom that Christianity is merely one of the various manifestations of that great religious movement which was developed in the Mediterranean world from the period of Alexander the Great up to the third century of our era. This syncretism, as it is called, derived its beliefs and its rites from all the pagan religions of the East, of Egypt and of Greece, and out of them formed the most various combinations.

Abundant materials for the criticism and refutation of this theory are to be found in the learned work now published by M. Bernard Allo. He takes up the teachings of the Christian religion and the condition of the Apostolic Church in the early centuries, and he puts them side by side with the whole mass of syncretism such as it appears to us at the same period. He analyzes the spirit of the one and of the other, and asks if the latter could possibly have produced the former and if both could have possibly arisen from the same source. The answer is absolutely negative.

QU'EST-CE QUE LE QUIETISME? Par J. Paquier, docteur ès lettres et en théologie. 1 vol. 1-16 de 128 pages de la collection Science et Religion, Nos. 569-570. Prix, fr. 20. Bloud et Cie, 7 place Saint-Sulpice, Paris.

Quietism has been the object of much study in the past. The point of view from which it has been considered by most writers and students has, however, been almost exclusively the aspect presented by French quietism, such as it appeared in the struggle between Bossuet on the one hand and Madame Guyon and Fenelon on the other. M. Paquier pushes his inquiry as far as Molinos and even the predecessors of the latter, and in dealing with their systems as well as those of Madame Guyon and Fenelon, it is chiefly the doctrinal side that he seeks to elucidate. He furnishes what may be considered as a solid exposition of the essence of quietism. He opposes to the false theory which he has described the genuine Catholic ideal of spirituality and mysticism. It is the reproduction

of a series of conferences held by the author at the Institut Catholique of Paris, and may be well considered as an indispensable introduction to the study of the religious movement whose consequences are well nigh incalculable.

L'EVANGILE ET LA SOCIOLOGIE, par le *Docteur Grasset*, professeur à la Faculté de Médecine de l'Université de Montpellier. 1 vol. in 16 de la collection Questions de Sociologie, No. 560. Prix, 9 fr. 60. Bloud et Cie, 7 place Saint-Sulpice, Paris.

What is the value of such propositions as the following: Sociology must be purely and exclusively scientific, or it cannot exist: Outside of medicine, of biology, of hygiene, outside of science in general, there is no sociology? These assertions are daily repeated with ever-increasing emphasis and begin to make a visible impression on the minds of most men. Dr. Grasset employs the authority which his high renown has so justly procured him to make clear the pernicious tendency of such a thesis and the exaggeration and falseness it contains. He shows how, in a purely scientific sociology, no duty and no obligation would be recognized, and only the clashing interests of this or that class would have weight or effectiveness. In order to be sound and fruitful in good results, sociology must be based upon the sentiment of obligation, on love and on sacrifice, and it is in the Gospel alone that we can find the unshakeable foundation of these necessary principles.

La Foi, par P. Charles, 1 vol. in 16 de la collection Science et Religion, No. 557. Prix, 0 fr. 60. Bloud et Cie, 7 place Saint-Sulpice, Paris.

This little volume is nothing less than a complete treatise on faith. After the study of its nature and its object, the author passes in review the modern theories upon the psychology of faith. He finally examines the problem of faith from the apologetic and especially the theological point of view. Being thoroughly conversant with the most modern works and most recent controversies, M. P. Charles holds forth in their full light the principles of scholastic and traditional theology, and he shows how these principles, though presented in a form adapted to the needs of men's intellects as at present felt, must never in the course of this adaptation be made to undergo any diminution or transformation.

The series of volumes to which this book belongs has for object

VIE DE SAINTE RADEGONDE, REINE DE FRANCE, par Saint Fortunat. Traduction publice avec une introduction, des appendices et des Notes, par René Aigrain, du clergé de Poitiers. 1 vol. in 16 de la cellection chefs d'oeuvre de la littérature hagio-graphique, No. 564. Prix, 0 fr. 60. Bloud et Cle, 7 place Saint-Sulpice, Paris.

the translation and annotation of the old chronicles and original texts of the lives of the early saints, the republication in their own first French garb, naive or high-sounding as it may be, of these ancient lives, which are a matter of dispute amongst lovers of books, the narrative of such humble careers as have not yet found any historian to trace them. The life of St. Radegonda, written by St. Fortunatus, deserved most assuredly to find its place in this golden legend of the twentieth century. In the skillful setting and grouping of the various parts of the ancient and venerable text, M. René Aigrain gives new life, so to say, to the splendid figure of this great saint, who was also a great queen.

LA VIE DE SAINT BENOIT D'ANIANE, par Saint Ardon, son disciple. Traduite sur le texte même du Cartulaire d'Aniane par Fernand Baumes, 1 vol. in 16 de la collection chefs d'oeuvre de littérature hagio-graphique, No. 562. Prix, 0 fr. 60. Bloud et Cie, 7 place Saint-Sulpice, Paris.

Amongst the grand ecclesiastical personages of the Carolingian period St. Benedict of Aniane stands forth with a preëminent lustre. We enjoy the immense advantage of possessing his life written a few years after his death, not indeed by the popular imagination of his admirers and worshipers, but by one of his own disciples, a saint of his school—St. Ardon. Thanks are due to M. F. Baumes for having placed this precious document within reach of all readers and for having done so with much skill and delicacy. It finds a most fitting place amongst the valuable series of publications entitled "Science et Religion," which bids fair to become a golden legend of the twentieth century in the true sense of the word.

LA NOTION DE CATHOLICITE, par A. de Poulpiquet. 1 vol. in 16 de la collection Science et Religion, No. 560. Prix, 0 fr. 60. Bloud et Cie, 7 place Saint-Sulpice, Paris.

It is certain that the integral parts of the idea of Catholicity are unity, the number of the faithful and geographical extent. Do these elements, however, exhaust the total concept of Catholicity as a mark of the true Church of Christ? The author of the present pamphlet does not think so. His opinion is that besides the quantitative aspect presented by these characteristics, the idea of Catholicity also possesses a qualitative aspect which completes the former, explains them by attaching them to the inner cause whence they proceed and thus enables Catholicity to attain its full value and effectiveness as a mark of the true Church. Thus completed by this spiritual element, Catholicity has for effect to make the Church of Christ appear before the world as the true and living incarnation of its Founder.

### THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC

# QUARTERLY REVIEW

"Contributors to the QUARTERLY will be allowed all proper freedom in the expression of their thoughts outside the domain of defined doctrines, the REVIEW not holding itself responsible for the individual opinions of its contributors."

(Extract from Salutatory, July, 1890.)

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#### TWO ROMES.

HIS year United Italy is holding in its capital city an exposition to commemorate the fiftieth year of the proclamation of the kingdom. What music, art and commerce can contribute to the triumphant display will be brought into requisition for the occasion—military reviews, the reception of foreign bodies, banquets and pompous speeches are to form part of the programme of proceedings, and as an old Italian chronicler would say in his quaint, grandiose way of such a celebration in his day! There shall be molte belle feste e grandi eventi!

And then the public inauguration of the new Palazzo di Giustizia—built where it can be well seen from the Vatican—will take place; the imposing monument to Victor Emmanuel, "Pater Patriæ," finished after fifteen years labor and after impoverished Italy has been three times entreated for the necessary funds, will be opened; the Piazza Colonna is to be renovated, and so are the baths of Caracalla—or rather the ruins of them; these and divers other projects are to be ready for the exposition—for we are not going to see "many grand feasts and high doings!"

And now that the temporal power of the Roman Pontiffs belongs to the past, that the head of the Church must under heaven depend for its maintenance upon the generosity of his spiritual children throughout the world, that a usurper holds the throne from which the Pope ruled for a thousand years, while its rightful owner is a prisoner in his own city, it will be of interest from many points of view to review what Roman people and Rome were like before 1870 and what they are to-day.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1911, by J. P. Turner, in the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington, D. C.

Long ages ago, when Rome through the neglect of the Western emperors was left to the mercy of barbarous hordes, Romans turned to one figure for aid and protection and asked him to rule them; and thus in this simple manner, the best title of all to kingly right, commenced the temporal sovereignty of the Popes. And meekly stepping to the throne of Cæsar, the Vicar of Christ took up the sceptre to which the emperors and kings of Europe were to bow in reverence through so many ages, from sentiments of respect for the dignity of his office and because he was the only mediator whom they recognized in their almost interminable wars.

Ages went by and Rome began to recover some of her old grandeur under Papal rule. The turbulent Roman barons fought with one another, and the most powerful of them crossed swords with the Pope-for every noble family of worth had its fortress, and the narrow, winding streets of the city made a battleground only too well suited to their fierce brawls. And then a change occurred. Tired of internal dissension and external intrigue, believing he could rule his spiritual dominions with more liberty and success in France than in Italy, the Pope-King quietly packed his luggage and took up his abode in Avignon, where a warm welcome and tranquillity awaited him, though perfect freedom of action was tempered, indeed, by less independence. Then the Romans had their eves opened. Their head was absent and had no intention of returning; their city crumbled and its population dwindled, and a day came when the populace of Rome sent a cry up to Avignon beseeching the return of "Il Papa-Re," for they were in a grievous plight. But the Pope had got a sharp lesson by his experience, or rather the experience of his predecessors, and refused to come back. And then saints knelt at his feet and begged him to go southwards and take up again his residence in the city where Peter and Paul sleep, and deputations of Rome's foremost men came to the steps of the Papal throne and besought Christ's Vicar to come among them and abide with them again as their father and king. And the Pope returned after an absence of seventy years. But what a woeful sight met the Pontiff's eves as he entered his city! A miserable population that dwindled week by week welcomed him; a woebegone look overspread what was once Imperial Rome; ruins and signs of decay stared him on every side, so that he asked himself: what had become of the brave and sturdy Rome he had left a few generations back, and how he should best undertake the task of regenerating it?

As the verdure bursts forth in springtime under the influence of showers and genial sunshine, as the drooping flower raises its head and opens its petals at the warm rays of the morning sun, as the little child grows up happy and strong under the gentle influence of a good parent's care, so did the city of Rome begin to change as soon as she got back her "Pope-King." With that slow energy, that programme of festina lente by which everything seems to be done in Rome, the Vicar of Christ commenced the rebuilding of his capital, and soon the city began to be worthy of her old name and her people once more took the ancient pride in being called Romans.

Years and years went by, each year seeing some vast achievement commenced or completed; Pope succeeded Pope, each seeming to vie with his predecessor in beautifying his beloved Rome, so much so indeed that when we have come through the long vista of ages down to the pontificate of Pius IX. we find a beautiful, dignified old Rome, in which the stately grandeur of the middle ages had a solitary home.

And what a noble, fearless life was that lived by those Popes! Naturally they made many and powerful enemies, for their office was to restrain unworthy ambition and combat vice. But that mattered little to them; each Pontiff's attitude in peace or war was that embodied in the reply given in 1848 by Cardinal Toste to the revolutionists, who, when Pius IX. and the Sacred College had fled from Rome after the attack upon the Quirinal Palace, came to tender their congratulations to the aged Cardinal for the courage displayed by him in remaining at his post:

"Sirs," replied the white-haired prelate, with dignity, "I am no more afraid of you than were any of my colleagues who are gone away. It was through love and obedience to the Holy Father that they followed him into exile. The same motives prevent my leaving this establishment (San Michele), for he has desired me not to abandon so many unfortunate persons sheltered here. Besides, I am a Roman and you are not. I shall remain at Rome without fear. If you give me a blow of a stiletto, it will only shorten my life two or three years, for I am already seventy-two."

And thus it was that in 1870, before the cannon of Victor Emmanuel II., "the loyal son of the Holy Church"—as His Majesty was pleased to style himself at the very dethronement of Pius IX.—were leveled at the Aurelian Walls, you had Rome an ideal city by reason of the happiness and contentment of her population, on account of her comparative freedom from vice and extreme poverty, because of the noble institution where the unfortunate one, whether culpable or not, was treated kindly and led gently back to the straight path; where the widow and the orphan were tenderly cared for; where the dowerless girl was honorably provided for; where the quiet, dignified old manners of men and women existed as yet untroubled with the idiotic fopperies, the feverish scramble for gold, the mad

struggle of godless societies in the unending chain of political intrigues that are so much in evidence in the metropolis of "United Italy" to-day.

Let us take up each of the foregoing points in which Rome prior to 1870 was distinguished, for they will perhaps open the eyes of some of our monern tourists whose chief source of information on everything that concerns the capital of Christendom—save and except the explanation regarding museums, churches, catacombs, hotels, etc., which are found in Murray or Baedeker—is the obsequious porter at their hotel door or the guide whom they hire at so much per day to pilot them through the streets.

It is probable that the matters spoken of in the following pages will be treated in a more partial manner than they usually are by the hotel porter or the sly Italian guide, both of whom are quite ready to tell the foreigner anything and everything under the sun, provided they think he will swallow it and increase their mancia on the morning of his departure.

Under Papal rule Romans were happy and contented. One occasionally comes across an old Roman, viz., member of a family resident in Rome before 1870, who will freely tell of the tranquil life of the 200,000 souls or so that Rome counted within her walls before Victor Emmanuel arrived. He will tell you that the people were content, because all their needs were satisfied: the cost of the necessaries of life was only about one-sixth of what it presently is; the rule of the Papal Government was gentle but firm; abuses were stamped out before there was time for them to take root; the people loved their Pope-King, who walked through their narrow streets almost as a simple priest, and they fell on their knees and asked his blessing with the faith and simplicity of happy children as he passed along.

But is there the same degree of happiness and contentment among the people of Rome to-day? Ask your old Roman, and he will turn his dark, flashing eyes over the city and speak with contempt of the motley population that is made up by the 600,000 persons that fill the Eternal City at this moment. For when Victor Emmanuel's army entered Rome in 1870 after battering down the Porta Pia six thousand camp followers followed in the soldiers' wake and settled down in Rome. And then on Rome being declared the capital of "United Italy," the riffraff from the Hundred Cities of the Peninsula flocked in and have lived here since. It is not always the best that leave their native city and emigrate to another on the mere chance of "something turning up," even though they have got all the sanguineness of Dickens' hero. And so in a short time the motley population of Tuscans, Lombardians, Venetians, Um-

brians, Sicilians and Neapolitans, though fused together under the generic appellation of "Italians," showed their distinctive characteristics and broke up into parties, the doctrines of which were suggested by the habits peculiar to their native soil and to that something which every one finds in his blood. To-day Monarchists, Socialists, Anarchists, Radicals and all their sub-divisions keep Rome in a state of ferment and help to show what a world of contrast there is between the Rome of to-day and that of forty years ago, for in the latter happiness and contentment reigned, but in the former we can find (that is, among most of the newcomers) only low living and party strife that never rests.

I have said that in Rome of the Papal days there was comparative freedom from vice and from extreme poverty. When the Pope had his own a degree of virtue made the people of Rome stand as examples for those of every city in Italy. Suicides were almost unknown; the event of taking away one's life usually kept the population in gossip for weeks. Now no day passes without a deserter from life. The theatre was pure; now, although several theatres in Rome are above reproach, others are of the most lurid French type. A high standard of morality reigned unsullied; to-day the descendants of Victor Emmanuel's camp followers make their presence only too keenly felt in the Eternal City, and if the present increase in population goes on, bid fair to raise the criminal record to a total that few ever dreamt of.

With regard to the state of comparative freedom from poverty that existed in Papal Rome, I must not be understood to state that all abounded in this world's goods. Doubtless a lira meant as much and more to the Roman of the Papal regime than to his brother of the present day. But there was none of that black, despairing want that haunts the poorer classes in Rome at this hour. Men were poor, but they were certain of sufficient food each day and a covering by night; at this hour there are hundreds who, if fortunate enough to obtain a dinner, do not know whence supper will come unless as alms, while for many the doorsteps of a church or the recesses of the Coloseum or of the aqueducts have to serve as a couch for the night. But it is chiefly in her public institutions that Papal Rome surpassed Rome of after 1870. In no single particular have English readers been so cruelly led astray by unscrupulous writers than in the question of the prisons in which the Popes retained political offenders. Bigots who, either through lust of money or through hatred of the Catholic Church, published in England accounts of "Papal dungeons," seem to have lost all respect for truth and honesty in their desire to please.

On the question of "Papal dungeons" let us hear what a foreign

visitor found on a personal investigation. "Passing over the prison for women," says Maguire in his "Rome," written, be it noted, in 1857, "which forms part of the vast collection of buildings, I may refer to that in which persons convicted or accused of political offenses were then confined. To this department of the building I turned with considerable anxiety, being desirous of judging, by what I myself should see, how far the statements of certain classes of the English journals, with respect to the treatment of political prisoners, were true or false. I expected, at the least, to behold gloomy and noisome cells; to see the victims of Papal tyranny lying on scanty bundles of straw flung on stone couches and to hear the clanking of the falling fetter and the ponderous chain. In fact, to realize the picture of a 'Roman dungeon' which English writers had made familiar to my mind, the prison into which I was about to be admitted should, as nearly as possible, resemble those fearful dungeons that are shown to the stranger in Venice and which, in their horrid gloom and tomblike aspect, speak with terrible eloquence of the mysterious tyranny of its departed Republic. But as the guardian turned the key and flung open the door of the great hall of the prison my thick-coming fancies and dark associations were at once dispelled, for instead of gloom and horror and noisome dungeons I beheld a large well-lighted, well-ventilated and-could such a word be properly applied to any place of confinement cheerful-looking hall. The bright sun streams in through several windows, placed rather high from the ground, on one side of this vast hall, and on the other side and facing the light the cells were constructed, row above row, their doors and windows opening into this large enclosure. There was no clanking of chains to be heard, but, instead, the hum of conversation as some twenty or twentyfive men were at that moment either walking up and down or engaged in a game of dominoes. They all wore their ordinary clothes and might have passed for a number of persons who had been confined for debt, and a glance into the interior of the cells of this 'Roman dungeon' was quite sufficient to show that not only had they ample light and air, but that they differed from the ordinary cells in the great superiority of their size and arrangement. In size alone they were considerably larger than the cells of an ordinary prison. They also differed from the ordinary cell in a much more remarkable manner; for in those into which I looked there were drinking glasses of different kinds, some ornaments and other articles not to be expected in such places. So far as a sense of delicacy would permit my doing so, I saw enough to discredit the statements which I had been accustomed to read and to convince me that, at least in this prison—the only prison in Rome in which political prisoners were then detained—there was no feature, whether of degradation or of cruelty, which in any way could justify those descriptions of 'Italian dungeons' so familiar to the public of the United Kingdom. I passed through a room or ward of considerable size, in which there were several men, the greater number of whom were sitting on their beds, which beds appeared to be of the description usually found in a public hospital. Light and air were fully supplied to this as to the other compartment which I have described."

Now compare this description of an independent Catholic layman, who was certainly decided to paint the "Roman dungeons" just as he should find them, with the descriptions served up for consumption in England and America by men who wrote merely what they believed to be marketable there. Then go a step further and compare the political dungeons—dungeons in the true sense of the word—of England, Austria and the Republic of Venice with the "Roman dungeons" found in use by Maguire. Davitt, Boyle O'Reilly and John Mitchell could tell from sad experience what treatment the English "lambs" meted out to political prisoners and how much light, air and space characterized their coffinlike abodes during their years of martyrdom at the hands of Bible-quoting hypocrites!

But perhaps it was in the hospitals that the humanity and generosity of the Pope-Kings were particularly remarkable. Here tenderness and the best treatment that the science of the time could afford were lavished on rich and poor alike in private hospitals as well as in the great public hospital of Santo Spirito, in the Borgo Vecchio, founded in 1198 by Innocent III. and rebuilt in 1471 by Sixtus V. I will confine my attention to only one branch of this great hospital and again allow the author of "Rome" to express an opinion on what he saw there in 1857:

"I was most anxious to judge for myself of the condition of the Foundling Hospital, which, as I have stated, forms an important branch of this vast institution, for I had heard different opinions as to its management. A kindly, cheerful-looking Sister was directed to act as our guide, and she at once led the way through many courts and corridors to that part of the building. The average number of children received during the year is about 900, but of these not more than 600, or two-thirds, are illegitimate—the remaining 300 are the offspring of poor and needy, perhaps in some instances of heartless parents who adopt this ready mode of providing for them or getting rid of them. . . . The number of 900 may seem very great, as representing the annual average; however, it should be remembered that the hospital of St. Spirito affords an asylum

not only to the foundlings of Rome, but to those of the provinces of Sabina, Frosinine, Velletri and the Comarca and also districts on the borders of the Kingdom of Naples. . . .

"The nurses are kept with great care and never leave their young charge. They are well fed and well paid and every inducement is held out to them to discharge their duty honestly and faithfully. The constant presence of one of the Sisters is a guarantee for as much care and attention as can be expected from such a class to such a class—from the mercenary to the offspring of shame, or at best the child of poverty.

"Particular care is taken in noting down everything connected with the reception of the child. Of course, the day of the year and month are noted as well as the very hour, and, if the person bringing the child has no difficulty in telling them, also the name and origin. The official in charge makes a slight incision in the shape of the cross of Santo Spirito on the right foot and introduces into it a dark dye, in order to render the mark indelible. The child is then carried to the nursery, where it is taken charge of by the superior, who examines the clothes to ascertain if there be any mark, such as a coin, medal or ribbon; if there be any such, she makes a note of it, which she fastens to the clothes. In fine, every particular by which the identity of the child can be described is carefully put aside and registered. If there be no certificate of baptism, the little one is carried to the church and there baptized conditionally. The nurseries consist of three rooms, capable of containing fifty beds for the nurses, and each bed has two cradles near it. Two of the rooms are for healthy children and one for the sick."

And those children were reared tenderly, educated and given a start in life, in such a manner as a rich empire might feel justly proud, not to speak of a little kingdom in Italy.

With regard to those about to become mothers, every inducement was afforded them to enter this hospital, lest the offspring should come to grief through malice. The female might enter wearing a veil and without giving her name. She was not obliged to make known her identity; her sad secret was safe with herself and was guaranteed to die with her in case it were her will. For even if she should die in hospital, the veil was left unremoved from her face, if such had been her expressed wish.

Needless to say, struggling widows and orphans were assisted by the Vatican itself from the earliest days: "Every Monday and Friday," says a pilgrim to Rome in 1630, writing of an ancient hospital that stood on the site of the present sacristy of St. Peter's, "some 2,000 poor persons here receive a dole of bread and a flask of wine; every week 1,000 large loaves and fourteen barrels of wine are thus distributed."

But it is of the dowerless girl that special care was taken under Papal regime, and large sums were given by ecclesiastics and wealthy Roman seculars to provide a certain number of doweries every year for poor but virtuous girls who wished to enter the matrimonial state. Each year applications for marriage doweries were received, the chief conditions being the presentation of a baptismal certificate and a letter from the girl's parish priest testifying to her good conduct. How sad it is to have to recall here that only last year these two conditions have been dispensed with by the Syndic and municipality of Rome! When Victor Emmanuel seized Rome he also seized the control of all pious foundations in the Eternal City, among which are the funds destined for poor girls' doweries. Until the advent of Ernest Nathan, the Anglo-Jewish Mayor of Rome, ex-Grand Master of Italian Freemasonry and late disciple of Mazzini, apostle of secret assassination, to the chair of the municipality, none of the wicked men who had risen to power by fawning on the usurper living in the stolen Ouirinal Palace had ever dared to violate the wishes of the dead regarding these funds. However, to Sig. Nathan and the Socialist City Councillors the idea of a baptismal certificate and a priest's letter testifying to the honorable lives of applicants proved distasteful! And now the good Catholic girl for whose benefit those funds were provided by charitable co-religionists of days gone by has as competitors for these doweries the daughter of the strolling Jew, the offspring of the Socialist, of the fire-eating Anarchist, of the member of the Giordano Bruno or the "No-God-nor-Master-Society," or mayhap the nameless creature that paces the streets after dark!

I have said that with the fall of Rome passed away the quiet, dignified old manners that were so characteristic of the middle ages. The saying is but too true; as the rush for gold, that hard grind that makes life a drudgery has taken away the halo of peace and quietness which one would like to see existing in the capital of Christendom.

Foreign residents in Rome speak with enthusiasm of the politeness and polish that were to be found among all classes of Romans a half century ago. "Even the very street-sweeper was almost a Chesterfield in his manner," one aged resident belonging to the English-speaking world once declared to the writer. Truly indeed, Rome in this respect as well as in many others has come down to the level of an ordinary European capital!

"Under Papal rule," said Bishop Chatard, "it is well known that not only in Rome did good order prevail, as the immense multitude

present at the Œcumenical Council can attest, but that also on the frontiers of the territories governed by the Pope, after the withdrawal of the French troops from Veroli and Anagni, the energy displayed by the Roman delegate was such as to liberate completely the provinces from the bands sprung from the civil strifes of Southern Italy. The city of Rome itself was a model of good order and of personal safety." But the same cannot be said of Rome at all times nowadays, for the city on the Tiber, with her half million or so of souls, imitates only too faithfully her bigger sister on the Seine in her number of Apaches. And on days consecrated to socialistic and irreligious celebrations modern Rome can make as imposing a display as can the most pagan of cities of Europe in deeds of violence and utter disregard for all human and divine law.

We have wider streets and larger squares to-day than Rome could boast of forty years ago, but we have not the grand old Rome that monarchs loved to gaze upon, nor the romantic scenes that inspired the pen and brush of so many masters.

Following the declaration of Rome as the capital of Italy, a vast movement betraying something of that megalomania which marked the Romans of old, came to be initiated by the new masters of the Eternal City. New streets were hastily mapped out and speedily lined with huge, cheaply built tenement houses, nearly every one of which was dignified by the title of "palazzo," for the influx to Rome from all over the peninsula was expected to be very great. The quarter of the historic Villa Ludovisi-in which are included the site of Sallust's gardens—was despoiled of its beauty and covered with those edifices: so also were the Prati di Castelli, the district between St. John Lateran's (the Pope's cathedral) and S. Croce in Gerusalemme, and not even the Campo Marzo, the Fields of Mars, where Cæsar trained his legions twenty-one centuries ago, was spared, for a large part of it is now turned into back yards. As to the destruction of mediæval monuments for the sake of sites. "that subject is so wide that volumes could not record it," says a foreigner who has lived in Rome since 1869. No monument was too sacred for those modern vandals if its site proved suitable for the rearing of a tenement house, wine shop or hotel. And perhaps the beauties of nature were never more disregarded in any single instance as when the personal intervention of Queen Margherita of Italy failed to dissuade the municipality from felling a line of ilex trees that for centuries had been regarded so ornamental to the Eternal City on the slope of the Janiculum Hill.

"In the wild range of speculation which culminated in 1889," says Marion Crawford, who perhaps knew more about Rome than any foreigner of his day, "its desolate open lands (i. e., the regions

near the Quirinal, Monte Mario, etc.), its ancient villas and its strange old houses were the natural prey of a foolish greediness, the like of which has never been seen before. Progress ate up romance and hundreds of wretched, cheaply built, hideous, unsafe buildings sprang up, like the unhealthy growth of a foul disease, between the Lateran Gate and the old inhabited districts. They are destined to a graceless and ignoble ruin. Ugly cracks in the miserable stucco show where the masonry is already parting as the hollow foundations subside, and walls in which the paint is still almost fresh are covered up with dirty beams, lest they should fall and crush the few paupers who dwell within. Filthy, half-washed clothes of beggars hang down from the windows drying in the sun as they flap and flutter against pretentious molded masks of empty plaster. Miserable children loiter in the high-arched gates, under which smart carriages were meant to drive, and gnaw their dirty fingers or fight for a cold boiled chestnut one of them has saved. Squalor, misery, ruin and vile stucco, with a sprinkling of half-desperate humanity—those are the elements of the modern picture—that is what the 'great development of modern Rome' brought forth and left behind it. Peace to the past and to its ashes of romance and beauty."

There is a huge building on the Quirinal Hill, famous in the history of the Universal Church and of Italy. "Eccoci qua, e qua resterremo!" "Here we are, and here we shall remain!" cried the first of the usurping line on taking possession of it. But Victor Emmanuel II. lived only eight years to enjoy his ill-gotten spoil, for in the midst of a brilliant fête in 1878 he dropped like a log while smoking a cigar, and the huge body was borne to the royal bedchamber, and no man knows yet whether a priestly hand had been raised over the excommunicated monarch before he breathed his last. His son, Humbert, succeeded him and reigned for twentytwo years until the Anarchist's dagger ended his bad life in 1900 at Monza. And Humbert's place was taken by Victor Emmanuel III., whom you never see outside his palace except in the midst of armed men; for those who killed his father have sworn to dye their hands in the son's blood, and well he knows their oath is terrible. As King of Italy, Victor Emmanuel is the living personification of the Italian Constitution, which says: "The Roman Catholic religion is the religion of the kingdom of Italy."

Leaving aside for the moment the political hostility of the King of Italy to the head of the Church while the present circumstances exist, one would imagine that the head of the State that acknowledges such an article ought to be at least a loyal Catholic. However, a condition of things quite the opposite obtains, for in contrast to his saintly mother, Victor Emmanuel III. is said to be one of the

bitterest anti-clericals in Italy. It is commonly said that he belongs to the sect of Freemasons; but for the present this assertion, though it is believed by many, cannot be clearly proved. Men may to some extent dispose of their own souls, but with their own their efforts must cease; and hence it is that no little ferment has been occasioned in Catholic ranks this past year or two on hearing it whispered about that the young Princesses of the house reigning over Catholic Italy are being reared without any definite religious training, with the view of their being able to embrace the faith of their future husbands. If this is true—and reference to a Protestant training being imparted to the little Princesses, though made in the press, has not been officially denied—to what a sorry pass has come the House of Savoy, one of the most ancient in Europe, which, as Pius IX. reminded Victor Emmanuel II., prior to the Piedmontese invasion, can count canonized saints on its annals! However, the Methodist minister who made the statement contrived to shuffle out of it, and Italy is yet at sea on the matter.

It is sometimes stated that on the taking of the Eternal City by Emmanuel II. the outraged Pontiff, Pius IX., said:

"Three generations of the House of Savoy will reign in Rome."

The grandson of the usurper is the third and perhaps shall be the last of these, seeing that many signs of a revolution are apparent in Italy. But nobody knows the year or the day on which the fire will burst forth, for the Socialist and Anarchist leaders keep cool heads, even though their dupes get themselves daily into trouble with the powers that be. To the trend of events Victor Emmanuel is keenly alive, so much so, indeed, that millions of his money are invested outside Italy, especially in England, lest the evil day might come and find him unprepared for exile.

But, happily, the advent of Victor Emmanuel's troops and the thousands of riffraff gentry, whom Theodore Roosevelt would term "undesirable citizens," have been able to change only one part of Rome; for there is another side to Rome which has retained all that was good and grand in the City of the Popes.

The most powerful of the old Roman aristocrats and patricians have staunchly adhered to the Papal cause and have continued to look with equal disdain on the usurper and those of the body who welcomed his advent. Amid weal and woe the Prisoner of the Vatican can count on the warlike Orsini, from which Benedict XII. sprang; the Patrizi-Montoros, the head of which house is hereditary standard-bearer to the Sovereign Pontiff; the Borghesi, who gave Pope Paul V. to the Church; the Lancellotti; the Aldobrandini, who gave Clement VIII. to Peter's throne, and who as a sign of mourning have not opened the front door of their palace since 1870; the

Lavaggi; the Rospighiliosi, the head of which house is Prince Assistant at the Papal throne and from which Clement IV. sprang; the Vitelleschi; the Colonna, from which house came Pope Martin V.; the Massimo, that traces back its descent to Fabius the Cunctator, who saved the honor of pagan Rome at a critical hour; the Ruspoli and several others.

Some of these gave saints to the Church, and as has been seen, many gave Popes; but all of them have suffered for having embraced the side of him who, though ruling 250,000,000 loyal subjects, has only a few acres of garden that he dare call his own. These nobles, so many of the borghesia and of the lower classes have preserved that genuine love for religion, for the fine arts, for culture, elevated surroundings and methods of life that has never died, and, let us hope, never will. With the families which they have assimilated and the foreign Catholics whose long period of residence in Rome has taught them to consider the Eternal City as their home, they have kept up all the grand traditions of a great and holy past. And thanks to the struggle for the coming generation carried on against the infidel schools by the Holy Father, the ranks of the good are being constantly refilled with devoted, self-respecting young men and women to balance the future efforts of the disciples of Government godless institutes.

To counteract the Government educational institutes where no mention of God is made, the Pope supports no less than forty-six schools, male and female, throughout the city, where at the present day upwards of 27,500 pupils are educated at an annual cost to Pius X. of 256,000 lire. God-fearing, well-educated young men and women leave these schools where they have been saved through Papal zeal and sacrifice from the fate of so many thousands of their kind in Rome who grow up pagan and cruel and carnal—the very type of the stripling tyrants of ancient Rome whose vicious lives and incapacity to govern when their time came did so much to hasten the dissolution of the great empire. Many of these make spiritual retreats each year for eight days, and all devote the last three days of Holy Week in one form or another to the care of their souls. What influence this number of the rising generation must have on the future of Rome and Italy will be easily comprehensible to American fathers and mothers who are placed in almost the same position as Roman parents in the necessity to strive for a Christian education for their boys and girls.

It would be a long recital to convey an adequate idea of the patience and persevering labors with which the religious of both sexes coöperate in the work so dear to the heart of the Sovereign Pontiff. Though rarely able to support themselves, they make a

gallant fight, and the few loaves and fishes seem to multiply in their hands. I know for a fact that the Irish Christian Brothers, who came to Rome some ten years ago for the special purpose of battling against the efforts of the Methodist proselytizers among children induced to attend their schools, lived cheerfully for the first year or two in great necessity. Now they own one of the most magnificent educational institutes in Rome, with seven hundred boys passing through their hands, many of whom are the sons of Freemasons and other enemies of the Church, who are attracted there by reason of the thorough training they see others receiving.

And thus shall stand as of yore the palace of a thousand years, the beacon-light of Christianity, in which the patient Prisoner of the Vatican sits teaching nations and showing men the way to higher things. Representatives of many cities and men serve beside his throne, and millions come from the four winds of heaven to kneel at his feet and offer him proof of affection and homage. After looking on all we come away convinced that although the war of 1870 defined two Romes—the Rome of Papal rule, which passed away, and that if Victor Emmanuel, by which it was replaced -still we have two Romes on the Tiber to-day, the Rome of Religion and that of Mammon, reared by the followers of Victor Emmanuel. The latter is always evident, sparkling in the sunlight and dancing on the surface like froth upon the surface of a windswept lake; the former remains silent, tranquil, undisturbed, like the still, deep waters below, reminding one of the truth of the declaration of an English Protestant journal made a half score of years ago:

"The Pope is alone in the Vatican, without a friend in the governments of the world, without treasure, without an army, without power, without a voice in the senate of nations, a prisoner in his own palace, surrounded by the troops of a hostile king. His visible power is indeed gone. Nevertheless, his invisible power was perhaps never stronger than to-day. . . . With all the forces of the world against him, he has fought well and drawn tighter the bonds of respect, love and obedience which knit the Roman Church into one harmonious whole, its unity never more absolute, its purity never more apparent, its authority never more loyally recognized." . . . Perhaps it is true to say that the bitterest and most unrelenting enemies the Papacy has on earth to-day are in Rome itself. Ever on the alert where the Church is concerned, sworn to pursue her with that patient, quiet rage which seems almost demoniacal, the irreligious societies, secret and open, wage a ceaseless war against everything savoring of Catholicity.

Like a daring general who boldly pushes the war into the enemy's stronghold, so they have commanded their ablest men to come to Rome and battle against "the Vatican." "Give me a hundred able men," said a Masonic leader at a public celebration held by the fraternity some twenty years ago, "and in ten years you will see the Vatican walls falling."

Night and day their emissaries are said to exercise surveillance over the Apostolic Palace, lest the body of the late Pope might be transferred to his chosen resting place on the Lateran Basilica, his own cathedral church. Calumny and a pornographic press, well endowed from home and foreign sources, are the chief weapons employed by those apostles of free thought in their unholy work; and when these fail in their ends, bribery, cunning, intrigue and open violence are resorted to. Freemasonry, which has honeycombed the city and country and is making of itself a State within a State, plots unceasingly for the destruction of the Catholic Church; Socialism has converted tens of thousands of the workingmen into enemies of the true faith, and the Giordano Brunoite will die, as he has promised on legally stamped paper to the blasphemous society to which he belongs, refusing the ministrations of a priest. These are the men who make Rome, only too often turbulent and occasion the head of the Church deep pain and sorrow.

"Thirty Popes," said Cardinal Vaughan, "have been martyred and one-fifth of the whole line has been exiled or imprisoned, but the Popes have always regained their liberty. The life of the Papacy is like that of Christ Himself, checkered by sufferings and peaceful times; to-day hosannas, to-morrow the passion and crucifixion, but these followed by the resurrection. The Vicar of Christ and His Church are necessarily in conflict with the false maxims of the world, and sufferings and persecutions are the inevitable consequences."

But notwithstanding all the trials which Christ's Vicar has to suffer in his own city, he may safely say that there are as many saints living within the Aurelian Walls to-day as at any period in history.

"Avete il vecchio e il nuovo Testamento E il Pastor della Chiesa che vi guida Questa vi basta a vostro Salvamento,"

Said Beatrice in "Il Paradiso." The formula is brief and clear and is one which guides those thousand of holy ones of Rome who so closely imitate the lines of Francesca Romana, Filippo Neri and Vincenzo Pallotti, their fellow-citizens of days gone by; for in no city have I witnessed such scenes of deep, abiding faith and unostentatious piety as in that in which Peter and Paul shed their blood.

One often hears criticisms of a harsh and censorious nature passed by foreigners on shortcomings they have witnessed in Rome and of the violence sometimes shown against the Church by a portion of the city press and by public men. Forgetting that a good general sends his best men into the enemy's stronghold to strike telling blows, such critics should remember that the emissaries of Satan are to be found in Rome in stronger numbers than in any other part of Italy. Italian Masonry has some of its keenest disciples living in Rome; all the atheistical bodies are governed by daring men, and now Methodism has for several years begun its campaign of hate against the Catholic Church and its terrible traffic in human souls. Why, then, should there be any wonder that one must often feel shocked at some of the products of modern Rome! "The worst Christians are found in Jerusalem, the worst Mahommedans in Mecca," is a saying common among the followers of Mahomet. If the Musselman added: "The worst and the best type of men are living in Rome," their adage would be more complete and not wanting in truth, for each day one encounters living saints in the streets as well as walking sons of the Evil One-men who would crucify Jesus Christ again, if it were in their power and who, not satisfied with fastening Him to the Cross with four nails, would. to gratify a fiendish, unreasoning hate for the supernatural, drive a nail through every pore of His body, were such a course possible.

To overthrow the kingdom of Christ on earth, to blot out every memory of His name, to bring back something of the old spirit of paganism which Peter and Paul crushed out in the City of the Cæsars twenty centuries ago, to drive the Pope from Rome and bring up the rising generation without ever hearing from his lips the divine message borne in the Appian Way by the Galilean Fisherman so long ago—these are the aims of wicked men in the interests of which a sleepless vigil is kept.

Qui mange du Pope en meurt! crief a French political leader of the Third Republic during a debate in the Chamber on the Papal possessions. The saying was true in connection with temporal questions; how much more is it so where attempts are made to destroy his spiritual sway, for did not somebody say on a memorable occasion: Tu es Petrus et super hanc petram ædificabo ecclesiam meam, et portæ inferi non prævalebunt contra eam?

JAMES P. CONRY.

Rome, Italy.

## ANCIENT SCOTTISH FAIRS.

HE gatherings for the purpose of merchandise commonly known as fairs (as distinguished from markets, which are more frequent and of less importance) are rapidly decreasing in Great Britain, and will soon have become a relic of past ages; yet once they occupied a very important place in the social life of the people. The multiplication of larger centres of commerce, the facilities afforded by railways and other means of traffic and numerous changes of the kind have combined to render fairs less necessary; in districts where they have survived, pleasure and amusement preponderate over serious business. Yet there is much that is of interest in their history, especially to those who take delight in anything connected, even remotely, with the Church of past ages. That such connection exists in this case will be shown later.

The origin of fairs is of such remote antiquity that it cannot be ascertained with accuracy; we may note that the Prophet Ezechiel refers (chapter 27) to the markets of Tyre. Such gatherings must have come about as soon as the needs of social life increased in any nation. Primitive peoples had few wants, but the time would come when a division of labor would become essential in order to provide adequately for the daily requirements of a nation. Simple home needs—food, clothing, implements of husbandry and other appliances of life—would be carried to fixed centres and there disposed of to those who might wish to acquire them. Later on needs of a more important kind—cattle, horses and farm stock of every species—would have to be provided for and some particular meeting place designated for such sales and purchases. Hence the growth of fairs among civilized nations.

The localities fixed upon for these gatherings would be settled by circumstances; a convenient position near converging lines of roads, an important town, a much frequented ford and the like would suggest the choice. But in order to render them really beneficial to the people concerned it was necessary to safeguard their procedure by legal approbation, since, as is apparent, mere private arrangement could never secure stability of place or freedom from confusion. Consequently we find at an early date in European history the accepted principle that no fair or market could be established in any particular locality without royal license. The oldest charter of the kind known is that of Dagobert, King of the Franks; he had founded the Abbey of St. Denis in the year 638 and granted to the abbot and monks of that monastery an annual fair on the patronal feast, "for the glory of God and honor of St. Denis."

The grant of a fair made in favor of any particular person or community secured to those thus distinguished the sole right to trade; all others who wished to make use of the fair for the purpose of buying or selling were therefore bound to acknowledge the claim of the superior to exact certain dues in return for the privilege afforded them. In some cases all business of the kind was prohibited within a certain specified radiuc of the place where the fair was being held. At Winchester, for example, where William the Conqueror had granted to the Bishop the right of an annual fair on the feast of St. Giles, the Magistrates were accustomed to deliver up the keys of the city to the prelate, who appointed his own officials for the sixteen days of the fair: Winchester and Southampton were forbidden to trade elsewhere than at the fair, and officers of the Bishop were posted along the highway to seize any goods purchased within seven miles of the site of the assembly.

To come more immediately to the subject of Scottish fairs, their chief interest, as already hinted, is their connection with ancient festivals of the Church. The commonly accepted derivation of the word "fair" is from the Latin feria-"holiday," the latter term being, as is evident, but a popularized form of "holy day." A modern survival of ancient usage is seen in the word used in Germany for both Mass and fair—messen; a like instance is the term "kermis," still bearing the same double signification among the country people of Flanders. The history of the middle ages shows clearly that many fairs originated with the observance of solemn festivals. The assembling of the faithful for the offices of the Church was found a convenient occasion for the transaction of business after spiritual duties had been fulfilled. By degrees such informal meetings in the churchyard would develop into more public assemblles in the town itself or before the gate of the monastery to whose church the people had gathered; then in due course would come the application for royal approval, and a legal fair was the result. The other components—vendors of refreshments, trinkets, toys and the like, as well as itinerant actors and musicians would naturally be attracted to the scene by the prospect of gain.

It may be imagined how important a part such fairs must have occupied in the ages of faith. No town of any considerable importance but had its two or three fairs at stated intervals; even smaller villages—some of them now extinct—had such a gathering on the titular feast of the parish church, should the situation of the place render it convenient. In some localities fairs were not

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Apart from the list of Sir David Marwick, to be mentioned later, the chief sources of information regarding these fairs are the following: "New Statistical Account of Scotland" (15 vols.), 1845; Forbes, "Kalendar of Scotlish Saints."



restricted to patronal feasts of the parish church and of the various chapels of the neighborhood; prominent days were chosen for the purpose—often some special Sunday of the ecclesiastical year. Thus Aberdeen obtained a charter in 1273 for a fair lasting for fourteen days from Trinity Sunday, and when some reason occurred in 1310 for a change of day. Low Sunday was chosen. Several other instances of Trinity fairs are to be found; that of Duns, in Berwickshire (granted 1489) lasted for eight days, as did also that held in Edinburgh (1447). There is record of two or three fairs having been held on Palm Sunday, which would not suggest itself at first sight as a very suitable occasion, yet that at Forgue, a small place in Aberdeenshire, lasted for five days. Maunday Thursday was still more popular. James IV., in 1492, granted a charter in favor of the Abbot of Coupar, by the terms of which a Burgh Cross (the sign of a legal market) might be erected before the gate of the monastery and an annual fair held "in Cana Domini." The great fair at Melrose, another Cistercian abbey, "in the time of Popery," as Protestant evidence states, was that on Maunday Thursday, popularly styled "Skeir Thursday." Shrove Tuesday, or "Fastrens Eve," had its fair in some localities. Other prominent festivals were Ascension Day and Pentecost.

But far more numerous were the fairs held on festivals of our Lady. The feasts of her Purification, Annunciation, Assumption, Nativity and Immaculate Conception were celebrated in this fashion in various places in Scotland. The nomenclature of some of these days is worthy of note here. The Purification always appears in such records as Candlemas; other feasts were designated by titles less familiar to us in these days, but evidently in constant use in earlier centuries. The Annunciation is styled "Lady Day in Lentron" and "Our Lady's Day in Lent;" the Assumption often appears as "Fyrst Lady Day," "Lady Day in Autumn," "Marymas" (since it ranks as her chief feast), "St. Mary in Autumn" and the like. Some of the above terms are explained by those attributed to her Nativity; this is called "Latter Lady Day," "Latter Lady Day in Harvest" and "Latter Mary Day." The Immaculate Conception is styled "Lady Day" simply in the three instances which occur; one of these (in 1536)—the fair at Selkirk—lasted for eight days, and is a remarkable instance of the popular observance of what some might regard as a modern feast.

It is certain that more than forty fairs were held in Scotland on different feasts of our Lady, and it is possible that there were many more whose records have disappeared. Many of these lasted for eight days; others for three days. In many cases, though not all, the parish church of the town or district had our Lady for

its titular; in some instances votive chapels of the Blessed Virgin were the scenes of such assemblies. At Banff, as also at Fochabers, in Morayshire, fairs were held on all the five festivals of our Lady enumerated above; it is curious that the charter in favor of the former town was renewed after the Reformation, granting a fair "on all days formerly dedicated to the Virgin Mary" (1592).

Next after our Lady's fairs come those of St. Michael. At least twenty-two were held on his feast in various parts of Scotland. Although many churches bore his name as titular, it may not have been out of devotion, but rather from utility, that Michaelmas suggested itself as a suitable time for a fair. In many places the harvest would be over and in most others far advanced, and this may have had something to do with the choice. The four "term times" in Scotland were Candlemas, Pentecost, Lammas and Martinmas; Michaelmas was never a quarter-day in the northern kingdom as it is still in England, and this fact renders such fairs more striking. Those of Kilmichael in Ayrshire and Kilmichael-Glassary in Argyleshire were due to the dedication of their churches to the Archangel.

St. Peter was next in popularity to St. Michael as patron of fairs. At one time there were as many as twenty held on his feast in various parts of Scotland, and some of them still survive. The festival was known as "Petermas." Haddington Fair lasted for the octave; Fortrose in Ross-shire, Houston in Renfrewshire and Rathven in Banffshire, with possibly some others, claimed St. Peter as titular of their churches. The last-named place, a village of a fishing district, was appropriately placed under his patronage; it is one of the localities in which the annual fair is still held—not on the proper feast day, for Presbyterian Scotland ignores the saints—but on a fixed Friday about that date. "Peter Fair," as it is called, now takes place in a large meadow near the railway station, to which it was removed long ago from the vicinity of the church, where a chantry of the ancient Catholic building is still standing in the churchyard.

The most noteworthy of the fairs held in honor of the Prince of the Apostles, with whom in this instance is associated St. Paul, is that which still takes place annually in the city of Glasgow. Its origin is of great antiquity, for it was granted at the petition of the Bishop earlier than the year 1198. It is held for eight days from the octave day of the festival, a remarkable exception to the usual practice. "Glasgow Fair" is the chief public holiday time in the city, when the working classes are as far as possible released from their ordinary labors and every one is bent upon amusement. "Lammas," or the feast of St. Peter's Chains (August 1), being

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one of the term days, was a convenient time for fairs; there were as many as thirteen of them. Of these, Huntly (1488) and Newburgh in Aberdeenshire, Fettercairn in Kincardineshire, Maybole in Ayrshire and Merton in Berwickshire lasted through the octave; others extended to two and three days respectively.

Among fairs named after other Apostles are those of St. Matthew, St. Bartholomew, St. Jude, SS. Simon and Jude, SS. Philip and James, St. Luke (under the name of "Lukemas"), St. Barnabas, St. Andrew ("Andrewmas") and a goodly number called after St. James. Many of them lasted for eight days.

Midsummer fairs were numerous. That at Ayr, of which St. John Baptist was patron, lasted for fifteen days. Those of Dumbarton and Fraserburgh in Aberdeenshire were extended through the octave. Perth (another city dedicated to the Baptist and popularly known as "John's Town") had not only a midsummer fair, but one on August 29, the Beheading of St. John, called the "Harvest Fair."

"Roodmas" fairs were held in some instances on the May festival—Finding of the Cross; others, called "Rood Fair in Harvest," on the feast of the Exaltation, in September. Martinmas, a term time, was a favorite day for fairs; some of them evidently owed their origin to the business aspect of the day rather than the ecclesiastical. Hallowmas, or All Saints, had also some fairs.

To instance other fair days whose patron saints are familiar to Catholics we may mention those of St. Clement, St. Nicholas, St. Cuthbert, St. Denis, St. Leonard, St. Mauritius, M., St. Patrick, St. Thomas of Canterbury, St. Jerome (whose fair at Banff was of six days' duration), St. Magdalen, St. Helen and St. Margaret; the latter, being a prominent patron of the country—the saintly Queen, whose feast was called "Margaretmas"—is one whose name we might expect to find in such a connection, but scarcely St. Margaret the Virgin Martyr of Antioch, whose fair lasted for eight days at Kirkliston in Linlithgowshire. It is curious that at Kincardine there were two fairs of St. Catherine each year (1540); one in May, known as "St. Catharine in the Summer," was in honor of the Sienese saint; the other, "St. Catharine in the Winter," referred to the Virgin Martyr of Alexandria, and was held on November 25. St. Francis (for eight days, at Mauchline, Aryshire, 1510), St. Anne, St. Antony, St. Apollinaris are also to be found; the latter saint's fair at Inverury in Aberdeenshire was vulgarly known as "Rollnar's" and lasted eight days (1558).

All these saints are fairly familiar to us, but there are numerous others whose very names will strike some readers as utterly strange; these are the ancient saints of the country, whose cultus in many instances has altogether ceased and in others has been restored of late years. The interest attaching to the fairs of such saints is this: they are frequently the only surviving trace of the patrons once so greatly honored; in some few cases the mere name is left and cannot be identified with that of any known saint. It was chiefly on account of the rapidly vanishing memory of many of these fairs and the prospect of the loss in many cases of all trace of the patron of many an ancient church or chapel in Scotland that it seemed to the writer desirable to give in this article a list of all Scottish fairs, arranged according to counties. With the help of a valuable compilation made by Sir David Marwick, Town Clerk of Glasgow,2 of numerous grants made at various times and with the addition of fresh matter collected from other sources. such a list was drawn up and arranged; but as it treated of at least 320 fairs, it was found too lengthy to be printed in its entirety. It must, therefore, suffice if we notice these more obscure saints and the fairs called after them with a little more detail than space allowed us to do in the case of those better known.8 When possible the date of the charter granting or recognizing the respective fairs will be given.

- St. Aloyne.—All that is to be said about this saint is that a fair was held under his name at Clyne in Sutherlandshire.
- St. Angus.—At Edinburgh and at one or two other places a fair was held on the feast of this saint. He is said to have been a disciple of St. Columba and to have preached the faith in Perthshire. Near the parish church of Balquhidder in that county are the ruins of a chapel dedicated to him; a fair called after him "Feil Aenais" ("Angus' Fair") was formerly held here in August, which was the month in which his feast fell. Another fair at Falkland in Fifeshire began on the eve of the festival and lasted for two days after it.
- St. Barchan.—All that is known of this saint is that he was an Irish Bishop who labored in Scotland for some years near Stirling. A fair was formerly held in December and was called by his name at Kilbarchan in Renfrewshire, which was evidently dedicated to him, and another in August at Tain in Ross-shire.
- St. Barr.—This is St. Finbar, Bishop of Cork in the sixth century. Many place names of Scotland evidence a devotion to him. The chief of these is the island of Barra. Two of his dedications were Dornoch in Sutherlandshire and Eddleston in Peebleshire; fairs were held at both places on his feast (September 25) every year.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Those readers who may wish for more details concerning these ancient saints will find them in an article contributed by the writer to the *Dublis Review* (London), Vol. CXXIV. (1899), p. 348 seqq., and in the little "Kalendar of Scottish Saints" (Abbey Press, Fort Augustus, Scotland).



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Appendix by Sir David J. Marwick to Blue Book, "Royal Commission on Market Rights and Tolls," Vol. VII., 1891.

St. Boniface.—This patron of Fortrose in Ross-shire was also called Curitan. He was an Irish Bishop who labored for some time in the north of Scotland to establish the Roman computation of Easter. A fair was held at Fortrose on his feast (March 16). He flourished in the eighth century.

St. Brandan.—He was an Irish abbot, who founded many Scottish churches in the sixth century. Many dedications in Scotland speak of the great devotion in which he was held there. His numerous missionary journeys by sea gained for him the title of "Brandan the Voyager." In one of these journeys he is thought to have touched the American continent. Two fairs were held on his feast day (May 16) at Inverary in Argyleshire (1474) and at Kilbirnie ("Church of Brandan") Ayrshire.

St. Brioc.—This British disciple of St. Germanus had many dedications in Scotland. One of these was Rothesay in Bute, where his fair was held on St. "Brock's" Day. He became a Bishop and founded a church in Brittany at the place now called St. Brieuc. He died about the end of April, A. D. 500.

St. Callen.—An annual fair under this name was held at Roggart in Sutherlandshire as late as 1630. No particulars of the saint are extant. The fair took place on November 28 each year.

St. Caral.—Up to 1847 a fair was held in May under this title at Ruthven in Banffshire, but nothing is known about the saint.

St. Caran.—On December 23 an annual fair, called after this saint, was held at Anstruther in Fifeshire. No particulars are known of the saint, except that he seems to have been honored in the east of Scotland.

St. Carden.—As late as 1630 a fair was held at Loth in Sutherlandshire under this name. No particulars of the saint are extant.

St. Causnan.—This saint is thought to be identical with St. Constantine, a British King, who ended his days in penance in Scotland and is honored as a martyr. There were many dedications to him. Dunnichen in Forfarshire was one, and there his fair was annually held. Pope Leo XIII. restored his feast to the Scottish calendar (March 11) in 1898. He flourished in the sixth century.

St. Columba.—This famous abbot of Iona, one of the chief apostles of Scotland, is better known than many ancient saints of the country. He occupies a foremost rank among the saints of his age and the dedications to him both in Scotland and Ireland are too numerous to mention. At least fifty churches were founded by him in Scotland alone. Fairs were held on his feast (June 9) at Aberdour in Fifeshire (1500) and Dunkeld in Perthshire (1511), each for eight days; others were at Largs in Argyleshire and Fort Augustus in Inverness-shire—the latter ceased within the memory of the writer.

- St. Congan.—This was an Irish prince who settled as a hermit in Argyleshire. Many churches and chapels bore his name in Scotland. Near that at Turriff in Banffshire a fair was formerly held on his feast (October 13) annually (1511). It was known as "Cowan Fair." A hospital for thirteen poor men, served by a collegiate body of clergy, was founded at Turriff in 1272 and called after the saint.
- St. David.—Two fairs are noted under this name; at Ballegarno in Perthshire (June 13) and at Kennoway in Fifeshire (March 2). The latter is evidently in honor of the great Welsh saint whose feast falls on March 2; the other patron is not recognizable, for King David I., popularly styled "Saint" in Scotland, died on May 24.
- St. Devenick.—A fair known as "St. Denick's" was held in November near the church of Methlick in Aberdeenshire, which is dedicated to a Scottish missionary named Devenick, who flourished in the sixth century. Another fair under the same title was at Milton of Glenesk in Forfarshire.
- St. Donan.—At Auchterless in Aberdeenshire and at Kildonan in Sutherlandshire fairs were customary on the feast of this Irish abbot, who was martyred with fifty-two of his monks after the celebration of Mass on Easter Day on the island of Eigg in the Hebrides, April 17, 617. There was much devotion to these martyrs in Scotland. Leo XIII. restored their feast in 1898.
- St. Drostan.—Fairs were held on the feast of this disciple of St. Columba (December 11) at some five localities in Scotland. The chief was that of Old Deer in Aberdeenshire, which lasted formerly for eight days. This fair was still in existence a few years ago. Deer took its name from the tears (deara) shed by Drostan on parting with his beloved master, Columba. There was much devotion to St. Drostan in Scotland, where his dedications were many. He flourished in the sixth century. His feast, formerly kept in December, was fixed for July 11, when restored by Leo XIII.
- St. Fergus.—Fairs were customary at "Fergusmas" (November 18) at Glammis in Forfarshire for five days (1491) and at Wick in Caithness. The saint was of Pictish race and founded many churches in the north of Scotland. He was probably present at a synod in St. Peter's, Rome, during the pontificate of Pope Gregory II. in 721. There was much devotion to him in Catholic ages. His feast was one of those restored by Leo XIII. in 1898.
- St. Fillan.—This abbot of Irish birth helped in the eighth century to evangelize Perthshire, where Strathfillan is named after him. At Killellan (formerly Kilfillan) in Renfrewshire, a fair was held on his feast (February 3.) There were many dedications to him.

<sup>4 &</sup>quot;Book of Deer" (Spalding Club), p. 92.

His festival has been restored to the Scottish calendar. St. Fillan's crozier exists still in the National Museum, Edinburgh.

- St. Fumac.—Botriphnie, in Banffshire, formerly known as "Fumac Kirk." had an annual fair in honor of its patron on May 3. An ancient wooden image of the saint existed until 1847, when it was burned by a fanatical Presbyterian minister. Other fairs were once held at Dunnet in Caithness and Watten, in the same county.
- St. Fyndoc.—At Dunning in Perthshire a fair was held on October 13 annually in honor of this virgin saint. It lasted for eight days (1511). No particulars of her life are extant, but the Breviary of Aberdeen gives her festival on that day.
- St. Gilbert.—At Dornoch in Sutherland a fair was held on April I in honor of the saintly Bishop who built the beautiful cathedral there in the thirteenth century; after his death, in 1245, the church began to be called by his name instead of that of the former titular, St. Barr. The fair lasted for three days.
- St. Inan.—A fair was held up to a few years ago and probably continues on the feast of this patron saint of Beith in Ayrshire (August 30). Many place names recall his memory, but little is known of the saint's history.
- St. Kessog.—An ancient fair at Auchterarder in Perthshire (1200) recalled the feast of this saint, once kept in Scotland (March 10). He was an Irish Bishop and is said to have suffered martyrdom in Dumbartonshire (A. D. 560). There were other fairs in his honor at Comrie and Callander, both in Perthshire, and on the island of Cumbrae. St. Machan.—At Kilmahoug in Perthshire, one of his dedications (in which the saint's name has probably become corrupted), a fair was held in honor of this Scottish Bishop, who flourished about the sixth century.
- St. Magnus.—The great martyr of Kirkwall in Orkney, whose body rests in the fine cathedral there, had a fair at Watten-Wester in Caithness on "Magnusmas" (April 16); St. Magnus was martyred in 1116. His feast is one of those restored by Leo XIII.
- St. Maluag.—This zealous Irish missionary (frequently designated Moluag) converted many to the faith in the western districts of Scotland and founded several churches. St. Bernard in his "Life of St. Malachy" refers to the tradition that St. Moluag (known also as Lua) founded no less than one hundred monasteries. He was greatly honored in Scotland. Fairs were held on June 25, his feast day, at Clatt in Aberdeenshire for eight days (1501), at Tarland in the same county, Milton of Balveny in Banffshire, Ruthven in Forfarshire and Alyth in Perthshire. His feast is now restored to the Scottish calendar.



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Migne, Patrol. Lat., tom. 182, p, 1,082.

- St. Maree.—This is one of the many forms of the name of a saint, properly called Maelrubha, an Irish abbot of the eighth century, who founded numerous churches in Scotland. More than twenty have been identified. More devotion was shown to this saint in the western districts of Scotland than to any other except St. Columba. He had fairs at Pitlessie in Fifeshire (1540) and at Dingwall in Ross-shire on August 27; his feast is now restored to the calendar.
- St. Marnock.—A fair was held at Paisley (1488) for eight days on the feast of this Celtic Bishop of the seventh century. He was a zealous missionary of the faith and his relics were long honored in the church of Aberchirder in Banffshire, which he had founded. A fair, called "Marnock Fair," was held there also (March 1).
- St. Marthom.—On September 20 a fair was annually held under this name at Ordiquhill in Banffshire for eight days. Nothing is known about the saint in question.
- St. Methven.—A fair of great antiquity was formerly held at "Methvenmas" (November 6) at Foulis Wester in Perthshire. The church bore the saint's name, but nothing further is known of him. It is a curious fact that even in Protestant times the feast was kept as a parish holiday.
- St. Mirin.—This was an Irish saint who helped to evangelize Scotland in the sixth century. He was buried at Paisley, where his shrine became a place of pilgrimage. When the Benedictine abbey was founded there in the twelfth century St. Mirin continued to be one of the titulars. A fair of eight days was held there annually (1488) on his feast (September 15). He had many Scottish dedications.
- St. Mittan.—A fair was held under this name on January 31 at Kilmadock in Perthshire. Nothing is known of the saint.
- St. Monoch.—From an old will of the sixteenth century it appears that the church of Stevenson in Ayrshire was dedicated to this saint. A fair called "Sam Maneuke's" and "St. Monk's" was formerly held there on October 30 each year. Up to 1845 a public procession was made on that day; it was evidently the surviving relic of a Catholic celebration of the patronal feast.
- St. Mund.—On April 15 the fair of this saint, an Irish abbot of the seventh century was celebrated at the church of Kilmun in Argyleshire for eight days (1490). Besides this church, he founded a monastery in the neighborhood, famous in its time. He returned to Ireland in later years.
- St. Mungo.—This was the famous St. Kentigern, founder and first Bishop of the church of Glasgow. His dedications were very numerous. At Alloa in Clackmannan an annual fair was held on

his feast under his more popular designation of Mungo ("Beloved"). The saint's feast, falling on the octave day of the Epiphany, but kept on the following day, had long been celebrated by the Benedictines and Passionists in Scotland when Leo XIII. restored it to the calendar.

St. Murie.—In 1630 a fair under this name was held annually at Lairg in Sutherlandshire, though on what day is not known.

St. Nathalan.—This was a holy Bishop of Scottish nationality, who labored much for the faith in Deeside, where he built many churches at his own cost. At Old Meldrum, one of these places, a fair was formerly held on or near his feast (January 8). Another took place at Cowie, Kincardineshire (1540), which was also one of his foundations.

St. Ninian.—He was one of the earliest apostles of the south of Scotland, a Briton by birth, consecrated in Rome in the early part of the fifth century and sent by Pope St. Siricius to preach to his countrymen. Whithern, his chief foundation and a home of sanctity and learning, became the seat of a bishopric, and his shrine in the cathedral was one of the famous pilgrimages of Scotland. A fair was held at Whithern on the vigil of his feast (September 15) and for three days after it. Another was held at Arbroath (1459).

St. Palladius.—This saint was a Roman deacon who was consecrated Bishop by Pope St. Celestine I. and sent to Ireland. He died, according to Scottish tradition, in the east of Scotland, where his relics were venerated at Fordun in Kincardineshire up to the Reformation. A fair of eight days ("Paldy Fair") was held there (1554) on his feast (July 7) and another for eight days at Glenfarquhar in Kincardineshire is recorded as "most ancient" in origin. Leo XIII., who restorted his feast, referred to the connection of this saint with Scotland in his Brief establishing the present Scottish hierarchy.

St. Regulus.—This saint, often designated St. Rule, was long believed to have brought the relics of St. Andrew from Patras to Scotland, but that can no longer be maintained in the light of modern research. He was probably an Irish monk, who lived near St. Andrews, where a cave is called by his name on the coast, which is said to have been his frequent retreat. The first cathedral there was dedicated to him, as also some other Scottish churches. At Kennethmont in Aberdeenshine "Trewel Fair" was held from ancient times in October, when his feast was formerly kept.

St. Serf.—This Bishop of the sixth century is often called Servanus. He died in extreme old age at Culross in Perthshire,

where a fair was annually held on his feast for many centuries. A custom prevailed there of walking through the streets in procession on that day (July I); it was of ancient origin and lasted until the accession of Queen Victoria, although the day had been changed a century earlier. It seems reasonable to suppose that this was a relic of the honor shown to the titular of the town. Other fairs were held at Abercorn in Linlithgowshire and St. Sair's (or Serf's) in Aberdeenshire. The saint baptized and educated St. Kentigern (or Mungo), patron of Glasgow.

St. Talarican.—A fair of eight days (1499) was formerly held at Fordyce in Banffshire in honor of this saint, who was a Bishop of Scottish race and flourished in the seventh century. Many dedications to him are to be found in Scotland, of which Fordyce was one. His name appears in many localities in place names; Kiltarlity, a large district of Inverness-shire, is one of the most prominent. His feast (October 30) was restored by Leo XIII.

St. Ternan.—This Scottish Bishop has given the name to Banchory-Ternan in Aberdeenshire, where he was buried and where his head was venerated as a precious relic more than a thousand years later. A fair was held there on his feast until quite recent times, and probably continues still. He flourished about the fifth century, and his festival was formerly kept on June 12.

St. Triduana.—Though much that is legendary has become mixed up with the history of this virgin saint, there is sufficient evidence to prove that she was held in great devotion in Scotland. She lived for a time as a solitary at Rescobie in Forfarshire, and there a fair was wont to be held on her feast (October 8) until it was transferred to Forfar about a century ago. It was known as "St. Trodlin's;" for her name has passed through many curious changes. In the many dedications which testify to her extreme popularity in different districts, it appears as Traddles, Tredwell, Trallen and under other forms. It is worthy of note that the saint's holy well, famous for curing diseases of the eye, has been discovered at Restalrig, near Edinburgh, within the last few years and the building over it carefully restored.

St. Vigean.—Up to the eighteenth century a fair was held yearly at Arbroath in honor of the Irish abbot Fechin, who is said to have lived for some time as a hermit in that neighborhood and was known in Scotland as Vigean. He flourished in the seventh century and was honored on January 20.

St. Wynnin.—This patron of the Abbey of Kilwinning in Ayrshire has been identified by modern scholars as St. Finian, or Frigidian, an Irish abbot and master of St. Columba. In later years he became Bishop of Lucca, where his remains are still venerated

in the Church of St. Frigidian. At Kilwinning a fair was held on his feast, known as "Winning's Day."

St. Yrchard.—This Scottish Bishop is often known as Merchard (the prefix mo, in Gaelic, expressing affectionate reverence, being added); he was honored in many parts of the country as well as in his native place, Kincardine-O'Neil in Aberdeenshire, which he converted from paganism about the fifth century. His fair of eight days was formerly held there (1511). The ancient bell of this saint, to which interesting legends attached, was preserved in the churchyard of one of his foundations, Glenmoriston in Invernessshire, until it was wantonly removed by Protestant strangers, to the great indignation of the whole neighborhood, less than fifty years ago. There remain still one or two interesting fairs to be noticed which could not be classified with the above. A few words must suffice for each.

At Barr in Ayrshire a fair was customary previous to the year 1845, under the title of "Kirk Dandy." The meaning of the name cannot now be explained, but it has been suggested that "Kirk Domini" may have been the original form. St. Barr, or Finbar, was the titular of the place.

A curious fair was once held at Kennethmont in Aberdeenshire. It was known as "Christ's Fair," and was held in May on the green near Christ Church. It is supposed to be referred to in a balled entitled "Christ's Kirk on the Green," ascribed to King James I. of Scotland (1406-37). The fair became popularly known as the "Sleepy Market," because it was held from sunset to sunrise next morning. About 1794 it was changed to the daytime, but the people were displeased at the innovation and it soon fell into disuse. It had disappeared before 1845.

At St. Andrews a fair was once called "Senzie Market;" it commenced on Monday after Low Sunday. Martine, the historian of St. Andrews, thus speaks of it: "The renowned faire of St. Andrews, called the 'Senzie Mercat,' held and kept for fifteen days, and beginning the second wek after Easter, whereunto resorted merchants from most of the then trading kingdomes in Europe; trade in this kingdom being then in its infancie." The charter of 1581 ratifying this fair speaks of it as held "from time immemorial." There is a tradition that two or three hundred vessels might have been seen, laden with foreign merchandise for the fair, in the bay near the city.

Sir Walter Scott in "The Pirate" gives a graphic picture of a fair such as any of the above might have appeared to a visitor in his description of St. Olla's, or St. Olaf's, Fair, in the Orkney Islands.

Marwick's Appendix to Blue Book.

It originally lasted for fourteen days, and, as he shows, was the great holiday of the year. To his pages we may refer the reader interested in such particulars. St. Olaf, it may be remarked, was a Norwegian king and martyr, who strove to spread Christianity in the Orkneys, which formery belonged to Norway.

We have given but a meagre account of some of the above saintly patrons of Scottish fairs, not because there was a dearth of information in regard to all, but rather from a fear of proving tedious to the reader. It would have been possible to add far more particulars about the lives of many of them.

It is cause for thankfulness that some at least of those who labored and prayed centuries ago for the spiritual enlightenment and best interests of Scotland are beginning to emerge from the obscurity into which the proud contempt of heretical teachers had condemned them, and that not a few have been restored to their former position as recognized saints of the Church Catholic.

We may well hope that the Masses and offices now celebrated on their respective festivals will move those holy ones to more ardent supplication for the land they still love and have never ceased (we may be sure) to intercede for before the throne of God. Their constant prayers cannot fail to bring down upon Scotland fresh supplies of grace which will result—we humbly pray—in the return of many souls to the unity of the Catholic faith.

MICHAEL BARRETT, O. S. B.

Buckie, Scotland.

## MR. CHESTERTON ON THE IRISH.

In his essay on Pope, should from time to time be reviewed anew. A piece of literature that merits the appellation of classic has a deep foundation in human interest; and whatever may have been the passing conditions under which it was produced, as for instance the society and the language of its time, it has abiding qualities that give it the power of appeal to humanity centuries later, and indeed forever. And with quite the same reason we may say that every great race of men, especially if it is a race that plays a leading role in the world's drama, should be from time to time analyzed anew. For that one touch of nature which makes the whole world kin, being multiplied in the race, exists therein as a wide and deep grasp that takes hold of the attentive consideration of all men, though they live at opposite poles, geographically

and sociologically. It is not so much the one great bond, universal and identical in all men, that makes them interesting to the student of ethnology or to the general reader of history: rather is it the varied differences that the races exhibit in actual life, the lights and shadows made manifest not so much by behavior as by conduct—that special physiognomy, as Joseph de Maistre might say, which is evident in the whole history of a nation and which we call character. Interest will always accompany any investigation into the causes of this diversity in national character, into the ideals that actuated it and the works that it accomplished.

So ponderous a task, however, is not the purpose of the present paper; neither do we propose to hold a court of inquiry into the ideals and the achievements of one great world-race, the Irish, namely, a race that is universally conceded to be interesting to a very high degree. Our present consideration has to do with some statements that have been made about the Irish, a topic that affords a rich supply of thought to writers in various languages. a student in the realm of national character, believing himself to be possessed of the rare philosophical ability to analyze, has endeavored to discover the leading traits of the Irish race, to put his finger on the predominant passion of the truly typical Irishman and to state, oftentimes dogmatically, the motive that universally prevails in swaying the Irishman's temperament and in regulating his ideals. And as there are Irishmen who are poles apart in conduct and temperament, some few in the dark abvsses of despicable meanness and others, in countless multitudes, upon the heights of personal grandeur, so the results of these attempted analyses, being the outcome of incomplete observations, are themselves marked with antipodism. Ob uno disce omnes is not a sure advice for the student of the Irish. The Irish character is not anarthropodus; to look at one of its temperamental segments is not to know it thoroughly. And such partial observations have, as a rule, been made, with the result that they are so widely variant.

What these numerous and different deductions are we do not propose to discuss here, nor even to enumerate them. We shall, however, make rather frequent mention of one, namely, of Matthew Arnold's analysis of Irish character, for the reason that by so doing we may the better appreciate some recent utterances on the Irish race by Mr. Gilbert K. Chesterton. For it is Chesterton's tribute to that race that chiefly concerns our present consideration.

Many reasons prompt us to take out Chesterton's testimony on the Irish from his books and repeat it here. First, though the books in which these passages occur are scattered broadcast, yet the very fascination which covers every page of Chesterton's work may cause some special remark to be overlooked or at least slightly noticed, a remark, be it noted, that may have a high critical value, though to the average reader it may appear a mere obiter dictum. Chesterton's pen flows so freely that his gift of seeming facile writing may lead to the defect, on the part of the reader, of a too facile perusal, one that is hasty, and therefore superficial.

Yet this is not the principal reason for reiterating beyond the pages of his books his assertions about the Irish. If it were, the reader might tell us that he intends to review the entire text even to a tenth time—for of Chesterton, the old sentence out of Horace will be verified: decies repetito placebit; ten times repeated his work may be, to the average man, a pleasure and a gain. What urges most cogently this segregation of his Irish encomia is that they contain the sincere testimony of one who is rated at present among the very first of capable critics, who is one of the three men most talked of in the street and by many called a prophet of his times. How deserving he is of these academic and popular estimates we need not vote either way; it is sufficient to note the fact and let it weigh with what he has to say.

Again, let us observe that he is an Englishman, a person, therefore, who at the start may have glanced at his Irish neighbors through the national monocle, or when that bit of glass is not used, through spectacles colored by the animadversions of "travelers" from Edmund Spenser to Thackeray. An Englishman, especially if he be a non-Catholic, can never look rightly at the heart of Irish life. He will belong always to that minority which is known as "The Garrison," and whatever advantages he may obtain from this

<sup>1</sup> Newman's words about the English Catholic visitor deserve note: "An English visitor to Ireland, if he happens to be a Catholic, . . . has turned his eyes to a country bound to him by the ties of a common faith; and, when he lands at Cork or Kingstown, he breathes more freely from the thought that he has left a Protestant people behind him and is among his co-religionists. He has but this one imagination before his mind, that he is in the midst of those who will not despise him for his faith's sake, who name the sacred names, and utter the same prayers, and use the same devotions as he does himself; whose churches are the houses of his God, and whose numerous clergy are the physicians of the soul. He penetrates into the heart of the country, and he recognizes an innocence in the young face and a piety and patience in the aged voice which strikingly and sadly contrast with the habits of his own rural population. . . . He finds the population as munificent as it is pious, and doing greater works for God out of their poverty than the rich and noble elsewhere accomplish in their abundance. . . . And he finds himself received with that warmth of hospitality which ever has been Ireland's boast, and, as far as he is personally concerned, his blood is forgotten in his baptism. How shall he not, under such circumstances, exult in his new friends and feel words deficient to express both his deep reverence for their virtues and his strong sympathies in their trials?" (Hist. Sketches, Vol. III.)

accoutred environment, he will be, like so-called Irishmen of the "Castle party," a stranger in a strange land; in Chesterton's phraseology,2 "their curse is that they can only tread the flagstones of the courtyard or the cold rock of the ramparts; they have never so much as set foot upon their native soil." And where they venture out upon the high roads it was only to see, as Thackeray did,3 the Hibernian looming large with grotesqueness and laughable idiosyncrasies. Even some Irish pens, for example, Lever's and Carleton's, devoted their energies too frequently to the elaboration of caricatures of their countrymen. The work was able to butter both sides of their bread, being marketable among the English journals; but it kept off from the British readers a sympathetic understanding of the Irish. In the words of Chesterton: "The Irishman of the English farce, with his brogue, his buoyancy and his tenderhearted irresponsibility, is a man who ought to have been thoroughly pampered with praise and sympathy, if he had only existed to receive them. But, unfortunately, all the time that we were creating a comic Irishman in fiction we were creating a tragic Irishman in fact."

Defective appreciation of the Irish character or its positive misappreciation did not, however, proceed only from adverse British or mercenary Irish pens. Estimates of Irish genius and talent have been made by men who posed as sympathetic and understanding analysts, who after a time came to be regarded with a great deal of seriousness, as something more than mere harmless doctrinaires. Of these the most noteworthy is, perhaps, Matthew Arnold, and here is he all the more noteworthy because Chesterton takes the opposite side of the debate. Arnold, we all know, kept a close ear to his own thoughts, and before uttering them he exercised his own keen censorship on them, smoothing their ultimate expression with much labor of the file. And therefore, when he wrote on "Celtic Literature"—though he called himself on that subject, as compared with the great Eugene O'Curry, "an unlearned, belletristic trifler"—he produced an essay that even to this day remains praiseworthy.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> It will be sufficient to state that these citations from Chesterton are found in his "Orthodoxy" (p. 274) and in his "George Bernard Shaw" (passim). Similar sayings occur here and there in his other books.

<sup>\*</sup>Thackeray, at the conclusion of his "Irish Sketch Book," very wisely says: "As for forming 'an opinion of Ireland,' such as is occasionally asked from a traveler on his return, that is as difficult an opinion to form as to express, and the puzzle which has perplexed the gravest and wisest may be confessed by a humble writer of light literature." But Thackeray had expressed his opinion in the preceding pages, not in a formal way, but by means of innuendo. He saw, as a general rule, only the caricatures that he wanted to behold; he leaves them on his pages.

To speak more knowingly of Celtic literature, Arnold endeavored to get down to the foundations of Celtic character, to dig for its first springs, as it were, and so became capable of pronouncing judgment on the fnudamental causes of Celtic life and literature. His verdict had much plausibility to recommend it, and indeed it has been quite largely accepted as an indisputable, oracular pronouncement on the Irish race. We say Irish, for though Arnold used the word Celtic broadly and included the Welsh, he meant the word, as most of the world still does, to stand for Irish. His analysis is defective because it takes into account only a partial constituent of Celtic, that is in our case, Irish genius; and as such it might be allowed to pass and be thankfully received—a half loaf being better than none-but for the supreme satisfaction with which it is accepted as the final word, the ultimate summarization of the influences at work in the rational animal of Ireland.4 It will not, therefore, be irrevelant to pay more than a passing glance at Arnold's analysis, at the conclusions he reached when he struck on sentiment and sentimentality as the keynote to Irish character, the cause of its limited success and of its multiplied failures in many spheres of activity. As a prelude to our examination of Arnold's verdict we may find two helpful sentences from Chesterton: "The English people certainly have somehow got an impression and a tradition that the Irishman is genial, unreasonable and sentimental," and "The conventional Englishman is never so silly or sentimental as when he sees silliness and sentiment in the Irishman." Nobody wishes to gainsay the fact that there is sentiment in the Irish nature; it is there and powerfully, too. But as George Bernard Shaw remarks, the Irishman has two eyes. "He meant," says Chesterton, "that with one eye an Irishman saw that a dream was inspiring, bewitching or sublime, and with the other that after all it was a dream. Both the humor and the sentiment of an Englishman cause him to wink the other eye."

The inadequacy of Arnold's estimate most probably came from his taking the attitude of a theorist. He had some a priori notions of his subject and a few facts that coincided with his theories. He may have thought that by concentrating his literary talents and his small studies in ethnology he could prepare for his vision a telescopic power that should enable him to see far into the Irish make-up and its unique complexion. He should have realized that a telescope shows, however brilliantly, only a limited "field," and that there is more to be seen of the wide sky of truth by a pair

<sup>4</sup> An American Catholic editor, for instance, in rejecting a paper that contained a partial analysis of the Irish genius, said: "After all, Matthew Arnold has given the final word upon that subject."

of healthy eyes out on a free hilltop—a condition under which Mr. Chesterton seems to have made his observations. And that is the most fitting place for the analyst of Irish character, which is, of all things in the world, one of the most difficult to be focused and brought for final notice before the narrow lens of a student under the hooded dome of his pit.

The telescope seems to have been adjusted for Arnold's eyes by hands that were lacking the fullness of skill. M. Renan, looking mainly at the Bretons and Welsh, kept telling, in a sentimental fashion, about the timidity and the shyness of the Celtic nature, about its preference for a retired life and its embarrassment at having to deal with the great outer world, à l'extérieur gauche et embarrassée. This, as Matthew Arnold sees, does not ring true with regard to the "typical Irishman of Donnybrook fair." Yet it is this testimony that counts high with him when he calls sentiment the backbone of Irish life. Then he allows the hand of M. Henri Martin, "whose chapters on the Celts, in his 'Histoire de France,' are full of information and interest," to regulate the lens, accepting as a guiding formula from him: "The Celt is always ready to react against the despotism of fact." And last, though this is an inscription at the very forefront of his essay, Arnold keeps humming a refrain from Ossian, the accepted epitaph, as it were, over the graves of the Celts: "They went forth to war, but they always fell."

With such twists and turns of the telescope, yet with a thoroughly sincere desire to get the proper focus, Arnold made his observations and pronounced his verdict. It was preceded by plausible formulas, one containing an analysis of the English spirit, which he called energy with honesty and the other giving the equivalent for Germanic genius, which was steadiness with honesty. Approved for his English and German equations, he feels worthy to pronounce on the Irish. The root of Celtic nature, he says, is sentiment; that is, its vital force, the fountainhead of Celtic temperament, the motive power in its activities. And this judgment, we repeat, was made in good faith and for a laudable purpose, for the very purpose of winning England's good will and interest towards the wealthy storehouse of Celtic literature, of gaining for so worthy a cause a hearing that would count; for Arnold may have been willing to confess, in these words of Chesterton, that "Englishmen will speak to Ireland; they will speak for Ireland; but they will not hear Ireland speak." And the final sentence of his ambitious essay is this earnest prayer: "Let us reunite ourselves with our better mind and with the world through science; and let it be one of our angelic revenges on the Philistines, who among their other sins are the guilty authors of Fernianism, to found at Oxford a chair of Celtic, and to send,

through the gentle administration of science, a message of peace to Ireland."

From this last sentence we may repeat what we have already asserted-that Arnold, in his resolution of the elements of Celtic character, had his eye fixed mainly on the Irish. In the field of Celtic studies, for instance, the man that loomed largest before his admiring gaze was the Irish scholar, Eugene O'Curry, in Arnold's eulogistic phrase, "the obscure Scaliger of a despised literature." And again, the full flower of Celtic sentiment grew best in Ireland. For the sentimental Celtic nature, so he professes, is an organization quick to feel impressions, and feeling them very strongly; a lively personality, keenly sensitive to joy and sorrow; rebellious against fact; its essence is to aspire ardently after life, light and emotion, to be expansive, adventurous and gay. And what is the full flower of this soil and of these seeds? Sensuousness! "The Celt is sensual, or at least sensuous; loves bright colors, company and pleasure." And the Celt is here, too, the Irishman. For "the sensuousness of the Greeks made Sybaris and Corinth, the sensuousness of the Latin made Rome and Baiae, the sensuousness of the Latinized Frenchman makes Paris, the sensuousness of the Celt proper has made Ireland."

Yet Arnold did not neglect to say that out of such a root as sentiment could and did spring much that was of high importance to life and literature. To constitute an ideal genius, he is prompt to say, a great deal of the Celtic nature must enter in; Celtic sensibility is perhaps the most positive element of genius; in English poetry much of the turn for style, much of the melancholy and nearly all the natural magic comes from a Celtic source; and, finally, some investigators have found in the Celtic nature and its sensibility, or in M. Renan's phrase, *l'infinie delicatesse*, the main root of chivalry, of romance and of the glorification of the feminine ideal.

All this makes for high praise; but out of it there are issues that make for a greater degree of dispraise. For the Celtic race, especially on Irish soil, is sadly lacking in material prosperousness. And the radical cause of this deficiency, according to Matthew Arnold, is that selfsame sentiment, "with love of beauty, charm and spirituality for its excellence; ineffectualness and self-will for its defect." This explains the Celt's ineffectualness in material civilization and in politics; it has made him "dwindle and dwindle as history goes on, and at last shrink to what we now see him. For ages and ages the world has been constantly slipping, ever more and more, out of the Celt's grasp." And consequently Arnold finds it fitting to sing again the refrain from Ossian: "They went forth to war, but they always fell."

How totally different is the truer judgment<sup>5</sup> of a later English observer! We have traveled a wide circuit to come to it, but in going over the aberrant pathway tracked out by Matthew Arnold we have noted the sign-posts that he constructed, the guiding marks that for most English people point the way to the grave of the Celtic race. Mr. Chesterton, who pronounces anew on that race, in its Irish branch, seems to have cast aside the a priori method and to have looked at actual results, standing out upon a clear hilltop, looking at plain, indisputable facts, neither trimming his vision to an inch-wide telescope nor enlarging the near-at-hand objects under a magnifying glass. He transmits the question of radical causes and regards with unblinking eyes the accumulated testimony of actual effects, though he knows full well that there must be some cause other than a dawdling sentimentality in the Irish nature capable of making it so stupendously efficient in the practical realms of politics and material civilization. In this clarionlike pronouncement Chesterton takes the final fall out of the protagonists of Irish sentimentality: "It is constantly said of the Irish that they are impractical. But if we refrain for a moment from looking at what is said about them and look at what is done about them we shall see that the Irish are not only practical, but quite plainly successful. The poverty of their country, the minority of their members are simply the conditions under which they were asked to work; but no other group in the British Empire has done so much with such conditions. The Nationalists were the only minority that ever succeeded in twisting the whole British Parliament sharply out of its path. The Irish peasants are the only poor men in these islands who have forced their masters to disgorge. These people, whom we call priest-ridden, are the only Britons who

It is not necessary to bring to bear on this point the encyclopaedial information that is within easy range of any student. The history of all English-speaking nations is written large with the achievements of the Celtic race, for the most part Irish to the very core. But a few lines from the first chapter of "The Irish Race," by Rev. A. J. Thebaud, S. J., is pert!nent to the statement from Matthew Arnold: "If the celebrated writer meant to say that this defect of character always accompanied the Celts in whatever they attempted, and that thus they were constantly foiled and never successful in anything, or, still worse, that, owing to want of perseverance and of energy, they too soon relaxed in their efforts, and that every enterprise and determination on their part became 'ineffectual,' we so far disagree with him that the main object of the following pages will be to contradict these positions and to show by the history of the race, in Ireland at least, that, owing precisely to their 'self-will,' they were never 'ultimately unsuccessful' in their aspirations, but that, on the contrary, they have always in the end 'effected' what, with their accustomed perseverance and self-will, they have at all times stood for. At least this, we hope, will become evident whenever they had a great object in view, and with respect to things to which they attached a real and paramount importance."



will not be squire-ridden. And when I came to look at the actual Irish character the case was the same. Irishmen are best at the specially hard professions—the trades of iron, the lawyer and the soldier. The average skeptic wanted to know how I explained . . . the political impracticability of the Celtic Christians. But I wanted to ask, and to ask with an earnestness amounting to urgency, 'What is this incomparable energy . . . which can inflame a bankrupt peasantry with so fixed a faith in justice that they get what they ask, while others go empty away; so that the most helpless island of the Empire can actually help itself?'"

This, then, is Chesterton's commentary on a portion of Irish achievement; and it is one that he reiterates in a totally different context, as if to stop the traditional rant about sentimentalism. On the occasion of his repeating it ("George Bernard Shaw," page 22. page 25.) he ventures to trace this effective energy of the Irishman to one of its causes: "One generalization, I think, may at least be made. Ireland has in it a quality which caused it (in the most ascetic age of Christianity) to be called the Land of Saints; and which still might give it a claim to be called the Land of Virgins. . . . But it is not this purity which I should chiefly count among the legacies of old Irish morality. A much more important gift is that which all the saints declared to be the reward of chastity: a queer clearness of intellect, like the hard clearness of crystal. . . . This is probably why Irishmen succeed so much in such professions as require a crystalline realism, especially about results. Such professions are the soldier and the lawyer. . . . If you have lost a battle you cannot believe you have won it; if your client is hanged you cannot pretend that you have got him off."

This single generalization, however, is in a striking contrast to that made by Matthew Arnold when he dug up sentimentality for the root of Irish character and painted for its flower sensuousness; "the sensuousness of the Celt proper has made Ireland." On such a flower Chesterton has breathed a killing frost.

And finally, it is well to note that Chesterton has not by any means either exhausted his subject or his observations on the Irish race. He has spoken out his mind only about one fact in Irish achievement, namely, on the energy and the efficiency of that race in practical affairs: and only "single observation" has he ventured to make on the cause of this racial power. The nation's love of purity he found to be one of the precious legacies of old Irish morality; and perhaps at some future day, in his own good time, Chesterton may find a pleasure in making other "generalizations" concerning causes that have their rise in that same source, a source that is, under God, the sure guarantee to Ireland of a greater destiny

and a more sublime vocation than success in mere worldly enterprises. To the trite plaint<sup>6</sup> of English visitors to Ireland: "Your people never for the future plan; they live but for the moment," Chesterton can answer in these words of Aubrey de Vere:

Our peasant, too, has prescience; far he sees; Earth is his foreground only, rough or smooth; In him from seriousness the lightness comes: Too serious is he to make sacrifice For fleeting good; the battles of this world He with the left hand fights and half in sport; He has his moment—and eternity.

And again, of that vocation which has, according to the testimony of worthy witnesses, been guaranteed to Ireland, Chesterton may some day contemplate with pleasure and speak of it in his own vigorous and brilliant way. Like another Englishman, Father Faber, of the Oratory, he may delight in speaking forth these words of Ireland's destiny: "It is not a splendid political or a prosperous commercial career. It is a holier greatness, a more exalted destiny that forbids a lower one. Ireland's vocation is, as it has ever been, an apolistic one. . . . As at the time of her only real greatness—her missionary greatness—the heathen are her inheritance: let her remember that first, and then all that she needs besides will be added unto her."

For the present Chesterton is content to give the lie to traditional assertions about Irish sentimentality and ineffectualness. To Englishmen, and indeed to the world of English letters in every land, Matthew Arnold had sung his chosen line from Ossian: "They went forth to war, but they always fell." Over against that sentence may we set a truer one, not as an epitaph, but as a line of living praise: Hac est victoria nostra, fides vestra. For it is easy for the Catholic mind to think of Ireland as an image of the Church herself -"for three early centuries the great missionary of the faith: for three late ones its martyr; ever in tribulation, but never consumed; at one time exalted as a nation, at another deposed from nationhood, but to become more powerful as a race, and effecting more in its captivities and dispersions than it could have done if oppression and the poverty bequeathed by oppression had never driven it to the margin of waters broader and more lonely than those of Euphrates or Choaspes."

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<sup>•</sup> Aubrey de Vere, "The Staters."

<sup>7</sup> Father Faber in a sermon preached in Limerick,

THE STATE OF THE CATHOLIC RELIGION IN THE HEBRIDES IN 1671.

PY THE kindness of Dr. Maitland Thomson, of the Register Office. Edinburgh the two fellows the state of the Catholic Church in the Hebrides are available for publication, and have been translated, the first from the Latin, the second from the Italian, in which the originals are written. Dealing as they do with a period and a district upon which so far very little has been written, these two letters to Propaganda cannot fail to be of interest. Certainly the two recent volumes of Father Forbes Leith afford a great deal of most interesting information regarding the mainland of Scotland. But, as he states in the preface, in the earlier periods with which he deals the names of persons and of places are rarely given. This deficiency we are enabled to make one step towards supplying—so far, at least, as the islands are concerned—by means of the following papers. They form part of the transcripts made by the late Mr. Bliss, whose work in Rome will prove to be of the greatest value. At present the transcripts made by him relative to the reign of Queen Elizabeth are being prepared for publication in the Rolls series, but many years must elapse-twenty probably and more-before the documents relating to the period covered by the following papers are reached:

Of the secular clergy there were in 1671 seven or eight on the Scotch mission, two of whom are mentioned by name in these letters. Concerning Father White, the venerable Bishop Geddes wrote: "White, an Irish Lazarian, was brought from Spain, together with Mr. Dermit Gray, by the Lord McDonald to the Highlands this year (1654). He converted many to the faith and confirmed others in it. He disappeared in 1657; appeared again in 1662; disappeared a second time in 1664; again appeared in 1668 and continued in the Highland mission till he died, on 28th January, 1679. He was held in great veneration in the Highlands, and his picture was kept in a room of the Castle of Glengarry, called Mr. White's room, until that castle was burned."

The Castle of Glengarry, the ruins of which are still so striking a feature on the shores of Loch Oich, was also the scene of the death—martyrdom it might well be called—of the Father Munro, who is mentioned as coming to the mission in the year the report was drawn up. This remarkable priest was three times imprisoned and sentenced to death, if he again returned from his banishment, but on each occasion he at once returned to his field of labor. In 1704, whilst lying prostrate with fever in a miserable hut in Glen-

garry, he was discovered by some English soldiers, who carried him off to the castle, where he was thrown into the dungeon, and where, after receiving the vilest treatment, he was allowed to perish. This brave priest, not including the years spent in prison or in banishment, labored for thirty years among the Highland Catholic districts.

Mr. Lesley, mentioned by name in the first letter, was the procurator of the mission so often cited in the second. He, too, was a veteran in the service of the Church, although, unlike the two previous, he never was on the mission in Scotland, but did excellent work as the procurator in Rome during no less a period than fifty-eight years. It is easy to trace his want of practical knowledge of parts of the country in the reflections which he makes on the report of the worthy Franciscan, reflections, indeed, which are not as correct as the report itself.

The prefect of the mission at this time was Mr. Alexander Winster or Dunbar, who excelled his colleagues, even of that period, in pluck and resourcefulness. "He alone," says the Abbe Macpherson, "did not fear writing the news of the mission, and even the political transactions of the country, to Paris and elsewhere. He wrapt up everything of that kind which he wrote in such ambiguous and obscure terms that none but those he intended could discover his meaning. Hence he was quite indifferent, though his letters were intercepted. His conduct as a missionary was excellent, and he had the love and esteem of all who knew him." For thirty-two years he was prefect of the mission, until the appointment of Bishop Nicholson, and after that he labored twelve years more. He died in 1708, in the eighty-third year of his age and the fifty-ninth of his priesthood. For many years he was assisted by Mr. David Burnett as vice prefect, who evidently did not long content himself with the quieter duties of professor, even if he ever undertook them at all, a point on which the writer of the report is uncertain.

Of schools one had been opened in the island of Barra, whilst in 1712 another was commenced on the island in Loch Morar. This had to be abandoned in 1715, but was started afresh on the same site by Bishop Hugh Macdonald. Though the situation was changed three times within a century, it continued to supply many useful missionaries up to the date of its union with Blairs College in 1829. Thenceforward the Heather priests, who satisfied even the requirements of the fastidious islesmen as to pure Celtic qualifications by never going out of the country for any part of their education, became more and more scarce, until they died out altogether many years ago.

The jealousy of the Privy Council of Scotland as regards Irish

influence is better understood when one remembers that only twenty-five years before Montrose had, time after time, defeated the forces of the Covenant—and of the Government—by the aid of his Irish veterans, sent to him by the Marquis of Antrim, of whom mention is made in the following letters.

Probably it was also due to the Marquis' influence that application was made to the Primate of Ireland for information regarding the isles; he had certainly sent priests to the spiritual assistance of his kinsmen, as was stated just now in the case of Mr. White. The letters themselves, however, show that the Archbishop of Armagh had no permanent jurisdiction in this quarter and that politically it was inadvisable that he should have any.

The customs described as existing in the isles have varied little since the report was written. Meal and water-fuarag-is still a common drink, and it is said to have much of the nourishment. as indeed it has much of the appearance, of fresh milk. In one point there has been no change at all, namely, in the difficulty of passing from island to island, and the dangers incurred in doing so. When the present writer was in temporary charge of one of the parishes of South Uist, he was invited to bring some of his people to the blessing of the memorial erected by public subscription over the grave of the late Father Allan Macdonald, the apostle of the island of Criskay and the best Gaelic scholar of his day. The morning was so stormy that it was after the appointed hour before the party reached the shore, and they experienced great difficulty in getting a boat to take them across. Once launched, however, the boat went gaily enough. The piper who was of the party started his lament, the strains of which were only heard by the congregation on the opposite shore as the little boat rose over the crest of the great waves. The effect was said to have been very striking. That morning proved too stormy for the outside function to proceed, and though the memorial stone was blessed quietly in the afternoon, there was no possibility of crossing to the other islands to get home. The next day the storm still continued, but the different priests were bound to return to their own parishes. The two who made the longest journey were seven hours in an open boat, with little shelter from the wind and the waves, so that on reaching their destination one of the two had to be carried to shore in so exhausted a condition that it was many days before he recovered from the effects of the journey. Little wonder that the good Franciscan begged for a set of vestments to be kept in each island. He must often have had similar experiences and knew what he was talking about when he mentiond the danger and difficulty in taking the vestments from island to island.

The translation has been kept as near the original as possible and where the proper names could be recognized their spelling also has been retained:

F. Francis MacDonnel to Monsignor Baldeschi, Secretary of Propaganda:

Armagh, 10th July, 1671.

When I heard that His Grace the Primate of Ireland had received from the Sacred Congregation the care of the Scottish islands, or Hebrides, I hastened hither to Armagh from the isles, in order that I might suggest how the faith might be propagated in those islands. His Grace himself greatly desired this summer to return there with me, but I was of the contrary opinion, inasmuch as a report has spread of the arrival of the French, whom the Scots are said to favor, so that if His Grace the Primate were to go there, every one would think that he had come to prepare the way for the French. It is for this same reason that no missionaries are to be sent there this summer, as the news of their arrival would at once get abroad and they would be cast into prison. For it is proposed to effect the union of the two kingdoms of England and Scotland in one Parliament, to which union the islesmen are strongly opposed. Now, if the Primate were to visit them, it would at once be said that he had come to foster the opposition to this union.

The best and safest method of propagating the Catholic religion in these islands and of strengthening it for the future is to select some youths and to send them to Rome or to the seminaries on the Continent, to be educated and promoted to the priesthood. Being natives, these may later do much good in the isles and will be more gladly welcomed there. Meantime, his Grace the Primate should send thither some Irish priests or religious, since the people of these islands understand nothing but Gaelic, and they can hope for spiritual assistance from none but the Irish, since the Scots (Scoto-Angli) speak a corrupt form of English, and experience has long since proved that they afford no spiritual help to the isles.

Moreover, so small an allowance as fifty scudi is not sufficient for the missionaries destined for that field of labor. A priest must support, besides himself, one and perhaps two servants to carry the sacred vestments, books and other things from place to place. Now, what are fifty scudi a year amongst two or three? Certainly were I not related to the Lords MacDonnell, who have great influence in those islands, I could not have subsisted there till now. Father George Fanning, also of the Order of Friars Preachers, would have perished from hunger before now were it not that he lived with the Laird of Barra. He has not received a sixpence form the Sacred Congregation for the past eight years, although he has labored much and with great fruit. I myself have received nothing for two and a half years, and three years' allowance will be due me next February. The Sacred Congregation only gave me one vestment, when two were very necessary, for the journey has often to be made from island to island, and there is great danger and difficulty in taking vestments between the five islands where there are Catholics. Indeed, there should be one set of vestments in each island, so that the priest be saved the labor and the danger of carrying them about.

As regards the allowance for the triennium which is almost complete, your Lordship may convey it to Mr. Lesley as heretofore; but for the future it will be best to send it to His Grace the Primate by means of His Excellency the Nuncio at Brussels, as also any letters with which you may favor me. Father George Fanning deserves a reward as well as his salary, since he has labored most diligently for eight years in the vineyard of the Lord; indeed, many thousands of Catholics would have fallen into heresy unless they had been supported by him.

From my receiving no answer to them, I conclude that my various letters to the Sacred Congregation have been lost on the way, and hence in future I shall write through His Grace the Primate, and I shall hope for the reply also through him. It would greatly help our mission if a letter were sent to the Marquis of Antrim, who is of the family of MacDonnell and has many followers in the isles; also it would be a good thing to write to the most noble Donald MacDonnell, Chief of Clanranald, for though he externally professes to be a heretic, still he is very well disposed towards us and has a great number of Catholic dependants; lastly, it would be of great service to write to the illustrious Gillerane MacNeil, of Barra, who is a Catholic.

An account of the other matters I gave to His Grace the Primate, and I shall always remain, etc.

Report of the Hebrides supplied by Mgr. of Armagh, Primate of Ireland, and dated 3d September, 1671, with reflections thereon by the procurator of the Scottish mission:

Monsignor the Archbishop of Armagh, Primate of Ireland, received a command to furnish a report of the Hebrides and to send some one thither for that end, or to go there himself should he find it convenient and the circumstances opportune. This charge he willingly accepted, and it is clear from what he has written that he was satisfied with the report given him by a Franciscan missionary when the latter visited him to fetch the holy oils. When this report was communicated to the procurator of the mission it gave him occasion to make some remarks on certain points and

to doubt of the truth of some of the things related, as will presently appear. It seems to him that he must believe that the number of the inhabitants of those islands is much greater than is therein described. This appears all the more probable because formerly these people carried on a most cruel war against the inhabitants of the mainland of Scotland and put in jeopardy the very power (corona) which the Macdonalds, lords of the isles, claimed as belonging to themselves. The Archbishop of Armagh writes that the first of these islands is called Bute; in Gaelic, Boad. It is eighteen miles long and five broad and is owned by one of the Stuart family. In it there is not one Catholic, through want of missionaries, although all are inclined to the holy faith and number about 20,000 souls.

The second island, called Arran, is twenty miles in length and eight in breadth. The inhabitants, who number 12,000, would all profess the Catholic faith had they any one to look after them; now externally they are heretics and live under the lordship of various proprietors among whom the land is divided.

The island of Islay is twenty-four miles long and ten broad. There are in it 8,000 souls, who change their religion at the bidding of their proprietors; now they are Protestants, formerly they were Presbyterians. The lord of the island is Signor Cadel (Calder), of the family of Campbell, who in Gaelic are called MacCallum.

The island of Jura is twenty-six miles long and six broad and has not more than 2,000 inhabitants. The lord of the island is the Marquis of Argyle, head of the Campbell family. All are heretics.

The procurator of the mission says that this comes from want of workers and from the heretical obstinacy of the Marquis of Argyle, who, however, is much more moderate than his father. When the present Marquis was in Rome he was so courteously treated by Father Dempster, then rector of the Scots College, that when this father was later taken prisoner in Scotland by the heretics the Marquis took a great part in saving him from the severity of the laws and would not bear any testimony against him. is certainly a confirmed heretic, but he might be won over by some good missionary who had the entry to that house. His grandfather was an excellent Catholic, whilst his father was the worst of heretics and the contriver of all the plots against the late King. For this he lost his head, whilst his son was to have lost his estate and his goods, but through the kindness of the King everything was restored to him. He is a man of great ability.

Other islands annexed to this one, but smaller, are Luing, Seil, Colonsay, Kerrera and Lismore. The greatest of them is scarcely six miles long.

The isle of Mull is thirty miles in length, twelve in breadth and

numbers 6,000 souls. The proprietor is Signor Maklein (McLean); all are heretics. The isle of Tyreke (Tyree) is ten miles long and four broad. In it there are about 2,000 inhabitants, who live under the aforesaid Laird of McLean and are externally heretics.

The isle of Coll is twelve miles in length and three in breadth. Here the population is about 1,000. It is under the same laird as the two former.

The island of Uist is thirty miles long and eight broad. There are in it not less than 12,000 souls. The two proprietors of the island are the Laird of Clanranald, who possesses half, and whose pendants are partly Catholic and partly heretical. The only priest pendents are partly Catholic and partly heretical. The only priest they have is Father Francis Macdonel. There are other islands belonging to Clanranald, namely, Canna, Rum, Eigg and Muck, in which there are not less than 1,000 souls, all Catholic. Of the chiefs of Clanranald the procurator of the mission says that they are very powerful, but they have a great feud with the chiefs of the clan called Mackintosh, with whom, as they will not make peace, the missionaries will not absolve them. Hence they remain neither Catholics nor heretics.

The missionary Munro had the intention of attending to the reconciliation of these two families, and if this were to come about, he hopes that both would be converted.

The isle of Barra is six miles long and three broad. The landlord is the Laird of Macneil; there are about 1,000 Catholics in it, amongst whom is the laird himself. Father George Fanning, a Dominican, labors here with good result. This father, according to the procurator of the mission, has no patents or faculties from the Sacred Congregation. His ground for staying there must be either the privileges of his order or else because he believes that these people, being, as it were, abandoned and in extreme necessity of sacraments, any priest may come to their assistance. This is, indeed, one of the strongest arguments urged by almost all those working in these British Isles and also in England; and they claim to have a right to continue their functions and their work, all the more as they persuade themselves that recourse to Rome is either impossible or unnecessary and that the delays of that court are intolerable. For these reasons they think that they should not leave those souls to perish. However, these and similar views are creeping in very fast, and if they are not remedied by giving them superiors, very few in time will have recourse to this Holy See.

The isle of Lewis is thirty miles long and ten broad, the population being above 40,000, all heretics. The proprietor is the Earl of Seaforth, of the family of Mackenzie (Macchegni). This noble-

man is fairly powerful and not ill disposed towards the Catholic faith. He persuaded the Privy Council of Scotland to allow the Irish priests to stay amongst the Highlanders for this very good reason that, from the time when these people were converted by them to the Catholic faith, thefts and rapine were less frequent; and restitution, which was never heard of before, is now made very often. This moved the Council to allow the missionary White (Bianchi) to remain amongst them. Munro, lately gone to those parts, has the entry of that house.

The isle of Skye is in length thirty miles, in breadth twenty. There are in it about 6,000 souls. The proprietors are Sir James Macdonel, who owns one-half, and the Laird of MacLeod, who owns the other half. There are only a few Catholics, and they suffer a great deal from the violence of heretical preachers.

The procurator of the mission has difficulty in believing this supposed persecution, since the heretics would not dare to try anything without the consent of the Macdonalds, who are its lords, and it is not possible that they would consent to it, since they are very favorable to the Catholics. We beg, therefore, that the Archbishop of Armagh be asked to specify this point more fully.

In all the aforementioned islands the country people know nothing but the Gaelic language; the nobles, however, besides Gaelic, speak corrupt English. The proprietors of the islands possess vast dominions on the mainland of Scotland, of which the inhabitants speak nothing but Gaelic and are much inclined towards the Catholic faith, of which they retain many signs and rites, whilst they hate the Protestant ministers, even though the lairds follow that creed for political reasons. On this point the procurator of the missions has considered the necessity of not separating these missions from for political reasons. On this point the procurator of the mission are thus united, better to protect them and prevent discords. Besides, those gentlemen, not being able to learn distinctions of jurisdiction, desire the missionaries, according as there is need, sometimes to go to the mainland and sometimes to the islands, and if they should decline to do so, they would run the risk either of being removed from the mission or at least deprived of protection. The fact is that the proprietors rule these people very despotically and the missionaries must not offend them, if they wish to live there.

In the islands wheat is not indigenous, but there is barley, oats and spelt. Oxen, cows, horses, flocks and deer abound, also fish and birds of every description, and a great quantity of fish are caught. In these islands are no woods and no fruit trees on account of the violence of the sea winds, especially the north winds, which burn and cut up everything.

There are many memorials of saints here and churches also, but these have been destroyed by the heretics, so that now the ministers preach in private houses and there exercise their other functions. All the islands are subject to a pseudo Bishop, called Bishop of the Isles, who, according to the procurator's account, never resides there, and hence he is not accustomed to take notice of what happens. Ordinarily he is at court, and, provided his income is handed him, he does not trouble about anything else. Hence results in great part the toleration which these people enjoy in matters of religion. The ministers also, although they live amongst the people, are very moderate, and if some good workers came here they also might be converted and made to preach the Catholic faith to the people, as was done on the mainland in one parish called Glenlivet, which to the present day remains mostly Catholic.

The drink that they use in summer is milk, and in winter boiled water mixed with flour, whilst scarcely among the nobles or the rich is beer met with. Hence the missionaries destined for these parts suffer a great deal until they accustom themselves to the climate and the manner of life, all the more as it is best for them to travel by night on account of the violence of the persecution. The people give nothing, even as an alms, to the priests who minister to them, but they are obliged to pay a stipend to the heretical ministers. Nor do the missionaries derive any income from marriages, funerals or baptisms, and their sustentation is only the allowance given them by the Sacred Congregation. Among the Anglo-Scots, however, the missionaries lodge in the houses of Catholic noblemen, with whom they can live in comfort.

It is advisable for any one who wishes to be a missionary in the Hebrides to keep a servant to carry the altar furniture and some kind of portable bed, which is used even in summer; whence, says the procurator of the mission, one can gather that no stranger missionaries will be found willing to come to the assistance of these people, to whose hardships they either cannot or will not ever accustom themselves, as experience shows only too plainly. Hence there remains but one means of helping them, and that is by schools in which youths may be taught here. For if the boys are sent away from the islands, we run the risk of their never returning any more after they have tasted the delights of Italy, France or Flanders. Indeed, it will exceed our expectations if those who have been brought up there will be willing to return to teach without the inducement of a good salary.

The missioner must also take flour with him, because the inhabitants have for food only milk, butter and cheese. Taking all this into consideration, it becomes clear that the missionaries there are reduced to great straits, having to provide for themselves and their servants on the fifty scudi which they receive from the Sacred Congregation, and even that does not reach them entire, since the rate of exchange must be deducted.

The Archbishop of Armagh writes that the method of propagating the faith in these islands is, first, to send there missionaries knowing the Gaelic language, well grounded in virtue and inflamed with zeal for souls. The procurator of the mission, however, is of opinion that the Irish are scarcely fitted to minister there, inasmuch as there would be danger of the jealousy of the Royal Council, and if this were aroused, the liberty now enjoyed would be lost. Hence it is necessary for many very important reasons to do everything as far as possible by means of priests of their own nation and to leave the jurisdiction over these people with those who are Scotch by nationality and that the Irish be there as their assistants.

Secondly, to send youths of that nation to be educated in parts beyond the sea, who would be more acceptable to these people than foreigners. On this point is copied in extenso the reflection made thereon by the procurator of the mission, who says: "You would hardly believe the affection which these people bear towards their compatriots and the facility with which with them they lose that title, inasmuch as those who go away and are educated outside their Highlands are no longer considered such and are called Anglo-Scotch. Hence it is most necesarsy that the youths be taught on the spot the knowledge necessary for sacred orders. He believes that for such a work some are fitted who have studied at the universities of Scotland, speak Gaelic, are natives of the Highlands or of the islands and know the ways of the people. Being well advanced in their studies, these, once they were converted, could in a very short time be prepared for ordination, and with that end in view it would be expedient to make an effort to gain them. They are naturally very clever and excel all the other Scots in the schools, and they are, moreover, much inclined to the Holy Catholic faith. From these we might in a short time have a good quantity of priests and we could distribute them through all the provinces and islands without danger.

The safest way of directing letters to these islands is to send them to Dublin, and from thence to Belfast to a man by name Daniel Margey, who is a Catholic, and who will then direct them to another man, Donald Groam Macdonel, who lives in Kintyre, otherwise called Caput Terrae.

The procurator of the mission suggests another way, and that is to direct the letters to London and from there to Edinburgh

to the superior of the mission, and in Edinburgh one always finds natives of the country who would carry the letters to whomsoever they were directed, whilst this would not be the case in Ireland.

Thirdly, it would also greatly help to the spread of the faith to make provision and give a salary to a Catholic schoolmaster who would teach the children here, for they need it much. It will be about ten years since Ewen MacAllister (Eugenio Makalastrio) was appointed as schoolmaster in Glengarry (Elenguri), a place in the Highlands; and it is now two years since P. NN. and David Burnett were selected for a similar office; but of the first we have no news and of the second we do not know whether or not he is willing to accept the office. The procurator says that in the meantime it would be well to avail oneself of some good Irish friar of St. Isidore, and in any case the procurator of the mission recommends his brother, who is in Paris finishing his theology. He could both fill the office of missionary and also instruct these youths in learning, since MacAllister is only qualified to teach grammar. Next, the procurator renews his requests that orders be given to the superiors of the colleges of that nation to keep up correspondence with the prefect of the mission, that the missionaries take those subjects that are offered to them and that two or three youths be induced to come to the Roman College, to be there instructed in learning and piety.

Fourthly, it would be well if the Sacred Congregation were to write to Gillerane MacNeil, Lord of the island of Barra, who is a Catholic, and to the above-mentioned Donald Macdonel, Lord of the country of Moydart, and to the Laird of Clanranald, who, although he is a heretic, is very favorable to Catholics. He has a Catholic wife, who was converted to the faith with 500 others by the above-mentioned Father Francis Macdonel. The procurator approves of this idea and says that there is nothing that does more good in these parts than to keep up correspondence with these gentlemen and foster their good dispositions by frequent letters. Since, however, it might happen that some would be written to and not others, it would be well to obtain from our Lord (the Pope) a Brief consoling and encouraging all, or to write to the missionaries that they should send here the names of all to whom it would be necessary to write, or, indeed, that the Sacred Congregation itself write them a circular letter.

This is the report of the Hebrides as given to the aforesaid Archbishop of Armagh by Father Francis Macdonel on the occasion of his coming to him to receive the holy oils. The Archbishop adds that he is very anxious to go and see these things with his own eyes, which are better witnesses than ears, but he says: Spiritus

quidem promptus est, crumena autem infecta" (The Spirit indeed is willing, but the purse is slender). He also praises Father Francis as a man of high qualities.

This report goes far towards proving what has indeed been often asserted before, namely, that the chief cause of the decay of the Catholic faith in the Highlands and islands of Scotland was the dearth of missionaries, who could keep the old faith alive amongst the people. This point is still more strikingly brought out by the letters of Father Francis White, which the present writer hopes shortly to publish. There are statements in Father White's letters which would scarcely be credited unless they were corroborated by contemporary witnesses such as the foregoing report of Father Francis Macdonnel.

Odo Blundell, O. S. B.

Fort Augustus, Scotland.

## PIUS VII. AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.—X.

ARDINAL CONSALVI did not arrive in Paris until two days after the signature on May 30 of the treaty between France and the four Powers which had most contributed to the overthrow of Napoleon-Austria, Russia, England and Prussia. No allusion had been made in this treaty with regard to the restitution to the Holy Father of any part of the Papal States; either the Legations or the Marches. On the contrary, though the Allies deprived France of the vast extent of territory conquered from neighboring States which Napoleon had annexed to his Empire and brought her frontiers back very nearly to the position they occupied at the dawn of the Revolution, they guaranteed to her the possession of the principality of Avignon and of the Comtat Venaissin, two districts situated in the south of France and belonging to the Holy See, which had been taken by a decree of the National Assembly in September, 1791. It was, indeed, declared by one of the clauses of this treaty that within two months the Powers engaged in the recent war should send their plenipotentiaries to hold a congress at Vienna and agree as to the mode in which the stipulations of the treaty were to be carried out. The Cardinal could thus entertain a faint hope that he might succeed in persuading the sovereigns and the statesmen in whose hands lay the destinies of Europe to render justice to the claims of Pius VII. His first experience was not, however, calculated to afford him much encouragement. In an interview with Talleyrand, the Min-

ister for Foreign Affairs of Louis XVIII., he was indeed assured that France would be glad to see the Legations restored to the Holy Father, but, unfortunately, France was at that moment powerless and had even had some difficulty in obtaining leave to send a representative to the Congress. As to the restitution of Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin, that was, he said, impossible. France, indeed, had not asked for them; but the Allied Powers had insisted that she should keep them, for they were firmly resolved that, in order to avoid anything that might give rise to disputes or serve as a pretext for war, there should in future be no more enclaves,1 Cardinal Consalvi then visited the King, who was most friendly in his manner and who spoke eloquently of the virtues of the Holy Father, of the sufferings he had undergone and of the heroism he had displayed. But he, too, was resolved not to restore the possessions of the Church, alleging as an excuse his dread of offending the French people, which had made many concessions and sacrifices and wanted some compensation. He added, though, that after some time it might be possible to come to an understanding, but that at that moment it was hopeless.2

The Allied Sovereigns and their Ministers had already left Paris for London, whither Cardinal Consalvi resolved to follow them and attempt to secure their good will in favor of the cause of the Holy Father. He arrived in London on June 10, 1814, and though he was the first Cardinal to appear in England since the days of Cardinal Pole,<sup>3</sup> he was agreeably surprised to find that he was received everywhere by the people with demonstrations of respect and friendliness. They showed neither surprise nor displeasure on seeing his Cardinal's robes, for while in England he wore on all occasions the dress worn by Cardinals in Rome when out of doors—a black frock coat lined with red, red stockings and red skull-cap and gold tassels to his hat.

The Emperor of Austria had returned to Vienna instead of going to London, but his Prime Minister, Prince Metternich, assured Cardinal Consalvi in the interviews he had with him that Austria had no intention of taking the Legations. He seems, however, not to have succeeded in dispelling the Cardinal's suspicion that, though the Emperor was in favor of the restitution, his Ministers were of a contrary opinion, and that at the Congress the Powers

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> An enclave is an outlying portion of a State situated within the frontiers of another State.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> P. Ilario Rinieri, La Diplomazia Pontificia nel Secolo XIX., Vol. IV. Il Congresso di Vienna e la Santa Sede. Roma, 1904, p. 115. This work is founded on hitherto inedited documents in the Archives of the Vatican.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Cardinal Pole died at Lambeth on November 17, 1558, the same day as Queen Mary.

might be guided more by their interests than by the rules of justice. In fact, Metternich pointed out to him that the question of the Legations was a European question to be decided by all the Powers, and that Austria could not dispose of the Legations according to her own will. From the Emperor of Russia, whom the Cardinal invited to Rome in the name of the Pope, he heard much praise of the Holy Father, but he seems to have received only vague promises of assistance.

On account of the many festivities which took place in honor of the Allied Sovereigns, Cardinal Consalvi could not have an audience of the Prince Regent until July 1. It was on the occasion of the presentation to the Prince of addresses from the Houses of Parliament congratulating him on the conclusion of peace. with other Ambassadors, the Cardinal assisted at this brilliant scene, which he describes in a letter to Cardinal Pacca. He was then admitted to a private audience, and he declares that he cannot give an adequate idea of the courtesy and friendliness which the Prince showed him during this interview. He expressed warmly his admiration and esteem for the Holy Father; no general, he said, at the head of an army had ever managed affairs with more wisdom or fought with more valor than Pius VII. at the head of the Catholic Church. He admired especially the patience he had shown in difficult circumstances when it was necessary for the welfare of religion and the resistance he had offered when he believed that his duty required it, even until he had lost his throne and his liberty. Cardinal Consalvi then expressed the hope that the Holy Father might reckon on being assisted by England to regain the Legations, since it was on account of his refusal to close his ports or to enter into a coalition against the English that he had been dethroned and imprisoned, and the Prince assured him that in this question he would willingly act in concert with Austria and defend the interests of the Holy Father at the Congress.4

The Cardinal's interviews with Lord Castlereagh, then Secretary for Foreign Affairs, were not less important and satisfactory than that with the Prince Regent. Castlereagh could not, indeed, give a positive answer, since the matter had to be discussed at the Congress of Vienna with the Envoys of the other Powers; but he assured him that England would take much interest in the Pope's affairs and hoped that His Holiness' demands would be satisfied. During his stay in London Consalvi had to treat religious as well as political matters, for since some time the question of Catholic Emancipation had occupied the minds of English statesmen and had been much discussed between them and the Catholic Hierarchy.

<sup>4</sup> Rinieri, Il Congresso, p. 131. Consalvi a Pacca, Londra, 5 Luglio, 1814.



Their negotiations referred mostly to the nature of the guarantees which the Government demanded before granting emancipation. They were: The oath of loyalty to the Government, the right of rejecting candidates known to be hostile to the Government and the right of examining all documents proceeding from Rome, with the exception of those from the Sacred Penitenziaria. In a word, claims much less arbitrary and far-reaching than those insisted upon by almost every Catholic Sovereign at that time. It would, however, be impossible to enter on any further discussion of the subject in this article; but it may be remarked that Lord Castlereagh, while treating religious questions with the Cardinal, stated that he saw no objection to the presence of a representative of the Holy See in England and of an English Envoy in Rome, who should maintain friendly relations between the two Governments. They could at first reside merely in a private capacity, but after the repeal of the laws against the Catholics they could assume publicly the title of Envoy, like those of other Powers. Cardinal Consalvi had not, however, been authorized to negotiate with regard to this proposal, so he agreed to apply to Rome for further instructions and to resume the discussion on again meeting with Castlereagh at Vienna.5

On his way to Vienna Cardinal Consalvi was obliged to pass again some time in Paris in order to inquire into the religious affairs of France, where some of the Bishops who had resigned their sees at the time of the Concordat, and who had returned from exile along with the Bourbons, expected to be allowed to reassume their former dignity. Louis XVIII., too, was anxious to set aside the Concordat of 1801 and conclude another as well as to increase the number of dioceses which had been then established. He also wished, as Consalvi believed, that the Pope should reinstate in their former sees as much as possible the Bishops who had not resigned. On the other hand, the King not only maintained Napoleon's law, according to which no Bull, brief, decree or other document, even concerning private persons, issuing from the Court of Rome could be published or executed without the authorization of the Government, but he decreed that the Bulls and the acts of the Holy See as well as the "acts of other communions" were to be submitted to the "approval of the King." Consalvi could only warn Cardinal Pacca of the nature of the demands which were to be presented to the Holy Father by Mgr. de Pressigny, the former

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Rinieri, Il Congresso, pp. 148, 157, 180.

<sup>6</sup> See the AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW for October, 1908.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Rinieri, Il Congresso, p. 200. Even the English Government, in demanding the right to examine documents coming from Rome, made an exception in favor of those from the Sacra Penitenziaria.

Bishop of St. Malo, whom Louis XVIII. was sending to Rome as his Ambassador, and put him on his guard against them. He then continued his journey to Vienna.

Pius VII. had sent Mgr. Rivarola to Rome as Apostolic Delegate to take over the city from Murat's representatives and to form a provisional government for its reorganization and administration. He published on May 13 a decree by which he abolished the laws imposed by Napoleon, reëstablished those which had previously existed and lowered the duties on salt and wine to what they had been at the time of the fall of the Papacy. The enemies of the Holy See have accused the Pope of showing much harshness towards those who had exercised public functions under the French Government; but, in fact, it chiefly consisted in dismissing those who had taken the oath to the foreign ruler—a very natural course for the Papal Government to follow. This was also the case with those who had been appointed by the French to positions connected with the institutions they had introduced and who could not tay claim to be indemnified when those institutions ceased to exist. Of the band of insurgents who had stormed the Quirinal only three were condemned to the galleys; the others were banished from Ecclesiastics, too, who had failed to perform their duty were punished more severely than laymen.8 On July 30, 1814, however, these very moderate measures came to an end with the publication of an amnesty for all those who had been guilty of disloyalty, and many of these time-serving functionaries were allowed to reoccupy their former posts. The same accusations of excessive severity were also brought against all the other Governments which had been overthrown by Napoleon and restored after his fall. Cardinal Pacca ascribed them to the machinations of the secret societies, which still endeavored to spread the anti-Christian spirit of the Revolution, and hoped especially to render the diplomatists assembled at Vienna hostile to the restoration of the territories belonging to the Holy See.9

The reëntry of the Papal Government into its former possessions was, indeed, still very uncertain. By a convention made between Austria and Murat after the campaign against Prince Eugene the King of Naples had withdrawn his troops from Tuscany, which was given back to its former Grand Duke, Ferdinand III. He had also ceded to the Austrian Government the three Papal Provinces of Ferrara, Ravenna and Bologna, known as the three Legations.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Rinieri, Il Congresso, p. 261. Cardinale Pacca al Nunzio a Vienna, 18 Agosto, 1814, pp. 278, 280. Cardinale Pacca al Cardinale Consalvi, Roma, 18 Agosto, 1814.



<sup>8</sup> Rinieri, Il Congresso, pp. 245, 263, 286.

A provisional administration had been established there, and they were occupied by the Austrian troops until the Congress should come to a decision with regard to their future destination. however, by the treaty made at Naples on January 11, 1814, Austria had promised to give Murat a portion of the Papal States as the price of his alliance, 10 he considered that he was still entitled to hold the three provinces of Macerata, Ancona and Fermo, known as the Marches. Some of the Austrian functionaries also held views opposed to those expressed by the Emperor as to the right of the Holy Father to regain possession of his States. Thus Mgr. della Genga while on his journey to Paris reported that General Eckhardt, the Governor of the three Legations, had been ordered to make every effort to induce the people to declare for Austria.11 In spite of the assurances of friendliness and assistance which he had received at Paris and in London, Cardinal Consalvi on arriving in Vienna still felt much uncertainty as to the success of his mission and the probability of overcoming the many hostile influences which aimed at depriving the Holy See of its possessions.

According to the statesmen who planned the Congress of Vienna, its object was to carry out the stipulations of the treaty signed at Paris on May 30, 1814, between France and the Allies, as well as to decide with regard to the future of the States or portions of States which had been annexed by Napoleon to his Empire, but had now been reconquered and occupied by the Allied Powers. They boasted that the Congress would reconstruct social order, regenerate the political system of Europe and establish a permanent peace based upon a just distribution of power; but according to its secretary, Friedrich von Gentz, who was also an intimate friend of Prince von Metternich, it really aimed at sharing among the conquerors the spoils of the vanquished.<sup>12</sup>

The most important of these spoils were the Kingdom of Saxony and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Napoleon had formed the latter State with some of the provinces of the dismembered Kingdom of Poland which he took away from Austria and Prussia, and by the treaty of Tilsit (July, 1807), between France, Russia and Prussia, he had given it to the King of Saxony, who had always been devoted to his interests. In the campaign of 1813 the King had joined Napoleon; he had fallen into the hands of the Prussians after the battle of Leipzig and was still a prisoner of war. It was considered

<sup>10</sup> See the AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW for October, 1910, p. 658

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Rinieri, Il Congresso, pp. 107, 661. Mgr. della Genga al Cardinale Pacca, Bologna, 11 Maggio, 1814.

<sup>12</sup> Prince von Metternich-Winneberg, Mémoires, documents et écrits divers, etc., Paris, 1884, Vol. II., p. 474.

only just that he should be deprived of his kingdom for having abandoned the Allies in the recent struggle for the freedom of Germany, and the King of Prussia claimed to annex it as compensation for the losses he had sustained and the services he had rendered. The Duchy of Warsaw was demanded by the Emperor of Russia, who intended to add to it the Polish provinces he already possessed, and thus create a kingdom of Poland, which he would endow with free institutions and of which he would wear the crown.

The Princes who had been deprived of their States by Napoleon as well as the Sovereigns whom he had created and who had been overthrown by the Allies also expected to be indemnified by the Congress. Among these was the Archduchess Maria Louisa, ex-Empress of the French, to whom the Duchies of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla had been allotted by the treaty signed at Fontainebleau on Napoleon's abdication on April 11, 1814. Duchies were also claimed by the Infanta Maria Louisa, daughter of Charles IV., King of Spain, widow of Louis I., Duke of Parma and ex-Queen of Etruria,18 and it seemed probable that to satisfy these pretensions it would be necessary to have recourse to the three provinces of Ferrara, Ravenna and Bologna. Pius VI. had ceded them to the French Republic in 1797 by the treaty of Tolentino, in order to save Rome; they were afterwards annexed to the kingdom of Italy, and they were now looked upon by the diplomatists assembled at Vienna as a conquest from France, a territory without an owner, to which the Pope had no longer any claim and which might, therefore, serve to provide indemnities, instead of being restored to the Holy See.14

Cardinal Consalvi was well aware of the difficulties with which he would have to contend, and he could only hope that the Emperor of Austria, who then held the Legations, would be restrained by his sense of justice and his religious principles from taking part in the spoliation of the Church. His first interview with Prince Metternich immediately after his arrival in Vienna produced on him a favorable impression, and he felt assured that Austria would not annex the Legations, nor, if possible, allow them to be given as compensation; but a few days later, when received by the Emperor.

<sup>14</sup> See the American Catholic Quarterly Review for January, 1907, p. 112.



<sup>18</sup> This was the name given by Bonaparte to the Grand Duchy of Tuscany when, in 1801, he gave it, with the title of King, to Louis I., Duke of Parma, whose duchies were given up to France. He was succeeded in 1803 by his son, Louis II., under the regency of his mother. But in 1807 Napoleon united the Kingdom of Etruria to his empire, and placed it under the administration of his sister, Eliza Bacclocchi, with the title of Grand Duchess of Tuscany, until it was restored in 1814 to its legitimate sovereign, Ferdinand III.

he found him very cold and reserved, and it was with much difficulty that he drew from him a positive declaration that he would not take the Legations for himself. The Emperor warned him, however, that the Pope ought not to be too sure of regaining those provinces; the treaty of Tolentino was against him; there were many other just claims to be satisfied, and he did not wish to go to war on account of that question.<sup>18</sup> These words caused the Cardinal much anxiety, for he took them as an allusion to the rival claims of the ex-Empress Maria Louisa and of the ex-Queen of Etruria, and his uncertainty with regard to the restitution of the Legations lasted until nearly the end of the Congress. His fears were not appeased by Tallevrand, who told him that it had been unanimously decided by the chief plenipotentiaries that the Legations were to be given to the Pope and not restored, a decision which, as the Cardinal perceived, left the Congress free to give as much or as little as it chose and employ the remainder to provide compensation. It is true that Lord Castlereagh, who in London had already informed the Cardinal that England was disposed to support the interests of the Holy Father, repeated the same assurances on meeting him again in Vienna, but Consalvi also knew that the English Liberals (who then formed the Opposition) were in favor of a united Italy under Murat. He had also learned when in Paris from Mgr. Poynter, Vicar Apostolic of London, that an appeal to that effect had been sent from Italy to the English Cabinet and that an emissary had been dispatched to Italy to ascertain the wishes of the people, with a view to placing Italy under one King, reserving, however, a sufficient amount of territory for the Pope.16

Moreover, the intentions of Russia and Prussia, if not positively hostile to the Holy See, were at least doubtful, for their interests were opposed to those of Pius VII. The Emperor of Russia had taken Prince Eugene under his special protection and wished to give him the principality of Pontecorvo as an indemnity for the loss of the Viceroyalty of the kingdom of Italy, and Prussia, anxious to annex the kingdom of Saxony, had already suggested that the Legations might serve to compensate the King.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> P. Ilario Rinieri, La Diplomazia Pontificia nel secolo XIX., Vol. V. Corrispondenza inedita dei Cardinali Consalvi e Pacca nel tempo del Congresso di Vienna (1814-1815), Torino, 1903. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 8 Settembre; 17 Settembre, 1814.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Rinieri, Il Congresso, p. 367. La Corrispondenza, p. 132. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 18 Novembre, 1814.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Rinieri, Il Congresso, p. 350. Pontecorvo and Benevento were two small States belonging to the Holy See, and situated within the frontiers of the Kingdom of Naples. Napoleon had seized them in 1806 and given the former to Marshal Bernadotte and the latter to Talleyrand.

In presence of the claims of Pius VII. to the Marches and the two Principalities and of Ferdinand IV. to the throne of Naples,18 Murat, who owed his crown to Napoleon, felt the insecurity of his position and often sought to induce Pius VII. to recognize him as King. He was even willing to purchase that recognition by the immediate surrender of the Marches. But the Holy Father refused to comply with his request until the Congress had decided the question.19 He could only offer to remain neutral between the conflicting pretensions of Ferdinand and Murat and take no active steps against Murat, such as, for instance, excommunicating him, until that decision was given. On the other hand, one of Murat's representatives, the Duca di Campochiaro, had already informed Consalvi in Paris that the Popes' recognition at that moment would be of far more importance to his Sovereign than after the Congress, and that if it were put off till then the King would feel no gratitude or friendship for His Holiness, and would, at most, give up the Marches if obliged to do so by the Congress.20

On arriving in Vienna, Consalvi found that the action of Pius VII. was fully approved of by Metternich, who was also anxious to get rid of Murat, whose alliance was no longer wanted by Austria, and to restore the Marches to the Holy See. But the Prince dreaded the probable result of a war with Murat, as in that case the King, who could not hope to retain Naples without allies, would raise the banner of Italian independence, call to arms all the malcontents of the various States and proclaim the kingdom of Italy. Metternich promised, however, to write to Murat, advising him to give up the Marches at once, without insisting on an impossible concession, and to be satisfied with the Pope's promise to observe neutrality during the Congress.<sup>21</sup>

If Murat had ever seriously entertained the idea of restoring the Marches to Pius VII. in return for his recognition as King of Naples, or even to obtain the neutrality of the Holy Father during the Congress, he soon abandoned it and caused reports to be spread that the Powers had approved the treaty made between Austria and Naples; that the right to the Marches had been decided in his favor, and that he was to keep the throne of Naples.<sup>22</sup>

This sudden change of policy was caused by the probability that

<sup>22</sup> Rinieri, Il Congresso, p. 415. Pacca a Consalvi, 5 Novembre, 1814.



<sup>18</sup> Ferdinand IV. of Bourbon, son of Charles III. of Spain, was driven from Naples in 1806 by Napoleon, who gave his kingdom to Murat. He held Sicily, where he was protected by British troops until the fall of Murat in 1815.

<sup>19</sup> Rinieri, Il Congresso, p. 364.

<sup>20</sup> Rinieri, Il Congresso, pp. 383, 386.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 8. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 8 Settembre, 1814.

before long a war might break out between the Powers represented at the Congress, in which case the belligerents would probably seek to purchase his alliance by concessions of territory. The claims of Prussia to the entire Kingdom of Saxony and of Russia to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which have been already mentioned, were the cause of the dissensions which gave rise to this alarming rumor and led Murat to modify his plans. The aggrandizement of Russia by such a large extent of territory, with a population of between three and four millions, caused, in the words of Lord Castlereagh, "much alarm to the Courts of Austria and Prussia and gave rise to a general state of fear throughout all Europe."28 It was, in fact, as both Metternich and Castlereagh pointed out, a flagrant infraction of the treaty of Reichenbach made on June 27, 1813, and renewed at Teplitz on September 9, of the same year, by which the Duchy of Warsaw was to be divided between Austria, Russia and Prussia.24 But the Emperor of Russia replied that Austria and Prussia were also obtaining augmentations of territory; that to rectify their frontiers he was ceding to them portions of the Duchy; that circumstances had changed since the time of the treaties, and that the Duchy was merely an indemnity for the very great sacrifices which Russia had made for the cause of the Allies.

Austria and England protested in vain against this pretension of the Emperor of Russia, but it was impossible to dissuade him from giving effect to it, and Prussia, which had at first been strongly opposed to it, was won over to his side by his promise of assistance with regard to the annexation of Saxony. In fact, before the Congress had come to any decision on the subject the Emperor withdrew his troops from Saxony and placed the kingdom, provisionally, under a Prussian administration. It was an arbitrary act, which much displeased Austria and France, as they were strongly opposed to so great an augmentation of the power of Prussia, though they were willing that a portion of the territory of the kingdom might be conceded, but the smaller German States were much alarmed, as they feared that they, too, might one day share the same fate.

This state of uneasiness soon reached such a pitch that war seemed to be inevitable, and in the beginning of November Austria and Bavaria began to calculate the number of troops which they should furnish in case it should become necessary to force Russia and Prussia to abandon their ambitious projects. The question was

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Angeberg, Le Congrès de Vienne et les Traités de 1815. Paris, 1863, Vol. I., p. 267. Mémorandum de Lord Castlereagh, Vienne, 4 Octobre, 1814. 
<sup>24</sup> Angeberg, id., Vol. I., p. 379. Note du Prince de Metternich au Prince de Hardenberg, 2 Novembre, 1814.

discussed during the month of December, and in January, 1815, Talleyrand, taking advoitly advantage of the irritation which Lord Castlereagh felt at the arrogant tone of the Russian Envoys in the conferences held between the Ministers of the Powers and the evident intention of the Emperor to lay down the law, induced him to enter into an alliance with France and Austria. By this compact the three Powers agreed to act in concert for the purpose of carrying out the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris according to the spirit of that treaty, and in case of any attack on their territories in consequence of their decision, to help each other to repel this aggression. Each of the Allies was bound to furnish 150,000 men.28 The practical result of this alliance, which must have soon become known, was that Prussia, finding itself abandoned by England and Austria, withdrew its demand to be allotted the entire Kingdom of Saxony and consented to leave the King onehalf, containing a population of somewhat over 1,300,000. Prussia also gave up its Polish provinces and accepted the portions of the Duchy of Warsaw which it pleased the Emperor of Russia to concede, and the Czar on his side gave up the idea of forming a Kingdom of Poland. All danger of war between the great Powers had thus passed away before the end of February, 1815.26

While these rumors of an impending war still circulated and Murat still hoped to secure a large tract of the Papal States as the price of his alliance, he proceeded to act as though he were already recognized as Sovereign of the province occupied by his troops. He raised heavy taxes, he established conscription and refused to allow the Bishops to name canons without his authorization. His emissaries also tried to induce the principal towns to present addresses to him, thanking him for the benefits he had conferred on them and begging of him to hasten as much as possible the definitive establishment in the Marches of his wise and farseeing government.<sup>27</sup> The Austrian Government was much irritated by his conduct and deeply regretted the unfortunate treaty of January 11, 1814, of which Murat's position in the Papal States was in a great measure the result,<sup>28</sup> but was unable to act, as, in view

28 See the AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW October, 1910, p. 658.

<sup>28</sup> Angeberg, Vol. I., p. 589. Traité secret d'alliance défensive conclu à Vienne entre l'Autriche, la Grande-Bretagne et la France, contrat la Russie et la Prusse, le 3 Janvier, 1815. Le Prince de Talleyrand, Correspondance inédite du Prince de Talleyrand et du Roi Louis XVIII, pendant le Congrès de Vienne. Paris, 1881, p. 210. Vienne, 4 Janvier, 1815.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Angeberg, Vol. L, p. 277. Neuvième Protocol de la Séance du 13 Février des plénipotentiaires des cinq Puissances. Talleyrand, Correspondance, p. 291. Vienne, 15 Février.

<sup>27</sup> M. H. Weil, Joachim Murat Roi de Naples. La dernière année de règne, 1814-1815. Paris, 1909, Vol. II., p. 577. Rinieri, Corrispondenza, Pacca a Consalvi. Roma, 27 Ottobre, 1814, p. 72.

of the possibility of a war with Russia, nearly all the Austrian troops had been moved to the frontiers of Gallicia, and there were not then more than about 50,000 men stationed in various parts of Northern Italy. When, therefore, Murat was requested by Metternich to restore the Marches to the Pope, he refused to do so unless Austria guaranteed to him the Kingdom of Naples and the Holy Father recognized him as King—conditions which neither Pius VII. nor Austria could accept. Metternich, therefore, advised Consalvi to warn the Pope not to irritate Murat, who could easily expel him from Rome and who feared nothing as long as he thought that the Congress would end by a war. The Prince hoped that the difficulties with Russia and Prussia would be settled in a very few days and that then he would send an officer to inform Murat that the Marches should at once be restored to the Holy See. as he had warned him a few days previously, the Revolution was far from being ended. In Italy and elsewhere its fire still burned beneath the ashes, and much prudence was necessary in order to avoid anything which might cause it to burst forth, for if it caught anywhere, it would be difficult to calculate how far it might extend or what might be its results.20

Talleyrand was anxious to please Louis XVIII., who as a Bourbon wished to see Murat expelled from Naples and Ferdinand IV. restored to his throne, but he could not persuade the Austrian Government to place the question before the Congress. He, therefore, tried to induce Consalvi to suggest to Pius VII. that it was his duty as the champion and defender of what was right and just to take active measures against Murat, either by excommunicating him or by appealing to the Congress. He assured the Cardinal that Murat would never dare to attack the Pope, but that if he did, all Europe would defend him. Cardinal Consalvi did not fall into the snare so cunningly laid for him by Talleyrand. He clearly saw that that statesman hoped that Murat, driven to defend himself, would call all Italy to arms, that Austria would then be obliged to make war for the preservation of its Italian possessions and that thus the restoration of Ferdinand IV, would be accomplished without any necessity for the intervention of France. Consalvi had, therefore, no difficulty in pointing out to Talleyrand the dangers to which the Papal Government would be exposed in case of a sudden attack and before the arrival of help. He remarked

<sup>29</sup> Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 223. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 18 Gennaio, 1815. Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 233. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 21 Gennaio, 1815. Weil, Joachim Murat, Vol. II., p. 384. Marquis de St. Marsan, the Sardinian Envoy to Comte de Vallaise, Sardinian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, 7 February, 1815.



also that just then the Holy Father was giving the Bourbons a proof of his attachment to their cause by refusing to recognize Murat as King of Naples, though by doing so he would at once regain possession of a large portion of his States.<sup>30</sup>

The Austrian Government came at last to the conclusion that it was to its own interest that Murat should be overthrown, and Metternich revealed the plan to Consalvi. Murat had brought his fate on himself by his own conduct. He had promised to cede the Marches to the Emperor, who was to give them to the Pope; but he had broken his word when he thought that the Congress was about to end by a war which would have enabled him to keep those provinces, and by his intrigues he had procured from the people petitions asking to pass under his rule. He had thus shown that in case of war Austria could not reckon on him, and the only matter to be considered was by what method he should be got rid of. It was, indeed, as Metternich remarked, a dangerous undertaking, and it required to be most cautiously planned. Murat had many partisans throughout Italy, the people were generally discontented with their Governments and the desire of forming a united and independent State had been spread over the whole peninsula. Talleyrand's suggestion of submitting the question to the Congress, in order that it might dethrone Murat by a decree, would have had no other result than to drive him to despair. Metternich, therefore, informed Louis XVIII. that though Austria would not allow foreign troops to pass through Italy to attack Murat, it would not hinder the French and Spaniards from landing in Sicily and crossing over to the Kingdom of Naples for that purpose. In that case, it would not help Murat. He also requested Louis XVIII. to forbid the French Legation to appeal to the Congress with regard to Murat, as such a step would drive him to make a sudden attack, the result of which would not be doubtful, on account of the small number of Austrian troops then in Italy. Louis XVIII. accepted this advice; he ordered Talleyrand not to call the attention of the Congress to the affairs of Murat, and the Austrian Government, freed from the danger of a war with Russia, began to withdraw its troops from its Gallician frontiers and send them into Italy, so as to have a large force in readiness in case Murat should declare war, or if it should be decided to depose him, to oblige him to come to terms and surrender whenever a favorable opportunity should have arrived.81

<sup>31</sup> Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 293. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 25 Febbraio, 1815. Weil, Joachim Murat, Vol. II., pp. 387, 393. Letter of de Saint-Marsan to Victor Emmanuel I., King of Sardinia, 17 Février, 1815.



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>80</sup> Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 284. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 22 Febbraio, 1815

Murat's own folly furnished Austria, at that very moment, with a plausible pretext for pouring troops into Italy without exciting any suspicion that his deposition was their ultimate object. Duca di Campochiaro, who represented Murat at Vienna, though not admitted to take part in the Congress, received from him on February 23 two dispatches. One was to be presented to Talleyrand, asking for an explanation of the hostile attitude adopted towards him by France, with which country he believed that he was at peace, and demanding to be at once recognized as King or to be informed if France were at peace or at war with him; if no reply were given, it would be looked upon as a declaration of war. The second note was for the Austrian Government. In it Murat asked leave to bring an army of 80,000 men through the Austrian possessions in Italy for the purpose of making war on France, and promised to pay all expenses in ready money. Campochiaro, who was an experienced diplomatist, did not approve Murat's action, which he looked upon as a false step, and he thought it more prudent to present these notes to Metternich not officially, but confidentially, saying that he preferred to disobey his sovereign rather than injure his cause by executing such an order.

Metternich approved the Envoy's action and told him that the Neapolitans should not be allowed to cross their frontiers, nor the French troops to enter Italy, and that any infringement of this decision would be looked upon as a declaration of war. As a precaution, the Austrian army in Italy would be raised to the number of 150,000 men, so as to be able to resist any attack. Metternich then addressed official notes to Talleyrand and to Murat to the same effect, warning them against any invasion of Austrian territories in Italy. He also pointed out to Murat's envoy that his King was maintaining an army which exhausted the resources of his States and that an invasion of Naples was not to be feared, since the Emperor was resolved not to allow foreign troops to enter Italy. Campochiaro was satisfied by this assurance that Italy would be guarded from all danger of a French intervention, and Metternich was able to tell Consalvi that if Murat advanced, the Austrian troops would soon be strong enough to attack him for not having obeyed the warning given him, and that if he did not declare war. or even if he gave up the Marches, he would certainly commit some act of folly which would afford a pretext for declaring war against him.82

While Europe was being thus reconstructed and reorganized in

<sup>82</sup> Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 303. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 25 Febbraio, 1815. Weil, Joachim Murat, Vol. II., p. 438. De Saint-Marsan a Victor Emmanuel I., 25 Février, 1815.

Vienna, Napoleon was plotting in the isle of Elba with a view to effecting his escape and again ascending the throne of France. His partisans and admirers have endeavored to disprove the existence of a conspiracy for that purpose, and have sought to represent the Emperor's flight as the result of a sudden inspiration, while those who are hostile to him assert that it was carefully prepared. Padre Rinieri's researches have thrown much light on this intricate question, which is still undecided; but they leave little doubt that Napoleon was kept well informed of the state of affairs and of public opinion in France, of the discontent in the army, of the animosity against the Bourbons and that when he thought that the favorable moment had arrived he left the island.<sup>38</sup>

When the news of Napoleon's landing in France reached Vienna on the morning of March 7, it caused the sovereigns and statesmen assembled there, if not a feeling of consternation, at least much embarrassment and anxiety. The labors of the Congress were, however, suspended for only a few days to allow the representatives of the eight Powers which had signed the Treaty of Paris to draw up a declaration which stated that Napoleon by his infringement of the convention which had assigned to him the isle of Elba as a residence, had become a general enemy; he had forfeited the protection of the law and had shown to the world that there could be no peace or truce with him. The Powers, therefore, agreed to unite their efforts and employ every means to suppress any attempt to plunge once more the nations of Europe into the disorders and troubles of the Revolution.<sup>24</sup>.

Before leaving Elba Napoleon sent to Murat an emissary named Colonna to inform him of his departure and advise him to maintain friendly relations with Austria. But Colonna was also ordered to sign an offensive and defensive alliance with Murat and to request him to hold his troops in readiness on the frontier in case Austria should invade France. Murat, in consequence of this advice, instructed his Envoy at Vienna to declare that he was resolved to remain faithful to his ally, the Emperor of Austria, and to coöperate with the Powers. Campochiaro was also told to ascertain from Metternich what line of action the Austrian Government intended to follow, since the interests and the true policy of both States demanded that they should be thoroughly united; but he was ordered to give nothing in writing. A courier was sent at the same time to London, bearing a declaration that the events which had just

<sup>34</sup> Angeberg, Vol. II., p. \$12. Déclaration des Puissances signataires du Traité de Paris. Vienne, 13 Mars, 1815.



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Rinieri, Il Congresso, pp. 522, 535. Napoleon left Elba on the evening of February 26, 1815; he landed near Cannes on March 1 and entered Paris on March 20.

occurred would not change the King's policy with regard to England.85 It is a remarkable illustration of the duplicity which seems to have accompanied all Murat's proceedings that on the same day, as it was afterwards discovered, he sent his aide-de-camp, Count de Beauffremont, to France to assure Napoleon that he would support him. 36 A few days later (March 12) he wrote to Lucien Bonaparte, then living in Rome and on whom the Pope had conferred the title of Prince of Canino, to request him to inform Cardinal Pacca that he was resolved to assist the Emperor with his troops and that he would make known to his family and to the world what his sentiments had always been. The Prince was also charged to announce that a portion of the Neapolitan troops would pass through the Papal States on their way towards the north and to express the hope that the Holy Father would not leave Rome. Though Cardinal Pacca was well aware of how Pius VII. intended to act in the case of an invasion, he referred the matter to him and was instructed to reply to the Prince that the Holy Father did not wish the Neapolitan troops to enter his territory and that as soon as they should he should certainly act according as his duty required.87

Count von Miers, the Austrian Ambassador at Naples, gives in a letter to Metternich a graphic description of the state of agitation in which he found Murat on the morning after he had received the news of Napoleon's departure from Elba. He did not seem to know what step to take, or even what he ought to desire. He maintained that Napoleon would have the army and all France on his side and would expel the Bourbons; but he was anxious to know what decision the other Powers, and especially Austria, would take. His ideas were evidently not yet fixed, and he was waiting to see what should be the result of Napoleon's enterprise. Oueen Caroline. on the contrary, who was more prudent and steadfast than Murat. was quite decided as to the course of action which her interests demanded. Though very uneasy with regard to Napoleon's fate, she knew that if he again became Emperor he would depose Murat. She assured Von Miers that the King's policy, therefore, was to unite with Austria, and she declared that she would make every effort to attain that end.88

<sup>35</sup> Rinieri, Il Congresso, p. 543. Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 401. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 18 Marzo, 1815.

<sup>36</sup> Angeberg, II., p. 1,065. Déclaration de la Cour de Vienne sur la conduite du Roi de Naples. Vienne, 12 Avril, 1815.

<sup>37</sup> Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 378. Pacca a Consalvi, Roma, 13 Marzo, 1815.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup> Weil, Joachim Murat, Vol. III., p. 31, p. 472. Le Comte von Miers au Prince von Metternich, Naples, 9 Mars, 1815.

For some days Murat was in the same uncertain, vacillating state of mind, but he at last decided to attack Austria, though Queen Caroline, Von Miers and his more experienced generals and Ministers sought to dissuade him from his mad project. It was pointed out to him that all Europe was resolved to crush Napoleon; that France was exhausted and could render him no assistance; that his army, ill-provided and mostly composed of young soldiers, was much inferior in numbers to that of Austria, which reckoned 450,000 men under arms. Murat was carried away by the conviction that the Italian people would hail him as their liberator; he believed that the Italians detested the domination of Austria; that they were discontented with their various Governments, and that they would rise to follow his standard and be united under his rule.

He still protested that he was resolved to remain faithful to the Austrian alliance, but on March 12 there began a general movement of the Neapolitan troops towards the frontiers, and Count von Miers warned the King that if his army crossed the frontiers of Naples or of the Papal provinces which he held, the alliance would be considered as ended. In consequence, perhaps, of this frank declaration and of the efforts of the Queen and his Ministers, Murat again changed his mind, the advance of the troops was stopped, the official press contradicted the rumors of war which had been spread, and for a few days peace seemed assured. But the announcement on March 15 of Napoleon's triumphal entry into Lyons again inflamed Murat's imagination, and though his Council advised him not to come to any decision until he saw how Napoleon's undertaking would end and the Queen made every effort to persuade him to maintain the alliance with Austria, in which she saw his only chance of success, he resolved to declare war.

He again sent to Lucien Bonaparte a letter to be given to the Pope asking leave for the passage of his troops through the Papal States, and on the following morning, March 19, before any answer could be given, the Neapolitan Consul, Luccari, presented an official demand that two divisions of Neapolitan troops marching to Ancona might be permitted to pass, one in the neighborhood of Rome and the other by way of Terni. The state of the roads through the Abruzzi at that season was alleged as the motive for making this request, and it was promised that the Holy Father should be respected, strict discipline observed by the troops and all provisions paid for. Pius VII. stated in his reply that such a permission would be contrary to the interests of religion, as the Holy See might thereby be drawn into a war, and thus depart from the neutrality which the Pope had always observed as becoming to his ministry of peace and indispensable for the Father of the faithful.

Two days previously Count Crivelli, Murat's Envoy in Rome, but not recognized by the Papal Government, protested to Cardinal Pacca that his Sovereign would not send a soldier into the Papal States, and he forwarded him a letter from the Duca del Gallo, Murat's Minister, dated February 28, assuring him of the King's veneration for the Holy Father. As it was, however, impossible to place any confidence in these declarations, Pius VII. prepared to leave Rome, and the frontiers were carefully watched, so that he might receive timely warning of the approach of the Neapolitan troops and be enabled to make his escape. A commission, formed by Cardinals della Somaglia, Gabrielli and Grizzoni, with Mgr. Rivarola as secretary, was appointed to govern Rome during his absence.<sup>20</sup>

Murat left Naples on March 17 for the headquarters of his army at Ancona, and it was foreseen that the hot-headed enthusiasts by whom he would there be surrounded would soon drive him to his destruction. Nevertheless, if even then he had acted with decision and promptitude and attacked the Austrians at once before they had concentrated their troops, dispersed in many garrisons, and received reinforcements, he might have won a victory which would have caused a rising in his favor throughout all Italy. But he again hesitated and was loath to take a decisive step by declaring openly for Napoleon or for the Allies.40 His first act on reaching Ancona was to make another attempt to conciliate Lord William Bentinck, who was then in command of the English forces at Genoa, assuring him that his policy with regard to France had undergone no change and that he desired to see peace established on a permanent footing between Naples and Great Britain. Bentinck, who had not ceased to be hostile to Murat, had already written to Marshal Count de Bellegarde to ask whether the movements of the Neapolitan troops were to be considered as an act of warfare against Austria, as in that case the armistice between England and Naples, which existed only in consequence of the treaty concluded between Naples and Austria, would come to an end. But the Marshal could only reply that Murat's conduct seemed to him doubtful and that Bentinck ought to ask him to explain it.

While on his way to Ancona Murat had sent orders to the left wing of his army to enter the Papal States, and on the evening of March 21 Prince Colonna di Stigliano crossed the frontier with a company of infantry and a detachment of cavalry and occupied Terracina. He was soon followed by the two divisions of troops

<sup>40</sup> Weil, Joachim Murat, Vol. III., pp. 116, 124, 252.



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 413, Pacca a Consalvi, Roma, 20 Marzo, 1815.
P. 407, Pacca a Consalvi, Roma, 18 Marzo. Weil, Joachim Murat, Vol. III.,
p. 187.

which had been assembled at San Germano and at Fondi, and they advanced towards Rome with the intention of seizing Tuscany and effecting a junction in the Legations with the army commanded by Murat.

Pius VII., accompanied by a few secretaries and servants, left Rome on the following day and reached Florence on the night of Holy Saturday (March 25). He continued his journey on the 29th by Pisa to Leghorn, where he would have wished to embark for Genoa on the English frigate Abonhir. But the captain was obliged to remain at Leghorn to protect the British merchants, and the Holy Father returned to Pisa; then passing by Sarzana, he embarked at Lerici, and after a short stay at Rapallo, entered the port of Genoa on Monday, April 3, and took up his abode in the palace of the Marchese Durazzo. He had been accompanied on his journey by the most enthusiastic manifestations of devotion to his person and of sympathy with his misfortunes on the part of the people, who were indignant at seeing the venerable Pontiff driven for the second time into exile.<sup>41</sup>

Murat's attempt to conciliate England did not succeed. Lord Castlereagh, who had returned to London, informed his Envoy, Cavalier Tocco, that he had no diplomatic position, that no answer could be given in London to his overtures, but that they would be forwarded to Vienna for the decision of the Duke of Wellington and the other plenipotentiaries. The King still continued to hesitate instead of acting, and with the object of gaining time by negotiating, Bellegarde sent General von Stahremberg to Ancona to ask for an explanation of this concentration of troops. Murat gave as his reason the chilling, not to say hostile, reception given to his Envoys at Vienna, which made him think that he was abandoned by Austria and had no other alternative than to make war. knew, indeed, that his forces were inferior to those of Austria, but he asserted that he would have all Italy in his favor, and he stated frankly that he would side with Napoleon.42 The General brought away, therefore, from the audience the conviction that Murat was about to take the field. At a council held on March 27 Murat's Ministers were strongly opposed to any further advance, but his generals were not unanimous on the subject, yet, nevertheless, on the same day he ordered his troops to begin their forward march, though some of his regiments had not as yet arrived and he had not then at his immediate disposal more than 15,000 or 16.000 men.

Two important letters reached Murat that day: one from Ben<sup>41</sup> Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 449. Mgr. Mauri a Consalvi, Genova, <sup>6</sup>

Avril, 1815. 42 Weil, Joachim Murat, Vol. III., pp. 188, 192. tinck demanding an explanation of the military preparations made in the Kingdom of Naples, the other from Joseph Bonaparte, the former King of Spain. It informed him of Napoleon's triumphant march towards Paris, and asked him to unite his troops to those of the Emperor and advance towards the Alps. But the request was unnecessary, as the frontier had already been crossed. To Colonel Dalrymple, who had brought Bentinck's letter, Murat and his Minister, the Duca del Gallo, sought to explain their action by the necessity of taking precautions against the Austrian Government, which they accused of perfidy and duplicity. He also denied that he had any knowledge of Napoleon's plans, or that he intended to form an alliance with France.<sup>48</sup>

The main body of the Neapolitan army continued to advance along the shores of the Adriatic towards the Legations, and the small detachments of Austrian troops which garrisoned the chief towns fell back before it, while Murat's guards marched through the Papal States towards Tuscany without entering Rome. The first shots were exchanged between the Neapolitans and the Austrians on March 30 at the bridge over the Pisatello (the ancient Rubicon). The Austrians resisted until their positions were turned, when they retreated towards Forli and thence to Bologna. On the same day Murat, who at Pesaro had issued a decree by which he declared the Marches to be annexed to the Kingdom of Naples, published an appeal to the Italian people which is known as the Proclamation of Rimini. In it he developed the ideas of the unity and the independence of Italy which he had already done so much to spread throughout the country, and called on the nation to take arms and fight under his leadership. Much discontent then prevailed in Northern Italy with the Governments which had been restored after the fall of Napoleon, as their methods were so much at variance with the revolutionary principles of the administrations formed under French influence, and many volunteers had declared themselves ready to join Murat, who may, perhaps, have been deceived by their apparent ardor, and thereby encouraged to take the field. But this appeal to the people met with no answer; it excited no enthusiasm; it caused no insurrection. In the following years, however, its ideas were adopted by the Revolutionary party in Italy as a guide and programme, and being diffused slowly and persistently among the people by means of the secret societies, produced at last the effect desired by Murat.44



<sup>48</sup> Rinieri, Il Congresso, p. 544. Weil, Joachim Murat, Vol. III., p. 213.
44 Weil, Joachim Murat, Vol. III., pp. 259, 504. This proclamation is believed to have been drawn up by Count Pellegrino Rossi, who was afterwards the Constitutional Minister of Pius IX. and was assassinated in Rome in 1848.

The Austrians still continued to retreat and offered a serious resistance to the Neapolitans only for a short time on the banks of the Panaro near Modena, but any hopes of ultimate success which Murat might have formed were dispelled by the circular which Lord William Bentinck sent from Turin on April 7 to all the commanders of the naval and military forces of England in Italy, informing them that the armistice between England and Naples had been terminated by the hostilities between Austria and Naples and that they should thenceforth assist the Austrians. This declaration was posted throughout Lombardy and Venitia and contributed very efficaciously to repress whatever tendency towards a general rising in favor of Murat might have existed.

Murat's successes did not last long, and the Austrian troops soon ceased to retreat, his attack on the fortified bridge over the River Po at Occhiobello was repulsed, he failed to take the citadel of Ferrara defended by General Lauer, and the Austrians, having received reënforcements, stopped the further progress of the Neapolitan army. Murat's illusions had at last disappeared, the few victories he had gained had produced no practical result, the thousands of volunteers on whom he had reckoned had not answered to his call, the Austrian forces were being rapidly concentrated and augmented, and it was evident that if he wished to save his kingdom he should at once bring this disastrous war to an end. He, therefore, held a council of war at Bologna on April 13, at which both his Ministers and his generals unanimously acknowledged the impossibility of continuing the campaign, and it was resolved to collect the troops which had been dispersed over too widely extended a line and retreat upon Ancona. The same order was sent to the two divisions which had passed through the Papal territory, without, however, entering Rome, invaded Tuscany and occupied Florence, whence the Grand Duke had fled at their approach. This army, owing to the want of energy of the officers who led it, never went beyond Pistoia, where Field Marshal Lieutenant Count Nugent, who commanded the Austrian troops in Tuscany, had retrenched a small body of men and checked their advance.45

The limits of this article will only allow room for a short sketch of the fall of Murat and the tragic end of his career. In his retreat towards Ancona he was followed along the shores of the Adriatic by the troops under Field Marshal Lieutenant Count von Neipperg, while Field Marshal Lieutenant Baron Bianchi led another army through Tuscany and the Papal States to intercept him on his way back to the Kingdom of Naples, and Count Nugent advanced towards Rome. Murat's position would have enabled him to hinder

<sup>45</sup> Weil, Joachim Murat, Vol. III., p. 428, p. 456.

the junction of the forces of Bianchi and Neipperg, but he failed to act with decision and promptitude, and thus lost a favorable opportunity of retrieving his fortunes.

The column commanded by Bianchi came up with Murat's troops, which had passed through Ancona, at the little town of Tolentino, and a battle took place there which lasted two days (May 2 and 3). The Neapolitans fought bravely and carried many of the Austrian advanced posts, but the incapacity of some of Murat's generals made him lose the advantages which he had at first obtained, and, discouraged by his want of success, he gave orders to retreat, though the battle was far from being lost.46 On the next day Murat established some order among his soldiers and continued his retreat towards the frontiers of his kingdom, closely pursued by a part of the Austrian army, while the main body under Bianchi took the direction of Central Italy, in order to cut him off from Naples. As Murat advanced his army broke up, his soldiers deserted, and when on May 17 he inspected in the neighborhood of Capua what still remained of his troops he found only about 3,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry, all demoralized and discontented and more ready to lay down their arms than to fight. Seeing the uselessness of further resistance, he sent the Duca del Gallo to negotiate with Bianchi, and published a Constitution which had long been promised, but it came too late to save his dynasty. He then gave the command of the army to General Carrascosa and returned to Naples.

At the interview of Murat's envoy with Bianchi, Neipperg and Lord Barghersh (the English Minister at Florence) he was informed that there could be no negotiation and that the King should abdicate in favor of Ferdinand IV., and on May 20, at Casalanza, Generals Carrascosa and Colletta signed an agreement with the Austrian leaders, by which the kingdom was surrendered, to be restored by them to the Bourbon King and a general amnesty guaranteed. Murat had left his palace on the previous night, and accompanied by some friends had sailed for Jaëta, but had been obliged to take refuge at Ischia. Two days later he embarked on a small vessel in which some of his generals were returning to France and was landed at Cannes. Napoleon refused to receive him and ordered him to remain at Grenoble, whence after Waterloo he fled to Corsica. Metternich let him know that he would be allowed to settle in Austria, but he preferred to make an attempt to excite an insurrection in the Kingdom of Naples. It is probable that he had received letters from Naples asserting that everything was ready for a revolution and giving him assurances of assistance. It has also been asserted that he was the victim of a cunningly

<sup>46</sup> Weil, Joachim Murat, Vol. IV., p. 370.

devised plot. On September 29, 1815, he left Corsica with about 250 men on board six small vessels, but they were scattered by a storm, and he landed at Pizzo, a small town on the coast of Calabria, on October 8 with only about thirty followers. The people refused to rise, they disarmed his soldiers and made him prisoner. On October 13 he was tried by court-martial, condemned to death and shot half an hour later.<sup>47</sup>

Before returning to Rome Pius VII. revisited Savona, where he had been so long imprisoned, and crowned the Statue of Our Lady of Mercy, the patroness of the town, venerated in a church in the Valle di San Bernardo, four miles distant. On May 18 he left Genoa, and after visiting Turin, he passed through Piacenza, Parma, Modena and Florence and reëntered Rome on June 7.

At the Congress of Vienna the conflicting claims of the ex-Empress Maria Louisa and of the ex-Queen of Etruria had already been settled. The compromise, suggested by Metternich, which he had charged Castlereagh to submit to Louis XVIII., when passing through Paris, had been accepted by the King. The Duchies of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla were to be given to the ex-Empress for her lifetime, and at her death were to return to the ex-Queen, who in the meantime was to hold Lucca, which should then be annexed to the Grand Duchy of Tuscany. Cardinal Consalvi was thus somewhat relieved from the apprehension that the Legations might be employed as compensation for either of these claimants,48 but the fate of Pontecorvo and Benevento, the two Papal territories situated within the frontiers of the Kingdom of Italy, was not yet decided. The Emperor Alexander had demanded that Pontecorvo should be given to Prince Eugene, and the Congress had consented, but the Prince had declined to accept it and had asked that the matter should be allowed to rest until the close of the war about to be declared against Napoleon. As to Benevento, Talleyrand seemed to have succeeded in retaining it, probably with reversion after his death to King Ferdinand IV.49 Even with regard to the Legations. Consalvi was still uncertain, for he was warned that the Legations would not be restored to the Holy Father until he had consented to abandon all claim to Avignon, Benevento and Pontecorvo, a proposal which he rejected with indignation. 50

48 See Note 13. Talleyrand Correspondance inédite, p. 306. Le Roi au Prince de Talleyrand de Paris le 3 Mars, 1815.

50 Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 529. Comsalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 30 Aprile, 1815.

<sup>47</sup> Weil, Joachim Murat, Vol. V., p. 201. J. Chavagnon and Georges Saint-Yves, Joachim Murat (1761-1815), Paris, 1905, pp. 287, 296. Marquis de Sassenay, Les derniers mois de Murat, Paris, 1896, p. 279.

<sup>49</sup> Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 472. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 12 Aprile, 1815. Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 600. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 15 Maggio, 1815.

In fact, as Cardinal Consalvi remarks, with the exception of the Pope, all the Italian Princes had gained something by the Congress. He alone was still in danger of losing irretrievably what his predecessor had been obliged to yield to the French Republicans. After long discussions with Metternich on May 15 and May 19 Consalvi perceived that the Congress was still acting on the principle which it had already laid down, that whatever had been won from the French belonged to the Allied Powers, and that what they allotted to each claimant was to be accepted as a gift and not as a restitu-They also looked upon the Sovereign Pontiff, who wished to observe a strict neutrality, as useless for the defense of Italy, and they therefore considered that they were acting very generously towards him by giving him back the Marches and the Legations.<sup>51</sup> The Austrian generals, it is true, who had retaken the Marches from Murat, had left the civil administration in the hands of the Papal delegates, though full possession had not yet been officially restored, but the Legations had not been given up; Ferdinand IV. of Naples and Talleyrand still claimed Pontecorvo and Benevento, and Austria insisted on retaining, with a view to strengthening its frontier, a portion of the Legation of Ferrara, situated to the north of the Po, with a population of 39,620 inhabitants and a revenue of 80,000 crowns a year. It also demanded the right of permanently maintaining garrisons in Ferrara and Comacchio.

The chief obstacle to the restoration to the Pope of the Duchv of Pontecorvo was the Emperor of Russia, who offered much resistance, as he wished that that territory should be allotted to Prince Eugene, but he finally consented that the Prince should accept a large sum of money instead. The restitution of the Principality of Benevento, also situated in the Kingdom of Naples, was strongly opposed by Talleyrand, who, as Cardinal Consalvi proves, had intrigued from the beginning of the Congress in order to retain this State which Napoleon had conferred on him in 1806 at the expense of Pius VII. The Congress had given Benevento to King Ferdinand under pretext of abolishing the enclaves (see note 1), but by a secret article in a treaty between Austria and the King it was to be transferred by him to Talleyrand as the price of the help he had given him to regain his throne. This was the origin of the threat made by the Congress that the Legations should not be restored to the Holy Father unless he consented to give up Benevento, and according to the treaty it was to revert to the King on the death of Talleyrand.52

<sup>1815.

52</sup> Rinieri, Corrispondenza, pp. 567, 574. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 9 Maggio, 1815. Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 600. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 15 Maggio, 1815.



<sup>51</sup> Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 607. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 15 Maggio,

In order to obtain the recognition of the rights of the Holy See, Consalvi was at last obliged to remind Metternich of the powers which the Pope held as Suzerain of Naples. The Normans, who conquered the southern provinces of Italy in the eleventh century, had made them a fief of the Church, for which the King did homage to the Pope,<sup>58</sup> and the Cardinal stated frankly that if King Ferdinand, who had taken that oath of allegiance, persisted in unjustly retaining the two provinces in question, the Sovereign Pontiff would declare that his kingdom was forfeited and would grant the investiture to the Emperor of Austria, or to an Austrian Archduke or to a Spanish Prince, one of whom would not fail to accept it.<sup>54</sup>

Talleyrand seems, however, to have feared to incur the censures of the Church by openly retaining its possessions; he made, therefore, an agreement by which the King was to hold Benevento and pay him an income equal to the amount which it annually produced. So As the Cardinal very well remarks: "It was a most disgraceful intrigue."

In the last days of May Consalvi was assured that at the close of the Congress the Marches and the Legations would be restored to the Holy Father, but the fate of Benevento and Pontecorvo still remained undecided, though the Austrian generals who had driven out Murat's troops had allowed the Papal administration to be reëstablished, as they had received no instructions with regard to the matter and they thought that such was the will of the Government.

The Allied Sovereigns had already left Vienna for the headquarters of the armies about to invade France, and their Ministers remained to sign the draft of the treaty known as the treaty of Vienna, by which the Congress ended its labors. Consalvi's anxiety as to the restoration of all the possessions of the Holy See, of which he had still reason to doubt, was not finally dispelled until June 12, when Prince Metternich sent him the draft of the artices in which the Powers which had signed the Treaty of Paris had dealt with the States of the Church. According to their decision, the Marches, along with the Duchy of Camerino, Benevento, Pontecorvo and their dependencies, together with the three Legations, except the northern portion of the Legation of Ferrara, were to be restored to the Holy See. The Emperor of Austria was to have the right to place garrisons in Ferrara and Comacchio and by a secret article added to the treaty the Holy Father agreed to pay 1,700,000 frances

Exinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 602. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 15 Maggio, 1815.



<sup>58</sup> See the AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW for July, 1906, p. 421.
54 Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 644. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 28 Maggio,

(\$340,000) towards the expenses of the war by which the States of the Church had been recovered. The Pope also agreed to accept a territory close to his States in exchange for the Duchy of Benevento, in case the King of Naples should wish it. As Cardinal Consalvi could not obtain an indemnity for Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin, which had been assigned to France by the Treaty of Paris, or for the part of the Legation of Ferrara, annexed by Austria, or for the Austrian garrisons placed in Ferrara and Comacchio, he presented to the Congress on June 14 a formal protest in the name of the Sovereign Pontiff and of the Holy See against the measures which it had adopted contrary to their rights. Another and not less arduous struggle was necessary before Consalvi could persuade Metternich to restore the possessions of the Holy See at the end of four weeks. He had intended to give them up only on the conclusion of a general peace. Consalvi then learned from Metternich the details of the bargain which had been made with Talleyrand, who in order that Benevento might be restored to the Pope, had been persuaded to renounce all claim to it and accept compensation in money. He had demanded 6,000,000 of francs for this concession, but Metternich remarked that he would be made to accept two millions, of which the King of Naples would provide 1,500,000 and the Pope 500,000.86

The diplomatic talent, the unflinching courage and the unwearied perseverance of Cardinal Consalvi had at last prevailed over the indifference of some of the members of the Congress and the undisguised hostility of others, the efforts of the Revolution to destroy the temporal power had been frustrated and the States of the Church had been restored to the Holy Father. But the Cardinal's foresight and his knowledge of the spirit prevailing throughout Europe did not allow him to believe in the permanency of the settlement effected by the Congress, and before leaving Vienna he warned the Papal Government of the dangers which it would have to face on retaking possession of the Marches and the Legations and the great prudence that should accompany all its measures. The majority of the people, it is true, had shown by its refusal to join Murat that it desired the return of the Papal Government, but the persons who had been employed by the Napoleonic administration were imbued with the principles of the Revolution; they were for the most part Freemasons, and would always be hostile to the Papacy. It should be remembered that the Holy See had lost the Marches for eight years and the Legations for twenty and that during that time the morals of the population had been corrupted, its manners, its cus-

<sup>56</sup> Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 716. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 12 Gingno, 1815.

toms and its ideas had been completely changed. It would be impossible to reëstablish the old order of things in those provinces, and if any attempt were made to do so, or if any blunders were made, they would not be kept for six months. He recommended, therefore, the formation of provisional governments, so as to effect a gradual transition back to Papal institutions and to change the actual state of affairs at first as little as possible.<sup>57</sup>

Cardinal Consalvi returned to Rome on July 2 and resumed his former position as Secretary of State. He undertook a complete reorganization of the administration of the Papal States, and the Pope's Motu proprio of July 6, 1816, approved the changes which he introduced. It announced that five new codes of law should be drawn up; it defined clearly the powers of the various tribunals and it placed the finances on a stronger footing. Many of the reforms established by the French during their occupation of Rome were retained.

In consequence of the sufferings which the Revolution had inflicted on the Church throughout Europe, ecclesiastical affairs also required to be reorganized. The example was given by the King of France, Louis XVIII., whose Ambassador, M. de Blacas, was charged with the negotiation of a new Concordat, which was signed on June 11, 1817. It reëstablished the Concordat of 1516 between Leo X. and Francis I., thereby repealing that of 1801, and it abrogated the Articles Organiques in so far as they were opposed to the doctrine and laws of the Church. It preserved, however, the sees which had then been created and reëstablished a certain number of those which had been suppressed, and it promised to endow them all with real estate or money as soon as it should be possible to do so. The French Chamber of Deputies rejected this Concordat on the ground that it was opposed to the liberties of the Gallican Church, and though, after further negotiations, it consented in 1821 to an arrangement between Pius VII. and the King, by which the Bishoprics should be increased to eighty, fourteen of which were to be metropolitan and sixty-six suffragan, the new Concordat never became law and that of 1801 continued to exist.58

Other Concordats followed that with France; one was concluded with Piedmont in August, 1817, by which the number of dioceses was increased to nineteen, and Russia made one for the Polish

<sup>58</sup> Artand de Montor, Histoire du Pape Pie VII., Paris, 1836. Vol. II., pp. 478, 489, 450. Alzog, Manual of Universal Church History, 1887, Vol. IV., p. 161. By later concessions the clergy obtained the right to accept gifts of real estate, and 3,900,000 francs were granted them to ameliorate their position.



<sup>57</sup> Rinieri, Corrispondenza, p. 732. Consalvi a Pacca, Vienna, 12 Gingno, 1815.

provinces in January, 1818. In February of the same year a Concordat with Naples removed certain restrictions on episcopal jurisdiction and allowed the fullest freedom of communication with Rome, and in 1821 a Concordat with Prussia effected some changes in the distribution of suffragans among the metropolitan sees.

The reëstablishment of the Society of Jesus had been one of the first acts of Pius VII. on returning to Rome in 1814. In Russia it had been already restored in 1801 and in Naples in 1805, and in answer to the demand of the whole Catholic world, its complete restoration was granted on August 7 by the Bull Sollicitudo omnium Ecclesiarum.

Pius VII. had now become much enfeebled by age; he could hardly move without assistance, and in the early part of July, by a fall in his room, he fractured his leg. The doctors tried to conceal from him the danger of his accident, but he at once insisted on receiving the last sacraments. Nearly a month of suffering, patiently borne, followed, and on August 20 he expired, aged eighty-one years and six days, after reigning twenty-three years, five months and six days.

More fortunate than his predecessor, Pius VII., after struggling like him against the violence of the Revolution, had seen it at last vanquished; he did not die a prisoner and in exile. The Revolution, crushed for a time, renewed its attacks against his successors; its spirit now prevails in many lands and seeks to destroy all trace of Christianity; but the Church must eventually triumph, and though at the present moment further evils seem to be threatened, we may hope that Pius X. may live to witness another and an equally glorious restoration of the independence of the Papacy.

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## UNIVERSITY EDUCATION IN IRELAND.

Dublin University Commission Reports, 1878, 1903, 1907.

"Ireland and the Home Rule Movement," by Michael F. J. McDonnell. Dublin: Maunsel & Co., 1908.

"University Teaching," by John Henry Cardinal Newman. Longmans, 1908.

RINITY COLLEGE, Dublin," writes Mr. McDonnell, in his "Ireland and the Home Rule Question," "was founded by Queen Elizabeth with the proceeds of confiscated Catholic lands, both monastic and lay, with the avowed intention of propagating the principles of the Protestant religion"—"Protestant" in this case meaning the principles of the Episcopalian Church of Ireland. "The Commissioners," so runs a statement submitted by a committee of the Synod of the Church of Ireland, "will be aware that Trinity College has since its foundation been the school in which the Irish clergy have been trained. The supply of clergy to the Irish Church is stated in the statutes to have been the principal object for which Trinity College was founded. The Fellows were not only, with two or three exceptions, obliged, on pain of deprivation, to take holy orders, but on their election each took an oath that he would make theology the main object of his studies."

Setting aside, for later reference, the prominence given to theology in the statutes and practice of "The College of the Holy and Undivided Trinity of Queen Elizabeth, near Dublin," it may be objected to the above statements that they represent a condition of affairs which must necessarily have come to an end, in principle, if not in fact, with the passing of the "Act to abolish Tests in Trinity College and the University of Dublin" (26th May, 1873). [The reader will kindly note the official distinction as being important.]

The terms of the preamble are worth quoting:

"Whereas, It is expedient that the benefits of Trinity College and the University of Dublin, and of the schools in the said university as places of religion and learning, should be rendered freely accessible to the nation;

"And whereas, by means of divers restrictions, tests and disabilities many of Her Majesty's subjects are debarred from the full enjoyment of the same;

"And whereas, it is expedient that such restrictions, tests and disabilities should be removed;

"Be it therefore enacted" . . . to the above effect.

As far, therefore, as Parliamentary intentions go, Trinity College



<sup>- 1</sup> P. 132.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Dublin Univ. Com. Rep., 1878, p. 61 (App. VI.).

<sup>\*</sup> Ibid, p. 101 (App. XXV.).

and the University of Dublin ceased in principle to be "sectarian" with the passing of the "University of Dublin Tests Act, 1873."

Before considering to what extent, if any, Trinity College ceased at that date, or any later one, to be as "sectarian" in fact and in spirit as it had always been, some explanation of the phrase "University of Dublin," as distinct from Trinity, may be in order. It can be given in a few lines, quoted from Mr. Michael McDonnell's "Ireland and the Home Rule Question," already referred to and to which, in passing, the present writer desires to acknowledge his indebtedness. "The Charter of James I.," he writes,4 "conferring on Dublin the privilege of a university foreshadowed the establishment of other colleges. Both the Act of Settlement, 14 and 15 Car. II. (1660), and the Roman Catholic Relief Act, 1703, expressly authorize the erection of another college in the university—a fact which makes the proposed change [now happily accomplished] which partisans are anxious to paint as revolutionary vandalism, appear in truth merely the belated performance of a long-expressed intention." It may be added that the reports of the Dublin University Commission fully bear out the contention as to the foundation or addition of other colleges to constitute with Trinity the University of Dublin.

To return, however, to the question: Has Trinity College ceased to be as "sectarian" in fact and in spirit as it ever was? We are again indebted for a reply to Mr. McDonnell, who, it will be seen, is careful to give chapter and verse for his assertions. At an inaugural meeting of the College Historical Society some years ago, he tells us, "Judge Webb declared: "Their university was founded by Protestants, for Protestants and in the Protestant interest. A Protestant spirit had from the first animated every member of its body corporate. At the present moment, with all its toleration . . . the genius loci, the guardian spirit of the place, was Protestant." If once more for "Protestant" we read "Protestant Episcopal" (Church of Ireland), the objections, not of Catholics alone, but of Presbyterians and others, to the practical identification of Trinity College with the University of Dublin becomes easily comprehensible.

"It is often alleged," Mr. McDonnell writes elsewhere,<sup>5</sup> "that the anxiety of the Irish for other facilities for higher education than are at present afforded arises from their priest-ridden condition and that the clergy urge the demand only in order that they may obtain more power than they already possess. The conditions in University College (Jesuit) are," he proceeds, "some answer to



<sup>4</sup> Op. cit., p. 189.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> P. 184.

this charge." The final settlement of the question, a college without tests or a national university, as accepted by the Irish Catholic hierarchy, is more than a complete refutation of it. "The shifts of intolerance," he adds, pertinently," "are many, but I cannot believe that it will long continue to masquerade in this manner as the statesmanlike buffer between a priest-ridden country and an aggressive clergy." Events have justified his confidence.

The official reports of the Dublin University Commission, as it may be most conveniently called, fully bear out, as already indicated, Mr. McDonnell's above quoted statements. Thus, in 1903 there were, according to the Commissioners, "two universities in Ireland, viz., the University of Dublin, of which Trinity College, Dublin, is the only college, and the Royal University of Ireland," founded under the University Education (Ireland) Act of 1879, a university, according to the same authority, "whose sole function it is to conduct examinations." The Commissioners, we may add, go on to point out "the evils which are well nigh inseparable from a university which is no more than an examining board."10

The Commissioners, indeed, are careful to refer to one such evil which in the present connection is the most vital of all, namely, the religious difficulty.11 After pointing out that "Roman Catholics do not avail themselves, to any considerable extent, of the existing Stateendowed colleges," they show the result to be at that date that "the Roman Catholics of Ireland, forming 74 per cent. of the whole population, a large number of whom are interested in the question, are as a body unprovided with any adequately endowed university education, of which they are willing to avail themselves." Taking into account Judge Webb's "expert evidence" in regard to the Protestantism of Trinity and the Catholic objection on principle to the divorce between religious and secular education represented by the Queen's colleges, we may, I think, fairly substitute "conscientiously able" for "willing to avail themselves." Nor do the terms on which the Mahommedan University at Khartoum received its charter fail to materially strengthen this contention.

"Whether they [the Catholic hierarchy] were right or not," the Commissioners continue,12 "this state of affairs exists; it is disastrous to the interests of education," the result being that "a comparatively small number of the Irish population go to college at all;" the royal university, "though created to meet the religious difficulty,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> P. 144. <sup>7</sup> P. 145.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Rep., 1903, p. 8.

P. 22. 10 P. 23.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Pp. 25, sqq. 12 P. 27.

has neither solved the difficulty nor satisfied educational needs. The kind of literary education which the Royal University promotes has been pushed beyond due limits and has become a source of weakness rather than of strength to the country. More than one Chief Secretary," they conclude, "has confessed that in making appointments he has found it difficult to find among the candidates well-qualified Roman Catholics."<sup>18</sup>

Whether the religious difficulty, which, as the Commissioners admit, is "the chief cause of this failure," may or may not be justly dismissed as a "scrupple," they at least bear witness to the readiness of the Irish Catholic hierarchy to meet the exigencies of the situation. "It is right to point out," they proceed,14 "that the last official statement of the Bishops . . . does not insist on the strict denominationalism formerly demanded." At this point we may leave the report in question to the closer study of those interested in the details of the subject, only adding that, in respect of the vexed question of a Department of Irish Studies, the Commissioners display the same fairness and even generosity of judgment which characterizes the whole document. "We do not think it necessary," they say, 15 "to do more than to record our concurrence with the opinion unanimously expressed by the witnesses that an Irish university should encourage and make adequate provision for a department of Irish studies."

The final report of the Royal Commission on Trinity College, Dublin, and the University of Dublin, issued in 1907, while of no less interest than those already referred to, naturally covers very much the same ground. It may, therefore, be left to the student of details, there being one matter, at least, if not two, of more immediate interest to be considered as succinctly as may be adequate to their importance.

The first and most immediate of these is the question: On what principle do Catholics demand a university or college as "Catholic in atmosphere" as Trinity College is Protestant? Or, in other words, on what principle do they insist on including theology among the subjects necessarily to be taught at such a national institution?

One answer might, obviously enough, be given in the contention that Trinity College, professedly "national," was for nearly three centuries—1592 to 1869—primarily and actually theological of a particular type, and that, further, it was over this very question, as the report of 1878 shows, that the chief difficulties in regard to Trinity by the Irish Church Discstablishment Act of 1869 arose.

<sup>18</sup> P. 29.

<sup>14</sup> P. 88.

<sup>15</sup> P. 57.

On the principle, however, that one wrong—if it be a wrong, which is by no means conceded—does not justify another wrong, the above answer can hardly be considered as adequate or satisfactory. The example of Trinity in this respect is indeed chiefly interesting as indicating the attitude of orthodox sixteenth century State Protestantism toward theology, considered as a department of knowledge, an attitude which, it may fairly be contended, was to all intents and purposes maintained at least till the middle or later years of the nineteenth. It is the attitude, in a word, which regards theology not only as one of many branches of knowledge, but as the supreme, the most important and the most necessary of them all.

In this connection, therefore, and also in search, as we may say, of an incidental explanation of Irish Catholic insistence on a "Catholic atmosphere" in a national university, we cannot do better than refer to Newman as to a master alike both of theology—in its widest signification—and of the theory, practice and principles of university education.

"Even the question of the union," he writes on page 8, "of theology with the secular sciences . . . simple as it is of solution in the abstract, has, according to difference of circumstances, been at different times differently decided." He even goes so far as to admit (on page 9) that "a system of what is called secular education, in which theology and the sciences are taught separately, may in a particular place or time be the least of evils," a purely secular university less dangerous to faith than one governed by a religious spirit antagonistic to the convictions of the minority. It is not, however, that he approves of such a system, and his definition, it should be noted, does not by any means connote that total exclusion of the religious element which has come to be associated with the notion of "secular education."

But he goes farther than this, and along lines intimately connected with the subject, as with the actual condition of Irish university education. Whatever may or may not be tolerable under the exigencies of circumstances, and the Church, as he shows, has made very generous concessions, at one period or another, there is one rule, and only one, to which Catholics must yield a ready and willing submission. "Ecclesiastical authority," he writes on page 10, "not argument is the supreme rule and the appropriate guide for Catholics in matters of religion." If so, and if education be, as it is for Catholics and indeed for all Christians, essentially a matter of religion, then the attitude actually assumed by the Irish Catholic hierarchy toward the Government's national university disposes once and for all of any charges of clerical instigation or of clerical domi-

nation over the movement which has culminated in that tardy and long-delayed matter of simple and elementary justice; the recognition of Catholic Ireland's claim to such facilities of higher education as it can conscientiously make use of.

"It is the fashion," Newman writes elsewhere, "to erect so-called universities without making any provision in them at all for theological chairs. . . . Such a procedure," he does not hesitate to say, "seems to me an intellectual absurdity," and goes far to explain his reason for making the assertion, basing it on the very name "university" as an institution professing to teach universal knowledge, of which "theology is surely a branch," and one that cannot logically be excluded. "I cannot," he continued, "so construct my definition of the subject matter of university knowledge and so draw my boundary lines around it as to include therein the other sciences commonly studied at universities and to exclude the science of religion."

If, therefore, the reasonableness and logic of Newman's contention for the inclusion of theology among the necessary elements of university teaching he conceded, the objection of Irish Catholics, not less to the "godless Queen's colleges" than to Protestant Trinity and their claim to a university which, by including theology, should accord with their cherished convictions—a claim, let it be remembered, unhesitatingly admitted in the case of the Mahommedans of Khartoum—becomes at least comprehensible. Nor, even supposing that theology, in the strict, technical sense, were not taught as such at the Irish national university, the mere concession of a Catholic, that is, of a religious "atmosphere," leaves the argument, to all intents and purposes, no less valid. For, as Newman rightly says,18 "the word 'God' is a theology in itself, indivisibly one, inexhaustibly various, from the vastness and simplicity of its meaning." It follows that any university which even tacitly, much more, openly, acknowledges the place of God in education to that extent, at least, may be said to include theology among the necessary elements of universal knowledge.

It is true, of course, that "the religious world, as it is styled, holds, generally speaking, that religion consists not in knowledge, but in feeling or sentiment." Hence, presumably, the apparent willingness of even professedly religious persons and communities to relegate religion, and particularly theology, to a domain wholly distinct from all that they conceive to be education. Hence, also, we may further assume, the unwillingness, to put it mildly, of the State to assist the institutions which remain loyal to the older

<sup>16</sup> P. 18.

<sup>18</sup> P. 25.

<sup>17</sup> P. 24.

and more logical notion of universal knowledge and include theology among the necessary subjects of their teaching. It may be of some little service, therefore, to present, however inadequately, both the case for the Irish National University and the principles on which it rests. And for this reason, that if the claim here made on behalf of theology of the older Catholic notion of university teaching be conceded and the State's duty in regard to such institutions admitted, consequences of vital issue to the welfare of education in Canada must, or at least should, ensue.

To this point, however, I hope to return presently. It may be permissible, as it seems necessary, before doing so, to make certain further references to Newman. He lays it down, to begin with,<sup>20</sup> "that all knowledge forms one whole, because its subject matter is one," and that "we cannot separate portion from portion . . . except by a mental abstraction." Again: "I say, then, that the systematic omission of any one science from the catalogue prejudices the accuracy and completeness of our knowledge altogether, and that in proportion to its importance."<sup>21</sup> From this rule, it should be noted, he does not except even theology.

"If to blot out man's agency," he writes elsewhere,22 "is to deface the book of knowledge on the supposition of that agency existing, what must it be, supposing it exists, to blot out the agency of God?" In yet another noteworthy passage he argues for the acceptance of the same conclusion28 on the principle that "if the various branches of knowledge which are the matter of teaching in a university so hang together that none can be neglected without prejudice to the perfection of the rest, and if theology be a branch of knowledge . . . to what conclusion are we brought . . . this? that to withdraw theology from the public schools is to impair the completeness and to invalidate the trustworthiness of all that is actually taught in them." And since on Newman's own showing the very word "God" is a theology in itself, a theology which is contained in, expressed and symbolized by the term "religious atmosphere," then, obviously, any system of university teaching which admits among its necessary subjects the notion of God, which has an atmosphere or spirit which can be described as religious, is a university within the meaning of Newman's, that is, of the Catholic definition of the term.

Nor does the nature or denomination of the theology here defined or assumed affect the issue in any material degree. The Irish Catholic hierarchy never questioned the right of Trinity College to make Protestant Episcopal theology a part of its teaching—for Protestant Episcopalians. They simply denied Trinity's right to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> P. 49. <sup>21</sup> P. 50.

monopolize either the name or the office of the "University of Dublin"—so far as the Catholic majority of the population of Ireland was affected by such a monopoly. And the real basis of their claim to possess a university (or college in a university) as Catholic in "atmosphere" as Trinity is Protestant, is this, that "religious knowledge is not only a portion, but a condition of general knowledge. To blot it out is nothing short . . . of unraveling the web of university teaching."<sup>24</sup> More; "a refusal to recognize theological truth in a course of Universal Knowledge" results not only in "the loss of theology," but also in "the perversion of the other sciences."<sup>25</sup>

But if this be the principle governing the system existing not only at Trinity College and at the Irish (Catholic) National University, but also at the Mahommedan College of Khartoum, a principle recognized, tacitly if not formally, as valid by the State which has made grants to all three, what possible application, it may reasonably be asked, can it have to the conditions of Canadian university education? To such a question I would make bold to answer: As much as it has to Irish or Soudanese conditions, and no less.

If, that is to say, theology, a mere "religious atmosphere," even the simple notion of God, the principle of the oneness and indivisibility of knowledge be admitted, as it is in the cases here referred to and forms no insurmountable barrier to State endowment and State assistance, why should it not apply equally to those educational institutions in Canada which in this respect fall into precisely the same category as Trinity College, the Irish National University and the Mahommedan University of Khartoum? If, in other words, the British State recognizes, endows and assists universities which, by including theology among their necessary subjects, thereby become "sectarian," as it is the fashion to call them, why should not the Canadian State, Federal or Provincial, be at least as generous?

That, it would seem, is the point to which a review of university education in Ireland inevitably leads, and at which the matter, without attempted discussion of details or of manifest principles, advantages and consequences may preferably be left. It only remains to apologize, should apology appear to be required, first, for the somewhat numerous and extensive quotations, but chiefly for the presumption that may possibly be taken to underlie a conclusion which, as has been said, can on the lines here laid down hardly be avoided.

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<sup>24</sup> Newman, op. cit., p. 68.

## CHURCH AND STATE.

A FTER the death in 395 of Theodosius the Great the empire, in accordance with the precedents of more than a century, was partitioned between the two sons of the late ruler, Arcadius, the elder, governing from Constantinople, under the guardianship of Rufinus, and Honorius, a mere child, from Milan and later Ravenna, under the guardianship of Stilicho.

The partition of the empire on this occasion was destined to be of more than ordinary moment, for never again were the two portions of what then formed the Roman State to be united under one chief. The fifth century, therefore, opens a new era in the long history of the empire, the chief characteristic of which, in the ecclesiastical domain, is the gradually increasing strain on the good relations of Western and Eastern Christendom, a strain which was eventually to culminate in a permanent rupture.

In previous papers, we have seen, these misunderstandings between East and West are traceable in the main to the usurpation by the Emperors of powers to which the Constitution of the Church gave them not the shadow of a claim as well as to the successive heresies and schisms which divided the forces of the Eastern episcopate. At the beginning of the fifth century the Eastern situation was for the moment tranquil, but soon it was destined to become worse than ever, owing to the keen rivalry between Alexandria and the capital and the outbreak of new heresies which still further embittered the contest for supremacy in Eastern Christendom between the ecclesiastical Pharaoh and the Bishop of Constantinople. Before the reign of Arcadius the struggle between Alexandria and Constantinople had reached no definite issue, although Alexandria, in compelling the withdrawal of St. Gregory Nazianzen from the capital, for the moment held the advantage. But the issue was far from decided when in 308 St. John Chrysostom, against the will of the Patriarch of Alexandria, Theophilus, was called from Antioch to fill the episcopal throne of Constantinople, left vacant by the death of the insignificant Nectarius.

The new Bishop of Constantinople had long been famous in the Orient for the eloquence of his preaching in the Cathedral of Antioch. His coming to the capital was consequently awaited with the greatest interest. That he was not at all overrated was at once apparent, and in a short time Constantinople was, if possible, more enthusiastic than had been Antioch over the golden-tongued orator.

But Chrysostom, to the inconvenience of some of his clergy, proved a strict disciplinarian, a fact which resulted in the formation among them of a party ill disposed to his administration. This

hostility would probably have been of little moment had Chrysostom continued to enjoy the favor of the court. But the Bishop's severe strictures on reprehensible customs in high places soon aroused the anger of influential personages in the entourage of the Empress Eudoxia, a circumstance which raised him new and powerful enemies. Certain Bishops also, who loitered around the capital, at the head of whom was the aged Acacius of Berea, were not at all admirers of his austerities, and only awaited an opportunity of openly taking part with his opponents.

Such was the situation when towards the end of the year 401 a deputation of Egyptian monks arrived in Constantinople, seeking the protection of the Bishop of the capital city from persecution they complained of suffering at the hands of Theophilus, Patriarch of Alexandria, on the charge of Origenism. Chrysostom refused to interfere in the case, save to intercede in their behalf with Theophilus. But Theophilus would brook no interference and curtly told Chrysostom that this affair was beyond his jurisdiction; at the same time he sent to Constantinople a second group of monks with accusations against the first. The accused monks now appealed to the civil tribunal, and with such success that their accusers were convicted of calumny and Theophilus himself was cited to appear in Constantinople to give an account of himself.

But this first check did not in the least discourage Theophilus. His partisans at Constantinople were numerous and influential, whereas, on the other hand, the court circle was daily growing more and more discontented with the strictures of John. Biding his time at Alexandria until conditions at the capital were almost wholly favorable to his cause, Theophilus finally embarked, with a large following of Bishops, and made no secret of his intention to depose the Bishop of Constantinople.

His calculations in this respect were not at all rashly formed. The prestige of his high office instantly made him in Constantinople the leader of the opposition to Chrysostom. Even the civil authorities, who had called him to account for his conduct towards the monks of Nitria, were easily persuaded to see things from his point of view. The consequence was that the roles of the two Bishops were quickly reversed: Theophilus became the judge and Chrysostom the accused.

It is unnecessary to dwell on the procedure of the "Synod of the Oak," presided over by the unscrupulous Patriarch of Alexandria. On charges utterly puerile, Chrysostom was deposed by Theophilus and exiled by the Emperor Arcadius.

The departure of John for his place of banishment was the signal for a popular outbreak, which prevented Theophilus from enjoying

in the capital the triumph he had anticipated; so threatening was the attitude of the people that he and his abettors hastily reëmbarked for the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus. This agitation, which was felt even within the precincts of the palace, was a disagreeable surprise to the chief instigator of the whole trouble, the Empress Eudoxia. A mysterious accident in her chamber about this time in addition greatly alarmed the Empress, with the result that messengers were immediately dispatched recalling the exiled Bishop. Chrysostom returned, and against his better judgment resumed his functions without securing rehabilitation, as the canons required. through a synod. This fact was kept in mind by his opponents and used against him a few months later when he again lost the favor of Eudoxia by rather pointed and uncomplimentary allusions to her Majesty. John was now accused of resuming office irregularly, and was declared by a second synod deposed without right of appeal. Some months later he again took the road to exile, and a successor named Arsacius, taken from among his opponents, was appointed to the See of Constantinople. The intervention of Pope Innocent and of the Archbishops of Milan and Aquileia was now invoked by the friends of the deposed Bishop, with the result that the Pope pronounced the judgment rendered against Chrysostom null and void. The Pope also interested the Emperor Honorius in behalf of the illustrious exile; but their united efforts, owing to the strained relations between East and West, were of no avail, and a few years later Chrysostom died in banishment.

Thus St. John Chrysostom became another example in the East of what even the greatest and best of ecclesiastics might have to endure at the hands of the civil authorities when aided and abetted by jealous and unscrupulous prelates.

The election in 427 of Nestorius to the episcopal throne of the capital opened a new phase in the relations, in the Orient, of the Church and the Empire. Like his predecessor, St. John Chrysostom, Nestorius was a noted orator, and like Chrysostom also he had been a priest of Antioch when he received the imperial call to become Bishop of Constantinople. By a curious, though by no means unparalleled irony, the new prelate, who was destined to become one of the most famous of heresiarchs, began his episcopal career with an all-devouring zeal for the extirpation of heresy. In an inaugular address, delivered before the young Emperor Theodosius II., April, 428. Nestorius formulated his programme: "Give me, O Emperor," he cried, "a land purged of heretics, and I in return will give you heaven; help me to vanquish the heretics and I will help you to vanquish the Persians."

With all the zeal of a neophyte Nestorius at once began to carry

out, warmly seconded by the Emperor, his plan of campaign. Arians and Novatians, Quartodecimans and Macedonians were sternly pursued by the vigilant Bishop. Adherents of the Pelagian sect were alone exempted from persecution; their chiefs, indeed, enjoyed the favor of Nestorius, a fact which was remembered to his disadvantage in the West in the days of his troubles. After three years thus occupied in the extirpation of heresy Nestorius to his surprise suddenly found that he himself was regarded by grave personages as not only a heretic, but a heresiarch. This serious charge originated in the following manner: Among those who accompanied Nestorius from Antioch was a priest named Anastasius. In a sermon preached on a certain occasion in the capital Anastasius took exception to the term currently applied to the Blessed Virgin of Theotokos, or Mother of God. Mary, explained the preacher, is not the Mother of God. since God could not be born of a creature. The sermon created something of a sensation, but a sensation the reverse of agreeable to its author, for Anastasius was universally and severely condemned. The Bishop came to the rescue of his friend and in a series of discourses elaborated his ideas on the subject in debate, which were substantially those of Anastasius. Popular opposition to his views he dealt with in the high-handed manner to be expected from the author of the inaugural already referred to; those who dared contradict him he caused to be whipped and imprisoned. The opposition of his priests, expressed by one of their number named Proclus, was not so easily disposed of; in a series of discourses Nestorius was obliged to defend his position, thus attracting general attention to the gravity of the issue.

In his pastoral letter of the year 429 Cyril, Patriarch of Alexandria, nephew and successor of Theophilus, without any mention of names, took cognizance of the erroneous teaching of Nestorius. At the same time Cyril wrote a long letter to the solitaries of Nitria, putting them on their guard against the doctrine of the Bishop of Constantinople. Nestorius keenly resented this action of Cyril and several letters were exchanged of a character by no means calculated to bring about a better understanding between the two Bishops.

Realizing the gravity of the situation, Cyril now wrote to Pope Celestine invoking his intervention, on the ground that all doctrinal difficulties of any moment should, in conformity with ancient precedent, be submitted to the Holy See. He rightly counted on Roman support in the crisis, for the views of Nestorius were already and unfavorably known at Rome. Cyril also forwarded to the Pope certain of the homilies of Nestorius, with his own refutations of their unorthodoxy, for the further enlightenment of Celestine.

The response of the Pope was even more than Cyril could have hoped for. In August, 430, Celestine held at Rome a synod which condemned the teaching of Nestorius and called upon the offender to retract, within ten days after the reception of notice of this decision, his erroneous doctrines, under penalty of deposition. Cyril was commissioned to carry out this sentence, but the Pope failed to specify wherein precisely lay the error of Nestorius. The consequence was that Cyril, in a synod at Alexandria, took it upon himself to supply the omission and drew up a profession of faith, together with twelve anathematisms, embodying theological views peculiar to Alexandria, for the acceptance of Nestorius.

Meanwhile letters of Pope Celestine to John of Antioch and Juvenal of Jerusalem on the heresy of Nestorius had reached their destination. The former was a warm personal friend of Nestorius, who now proved his friendship by exhorting the Bishop of Constantinople, in his own name and in that of some other Syrian Bishops, chief among whom was the learned and apostolic Bishop of Cyr, the historian Theodoret, to submit to the Pope's decision. Nestorius replied that he would do so, and admitted that the contentious term Theotokos could be used in an orthodox sense; it would be for the future council, he added, to make a definite pronouncement on this matter.

But just as the controversy thus seemed on the point of ending, the anathematisms of Cyril reached Nestorius and put an end to all hope of an agreement. For in the eyes of Nestorius and his friends of Antioch Cyril's anathematisms were strongly tainted with Apollinarianism; accordingly, they were refuted by Theodoret and repudiated by Nestorius in twelve counter-anathematisms.

Meanwhile, Theodosius II. had issued in his own name and in that of his Western colleague, Valentinian III., orders for the convocation of a general council, which was to meet at Ephesus, Pentecost, 431. The letter of invitation was sent only to metropolitans, who were directed to bring with them some of the more distinguished of their suffragans; they were further admonished to arrive in good time under penalty of incurring both the divine and the imperial displeasure. Cyril received a special letter of invitation, which, however, was the reverse of complimentary to the recipient; he was reproached as a disturber of the Church and of the imperial household and warned that the decisions of the future council would be carried out to the letter. Evidently the Emperor entertained the hope that Cyril should be found in the wrong.

The general letter of convocation to the metropolitans of the empire issued on this occasion is of more than ordinary interest among documents of its class for the light it throws on the development of imperial pretensions in regard to the Christian religion. There is, declares the Emperor, a most intimate relationship between the empire and the Church, so close, indeed, that the well-being of the former depends upon the latter. Indeed, Church and State mutually penetrate one another, and each derives advantage from the extension of the other. Thus the true religion is indebted to justice, and the State is at the same time indebted to religion and to justice. The Emperor, who reigns by divine ordinance, is the natural connecting link between the temporal and the spiritual orders. Therefore, it is his duty to maintain harmony between their respective representatives, and thus exercise between God and men the office of a mediator. These functions of his imperial office he performs, on the one hand, by guarding the interests of the State and on the other by seeing that the people live with the piety that becomes Christians. Thus his solicitude extends over a double domain, and the thought of the one necessarily involves the thought of the other. Above all, the pious Emperor is anxious that religion shall enjoy the degree of respect God requires for a thing so sacred; hence he desires to see peace and concord reign and that the conduct and achievements of all ranks of the clergy shall be above reproach. It is in order to restore the Christian religion to this desirable condition that the Emperor now summons a general council, whose decisions will be of the greatest moment to both Church and State; hence the metropolitans are ordered to carry out the directions noted above, and none of them may absent themselves from the council without the proper authorization.

In response to the Emperor's invitation Pope Celestine informed Theodosius that he could not personally attend the council, but that he would be represented by legates. The Pope wrote Cyril of Alexandria also, in answer to the latter's inquiry whether the Bishop of Constantinople should or not be allowed to take part in the discussions, counselling moderation. Cyril's prime object should be the restoration of peace in the Church and the winning back of Nestorius from the path of error. In his instructions to his representatives, the Bishops Arcadius and Projectus and the priest Philip, the Pope directs them to refrain from siding either with Nestorius or his adversaries and to act in harmony with the Bishop of Alexandria. The legates received also a letter to the council, in which the Pope eloquently exhorts the fathers to preserve intact the deposit of faith; Celestine, however, clearly indicates that he has himself already pronounced a final decision in the case, which his representatives are deputed to see carried into effect.

Theodosius appointed the captain of his guard, Count Candidian, his personal representative to the council. The Count was instructed to take no part in the discussions on matters of faith, which must be left wholly to the Bishops. But, on the other hand, he was charged to tolerate no cabals or private assemblies, to see that the various provinces of the empire were fittingly represented before the opening of the sessions, to assist at the debates and maintain order and to permit none of the Bishops to leave Ephesus before the completion of their work. The fathers were to be allowed absolute liberty in debating the questions before them, but irrelevant discussions should not be tolerated. Finally, to prevent disorder, the Count was instructed to expel from Ephesus any and all persons drawn thither on this occasion by mere curiosity.

Despite the order of the Emperor that each province should be represented by only a limited number of Bishops, Cyril arrived at Ephesus some days before the date fixed for the opening of the council, accompanied by no less than fifty Egyptian Bishops as well as by a large number of the lower clergy and monks. Juvenal of Jerusalem brought with him fifteen Bishops from Palestine, while the Diocese of Asia, of which Ephesus was the capital, was represented by a hundred or more Bishops. Apart from the merits of the question at issue, the Asiatic Bishops, because of their strong opposition to the interference of the Bishops of Constantinople in their domestic affairs, were predisposed to side with Alexandria. Juvenal of Jerusalem had also his reasons for leaning to Alexandrian views; the ambition of his life, in the attainment of which Cyril's influence would be of the greatest moment, was the erection of Jerusalem into a patriarchal see at the expense of Antioch.

Nestorius, accompanied by sixteen Bishops, had reached Ephesus before Cyril, but the Papal legates and the Syrian Bishops, with their Patriarch, John of Antioch, were still absent. The day set for the opening of the council, June 7, 431, both of these important delegations were still en route, but a letter from the Patriarch of Antioch to Cyril announced that John, with the Bishops of his suite, expected to reach Ephesus shortly after Pentecost. Sixteen days passed and John was still absent. A delegation from his party, however, consisting of the metropolitans of Apamea and Hierapolis, then arrived, and, according to one account, informed Cyril that the Patriarch of Antioch had instructed them to say that the opening of the council should no longer be deferred. This story, however, is contradicted by the subsequent action of these same two metropolitans, who both signed the manifesto of the sixty-eight Bishops protesting against the opening of the council before the arrival of the Orientals.

Cyril, at all events, was decided on waiting no longer. Many of the Bishops, he said, were ill, some even had died at Ephesus, and all were anxious to leave for their homes. Moreover, the time

appointed by the Emperor had long since passed and he did not wish to be responsible for further disregard of the imperial orders. Accordingly, Cyril and his partisans decided for an immediate opening, which took place in the Cathedral of Ephesus, June 22, 431.

But the imperial protector, Count Candidian, did not agree with the Patriarch of Alexandria in his interpretation of the imperial instructions. On the contrary, he warned Cyril and Juvenal of Jerusalem that by opening the council before the arrival of the Orientals they were contravening the orders of the Emperor; Theodosius had instructed him, his representative, that no sessions should be held until the various provinces were fittingly represented. Candidian, therefore, asked for a further delay of four days. At the same time a delegation from sixty-eight Bishops, twenty-one of whom, including Alexander of Apamea and Alexander or Hierapolis, were metropolitans, presented a written protest against the action of Cyril.

To these protests the Bishops assembled for the first session of the council replied by asking that the instructions of the Emperor should be read, so that they might themselves judge as to their meaning. The Count at first refused to comply with this request, but when further pressed he yielded and read the letter of his master to himself and the council. When he had finished, one of the Bishops rose and proposed that, having heard the "sacred letter," they should at once proceed to carry out the imperial instructions and come to a decision on the question of faith. Candidian could not see the matter from this point of view, but the majority prevailed and the official, with his deputation of Bishops, had no alternative but to depart.

The council now proceeded to business. Nestorius, who was invited to assist at its deliberations, refused to attend. The debate opened with the reading of the principal documents in the case, among them the letter of Pope Celestine commissioning Cyril to depose Nestorius if he refused to retract within ten days, and the letter, including the anathematisms, in which Cyril demanded this retraction. The testimony was then taken of two Bishops, friends of Nestorius, which was particularly damaging to the accused. The first of these witnesses, Acacius of Mitylene, testified that Nestorius a few days previously, in conversation with him, had tried to induce him to deny the incarnation of the divinity in the person of our Saviour. The second witness, Theodytus of Ancyra, swore that Nestorius had recently stated in his presence that he would never admit a God of two or three months old, and that on the same occasion when he had heard this one of the entourage of Nestorius asserted that he did not regard the Jews as guilty of deicide, since they had put to death only a man and not God. Apropos of this,

however, Nestorius subsequently explained that he had been misunderstood, and that all he had said was that God could never have been but two or three months old.

In this the first session of the council Nestorius was condemned, in accordance with the canons and the requirements of "the letters of our Holy Father and colleague, Celestine, Bishop of Rome," as a teacher of blasphemous doctrines; his punishment was deposition and excommunication. The sentence was subscribed by over two hundred Bishops, including some twenty of the sixty-eight who had protested against the opening of the council before the arrival of the Oriental Bishops.

Cyril, Nestorius and Count Candidian now wrote to the Emperor, informing him, each from his own point of view, of what had been done. Candidian also issued a proclamation at Ephesus pronouncing the sentence against Nestorius null and void, owing to the fact that it was the verdict of only one section of the episcopate. Nestorius complained to the Emperor of violence at the hands of partisans of his opponents and advised the convocation of a new council, consisting of the metropolitan and two Bishops from each province and the exclusion from all participation of monks and the lower clergy. Cyril, on the other hand, informed Theodosius that he had waited sixteen days for the Orientals (the time was actually only fifteen days); that John of Antioch had advised him through Alexander of Apamea and Alexander of Hierapolis not to delay the opening any longer; and that in any event the council had merely followed the lead of Pope Celestine, who had already condemned the teaching of Nestorius.

On June 26 John of Antioch, with his contingent of Oriental Bishops, at length reached Ephesus. The council lost no time in endeavoring to open relations with him, but John declined their advances; the messengers of the council were driven from his residence with blows by a friend of Nestorius, Count Irenaeus.

Had John of Antioch at this juncture acted with calm and prudence he could probably have rendered invaluable service to the Church. But just at the moment when he so resented what he, with some reason, regarded as the arbitrary procedure of the Alexandrians he himself went one step further in arbitrariness by holding a council of his own followers, consisting of forty-three Bishops, who assumed the role of a legitimate occumenical council. John presided over this body of prelates, to whom Count Candidian, after relating his grievances, read the imperial letter of convocation. After this preliminary the council went to work. Cyril and Memnon of Ephesus were without difficulty convicted of Arianism and Apollinarianism and pronounced disturbers of the peace as well as viola-

tors of the imperial commands. They were accordingly deposed and the Bishops of the legitimate council were excommunicated until such time as they would acknowledge their error and join the Antiochians in anathematizing the Patriarch of Alexandria and the Bishop of Ephesus.

Meanwhile the report of Cyril's council had reached Constantinople, where the news of the deposition of Nestorius made a favorable impression. But shortly afterward the report of Count Candidian arrived and brought about a complete change in the attitude of the Emperor. Theodosius at once dispatched a new envoy. Palladius, to Ephesus, for the purpose of making an investigation, and declared null and void all that had thus far been decided upon. Palladius was regarded as an ally by the Antiochians, but he gave a hearing to both parties and returned to the capital. About this time the three Papal legates reached Ephesus and a second session of the council was convened, July 10, for the purpose of hearing read the letters of Pope Celestine. In his message to the fathers the Pope exhorted them to guard against the admission of any erroneous teaching relative to the person of Christ, and added that he had no doubt the assembly would agree with his previously given decision on the particuar question that now occupied their attention, a decision which his representatives would see carried into effect.

That the confidence of the Pope in his colleagues thus expressed was fully justified the cries of applause which greeted his letter left no room for doubt. "This is the true judgment; thanks to the new Paul, Celestine, to the new Paul Cyril, to Celestine, guardian of the faith." The legate Philip thanked the fathers for the happy union, thus manifested, of the members of the Church with their chief, knowing as they did that "Peter is the head of the common faith and of all the Apostles." Philip then asked that, in conformity with the demands of the Pope, the work of the council achieved before their coming be submitted to the legates for approval. This was done in the third session, when the legates signed the Acts as representatives of the Pope and of the Western Bishops.

A conciliar letter was then forwarded to the Emperor Theodosius II. informing him of the approval of its decisions by the Papal envoys and requesting his authorization for the appointment of a Bishop of Constantinople in place of the deposed Nestorius. In the fourth session the council took cognizance of the action of John of Antioch relative to Cyril and Memnon and pronounced the deposition of these Bishops by the Orientals null and void. John was next three times cited to appear before the council, and on his refusal to do so he and his partisans were excommunicated, though not

deposed, until such time as they would come to a better state of mind.

But the orthodox, because of the hostility of Count Candidian and the activity at Constantinople of the friends of Nestorius, experienced great difficulty in communicating the real state of affairs at Ephesus to the Emperor. All the roads leading to the capital were watched and the ships entering its port searched, lest the friends of Cyril should obtain a hearing at court. At length a beggar succeeded in bringing a letter, concealed in a hollow cane, from Cyril to his adherents in Constantinople, informing them of the situation. The monks of the various monasteries at once took action and, headed by an archimandrite, Dalmatius, famed for his austerities, sought and obtained an audience from Theodosius. The outcome was so favorable that the Emperor issued orders to the officials at Ephesus to permit deputies from the council to proceed to the capital. In compliance with these commands three Bishops from the council were now sent to court and shortly afterwards the Antiochians commissioned Count Irenaeus to lay their side of the affair before the Emperor. After hearing both sides, Theodosius issued an edict confirming, on the one hand, the deposition of Nestorius by the council and on the other the depositions of Cyril and Memnon by the Orientals. A new commissioner, Count John, announced at Ephesus this decision and placed under arrest the three deposed Bishops.

The Bishops of the council thereupon addressed to both Emperors a strong letter of protest against this curious pronouncement and demanded that Theodosius should summon to his capital a new deputation of orthodox Bishops if he wished to know the exact state of affairs. The Emperor accepted this suggestion with an amendment; he commanded that eight representatives of each party should present themselves at court and state their respective cases. Among the deputies of the orthodox party were two of the Papal legates, the priest Philip and the Bishop Arcadius, while the Antiochian deputies included John of Antioch and Theodoret of Cvr. The instructions given by the orthodox to their deputies are of interest as showing their attitude towards the imperial power. First of all, the delegates were forbidden to enter into communion with John of Antioch and his partisans. If the Emperor, however, should make any approaches to the delegates on this point they were authorized to accede to his wishes on condition that the Antiochians agree to accept the deposition of Nestorius, to anathematize his errors and condemn his partisans; that they further demand pardon in writing of the council for their action in regard to Cyril and Memnon; and that finally they assist the council's representatives in their efforts for the deliverance of the Bishops of Alexandria and Ephesus from imprisonment. As to the doctrinal decisions of the council, the delegates were to demand their ratification by the Emperor. These terms were the minimum required, and they were put forward with all respect for the civil authorities, who, say the fathers, are to be respected and obeyed as far as possible.

While on their way to the capital the envoys received orders to remain at Chalcedon, where they were received in audience by the Emperor. At first the hopes of the Antiochians were high, and they felt confident, with the aid of influential courtiers, of triumphing over their opponents. But the approval of the council by the Papal legates and the presence of two of these legates in defense of its action probably were the principal factors in an unexpected volteface of Theodosius, who, to the surprise of the Orientals, suddenly decided in favor of orthodoxy. The Emperor then returned to the capital, bringing with him the council's envoys, to whom he entrusted the responsibility of selecting and consecrating a successor to Nestorius. A priest named Maximianus, who had long sojourned at Rome, where he was persona grata, was chosen for the high office: Nestorius was directed to return to his monastery at Antioch. The Bishops at Ephesus were then permitted to depart for their respective dioceses, but Theodosius still insisted on regarding Cyril and Memnon as deposed. Cyril, however, taking matters in his own hands, had previously escaped from Ephesus and returned to Alexandria. This defiance of authority must have been rather embarrassing, but as there was no help for it, the Emperor issued a second rescript permitting Cyril to stay at Alexandria and Memnon at Ephesus. Theodosius, however, as though to disguise his real weakness, inserted in this pronouncement a clause to the effect that during his lifetime he would never condemn the Antiochians. Eventually John of Antioch and his principal followers, after long pourparlers and through various influences, agreed to condemn the errors of Nestorius and acquiesced in his deposition. At the same time, however, Cyril, after explaining his anathematisms to the satisfaction of the Orientals, accepted, as in accordance with his belief, a profession of faith submitted to him by John, and thus for the moment peace was restored between the two Eastern Patriarchs. Some irreconcilable Bishops were exiled and Nestorius himself was directed to take up his residence at Petra, in Idumea.

But the debate between the two schools of theologians representing Alexandria and Antioch was destined to be renewed, some years later, in a new form and with new actors. As in the previous instance, the trouble began at Constantinople. Its author was the aged and universally esteemed archimandrite Eutyches, ruler of

some three hundred monks in the capital and sponsor as well as spiritual director of one of the highest functionaries of the State, the Grand Chamberlain Chrysaphius.

Eutyches was one of the most warm admirers of the now deceased Patriarch, Cyril of Alexandria, and consequently an ardent opponent of the Antiochian theology. In studying the writings of his revered master Eutyches came across an expression to the effect that "the nature (phusis) of the Incarnate Word is One," from which he drew the conclusion that after the Incarnation there is in Christ but one nature. But in Cyril's terminology, according to a recent writer,\* the words phusis (nature) and hupostasis (substance) were practically synonymous. Ignorance of this fact on the part of Eutyches, and indeed on the part of many others, appears to have been largely responsible for the monophysite schism; terms were used in wholly different senses by the parties in the controversy.

The grave issue thus raised by the pious archimandrite might have been quickly and satisfactorily disposed of were St. Cyril himself then living. But his death (444) had occurred before the interpretation of his teaching put forward by Eutyches had attracted attention, and his successor, Dioscorus, without hesitation lent all the weight of his high position to the furtherance of the new heresy. Thus was peace again disturbed in the East and the cause of orthodoxy gravely threatened, for the Emperor, having whole-heartedly repudiated Nestorianism, now took the side of Eutyches and Dioscorus under the conviction that by so doing he was combating the error condemned at Ephesus.

The seriousness of the question was soon realized in the Antiochian sphere of influence, and in 447 Theodoret of Cyr published a refutation, without naming its author, of monophysitism. Domnus also, the successor of John as Patriarch of Antioch, wrote to Theodosius protesting against the heretical teaching of Eutyches. The Emperor's reply was a rescript prohibiting the circulation of the writings of Nestorius and all other publications not in conformity with the teaching of St. Cyril and of the Council of Ephesus; he also directed that all members of the clergy who were what he considered partisans of Nestorius—in other words, who were opposed to Eutyches—should be deposed. Irenaeus, the former friend of Nestorius, who meanwhile had been made Bishop of Tyre, was ordered to resign his see and return to the ranks of the laity; a successor named Photius was appointed in his place.

Things had reached this point when Eusebius, Bishop of Dorylaeum, who as a layman twenty years previously had denounced Nestorius, now came forward and presented a memorial to Flavian,

<sup>\*</sup> Lebon, "Le Monoplysisme Severien," Louvain, 1909.



Bishop of Constantinople, and the sunodos endemousa against Eutyches. Flavian, however, whose personal views were those of St. Cyril as understood in Antioch, was reluctant to open what he foresaw would be a long and dangerous controversy. But, Eusebius insisting, he had no choice, and Eutyches was cited before the synod. At first the accused declined to appear on the ground that he never left his monastery, and that, anyhow, Eusebius was his personal enemy. Subsequently, however, he thought better of the matter, and November 22, 448, he presented himself before the synod, accompanied by an imposing cortege of monks and court functionaries, as though to intimidate his judges. At the same time a request, equivalent to a command, was received from the Emperor asking that the patrician Florentius be allowed to assist at the examination.

The answers of Eutyches to the questions of the judges were unsatisfactory; he insisted on maintaining that "before the union of the divinity and humanity" in Christ there were two natures, but that after the union there is but one nature. As he refused to admit and retract his error, he was deposed from his office of archimandrite and excommunicated.

With the hope of obtaining Roman support Eutyches and the Emperor now wrote Pope Leo their versions of the issue, but Leo declined to accept an *ex parte* statement and waited to hear from the synod. From Flavian he soon received the documents of the process, which placed him in a position to give judgment. He pronounced in favor of the synod. The correct teaching of the Catholic Church, declared the Pope, is just the opposite of what Eutyches supposes; before the Incarnation, instead of two, there was but one nature, the divine; after the Incarnation the divine and the human natures are united in Christ, but without confusion.

Eutyches, however, would not yield, and, at his instigation, supported by Dioscorus of Alexandria, the Emperor issued a summons for an occumenical council to be held at Ephesus, for the purpose of settling the question. The Pope as well as Flavian was opposed to the holding of a general council at this time, on the ground that it was altogether unnecessary, but yielding to the wish of the Emperor, he consented and appointed four legates, Bishop Julius of Pozzuoli, the Roman priest Renatus, the deacon Hilary and the notary Dulcitius, to represent him; one of these, Renatus, died en route.

The council assembled at Ephesus in August, 449. Two imperial commissioners were appointed by Theodosius II. and received instructions of the usual tenor, namely, to maintain order and see that business was carried on expeditiously. The Emperor further directed that Flavian and the other Bishops who had composed the

synod of Constantinople might be present at the debates, but should not take any part in them, on the ground that it was the justice of their decision which was in question. Theodoret of Cyr was to be excluded from the council also, unless the fathers should decide otherwise; his offense was that he had written against St. Cyril of Alexandria, now in favor with Theodosius.

The Papal envoys, on their arrival at Ephesus, entered into communciation with the Bishop of Constantinople. They had brought with them from the Pope a number of letters, the most important of which was the dogmatic letter to Flavian, the celebrated Tome, defining the Catholic doctrine on the nature of Christ.

The council opened, under the presidency of Dioscorus of Alexandria, August 8, 449. Beside the president sat the legate Julius, Juvenal of Jerusalem, Domnus of Antioch and Flavian of Constantinople. About 130 Bishops, most of them devoted to Dioscorus, participated. After the reading of the first imperial letter the legate Julius asked that the Pope's communication to the council should be read. Dioscorus, while pretending to comply, eluded this request, a policy which he successfully adopted, regarding the Papal letters, through all the sessions of the council. The first question brought up was whether the sentence already pronounced against Eutyches was or not justified by the facts. Eutyches was admitted and presented his profession of faith, after which the Acts of the synod of Constantinople were read. The statement of Eutyches that he believed in two natures before the Incarnation and one afterwards was warmly approved by the majority, who at the same time recommended that his accuser, Eusebius of Dorylæum, be burned alive. The archimandrite was immediately rehabilitated, after which Dioscorus carried war into the opponents' camp by formally accusing Flavian and Eusebius of violating a regulation of the first council of Ephesus which forbade any addition to the symbol of Nice: the formula regarding the two natures was thus interpreted by the Patriarch of Alexandria.

This declaration of the president brought consternation into the assembly. The legate Hilary protested; Flavian appealed against it to the Pope; and a number of Bishops on their knees exhorted Dioscorus to moderation. But Dioscorus knew not what this term meant. Pretending that he had been threatened by the opposition, he called for "the Counts," who, awaiting the word, instantly threw open the council chamber to a host of clamoring soldiers, sailors, monks and Egyptian parabolani. Dioscorus then ordered the doors closed and the votes of the Bishops taken. As it was impossible to draw up the Acts at once in their final form, Dioscorus decided to take the signatures of the Bishops on blank sheets, which after-

wards he could have filled in as he pleased. The legate Hilary effected his escape and returned to Rome. Meanwhile Dioscorus, accompanied by Juvenal of Jerusalem, went from seat to seat and compelled the Bishops, one after another, to sign the blank Acts; even Domnus of Antioch yielded. When Dioscorus reached Flavian his fury got beyond control, and he struck the venerable Bishop on the face. This was the signal for his followers to act. Two deacons seized Flavian and threw him to the floor, after which exploit the monks of Barsaumus took a hand, encouraged by the furious cries of their master. Finally Flavian was dragged from the basilica and escorted by soldiers into exile; three days subsequently he died.

Dioscorus now reported to the Emperor, and fifteen days later held a second session of his followers, which was devoted to dealing with their leading opponents. Theodoret of Cyr, Ibas of Edessa and Irenaeus of Tyre, among others, were deposed, and their deposition was acquiesced in by the weak Domnus of Antioch. But when the Alexandrian had thus used the Patriarch of Antioch Domnus was himself arraigned and deposed.

With no small difficulty the legate Hilary made his way from Ephesus to Rome, bringing to the Pope the first news of the travesty of a council that had been held as well as the appeal of Flavian. Later on came Eusebius of Dorylæum and some priests of Theodoret of Cvr with appeals to the Apostolic See. Pope Leo the Great thereupon called a synod at Rome to act on the matter, and subsequently he forwarded to the East a series of letters addressed to the Emperor and his sister Pulcheria, to Flavian, whose death was not yet known to him, as well as to the clergy, the archimandrites and the faithful of Constantinople. In his letter to the Emperor the Pope, first of all, speaks of the hopes he had entertained relative to the council Theodosius had convened at Ephesus and of his disappointment at the outcome. Had the letters sent by him to Flavian and the council been read, all would have been well, but private interests and the disloyalty of a few, together with, in particular, the want of moderation shown by Dioscorus, had led to decisions which would destroy the very foundations of the Christian religion. So blasphemous were these decisions that no pressure was strong enough to induce the Pope's representatives to accept them; which being the case, the Emperor is adjured to disapprove of a council whose Acts are so unworthy of Christian Bishops. Should the Emperor neglect this admonition and allow himself "to be weighted with another's sin," the Pope fears "lest He whose religion is being destroyed be provoked to wrath." Finally the Pope recommends Theodosius to order a council, really œcumenical, to be held in Italy, that all contentious matters may once for all be settled.

But protests were of no avail with an Emperor as obstinate as he was weak, and the "robber synod" received the imperial sanction. Theodosius also forbade those whom he regarded as Nestorians, that is, those who held the doctrine of the two natures, to be elevated to the episcopate, and proscribed the writings of Theodoret of Cyr as well as those of Nestorius. Valentinian III., with his mother, the Empress Galla Placidia, at the request of Pope Leo, protested to his Eastern colleagues against the doings at Ephesus and urged that the decision of the Apostolic See, "wherein he assuredly first adorned the primacy who was deemed worthy to receive the keys of heaven," be accepted as final. But the intervention of his co-Emperor had no effect, and for the moment the Alexandrians had things their own way. Dioscorus was powerful enough to obtain the See of Constantinople for his own apocrisiarius at the capital, and Anatolius succeeded Flavian.

In compliance with custom, Anatolius applied for recognition to the Apostolic See, his request being supported by Theodosius and Dioscorus. Leo replied that he would gladly recognize Anatolius when satisfied as to his orthodoxy; Anatolius had but to accept the Tome and all would be well. His reply to the Emperor was to the same effect; the Pope requested Theodosius to "see that such a document as is due (i. e., a profession of faith) may reach us as soon as may be from the Bishop of Constantinople, as from an approved and Catholic priest, that is, openly and distinctly affirming that he will separate from his communion any one who believes or maintains any view about the incarnation of the Word of God other than my statement and that of all Catholics lays down." To expedite matters, the Pope sent a delegation of two Bishops and two priests to Constantinople for the purpose of receiving from Anatolius a profession of the tenor required. Meanwhile an unlooked-for event completely changed the whole situation; Theodosius lost his life in a hunting accident, and when the Papal representatives arrived at the Eastern capital they found the orthodox Empress Pulcheria occupying the throne alone.

One of the first acts of Pulcheria was to order the execution of the chamberlain Chrysaphius for grave abuses of power under the late ruler; as we have seen, this personage was mainly responsible in the religious sphere for the rapid spread of the Eutychian heresy. The Empress next associated with herself the Senator Marcian, whom she married, and as Marcian adhered to orthodoxy as strongly as his wife, it became clear that important events would soon modify the ecclesiastical situation.

Among the first to perceive the signs of the times was Anatolius, who, despite his antecedents, now without hesitation subscribed the Tome of Pope Leo and exerted himself to bring about its acceptance by other Eastern Bishops. This was not at all a difficult matter, for now that the imperial wind had changed, the Bishops of the latrocinium eagerly declared that their signatures had been given under constraint and that they were ready to repudiate them. The Bishops exiled during the late reign were recalled and the remains of Flavian, like those of his great predecessor, St. John Chrysostom, some years earlier, were brought back in triumph to receive honorable interment in the Church of the Holy Apostles. Dioscorus, however, declined to submit, and he, with his two chief aides at Ephesus, Juvenal of Jerusalem and Eustachius of Berytus, remained under excommunication.

Matters were thus gradually shaping themselves and peace seemed likely to be restored with little further difficulty in the East. But Marcian seemed to think that the circumstances called for a general council, which, by the weight of its authority, would define once and for all the Catholic doctrine on the nature of our Lord. He therefore proposed that Pope Leo should attend a council of this character in Constantinople or in any other convenient locality. Leo strongly opposed this proposition, on the ground that a council at this moment would be as inopportune as it was unnecessary. Eventually, however, he yielded to the Emperor's wish in the matter and sent representatives to the council, deputing one of this number, Paschasinus, Bishop of Lilybæum, in Sicily, to preside in his place.

The council met at Chalcedon and held its opening session October 8, 451; more than five hundred Bishops assisted. The Pope's letter to the fathers opens with a significant allusion to a contingency always possible in the East, namely, the danger of undue interference on the part of the civil authorities in matters pertaining to the Church alone. The Bishops of the council, exhorts the Pope, should remain devoted to the Catholic faith, and none of them should be "misled by fear or favor of the secular powers into departure from the ways of truth." Leo then speaks of the Emperor's "piously intentioned" council and of Marcian's respect for "the rights and dignity of the Apostle Peter" shown by his invitation of Peter's successor to attend the council in person. This invitation, however, he cannot accept, and therefore he is sending legates who will preside over the council in his place. Wherefore, he continues, "let all attempts at impugning the divinely inspired faith be entirely put down and the vain unbelief of heretics be laid to rest, and let not that be defended which may not be believed." The correct teaching of the Church the fathers will find set forth "with great fullness and clearness in the letter which we sent to Bishop Flavian of happy memory." An imposing deputation of civil dignitaries represented the Emperor at the council and "presided to the furtherance of due order;" the Papal legates, we learn from the conciliar letter afterwards sent to the Pope, "assumed the hegemony over the council as the head over the members." With the exception of the Papal legates, four in number, and two African Bishops, the council was composed entirely of Eastern Bishops.

The first question to come before the assembly was the status of Dioscorus of Alexandria. This matter was introduced by the presiding legate, Paschasinus, who announced that his instructions from the Pope directed that he and his colleagues must under no circumstances take part in the council unless the Patriarch of Alexandria were excluded from active part in its deliberations. "Let your Magnificence," the legate demanded of the chief imperial official, "command Dioscorus to leave or we shall immediately depart." The officer inquired what in particular were the legate's objections to the presence of Dioscorus, to which the second legate, Lucentius, replied that the Patriarch of Alexandria had convoked a council without the consent of the Apostolic See; meaning, apparently, that although the Pope had agreed to the holding of the recent council of Ephesus, yet Dioscorus had improperly arrogated to himself its direction, to the exclusion of the Papal representatives. The commissioner to this objected that Lucentius could not be at once accuser and judge and that the case of Dioscorus should be disposed of in the regular way. But the Papal envoys, nevertheless, won their point to the extent that Dioscorus was ordered to take his place in the centre of the church to answer for his conduct in the latrocinium.

Eusebius of Dorylæum then arose and made his charge against Dioscorus, after which the accused asked that the Acts of the synod of Constantinople be read. His request was granted. The imperial secretary next announced that the Emperor Marcian had recalled from exile Theodoret of Cyr and that Pope Leo had restored him to his rank as Bishop; in consequence, he added, there was no reason why the vindicated Bishop should not participate in the council. Theodoret was therefore admitted, amidst the furious protests of the Egyptians. Mutual recriminations then for a time became so violent that the imperial officials were obliged to impress on both parties that their conduct was wholly unbecoming so dignified an assembly.

Dioscorus had not much to say in his defense; he merely pleaded that Juvenal and Thalassius had shared with him authority in the latrocinium and were equally responsible for its decisions. Moreover, he claimed the Acts of this council had received the approval, under their signatures, of the Bishops present as well as that of Theodosius II. The obvious reply of the Bishops who had thus yielded to intimidation was that they had not been free agents, to which the Egyptians replied that Christians worthy of the name do not yield to constraint and taunted their opponents with cowardice. Dioscorus was then asked to explain why the Pope's letters had not been read at Ephesus. He answered that for this Juvenal and Thalassius were in fault; these two Bishops, however, declined to accept so grave responsibility.

As the investigation proceeded Dioscorus, Juvenal and Thalassius were interrogated by the commissioners as to why they had declined to admit at Ephesus the formal accusation of Eusebius of Dorylæum against Eutyches. They replied that not they, but the Emperor's representative, Elpidius, had refused Eusebius a hearing. excuse was pronounced by the commissioners insufficient, on the ground that where a matter of faith was in question Elpidius should have had nothing to say. At the close of the session, late in the evening, the commissioners announced that the debate on the dogmatic question would be taken up at the next session. Meanwhile, they declared, it seemed to them now certain that Flavian and other Bishops had been unjustly dealt with, and that, consequently, if it pleased the Emperor, Dioscorus and those responsible with him for the outrages of Ephesus should be punished with deposition from the episcopal dignity. Further action on this subject was deferred to a subsequent session.

In the second session the doctrinal issue was practically settled by the acceptance of the Tome of Pope Leo as an excellent exposition of the Catholic teaching on the natures of Christ. The reading of this famous document was greeted with cries of "This is the faith of the fathers, of the Apostles; this we all believe. Anathema to him who believes otherwise. Peter has spoken by the mouth of Leo; that is the teaching of Cyril, this is the true faith." The Bishops of Illyria and Palestine, who had entered the council as partisans of Dioscorus, but who during the first session had gone over to the majority, for the moment dissented from certain passages of the Papal letter. Subsequently, however, after receiving satisfactory explanations from the legates, they also subscribed the Tome.

The third session of the council was devoted to the disposition of the case of the Patriarch of Alexandria. The imperial commissioners were not present. The session was opened by the legate Paschasinus, who, after alluding to his character as legate of the Pope, directed that a second memoir of Eusebius of Dorylæum

against Dioscorus should be read to the council. Dioscorus was not present, having declined several invitations to attend. After listening to further complaints, made by four of his clergy, the Papal legates summed up the accusations against him as follows: Dioscorus had illegally admitted Eutyches to communion; at Ephesus he had hindered the reading of the Pope's letter to Flavian; subsequently, when other Bishops acknowledged the fault of which they had been guilty at Ephesus and obtained pardon of the Apostolic See and of the present council, Dioscorus, so far from repenting, had actually dared to excommunicate the Pope. For these and other offenses Paschasinus pronounced on the offender the following sentence: "The most holy Archbishop of Rome, Leo, declares through us and through the holy council here assembled, and in union with the blessed Apostle Peter, who is the corner-stone of the Catholic Church and the foundation of the orthodox faith, that Dioscorus is deposed from the episcopate and from every other ecclesiastical dignity." This sentence was subscribed by all present; the Egyptian Bishops, like Dioscorus himself, had remained away.

The next business to dispose of concerned the five chief accomplices in the latrocinium of Dioscorus: Juvenal of Jerusalem, Thalassius, Eusebius, Eustathius and Basil. These five personages had also subscribed the Tome of Leo, in consequence of which the fathers urged the commissioners to admit them to the council chamber. The officials replied that they had written the Emperor on the subject and were awaiting his reply. When this came it was to the effect that the council should decide the matter, whereupon it was at once agreed that the repentant Bishops should be pardoned. Subsequently the monastic followers of Eutyches appealed to the Emperor in their own behalf, but Marcian referred them also to the council, saying: "If I myself wished to decide the question I would not have summoned a council . . .; what the holy council determines is for me the rule."

After considerable further debate, in which the Papal delegates stood out with the Orientals for a clear acknowledgment of the two natures, a profession of faith was drawn up in harmony with the Tome. This the Emperor, who was present in state at the sixth session, approved. Addressing the council, he said that from the beginning of his reign the grave issue just disposed of had been his greatest preoccupation. To remove all error he had brought them together, and they, by their decisions, had so dissipated all obscurity relative to the Incarnation that in future no one would dare utter an opinion on this subject different from what had been taught by the Apostles, by the Council of Nice and by Pope Leo in his letter to Flavian. The Emperor's address was greeted

with loud applause and cries of "You are priest and Emperor, conqueror in war and teacher of the faith!"

Such is a brief outline of the more important incidents in the relations of the Church and the Empire during the first half of the fifth century. Their characteristic features differ in little from those of the Eastern empire from the reign of Constantine to that of Theodosius. As in the fourth century, the Emperors, particularly those who espoused the cause of heresy, still practically assumed as a matter of course the direction of the Church, although still careful to recognize in principle that they had no right to interfere in the definition of a dogma of faith. The attitude of Marcian was indeed generally correct, except in the matter of convening the Council of Chalcedon, to which Pope Leo the Great was opposed. But at the council itself the conduct both of the Emperor and his representatives was in strict conformity with the imperial role of Bishop-Exterior.

As in the fourth century also, it is to be noted that the orthodox Bishops were, as a rule, more sturdy in defense of the Church's freedom than their opponents. Yet, at the same time, there is always noticeable, even among the orthodox, in the Orient a tendency to regard the Emperor as the God-given ruler both of the Church and the State: witness the acclamation of Theodosius II. at the Synod of Constantinople and of Marcian at the Council of Chalcedon as "priest and Emperor."

But the feature most worthy of note in this fifty years is the gradually increasing consciousness of authority and responsibility manifested by the Papacy. During the fourth century the Emperors had had things pretty much their own way, with the consequence that the freedom of action of the Church was constantly and seriously hampered and ultimately threatened with complete destruction. Serious resistance to this condition of things began in the fifth century and found its highest expression in the pontificate of Leo the Great. As yet this resistance was chiefly indirect and always respectful. But none the less was it evident and effective. The brigandage of Ephesus showed clearly enough what the consequences to religion would be from an alliance between an enthroned weakling and an ambitious, unscrupulous Bishop. Leo resolved that that sort of thing should cease, and it ceased; how, we have seen in the story of Chalcedon, where the Pope's legates assumed their rightful place and with a calm consciousness of authority directed the deliberations of the assembly. And nobody disputed their claims, but, on the contrary, all recognized the voice of Peter, as chief of the Apostles, speaking through his successor.

The pontificate of Leo the Great was therefore the most important

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by all odds thus far in the history of the relations of the Church and the Empire; a precedent was then established never to be forgotten at Rome. The substance of this precedent may be summed up briefly thus: The internal government of the Church, and particularly the determination of what constitutes the Christian creed, belongs to the Bishops of the Church, united with their head, the Pope.

The terrible crisis through which the Western Church was, just at this time, passing in the long run proved a blessing in disguise. For while the barbarian invasions destroyed the Western empire, they at the same time placed the Popes in a stronger position than they had previously occupied for the defense of that fundamental principle of the Christian religion enunciated by our Lord in the words: Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's and to God the things that are of God.

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## ENGLAND UNDER GEORGE II.

HE approaching coronation of King George V. reminds us that the House of Hanover has held the throne of Great Britain nearly two hundred years. His Majesty is the eighth sovereign of the dynasty; and of the five Georges, the last will, probably, not be the least; though time will tell. He has, back of him, the honorable and correct traditions of his grandmother's court, and he will likely show the world how, in many respects, we are in advance of the age of George II., whose reign I have selected for my theme as typical of the House of Hanover in the eighteenth century. Though neither the longest, nor the most important reign of the dynasty, it was the last that came to an end, with the British flag flying over the American colonies, and it thus becomes of greater interest to us. Further: occupying the middle of the century, at a period of transition, it is best calculated to illustrate the age which toward its close was to produce such farreaching results, as the American and French revolutions, and it gives us the better portion of the early history of the House of Hanover.

George V. is a descendant of George II. through his son, Frederick, Prince of Wales, who did not live to succeed his father. The present English King represents thus the seventh generation of the

dynasty, deriving his descent in the female line through Victoria, granddaughter of George III., son of the Frederick who never reigned and whose father was George II.

The eighteenth century was eminently a period of transition. Absolutism, begun in the fifteenth, had reached its highest level on the Continent. The great Monarch of France had bequeathed to his successor a powerful kingdom, over which he had long wielded an iron sceptre. Prussia, in the person of Frederick II., was rising to prominence and Russia was taking its place in the family of Austria, no longer linked to Spain by the dynastic ties which for two centuries had held these countries united, was the theatre of much of the struggles which agitated the century, and Spain, whose decline had long set in, was now held in the grasp of Bourbon despotism. But there were undercurrents at work which were to culminate first in the French Revolution and later in Napoleonism, until they finally emerged into the open sea of nineteenth century constitutional government. France was honeycombed with deism, which spread throughout Europe—England as well as the Continent—reaching even the far-off shores of the New World. There was one exception to the absolutist tendencies which prevailed among the ruling classes in the eighteenth century. In England the despotic power of the crown had been broken with the downfall of the Stuarts and the British Constitution had triumphed. The prerogatives of the sovereign remained intact, but the limits set to his power, widened since the time of the Tudors, had been drawn closer, while the authority of the Commons had increased in proportion.

The century was still young when an important dynastic change occurred. England was at heart intensely Protestant. It had cost Henry VIII. a strong effort to wrench the country, especially the lower classes, from their old allegiance to Rome. Under Elizabeth, and even at a much later period, religious persecution raged against the Catholics; but their cries were stifled and the triumph of Protestantism was now complete. The ancient faith of "Merrye England" was not quite dead, but it dared not show itself. In James II. England had tolerated a Catholic Prince, whose imprudence and want of tact had lost him the crown; but it was determined to tolerate no other. The Stuarts were not excluded from the succession, as such, but the Catholic Stuarts were. In fact, William of Orange ascended the English throne only because he was connected with the royal Scottish house, and even to-day the blood of the Stuarts still flows in the veins of England's ruler. To bar all Catholic claimants from the throne forever the Act of Succession was passed in 1701, while William III. still lived, and the English

crown was hereby settled on the Protestant members of the House of Stuart. Queen Anne died without issue in 1714, and the British crown at once passed to George Louis of Hanover, son of Sophia, granddaughter of James I., who had married Ernest Augustus, Duke of Brunswick-Luneburg and Elector of the Empire. Ernest Augustus was descended from Ernest, Duke of Luneburg, surnamed the Confessor, the friend of Luther, the same who first Protestantized the Duchy. George Louis, Elector and Duke of Hanover, became thus George I. of England.

When the House of Hanover entered Great Britain, England was no longer what it had been under the Stuarts. The great struggle between the King and Parliament had come to an end with the Revolution and absolutism was conquered forever. Parliament had again obtained its ancient power, with the House of Commons in the ascendancy. Since the time of William III. the King had governed by the aid of Ministers who possessed the confidence of a majority in both houses; but the existence of a Prime Minister may be dated from the reign of George I., though the title only gradually came into use.

When, in 1727, the sceptre passed from the hands of George I. to those of his son, the second George, Great Britain consisted, as it does to-day, of the kingdoms of England and Scotland and the principality of Wales. Ireland was a downtrodden dependency, worn out by civil and religious persecution, its trade restricted, its manufactures languishing and its poor living on starvation wages, if they received any wages at all. Far off, in distant lands beyond the seas, the British flag still waved, but George II. was the last King to die as sovereign of the American colonies. The King of Great Britain possessed also the Bahama Islands and in the West Indies those of Barbadoes, Nevis, Antigua, Monserrat and St. Kitts. Adjacent to the mother country England owned the islands of Jersey and Guernsey, while the Rock of Gibraltar, on the straits that divide the Atlantic from the Mediterranean, and Minorca, one of the Balearic Isles in that inland sea, were also dependencies of the British crown. British empire in India had not yet begun, but the East India Company had for a long time been trading with those distant regions and paving the way for British sovereignty. Australian colonization was still a thing of the future.

The population of England at that period can only be guessed at. Even when the eighteenth century had passed its maturity it remained still a matter of conjecture. One of the bases of this conjecture was the proportional tax of the counties. According to Houghton's calculation, England and Wales in 1693, that is, thirty-four years before the accession of George II., contained 1,175,951

houses. Allowing an average of six persons to each house, the population would have been 7,055,706. Of these 1,000,000 were men capable of bearing arms, while the clergy were less than 15,000. London, which, together with Westminster and Southwark, was upwards of seven miles long, contained, toward the middle of the eighteenth century, a population something less than a million, though it had increased wonderfully since the great fire. Scotland at the same period was supposed to possess a million and a half of inhabitants, while those of Ireland are put down at between two and two and a half millions. Macaulay believes that toward the close of the seventeenth century England could not lay claim to more than 5,500,000 inhabitants.

George Augustus, the only son of George I., was born in 1683, several years before his father ascended the English throne. was then thirty-one years of age. A man of singular regularity and method, he seemed incapable of rising above the routine of everyday work, and, in affairs of state, he allowed himself to be guided by Walpole, his powerful Minister. The King had quite a reputation for economy, and he took great delight in counting his money. It is related that, on one occasion, when he had done this over and over again, a lady of the court, to whom he was much inclined, said to him: "Sir, if you continue counting your money, I will leave the room." This must have had the desired effect, for in the King's heart women found a soft spot. He had been brought up at a German court, and German courts in the eighteenth century were greatly influenced by that of Versailles, which was by no means a school of morality. His father had set the example, and his son, Frederick, Prince of Wales, who did not live to succeed him, kept up the tradition. Frederick's chief passion, says Horace Walpole, were women and gambling, while the King was avaricious, though his ruling passions were Germany, the army and women also.

The age was one of satire; nor did the court escape its darts. The numberless lampoons, ballads and pamphlets of all descriptions that were scattered broadcast spared neither the King nor his courtiers. An impression had gone abroad that George was ruled by his wife, as the latter was governed by her favorite, Mrs. Clayton, the Viscountess Sundon, a woman of immense influence, while Queen Caroline lived. The following verses are an instance of the freedom with which writers of that class treated their sovereign:

You may strut, dapper George, but 'twill all be in vain; We know 'tis Queen Caroline, not you, that reign—You govern no more than Don Philip of Spain. Then if you would have us fall down and adore you, Lock up your fat spouse, as your dad did before you.

In spite, however, of the King's weakness, and in spite of the

internal corruption of government which prevailed until Pitt came into office, England was making rapid strides toward the position she held at the death of George II., that of the first maritime and colonial power of the world. The reign of George II. was an era of consolidation and growth. William of Orange had found England an isolated, insular nation, of little account in international affairs. He at once brought her forward to the arena of European politics, and under Anne and the Georges she continued to make steady progress until the blow was struck which deprived her of the American colonies, a loss for which she was compensated by the vast extent of territory taken from France and by the colonization of India and Australia, that was soon to begin.

By the middle of the century England had outrun France and Spain, and she was second only to Holland in her commerce and trade. English corn fed several countries of Europe, English horses were everywhere and English cloth supplied the Indies, East and West. At that period the annual exportation from England to America of clothing, hats, shoes and domestic utensils was computed at £200,000; her yearly output of coal was of 5,000,000 chaldrons, while other minerals were exported to the value of £500,000. Compare this with £34,030,183 for metals alone in 1887.

Among the English trading companies, which spread like a network over the world, the most important were the Merchant-Adventurers', the Turkey, the East India, the Muscovy, the Eastland, the Greenland, the Spanish, the African, the Hudson Bay and the South Sea Companies. The name of this last one recalls the financial panic of the reign of George I., known as the bursting of the South Sea bubble, an event that brought Walpole into power. A monopoly of trade on the coast of Peru had been granted to the holders of South Sea stock, but the collapse of the stock involved the ruin of thousands. To Robert Walpole belongs the honor of having been the first Prime Minister of England. With the accession of George I. the Whigs came into power and Walpole soon found himself on the crest of the wave. This man, whose son Horace has left us his "Memoirs of the Reign of George II.," was much attached to the Prince of Wales, son of George I., and when the Prince succeeded to the throne he continued to retain his influence. His strong practical sense, good nature and absence of sensibility were great aids to him in reaching the power he wielded till near the end of his life. Tall and well-proportioned, his features regular and his eyes full of intelligence, Walpole was in his manners coarse and loose in his morals, yet he ruled England, while two foreignbred kings, one of whom could not even speak the language of his adopted country, wore the crown. Pope wrote of him:

Seen him I have, but in his happiest hour, Of social pleasures, ill exchanged for power; Seen him, encumbered of the venal tribe, Smile without art, and win without a bribe.

In spite of his coarseness and his boisterous gayety, Walpole managed to conciliate the Princess, afterwards Queen Caroline. This lady, Wilhelmina Carolina von Anspach, was married to Prince George in 1705, several years before his father became King. When she first visited England Walpole was thirty-eight years of age and rather handsome. The Princess, however, was of a nature much too refined to be favorably impressed with one whose want of good manners, as we learn on the authority of Mrs. Thompson in her "Memoirs of the Court of George II.," must have made him peculiarly obnoxious. Yet sound policy caused her to tolerate the society of the powerful Minister, and it was probably due to her influence that, at the accession of her husband, he was continued in power.

The first years of George II. were spent in comparative peace, but in 1730 began a disastrous war with Spain. The King was then a widower, his consort having died two years previously. In Oueen Caroline George II. lost a wife extremely devoted to him, perhaps not so much from natural affection as from a strong sense of duty. Their characters were greatly at variance, the King being little versed in learning, while her education was complete, and she had acquired a wide range of knowledge. His gross nature could ill sympathize with her refinement, though he admired and extolled her charms, while opposing her generosity and forcing her to bear the odium of his avarice. A woman of ready discernment of character and of a natural beauty, of which even the ravages of the small-pox did not completely deprive her, the Queen ruled her royal husband with a gentle, but firm hand, while showing him the most deferential respect and entire submission.

Walpole did not enjoy his power long after the Queen's death, for the Spanish war occasioned his downfall. This war was not of his own choosing. He recognized its injustice, but weakly yielded to a popular clamor for it and paid the penalty in consequence.

The military arm of Great Britain had obtained its prestige on the Continent in the reign of Queen Anne, principally through the victories of the Duke of Marlborough. Toward the middle of the eighteenth century the standing army of England amounted to about 100,000 troops, scattered over Great Britain and Ireland, Flanders, the East Indies, Gibraltar, Minorca and the American colonies. The militia, which were to be employed only in service at home, were computed at 200,000.

England's power then, as now, lay in her fleet. Since Henry

VIII. had launched the Henry Grace de Dieu, a ship of 1,000 tons burden, the largest vessel England had ever seen, more than two hundred years had passed. In the reign of James I. ships of 1,200 and 1,400 tons ploughed the main. George II. might boast of men-of-war of nearly 2,000 tons, the largest of which was the Royal William. In 1747 the British navy consisted of six first-rate ships of 100 guns each, eleven of 90 guns, thirty-nine with guns ranging from 70 to 80, seventy-six with from 50 to 66 guns, thirty-nine of 44, fifty-three of 24 and one of 10 guns, besides a large number of smaller vessels, such as fire and bomb ships, hospital and store ships, sloops of war, transports and lighters.

Among the distinguished British officers of the period I notice Admiral Sir Edward Hawke, who defeated the French fleet off Ushant in 1747, and Captain George Brydges Rodney. The latter commanded in the same battle the Eagle, a sixty-gun ship of 1,130 tons. He became a rear admiral in 1759. The name of Admiral Rodney will, I suppose, never be forgotten in the little West Indian island of St. Eustatius, which he captured in 1780, the island dating its decadence from that event. I well remember how, in my childhood, when I lived in St. Eustatius, Rodney was to me like one of those terrible heroes in fairy tales that so strongly impress the imagination of children. Many were the stories told of the days of the terrible admiral. The great Nelson was not yet born at the period of which I am writing. He came into the world the year after George II. died.

The latter portion of this reign was much disturbed by trouble at home and abroad, but these things are matters of general history. Pelham succeeded Walpole, and under his Ministry the corruption of English politics reached its lowest depths. In 1743 a war was undertaken with France to protect the Hanoverian domains of the King, and while hostilities were in progress on the Continent a new danger arose at home. Charles Edward, the son of the Pretender, landed in Scotland in 1745, defeated the English army at Prestonpans, and before the end of the year he had advanced as far as Derby. The English failed to support him, he was forced to retreat and the following year his enterprise ended in the battle of Culloden, which ruined his prospects. The peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, two years later, put an end to the war on the Continent.

When Henry Pelham died in 1754 he was succeeded by his brother, the Duke of Newcastle, under whom the corruption of government continued. The administration of the latter was short, for the war which broke out with France drove him from power. The fall of Minorca awoke Englishmen to a sense of the danger; they clamored for a stronger hand to hold the reins of government,

and the Ministry of Newcastle fell. A regeneration began with the accession of the new Ministry, under the celebrated William Pitt, a man to whom England owes so much and whom Americans will always gratefully remember. Unfortunately, the great Whig families sided with Newcastle, so that a compromise was effected, and the old system of bribery continued.

The Seven Years' War lasted until 1763, and blood flowed freely in Europe as well as in America. Austria, France, Russia and the German princes on the one hand and Prussia with England on the other were parties to the struggle. In our history this conflict is known as the French and Indian War. France lost Canada; but the American colonies spent \$16,000,000, and the lives of thirty thousand men was the price paid for the extension of territory. This war brought into prominence a man who was destined to play an important part in the future history of his country, the immortal George Washington. He had suffered a defeat at the hands of the French on July 3, 1754; but a short time previously, with a force of fifty men, he had defeated them and slain their commanding officer. In the despatch in which this victory was announced Major Washington wrote: "I heard the bullets whistle, and, believe me, there is something charming in the sound." When this letter was brought to the attention of King George he remarked that Washington would not have written thus if he had been used to hear many bullets. Walpole, who wrote long before Washington had drawn the sword in defense of American liberty, adds the remark: "This brave braggart learned to blush for his rodomontade. and desiring to serve General Braddock as aide-de-camp, acquitted himself nobly."

It was during this war that Havana was captured by the British under General Lord Albemarle and Admiral Pocock. A number of Americans, among whom were General Lyman and Colonel Israel Putnam, took part in the siege, which lasted nearly two months and cost the English many lives. One of the most heroic incidents of this struggle is the gallant conduct of Velasco, the Spanish commander of the Morro, who fell mortally wounded while striving in vain to bar the passage of the enemy into the old fortress. Friends and enemies united in paying tribute to his bravery.

The Treaty of Paris ended the Seven Years' War and restored Havana to the Spanish.

The age of George II. was not characterized by wars alone; it was also an age of letters as well as of statesmanship. If the historian records the names of such statesmen as Walpole and Pitt, he also tells us that England might boast at that period of writers and literary men like Horace Walpole, Lord Chesterfield, Berkeley,

Hume, Pope and of such orators as Pitt, Campbell and many more.

The empirical philosophy, against which a reaction was to set in, in the idealistic school of Kant, was then at its height. Condillac was teaching in France and the pseudo-philosophy of Rousseau and Diderot was beginning to spread rationalism throughout the world. Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, died in 1753, while Hume, in the position of librarian at Edinburgh, was preparing his "History of England" and continuing his philosophical studies. These two are the great representatives of the English empirical school. The former had been in relations with the French philosopher Malebranche, a man of very different views; but their relations appear to have been cordial, for Berkeley is known to have visited him when on the Continent.

Another French ecclesiastic with whom an English churchman entered into friendly relations was Père Courayer, with whom Wake, Archbishop of Canterbury, kept up correspondence regarding his desire to unite the Church of England with that of France. This, of course, would have meant submission to Rome, without which any ecclesiastical union with France would necessarily have remained a mere chimera. Père Courayer seems to have held Dr. Wake in great esteem.

The closing years of Swift's life embrace the first portion of the reign of George II., but his great literary activity belongs to those of Anne and George I. The age was one of general laxity and the clergy itself felt this influence, although the increase in the value of their benefices and the accession to their ranks of sons of the nobility had raised them in the reign of George II. above the social level they occupied in the preceding century. Swift, dean of St. Patrick's, Dublin, was no longer the humble Vicar of Laracor, where his average congregation amounted to ten people. In 1716 he secretly married Esther Johnson, the Stella of his earlier writings, and his relations with Miss Vanhomrig came to an end. When George II. ascended the throne "Gulliver's Travels" had just been published, and the author had reached the height of his literary fame. He lived during eighteen years of the reign of the second George and died in 1745. Five years after Swift's death another English churchman, Convers Middleton, departed this life. He may be regarded as the founder of theological rationalism in the English Church.

Among the literary men of this epoch, which followed that of Addison and Steele, who were no more, the names of the two Boyles, Earls of Orrery, and of Lord Chesterfield must not be overlooked. Charles Boyle, third Earl of Orrery, has left us his translation of

Plutarch's life of Lysander, and from his son, John, who cultivated the muses in his retirement, we have the "Letters from Italy."

Philip Dormer Stanhope, Earl of Chesterfield, was one of the orators of this reign as well as a prominent figure in the politics of his day. Pitt admired his oratorical talents and preferred him to any other, though he was far surpassed by Lord Chatham himself. Chesterfield will probably be longest remembered by the famous "Letters," written for the benefit of his illegitimate son, Philip Stanhope, who preceded him to the grave by several years.

Perhaps the most illustrious literary man of this epoch is Samuel Johnson, whose activity belongs principally to the reign of George II. His dictionary appeared in 1755, a work which established his fame and gave him immortality.

Poetry was quite fashionable at this period. Men and women wrote to each other in verse, and the muse was invoked to lash the real or imaginary vices of the age. Richard Savage, the poet, is more known on account of his extraordinary life and his connection with Dr. Johnson and with Pope than for his literary merits. He was united with the latter in the publication of the "Dunciad," and Samuel Johnson wrote his life.

The most famous poet of the period was Alexander Pope. He had made a name for himself when George II. came to the throne and some of his greatest works had been given to the world. Although the Catholic religion, to which he belonged, had excluded him from the public schools of his native country, it did not bar his ascent to Parnassus at a time when England was intensely Protestant and the penal laws were still in force. It was chiefly in the reign of George II. that he acquired his fame as a moralist and satirist. The "Dunciad" appeared in the beginning of this reign. Lord Hervey, one of the historians of the reign, was also a victim of Pope's pungent verse.

What Pope was doing by means of his pen Hogarth was effecting with his pencil. The life of this great pictorial satirist, the greatest among Englishmen, whose equal, perhaps, never existed, extends over the greater part of the eighteenth century. He was about thirty at the accession of George II., and he survived the King three years, leaving to posterity his remarkable works, that present a picture in which the manners and customs of his age and country have remained crystallized for all times.

London was then, as it is now, the centre of England's commercial interests; it was also the heart of its literary activity. There lived Johnson and Pope and Hogarth. There flourished the court, around which a host of satellites, like so many fireflies on a summer night, were constantly fluttering. In this age of progress and com-

fort it is hard to form an idea of the London that was. The great landmarks of England's history, the Tower, Westminster Abbey and the old buildings of Parliament, stood then, as they had been standing for a long time. The Royal Exchange of the reign of George II. has disappeared. It was consumed by the flames in 1838. The business of the Bank of England was carried on at Grocers' Hall until 1733. A portion of the present building was then erected. Of the twelve bridges which now span the Thames, only London Bridge existed, Blackfriars not having been begun until several years after the death of King George. The Mansion House, the present residence of the Lord Mayor, was erected in 1740, before the old Guildhall had been rebuilt.

The principal palace of the King was St. James', which had taken the place of old Whitehall, since the latter had been destroyed by fire. George II. added to the old Kensington Palace that had been purchased by William III. It was here that in later years Queen Victoria was born. Old Hampton Court, the favorite residence of Henry VIII., presented to him by Cardinal Wolsey, was still used in the days of George II., while Marlborough House had been purchased by the Crown in the preceding reign. Buckingham Palace did not become a royal residence until the year after the death of George II. In these abodes the sovereigns of Great Britain held their court, surrounded by an immense retinue of servants, from the Lord Steward down to the Master of the Revels. The number of these had, however, been greatly diminished since the reign of James I.

There were several newspapers in the reign of George II., by which the public was kept informed regarding matters of interest, both at home and abroad, although the increasing influence of the press could not fail to meet with opposition on the part of the Government. The "Times," England's greatest paper, was not yet born, but the "Public Advertiser" had been founded in 1726 as the "London Daily Post and General Advertiser." Its principal contemporary, though much younger than itself, was the "Morning Chronicle," a paper which continued in existence until late in our own century. There was no evening paper in those days, nor for many years after.

The reign of George II. came to an end with his death in 1760. Not the least merit of the years he had spent on the throne was the support he gave to his countryman Handel, who produced in England those masterpieces which the world has so greatly admired. No man, perhaps, exercised greater influence on the musical development of England. The rivalry between him and Buononcini, which for a time divided the aristocracy of London, has been immortalized

in the verses generally attributed to Swift, but which seem to have been written by John Byrom:

Some say, compared to Buononcini, That Mynheer Handel's but a ninny: Others aver that he to Handel Is scarcely fit to hold a candle. Strange all this difference should be 'Twixt Tweedle-dum and Tweedle-dee.

The King and Handel both repose beneath the lofty arches of Westminster Abbey. George, the second English King of Hanover's blood, sleeps in the vault of Henry the Seventh's Chapel beside Queen Caroline. The Hanoverian Handel, who died one year before his sovereign, has found a resting place in the south transept, known as the Poet's Corner. The monument over his ashes is the last work Roubiliac lived to finish. Here rests in death the composer with his contemporaries, Sir Robert Taylor, the architect; Sir John Pringle, president of the Royal Society and physician to their Majesties; Dr. Stephen Hales, the botanist, and James Thomson, the poet.

In the Abbey lie buried also Lady Walpole, the first wife of Sir Robert; Admiral Vernon and the great Earl of Chatham, William Pitt. Death has placed its seal upon them, and the age of George II. slumbers in the dust, while the towers of the venerable Abbey still cast their shadows on the stage where once it acted.

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## CRITICISMS IN KANT.

## KANT AND THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

We are dealing merely with the great fundamental errors of the work—and even with these in only a general way. The exposition of these errors, however, is intended to be so adequate that, even were we to proceed no further and leave the subordinate errors untouched, the earnest student of philosophy, who really understands Kant, will have a sufficient basis on which to proceed, and will thus be able to detect the fallacies for himself and discount the random reasoning which has imposed upon so many. For example, in the present article we shall consider Kant's treatment of the proofs for the existence of God; that is, we shall deal with the fundamental and leading errors underlying his rejection of these proofs, leaving for a future time the refutation of the particular

arguments by which he seeks to discredit these proofs. The reason of this arrangement is that the fundamental fallacies may be exposed as soon as possible, the subordinate errors being so manifold, that to delay upon them, would postpone for too long a time the exposure of the nature of the fallacies that lie at the foundation of his false theory of human knowledge. Kant has once more become the fashion, and the sooner his multiplied shortcomings are understood the better. Moreover, the broad foundation of folly being once shaken, we may then proceed more leisurely to a consideration of the details, which will then be an easy task. It is the intention, however, to proceed to the criticism of most of even the minor errors, so that at least all the principal errors will come under review and the gigantic sophistication of the vaunted system of knowledge be seen in its true colors.

Kant's treatment of the proofs for the existence of a Supreme Being—the highest and gravest of all the problems that can be proposed to man for his consideration—is in the highest degree disingenuous. Instead of meeting these proofs directly, he adopts the tactics of a barrister who holds a brief to discredit them and resorts to all the devices known to pettifogging methods. true he states—after a fashion—the proofs on the opposite side; but he does so only to belittle, to misrepresent, to vilify and malign them. Substitution, adroit shuffling of names and terms, suppression of the vital necessities of the case, misrepresentation—these are some of the devices by which Kant seeks to discredit the proofs for the existence of God before he utters a word in disproof of them. Instead of a zeal to discover where the truth lies, there is, throughout, the sophistry which, by fair means or by foul, endeavors to make the worse appear the better reason. This is hardly the proper temperament of a philosopher, whose main object should be the discovery of truth wherever it lies and at any cost.

It would be difficult to find anything at once so ingenious, so disingenuous and so positively vicious as is his introduction of the grave problem itself. The caricature which he paints in his Transcendental Ideal is a foul travesty of the great question. Instead of meeting directly the argument from a first cause of the universe or the argument from design—or any of the other proofs for the existence of God—and judiciously weighing their merits and demerits, Kant's very first step is a fraudulent misrepresentation of the origin of the notion of the Supreme Being. The importance of this feature seems to have escaped the critics altogether; yet it is the very basis of all Kant's sophistry in dealing with this supreme problem. According to Kant, the notion of a Supreme Being is not an idea necessarily forced upon the intellect by the laws of

reason at all. It is not the outcome of a logical necessity. It is not the first cause—absolutely necessary. According to Kant, the ens realissimum is a mere beau-ideal of reality—a utopian fancy—a dream of transcendental romance. It is the lofty standard which man sets up for himself for comparison, but which has no more existence than the hero of a novel. The mind has been seeking for merely the notion of the highest reality, and, having imagined it, has merely clothed it with the character and existence of a hero of rational romance—the highest standard of greatness and type of reality which it can represent to itself. The idea which Kant thus fashions for himself into an ideal is not the offspring of reason, but of the imagination, and, while it is the concept of the most exalted standard of all reality, can, of course, lay no claim whatever to reality of any kind.

"These ideals," he tells us, "though they cannot claim objective reality (existence), are not therefore to be considered as mere chimeras, but supply reason with an indispensable standard, because it requires the concept of that which is perfect of its kind, in order to estimate and measure it by the degree and the number of defects in the imperfect. To attempt to realize the ideal in example, that is, as a real phenomenon, as we might represent a perfectly wise man in a novel, is impossible, nay, absurd, and but little encouraging, because the natural limits, which are constantly interfering with the perfection in the idea, make all illusion in the experiment impossible and render the good itself in the idea suspicious and unreal.

"This is the case with the ideal of pure reason, which must always rest on definite concepts and serve as a rule and model, whether for imitation or for criticism."

This ideal of pure reason is the Supreme Being, the ens realissimum, the highest reality, and, according to Kant, seems to be born wholly of transcendental romance—not of reason. Consequently it is not to a logical necessity, or to necessary being, or to the Great First Cause, Kant primarily introduces us, but to a highly fantastic, arbitrary idea, which is made to appear rather as a Quixotic creation of the fancy than as the answer to the imperative demands of reason. This seems incredible, but Kant tells us:

"By this complete possession of all reality we represent the concept of a thing by itself as completely determined, and the concept of an ens realissimum is the concept of an individual being, because of all possible predicates, one, namely, that which absolutely belongs to being, is found in its determination. It is therefore a transcendental ideal, which forms the foundation of the complete determination which is necessary for all that exists, and which constitutes at the same time the highest and complete condition of its possibility,

to which all thoughts of objects, with regard to their content, must be traced back. It is at the same time the only true ideal of which human reason is capable, because it is in this alone that a concept of a thing, which in itself is general, is completely determined by itself and recognized as the representation of an individual."

Here, then, according to Kant, is the cradle of the notion of the Supreme Being. That notion is not the result of a stern logical necessity from which the mind cannot escape if it inquires at all into the origin of things, nor is it the outcome of an inexorable causality, nor is it derived even from the contemplation of the order and intelligence manifested in the universe. It is neither one nor the other, nor all of these things. Its origin has nothing whatever to do with necessity. It is the ideal of the mind, discovered by the imagination, which, having started out on an expedition of inquiry, has brought home this transcendental ideal as the result of its quest. Unfortunately, however, it is only an ideal, the mere offspring of an idea—and is wholly destitute of objective reality; that is, of existence. Kant tells us:

"It is self-evident that for that purpose, namely, in order simply to represent the necessary and complete determination of things, reason does not presuppose the existence of a Being that should correspond to the ideal, but its idea only."

And again:

"Hence the object of its ideal which exists in reason only is called the original Being (ens originarium), and so far as it has nothing above it, the highest Being (ens summum), and so far as everything as conditioned is subject to it, the Being of all beings (ens entium). All this, however, does not mean the objective relation of any real thing to other things, but of the idea to concepts, and leaves us in perfect ignorance as to the existence of a being of such superlative excellence."

Now, it is this artificial and arbitrary notion—this mere transcendental ideal—without existence or reality of any kind—that Kant sets up throughout as the idea of God and on which he wages his strange warfare. He tells us:

"If we follow up this idea (the ideal) and hypostasize it, we shall be able to determine the original being by means of the concept of the highest reality as one, simple, all-sufficient, eternal, etc., in one word, determine it in all its unconditioned completeness through all predicaments. The concept of such a being is the concept of God in its transcendental sense, and thus, as I indicated above, the ideal of pure reason is the object of a transcendental theology.

"By such an employment of the transcendental idea, however, we should be overstepping the limits of its purpose and admissibility.

Reason used it only as being the concept of all reality, for a foundation of the complete determination of things, without requiring that all this reality should be given objectively and constitute itself a thing. This is a mere fiction by which we comprehend and realize the manifold of our idea in one ideal, as a particular being. We have no right to do this, not even to assume the possibility of such an hypothesis; nor do all the consequences which flow from such an ideal concern the complete determination of things in general, for the sake of which alone the idea was necessary, or influence it in the least."

This, then, is Kant's account of the origin of the reasons for belief in the existence of God. It is not the Great First Cause of all things, nor the Author and Supreme Ruler of the universe, nor the necessary and necessarily existing Being to which we are introduced. Not at all. It is this mere figment of the idealizing imagination that is made the foundation of all proofs and arguments for the existence of the Supreme Being. The best that can be said of it is that it may be called a joint creation of the imagination and of reason, although reason has really little share in its manufacture. It is this ideal which Kant tears to tatters. It is this "mere fiction" which he is everywhere sophistically thrusting into the place of the necessary being-into the place of the first cause-into the place of the all-wise Author and Supreme Ruler of the universe. It is to it he returns again and again. It is against it all the artillery of his sophistry is directed. Thrice he slavs the slain that never had real existence at all, so that when Kant has finished it is not the existence of God that has suffered, but the existence of his own ideal.

Now, Kant was astute enough to realize all this. He was well aware that such bald sophistry could not pass muster for a moment with even the most ordinary understanding. It is indeed true that Descartes had founded a proof for the existence of God on the idea of the most perfect being; that Leibnitz followed Descartes; and that, centuries before either Leibnitz or Descartes, St. Anselm had given us an ontological proof—as it has been called —that followed to some extent along those lines; but each of those insisted upon a very different certificate of birth for the idea of the Supreme Being from that of the imagination to which Kant assigns his "ideal" being. No one understood this better than Kant, and no one comprehended more fully than he that he must acknowledge the real necessities in the case. Consequently he finds himself constrained to admit the compelling forcefulness of the real arguments for the existence of God. Meanwhile, however, he had, with much admirable forethought and much consummate ingenuity, worthy of

a better cause, established this strategic point to which he could retreat on occasion and where he could stoutly maintain that the notion of the Supreme Being was a mere idea—"a pure ideal" but wholly without objective reality. This was to be a point d'appui for him throughout his whole contention. By it he had already forestalled all the real proofs and had established a fairly plausible claim to the conclusion that the objective reality of this ideal being could hardly be admitted. It is this empty figment of the imagination which he keeps before himself and before his readers throughout; and when he does finally come to the real proofs, he makes a bold attempt to reduce them all to this ideal, which—for the purpose—he again transforms into an idea. He reduces all the proofs for the existence of God to three; the ontological, the cosmological and the physico-theological—as he calls it. He states each with sufficient candor and honesty; but he tells us that the cosmological proof and the teleological proof are merely the ontological proof in disguise, while he reduces the necessary being of the ontological proof to the terms of "the transcendental ideal;" so that-if we accept his argument—when he has shown this ideal to be without objective reality, he has practically canceled all the proofs from reason for the existence of God. Nero is said to have wished that all Roman citizens had but one neck, that he might cut them all off at a single stroke; and Kant seems to have had a similar design in his treatment of the proofs for the existence of God. His entire argument throughout is a return to this "ideal of pure reason." which he surreptitiously substitutes for the real argument in each of those proofs. Now, this reductio ad unum is without doubt a clever piece of strategy. It is splendid generalship; but it is poor philosophy. Kant thus becomes, like Carnot, simply an organizer of victory. Having created his "ideal of pure reason," he uses it as a flying column easily summoned to his aid in every emergency, and by its use he disposes of all the arguments for the existence of God. Nothing is easier, of course, than to show that the existence of the transcendental ideal is an existence in the imagination only—"an existence in the idea only," as Kant calls it—and that, therefore, the Supreme Being is without existence; that is, without objective reality of any kind. But, of course, in his assaults upon it Kant is merely assailing a man of straw, which he himself has manufactured. The manner in which he accomplishes the substitution of this ideal, first for the necessary being, next for the first cause and finally for the Author and Supreme Ruler of the universe, is adroitness itself. It is, however, fully equaled by the skilful but wholly sophistical manner in which, after admitting the full force of the proofs for the existence of God and quoting them with

sufficient frankness—nay, with all apparent sincerity and candor—he proceeds, by a similar substitution, to weaken their efficacy, to belittle their overwhelming force and to misrepresent their full significance, until led on step by step, almost unawares, we find ourselves—instead of defending the reality of a first cause and its existence, or the incontrovertible reality in the absolutely necessary being—confronted not by any of these, but by this selfsame "transcendental ideal." Nothing to all appearances could be more ingenuous than Kant's frank statement in which he tells us in his transition from this ideal:

"Notwithstanding this urgent want of reason to presuppose something, as a foundation for the complete determination of the concepts of the understanding, reason nevertheless becomes too soon aware of the purely ideal and factitious character of such a supposition to allow itself to be persuaded by it alone to admit a mere creation of thought as a real being, unless it were forced by something else to seek for some rest in its regressus from the conditioned, which is given, to the unconditioned, which, though in itself and according to its mere concept not given as real, can alone complete the series of conditions followed up to their causes. This is the natural course, taken by the reason of every, even the most ordinary, human being, although not every one can hold out in it. It does not begin with concepts, but with common experience, and thus has something really existing for its foundation. That foundation, however, sinks, unless it rests upon the immovable rock of that which is absolutely necessary; and this itself hangs without a support, if without and beneath it there be empty space and everything be not filled by it. so that no room be left for a why—in fact, if it be not infinite in

"If we admit the existence of something, whatever it may be, we must also admit that something exists by necessity. For the conditioned exists only under the condition of something as its cause, and from this the same conclusion leads us till we reach a cause which is not contingent, and therefore unconditionally necessary. This is the argument on which reason founds its progress toward an original being."

Everything here seems to be frankness itself. The full force of the argument for the real existence of a necessary first cause is admitted as well as the conclusion that this cause must be infinite in reality. The contingent can exist "only under the condition of something else as its cause." But having stated the argument candidly, Kant seems to think that he is absolved from all further necessity of recognizing the force of his own admission and immediately substitution, belittlement, misrepresentation, dry cynicism

take the place of the candor. He loses no time in surreptitiously canceling the effects of his statement. With consummate suavity of manner he soon tells us:

"This, therefore, is the natural course of human reason. It begins by persuading itself of the existence of some necessary being. In this being it recognizes unconditioned existence. It then seeks for the concept of that which is independent of all condition, and finds it in that which is itself the condition of all other things, that is, in that which contains all reality. Now, as the unlimited all is absolute unity and implies the concept of a being, one and supreme, reason concludes that the Supreme Being, as the original cause of all things, must exist by absolute necessity."

It is difficult to absolve Kant from the charge of wilful misrepresentation here. At once he begins to drop a strand or two from the chain of necessity. He tells us that "reason begins by persuading itself of the existence of some necessary being;" whereas it is not persuasion, but an overwhelming conviction—which really amounts to an apodictic certainty—which compels us to the conclusion that a necessary being must exist. Next he calls this a persuasion of the existence of some necessary being, in order to create the opinion, unconsciousy and insensibly, that there is a choice of necessary beings; so that by the time we reach the absolute necessity of the Supreme Being as the cause of all things, we find that this necessity -so conclusively shown in the argument-is wonderfully weakened and has lost the apodictic ring which we find in his first candid statement of the case. This, however, is but a beginning which Kant follows up diligently throughout the whole question. Immediately he adds: "For if we accept everything as here stated, namely, first, that we may infer rightly from any given existence (perhaps my own only) the existence of an unconditioned necessary being," etc., whereas the real state of the case is not that "we may infer rightly," but that we must inevitably conclude "from any given existence the existence of an unconditionally necessary being," as Kant himself has candidly admitted a few moments before in the above quotation where he states the proof. Now, this is not mere sophistry. It is palpable dishonesty of the most culpable kind. easy stages then he tries to lead back to the transcendental idealwhich he never really leaves altogether—and to keep the necessity of the existence of the first cause out of sight completely. That is, for the absolutely necessary being he loses no time in substituting the Supreme Being; and this Supreme Being is from the outset vitiated and adulterated by the imaginary process which classes it with the heroes of romance. Soon the process of belittlement is added. Kant informs us:

"The concept of a being of the highest reality (ens realissimum) would therefore seem of all concepts of all possible things to be the most compatible with the concept of an (mark the 'an') unconditionally necessary being, and though it may not satisfy that concept altogether, yet no choice is left to us, and we are forced to keep it, because we must not risk the existence of a necessary being, and, if we admit it, can in the whole field of possibility find nothing that can produce better founded claims on such a distinction in existence."

Kant has certainly mastered the art of damning with faint praise or of so discrediting where he pretends to credit that he throws the reader completely off his guard. We started with the absolute necessity of the existence of the necessary being as the necessary consequence of the existence of the contingent. Next we were told—although the statement had a false ring—that the Supreme Being must be concluded by reason to exist by absolute necessity. And here this necessity is so defecated to a myth that it is simply a matter of "look out or you will find it difficult to find a place in your Supreme Being at all." This is skilful, but wholly sophistical manipulation. Finally he tells us dryly:

"We cannot deny that this argument possesses a certain foundation, when we must come to a decision, that is, when after having admitted the existence of some one necessary being, we agree that we must decide where to place it."

It should be remarked here that all this misrepresentation, belittlement and substitution, as well as the gradual, stealthy progress back to "the ideal of pure reason" which is without objective reality, occurs before Kant leaves the statement of the proofs or before he proceeds to rebut them by a single word. And yet by an adroit selection of terms he has almost won his case. The Supreme Being comes into the arena already wholly discredited. All this demonstrates clearly what a judicious selection of words can accomplish. yet it is of this discredited and already shamefaced Supreme Being that Kant has told us just a few moments ago, that "the contingent exists only under the condition of something else as its cause, and from this the same conclusion leads us on till we reach a cause which is not contingent, and therefore unconditionally necessary." All of which shows that Kant is a consummate master of strategy, however we may regard him as a philosopher. In our first article we saw something of the same kind; and we shall meet with the same when we come to deal with the categories. In fact, Kant seems to have adopted these tactics throughout and to have depended upon them quite as much as upon the force of his arguments. Strategy rather than logic is the measure on which he relied for

the success of his contentions. Indeed, Kant's methods here are adroitness itself. He wishes to deny reality to the object represented by the notion of a Supreme Being. He wishes to establish as a truth that the notion exists only in our minds and cannot be proved objectively. At the same time, no one understands better than Kant that, underlying this idea, there is postulated by reason the necessary existence of the cause of the contingent. Kant himself has admitted this and nowhere has he the courage to openly deny it. He dare not maintain that the existence of the necessary being cannot be proved; for he has proved it himself. This he has established on the immovable rock of reality. There existence is unimpeachable. There is objective reality that is incontrovertible. Kant dare not call it in question. What he does, however, is to remove this necessity of necessary existence as far as possible from the discussion, and in the place of the necessary being to introduce the idea of a Supreme Being, whose properties, as he terms them, he has been trying to discover-or imagine; for it is imagination rather than reason which Kant uses here throughout. He seeks for "the properties" that are most compatible with absolute necessity. pretends to seek for a place in which to locate this absolutely necessary being. His perplexity arises from the necessity of admitting a necessary cause for all that is contingent. He has been obliged to admit the necessity of the existence of the necessary being. He has also admitted that this necessary being must be infinite in reality. He admits that, if the contingent exists, the necessary being must also exist. Hence he recognizes the full force of the argument from the existence of the contingent to the existence of the necessary being which is its cause. This necessary being, however, he soon merges in the highest reality and the highest reality again in the Supreme Being, and this in turn in the ideal being, which he tells us is a mere idea without objective reality; so that having reached the existence of a necessary being by the road of pure logical reasoning, he leaves it instantly to go in search—with his imagination -of "a being worthy of such superlative excellence." That is, he sends reason out on a guessing expedition in quest of a being "worthy of such a distinction as the unconditioned necessity of existence . . . in order to find among all concepts of possible things one which has nothing incompatible with absolute necessity." He then informs us that "after discarding everything else as incompatible with that necessity, reason takes the one being that remains (sic)-after what?—for the absolutely necessary being;" and "the being . . . which is in no point and no respect defective and is sufficient as a condition everywhere, seems, on that account, to be most compatible with absolute necessity." The being which Kant seems to

have thus discovered in his inquiring process seems to be the Supreme Being. Consequently the Supreme Being is immediately introduced at once into the place of the necessary first cause, and the necessary first cause of all things is quietly dropped out of sight. The substituting process is begun at once, and the being whose existence is soon challenged is not the necessary cause of the contingent, but this Supreme Being of Kant's own manufacture—a thing of shreds and patches. This Supreme Being soon becomes identical with the ideal of pure reason—indeed, is that ideal -which we are told has no existence outside the mind. It is a mere idea; Kant cannot determine it with sufficient accuracy, and so he rejects it as incapable of proof. Now, it is quite plain that we have not here question of the existence of God, but of the nature of God. Kant's supreme being is his answer not to the question: Is there a God? but to the question: What is God? And when Kant maintains that this being has no existence or reality, we can hardly disagree with him; for it is a mere figment of his own imagination. There can hardly be any doubt, then, that he is right when he tells us of the objective insufficiency of a supreme being of this character. This reality we can never meet in experience or out of it, for the very simple reason that such a being is impossible. A God that the mind could adequately determine would be no God at all.

Those who have undertaken to prove the existence of God from reason alone have never pretended to be able to give us an exact portrait of the Supreme Being. Such a being as the mind could conceive is only a concept of the imagination, wholly without objective reality. It may be the ideal of Kant and his followers, but of no one else. But the necessary being, the cause of all things, the wise and intelligent being who rules the universe—this being has been proved not to be a mere figment of the imagination, but an existing being, whose existence Kant himself declares to be necessary if we are to admit the reality of the contingent. Hence we find that Kant has, with or without design, confounded or confused two things essentially different. For the absolutely necessary cause of the contingent he has substituted "the ideal of pure reason." He fraudulently gives us the one for the other. And he has made the attempt to make the arguments against the latter valid against the former. It is this figment of the imagination that is in Kant's mind throughout. The serious reader of Kant who grasps his full meaning can hardly fail to see that it is the confusion of those two notions-which are forever overshadowing each other in Kant's imagination—that is responsible for the preposterous claims which Kant advances and which are so diametrically opposed to the admissions which he finds himself forced to make, as, for instance, in the passage quoted above, where he says:

"Reason does not begin with concepts, but with common experience, and thus has something really existing for its foundation. That foundation (that is, the empirical, common experience), however, sinks, unless it rests upon the immovable rock of that which is absolutely necessary; and this itself hangs without a support, if without and beneath it there be empty space, and everything be not filled by it, so that no room be left for a why—in fact, if it be not infinite in reality." (Here he admits the reality of the infinite, nay, declares it absolutely necessary.)

"If we admit the existence of something, whatever it may be, we must also admit that something exists by necessity. For the contingent exists only under the condition of something else as its cause, and from this the same conclusion leads us on till we reach a cause which is not contingent, and therefore unconditionally necessary."

No one has put the case in stronger terms than these, and the only reason that we can see why Kant has wandered so far from these just and necessary conclusions of true reason is, that he allowed himself to be confused by the duplex lens of unlimited reality, which came and went so incessantly before his mind. However that may be, here, at least, there is no doubt that Kant recognizes that it is not from the concept merely or from the idea, but from the reality of the contingent that we are forced to conclude the objective reality of the first cause. There is no rom for doubt here. The contingent does not rest on a mere idea destitute of objective reality or of existence. Not at all. We are told plainly that the contingent exists only under the condition of something else as its cause, and that this cause must be "infinite in reality."

Nevertheless, in spite of all this, we find Kant soon arguing—forgetful of it all—that this infinite reality does not exist, and stoutly maintaining that it is but an idea without objective reality of any kind. The real fact is that, in spite of all his sophistry, Kant finds himself helpless before the logic of the absolute necessity of the existence of an absolutely necessary cause of all things and does not dare to deny its force. The argument from the contingent to the necessary being is so overwhelming in its irresistible logic that Kant does not dare to challenge it. He is forced to admit it, and being compelled to admit it, while at the same time he holds a brief against it, the only resource left him seems to be an attempt to misrepresent it, to belittle it, and per fas out nefas to weaken its invincible strength. Consequently he grumbles over it, he snarls at it, he evades and shuns when it is at all possible. He shifts into

its place the ens realissimum, and, with the necessity of a first cause persistently crowded to the background, he wages his warfare against the notion of an ens realissimum or the Supreme Ruler of the universe, because, as he tells us, he cannot determine this notion fully or meet with its object in experience. It would be exceedingly interesting to follow Kant through all the divagations by which he tries to rid himself of the argument for a necessary cause of the universe; but this must be omitted for the present, as it would lead us too far from our present purpose. Here we must examine Kant's fundamental reasons for his Quixotic rejection of a proof which he has admitted in all its fullness and strength. Let us try to grasp these objections in all their fullness and force.

Briefly summarized, Kant's reasons for rejecting the proofs for the existence of a Supreme Being are two: (1) He argues that the idea of a Supreme Being is merely an idea wholly without objective reality, and that consequently the Supreme Being cannot be proved to have existence. And (2) he argues that since we can never meet with the Supreme Being in experience there can be submitted no convincing proof of its existence. These two reasons are buttressed by two subordinate ones, on which their validity is supposed to rest, viz., (I) that the principle of causality is not valid outside experience; in other words, it is immanent only, and consequently has no validity in the argument for the existence of God; and (2) that, since we are unable to complete for ourselves the synthesis of the sum total of all phenomena-inasmuch as the mind is unable to grasp it in its fullness—the idea of the sum total of all phenomena or of the totality of all phenomena; that is, of the universe as a whole, can be only a transcendental idea. Consequently, the problem resolves itself into something like this formula: for one transcendental idea which we take as an effect to find another transcendental idea which is its cause. Kant does not use exactly this formula; but it amounts to this precisely. However, since Kant does not elaborate the latter notion to any great extent and relies mainly on the inefficacy of the principle of causality, and since an adequate treatment of this special feature would extend this article to undue limits, we shall, for the present, omit the consideration of our inability to grasp the synthesis of all phenomena.

That these are Kant's reasons for the rejection of the proofs for the existence of God does not admit of any question. He is exceedingly explicit on the subject and returns to it again and again. For instance, he tells us:

"It makes a great difference whether something is represented to our reason as an object absolutely or merely as an object in the idea. In the former case my concepts are meant to determine the object; in the latter there is only a schema to which no object, not even a hypothetical one, corresponds directly, but which only serves to represent to ourselves indirectly other objects through their relation to that idea and according to their systematical unity. Thus I say that the concept of a highest intelligence is a mere idea, that is, that its objective reality is not to consist in its referring directly to any object (for in that case we would not be able to justify its objective validity); but that it is only a schema arranged according to the conditions of the highest unity of reason, of the concept of a thing in general, serving only to obtain the greatest systematical unity in the empirical use of our reason by helping us, as it were, to deduce the object of experience from the imagined object of that idea as its ground or cause."

In this strange doctrine—to which we shall return later—Kant denies objective reality to the idea of a supreme being. Elsewhere he tells us:

"In whatever way the understanding may have reached that concept, it is clearly impossible that the existence (italics Kant's) of its object could be found in it through analysis, because the very knowledge of the existence of the object implies that it exists outside our thoughts. We cannot, in fact, go beyond concepts, nor, unless we follow the empirical connection by which nothing but phenomena can be given, hope to discover new objects and imaginary beings."

This is very plain language and admits of only one interpretation, that is, that there is no objective reality to correspond to the idea of the Supreme Being. Indeed, this is his main argument throughout—coupled, however, with the notion that his position on this point is strengthened by the fact that we never can meet with the Supreme Being in experience, and that the argument from the effect to its cause breaks down when we come to the question of something outside experience. He says:

"For all synthetical principles of the understanding are applicable immanently only, i. e., within its own sphere, while in order to arrive at the knowledge of a Supreme Being we must use them transcendentally, and for this our understanding is not prepared. If the empirically valid law of causality is to conduct us to the Original Being, that Being must belong to the chain of objects of experience, and in that case it would, like all phenomena, be itself conditioned. And even if that sudden jump beyond the limits of experience, according to the dynamical law of the relation of effects to their causes, could be allowed, what concept could we gain by this proceeding? Certainly no concept of a Supreme Being, effects, to bear witness to its cause."

And again:

because experience never presents to us the greatest of all possible "And even if we were thinking only of the form of the world, the manner of its composition and its change and tried to infer from this a cause totally different from the world, this would be again a judgment of speculative reason only; because the object here is not an object of any possible experience. In this case the principle of causality, which is valid within the field of experience only and utterly useless, nay, even meaningless, outside it, would be totally diverted from its proper destination."

It is hardly necessary to multiply quotations to show Kant's position on these points. They are the false principles on which he insists throughout his entire contention.

It is not a little singular to find how easily he has found disciples, especially in these views where the reasoning is so shallow and the sophistry so palpable. But it is astonishing to find such a man as the late Dr. Brownson humbly subscribing to these Kantian canons and preaching them as if they were incontrovertible. Incredible as it may seem that Kant should put forward such rubbish as philosophical arguments—and they are the only ones on which his rejection of the proofs for the existence of God is based—it is with utter amazement that we find Dr. Brownson's keen mind imposed upon by them. Yet the fact is that he seems to have swallowed them without wincing. The argument that the proofs for the existence of God must be rejected because they give us the object in the idea only and that consequently the idea is without objective reality, he adopted and made his own and argued from as stoutly as if it were based on sound philosophical principles. He not only makes a complete surrender to Kant upon this point, but frankly adopts all the conclusions from the doctrine and maintains them against all oncomers. He even attempts to rail at the scholastics on this point and argues plainly in these words:

"We object to those who profess to rise from the contingent discursively to the necessary, because if they have only the ens contingens and its phenomena, they can conclude only the contingent and its phenomena. . . . It is equally impossible by synthetic reasoning, which adds to the subject a predicate not contained in it or a predicate not intellectually apprehended, as Kant has sufficiently proved in his "Critik der Reinen Vernunft."

Thus we see that Brownson swallowed Kant's arguments from immanence whole. This argument has imposed upon so many that it may be well to expose its shallowness and weaknesses.

Now at the very outset it is necessary to bear in mind that the existence of God is forced upon us by the laws of reason itself;

that without the first and necessary cause the contingent can have no meaning and no existence; and that Kant himself has been forced to concede all this, and that he has expressed the necessity of a necessary cause in language as strong as any one. He has told us that in reaching the notion of the necessary being reason "does not begin with concepts, but with common experience, and thus has something really existing for its foundation." Hence, according to Kant himself-when he is forced to deal squarely with the matter-the notion of God does not arise from concepts or ideas, but originates with real existences in our common experience. He also tells us that this "foundation" for the notion of a Supreme Being "sinks, however, unless it rests upon the immovable rock of that which is absolutely necessary"—which, if it means anything at all, must mean the existence of the necessary being as the cause. Of this he leaves little room for doubt; for he at once tells us: "If we admit the existence of something, whatever it may be, we must also admit that something exists by necessity." Therefore, according to Kant's own admission, there must exist, "by necessity," something independent of the world and apart and distinct from it, which is its cause. And he further tells us: "For the contingent exists only under the condition of something else as its cause." Now, Kant makes no effort whatever to cancel these admissions. They stand, therefore, uncon-This is the foundation which it is verted and incontrovertible. necessary to keep ever in mind in dealing with Kant's further views on this point. For Kant instantly takes leave of this line of thought and hardly ever again alludes to it or its necessity. It might naturally be supposed that, having made such fatal admissions, he would have attempted to meet them directly and controvert them. But he does nothing of the kind. There they stand in all their impregnable strength; so that when Kant has accumulated his mass of irrelevant sophistry, this argument still stands towering, clifflike. unassailed and unassailable as a rock of adamant. What Kant does is, by a devious and circuitous route, to avoid this impregnable fortress and turn men's attention away from it to his "ideal of pure reason," which, as has been seen, he had previously prepared with so much assiduity and care, and which he now substitutes everywhere for this necessary being. Consequently, when all is said and done by Kant against the proofs for the existence of God, this admission by him remains intact-unquestioned even by Kant-and in it we have established the existence of a necessary cause, as well as the fact that the contingent itself can have no meaning of any kind-is wholly unintelligible, in fact-if we deny the existence of this necessary cause. How, then, can Kant call this a mere idea? The adroit manipulation of "the ideal of pure reason" is but a diversion

-a mere demonstration—to lead away from the real question at issue; and the idea or ideal is fraudulently thrust into the place of the necessary cause, without whose existence, Kant admits, the contingent itself cannot exist. But no artificial or adventitious invention must be permitted to stand in the way of the real conditions of the case. To ignore the real argument is to misrepresent the real problem. To call this existence, thus postulated by reason, "an object in the idea only," is so directly opposed to all the laws of logical reason that Kant has been forced to invent his ideal of pure reason to impart to it any color of plausibility at all. The argument from the contingent to its necessary cause is that of a reality based upon a reality; whereas Kant would have us believe that it is merely "a relation of an idea to concepts." Now, the fact is that we have here not a relation between mere ideas at all, but a relation between the reality of the contingent and its cause. This is so evident that the plain man and the wayfaring man cannot err therein. Nevertheless, it is this relation which Kant and his followers—Brownson among them—insist is merely a relation between ideas and does not involve existence at all. But the effect the world—is a real existence and therefore a reality; and this effect cannot exist, according to Kant, unless there also exist something as its cause. It is-to concede all that can be lawfully conceded—the relation of a real effect to its cause whose existence is necessary, but which itself is unknown. There is just one step in this relation; and this step is from effect to cause. And than this effect nothing can be more real in the empirical world; for it is the sum total of all empirical reality. Therefore, it is the mere assurance of audacity to claim that this is merely an idea and a relation between ideas. Than the given effect nothing can be more real; and the step from this sum total of all reality is simply the step from effect to cause. If, then, the effect is real and really existing, and if the existence of this effect depends on the existence of its cause—without which it cannot possibly exist-it is difficult to understand how Kant could by any process of legerdemain or skillful substitution claim that the existence of the cause is not involved in the conclusion at all. It is the very thing that is involved; and without it the contingent with all its reality sinks into the abyss. Kant would have perceived this easily had he not permitted himself to be blinded by his ideal of pure reason, which, like a swinging lamp, is forever intercepting his view of the real conditions in the problem. The existence, then, of the cause is an apodictic certainty, as truly real as the existence of any cause in the world of empirical reality; and without it the entire contingent sinks without foundation of any kind. The existence of the cause is, then, a logical necessity. Its existence is absolutely necessary for the existence of the contingent. Consequently, the existence of the cause is an absolute necessity. Without it we cannot—as Kant himself has admitted—conceive the existence of the contingent at all. It is utterly inconceivable, then, how Kant can call all this an object in the idea only, declare it without objective reality, and maintain that it does not involve existence on the part of the necessary cause. Unless all the laws of logic are at fault, it is this, precisely and preëminently, that it does involve and imperatively demand, viz., the existence of the cause.

But because we do not meet in experience the first cause or the Supreme Being and cannot have an empirical verification of the existence of the necessary first cause, Kant seems to think that he is justified in denying existence to the Supreme Being or the first cause. And this brings us face to face with one of the most profound problems in the whole realm of philosophy, viz., the relation of logical necessity to reality. It is the real question to be decided here. Kant seems to have perceived this at least in a dim sort of way; but his manner of dealing with the problem is one of the scandals of philosophy. He dare not put the question directly as we have stated it—perhaps it did not strike him in this way at all. What he does is to make this necessity a regulative principle which guides reason, although it is itself wholly fictitious in its character. But of this later.

It is worth while to inquire into the nature of this relation. We have not seen the question treated by any of the philosophers; nevertheless, it is the real problem raised by Kant in this particular instance, whether or no he himself was aware of it. If we are to believe Kant's contention that all our logical necessity does not give us existence or reality, then logical necessity does not involve reality. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that the truth of all sound, logical propositions rests, not on the subject or the idea, but upon the truth of the reality that underlies the idea. The truth of the thought in the long run must rest on the truth of things. The truth of the proposition-man is mortal-does not rest on the mere ideas there expressed, but upon the truth of the reality. In other words, the truth of the proposition rests upon the objective reality of the truth that underlies the proposition. It is not, then, so much the truth of thought that gives true logical propositions as the truth of things. Or perhaps it were better to say that it is the truth of thought based on the truth of things that gives us truth in a logical proposition. If I say that a circle is round, my statement is true, not because of the truth of the words, but because of the truth of the thing. Every statement, then, is true if the thought as expressed

in the verbal formula corresponds to the truth of the thing. Hence all logical truth is based directly not on mere truth of thoughtalthough this, too, is requisite—but on the truth of the things that underlie the thought. In particular propositions this is self-evident. All logical errors are errors because they misrepresent the reality, and they are logical errors simply because they are at the same time real errors. This requires no proof in particular propositions. In general principles or in universal propositions the connection is not so self-evident, and hence have arisen the contentions of philosophers regarding the origin of universal ideas. Now, the principle of contradiction and the principle of causality are wholly independent of all experience and are in themselves criteria of truth. applied in experience we know they ring true and we accept their testimony, although we are fully aware that their truth does not rest on empirical objects. Whence, then, do they obtain their apodictic character? It is not from experience. It is not from the mind itself. It must be from their acquaintance in some mysterious manner with the reality in all truth of which the propositions themselves seem to be a part. One thing is certain: we cannot deny to them a determining character in the ascertainment of truth; for if we were to do this, we would thus upset the very foundations of all empirical truth. There is only one conclusion then, viz., that these general principles have their foundation deep in reality and are consequently true. Hence the truth of all propositions lies down deep in the reality that underlies objectively the idea expressed by the propositions themselves. Hence the truth of the statement rests on the truth of the thought and the truth of the thought rests on the truth of the thing. Hence in every logical proposition that includes a truth the truth of the thing is implied in the truth of the statement; that is, underneath it all lies the truth of the objective reality; otherwise we would have no truth at all. Hence the truth of all propositions lies down deep in the truth of the reality underlying the idea. This is true in all mathematics. It is true throughout physics. It is true in what are known as the primary principles of reason. It is true of cause and effect. It is true of the principle of contradiction. It is true especially in all conclusions which we designate as logical necessities. And it is superlatively true where the logical conclusion follows by what is known as absolute necessity. It is the underlying reality beneath both the verbal statement and the ideas, on which the truth of this logical necessity is based. These principles, then, are established truths, without which we can have no knowledge at all. And if the conclusions of reason which are apodictically certain or which imply an absolute logical necessity are to be called in question, then we have no criterion of knowledge

at all and no standard by which to judge whether a thing be true or false. This is so true that no one before Kant had ever thought of questioning it. But as the truth of logical necessity seemed to stand in Kant's way when he wished to discredit the proofs for the existence of God, there was only left for him—what he had no hesitation in doing—to challenge the truth of logical necessity. Accordingly, in one of his arguments for the rejection of the proofs of the existence of God he tells us:

"All these pretended examples are taken without exception from judgments, not from things and their existence. Now, the unconditioned necessity of judgments is not the same thing as the absolute necessity of things. The absolute necessity of a judgment is only a conditioned necessity of the thing or of the predicate in the judgment."

And he proceeds to tell us:

"Nevertheless, this pure logical necessity has exerted so powerful an illusion that after having formed of a thing a concept a priori so constituted that it seemed to include existence in its sphere, people thought they could conclude with certainty that, because existence necessarily belongs to the object of that concept, provided always that I accept the thing as given (existing), its existence also must necessarily be accepted (according to the rule of identity), and that the Being therefore must itself be absolutely necessary."

Kant here challenges the truth of logical necessity and boldly maintains that the truth of thought is entirely different from the truth of things; or in other words, that a thing may be true and yet the true statement of it may be false; that is, that a thing may be logically true and really false. He maintains that no objective reality underlies the logical necessity in a judgment. Consequenty when, from the existence of the contingent, we conclude, by absolute logical necessity, the existence of the cause, while our conclusion is logically true, it may be at the same time really false. This proposition is so absurd that all that is needed for its refutation is its clear statement. Evidently Kant was as well aware of this as any one, and consequently, instead of expressing his opinion clearly, he resorts to his customary trick of confusing things. Nevertheless, one might be inclined to think that Kant, driven, perhaps, by the exigencies of his difficult position to maintain his theory, had persuaded himself that it was possibly true that a logical necessity is not based on a reality, and that, consequently, while his argument was erroneous, his maintenance of it was strictly honest. But alas! for the honor of philosophy, Kant himself will not permit us to believe that his contention here: that logical necessity is not based on reality, was the honest expression of erroneous views

honestly held; for elsewhere Kant shows very plainly that his opinions on this subject were—when it suited him—as sane as those of other philosophers. Arguing that his categories cannot be "subjective dispositions of thought," he stoutly maintains:

"Thus the concept of cause, which asserts, under a presupposed condition, the necessity of an effect, would become false, if it rested only on some subjective necessity implanted in us of connecting certain empirical representations according to the rule of causal relation. I should not be able to say that the effect is connected with the cause in the object (that is, by necessity), but only I am so constituted that I cannot think these representations as connected in any other way. This is exactly what the skeptic most desires, for in that case all our knowledge, resting on the supposed objective validity of our judgments, is nothing but mere illusion." (Italics ours.)

Hence we need not go outside of Kant's own statements for his complete and thorough refutation on this point. He believed, like everybody else, that unless the logical expression of our judgments is based on their objective validity, all our knowledge is nothing Yet so unscrupulous is Kant in his more than mere illusion. methods of arguing that, in order to carry his point, he does not hesitate to argue against his convictions and maintain that the logical necessity which links the existence of the contingent to the existence of the necessary being has no objective validity. Now, there is not in the whole range of human knowledge a single judgment that carries with it a logical necessity more absolute and more unconditional than the proposition that—to use Kant's own words—"the contingent exists only under condition of something else (existing) as its cause." The proposition that two straight lines cannot enclose a space; that a straight line is the shortest distance between points; that two and two cannot make five, but four, do not carry with them a stronger apodictic certainty of conclusion than the judgment that we cannot have the existence of the contingent unless we have also the existence of the necessary cause. Thus we see that all that is necessary to refute Kant even in his most stubborn strongholds is to use Kant against himself. Once we have learned the trick of Kant's unscrupulous methods, all that is necessary is to patiently wait, keep our eyes open, and sooner or later he is sure to contradict himself. But what are we to think of Dr. Brownson, who not only accepted Kant whole on this point, but planting himself squarely on Kant's fallacies, proceeded to berate the scholastics? So much, then, for Kant's famous objection that the idea of the Supreme Being is without objective reality.

His second fundamental objection to the proofs for the existence

of God possesses no more weight or dignity than the first-indeed -like it-is nothing more than mere cavil. It need hardly be said that the claim that we can never meet with the Supreme Being in experience rests on an element of profound truth. According to the law of natural reason, we can never have an empirical knowledge of God-such, for instance, as we have of phenomena. This is not only a truth, but a truism. The difference between our knowledge of God and our empirical knowledge of phenomena has always been recognized by philosophers. God cannot be an object of our senses. If He did, He would cease to be God. Our knowledge of phenomena is a knowledge of the senses; our knowledge of God is a knowledge of reason. Consequently, Kant's claim that we can never meet God in experience is to a certain extent valid. when we have said this we have said all that can be conceded to Kant on this point. For since when have the senses become the criterion of truth? How does the fact that the senses can never give a representation of God prove that God does not exist? By what authority is experience established as the supreme arbiter of life and death—that is, of the existence or non-existence of things? Since when has sense-experience become the throned dictator and snatched the sceptre of knowledge of truth from reason? Kant's argument on this point is nothing more or less than a bold attempt to wrest from reason its proper jurisdiction in the realm of truth and transfer it to sense-experience. But the rational mind is not accustomed to look to the senses for truth in its last analysis, but to reason. Again and again, even within what is recognized as their own realm, have the senses been found misleading, and it has the duty of reason to step in and correct their errors. How, then, been the duty of reason to step in and correct their errors. How, then, can they give the final verdict in matters wholly outside their province? If reason has been compelled so frequently to rescue the senses from their delusions within their own special field, why should we be expected to fling aside reason—which has never deceived us—and call in the senses to interpret truth to us instead? Had any one maintained that they could prove the existence of God by means of the senses or of sense-experience alone, and without recourse to reason at all, there might be some slight pretext for Kant's strange position when he refuses to accept the proofs for the existence of God on the ground that we cannot meet God in experience and our senses can tell us nothing of His existence. By the very terms of the problem God is unattainable by man's senses. What Kant's claim amounts to is—when all is said—what no one ever denies—that we cannot have an empirical knowledge of God. But is the existence of God the only proposition within the whole

field of human knowledge which does not come within reach of the senses and cannot be reached empirically? Evidently Kant seems to think that it is. But this is only one more proof of Kant's shallowness when he was intent on proving true a false proposition. Nevertheless, Kant himself has shown quite as well as any one that there are truths which are utterly unattainable by the senses or by experience, and consequently which cannot be called empirical truths at all. Whole realms of knowledge are ours-wholly independent of experience, as Kant himself stoutly maintains. knowledge of first principles—the principle of contradiction, the principle of causality—all of what Kant calls "synthetic judgments a priori"—all primary concepts—are knowledge which the mind has reached by other than empirical routes. Why, then, should Kant be so inconsistent as to accept all these and clownishly balk at the acceptance of the existence of God, under the pretext that this knowledge is not empirical, that its object does not come under the senses, and that we can never meet its object in experience? The knowledge involved in the principle of contradiction or the principle of causality comes to us we know not whence, nor where, nor how—one thing is certain, that it is not empirical—yet the fact is that all our empirical knowledge depends entirely on the knowledge which these principles furnish. We cannot interpret one single fact of experience unless by the aid of these principles and the knowledge which they supply: yet while we know not what their origin, we are certain that they are neither the offspring of experience nor the children of the senses, nor the result of empirical knowledge in any form. Since, then, all our empirical knowledge rests on knowledge that is as far removed from empirical as anything can well be, the action of Kant in singling out the existence of God and excluding it, on the ground that our knowledge of it could never be empirical, was shallow, arbitrary and inconsistent in the highest degree. For we need go no farther than Kant himself—here also to show the absurdity and inconsistency of his claim. It is provocative of a smile, when we read his contention on this point, to turn to another part of his work and read:

"For where should experience take its certainty, if all the rules which it follows were again and again empirical?"

Or again:

"It is therefore a question which deserves at least closer investigation and cannot be disposed of at first sight, whether there exists a knowledge independent of experience, and even of all impressions of the senses?"

And later he answers this question:

"That there really exists in our knowledge such necessary and,



in the strictest sense, universal and therefore pure judgments a priori, is easy to show. If we want a scientific example we have only to look to any of the propositions of mathematics; if we want one from the ordinary sphere of the understanding, such a proposition as that each change must have a cause will answer the purpose."

And he maintains that we have not only knowledge and judgments which are independent of experience and hence not empirical, but that we also have concepts which owe nothing whatever to the senses or experience, but are wholly independent of them. He says:

"Not only in judgments, however, but even in certain concepts, can we show their origin a priori. Take away, for example, from the concept of a body, as supplied by experience, everything that is empirical, one by one, such as color, hardness or softness, weight and even impenetrability, and there still remains the space which the body (now entirely vanished) occupied: that you cannot take away. And in the same manner, if you remove from your empirical concept of any object, corporeal or incorporeal, all properties which experience has taught you, you cannot take away from it that property by which you conceive it as a substance or inherent in a substance (although such a concept contains more determinations than that of an object in general). Convinced, therefore, by the necessity with which that concept forces itself upon you, you will have to admit that it has its seat in your faculty of knowledge a priori."

Hence we need not go further than Kant himself to learn that we have knowledge that is independent of all experience. All that is required to overthrow his random arguments is the fact that he admits, as he does here, that there is a knowledge wholly independent of experience—a knowledge of concepts and even of judgments. Now, if there be such a knowledge—totally independent of all experience and having not the slightest taint of the empirical in its character—how can Kant consistently argue that he must deny the validity of the proofs for the existence of God based on a logical necessity which is absolute, solely for the reason that this knowledge cannot be met with in experience or that it is not empirical? The bias in the argument is so evident as to discredit the witness completely.

Therefore, the point, ingenious though it is, and though founded on the fact that our relations to God are entirely outside of experience, cannot be seriously regarded as having any weight in the determination of the truth in the matter. For what is the final tribunal of intellectual truth? Is it the senses or is it reason? The entire argument of Kant amounts to this: that while in every other instance we may implicitly trust the conclusions of reason, here we must make an exception and distrust—nay, disbelieve—the abso-

lutely necessary conclusions of reason. This is certainly a singular position to assume. By a logical necessity which is absolute in its conclusions we are compelled to admit the existence of the necessary being as the cause of the contingent, and while, according to Kant himself, this logical necessity must be based on an objective reality. we must deny this objective reality existence—because, forsooth, we never meet with such an existence in experience. In mathematics, in physics, in the whole realm of the natural sciences wherever and whenever reason announces that her reasons are compelled by a logical necessity, we accept her terms without question; here, however, we are forbidden to do so. Inexorable reason tells us that we must have more than two straight lines if we are to enclose a space; that the angles at the base of an isoceles triangle are equal; that the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the sum of the square of the other two sides, and we never question the verdict. The same inexorable reason informs me with full apodictic certainty that the necessary cause of the contingent must have existence. Why must I accept the logical conclusions in all the former cases and reject it in the latter? The logical necessity is quite as imperative in the latter as in any of the former. Why accept the former and reject the latter? Logical necessity is paramount when it tells us that the three angles of a triangle must be equal to two right angles, when it tells us that Cologne Cathedral must have had an architect—even if we were forced to admit that Satan drew the plans. Why, then, must we doubt its truth when we are told that the universe must have an author or an architect? But, we are told, we cannot meet this reality in any experience. But the truth of our first principles—that is, the reality on which they rest cannot be met with in experience; why, then, accept these and reject the existence of the cause of all things? This is an inconsistency which Kant does not seem to have noticed at all. He seems to have forgotten completely what he has elsewhere told us, viz., that "all our knowledge rests on the validity of our judgments," and if we call in question this validity, "all our knowledge is nothing but mere illusion." He forgtts also that he shakes the value of all experience to its foundations by such mad, insensate philosophy. For on what does the truth of experience depend? Not on experience. Not on the senses. Not on the empirical at all. Let Kant himself give the answer: "For whence should experience take its certainty if all the rules which it follows were again and again empirical?" Hence the certainty of experience must rest on other certainty independent of experience. But since this is the case, what can redeem from the character of petty cavil of the most wretched kind the claim that we must deny existence to the objective

reality that underlies the absolute logical necessity of a first cause of the contingent, because we do not meet with it in experience and cannot have empirical knowledge of its existence?

Now, Kant in his haste to discredit the proofs for the existence of God did not stop to consider the principles involved in his challenge at all. He overlooked the nature of our a priori knowledge. although he fully understood it. Indeed, he admits in the above quotations that it is this a priori knowledge which gives efficacy to all our empirical knowledge and that without it we would have not knowledge, but illusion. Consequently, the validity of all our empirical knowledge rests in the long run on knowledge which is wholly independent of experience. He seems to have overlooked the fact that the principle of contradiction and the principle of causality—both of which he admits in all their fullness—are special possessions of the mind which it has not derived from experience and which are totally independent of all experience. Whence, then, do they obtain their efficacy? Not, surely, from experience. After removing all experience we find that these principles remain in all their force and efficacy. It is only by means of them that we can at all interpret experience. Kant, while he understands all this perfectly, unconsciously or with design, completely ignores it and undertakes to proceed as if all empirical knowledge did not depend upon these and that our senses were all-sufficient for the acquisition of knowledge; whereas the fact is that in the melee of the senses and sense-experience it is these principles which must be called in to give experience a meaning, to bring order out of the confusion and to establish truth and knowledge in our gropings among phenomena. We have an example of this in mathematics. The concrete demonstration in a mathematical proposition adds nothing to its truth. Even in geometry, where we seem to depend on the construction of the figure for the extension of our knowledge, the senses or the empirical construction adds not one iota to the truth of the principles of a priori knowledge which we apply there; and the constructed figures in geometry do not serve to prove the truth of the principles applied—Kant to the contrary, notwithstanding. They are used for illustration of the truth rather than for proof, the mind being reached at once by means of the sensible figure. The demonstration, however, does not add one single iota of truth to the principles themselves or to the propositions which are proved by means of them. If they did, every new demonstration would add to the weight of the proof. But the fact is that experience or empirical demonstration does not add one jot or tittle to the truth of the principles or to the truth of the propositions that are deduced from them. All mathematical principles and all a priori principles

of reason retain the same amount of validity whether we apply them in one instance or in one hundred thousand. There is not one single iota more of certainty added to the proposition that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles after a million applications or illustrations or demonstrations than there belonged to it at first; and we may remove the million demonstrations and the proposition will remain in all its invincible apodictic certainty. It is precisely the same with the principle of causality in the case of the contingent and necessary. It possesses the same validity independent of all experience, as does the proposition that two and two make four. Kant is here wholly—and possibly wilfully wrong. But the fact is that he does not seem to have gone to the bottom of the question here at all, or brought to the front the principles on which the problem must be solved. It is, then, the truth of the logical necessity of a first cause that is at stake herethe question whether the great principle of causality, which, in its truth, is independent of all experience and without which experience of effects would have no meaning, may be trusted to furnish us with the truth in this particular problem. That is the whole ques-Shall we believe, Kant, who insanely insists that experience must confirm the truth of our logical necessity? Shall we wait with him for experience to vouch for the truth of reason in her imperative requirements? Must the testimony of the handmaid be awaited before we accept the testimony of the mistress to whom that handmaid owes character, existence, even, according to Kant, the faculty of knowledge itself? Yet this is what Kant insanely insists upon.

Nor is it strictly true that we do not meet with the Supreme Being in experience. In a certain sense God is outside of all experience, but in another sense He traverses all experience. Throughout every portion of our experience we find traces and footprints of the architect and ruler of the world-to such an extent, indeed, that Kant cannot resist their evidence. When from the irregular perturbation of Uranus Herschel was convinced that there must exist some body outside which was the cause of these disturbances, he had no hesitation in concluding the existence of a body outside, although it had not yet come within the range of his telescopic vision. He was convinced by logical necessity. When the great planet Neptune itself swung into view it added not one iota to the truth of the principle of causality with its logical necessity, which led the astronomer to accept the existence of the planet as a fact. long before it appeared. Its appearance was merely another demonstration of the principle of cause and effect—but was no proof. for the principle needed no proof. But who will deny that there was empirical knowledge of the new planet even before its appearance to the senses in the disturbances of its sister planet? Had Neptune never appeared, the principle of logical necessity or causality would have been just as true, although cavillers might have cried: "Why don't you produce your cause?" The appearance silenced the caviller. Many other analogies might be brought forward to show that it would be the height of absurdity to permit the absence of empirical representation to discount the validity of a logical necessity of reason; such, for instance, as the revelations of the spectroscope with regard to the ingredients in the sun's constitution—all of which we accept without question, although the objective reality can never come into or form a part of our empirical knowledge—at least until the human family will have evolved into the salamander species.

But our limits forbid us to pursue this interesting subject of analogies further, and we must hasten to other points. Meanwhile it is sufficiently clear, even from Kant's own teachings, that it is utterly false, shallow and unreasoning to maintain that because we cannot meet with a thing in experience we must reject it as non-existent, even when that existence is forced upon us by all the absolute necessity of an incontrovertible logical conclusion of reason. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive the sanity of the intellect that could stand out in defense of such a proposition.

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## GOD AND MAN.

HERE is a special danger attendant on the maturity of those whose youthful religion was too anthropomorphic, who conceived of God too literally manwise and never cared to correct by the aid of their reason what reason itself should have told them stands in constant need of correction. been as clearly aware of their mental as of their physical growth, no doubt they would have perceived that the surroundings of the one require as continual readjustment as those of the other. But introspection is ordinarily a very fitful mood, and it is in fact only at such seasons that one notes the attainment, for better or for worse, of a new stage of mental development. The cause of this awakening may reach the intellect from the outside through the medium of something heard or read, or it may be that a totally new experience makes a call upon the accumulated experience of the past and finds there only a very inadequate response or none at all; but the time of crisis does come, and it may easily be a time of disaster. And this, which is true of a number of minor matters and is full of danger even in them, is equally true, but vastly more dangerous when the matter is religion—understanding by that term the whole complexus of relations that exist between the Creator and the creature. For here we are in a region where faith takes the place of vision and experiment and where the issues at stake are of such momentous import that all else, where it is not distinctly subsidiary to them, dwindles by comparison into something less than microscopic insignificance.

It was easy as a child to think of God as a person, loving, hating, grieving, rejoicing, punishing, rewarding. To pray was to speak to a friend, to a father; it was to ask pardon of an offended superior, to promise Him amendment, to give Him thanks for a gratified desire, to petition Him for future favors as the reward of "being good." But now it has come upon us that the God to whom we pray can suffer no emotions nor any change; that, consequently, our sins cannot grieve any more than our virtues can please Him; that whatever we have to tell Him He has known from all eternity; that our birth, our life, our death and our final destiny are neither past nor future, but eternally and singly present to Him, and that, consequently, any relation of a personal nature between ourselves and Him can only be a make-believe on our side as it is an impossibility on His.

These difficulties as stated here are, of course, far too harsh and crude, not to say inaccurate, and they have need of much distinction and explanation. Still, it were idle to pretend that in any system

of theology is there to be found an exhaustive explanation of them, or, finally, anything but an admission that there is deep mystery here for whose better appreciation perhaps this or that hypothesis may be recommended. And indeed no Christian, no Theist, of ordinary humility can expect or wish to have his belief denuded of mystery; reduced, that is, to the level of an exact science. But it is probably true to say that the class of persons of whom we are speaking are usually content to acknowledge all this and to continue in the practice of prayer to which they have been accustomed from their childhood. Their great difficulty—which, however, amounts to practically the same thing-is to understand how this God now revealed to them can be either the subject or the object of those affections which, under one aspect or another, are included in the term "love." Praise, reverence and service on the one side—yes, but love! It results that their religion indues those qualities of formalism and aridity which when pushed to extremity have, under another civilization, issued in the joss-stick and the praying-wheel. It ought, then, to be of the greatest use to examine into this matter. and starting from what revelation has taugh us of the nature of the Supreme Being, to search for some answer to the conjugate questions. Can God love me? and Can I love God?

It should be sufficient to say of God simply that He is perfection, and to the rapt intuition of the contemplative, unvexed by the importunity of imagination, intellect and will, that would doubtless suffice. But our minds ordinarily have need of a more detailed definition, one which will offer matter for the exercise of each of these powers, and we shall find it safer and more fruitful to set forth quite soberly what positive knowledge we possess of the Godhead and to work upon that. It is, of course, true that our conclusions as well as our reasoning must inevitably fall far short of the truth. But it is also true that anything more exact, were it possible for us, would be out of harmony with our created and therefore limited nature. It would be an impossible identification of via with terminus, of faith with vision. With these limits understood, however, it is competent to any reflecting mind to conceive truthfully of God as of a coadunation of perfections really identical one with the other, yet at the same time virtually distinct; to realize, that is, that God is perfect truth, perfect goodness, perfect justice, perfect mercy, and that being One, He cannot, as it were, overlap Himself or be less or greater than Himself under one of these aspects than under another—this without at the same time failing to realize that at our end of the scheme the concepts of perfection in truth, or in justice, or in mercy do really stand for distinct and in practice, perhaps, for conflicting ideas. It is easy to see that the more perfect an object is the greater will be the number of excellencies that can be predicated of it. When we admire anything we instinctively seek in our vocabulary for fresh ways of expressing our conception of its perfection. But though in praising, for instance, the courage of a soldier it would be quite beside the point, and might be quite untrue, to say of him also that he is handsome, refined, talented; there can be no such incongruity nor any pleonasm when God is the object of our admiration. For the unity of God, which is His perfection, means just this, that He is all good, most perfectly and at once, so that in naming any one of His attributes we at the same time affirm all the rest in a like degree and with equal distinctness. Still, the distinction which we must perforce make between the perfections of God is not a purely subjective one on our part; it has this much foundation in fact, that the various concepts of Him that we form do most truly correspond to a reality in Him. He is no less perfect in justice than He is in mercy, and it is as true to say with St. Paul that "it is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God" as it is to say with St. John that "God is love."

But what we want above all is a practical, concrete notion of God such as we can reach and preserve without continual strain. We want an idea of the divine nature which without lowering it will yet bring it nearer to our own, since the final object of our study is to be that love between the Creator and the creature which, unless it can be stated in terms commensurable with the natures of both, will remain forever an abstraction and an unreality to us and will have no power to convert us from that dry formalism which robs our religion of its actuality and leads us away from and not towards our true end, that straight union with God which can come of love alone. We want, in short, to find a common term between God and ourselves.

We admit at once, then, that God is infinite, and that, therefore, whatever it is true to say that He is, that He must be infinitely. We cannot, naturally, represent infinity to ourselves as something real, and there is nothing helpful to be gained by attempting to do so. It is enough for our purpose to consider infinity as implying complete independence and self-sufficiency such as can only become one who has existed from all eternity and has created all things out of nothing. We need go no further than the truth that the divine nature is all-sufficing for itself and neither does nor can require anything outside of itself; that the Creator cannot possibly have need of the creature, since the contrary would be an implication of terms. This being so, it will follow that every act of the

Divinity must be formally immanent; that is, must begin and end in itself, just as our vital acts of feeling, understanding or willing are immanent, begin and end in ourselves. God, self-sufficient, eternal, infinite, can suffer no change nor acquire any new relation, so that from the side of God the act of creation, for instance, is simply Himself who is eternally in act, unaltered by the fact that from the side of the creature of His hands a new relation to Him has come into existence. We may perhaps find a helpful parallel to this apparently inconceivable position in our own experience. We can understand, for example, that a tree or a landscape undergoes no change at all from the fact that I have made a sketch of it; from the fact, that is, that something has come into existence whose being, as such, consists in a relation (of likeness, namely) to itself. For many reasons the parallel is not accurate, but it is enough for our purpose, which is to emphasize the self-sufficiency and absoluteness of God by realizing as well as we can how it is that He does not go out of Himself even in the act of creation, the most obvious of His visible operations.

But how, then, is this to be translated in terms of that love which we know from revelation, which the Scriptures tell us in so many words, God has for His world and especially for man? What meaning is left to such passages as "I love them that love Me" or "God so loved the world?" Or is the word "love" to be understood here in some transcendental sense, quite other from the meaning which we assign to it among ourselves? We have seen briefly what is the nature of a divine act, and we deduce that as in others so in the act of love God does not and cannot go out of Himself. But it is also true that love implies a reciprocity, a giving and taking on both sides, and it seems to be of its very essence that it should involve a going out from self—self-love is a misappropriation of terms. Either, then, love between God and man is something quite different from love between man and man or we must correct our notion of one or the other.

An answer to these questions will be reached more easily by starting now from another point. Beginning with ourselves, we find it to be a quite obvious truth that we can only love what is good, or at least what we take to be good, and especially good for us. Not the most depraved of mankind can deliberately choose what is bad precisely because it is bad; he cannot disobey his nature, which absolutely forbids the free choice of evil as such. As his conscience, though it may err objectively in its appreciation of the ethical value of an action, is infallible in its command to do what is apprehended as right and not to do what is believed to be wrong, so his nature, though it may mistake not only moral

but material evil for good, can make no mistake in its election of what is apprehended as good. But with this difference, that while a man can turn a deaf ear to his conscience, he cannot resist his nature. The law works with the same force and precision in saint and sinner alike. So that our love, whether it be of brother or sister or parent or spouse or friend, reduces at last to our perception, apprehension and appreciation (perhaps purely selfish) of the good in them, whether under myriad forms and varieties, that good be an objective fact or not.

But we should fall into the vulgar rationalistic error of personifying and deifying the laws of nature if we sought for an explanation of the working of our affections no further than the axiom, "The object of the Will is whatever is good." "Good," whether in itself or in relation to us, is not something absolute, irreducible, elemental, an ingredient compounded in different proportions with the stuff of persons and things in some such way as the "caloric" of earlier physicists mingled in the substance of bodies to raise the temperature of each in varying degrees above its natural zero. It is supposed that we believe in a personal God and that we have admitted that He is infinite perfection; it is therefore no new tax upon our belief to hear that all good, under no matter what aspect, is God; not, of course, in the falsely Pantheistic sense, but, nevertheless, quite truly in so far as all creation is an imitation of the Creator and is most clearly seen to be so when it is realized as good. In no sky or hill or twig or blade of grass does His likeness fail; here and there it is blurred, here and there one man sees it, while another cannot; but as in the beginning when God made all, He "saw that it was good," because it was the work of His will, the reflect of His eternal thought, so now, conversely, we can reach up from the creation of the world to "the invisible things of Him" which are "clearly seen, being understood by the things which are made." Put in a few words, when we love any one or anything we in fact love God—unwittingly, it is likely, and not formally; but in the end no less actually than did those saints who after St. Francis of Assisi have recognized a brotherhood with all nature in the fatherhood of its God. And if it seems to admit of no doubt that human love reduced to its last terms is simply an externation of the natural appetite for the good-ultimately and fundamentally for God—it is clear from His very nature that the love of God, too, can have no other term than Himself, in which expression must be included whatever participates in His nature. that is, whatever is good. And where among created nature is good in its highest form to be found if not in man? For in man alone among the creatures of the earth do those forms of the good which

we distinguish as truth, beauty, purity, strength and the rest become active potencies instead of remaining, as they do among irrational and inanimate creatures, in the state of purely passive qualities. In man alone can the good be ethical, that is, can exist in its most excellent form, and in him alone is it capable of indefinite expansion. It is in man, then, that God finds Himself most vividly expressed, and the necessity which He has of loving Himself wherever He finds Himself constrains Him therefore to love Himself in man. Yet it would no be just to limit the lovableness of man in the eyes of God to those obvious good acts and qualities which we habitually distinguish as such. Everything in him that is not downright evil (and do we know where to rule the dividing line?) is irradiated with divinity, is an image more faithful in this one than in that of those divine perfections which our limited intelligences must represent as numerically distinct. The very personality of a man, that incommunicable note of the individual which attracts or repels us, though it eludes our definition, is "borrowed" from God, to whom alone belongs the attribute of a perfect person. It follows, then, that God's love for us is not a mere love of our goodness in a state of precision, as it were, from ourselves; it is a love of each as such, and is most truly a personal love, though in the end it be in truth love for Himself.

It is another consequence of the infinite perfection of God that He is also perfectly free. The same act which created this world might also have created a different one or none at all. But there is no contradiction in the statement that under some aspects God may be said to be necessitated. He could not be other than just, merciful, holy, omniscient, true, and He cannot do other than love Himself wherever He finds Himself. To everything that, so far as it is good, is an image of Himself, He must extend that infinite, eternal, mutual love of the Father for Himself in the Son and the Son for the Father, that singular, subsistent, sempiternal act of Will which is the Holy Ghost. It is surely not extravagant to draw from this a clearer perception of that indwelling of the Holy Ghost in us of which St. Paul speaks: "Know you not that you are the temple of God and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?" In the temple of the soul adorned with charity, lovely in the sight of God, the Father finds the Son and the Son the Father, and there, if we may dare to use the words, knowing that in the presence of the divine mysteries the utmost that we can say is but little less short of the truth than the least, there in the ineffable love of each for each proceeds anew that Spirit of Love, the Third Person, the Holy Ghost. Is it fanciful to think that in each nearer approach of the soul to its end, in each closer approximation to its exemplar, in every good act accomplished in the state and under the influence of grace there is, as it were, a renewal of that divine procession, a fresh consecration and dedication of that temple? It is not literally true, but there is in it a symbol of the truth, and if in that symbol we find some image and some shadow of the reality that now we cannot reach, to that extent will it suffice us for the truth.

But even if we have convinced ourselves that the natural object of our love is God and that, on the other hand, the love of God for us is comprehensible and real, there still remains a practical difficulty drawn from the very premises from which we have derived our conviction. An Infinite Being can undergo no change; there can be no greater and no less in Him. If there be love between us two, at least on His side that love can neither grow nor wane. and once more we waver between determinism and disbelief. For in what sense can it be said that our good actions please or our bad actions offend an immutable Being? And again, if I am pleasing to Him now, how can I cease to be pleasing to Him a little later, and conversely? A general answer might be that it would be contrary to the justice of an infinitely just God if there were no foundation in truth for the instinctive feeling of unsophisticated man that the good and evil in his life consists in something more than the conformity or not of his actions with an abstract ethical ideal and that the true measure is his attitude towards a Supreme Being who has the right to command and the power to impose sanctions upon His commands. Religion in some form or other is absolutely necessary to the full perfection of human nature and lies buried in the hearts even of those who believe that they have no need of it; yet from no known form of religion is there absent this consciousness of a relation towards a superior Being or group of Beings whom it is in the power of the individual to offend, to please or to propitiate. It is altogether incredible that the common sense of humanity can have erred on such a point and so invincibly.

But we can bring the truth nearer home to ourselves in another way, provided always that we bear in mind the extreme inadequacy of even the most careful language that we can use. It is indeed necessary that we should speak of God manwise unless we are to keep silence altogether; but in the end the best concept of Him that we can form will be as little like the truth as a circle on the blackboard is like the sun. We cannot think of God as angry or pleased with us except as connoting a change in Him; that is, we implicitly place Him in our own category of being. But the truth is that the only change involved in what we call the complacency or the wrath of God is a change in ourselves. There is in God but one single act, operative from eternity; but as it contains

in itself all possible perfection, it is equivalent, as we see it, to a number of distinct acts which we know separately as love, anger, joy and so forth. These different facets, as perhaps we may call them, of the same act are lit up in turn according to the object on which they are directed, and this "lighting up" constitutes the relation in which that object stands towards God. St. Augustine uses the similitude of light to describe, as well as may be, the nature of this relation—very real on our part, an abstraction of our reason when we view it in God. "Just as light," he says, "is painful to the eye when the eye is weak and invigorating to it when it is in health, not on account of any change in the light, but because of the change in the eye."

Or we may find another parallel in the ordinary process by which we acquire knowledge. The laws of nature, which are the object of science, remain ever what they are, unaltered by the fact that any number of persons, or none at all, have attained to a knowledge of them. Yet how vast is the difference in his relation to these truths between an ignorant man and the same man after a successful course of study.

But, let us insist upon it, these comparisons and examples are but rude blundering attempts to bring within the scope of finite intelligences what belongs wholly to the realm of the infinite. In so far as they are faithful representations of the truth, they will preserve us from the fatal extreme of imagining God to be quite remote from us and indifferent to our attitude towards Him: in so far as they fall short of the truth, they will remind us that we are dealing with mystery where faith must supply the place of reason. We understand from them how the root of God's love for us, His presence, namely, in our souls, may vary without any corresponding change in Himself; but yet we cannot understand how that love itself may be said to vary. Here the efforts of our reason must stop. We are come to the barrier that only faith can surmount. Reason and our consciousness tell us that we can truly have love for God, since reason shows Him to us as the sum and substance of all good, and reason and consciousness hourly teach us that what we know or at least take to be good we must love. Reason assures us that God must have love for us, since apart from its deductions from revealed premises it would recoil from the picture of a Supreme Being, calm, impassive, implacable, before the outstretched hands, the withered hopes, the undeserved misery of so many of the creatures whom He had made-made, too, for Himself and after His own likeness. But if we ask how this is, how eternal beatitude can compassionate, infinite wisdom relent, omniscient justice forbear, reason is silent. Any further step it could take would lead us backward instead of forward. But of that domain where reason, limited and bounded, cannot come, faith is free. Faith, a gift from God, can alone explain Him to us, and it is enough that, having seen as much as reason had to show us, we can say of what remains, I believe.

After all, should we be satisfied with an explanation, complete at every point, of this mystery of the divine love for us? Would not God be less in our eyes just because we could see Him now so distinctly? Would our reverence for Him be so profound, our praise of Him so genuine and so easy, our service of Him so careful, if we could measure His perfection and weigh His love by the standards of this life? We may try to comprehend Him, and it is our happiness to do so; but when we have done our best we have to own that still the mystery remains and the truth, and only faith can understand it. But God is not destroyed because our thoughts of Him are confused and contradictory; rather for that very reason we see Him the more truly as He is. For the God whose attributes and operations are literally explicable in terms of our own is not our God; He is perhaps the first of creatures, but He is in the end limited like ourselves; we need not fear Him, and we are not compelled to love Him. "Let him who cannot understand it," says St. Augustine, "rejoice that he can only wonder. Let him rejoice and be glad rather to find Thee by not finding Thee, than by finding Thee to lose Thee."

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## LITERARY INTEREST OF THE BOOK OF JOB.

REAL literature, of whatever age or clime, has two essential marks; first, "the subject must be one that appeals to our common humanity, and, second, this subject must be treated in so perfect a manner that the reading of it gives general pleasure." The Book of Job possesses both of these qualifications in an almost unrivaled degree.

The difficulty of reconciling our faith in God's infinite holiness with the sin-laden world before our eyes, His justice with the prosperity of the many who know Him not and the persecution which is the portion of His chosen servants would be insurmountable were man left to himself. And sorrow, which touches us all so closely, so intimately, what does it mean? Does it not seem paradoxical that man, created for happiness, must drink its very dregs that he may be purified and ennobled? It is with these, life's deepest problems, that the Book of Job deals and to solve which, according to Brother Azarias, is the aim of all literature. The sum of the teaching of the poem is that suffering as well as prosperity is God's gift and that man must trust Him implicitly, however dark the way, for He is infinite power and wisdom and goodness and His ways are unsearchable. Add to this the Gospel's constantly reiterated assurances of His love and we have the solution of the deepest and most vexing of questions as far as it is meant for man to know and understand.

The belief common to the ancients for centuries after the time of Job was that misfortune and disease marked the anger of the gods. Hippocrates was the first Greek to assign a natural cause for sickness. Nor has the misconception of the significance of suffering retreated before the advance of modern learning, where it is unarmed with the sublimely simple lessons of Holy Scripture. For the pessimism which is the philosophic fashion of the age, the darling of Leopardi, Schopenhauer and their following, there is but one refutation. That the human race is crushed and bleeding beneath its load of suffering—its bodily pain, its sharp mental anguish, the pangs of remorse, heaviest of all, the untold, unfathomable heartache of thousands—this is a stern fact; but cries Job, "Our days upon earth are but a shadow"—so why grieve without comfort? "I know that my Redeemer liveth, and that I shall arise from the earth on the last day"—so why mourn without hope?

As to the manner in which the drama is presented, to praise it extravagantly were impossible. It is a didactic drama with an epic introduction and conclusion, the prologue and epilogue being written

in prose, the remainder (chapters iii.—xliii.) in poetry. It has been called the Hebrew Tragedy, but the definition is inaccurate, for it closes happily. Though the setting is dramatic, the substance is didactic, and it was intended for study, not for the stage, as some few commentators suggested, but were unable to prove. Because their God was infinite, incomprehensible, immeasurably above man's power to depict, the Hebrews, unlike many of the nations of antiquity, had no theatre and, strictly speaking, no drama. It would have been a desecration to have represented the One who said of Himself, "I am who am," or even the venerable figures of the patriarchs, as the Greeks did Jupiter and Venus and a host of lesser deities and heroes whose strong, ungoverned, human passions furnished the groundwork of their tragedies. Many, enamored of classic models, do not enjoy the poetry of the Bible, objecting that it lacks the regular flow of uniform meter and stanza; yet these things are no more essential to true poetry than rhyme, which was unknown to Homer, Virgil and Horace and which Milton deprecated as "the invention of a barbarous age to set off wretched matter and lame meter, the jingling sound of like endings trivial to all judicious ears and of no true musical quality." Some students think that Hebrew poetry followed no metrical laws, others that it had rhyme without meter. St. Jerome, and surely there is no higher authority, asserts that Job and almost all the poems of the Bible are composed in hexameters and pentameters or other regular meters like those of the classics. Herder is among those who believe that the Hebrews had a complete system of versification. but he thinks that it would be impossible to recover it.

It has been truly said that "though not written for the purpose of pleasing literary critics, still our bountiful Lord has scattered through the Sacred Volume the same profusion of beauty and of grandeur which is so conspicuous in all the works of His omnipotence," and in poetic sublimity, the epic simplicity of its setting and the variety of its characters the Book of Job stands alone even in Holy Scripture. As Stedman has it, "the life drama of the man of Uz towers with no peak near it." Even Carlyle, prone as he was to pick flaws, hushed his noisy railing to speak with humble reverence of the history of Job. "It is one of the grandest things ever written by man," he exclaims. "A noble book! All men's book! Such living likenesses were never since drawn. sorrow, sublime resignation; as soft and great as the summer midnight, as the world with its seas and stars. There is nothing written. I think, of equal literary merit!" And to multiply quotations: "No writer, not even Jeremias, he alone whose lamentations, according to Bossuet, come up to his feelings, has carried the sadness of the soul to such a pity as the holy Arab. It is true that the imagery borrowed from a southern clime, from the sands of the desert, the solitary palm tree, the sterile mountain, is in singular unison with the language and sentiment of an afflicted soul; but in the melancholy of Job there is something supernatural. The individual man, however wretched, cannot draw forth such sighs from his soul. Job is the emblem of suffering humanity, and the inspired writer has found lamentation sufficient to express all the afflictions incident to the whole human race."

In the "Genius of Christianity" Chateaubriand has also an elaborate comparison between the Bible and Homer, endeavoring to prove that, even as mere literature, the former surpasses man's greatest masterpieces and notably so in Job. "In Homer," he says, "the sublime consists in the magnifience of the words harmonizing with the majesty of thought. In the Bible, on the contrary, the highest sublimity often arises from a vast discordance between the majesty of the idea and the littleness, nay, the triviality, of the word that expresses it. The soul is thus subjected to a terrible shock, for when, exalted by thought, it has soared to the loftiest regions, all on a sudden the expression, instead of supporting it, lets it fall from heaven to earth, precipitating it from the bosom of the divinity into the mire of this world. This species of sublime the most impetuous of all-is admirably adapted to an immense and awful Being allied at once to the greatest and most trivial objects. Homer has a thousand sublime ways of characterizing a violent death; but the Book of Job has surpassed them all in this single expression: 'The first born of death shall devour his strength.' The first born of death, to imply a most cruel death, is one of those metaphors which are to be found nowhere but in the Bible. We cannot conceive whither the human mind has been in quest of this; all the paths that lead to this passage of the sublime are unexplored and unknown."

Again, speaking of the "Odyssey," Chateaubriand quotes the following passage in which the soothsayer, struck with the sinister omens with which Penelope's suitors are threatened, addresses them this apostrophe:

O race to death devote! with Stygian shade Each destined peer impending fates invade: With tears your wan distorted cheeks are drowned; With sanguine drops the walls are rubied round; Thick swarms the spacious hall with howling ghosts, To people Orcus and the burning coasts! Nor gives the sun his golden orb to roll, But universal night usurps the pole.

"Awful as this sublime may be," is his comment, "still it is inferior in this respect to the vision of Eliphaz in Job: 'In the horror

of a vision by night, when deep sleep is wont to hold men, fear seized upon me, and trembling, and all my bones were affrighted; and when a spirit passed before me the hair of my flesh stood up. There stood one whose countenance I knew not, an image before my eyes, and I heard the voice, as it were, of a gentle wind.' Here we have much less blood, less darkness and fewer tears than in Homer, but that unknown countenance and gentle wind are much more awful."

Most famous of all the wonderful passages in the Book of Job is the description of the war horse. Men, capable of judging, declare that as a word-picture it is unsurpassed even in Holy Scripture.

Wilt thou give strength to the horse, or clothe his neck with neighing? Wilt thou lift him up like the locusts? The glory of his nostrils is terror. He breaketh up the earth with his hoof, he pranceth boldly, he goeth forward to meet armed men.

He despiseth fear, he turneth not his back to the sword.

Above him shall the quiver rattle, the spear and shield shall glitter.
Chasing and raging he swalloweth the ground, neither doth he make account when the noise of the trumpet soundeth.

When he heareth the trumpet he saith: Ha, ha: he smelleth the battle afar off, the encouraging of the captains, and the shouting of the army.

As to the passages in which God's power and majesty are described through the works of His creation, nothing has ever approached their simple, awful grandeur. All merely human effort is dwarfed by comparison with them. For example, take the verses:

Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? Tell me 'f thou hast understanding.

Who hath laid the measures thereof, if thou knowest? or who hath stretched the line upon it?

Upon what are its bases grounded? or who laid the corner-rone thereof, When the morning stars praised me together, and all the cons of God made a joyful melody?

Truly, as Bacon, with his matchless genius for saying all in a single sentence, pointed out as the reason of the marvelous beauty of the poem, "The pencil of the Holy Ghost hath labored more in describing the afflictions of Job than the felicities of Solomon."

Though no poem had ever reached the heights attained by Job, many of the ideas embodied in it had long been the property of humanity. As Brother Azarias says: "Of all the beautiful and elevating thoughts found in all the great works of antiquity, there is not one that has not been crystallized into a fuller and clearer and more rounded expression in the Sacred Books of the Old Testament and the New." Beginning with the "Prisses Papyrus," conceded to be the oldest document in the world and dating from the thirty-fifth century before Christ, we find Pita Hotep, the Egyptian sage, speaking words that were echoed on the dunghill of Arabia. Later an Egyptian prince, calling down maledictions on any one who would destroy the tablet inscribed with the names of his vic-

tories, sums up a list of calamities which he charitably hopes may overtake them. It might have been copied bodily from Job: "May not his offspring survive him! May his servants be broken! May his troops be defeated! May his name and his race perish!"

And in modern times the greatest minds that have wrested with the deep and ever-recurring problem of suffering, just so far as they approach the ideal, do they repeat the message of Job. Dante and Milton transmitted it—each in his own way; in our own day Tennyson in "In Memoriam" groped for it, but, hampered by the philosophic errors of a doubting age, failed to grasp its full meaning. Francis Thompson, having the light of Catholic faith, saw farther. "Must Thou char the wood ere Thou canst limn with it?" he asks, knowing the answer.

When Job lived and by whom his history was written are questions which cannot be conclusively answered. Comparatively easy of solution is the, at first sight, more difficult one: How did pagans like Job and his friends possess so pure a knowledge of the one true God and so firm a faith in the coming of a Redeemer? All the nations of antiquity, being children of Adam and Noe, had the tradition of a Redeemer to come. The Chinese, whose conservatism led them to hold closely to the primitive revelations, knew so exactly the time of the advent of the "Great Star that was to appear in the West" 'hat thirty years after the death of Christ they sent messengers to Him. Vestiges of the tradition are found in the answers of the Roman Sybils, in Virgil and even in ancient national songs; so it would be strange to find that Arabs, such as Job and his friends, being Semites and hence naturally religious, had no knowledge of the Promised One. But in Job they go farther and manifest a humble trust in an all-wise Providence and a realization of man's nothingness in comparison to God which are peculiar to them and the antithesis of pagan pride. This arose from the fact that the Arabs were descended either from Heber, an ancestor of Abraham. or from Ishmael, the son of Abraham, and were consequently, in the first ages of their history, possessed of a simple, patriarchal faith in the one God. Later, through their intercourse with other nations, they became corrupt, and Herodotus says that in his time they worshiped Venus, as did their Assyrian neighbors. These facts would indicate that Job must have lived at the time of Abraham or soon after. And there are other indications that this was the case. He lived to a great age—a hundred and forty years after his wealth was restored; that wealth consisted solely of flocks and herds: and the musical instruments referred to are those mentioned only in Genesis—the organ, harp and timbrel.

As to the authorship of this "sublimest poem of antiquity," some

ascribe it to Job himself, others to Moses, and this theory is supported by the purity of its Hebrew, by the display of what in his day comprised Egyptian learning, and by his long residence in Arabia. The opinion now held by the greater number of Catholic commentators is that it was not written before the time of Solomon. The question remains an open one. Stedman, standing on higher ground than he often attains, suggests that "the shadow of his name was taken lest he should fall by pride."

Needless to add that there is much in the book of Job not easily understood, more, perhaps, incomprehensible. What Hello with his marvelous spiritual insight wrote of the Bible as a whole applies to no part of it more forcibly than to this poem: "Holy Scripture is an abyss which guards within itself marvelous mysteries. One of the most astonishing things in it is its simplicity. If it seemed to be profound its depths would be less terrifying. But this simplicity! Words without adornment, characters without affectation, virtues without pride, crimes without disguise, and behind all this depths that would make an angel dizzy, depths that the eye of the eagle could not pierce."

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### TALLEYRAND'S CONVERSION.

NHE story of the life of Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Perigord has long been an enigma to men of ordinary conscientiousness and consistency. That of his death has to many seemed as enigmatical and as hard to understand. The volume now before us, however, dispels much of the mystery which has long enshrouded the closing days and hours of an extraordinary career and makes clear the reality of a conversion and a repentance which have constantly been the subject of the sneers of cynics. Talleyrand was born at Paris in 1754, the oldest of three sons of an ancient and honorable family. In accordance with a custom then common in France, he was confided at an early age to a foster mother of the peasant class and sent to reside at her home. When only three years old he met with an accident therein which resulted in permanent lameness and rendered him incapable of service in the army, in which many of his ancestors had won distinction and It is not improbable, although we have not found the suggestion offered elsewhere, that the practical experience thus early acquired by Talleyrand of the hardships of the peasant's lot under

the olden order of social existence in France may have had a great deal to do with the creation of those subversive tendencies which afterwards so considerably influenced his political and public actions. At any rate, he was largely the victim of circumstances which he could not control, and he has himself testified to the fact that he could not remember having ever been allowed to spend a day beneath the parental roof. The Talleyrand-Perigords belonged to a fighting race, and they saw no use in wasting care on a cripple who was incapable of perpetuating the proud traditions of the family. Accordingly, they bestowed him on the Church! His uncle was the Archbishop of Rheims, so that there was no difficulty in securing his early admission to the famous Seminary of St. Sulpice. In this renowned centre of ecclesiastical education he soon gave ample proof of the possession of talents far above the average. His capacity for dealing with matters of administration and business was specially marked. It was this, combined with the influence of his uncle, which secured for him almost immediately after his ordination appointment to the office of Agent General for the clergy of France. His services in this position won him nomination to the vacant Bishopric of Autun, and he ruled this see at the time of the birth of the Revolution in 1789.

Talleyrand's career as a revolutionist is a matter of general history and need scarcely be described in detail here. It will suffice to say that he became an open and avowed enemy of all the traditional principles of Catholic France. In common with other foresworn prelates, he denied the supreme authority of the Holy See and accepted the so-caled Constitutional Oath rejecting the Papal headship of the Church within the Republic. It was he who acted as celebrant of the High Mass on the occasion of the famous gathering on the Champ de Mars on the 14th of July, 1790, in commemoration of the first anniversary of the capture of the Bastile. Upwards of two hundred other priests assisted, wearing tricolor robes, instead of their proper vestments. The unfortunate King and Queen and the little Dauphin were present, as well as many of the nobility, in futile effort to propitiate the Revolution which was eventually to destroy them. Four days previously, on the 10th of July, 1790, a meeting had been held of all the Bishops of France, at which it had been resolved by an enormous majority to refuse to recognize the so-called Civil Constitution of the Clergy, which had been condemned by the Pope. Four prelates voted for acceptance, in defiance of the Holy See. They were Talleyrand, Bishop of Autun; the Archbishop of Aix and the Bishops of Lidda, Orleans and Vivier. It may be desirable to explain that the Civil Constitution decreed by the National Assembly conferred the right of appointment of all

Bishops and parish priests on a simple majority of the laity of their respective dioceses or parishes, without any reference to Rome even for approval. The project was, of course, equivalent to an attempt to create a schismatical National Church. It cannot be amiss to quote Alison's description, in his "History of Europe," of what followed on the 28th of January, 1791. He says: "Cazales in this contest, animated by the greatness of the cause he was defending, rose to the highest pitch of eloquence and pronounced a speech which proved to be prophetic: 'The clergy, in conformity with the principles of their religion, are compelled to refuse the oath. You may expel them from their benefices; but will that destroy their influence over their flocks? Do you doubt that the Bishops, driven from their stations, will excommunicate those who are put in their place? Do you doubt that a large part of the faithful will remain attached to their ancient pastors, to the eternal principles of the Church? There is a schism introduced, the quarrels of religion commence; the people will come to doubt the validity of the sacraments; they will fear to see disappear from the land that sublime religion which, receiving man in the cradle, and following him to the grave, can alone offer him consolations amidst the vicissitudes of life. Thus will commence the division of the people, the multiplication of the victims of the Revolution. You will see the Catholics, over the whole country, following their beloved pastors amidst forests and caverns; you will see them reduced to the misery and desolation which the Protestant clergy experienced on the revocation of the edict of Nantes. Is that a result to be desired of a Revolution which proclaimed peace on earth, good will towards men? Driven from their episcopal palaces, the Bishops will retire to the huts of the cottagers who have sheltered them in their dis-Take from them their golden crosses, and they will find others of wood; and it was by a cross of wood that the whole world was saved!""

A further quotation from Alison will show how widely sundered Talleyrand already was from the majority of his colleagues in the true episcopacy and clergy of France. We read: "When the fatal day arrived, fixed for the final taking of the oath by the Bishops and dignified clergy in the Assembly, a furious multitude surrounded the hall, exclaiming: 'To the lamp-post! to the lamp-post with all who refuse!' The Abbé Maury raised his powerful voice in the last extremity, but he was interrupted by incessant cries. 'Strike; but hear me!' exclaimed the intrepid champion of the Church; but it was all in vain. 'Swear! swear!' resounded on all sides, and the grayhaired heads of the French Church came forth.

<sup>1 &</sup>quot;History of Europe," Vol. II., pp. 222, 223, 224.

The Bishop of Agen was the first called; he had never before spoken in the Assembly, and it was with great difficulty he could obtain a hearing. 'Swear or refuse!' was the universal cry of the galleries. 'I feel no regret at the loss of my preferment; I feel no regret for the loss of my fortune; but I should feel regret, indeed, if I lost your esteem; believe me, then, I cannot take the oath.' M. Fournes was next called. 'I glory,' said he, 'in following my Bishop, as St. Lawrence did his pastor.' Le Cleve was the next called. 'I am a member,' said he, 'of the Apostolic Church.' 'Swear or refuse!' said Roederer, in a voice almost hoarse with fury. 'This is tyranny indeed!' exclaimed Foucault; 'the emperors who persecuted the Christian martyrs allowed them to pronounce the name of God and testify, in dying, their faith in their religion.' The Bishop of Poictiers then presented himself. 'I am seventy years old,' said he; 'I have passed thirty-five years in my bishopric; I will not dishonor my old age; I cannot take an oath against my conscience.' 'Say yes or no.' 'I prefer, then, living in poverty, and will accept my lot in the spirit of patience.' Only one curé, named Landrin, took the oath; even the hundred and eighteen who had first given victory to the Tiers Etat, by joining their ranks, held back. At length the President said: 'For the last time I call on the Bishops and ecclesiastical functionaries to come forward and take the oath in terms of the decree.' A quarter of an hour of dead silence ensued, during which no one came forward and the meeting adjourned. In all probability Talleyrand was present at this terrible scene, but there was no reason to call upon him to take the oath, because he had already accepted it. Moreover, so far back as August 23, 1789, he had openly declared in the Assembly his complete indifference on the question of religion or morality and proclaimed that 'the only proper course was to allow every man to choose his own.' Again, he had been the first to propose the confiscation of the possessions of the Church for the purposes of the State on the 2d of October, 1789. It was these proofs of his revolutionary orthodoxy which secured his selection as celebrant of the Mass in the Champ de Mars. In June, 1792, he was sent to London, nominally as attaché or secretary to the Minister Plenipotentiary, the Marquis de Chauvelin, sent to England by Dumouriez, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, to secure the neutrality of that country in the impending conflict between France and the Continental Powers. In reality he was the Ambassador, a position for which his natural gifts as a diplomatist, both subtle and unscrupulous, abundantly qualified him. At the same time he was guarding against possible accidents by conveying assurances to Louis XVI. that he was devoted to his interests. The mission to London

was a success and would have remained a permanent one if it had not been for the murder of the King and Queen by the revolution-Talleyrand completely cajoled George III., but the horror and indignation created in England by the act of regicide put an end to his diplomatic usefulness. Moreover, the secret of his communications with the murdered monarch had been discovered in Paris, and he was recalled. His marvelous courage is attested by the fact that he returned, faced his accusers, denied the validity of the evidences they had secured and obtained permission to go back to London. This he did, but the English authorities would not allow him to remain, and he was compelled to seek a refuge in America. He settled in Baltimore, where his life was scandalous in the last degree; but, shameful to relate, his courtliness of manner and personal fascination secured him admittance to the best social circles in that city at the time, although he flaunted himself in the chief thoroughfares with his favorite companion—a Negro woman hanging on his arm. The eccentricity of taste was probably ascribed to his French origin. However the fact may be explained, it remains a fact all the same. He even attempted to secure reception at the White House, but George Washington refused him admission. Following the fall of Robespierre, Talleyrand was enabled to return to France, in September, 1796. Thenceforth his life was a part of the life of France. He was as prompt to recognize the genius of Napoleon as the latter was to recognize his. That he was a patriot always desirous of securing the independence, prosperity and power of his native land is beyond question. That he ever really lost his faith or ceased to be a believing Catholic, despite all his aims, is by no means certain. What is absolutely proven is that, when Napoleon decided to restore the supremacy of religion and entered into negotiations with the Holy See for the reëstablishment of the Church, Talleyrand labored indefatigably to secure reconcilement of the views of the First Consul with those of the Pope and his advisers. The memory of his olden avocation, if not vocation, seems to have stirred his heart and intellect, and all his energies were devoted to securing the settlement which was arrived at and which has only come to an end in our own time.

His action in this respect was, however, only preliminary to what was, perhaps, the greatest fault of Talleyrand's strange career. The ink with which the Concordat was written was barely dry when he determined to marry. The decision must have been the outcome of some strange infatuation. He was a priest, notwithstanding all his moral abberations. His vow of celibacy was irrevocable. He had been consecrated Bishop, and the fact made his original obligation, if possible, still more irrevocable. Nevertheless, he applied to

the Pope for a dispensation to enable him to marry the woman of his choice. This was Madame Grand, the divorced wife of a French official in the service of the Dutch Government and a female of absolutely irretrievable reputation, so flagrant had been her offenses against the marriage vow. It was absolutely impossible for Talleyrand to enter into legitimate alliance with her, her husband being still alive, even if he had never been an ecclesiastic. His case seems to have been that of a victim of delusion. There were plenty of other women of comparative respectability who in that sad time would have linked their fate with his, with or without dispensation, but he deliberately selected as his consort her who seemed the worst of a bad lot. Yet, with all her sins written on her shoulders, poor Madame Grande, like the Penitent Thief and Talleyrand himself, did not die the death of the unforgiven. Mercy she sought and mercy found when the very curtains of death were already shrouding her. We are, however, rather anticipating the regular course of our narrative. This may, nevertheless, be as good a place as any for remarking that while Talleyrand's relations with Madame Grand had been the subject of much scandalous comment and denunciation by extreme Republicans as far back as 1798, the attacks leveled at him were mainly based on the ground that he persisted in maintaining his belief in the Crucified Saviour and in the truths taught by the Catholic Church. The ex-Bishop was a great sinner, but he never lost the faith and never wanted to lose it. He met the scoffs of his infidel lecturers on morals with sneers as bitter as their own. M. de Lacombe tells us that Laréveillère-Lépeaux was one of the most virulent of his critics: "An honest man, but a narrow-minded and impassioned sectary, this apostle of a so-called philosophical religion could not forgive Talleyrand for the epigrams with which he had riddled Theophilanthropy. One day at the Institute, when Laréveillère in enthusiastic terms was vaunting the beauties of the new ceremonies, the ex-Bishop of Autun had had the impertinence to interrupt him: 'I have but one observation to make,' he said gravely. 'In order to found His religion Jesus Christ was crucified and rose from the dead. You should have tried to do as much.'2 Yet the Talleyrand who thus silenced a blatant unbeliever was the same who consecrated the schismatic socalled Constitutional Bishops at the bidding of the leaders of the National Assembly, functionaries who usurped the sees of the true Bishops of France and who-elected by the sovereign people-rejected the authority of the Vicar of Christ. Whatever stands to the credit of Talleyrand almost seems to deepen the shadow of the guilt of his sins.

<sup>2 &</sup>quot;Talleyrand, the Man," p. 125.

During the negotiations betwen the Holy See and the First Consul which resulted in the conclusion of the Concordat Talleyrand constantly endeavored to secure the inclusion in that treaty of some clause which while appearing to be of general application to all the French ecclesiastics who had broken their vow of celibacy might be interpreted as being equally applicable to his case. This, however, was precisely what the Pope, who knew perfectly well the nature of the game Talleyrand was playing, was determined should not be granted, because the status of a Bishop or of a member of a regular order was in some degree different from that of the members of the rank and file of the secular clergy. As early as the 26th of January, 1801, the Abbé Bernier, who was the delegate of the French Government in the preliminary negotiations for a Concordat, had in his notes for the information of the Holy See written as follows:

"The second article of the proposed convention has for its object the status of ecclesiastics who have received holy orders and contracted civil marriage since the Revolution. The Government, desiring peace for all, wishes that a salutary door should be opened to admit them to the Catholic communion, if they themselves desire it, and that the dispositions of the Council of Ancyra in 314 with regard to married deacons should be revived on their behalf if they are ready to live and die as Catholics and to renounce all exercise of holy orders, which they cannot be allowed to resume, even by putting away their wives, without real scandal."

It will be seen from this that the Holy See at the very outset had received assurance of a reasonably satisfactory kind as to what the most extreme demands of the rulers of the Republic would be so far as the so-called Constitutional and married clergy would be. Urged by Talleyrand, however, Bonaparte pressed for the insertion of a clause in the Concordat in the following words:

"Ecclesiastics who have contracted marriage since their ordination, or who by other acts have notoriously renounced the ecclesiastical state, shall be classed as ordinary citizens and be admitted as such to the secular communion."

M. de Lacombe points out that: "Mgr. Spina, the representative of the Holy See, immediately made reservations; he gave it to be understood that the addition 'or who by other acts have notoriously renounced the ecclesiastical state' would not be accepted in Rome; and guessing that Talleyrand was concealed under this formula, he hastened to report it to Cardinal Consalvi." The message was as follows:

"I do not know if the Minister Talleyrand wishes to be included

<sup>8 &</sup>quot;Talleyrand, the Man," p. 137.

in this; but I have made it quite clear that no Bishop, nor any one bound by solemn vows, can obtain the Apostolic indulgence."

As M. de Lacombe puts the case: "This was the crux of the problem. On the one hand, Rome, though disposed to make concessions, would not allow secular authority to meddle in a question of ecclesiastical discipline, nor that a case of conscience should become an article of the Concordat. She was ready to absolve, but by a special act, emanating from her spiritual authority alone. On the other hand, her traditions obliged her to make a distinction. Seculars and regulars are not bound by the same vows; the same treatment was not suitable to both. In the days of Mary Tudor the Pope, Julius III., full of benevolence towards the unfaithful priests among the English clergy, was inflexible towards Bishops and religious. This precedent was an example to Pius VII., and he would not swerve from it." No one ought to have known better than Talleyrand what the attitude of the Pontiff must be, but he seems to have cherished the delusion that the Vicar of Christ. influenced by motives of statecraft, would subordinate sacred principles for the satisfaction of himself and Bonaparte. The Holv Father condescended so far as to write a personal letter to the First Consul setting out exactly the lines on which he was resolved to act. In this he said:

"As to the absolution of married priests—excepting religious bound by solemn vows, and Bishops, concerning whom not a single example of such indulgence has been admitted in the Church in the whole course of her existence—and the absolution of those who have separated themselves from the Church in other ways we will provide for it by giving the necessary powers, in order that they may be absolved in accordance with ecclesiastical rule and discipline, assuring you that it will be to us a duty full of sweetness to let them feel the effects of all paternal condescension on our part to its utmost extent; and in this we will even have regard, in so far as is permissible to us, to the present circumstances of the Church in France."

Talleyrand was furious, but he preserved an outward calm. Master of intrigue and diplomatic wile as he was, he set himself to obstruct the negotiations with the Holy See. M. de Lacombe says: "He hindered the preliminaries, raised or exaggerated difficulties, was less supple and adaptable, less fertile in suggestions for overcoming difficulties and ever on the watch to bring upon the 'tapis,' with indefatigable dexterity, the question which touched him so nearly.' Finally he induced Bonaparte to request from the Pope that:

<sup>4 &</sup>quot;Talleyrand, the Man," p. 139.

"His Holiness will dispense from the vow of celibacy those ecclesiastics who have contracted marriage since their ordination, upon condition that they shall renounce the exercise of their functions, and will admit to the ranks of lay Catholics those who by other acts have notoriously renounced their condition."

His Holiness took absolutely no notice of the request, and the Concordat was eventually signed on the 15th of July, 1801, without any reference to the unfaithful priests in its provisions. When the formal treaty was complete and duly ratified on both sides, the Sovereign Pontiff issued a Brief on the 15th of August, addressed to the Archbishop of Corinth, in which by a measure of exceptional elemency he absolved all sub-deacons, deacons and priests of the secular elergy who had contracted marriage or renounced their condition; but the pardon did not extend to either ex-religious or Bishops. Mgr. Dupanloup, referring to this episode, has written:

"On one side we see all the efforts of ability and power; on the other ability likewise, but a weakened and threatened power, immutable, however, by the firmness of justice and triumphant by the ascendancy of virtue. It is one of the numerous hidden episodes of that great religious epoch; and I do not hesitate to say that none is more glorious to the Church."

It will be seen that, solely by virtue of his own authority, the Pope—so far as he felt free in conscience to do so—had simply drummed out of the ranks of the French secular clergy a number of men who were a disgrace to their cloth and whose continued discharge of sacerdotal functions would have been only a prolongation of sacrilege and scandal.

Now, there is one point upon which it is well to be clear and The Pope was willing—under the sad and irrevocable human conditions which had arisen—to unfrock and treat as lay Catholics the ordinary secular priests who had fallen away from their vocation. He was even willing to recognize their marriages, but he would grant no dispensation from their original vow of celibacy to those ecclesiastics who had been members of religious orders or received episcopal consecration. Even in the case of the latter he was, however, content, in certain special instances, to allow them to remain in the lay community of the Church if they abandoned unions which were absolutely null and void from the beginning and for the continuance of which no absolution could be given. This concession was a great one, but it was not enough for Talleyrand, and he had the audacity to continue to pester the Holy See with petitions for license to marry Madame Grand. Moreover, he had incurred excommunication of the directly personal kind,

<sup>5 &</sup>quot;Talleyrand, the Man," p. 141.

and absolution of his sins was reserved to the Pope. He thought, or pretended to think, that remission to the position of a lay Catholic would involve permission to enjoy all the privileges, matrimonial or otherwise, of the ordinary layman. It is difficult to see how one so astute as he was could possibly have honestly fallen into such Talleyrand, however, had more than ordinarily good grounds for hopefulness. Both Cardinal Caprara, the Papal Legate at Paris, and Cardinal Consalvi, Papal Secretary of State at Rome, were earnestly desirous of facilitating the accomplishment of his views because of the services he had generally rendered in connection with the Concordat. The Pope, however, had other advisers than his diplomatists and politicians in a matter of spiritual importance. To these the case of the ex-Bishop of Autun was referred for consideration. Mgr. di Pietro, a very learned theologian, examined it carefully and reported upon it at considerable length towards the end of February, 1802. In the course of his report he said:

"It does not seem possible to be satisfied with the petition presented by Charles Maurice Talleyrand. It contains not a single expression to show unequivocally that he detests the heretical and schismatical maxims of the civil constitution of the clergy, to which he adhered by taking the civil oath."

Di Pietro further pointed out that Talleyrand, by acting as the consecrator of the constitutional Bishops, had been the real author of the schism. Napoleon, however, was bent on securing the gratification of the desire of his astute Minister for Foreign Affairs, and with his usual adroitness had managed to persuade the Papal Legate at Paris, Cardinal Caprara, that special concession in his favor—if it could be made—would be fraught with considerable advantage to the security of religious interests in France. Even Cardinal Consalvi was inclined to hold the same view. On the 10th of March, 1802, the Pope issued a Brief in which he made it quite clear that the only concession he would make to Talleyrand was that which he would make in the case of any other Bishop whose personal character was so notorious that his continued public discharge of episcopal functions would be scandalous in the last

Cardinal Ercole Consalvi was born at Rome, June 8, 1757, and died in that city January 24, 1824. He was a worthy ecclesiastic, a great statesman and a fearlessly honest administrator of public affairs. Napoleon not only hated, but feared him, because of his unflinching opposition to his designs for the enslavement and humiliation of the Holy See. It was mainly through his exertions, supported as these were by Talleyrand, that the Congress of Vienna decreed the restoration of the Papal States. As Cardinal Secretary of State he reformed numerous abuses, suppressed monopolies, feudal taxes and exclusive rights. He was a liberal patron of science and the fine arts, a scholar and a musician.

<sup>7 &</sup>quot;Talleyrand, the Man," p. 145.

degree. The Pontiff was willing that he should finally relinquish the mitre and the crozier he was unworthy to bear and to devote himself henceforth to secular pursuits, but he was determined not to grant him any dispensation from the vows he had sworn, which were most galling to Talleyrand. Furthermore, he urged the imperative need of confession, penitence and penance. In addition, through Cardinal Antonelli, he issued authority to whomsoever Talleyrand might select as his confessor to grant him absolution when he had fulfilled the plain obligations of one in his state. The Papal Brief was a beautiful and touching document. As epitomized by M. de Lacombe, it reads in part as follows:

"'You voluntarily confess that you have fallen into the most grievous errors; you bewail the crimes you have committed; hearkening to wise counsel, you blush and ask pardon of your beloved Father. Oh, holy and blessed shame, never to be sufficiently rejoiced over!' We know that 'prostrate at your Father's knee you confess your faults; that having returned to the fold of the Supreme Shepherd you promise never to be led astray from it again. you not only take the sacred engagement to be in future entirely subject with filial obedience and docility to the Apostolic Chair, but also to devote all your energy to the advancement and increase of religion and of the Church.' By which 'many sins shall be forgiven you.' We give power to our legate à latere to the First Consul, Jean Baptiste, Cardinal Caprara, 'to release you from the various censures by which you are bound; to restore you, under certain conditions, to the union of the Church; to give you leave, by restoring you to the lay communion, to assume the secular habit and discharge the duties of office in the French Republic.' The Brief further exhorted Tallevrand to repair by word and deed the evil he had done to the Church. 'Love God and His Only Son, love the Church and accept her decisions, love your neighbor, and, above all, love your former sons, those to whom the holy unction had bound you as father and spouse; love all Christians.' The Brief ended with an unexpected comparison: 'The threefold denial of Peter was completely effaced by his threefold confession of love. Take for your imitation the illustrious example of the Prince of the Apostles, and before your brethren, before all those to whom you have been a cause of scandal, before the altar of Christ, exclaim freely and courageously: "Lord, Thou knowest all things, Thou knowest that I love Thee." If you have followed Peter in his errors, follow him also in his penitence; that is to say, his triumph.' In conclusion, the Holy Father extended to Talleyrand his apostolic blessing."

Beautiful, condescending and touching though the Papal letter was, it was very different from what Talleyrand wanted. What he

really desired was a kind of Pontifical license to commit one sin more before settling down as a lay Catholic statesman. In other words, he sought what no Pope could or would grant him. Rather than give him what he craved, the Pontiff would have allowed the Concordat to be torn into shreds, as it has been in our own time by the present impious rulers of the latest French Republic. With the Pope's Brief Cardinal Antonelli transmitted to Cardinal Caprara secret instructions regarding the manner of "absolution of M. de Talleyrand." As M. de Lacombe puts it: "One thing preoccupied him above all—how would the Brief be received? Did he to whom it was addressed repent in all the sincerity of his heart? Did he wish to recover grace before God by confession and penance? Or did he simply wish to extricate himself from a false position, be reconciled with the Church, absolved from censure and excommunication, and released from sacerdotal duties? In the first case, if the conversion was deep and sincere, the Legate would transmit to Talleyrand the written Brief, not for himself only, but for the public. "When," added Antonelli, "he has appreciated and relished the exhortations of the Holy Father, so full of gentleness, and his sweet invitation to do penance, the letter of the Penitentiary may be given to him. . . . Naturally he is not to be restricted in the choice of a confessor to his liking, to whom he will make a good confession." With the sacramental absolution he will receive also absolution from the censures and excommunication. A penance will be enjoined him. But if Talleyrand should refuse to take the decisive step and kneel in the confessional, "and this," said Antonelli, "would be a source of unspeakable sorrow to the paternal heart of His Holiness," it will be necessary to exact from him a written declaration. In this Talleyrand was to make oath to be "the very obedient son of the Roman Catholic Church," to adhere to her judgments, and to abjure the errors in which he had formerly lived. Besides this, he must submit to the prayers and supplications prescribed by the ritual, and would then be released "at the external tribunal" from the censures and excommunication. "He would be left free, when God should touch his heart, to have recourse to a confessor and receive absolution in the sacrament of penance." The Cardinal Legate, however, was better acquainted with the character and purposes of the ex-Bishop of Autun than were either the Pope or his advisers, and—if M. de Lacombe is correct—he accepted the grave responsibility described "in a note in the archives of the Vatican" in the following words:

"The Cardinal Legate did not present the Brief to the Minister Talleyrand, having heard from some of his friends that it would Thus it was that, to again quote M. de Lacombe's words: "Talleycertainly have displeased him."

rand made a third and supreme effort to restate the question to which Rome could only return a 'non possumus' and an equally inflexible 'non licet.'"

It must be remembered that, later on, Talleyrand repeatedly declared that he had no knowledge of the conditions set out in the Pope's Brief or Antonelli's instructions. This statement appears to be justified to some extent, at all events, by the Vatican memorandum just quoted. It is, however, quite certain that he knew he had failed to obtain what he most urgently sought, and this assertion is fully sustained by the unquestionable fact that on the 27th of May, 1802, a special messenger conveying dispatches to Rome set out from Paris. This was Major Lefèvre, of the Gendarmerie. According to M. de Lacombe, "he seemed in a great hurry, galloping at full speed and changing horses at the stages without stopping." The missive he was bearing to the Vatican was a formal demand from the First Consul for a decree of secularization of his Foreign Minister, backed by a series of wholly fallacious arguments, professedly based on historic precedents. These precedents had no real existence, and the fact that they were gravely relied on by Talleyrand shows that he was either wholly unscrupulous or extremely ignorant. The document ran as follows:

"It is a thing befitting the dignity of the French Government and useful to the discipline of the Church to grant a Brief of secularization to Citizen Talleyrand.

"That Minister has rendered great services to the Church and State. He has publicly and irrevocably renounced the functions and dignities of the priesthood. He wishes this renunciation to be ratified by a formal admission from the supreme head of religion; and he deserves this special favor.

"From the political point of view, now that France is once more a Catholic nation, it is not fitting that a Minister who has a principal place in the confidence of the Government should be a subject of uncertainty and controversy on account of his former condition.

"With regard to the efforts he has made to reconcile the Church and the Government, he must be enabled to enjoy, by the free expression of the gratitude of all the friends of religion, the reward of the zeal he has shown for its reëstablishment.

"These weighty considerations must immediately touch the benevolence and justice of the Holy Father.

"We will say nothing about the formalities required in such a case. His Holiness will choose the most proper and complete. As for examples in the past, the Holy Father will find many in history.

"In the seventeenth century, under Innocent X., Camille Pamphili,

Cardinal and nephew of the Sovereign Pontiff, was secularized and died a layman.

"In the fifteenth century Cæsar Borgia, Archbishop of Valencia, became Duke of Valentinois, married a princess of the house of Albret, and died a layman.

"Ferdinand de Gonzague, first an ecclesiastic and then Duke of Mantua; Maurice of Savoy, who was married in 1642, after receiving holy orders; the two Cardinals of Bourbon, uncle and nephew, both Archbishops of Lyons, died laymen, after abdicating their ecclesiastical dignities, with the consent of the Holy See.

"Henry of Portugal, Archbishop of Lisbon, and successor to the crown of Sebastian in 1588, died a king and a layman.

"Francis of Lorraine, who succeeded his brother, Charles IV., in 1634, and who afterwards became the father of Leopold, passed from the sacerdotal state to that of layman and remained faithful to the Church.

"All these examples are taken from times when the Holy See enjoyed full authority. The use which the predecessors of Pius VII. then made of it had for motive expediency and the good of the Church. These motives exist to-day, and it is doubtful if at any of these times the same request was ever founded upon such strong considerations."

This document was, in its way, a diabolically clever concoction, but it will be observed how few of the cases quoted by Talleyrand were really parallel to his own. The Pope was willing, under the peculiar conditions of his case, to allow him to cease the discharge of clerical or episcopal functions. If Tallevrand had not asked for this dispensation, His Holiness would have been compelled to inflict on him before the face of the world the disgrace of formal inhibition. That there had been other instances in the long history of the Church, wherein similar alternatives had had to be faced, was nothing to the point at all. What would have been would have been production of one in which the Holy See had permitted the marriage of a Bishop. The pleas advanced by Talleyrand were backed up by the First Consul in what was almost a threatening letter to the Pope, while the French Ambassador to the Holy See was instructed to press for immediate acquiescence with all the authority attaching to his position as representative of the recently reconciled Republic. The Pope, however, was not to be intimidated. He referred the whole matter to competent investigators. As M. de Lacombe says: "No dogma was at stake." It was solely a question of the maintenance or relaxation of immemorial discipline in case of a solitary Bishop, and this one who was palpably incapacitated from the discharge of episcopal duties, without the creation of a new scandal. In the words of the writer just quoted, the Pope, "to his greater honor, treated the petition of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the French Republic as that of any one else." The standard of morals safeguarded by the Church does not vary with the rank or convenience of its members. The most careful examination was made of the alleged precedents relied on by Talleyrand, and they were clearly shown to be non-existent. It is best to quote again from M. de Lacombe. He says:

"The archivist of the Vatican, Mgr. Marini, refuted point by point, with learned notes written even on the margin of the request of the French Government, all the alleged precedents of married Bishops. To facts alleged, the learned Roman replied with facts proved. Before their marriage neither Camille Pamphili nor Cæsar Borgia had ever received episcopal consecration, nor even sacerdotal ordination: Ferdinand de Gonzague, Duke of Mantua, was only a lay Cardinal. His resignation of membership of the Sacred College was sufficient to release him. Maurice of Savoy was not even in minor orders. The Cardinals of Bourbon who renounced the purple never returned to the lay condition and were never married. to the two Cassimirs, Kings of Poland, it was very doubtful that the first had ever received a dispensation from his vows as a Benedictine: in any case he was not a Bishop; the second, the Jesuit, was only bound by simple vows. Francis of Lorraine had never received any holy orders. The case of the Cardinal Henry of Portugal, Archbishop of Lisbon, who succeeded his nephew, King Sebastian, in 1578, was still more decisive; in spite of the wishes of his people he could never obtain leave to efface the episcopal unction and contract marriage. Carried away by his polemical ardor and sure of his ground, Mgr. Marini forestalled objections. He did not content himself with tearing to pieces the examples sent from Paris; he brought to light three more old petitions which lay forgotten among his archives and crushed them victoriously with the weight of his learning. His report ended with these words: "Never has any dispensation from celibacy been granted to any one whatever who had previously been invested with the episcopal character."

The confutation of the pleas advanced by Talleyrand was complete. No doubt, in the long history of the Church instances can be found of bad Bishops and bad priests, as well as very many more of laymen; but these have existed not by the formal license of the Church, but in her despite. Mgr. di Pietro clenched the arguments of Marini, writing more as a theologian than a historian. He said:

"The celibacy of priests dates from the early days of Christianity.

No written tradition imposed it at first; but according to the teachings of St. Ierome in one of his epistles, the Apostles were virgins, or if they were married, they separated from their wives. In the fourth century the Council of Carthage, taking them as models, imposed continence upon the ministers of religion. Ever since the Latin Church has firmly maintained the celibacy of the clergy. The Eastern Church, it is true, on account of the weakness of her clergy, softened this discipline and authorized priests, deacons and subdeacons to retain their wives when they were married before their ordination, but afterwards they were not allowed to contract marriage upon any pretext whatever. Moreover, even in the Eastern Church, a Bishop must be a virgin or widower, or at least he must put away his wife without any hope of resuming conjugal relation-Whenever for the reëstablishment of the Catholic Church in any country the Holy See has condescended to a measure of exceptional benevolence, it was restricted to making valid the marriages, hitherto accounted null, of priests, deacons and sub-deacons; at no time and in no country has the marriage of Bishops ever been admitted. Such was the conduct of Julius III. towards England in 1554, and such was the conduct last year towards France of the Pontiff now actually reigning."

M. de Lacombe, having quoted the precise words of Mgr. di Pietro up to this, now proceeds to partly quote and partly epitomize the final conclusions of that learned theologian. He writes as follows:

"Having got so far in his demonstration, Di Pietro interrupts it as follows: 'It will be objected that the law of continence imposed on all Bishops of the Eastern and Western Church is founded on the very valid reason that it is not fitting that men occupied in dispensing the most sacred ministeries of our religion should at the same time be called upon to discharge conjugal duties. . . . That this reason does not apply in the present case, which deals with a Bishop who has renounced all episcopal functions and is reduced to the lay communion. . . .' No matter! Di Pietro hastens to reply; the episcopal character can never be effaced; the Fathers have said: 'The Pontificate is the crown of priesthood, the summit of sacerdocy;' having climbed so high, a man cannot descend. The history of the Church proves that she has never wavered on this point; for eighteen centuries, in spite of ardent prayers, in spite of imperative motives, she has never once consented to the marriage of a Bishop. The conclusion of Mgr. di Pietro was the same as that of Mgr. Marini: 'There is no ground for granting the solicited dispensation."

It is scarcely possible to do better by way of commentary on this

than quote the description given by M. de Lacombe of the action taken by the Pope when he received the report. He says: "Pius VII., who had, as has been said, the soul of a saint, and as he proved himself, the heart of a hero, never hesitated in the face of this double opinion so strongly supported, given him by Marini and Di Pietro. Whatever might be the consequences to himself, he would not license the marriage of Talleyrand. The principle should be safe in his hands. The Pope had ordered Mgr. di Pietro to prepare the Brief, and the usual writer of the Pontifical acts, aided by Spina, Consalvi and others, had surpassed himself. Never had the beautiful Latin phrases been so skillfully used, never were such tact and pliancy displayed. Not a word at which Talleyrand could take umbrage, and yet everything was said; his complete submission to the Holy See; his obligation to serve religion and the Church; he was restored to the lay communion, with right to wear the dress of a layman and discharge the high offices of state. Of marriage there was not a word." The Pope, however, was determined that no excuse for either misconception or misrepresentation should be found in this fact, and, accordingly, he wrote a personal letter to the First Consul, in which he fully explained the position of affairs. In this he said:

"We would have been ready to satisfy your Minister in his desire to contract marriage if this were not contrary to the laws of the Church. There is not a single example in eighteen centuries of license to marry being granted to a consecrated Bishop. You will see from the notes in the margin of the document you sent to us, and which we return, that there were errors of fact in all the alleged precedents. Your wisdom will prove to you that we could not do more than we have done. The tenor of the Brief which we send to Monsieur de Talleyrand will show him how much the interest you take in him and the services he has rendered for the reëstablishment of religion in France have weighed with us."

Moreover, Cardinal Consalvi also wrote directly to Talleyrand as follows:

"I make no doubt but that your Excellency will find in the wording of the Brief which I send to-day what you meant when you wrote to me that there were certain formulas which would increase the favor granted by His Holiness, and others, which would destroy its value. Your Excellency will see that the Brief meets your views in a manner which cannot fail to be agreeable. Your Excellency has too much knowledge of the matter to make it necessary for me to point out that His Holiness has carried delicacy and consideration in the formula to the highest possible degree."

<sup>8</sup> This letter was dated 30th June, 1802. De Lacombe, p. 169.



Consalvi went on, in words almost identical with those used by the Pope in his letter to Napoleon, to explain to Talleyrand how impossible it was for the Pope to grant him permission to marry. All these documents were carried to Paris by the same officer, Major Lefèvre, who had borne Talleyrand's petition and the First Consul's letter in support thereof to Rome. The envoy appears to have made both journeys on horseback. When he reached the French capital, in the middle of July, Talleyrand, with Madame Grand, had left it for Bourbon l'Archambault, where the former went annually to undergo the "cure." Napoleon sent a brief note to his Minister informing him of the tenor of the Papal Brief, but Caprara, the Nuncio, had to send him Cardinal Consalvi's letter. He should also have sent the Brief, but the poor man was simply frightened out of his wits, and, instead, wrote a letter of his own full of slavish blandishments. Talleyrand was not a person to be humbugged by such endearments, and he promptly demanded the Brief itself, which Caprara, most reluctantly, had eventually to transmit, accompanied, however, by still another adulatory communication from himself, which the ex-Bishop of Autun most probably cast into the wastepaper basket it was so eminently fitted to adorn.

Every one who knows anything of the history of the Concordat between the Holy See and France will be aware that by a gross breach of faith Napoleon, without the consent of the Pope, tacked on to that treaty certain so-called organic articles, the validity of which was promptly repudiated by His Holiness. These articles were utilized for the first time for the benefit of Talleyrand. On the 19th of August, 1802, the meeting of the Council of State was held in Paris. At this assembly Portalis, who had been placed in charge of all matters relating to public worship, rose and called attention to the first of the articles in question, which he read in the following words:

"No Bull, Brief, Rescript, decree, order, provision, signature serving as a provision, nor other dispatch from the Court of Rome, even those concerning a private individual, shall be received, published, printed, nor otherwise put into execution, without the authorization of the Government."

Then he proceeded to read in the original Latin the Brief concerning Talleyrand, and proposed its registration. Various members of the Council protested, no doubt quite honestly, that they did not understand the document and that it should be translated. The President, Cambacérès, however, insisted that it should be forthwifh registered, declaring that the First Consul demanded this. In the course of a vehement and dictatorial speech he said: "I cannot

conceive how you can oppose the registration and promulgation of a Brief from the Pope restoring a Bishop to the lay communion. It is surely the only way to prevent the Court of Rome from encroaching on the temporal authority in France." All opposition subsided, and the Brief was registered. The words used by Cambacérès indicated pretty clearly the nature of the game that was about to be played. The next day the three Consuls met, dominated as usual by Napoleon. The result was the formulation of a decree in the following words:

"The Consuls of the Republic having seen the Brief of Pope Pius VII., given at St. Peter's in Rome on the 29th of June, 1802—upon the report of the Councillor of State charged with all matters pertaining to public worship—after consultation with the Council of State, decree:

"The Brief of Pope Pius VII. given at St. Peter's in Rome on the 29th of June, 1802, by which Citizen Charles Maurice Talleyrand, Minister of Foreign Affairs, is restored to secular life and to the lay communion, shall have full and entire effect."

The clear purpose was to mislead public opinion, to misrepresent the purport of the Brief and to create the idea that Talleyrand was free to marry. As soon as the text of the Consular decree became known in Rome there was consternation in the Papal councils. The perfidy which was being practiced was appalling, both in sinfulness and subtlety. All that could be done was done to counteract the treachery. Cardinal Consalvi at once forwarded dispatches to the Nuncios at the various European courts, and he directed Caprara to make the actual facts known in Paris. An official statement of the true circumstances was published in the chief Italian papers, and the Papal Secretary of State even drew up a paragraph which he instructed Cardinal Caprara to have inserted in the journals of Paris. This was as follows:

"In virtue of a Pontifical Brief, the Cardinal Legate has reconciled Citizen Talleyrand, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Church; he has restored him to the lay communion, but without releasing him from the vow which binds him since his ordination."

There were more reasons than one why this announcement could not be published, but the most essential of all was that there had been no "reconcilement" of Talleyrand to the Church. Despite this fact, Cardinal Caprara tried to get the paragraph published, but no editor was courageous enough to print it in face of the rigid State censorship which existed. At this moment Madame Grand's real husband, M. Grand, was actually in Paris, whither he had come presumably to levy blackmail. His divorced wife, acting in the name of Talleyrand, applied to the Dutch Government for an

appointment for him in some Dutch colony. This was at once given, and he was sent to the Cape of Good Hope, then still a possession of Holland. On the 9th of September, 1802, a formal contract of marriage between Talleyrand and Madame Grand was executed at the villa of the former at Neuilly. The witnesses were Napoleon and Josephine, the other two Consuls, Cambacérès and Lebrun; the Secretary of State, Maret; Archambault and Boson de Perigord, Talleyrand's brothers, and two notaries, Fleury and Lecerf. On the following day a civil marriage was registered in the mairie of the Tenth Arrondissement of Paris, in the presence of a host of distinguished witnesses, and it has been alleged by more than one writer that the crowning scandal was enacted of a religious ceremony, performed by a priest of character akin to Talleyrand's own at Epinay. The marriage register of the church at Epinay during 1802 has disappeared, however, and there is no evidence existing to show that any such monstrous sacrilege was perpetrated. The ex-Bishop of Autun had now, apparently, done everything within his power to make certain his spiritual ruin and final revolt against the Church of which, despite himself, he remained a consecrated minister.

WILLIAM F. DENNEHY.

Dublin, Ireland.

#### REUNION OF THE CHURCHES.

LETTER OF OUR MOST HOLY LORD PIUS X., BY DIVINE PROVIDENCE POPE.

TO THE ARCHBISHOPS, DELEGATES APOSTOLIC OF BYZANTIUM IN GREECE, EGYPT, MESOPOTAMIA, PERSIA, SYRIA AND EASTERN INDIA.

Venerable Brethren, Health and Apostolic Benediction.

T WOULD be hard to say how much has been done by holy men from the closing years of the ninth century, when the nations of the East began to be snatched from the unity of the Catholic Church, in order that our separated brethren might be restored to her bosom. Beyond all others the Supreme Pontiffs, our predecessors, in fulfillment of their duty of protecting the faith and ecclesiastical unity, left nothing undone, by fatherly exhortations, public embassies and solemn councils, to remove this most fatal dissidence which brought bitter grief to the West, but to the East grave loss. The witnesses of this, to mention but a few among many, are Gregory IX., Innocent IV., Clement IV., Gregory X., Eugenius IV., Gregory XIII. and Benedict XIV.

But no one is unaware of the great zeal with which more recently our predecessor of happy memory, Leo XIII., invited the nations of the East to associate themselves again with the Roman Church.

"As for ourselves," he said, "to say the truth, we must confess that the very remembrance of the ancient glory and incomparable merits of which the East can boast are to us inexpressibly sweet. There, in fact, were the cradle of human redemption and the first fruits of Christianity. From thence, as streams of some royal river, were diffused over the West the riches of the inestimable blessings derived to us from the Gospel of Jesus Christ. . . . While we ponder on these things, venerable brethren, in our mind we desire and long for nothing so much as to effect the restoration to all the East of the virtue and grandeur of the past. And the more so because the signs which, in the development of human events, appear there from time to time give reason to hope that the Orientals, moved by Divine grace, may return to reconciliation with the Church of Rome, from whose bosom they have been for so many years separated."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Const. "Nuper ad Nos," March 16, 1743, prescribes a new profession of faith for Orientals.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Allocution "si fuit in re" of December 13, 1880, to their Eminences the Cardinals at the Vatican. "Acta," Vol. II., p. 179. Cf. also Ep. Ap., "Praeclara Gratulationis," of June 20, 1894, "Acta," Vol. XIV., p. 195.

Nor, indeed, are we, as you are well aware, venerable brethren, less desirous that the day so ardently prayed for by so many holy men may quickly dawn on which the wall which has so long divided two peoples may be destroyed to its foundations, and that these, being enfolded in one embrace of faith and charity, the peace so long besought may at length flourish, and that there may be one fold and one shepherd. (John x., 16.)

Whilst these were our thoughts there came to us a cause for grief from a certain article published in the new review, Roma e l'Oriente, entitled "Thoughts on the Question of the Union of the Churches." For, indeed, this article is full of so many errors, not only theological, but historical, that a greater collection could scarcely be pressed into so small a number of pages.

And, certainly no less rashly than falsely, approach is made in the article to the position that the dogma of the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son in no way flows from the words of the Gospel or is proved by the belief of the ancient fathers. With equal imprudence doubt is expressed whether the sacred dogmas of Purgatory and the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary were held by the holy men of the first centuries. Again, when the article comes to deal with the constitution of the Church, we have, first, a renewal of the error long ago condemned by our predecessor, Innocent X.,8 by which St. Paul is regarded as altogether equal as a brother with St. Peter. Secondly, and no less erroneously, it is suggested that in the first centuries the Catholic Church was not ruled by a single head—that is, a monarchy—and that the primacy of the Roman Church was supported by no valid arguments. Nor does the article leave untouched the Catholic doctrine of the Most Holy Eucharist, for it is stoutly advanced that the view is admissible which holds among the Greeks that the words of consecration do not produce their effect unless the prayer called the "Epiclesis" shall have first been offered, though it is known that the Church has no power at all to touch the substance of the sacra-Equally inadmissible is the view that confirmation given by any priest may be regarded as valid.4

Even from this summary of the errors contained in this article you will easily understand, venerable brethren, the very grave offense that has been done to all who read it, and how greatly we ourselves have been astounded that Catholic teaching is so wantonly perverted by open words, and that many historical points on the causes of the Oriental schism are all too rashly distorted from the

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Benedict XVI., Constit. "Etsi Pastoralis" for the Italo-Greeks, May 26, 1742.



Decr. Congr. Gen. S. E. et U. In quis, January 24, 1647.

truth. In the first place, it is falsely laid to the charge of the holy Popes Nicholas I. and Leo IX. that a great part of the responsibility for the trouble was due to the pride and ambition of the one and to the harsh rebukes of the other—as if the apostolic energy of the former in the defense of most sacred rights can be attributed to pride, or the persistency of the latter in coercing the wicked can be called cruelty. The principles of history also are trampled underfoot when those holy expeditions called the Crusaders are traduced as piratical enterprises, or, more seriously still, when the Roman Pontiffs are blamed as though the zeal with which they ought to call the Oriental nations to union with the Roman Church is to be attributed to a lust for power and not to an apostolic solicitude for the feeding of the flock of Christ.

Great, too, was our amazement at the assertion in the same article that the Greeks at Florence were forced by the Latins to subscribe to unity, and that the same people were induced by false arguments to receive the dogma of the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son as well as from the Father. The article even goes so far as, in defiance of the facts of history, to question whether the general councils which were held after the secession of the Greeks, from the eighth to that of the Vatican, are to be regarded as really ecumenical, whence a rule of a sort of hybrid unity is propounded that only that is henceforth to be acknowledged by either Church as legitimate which was their common heritage before the disruption, complete silence being observed on all else as superfluous and spurious additions.

We have thought that these things should be pointed out to you, venerable brethren, not only that you may know that the propositions and theories are rejected by us as false, rash and foreign to Catholic faith, but also that, as far as may be in your power, you may endeavor to drive away so dire a pestilence from the people entrusted to your watchful care by exhorting all to stand fast in the accepted teachings and never listen to any other, even though an angel from heaven should preach it. (Galatians i., 8.) At the same time, too, we earnestly pray you to impress upon them that we have no more ardent desire than that all men of good will may unweariedly exert all their strength that the unity longed for may be more speedily obtained, so that those sheep whom divisions hold apart may be united in one profession of Catholic faith under one supreme pastor. And this will more easily be brought about if fervent prayers are multiplied to the Holy Spirit, the Paraclete, who is "not the God of dissension, but of peace." (I. Cor. xiv., 33.) So will it befall that the prayer of Christ which He offered with groans before undergoing the worst of torments shall be fulfilled,

"that they all may be one, as Thou, Father, in Me and I in Thee; that they also may be one in Us." (John xvii., 21.)

Lastly, let all be sure that work with this object will be in vain unless first, and above all, they hold the true and whole Catholic faith as it has been handed down and consecrated in Holy Scripture, the tradition of the fathers, the consent of the Church, general councils and the decrees of the Supreme Pontiffs. Let, then, all those who strive to defend the cause of unity go forth; let them go forth wearing the helmet of faith, holding to the anchor of hope, and inflamed with the fire of charity, to work unceasingly in this most heavenly enterprise; and God, the author and lover of peace, in whose power are the times and the moments (Acts i., 7), will hasten the day when the nations of the East shall return to Catholic unity and, united to the Apostolic See, after casting away their errors, shall enter the port of everlasting salvation.

This letter, venerable brethren, you will cause to be published after being diligently translated into the vernacular of the country entrusted to you. And whilst we rejoice to inform you that the beloved author of this article, which was written by him inconsiderately indeed, but with good faith, has in our presence sincerely and from his heart given his adhesion to the doctrines set forth in this letter, and has declared his readiness to teach, reject and condemn to the end of his life all that is taught, rejected and condemned by the Holy Apostolic See, we most lovingly in the Lord impart the Apostolic Benediction as an earnest of heavenly gifts and as a witness of our benevolence.

Given at St. Peter's, Rome, on the 26th day of December, in the year 1910, and in the eighth of our pontificate.

Pius PP. X.

# In Memoriam

MOST REV. PATRICK JOHN RYAN, D. D.,

DIED FEBRUARY II, 1911.

THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW records with deep sorrow the death of its directing editor, Archbishop Ryan. His interest in the QUARTERLY began with its publication in 1876. He saw in it from the beginning a powerful instrument for good in the spread of truth and the correction of error. He was contemporary with the group of great intellectual churchmen who were its chief contributors in its early days and who gave to it a reputation that was as wide as the English language.

When he was appointed to the See of Philadelphia in 1884 he was brought into closer touch with the publication, and with its editor, Right Rev. James A. Corcoran, D. D. His appreciation of the QUARTERLY at that time, his sympathy with its owners and publishers, Messrs. Hardy and Mahony, and his unbounded admiration for its great editorial head contributed very much to its success.

When Archbishop Ryan assumed editorial direction, on the death of Monsignor Corcoran in 1800, he did so with diffidence, indeed, as to his fitness, but with full confidence as to the ability of the QUARTERLY to continue to live up to the high standard to which its founders had raised it. In his salutatory which appeared in July, 1890, he says: "The aims of THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW and the mode of attaining them were admirably set forth in the first salutatory, January, 1876, by its first editor, the late Monsignor Corcoran. . . . On the lines mapped out by this great pioneer the new management proposes to work." He never departed from those lines. To the study and discussion of those subjects which came within the scope of the Review, and which embraced theology, philosophy, history, science, literature and politics—using the latter term in its original and proper meaning—he brought those distinguished qualities which made him a successful director. His strong faith, uncompromising orthodoxy, far-seeing prudence and untiring zeal lent a value to his editorial direction that is hard to measure, while his kindness, patience and sympathy with his associates encouraged them and moved them to constant endeavor.

The associate editors and readers of the QUARTERLY have lost a true friend and able director.

May he rest in peace.

## In Memoriam

RIGHT REV. MONSIGNOR JAMES F. LOUGHLIN, D. D.,

DIED MARCH 17, 1911.

HE AMERICAN CATHOLIC QUARTERLY REVIEW has been doubly orphaned in the death doubly orphaned in the death of Archbishop Ryan and Monsignor Loughlin. In the former it possessed an unusually wise director and in the latter an exceptionally learned editor. It is very remarkable that they both took up the work of the Review in the same year-1890-and both laid it down in the same year—1911. For twenty years they were associated together in the publication of this work, which was very dear to them. As the Archbishop excelled in his particular field, so Monsignor Loughlin shone in his. He had a wonderful equipment for editorial work. He had great natural ability, which was fully developed in the best educational institutions at home and abroad: he made every one of his talents double itself according to the Scripture standard, and permitted none of them to lie idle; he acquired a store of knowledge that was marvelous in its extent and variety, and he formed habits of study that were almost suicidal. When his mind began to pursue a subject he forgot everything, even rest, sleep and nourishment, until he found it and mastered it.

His knowledge of languages was very remarkable and very valuable, for it embraced, besides Latin and Greek, French, Italian, German and Spanish, with some knowledge of Polish. He had a special love for Church history and excelled greatly in that study. With such an equipment his services as editor of the QUARTERLY were invaluable.

He thought so quickly and analyzed a subject so readily that he seemed to act almost by intuition; and yet he was most kind and indulgent with persons of lesser ability. His beautiful simplicity of character, together with his cheerful and obliging disposition, made him approachable and lovable at all times. The American Catholic Quarterly Review has suffered a heavy loss in the death of its genial, able, sterling editor.

May he rest in peace.

## Book Reviews

THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC WHO'S WHO. Comiled and edited by Georgina Pell Curtis. 8vo., pp. 710. St. Louis: B. Herder.

This first issue of "The American Catholic Who's Who" has been much talked of, long promised and finally completed. There can be no question of its usefulness, and on the whole it is excellently well done. The first issue is the most difficult and, therefore, generally the least perfect. Indeed it might be said that the only way to perfect a work of this kind is to bring it out in imperfect The criticisms passed upon it will do most to perfect it. The editor has probably heard already, or she will hear very soon, from many prominent Catholics throughout the country, or from their friends, who ought to have a place in the book and are not found within its pages. She will also hear from the enemies of some who are in it and should not be there. It is impossible to complete a list of this kind which will please all persons or on which all will agree. We do not intend to touch on either of these points. We rather wish to call the author's attention to one or two other things.

And first, while it is very desirable and indeed necessary to let each subject submit his or her own story, it by no means follows that these stories are to be printed as submitted. There is evidence that this has been done in some instances. The result is an unreasonable amount of space given to comparatively unimportant persons and to trifling details that are of no interest to any one except the subject and of no historical value whatever. For instance, it is hardly worthy of note that a man sees the Pope or dines with a duke or goes to Europe every year. Much less that he receives a nomination for political office from a minority party so hopelessly out of the running that no man of standing will take it. Secondly, beware of the advertiser. There is a class of persons in every community who crave notoriety and are so hungry for advancement or gain that they use everything and everybody for advertising purposes. They are a variation of the type that writes or carves its name in high places—physically high. That class should be suppressed. Third, stick faithfully to the rules laid down in the beginning as to the classes of persons to be admitted to the book. Exceptions will multiply so fast as to destroy the rule. Fourth, while inviting suggestions of names, sift them well, because with men as with other things that which is worth having is rarer and harder to find than that which is worthless. Finally, get a very

strong glass, a long pair of editor's scissors and cultivate a hard-heartedness almost equal to adamant. Scrutinize, clip, reduce, until only persons worthy of note are admitted and only things worthy of comment are printed. Then the book can be reduced in bulk, while increased in subjects, and it will command the respect and compel the patronage of all thinking people.

CHRISTIAN MYSTERIES. A New Series of Sermons. By Right Rev. Jeremias Bonomelli, D. D., Bishop of Cremons. Translated by Right Rev. Thomas S. Byrne, D. D., Bishop of Nashville. Four volumes, 12mo., cloth. \$5.00, net, for the set.

Those who have read "Homilies for the Whole Year," by the same author and translator, will welcome the announcement of another four-volume set, entitled "Christian Mysteries." This new work contains discourses easily adapted for sermons on the mysteries of our holy religion. The depth of thought, wealth of erudition and grace of expression that characterize all the other works of the distinguished author have impressed themselves on this work also; and Bishop Byrne has turned the treatises into English with his accustomed brilliancy of style.

The author, after describing in his preface how he has collected the material for these discourses, continues:

"Here I have gathered together all these rough drafts, thrown them into orderly arrangement and developed them as best I could, and now I present them to the reader in the form of discourses.

"The reader may find two points interesting in these discourses; first, the study I have given to bring out clearly the rational part of the mysteries, illustrating them by similitudes and comparisons that make the conception of them more accessible; and next, the care I have taken to set forth the Catholic doctrine in the clearest and most precise language, avoiding all that display of imagery and rhetoric which clouds and obscures the simplest ideas. We priests, sent to preach the Gospel, should have ever before our minds the example of Jesus Christ, the Teacher of teachers, whose ministers we are. He announced the most exalted truths and the most profound mysteries in simple and popular language and in short sentences. In the words of Jesus Christ, the idea is as transparent as if His words were luminous crystal; there is not a word too many. nor a word too few, and children could understand Him. And when necessary He had recourse to parables, and He did not Himself disdain to explain them, which He did with a clearness that will ever be the amazement of the world. Let Him be our model. And, finally, let us keep in mind these words of St. Paul: "But in the Church I had rather speak five words with my understanding (that is, so as be understood), that I may instruct others also, than ten thousand words in an (unknown) tongue."

THE HISTORY OF THE POPES FROM THE CLOSE OF THE MIDDLE AGES. Drawn from the secret archives of the Vatican and other original sources. From the German of *Dr. Ludwig Pastor*. Vol. X., 8vo., pp. 525. Clement, VIL, 1523-1534. St. Louis: B. Herder.

Pastor's great work grows apace. Always intensely interesting and no less valuable, because of the important chapters of Church history which it opens, the exceptional sources which it taps and the extraordinary historical acumen, power and courage of the author, the present volume yields to none in this respect. It is devoted entirely to the eventful reign of Clement VII., with the history of the Anglican Schism and the German Reformation. The author's references to original sources on these subjects and the other events that crowded the reign of this Pontiff make this volume especially valuable, because no chapters of Church history have been more frequently written by hostile and incompetent hands, and none call more loudly for the pen of the master. The book is an imperative necessity for the true seeker after historical truth and should be in the library of every earnest student and every educational institution.

MISSAL FOR THE LAITY. In Latin and English. To which is added a collection of usual public prayers. Printed on India paper, 16mo., 1,800 pages. New York: Benziger Brothers. Price, \$1.85 to \$4.00.

We are pleased to announce the publication of a new edition of the Roman Missal in Latin and English. The following points commend this Missal for the laity to the favorable consideration of English-speaking Catholics: This is the only complete Missal in the English language; the Latin text is given side by side with the English, not only of the Introit and some other few parts of the Mass (as in other "Missals for the Laity"), but all the parts of the Mass, so that the faithful can follow the priest word for word; all Masses are given, even those rarely celebrated; a few words outlining the life of the saint or tracing the history of the solemnity precede the Mass of each day in the year; special rubrics are carefully explained; the translation is new, and idiomatic, easy English is aimed at; an appendix gives the usual litanies, devotions and prayers which the faithful are likely to require at Mass; the book contains approximately 1,800 pages, nearly twice the matter contained in other "Missals for the Laity;" it is, however, less bulky than most others, because a thin India paper is used; this paper, though thin, is opaque, so that the print does not show through; it is strong and will not tear or crack as ordinary paper does; the type is clear, adapted to meet the circumstances of poor light experienced in some churches and chapels; it is attractively and substantially bound in black embossed doth; altogether its mechanical make-up is ideal; the low price at which it is offered speaks for itself; in a word, it deserves to be the standard Missal for English-speaking Catholics.

RITUALE ROMANUM. 16mo. Neo Eboraci: Fred. Pustet.

It is hard to believe until one has examined it that this small book, no larger than the "Excerpta" of a few years ago, contains the whole ritual. Formerly the ritual was a large, cumbersome book, seldom seen outside of the sacristy or the library. In its present form it is small, compact, legible, attractive and can be carried in the pocket as easily and conveniently as the smallest compendium. It is most useful for every priest.

THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA. An International Work of Reference on the Constitution, Doctrine, Discipline and History of the Catholic Church. In fifteen volumes. Vol. IX., Lapr—Mass. Vol. X., Mass—Newman.

If any one were to ask what is the best book and the latest on the Constitution of the Church, one might safely answer, the Catholic Encyclopedia. If he were to further ask for the best book on Church doctrine, the answer might still be the Catholic Encydopedia. If he were then to inquire for the best work on Church discipline, the answer might be the same, and, finally, if he were seeking the best on Church history, the answer need not be changed. By this we do not mean to say that the Catholic Encyclopedia is a collection of exhaustive treatises on all these subjects, but we do declare without fear of contradiction that its collection of papers on these and kindred subjects are so well and ably written by the best authorities and so perfectly edited as to be unusually informing, always satisfying and in many cases practically exhaustive, because ninety-nine times out of a hundred they will give all the information on a subject which a reader needs. This has been the experience of all who have consulted the Encyclopedia, as it has been the experience of the writer of this review. It has been proved by every one of the ten volumes that have come from the press and it is proved by the two volumes before us. We have heard a good deal in recent years about the best hundred books and smallest possible book shelf, but for the Catholic at the present time who wishes to get the largest amount of useful, reliable, necessary information in the smallest possible compass we recommend without hesitation the Catholic Encyclopedia. It is undoubtedly the very best work for the library of every individual, but its importance cannot be exaggerated for the library of the family which has boys and girls at school or college and young men and young women in contact with the world. For all these correct information concerning the constitution, doctrine, discipline and history of the Catholic Church is imperative, and here it is in its best, concisest and most attractive form.

L'HISTOIRE DES RELIGIONS ET LA FOI CHRETIENNE. A propos de l'Orpheus de M. Salomon Reinach, par J. Bricout, directeur de la Revue du Clergé français. 1 vol. in 16 de la collection Science et Religion, Nos. 571-572. Prix, 1 fr. 20. Bloud et Cie, 7 place Saint-Sulpice, Paris.

Amongst the difficulties of belief which embarrass our contemporaries in the road of faith, Brunetière lays special stress upon that which is too often occasioned by the history of religions. And indeed the favorite vantage ground chosen by the enemies of Catholicism for making their attacks upon our faith is that of the comparative study of the various beliefs and systems of worship. Hence arises the necessity more strongly than ever before to prove that the Church has nothing to fear, but rather has much to hope from these new courses of study. To make a frank avowal of the problems, to point out their solution with precision and clearness is the object aimed at and attained successfully in this pamphlet by the distinguished director of the Revue du Clergé français.

It was written as an offset against the Orpheus of M. Salomon Reinach. As this production resumes and condenses all the objections raised by the science of comparative religions, a lasting and widespread service was effected by exposing its treacherous schemes and by refuting its pernicious errors.

QUE DEVIENT L'AME APRES LA MORT? Par Mgr. Schneider, evêque de Paderborn, 1 vol. in 16 de la collection Science et Religion, No. 559. Prix, 0 fr. 60. Bloud et Cie, 7 place Saint-Sulpice, Paris.

The eminent writer sums up all that theological science teaches us on the destiny of the human soul beyond the grave. After firmly establishing against the materialists the fact of the persistence of consciousness after death he refutes a certain number of erroneous opinions, the sleep of souls, the migration of souls, the dreams of a millennium. If our mortal eye cannot penetrate into the mysterious region in which the accounts of the moral world are settled, at least we can affirm, upon the strength of what faith, tradition and reason teach us, that there is a personal survival in souls, that after death the just enjoy the reward due to their merits; that they remember us and call us to join their company, and that the last judgment will fully satisfy the yearning felt by the departed souls to be reunited with their spiritualized body.

# THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC

## QUARTERLY REVIEW

"Contributors to the QUARTERLY will be allowed all proper freedom in the expression of their thoughts outside the domain of defined doctrines, the Review not holding itself responsible for the individual opinions of its contributors."

(Extract from Salutatory, July, 1890.)

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#### THE EARLY CHURCH AND COMMUNISM.

HE Acts of the Apostles when intelligently examined, give no countenance to the interpretation of them in the sense that Communism was the general and the practically enforced teaching of the Apostles. Such community of goods as existed was evidently optional and limited in area, though almsgiving for the needy was universally expected.

There are, however, some isolated passages from early fathers, which are much exploited by communists, with great show of conclusiveness in the eyes of those who see no further than the words specially garbled for a purpose. From out the stump orator's stockin-trade we may select the following as among his most plausible specimens. Those two interdependent documents, the Didache and the Epistle of Barnabas, have almost identically the words: "You shall hold all things in common with your brethren and shall not call things your own; for being sharers in a common immortality, how much more should you be sharers in things perishable." (Didache 4, Ep. Barnab. 19.) Clement of Rome is often added to the above two witnesses, more or less contemporary; but the words culled are really from the pseudo-Clementines of a later date and are not made authoritative by the fact that they were inserted in Gratian's Decretals (cap. 2, Dilectissimis, p. ii., causa xii., quæst. i.), which was not a critically formed collection. The doctrine there found is that per iniquitatem1 individuals took out of the common possessions certain portions and called them their own. What is

<sup>1</sup> Clem. Recog., Lib. x., n. 5. Cf. Hom., xv., 7.

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lacking in authority to this document is supposed to be supplied by similar declarations on the part of St. Ambrose, who certainly is rhetorical and hyperbolical in some of his phrases. In his sermon on Naboth's vineyard he speaks of the earth as made for all men, who are all born naked into the world; thus nature produces no children rich by their nativity; she is the equal mother of every one. Here is a truth, but it is isolated by communists from other truths which St. Ambrose recognized in other places concerning right of property and wrongness of theft. One passage, however, he has which opposes the doctrine of recent theologians, who say that when the rich man neglects a clear obligation to give alms he sins, but against charity, not against justice; for the money withheld by him has never been made the property of the destitute claimant, and so has not been stolen from him, and does come afterwards under the law of restitution. The Bishop of Milan, on the contrary, writes: "It is not out of your own belongings that you relieve the indigent; you restore to him what was his. What was given in common for the use of all you wrongfully turn to your own exclusive use." (Quod commune est in omnium usum datum, tu solus usurpas.) Here we do better to leave alone usurpas, since it has not in Latin a necessarily bad sense; but we must examine more minutely the kindred word usus.

Moralists distinguish ownership of a property from the use of it; the two are separable and are often separated in practice. Aristotle, who attacked the communism of Plato-which was put forth explicitly for a limited class of citizens, and these the highest in position—argues that ownership in private is needful, but that its evil is to be counteracted by a generous allowance of the use for the benefit of those who are in want. The like doctrine may be gathered from St. Paul, when he instructed St. Timothy to preach so much of communism in actual use of private property as to tell the rich to be free in communicating (koinonikoi) from their abundant means relief to the destitute (I. Tim. vi., 18). The Apostle never shows himself much versed in Greek literature, but he might have read-or might not, for Christ was sufficient Master-the fifth chapter in Book II. of Aristotle's Politics, where we find: "Plainly it is desirable that the tenure of property shall be private; yet the practical use of it should be for the common benefit." There should be no extravagant possession (pleonexia) and no destitution. St. Thomas holds a similar doctrine; both writers have been accused of great reserve in their defense of private property and have made no case out for the millionaire such as the gigantic enterprises of modern commerce render possible without what we deem fraud-though fraud is often present. St. Thomas condemns

all avarice in quest of the wrongful pleonexia (2<sup>da</sup>, 2<sup>dae</sup>, Q. 118, A. 1), and in another place, while he upholds a reasonable possession of riches on condition that the use of them be with due charity to the poor: "As to their use man ought not to regard external goods as simply his own, but he should be easily moved to employ them for the common good." (Q. 66, A. 2.) And in reply to the first objection raised on the point he says: "Community of goods is referable to the law of nature, not because this law enjoins the common possession of everything to the exclusion of private property, but because the division of property is something supervening upon nature and belongs to the positive law of human institution." The like is taught also in 1<sup>a</sup>, 2<sup>dae</sup>, Q. 94, A. 5, ad. 3. It is not needful here to suppose that St. Thomas means by the law of nature anything wider than human nature; positive facts always enter into the determination.<sup>2</sup>

Let us now return to St. Ambrose and consider how he, a busy magistrate, suddenly transferred in ripe age, at the call of the popular voice, from the secular administration to be a Bishop in an important centre during critical times, had not the leisure, as St. Thomas had, to study the analysis of property into the elements of ownership and use. If the analysis had been presented to him, he might have worded his doctrine with more precision. But, furthermore, an analysis other than the one approved in our recognized text books of moral theology is worth notice and is more consonant with the words of St. Ambrose. By at least an implied consent of the community for the common good, certain individuals appropriate certain things out of the common stock. Now suppose the appropriation to be not absolute, but limited by future claims of charity. Then so much property belongs to A till in a future emergency a portion of it will pass to B as his by right of necessity. theory, as far as we know, has to-day no declared supporters among our theologians; but some way for it has been prepared by certain words of St. Thomas when he refers the division of property among individuals not simply to nature, but to a foundation only in nature upon which men build up forms of agreement by quasi contract. Evidently it is possible for us, in the absence of actually formulated terms, to vary our conception of the contract about which St. Thomas speaks.

He says, 12, 2dae, Q. 94, A. 5, ad. 3: Aliquid dicitur secundo modo esse de jure naturæ, quia natura non inducit contrarium, et hoc modo communis omnium possessio dicitur esse de jure naturali; quia scilicet divisio possessionum per hominum rationem ad utilitatem humanæ vitæ introducta est—or, as he says elsewhere, secundum

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Lugo, De Justit et jur., Disp. VI., Sec. 1.

humanum condictum (2da, 2dae, Q. 66, A. 2, ad. 1). And in his reply, ad. 3, he deals precisely with the words of St. Ambrose: "As to what St. Ambrose says, namely: Let no one call his own what is common; he is speaking of property in regard to use." This distinction of use from ownership was the first and best account which we have here rendered of what the Milanese Doctor has written; the second account we have offered only as a speculation, not as the solution to be adopted.\* We may compare the case indirectly with what is taught about the Immaculate Conception. Some are not content to hold simply that Mary, after being generally included in the sentence, was specially taken away from the effect of the decree that on Adam's sin a taint should follow for all descendants of the offending progenitor; they maintain that she was exempted not only from the actual incidence of the penalty, but even from the actual sentence itself, so that her redemption through Christ's merits took place in the form: "This decree from the first shall not include the Mother of God, because her Son prevents it." The partial likeness here to the appropriations out of the common stock of goods lies only in the matter of agreements being more or less The less radical says that ownership is absolute, but limited in use by demands of charity; the more radical asserts that when those demands arise the charitable contribution is simply and ipso facto the property of the needy person by the implied terms of the original division, secundum humanum condictum. This is ideal construction, not actual transaction in the past history of society. The second supposition would best fit the words of St. Ambrose: Non de tuo largiris pauperi, sed de suo reddis.

Keeping to his conception, St. Ambrose uses the phrase again in his Explanation of Psalm cxviii., n. 22, on which he thus comments: "God wished the earth to be common property of all men and to bring forth its fruits for all, but avarice has made a distribution of right to property." Undoubtedly avarice has so offended beyond what we may style the equitable distribution: no one can defend the whole existent facts of the distribution, and Aristotle and St. Thomas seem to offer no explicit justification for any fortune that is enormous (pleonexia). Commerce was then a comparatively small affair. We may be sure, at any rate, that St. Ambrose, with all his

<sup>\*</sup>We should remember that moral distinctions have not mathematical rigor. St. Gregory I. takes the view of St. Ambrose: "Cunctis terra communis est, et alimenta omnibus comuniter profert. Cum quaelibet necessaria indigentibus ministramus, sua illis reddimus non nostra largimus. justitiae debitum potius solvemus quam misericordiae operae implemus" (Lib. Reg. Past, Part III., 21.) A man in extreme hunger, if no other means is available, may without theft take food even against the wrongful unwillingness of the possessor, who therefore does not give it.



practical knowledge of the world and by acquiescence with its well-accredited usage among the aristocracy of which he was a member, allowed for a legitimate possession of riches by a whole class of men. It was in acceptance of such a situation that he wrote in this style: "The sentence of condemnation by heaven is out, not against those who simply hold riches, but against those who do not know how to employ them." In Luc. Lib. v., n. 69.)4

It would be too long to examine difficulties adduced from the Greek Fathers, St. Basil (Migne tom. 31, col. 276 sqq., col. 309 sqq.) and St. Chrysostom (tom. 62, col. 564 sqq.),5 but we may here add to the citations from St. Ambrose a proverb which St. Jerome has in some way made his own, and which is often cited: "That common saving seems very true: The rich man is either a thief (iniquus) or the heir of a thief." (Ep. 120, c. 1.) This is found in a comment on the text, "Make to yourselves friends of the mammon of iniquity;" and the proverb has just that quantity of truth in it which suffices for a proverb, but not for a rigorously accurate utterance. St. Jerome, who denounced women, does not wholly vilify the sex; it was even made a charge against him that he did so cultivate the friendship of some female devotees who are now known as saints; and similarly his general denunciation of the rich left him quite reconciled to the rich who made good use of their riches. In due season he can and does speak of legitimate wealth. It would be as absurd to tie him down to a single proverb as it would be to measure St. Augustine by his characteristically exuberant utterance which is not simply his own: "Search out what things are really necessary and you will see how few they are: superfluities beyond your necessity are the necessities of other people. To possess superfluities is to possess what belongs to others." (In Psal. cxlvii., 12. Migne tom. 37, col. 1922.)

Furthermore, while insisting upon alms-deeds the early writers were very careful not to encourage idle vagrants, who should simply on the score of having nothing put in a claim for a share of the common possession. The Fathers upheld the obligation to found a claim to the means of subsistence by the title of work. St. Paul had led the way in the well-known utterance, which may be and has been too hardly pressed: "He that will not work, neither let

<sup>4</sup> Similar difficulties to the above occur in what St. Ambrose has written, De Officis Ministrorum, Lib. I., q. 28, n. 132, where he repeats the phrase, "Natura jus commune generavit, usurpatio fecit jus privatum."

<sup>\*</sup>We have no proof that St. Basil himself is responsible for the words of Rufinus, his translator, who was accustomed to take liberties with the text: "Terra communiter omnibus hominibus data est; proprium nemo dicat; quod e communi plus quam sufficeret sumptum est, violenter obtentum est" (Tom. 31, col. 1,752).

him eat." (2 Thess. iii., 10.) At the same time effort was made to find work for the unemployed-employment even for clerics, provided it was suitable to their special calling. Their office might be humble, but not degrading. In the so-called second Epistle of St. Clement to the Corinthians (n. 8) the general law is: "Give work to those able to labor, but for those unable make charitable provision."6 And against ministers of the Gospel in particular, that they might not make a distracting traffic of their employment, it was enacted that foreign trade should be forbidden to them, while an itinerant prophet could not impose himself on a congregation for more than two or three days. Many sources of money earning were shut out from Christians because of their connection in some way or other with the recognition of idolatrous practices. Hence Tertullian had as best he could on his own rigorous principles to reply to the charge that Christians were infructuosi in negotiisa race of non-productives. (Apol. n. 42.)

A fuller proof that all private property was not condemned lies in the very obvious facts that the Church tolerated and even welcomed to its bosom the legitimately well-to-do classes, as is shown in the converts received. Various writers have sufficiently gathered the evidences that while early Christians were mainly the poor, they always had some rich in their body, and these increased in numbers as the religion spread. It would have been against the universality of Christ's mission had he excluded from His Church any rank whose position was not intrinsically wrong in itself. Christ proved Himself willing to receive among His disciples centurions in the specially difficult position of the army; He made use of the resources of such men as Nicodemus and Joseph of Arimathea, who held prominent positions. The Acts of the Apostles and their epistles show that the Church enjoyed the assistance of certain rich or well-stationed men and women. If we leave as doubtful the rank of Pope St. Clement we find two of the Flavii to be Christians, Titus Clemens and his wife Domitilla. The lady Pomponia Græcina was probably a convert. The gens Annoea, the Pomponii and the Acilii had Christian members in their families. That the Christians were of all ranks is explicitly asserted not only by Tertullian (omnis dignitatis, Ad. Nat. i., 1) and Origen, but also by the Roman Governor Pliny in his letter to Trajan (multi omnis ordinis). It is quite a strong point in the exhortations of the times that Christians possessed of wealth should use it in the spirit of their religion and not consort with the pagans of their own rank in the pursuit of excessive pleasures-that "they shall not hold intercourse with heathens on the plea that such a life was sweetest to their taste."

<sup>6</sup> So also in the Didache, n. 12.

(Hermas Sim. viii., 9.) The oft-quoted treatise by Clement of Alexandria on the Salvation of the Rich has special regard to such Christians. From the time mentioned by the Acts (xiii., I,) when "Manahen, who had been brought up with Herod the tetrarch" was a Christian and by St. Paul in his reference to the Christians "of Cæsar's household" (Philip. iv., 22) up to the age of Diocletian, who made the many Christians at his court a special object of persecution, imitating therein what Valerian had done before him, there had been, with interruptions, a constant increase of the faithful who held positions round the royal person. The above instances are a few items out of many which have been extracted to show that a poor station was not the only one compatible with Christian doctrine and that the main commandment on the point was that embodied in the words of Psalm 1xi., 11: "If you are in affluence fix not your heart on riches." That such is the fact is gathered not from the inconclusive references to a few isolated sentences, but by the normal attitude of the Church to the existence of riches among her members. The condition as such was never condemned, and therefore communist theories on the subject will not stand examination. They belong to the category of clap-trap very manifestly, while, on the other hand, it is equally manifest that many of the facts of our age in the relation of rich to poor are strongly reprobated by the Gospel. But we shall never mend matters and make the interrelations of men satisfactory by mechanically devised schemes for the equal distribution of goods. Even a pagan philosopher saw the fact which early Christianity viewed in a still higher light of the Beatitudes. He appealed only to natural reason. "It is in the strength of the hold on the subjective side of law and institutions that Aristotle reaches some of his greatest conclusions. He can answer Plato's communism with the rejoinder that it is a cleansing of the heart and not of the garments that the world requires. Communistic institutions will not create unselfishness, but a mind trained to unselfishness by education will treat even private property in the spirit of communism." It was the agreement of Aristotle with St. Thomas to recommend private tenure with use for the community—possession for the individual with benefit for all. The exact proportion between property to be possessed individually and property to be possessed communally the Church does not pretend to determine; it will vary with the changes of social organization.

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<sup>7 &</sup>quot;The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle," by E. Barker, M. A., p. 324.

### ST. ELIZABETH VON SCHONAU AND HER VISIONS.

A BOUT twenty-five years ago there was published in Germany an exhaustive treatise by F. W. E. Roth on this celebrated German mystic, Elizabeth of Schönau, which includes an edition of her visions and letters and the writings of her brother Eckbert, abbot of Schönau. It is from this source, mainly, unless otherwise stated, that this sketch of her is derived. Although she was not a canonized saint of the Church, Elizabeth's name is mentioned in the Roman Martyrology, and in the calendar of the saints of the Cistercian Order she is honored on June 18, which has perhaps led to the mistake of calling her a Cistercian nun, whereas she was a Benedictine. In the Benedictine Menology, published in 1650, she is spoken of as "St. Elizabeth of Schönau, celebrated for her observance of monastic life, virgin and abbot of Schönau." Also in the Benedictine Annals of 1656 she is mentioned as "our prophetess, the admirable St. Elizabeth of Schönau."

Bucelinus calls her "that jewel of Germany, St. Elizabeth of Schönau, recommended for her great merits, who foretold with incredible fruit by her prophetic spirit what was about to happen in this world." Peter Canisius says of her in the Martyrologium, "the virgin Elizabeth of Schönau, of blessed memory, to whom divine secrets have been revealed, who wrote a splendid book of divine and holy admonitions."

An English Cistercian monk named Roger, of the Abbey of Ford, on the River Exe, in Devonshire, who was very pious and learned, while traveling in Germany with the leave of his abbot, was so excited by the fame of her holiness that he visited Schönau and received all her revelations from William, then abbot of Schönau. These he afterwards collated in two books, with the title "The Revelations of St. Elizabeth of Schönau." Her name is found in most biographical dictionaries and mediæval chronicles, for her fame was widely spread, though she is not so well known as her great contemporary, another visionary, St. Hildegarde, abbess of Elizabeth was born in 1129, in the Middle Rhine St. Rupert. province. Her family name, according to Zedler, was Hartwig, but little is certainly known of her home and parentage. She had two brothers, Eckbert, abbot of Schönau, and another, who was provost of Polden, and several sisters, one of whom married and came from a distance to attend Elizabeth's funeral. Bonn is believed to have been her birthplace, but all that is certain is that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Die Visionen der heilage Elizabeth von Schönau," von F. W. E. Roth, 1884, Brunn.

it was some town in the Middle Rhine province. She was a delicate child, sickly by nature, and when she was twelve years old she was sent to the Benedictine Abbey of Schönau to be educated.

The monastery of Schönau was founded about the year 1124, but the exact date is uncertain, as also are the names of the founders, who are believed to have been Count Rupert of Nuremberg and Hildelin, the first abbot, who was of noble birth. patron saint of Schönau was St. Florin, who lived at Coblentz in the beginning of the seventh century,<sup>2</sup> and to him the monastery was dedicated and called after his name. The district in which the site was situated was rude and uncultivated, and the building of the new monastery proceeded slowly, but Hildelin appealed to the Archbishop of Trêves to help them, and he gave them the church of Welterode, which stood near the new building, and gave the priest of Welterode another church. This was in 1145, a few years after Elizabeth was sent to school there. The nuns' convent was built close to the monastery, and was dependent upon it and was under the superintendence of the monks; it was governed by a prior and a mistress or prioress. The convent always remained small, and is spoken of as a cell in old documents, but it attained great notoriety through Elizabeth, the visionary and saint. The discipline was strict. The nuns' convent suffered many losses from the plague in 1503, and later it was injured in the Reformation, and in 1590 it fell. The rest of the monastery remained standing till 1606, when the Nassau government broke up the buildings.

Elizabeth was educated in the convent, and when she reached the age of eighteen she took the habit in 1147, and ten years later was elected abbess, or, as she called herself, mistress of the nuns. Since only women of noble birth were promoted to spiritual offices in the Benedictine Order in the twelfth century, and indeed the subjects themselves were mostly of noble birth, it seems most probable that Elizabeth sprung from the nobility. When she was twenty-three her visions began, and from that time till her early death, in 1164, she seems to have been always more or less in a suffering condition. When she reached her thirty-sixth year signs of her approaching end showed themselves, but the illness was a lingering one, and Elizabeth employed the time in exhorting the monks and nuns and the strangers who visited her. Her death was that of a saint, and took place on June 18, 1164. Her end was no doubt hastened by her austerities, especially by her wonderful abstinence from food and drink, which seems to have been almost miraculous. On her deathbed she asked pardon of the

<sup>2 &</sup>quot;Histoire Ecclésiastique," par M. Fleury, Vol. XV., pp. 28-29.



monks and nuns who were gathered round her for any wrong she might have done them, and addressed warning words to her superior, Abbot Hildelin, and admonished the monks to say their office and her brother Eckbert to remain in the cloister. He was a canon of Bonn Cathedral when his sister sent for him to come to Schönau and take the habit there. She directed that one of her relations should succeed her as abbess, and then passed away.

The Abbot Hildelin was a very old man when Elizabeth died, and on his death he was succeeded by Elizabeth's brother, Eckbert, who remained true to the exhortations she had given him when dying, not to leave Schönau, although several higher appointments were offered him, for he was a learned man, very pious and much respected. The outward events of Elizabeth's life were very few. Her clothing, her profession, her subsequent election as abbess, the arrival of her brother Eckbert at Schönau at her request and her visit or, it may have been, visits to her contemporary, St. Hildegarde, and to Cologne and Mainz were the principal incidents in her career, if we except her illnesses and the ecstasies, trances, visions and raptures to which she was subject. She had a large correspondence with various abbots, abbesses, monks and nuns and with the principal people in Mainz and Trêves, but her correspondents were less celebrated than those of St. Hildegarde, who wrote to Popes and emperors and kings. In these letters Elizabeth expresses her grief at the wickedness of the age, and points out what she conceives to be the remedy for it; but, as we shall see, there is a great similarity in these epistles, in which she acts as a monitress to the clergy and laity. Elizabeth lived in the time of the Papal schism which arose on the death of the English Pope, Adrian IV., in 1159, when Frederick Barbarossa's party set up the antipope Victor IV. in opposition to Alexander III., elected by the Roman Cardinals. Unfortunately for her, Elizabeth adhered to the schismatic Victor, which was no doubt the cause of her unpopularity among the clergy and of the persecution she endured at the hands of some of them. It was her brother Eckbert's influence which induced her to support the schismatic Pope, and he was led away by political and patriotic reasons and his lovalty to his emperor, and it is probable that Elizabeth, living the retired, contemplative life she did, cared nothing for politics and simply accepted Eckbert's opinion as to which was the true Pope. This fact gave the clergy some excuse, if not some reason, for the attacks they made upon her and for the mockery some of them made of her gift of second sight. Perhaps to it must be ascribed the calumny she suffered by false letters being written and spread in her name and the unjust accusation that she had written concerning the last judgment. She defended herself against these charges in a long letter to St. Hildegarde.

After her visit to St. Hildegarde at the Monastery of Mount St. Rupert, in 1156, the year before she was elected abbess, she began to write her celebrated little treatise, the "Liber Viarum Dei," apparently modeled on the "Scivias" of St. Hildegarde, who was a great inspirer of Elizabeth's writings. One of the marks of the genuineness of Elizabeth's visions is that her development was gradual. Herr Roth divides her life into three periods, the first of which was prefaced by diabolical visions, in which she suffered temptations which she resisted successfully by prayer. To these succeeded the appearance of the angel through whose means she always received her revelations and of certain saints, which appearances continued for a year. During them she held converse with the angel and the saints over heavenly things, mainly on the interpretation of Holy Scripture. This was the first period of Elizabeth's work when her soul's life was the contemplation of higher things. In her second period, in which she wrote the "Liber Viarum Dei," she became a teacher of the people, working outwardly, uttering all kinds of warnings beautifully and sublimely. In her third period she appears as a pointer out of the relics of the new-found saints of Cologne. Her gifts of second sight, according to Roth, now stood at its highest, and she used it to spread the cultus of these new-found saints.

As it was Elizabeth's revelations on these Cologne relics which are the most open to suspicion of all her writings and visions, it may be as well to say a few words about them. It seems that in 1156 several tombs were discovered at Cologne,<sup>8</sup> with inscriptions saying they were the tombs of St. Ursula and her companion saints, and that they had been honored there for over three hundred years. The names of several Bishops and holy people who were reported to have accompanied Ursula were also mentioned. Gerlac, abbot of Duits, sent the principal and most remarkable of these inscriptions to Elizabeth of Schönau, hoping she would have some revelation concerning them and be able to assure him whether to honor them or not, some suspicion having arisen that the people who found the bodies had forged the inscriptions.

The revelation concerning St. Ursula and the eleven thousand virgins by Elizabeth has been condemned by Pope Gregory VIII., and it seems a pity she yielded to the pressure put upon her by some of her confidants and wrote it against her own wish, for she refused at first to do so. The probability is that, if the inscriptions

<sup>3 &</sup>quot;Histoire Ecclésiastique," par M. Fleury, Prêtre Prieur d'Argentine. Paris, 1724, Vol. XV., pp. 28-29.



had never been sent to her for her opinion, she would never have had any vision concerning them. In the lowest degree of her visions she saw objects only with the eyes of her spirit, but in the highest degree with the eyes of her body and spirit together. At these times she fell into an ecstasy, in which her body was deprived of all feeling, and her fall to the ground was unperceived by her; her body was stiff, her will could not struggle to raise it, she had to be lifted by others. These ecstasies especially occurred when she had been fasting very rigorously. Though insensible to exterior pain, she nevertheless perceived pains inflicted by the angel who appeared to her during one vision and felt these pains for several days afterwards.

Herr Roth endeavors to describe the origin and nature of the visions of Elizabeth in a natural manner, and since the present writer desires to express no opinion on such high matters as the truth or falsehood of these visions and revelations, it will be as well to quote verbatim the learned German's psychological disquisition on the same, leaving our readers to judge for themselves where his theology is at fault.

He says "that Elizabeth possessed by nature the disposition to ecstasy, which later developed to a magnetic clairvoyance. was cut off from the world, thrown upon the resources of her inner soul's life and compelled by the strictness of the rule of her order to busy herself only with prayer and contemplation, and that in the spirit of the Benedictines. To sink her soul in the mysteries of religion became to her a second nature, which developed into a fanatical devotion, reaching to ecstatic clairvoyance and raptures. Elizabeth generally had these ecstasies after her visions at the time of divine service, when her devotion was kindled and her powers of contemplation raised. Then she saw her thoughts embodied, she saw supernatural things, she had speech with the angels of God, with Mary, with the saints; even Christ Himself appeared to her in spirit. On feast days it was generally those saints whose feasts had begun who appeared to her. Through the continual reading of Holy Scripture, especially the Apocalypse and the Psalms, she mixed these appearances with the texts of Holy Scripture and supported the visions with the latter. She explained difficult parts of the text after she had had a pretended (sic) vision on it and had had speech with the saints."

From this quotation it will be seen that Herr Roth, though a great admirer of Elizabeth, is no believer in her visions as divine revelations; in fact, he says plainly in another place that "her visions have a very earthly character, in no way that of the revelation of God, and that, just like a weak woman, she had confidence

in her visions and praised them as divine inspirations." He also says that "she frequently in her visions comes into conflict with the words of Holy Scripture," but he adds that though "she often sees the opposite of what Holy Scripture says, more often are her visions in correspondence with the words of Holy Writ."

She always she tells us received her revelations through an angel or a saint, whose utterance she valued as the Word of God; but, on the other hand, she sometimes mistrusted their statements and wanted things explained again. On her deathbed she acknowledged her revelations as divine, and in a letter to St. Hildegarde she denounces all doubters.

The saints with whom Elizabeth had communion in her visions were especially those honored in the Order of St. Benedict and who possessed a special cultus in Schönau, which was extended through her influence.

Again Herr Roth says that "Elizabeth's visions have a distinctly womanly character; the inner life of the soul that speaks in them, the fantastic dreams, the half-dreams during the day, the ecstasy, the melancholy pains, the hysterical raptures as such are all womanly. The womanly curiosity about all she hears and sees, often so naive, must also be considered. All this protects the visions (whose simple statements are too absolutely true to be the work of a man) from all attacks of ingenuineness."

In this last remark the German author is alluding to the fact that all Elizabeth's visions and revelations were written by her brother Eckbert, who came at her request from Bonn to record them. It seems that after a vision Elizabeth either wrote down herself what she had seen and heard on one of the wax tablets in use in the twelfth century or got some of the nuns in her confidence to do so for her, and that when Eckbert came from Bonn, he used these records and put them into better Latin when written in Latin, or translated them into it when written in German. Others he wrote down which were related to him from memory by the saint. She testifies herself that her visions were all written down during her lifetime, and the book in which they were written was hidden in her bed and given to the abbot at her death.

Herr Roth does not believe that Eckbert added anything to his sister's records, for he had too great a reverence for her to do so. All he did was to correct the grammar and put them into better Latin, for he was a scholar himself and for his age a learned man.

Another question is, was Elizabeth illiterate, and was, as the monks and nuns of Schönau believed, all her learning infused? Herr Roth thinks not. She would certainly, he thinks, have learned sufficient Latin to understand the Psalms and Holy Scripture in

the Vulgate and to make herself clear to a certain extent in writing, for many nuns in the Benedictine Order in the twelfth century could both read and write Latin. It is clear from the headings to her letters that she was not highly educated, for she describes herself as an unlearned woman; but this would not preclude a small knowledge of Latin in a nun whose principal occupation was saying the divine office in Latin.

Many Protestant writers and some Catholics also have put down Elizabeth's visions to the work of Eckbert, considering that he wrote them in order to bring the monastery into renown, but on the face of it this seems unlikely, for he was a devout, steadfast man, incapable of such deception. As a religious he was a zealous monk, edifying his contemporaries by his learning and piety; he was well known as a writer and preacher and as a defender of the faith against the Cathars, German heretics who held Nestorian views. The internal evidence of the visions goes to show that his transcription of them was genuine, for he did not cut out the places in which Elizabeth mentioned that he had suggested many of the questions out of Holy Scripture which he wished her to put to the angel, which seems to show that he believed in his sister's gifts and looked upon her revelations as divinely inspired, and so asked the questions to enrich his own theological knowledge.

Herr Roth says on this subject "that if the revelations are not divine, they are certainly the outcome of the spiritual life of Elizabeth, handed down to us after her relation by Eckbert." He thinks it probable that Eckbert suppressed the incredible and the womanly fantasies in the visions, in order not to throw discredit upon the whole. In his letter to Abbot Reinach, of Rheinhausen, Eckbert says that he attributed Elizabeth's visions to supernatural origin, and Herr Roth considers the visions were undoubtedly genuine and that any attempt to prove that Eckbert invented them is doomed to failure.

According to many writers, Eckbert himself died in the odor of sanctity. It is certain that on the old Abbot Hildelin's death he was considered the most worthy monk to succeed him and that he then devoted all his powers to the care of the monastery and the schools in which he took a great interest. He held the post of abbot, according to Trithemius, for eighteen years, and on his death, which happened about 1185, he was buried in the place he had himself chosen, near the high altar in the monastery church of Schönau, by the side of his sister.

Before we turn to the visions themselves, it may be as well to say a few words as to the character of Elizabeth's writings, which in the Middle Ages were widely known and much honored, for a

great many copies of the manuscript were made and still exist. It is an interesting question how much St. Bridget may unconsciously have owed to her mystical ancestress' revelations, though there is a wide difference between the terrible denunciations of evildoers and severe judgments and prophetic warnings of the great Swedish prophetess and the simpler utterances of the gentle German abbess.

Since a simple, childlike spirit is a predominant note in German piety, it is not surprising to find that simplicity and an absence of all affectation of learning characterize the revelations of our saint. She is always so natural, often naive, and though she never reaches such depth of thought as St. Hildegarde or such terrific imagery as the revelation of St. Bridget of Sweden display, she is much easier to understand than either of these visionaries and possesses a certain charm which both these greater women lack.

Elizabeth was a child of her age, interested in the things it was concerned with, such as the Papal schism, the struggles of the regulars and seculars, the search after relics and a great predilection for legends. The visions are divided into three books. In the beginning of the first book Elizabeth explains how she came to write them, and justifies herself for so doing in these words: "Thou askest me, brother, and for this thou camest that I should narrate to thee the mercies of the Lord, which He has deigned to work in me according to the good pleasure of His grace. I am ready certainly to satisfy thee, for my soul has long desired this, that it should be given me to confer with thee concerning all these things and to hear thy judgment.

"Perhaps there are some who say that I am of some sanctity, and they attribute favor of God to my merits, judging me to be something when I am nothing. But others think among themselves, saying: 'If this woman was a servant of God, she would be silent and not permit her name to be magnified upon earth, not knowing by what forces I am accustomed to be urged to speak.' Also there are some who say that all these things which they hear from me are womanly figments, or perhays they judge me to be deluded by Satan. In these and other ways, dearest, it will behoove me to be spoken of in the mouths of men.

"Sometimes it happens that when I should have been able to hide these things in my heart which were shown me by the Lord such pains of the heart have seized me that I thought myself to be close to death, but when I disclosed to those who were round me what I had seen I was alleviated immediately. But I confess I am uncertain how I ought to act. For I understand it to be dangerous to me to be silent concerning the great things of God and to speak

I fear greatly may be much more dangerous. For I have not sufficient discretion to know which of these which are revealed to me it is convenient to tell, and which it is proper to honor with silence. And behold, between these things I am placed in danger of falling.

"On account of this, my beloved, my eyes do not cease from weeping and my spirit is continually vexed within me. But my soul begins to be consoled with your coming and a great peace is within me. And now I will not hide my heart from thee, but will open to thee both the good and the evil concerning me.

"I, the least of his poor, give thanks to God, because from the day when I began to live under regular institution up to this hour the hand of the Lord is confirmed upon me, and never have I failed to carry His arrows in my body. My various and daily sicknesses have not only vexed me, but also all the Sisters who are round about me. May the Lord have mercy upon them, because they have borne with maternal affection the burden of my calamity with me. Sometimes they gave me medicines for my ailments, but I became much worse with them, and I heard in a nocturnal vision a voice saying to me: 'But our God did all things whatsoever He would in secret.' Then I understood that I was admonished that I should not commit my body to the medicines of men, but to the will of my Creator, and so indeed I did, and often when I was overwhelmed with so much languor that I had the mastery of no member except my tongue without arrogance, I would say that I remained in a chair ruminating upon the Psalms. But when paralysis deprived me of my tongue I supplied its office with my mind.

"But it would be long to enumerate how many deprivations of necessary things I bore in my infirmities. But I will now turn to those things without further delay concerning which you have inquired of me."

The three first visions which she now goes on to describe are of the devil, by whom Elizabeth was, as she says, grievously tormented not only to unbelief, but even to suicide. The fourth vision we will translate, as it is highly characteristic of the visions of this saint:

"When the Mass of the Blessed Virgin was finished, for it was Saturday, I fell into an ecstasy and my heart was opened, and I saw in the air a wheel of great light like a full moon, but double the size. And I looked into the midst of the wheel and I saw the likeness of a royal woman, standing on high, clothed in the whitest vestments and with an outer garment of purple. I understood immediately that she was the sublime Queen of Heaven and

the Mother of our Lord, whom I had always desired to see. And when with desire I had reached out to her, she fell on her face three times adoring before a certain divine light which was before her. But the fourth time when she had humbled herself she was seen to lie there for a long time. But as she arose she turned her face to me and proceeded a little way towards me in the lower air. having two glorious companions, one on the right hand and one on the left. He who was on the right seemed to be clothed in a monk's cowl, but it was very white, and in his hand was the monastic rod of the Father. Then it struck me that this was our holy father St. Benedict. But he on the left hand side seemed to be a beautiful youth with white and curly hair. But my Lady, standing, made the sign of the cross over me, and in what way I know not these words were as it were inserted in my mind: 'Fear not, for none of these things shall hurt you.' I did not, indeed, hear the sound of the voice, but I saw distinctly the movement of her lips in that way.

"After she had stepped back into the interior of her light, I, adoring, followed her with thirteen little verses of the praises which I was accustomed to use. And these being said, I came out of my ecstasy and immediately refreshed my spirit with Holy Communion. Then I asked the priest that he would invoke the name of the Lord over me, Who when he had begun the litany I again fell into an ecstasy. And again I saw our Lady standing by the side of the altar in a garment like a chasuble of a priest, and she had on her head a glorious diadem, as if set with four precious jewels, and round it was written the angelic salutation, 'Ave Maria gratia plena Dominus tecum.'"

On the vigil of St. John the Baptist Elizabeth describes a vision in which he appeared to her clad in a white robe and turning a most amiable face to her, as though he wished her to look at him.

On the feast one year of SS. Peter and Paul Elizabeth fell into an ecstasy and saw these glorious princes standing in a great and splendid light, with the signs of victorious martyrs. Our Lady then appeared standing before them, and St. Peter made the sign of the cross over her, and she saluted him, saying: 'Thou art the shepherd of the sheep, Prince of the Apostles,' and watching a little while she heard these words: 'I have fought the good fight; I have finished my course,' and when they had returned to their region of light she breathed out of her ecstasy."

She thus continues her description of this vision: "That day at Mass, while the office was being intoned, I saw a dove descending from heaven, and it went to the right horn of the altar, and there it sat. It was like a turtle dove and whiter than snow. And

when the lord abbot said this collect among others, 'God to Whom all hearts are opened,' and reached the words 'purify the thoughts of our hearts by the infusion of the Holy Spirit,' it flew, and circling his head three times it returned to the place where it was before sitting. But when the Sanctus was said it came and sat on the corporal and something like a ruby seemed to hang from its mouth. And when Mass was finished I went to Communion among the Sisters, and I bent the eyes of my flesh to it and I was not able to see it. But my eyes being turned away, I saw it, and for the fear which I had of it immediately that I had communicated, I fell into an ecstasy presently I breathed. And thenceforth any saint of any celebrity among us, each on his feast, appeared to me by the favor of God in celestial light."

The next visions in this first book describe the appearances of various saints, St. Stephen, St. Mary Magdalene, St. Margaret, St. James, Blessed Cristina and frequently our Lady, and it is all told in the same simple way without any circumlocution, and rarely are any words except those of Holy Scripture attributed to the saints who appear.

The patrons of Eckbert's church at Bonn were two martyrs named Cassius and Florentius, and he while still a canon of Bonn wrote to Elizabeth and asked her for some revelation concerning them, to which she replies as follows in vision 29:

"Thou hast asked me in a letter, brother, concerning your patrons, i. e., the martyrs of the church at Bonn, Cassius and Florentius, that on their birthday I would do them some service, so that perhaps they would deign to show themselves to me, and I did what I could. For in their honor I said that day fifty psalms after Matins, when also the devil extinguished my candle, which I held in my hand. But after this about the third hour I went into an ecstasy without pain, and I saw three splendid men in the region of light, decorated with palms and crowns, adorned in the front with red. But two stood joined to each other, and after a little while they were united to a third.

"On the following day at Vespers, when according to my custom I was in ecstasy, for it was Saturday, I asked the Lord that He would show me again those two patrons, for I was troubled because I did not know distinctly who these might be of whom thou askest me, because I saw three. And the Lord delayed to hear me for a time, so that I feared I had asked something against His will. And I said trembling, 'Lord, if it be Thy Will which I ask, let it be done, but if not, let it not be done.' And immediately I saw two men exceedingly amiable from among the company of martyrs proceeding with the signs mentioned above, who came in and

stood in the midst before the sight of the throne. And I awakened with joy, and immediately I heard these words: 'These are two olive trees standing before the throne of the Lord, the governor of the whole earth.'"

The visions of St. Elizabeth, as we have said, nearly always corresponded to the feast on which she saw them; during the last four days of Holy Week she had visions of the Passion of our Lord, and these were preceded by severe illness and such pain that the Sisters thought she was dying. These visions closely correspond with the account given in the Gospels of the Passion of our Lord. When the Sisters assembled in the chapter house on Maundy Thursday for the washing of the feet, they carried Elizabeth, ill as she was, to her place, and she fell into an ecstasy, in which she saw the whole scene in the upper chamber at Jerusalem, when our Lord washed the feet of St. Peter and the other apostles.

On Good Friday she saw the whole Passion, on Easter Day the scene of the Resurrection in the garden, on Pentecost the descent of the Holy Ghost on our Lady and the Apostles. All these visions she describes simply and naturally as they are told in the Gospels, without any additions of her own to the facts of the narrative. There is, as a rule, an absence of all extravagance in the visions of Schönau, which with their simple style and close correspondence with Holy Scripture gives them a claim to our acceptance. They may not strike us as divine revelations, but we always feel they are the outpourings of a very holy soul, unsaturated with Holy Scripture, in the meditation of which her mind has been steeped and colored.

The visions were nearly always preceded by illness, pain and languor, and then she fell into the ecstatic state, sometimes preceded by convulsions. Sometimes all vital functions seemed to be suspended, and she was so lifeless that the Sisters thought she was dead.

The second and third books of the visions are less simple; the visions are darker and more artistic; they contain more explanations of Scripture and show more theological learning, and two letters from Elizabeth to her contemporary visionary, St. Hildegarde, are inserted in them; no dates are given to these visions. The second book opens as follows:

"The mercy of God is kind, and richly does He shower grace upon grace on those who love Him. According to the greatness of His goodness, He has multiplied His consolations upon His handmaid, as the preceding book declares, and behold, nevertheless, His hand is extended to console her. For the murmuring of those who judge themselves to be great and who spurn those who appear

to be weak is not repressed, for they do not fear to mock at the richness of His goodness in her. Nevertheless, it is to be feared that in murmuring they will hear the voice of the father saying to the servant: 'Is thy eye evil because mine is good?' This scandalizes them; that in these days the Lord has deigned to magnify His mercy much in the weaker sex. But why do they not remember that it was so in the days of our fathers when it was given to foolish men that holy women were filled with the spirit of God, that they might prophesy, that they might govern the people of God strenuously, that they might also triumph over the people of Israel as Deborah, Judith, Jael and the like? And now because we may hope to find things of edification in the minds of the humble, those things also which the Lord has deigned to work in His handmaid after the end of the first book, according to her own narrative, are here added."

From this we may gather that Elizabeth had suffered from ridicule on account of her sex. The following vision shows what trust the rest of the community placed in her revelations:

"And immediately the angel of the Lord bore me away, and we came to a green and pleasant meadow. And behold, there appeared three beautiful girls walking by the side of a certain river, whose clothes were not very white; they were discalced and their feet were very red. And when I wondered who they were and what they were doing there alone, they said to me: 'Do not be astonished: we are souls, and we were placed under regular discipline, one of us from a little child, one from youth and one from an older age. And because we seemed to be of some merit among men, when we died we were helped less than was necessary by the prayers of men. And when we should have been able to have been liberated within the space of one year, behold, now we have been detained here thirty years. We do not, indeed, bear other pains except a great fear, which we have from three terrible dogs who constantly threaten to bite us. If you will ask your abbot that he would offer the divine sacrifice for the delivery of our souls and the souls of all the faithful departed, we hope to be delivered more quickly and to be able to pass over to the joys prepared for us.' When I pointed out these things to our Sisters they met together and with a devout mind submitted to bodily penance in common for them and divided the psalter between them, praying with all diligence to the Lord for the delivery of these souls.

"VIII. But the lord abbot, warned by me, came the next day when the office of the vigil was said and celebrated the divine office for the faithful departed carefully. And again in the same time of sacrifice I was translated to the place above mentioned, and the

same souls again appeared ascending with great haste against the course of the aforesaid river. And I, joining myself to them, inquired from whence they came and what were their names. One of them answered for all. 'It would take long to tell thee all about us, but I will answer thee briefly; we are from Saxony; I am called Adelheid, and the one who is next to me is Matilda, my sister in the flesh as well as in the spirit; but this one, Elizabeth, is only our spiritual sister. But I, seeing that they were unwilling to delay, did not wish to detain them longer, but I commended myself and all our congregation to them more attentively, that when they should be received into the company of saints they would remember us. Which when they had kindly promised they began to proceed more quickly. And behold, in the way which they pursued the angel of the Lord appeared before them in the likeness of a beautiful youth, and as if offering to lead them, went before them with the same haste. And when they had drawn near to a certain building in which I frequently see blessed souls received, three venerable men came out to them, each having a golden thurible in his hand, and they offered incense to each of them. And presently out of the smoke of the incense their faces and clothing were washed whiter than snow, and thus they were happily led into the interior of the building."

There is one other delightful vision which at the risk of wearying our readers we should like to quote, because it is so thoroughly characteristic of German mysticism. Any one conversant with the revelations of St. Bridget of Sweden will see at once how unlike her dark and stern denunciations were these dreamlike visions of her gentle German sister:

"Immediately afterwards the angel of the Lord carried me into another place of most delightful pleasantness and placed me under a certain tree, which was covered with the most beautiful flowers. And I said to him: 'My Lord, let us rest a while in this place.' And he said: 'It is pleasing to me that thou shouldst rest.' Presently I sat down on the grass and filled my hand with flowers, which were lying everywhere around me and drawing them nearer to me, I extracted a wonderful sweet smell from them. And when I had desired to stay there longer I saw far off an exceedingly venerable man coming towards us and two most beautiful virgins with him.

"And my Lord, who was standing beside me, said to me: 'Behold, our Lord Peter is coming.' Immediately rising, I went to meet him, and falling down before him, begged his patronage humbly, and committed myself and my dear ones to him. He, turning and looking at me mercifully with clemency, said: 'Tell

thy abbot that Brother Laurence is waiting for an obedience from him.' And I said to him: 'And what may I hope from thee, Lord?' Who said: 'You may have good hope in me and my other apostles for him; he is accustomed to show devout obedience to us.' And when he was borne away from me the angel said to me: 'Come and I will show thee one of the Brothers of my monastery.' And he showed me in the place of refreshment a certain monk who was called Erminricus and another certain one of our Brothers by name Gerhard, whom he said was quickly about to arrive at the same place."

The third book of the visions is mostly taken up in answering questions which her brother Eckbert had put to her and belongs to what Herr Roth calls the second period of her work. It does not lend itself to quotation easily, as the sections into which it is divided are often several pages long, but it contains two letters to St. Hildegarde, too long to quote in full, from which it is possible to give extracts. Both are rather epistles than letters in the modern sense of the word, but parts of them are interesting, because they throw some light on the writer's relations with the external world and what she had to suffer from it.

The first letter opens formally thus:

"To the venerable lady, mistress of the spouses of Christ who are in Mount St. Rupert, Elizabeth, a humble nun, sends devout prayer with all charity. May the grace and consolation of the Most High fill you with joy because you kindly have compassion on my distress, as I understood from the words of my consoler, from whom you have diligently secured consolation from me. For, as you said, it had been revealed to you concerning me, I confess that lately I conceived in my mind a certain cloud of confusion on account of the impertinent words which many people have spoken of me which are not true. But I should easily bear the words of the common people if those who wear the religious habit did not sadden my spirit more bitterly. For with what incentives these are moved I do not know, who laugh at the grace of God in me, and those who are ignorant do not fear to judge me rashly.

"They have spread an evil report about me that I have prophesied concerning the judgment day, which certainly I never presumed to do, when the knowledge of His advent escapes all mortals."

She then goes on to say how to avoid arrogance; she had striven to hide the things which had been revealed to her, as about to happen on account of the wickedness of the people, and thus relates what ensued to her in consequence. "When, therefore, on a certain Sunday I in my accustomed manner was in ecstasy and the angel of the Lord stood by me, saying: 'Wherefore dost thou hide thy

gold in mud? This is the Word of God which is sent to the earth through thy mouth, not that on account of distorted faces it should be hidden, but that it should be shown to the praise and glory of our God for the salvation of His people.' And saying this he raised a whip over me, which he inflicted on me five times as if in great anger most severely, so that for three days I was faint in all my body from that beating."

A little further on in this letter Elizabeth writes that the abbot began to divulge some of her revelations to the magistrates of the Church and to some religious men, some of whom received them with reverence, but some spoke badly of the angel through whom she received them, saying he was a deluding spirit transfigured into an angel of light. And through obedience the abbot constrained her that when he appeared again she should ask him in the name of the Lord to show her whether he was a true angel of God or not. She did not so trembling, and the angel assured her he was a true angel of God, and that her visions were true and her prophecies would become true unless God was reconciled with man."

She concludes the letter by asking Hildegarde's prayers and begging her to write to her again.

It is clear from the above that Elizabeth firmly believed in her own visions, and it is equally clear from her letters to others that there were many people who also believed in them, besides her own brother and the community of Schönau. The preface to the letters of Elizabeth in one of the original manuscripts thus describes their origin:

"A certain monk from the Abbey of Dusindorf, in the Diocese of Metz, very learned in sacred knowledge, came to Schönau to visit Elizabeth and to see what God had done in her. And when she had been vehemently congratulated by him and he had faithfully instructed her with good counsels, when about to depart he asked if he might sometimes merit to receive from her a letter, from which he might receive some good counsel and consolation. also begged her at the same time to send a letter to his abbot and Brothers to correct and admonish them. And when he had reverently commended this to the divine favor, that same night his petition was made while Elizabeth was present at Matins, she suddenly pronounced an improvised letter, which the aforesaid Brother had asked to be sent to him. Likewise on the third night after this she pronounced another letter, which he had asked to be sent to his abbot and Brothers. From that time she began to have the grace of dictating letters in this way, which are here written down."

The letters contain excellent spiritual counsels and are distinctly

Scriptural in tone, but as there is a great similarity in them, except that in some she narrates one of her visions, the quotation of one or two will give a very good idea of the whole of them, so we will quote the letter to the abbot asked for by the monk alluded to in the preface to the letters:

"Elizabeth by the grace of God to the abbot of Dusindorf: A certain divine inspiration admonishes thee, O servant of God. Bring out, raise and extend thy pastoral staff and strike boldly and gently dispose all things round thy sheep whom thou hast received to rule and guard. For every one has followed his own heart, declining and stepping unjustly from the way of contemplation. On this account God will not give you necessary things for food. Go back, sons of God, sons of light, to your hearts and ask your consciences if there is anything in you which is not well pleasing to Him at whom all the earth trembles. Amend; do better; you have a Father Who dwells on high and looks on the humble. Be unwilling to give room in your hearts that this and that may enter. Spurn the world and all the ornaments of the world, on account of the love of God, that you may be able to see the King in His beauty and the author of life Who invites you to the feast of the citizens on high, where the Father remains in the Son and the Son in the Father with the Holy Spirit for ever."

The letters are all couched in Biblical language, and many of them begin as the following one to the Archbishop of Trêves: "A certain little spark sent out from the great seat of Majesty and a voice thundering in the heart of the same, a little woman to the Archbishop of Trêves."

More than thirty MSS. of Elizabeth's writings exist; there is one in the British Museum of the thirteenth century; there was one at Cheltenham, in Gloucestershire, belonging to Sir Thomas Philipps, now the property of his heirs, and there is one in the Bodleian. Others are in various places in Germany, some in private and some in public collections; there are some in Cistercian convents in Austria, several in Paris and Bonn, and some in Munich, Brussels and Trêves.

We will conclude this account of St. Elizabeth with the opening verse of a Latin poem in praise of the saint written by Abbot Emecho, who succeeded Abbot Eckbert at Schönau:

Salve felix Elizabeth Odorifera rosa, In Dei mirabilibus Virgo satis famosa,

F. M. STEELE.

Stroud, England.

#### PRESSURA GENTIUM.

T IS a commonplace of Latin Literature that the Vulgate continues the tradition of Tacitus. The neat, terse style, plated with epigrams, that condenses into a single phrase the vaporous essence of some idea, waited for a master hand to refashion it. Its glittering brilliancy was hidden under the ashes of the Agricola, the Germania, the Annales. Then some unknown, unnamed, forgotten scribe penned from the circuit of Carthage a Latin Bible. He poured the sacred wine from the Greek into the Latin, drop by brilliant drop, spilling none. Critics of English prose, like Ruskin and Matthew Arnold; scholars of classic style, like Tyrrell and MacKall, are at one in calling attention to this patent fact. But alas! the Vulgate has the defect of its good qualities. It is untranslatable. The tightly packed sentences have to be loosened before they can be transformed. Nor are any more quick to admit this than that band of scholars, the best that Oxford then could boast, known as the Douay translators. In their frank preface to the edition of 1600 they quaintly forestall much obvious criticism: "Now for the strictness observed in translating some wordes, or rather the not translating of some which is in more danger to be misliked, we doubt not but that the discrete lerned reader, deepely weighing and considering the importance of sacred wordes and how easely the translatour may misse the sense of the Holie Ghost, wil hold that which is here doune for reasonable and necessarie."

Certainly when they depart from the Latin they lose in strength and vigor. Thus in one expression made use of by our Lord in describing the terrors of His "visitation" (Luke xxi., 25), we have the phrase pressura gentium. They, alike with the versions termed Authorized and Revised, term it "the distress of nations," Luther's German bange has the same idea of fear. But surely the Latin is more pregnant with meaning. It is a word-picture after Tacitus. It suggests a huddled group of peoples, driven by oncoming hordes of fiercer and more desperate tribes. We are poised by the metaphor over the scene of terror. We gaze at troops of men following, like the headstrong rush of wild waves, on the heels of a flying foe. And upon the back of these, stretching far out as in some deep-drawn picture of Dorè, others can be dimly discerned trampling upon all that bars their roadway. The so-called Wycliffe Bible, which Abbot Gasquet has taught us to hold as the old Catholic version, tries, by building on the older Anglo-Saxon phrasing, to depict all this in its "overlaying of folks."

Indeed, is this not a precise picture of each crisis of the Church's life? Has it not been one long-continuous "overlaying of folks," an ever-present, ever-constant pressura gentium? The Church has been assailed in increasing energy, at one time by the literal, material overcrowding of barbarous peoples as from her first century to her ninth; at another by the no less terrible overcrowding of ideas, a pressura idearum.

Says St. Bede: "At times the Church has been so afflicted with the press of nations, nay, even so defiled, that Christ our Lord would seem to have forsaken her." 1 At first the faithful were agitated by the pressure of the Gentiles. The opening of the gates of God's kingdom by St. Peter to Cornelius the Centurion was the first shock to the consciences of the Judaic Christians. The solid body converted from the Hebrew peoples in the earliest beginnings of Christianity seemed intentionally to show that the New Law was but engrafted on the Old. This second dispensation was looked upon as the fulfillment of the Messianic prophecies, and therefore as a development of Israelitish ideals. Hence the Gentiles who began to flock to the Church, especially through the mediation and preaching of St. Paul, found themselves expected to become not Christians merely, but Jews; to be not merely baptized, but circumcised. They were to be naturalized to the New Kingdom through the ceremonies of the Mosaic dispensation. heavals resulted. The Church passed through her first crisis. The vigorous Apostle of the Gentiles, though a Pharisee and a Hebrew of the Hebrews, spoke hot words in their defense, and his arguments showed the true lines along which the Church was to move. Then Judaism fell off and was lost; but Christianity was saved. For not in Jerusalem, but in pagan Antioch, the step was taken; "the disciples were first named Christians."

The next great milestone along the roadway of the Church stood over against the conversion of Constantine. Rome became Christian, and at once the danger arose lest Christianity should become Roman. Instead of the catacombs and a gens lucifuga came the basilicas of the Church and the General Council of Nicæa. Here, thought the released believers, at last is peace. In their eyes an emperor, a Cæsar, had taken his place in the life of the Church. The edict of 312 seemed a beginning of what the civil authority might do for the glory of God. The dream of the classic poets, upon whom rested the vision of an eternal empire, appeared passing into fact. The golden, half-lit splendor of patriotic imperialism, such as Virgil sang of in the inspired lines of the Sixth Book of his "Æneid," was approaching in gorgeous pageantry, not through

<sup>1</sup> Hom. in Mark 6, Bk. 2, Cap. 28, Migne, L. P. Vol. XCII., p. 196.

portals of ivory, but through portals of horn; not a lying vision, but a glorious reality. Rome became identified with Christianity. Its allies were thought to be the friends of Christ, its enemies His sworn foes. The old horror of Rome displayed in the Apocalypse, that shudder passing through the frame of St. John the Divine when he mentions "Babylon the great . . . . drunk with the blood of the saints and with the blood of the martyrs of Jesus," has given way to a new feeling of pride, admiration, love for that home of saints where lay the bodies of the Twin Prince Apostles. The Empire was supposed, despite its patent corruptions and misrule and its interference with effective Church government, to stand for the unique type of Christianity. St. Ierome, whose pen spared few and whose tongue spared fewer, was overwhelmed at the rumor of the sack of Rome: "A terrible report reaches us from the West. They talk of Rome besieged, ransomed with gold, besieged again, so that lives may perish after property has been destroyed. My voice is choked; sobs stifle the words I am dictating."2 How, we ask in astonishment, can the fierce, passionate, stern saint feel reverence for that city he had himself not seldom denounced as a den of thieves? How can he venture to identify Rome with the same city of Jerusalem or quote of her the old words of Virgil: Quid salvum est si Roma perit? Yet, nevertheless, St. Jerome did represent one side of Christian feeling in the fifth century. He stood for a vast body of the faithful who linked up the fortunes of the Church with the material empire of the Roman name. The fall of Rome could be for them but a prelude to the end of the world.4 "Who can bear witness to the truth of Christ's terrible predictions," says St. Ambrose, "so well as we upon whom the end of the world is come?" Here, then, precisely once again lay the old difficulty. An old social organization was crumbling to ruin, new peoples were coming in contact with the Church. Once again it is pressura gentium. What, then, will be the Church's attitude to the heathen? St. Jerome can but lament. For him in Rome's fall fell all the world. Nor is it a mere literary exaggeration, for his point of view became an actual working principle, as when the British Bishops steadily refused to make any attempt to convert the Saxons or even to cooperate with the Roman monks.

But these Roman monks show us other ideas, and ideas which ultimately prevailed. The baptism of Constantine was followed

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Migne, L. P. XXII., 1,094, ep. 127.

<sup>\*</sup> Ibid, 1,059, ep. 124.

<sup>4</sup> Lactantius, Iustit. VIL, 25, Migne, P. L. VI., 812-813.

In Lk. 21, lib. 10, Migne, P. L. XV., 1898.

by the baptism of Clovis, to prove that the Church was not bound to any particular political system.

For St. Augustine, lamenting as bitterly as St. Jerome the fall of the world's metropolis, yet discerns even here the working out of God's laws. Even through the hollow eyes of death he sees life peering. Brooding over the broken walls that crowned the Seven Hills, hovering across the marble grandeur of palace, basilica, Coliseum, his eyes beheld the vision splendid of the city of God "coming down out of heaven, adorned as a bride for her husband." With wider faith St. Augustine sees a new Christianity rising out of a world "shattered in shard on shard." No human power, no human destiny can entangle the Church in its life. These things are of their nature temporary, while the Church is eternal. The city of God and the city of the world may exist side by side, but must never be confused. The world may be influenced for the better, or its contaminating atmosphere may affect God's children, for there is an unending struggle battled between the two standards. But the city whose maker and builder is God cannot have its foundations laid by men, nor are its stones set together by human cement.

Here, then, was a theory that answered the laments of St. Jerome. St. Augustine took up the burden of St. Paul and fought in writing for the liberty of the sons of God. These were to be no longer cramped by the narrow limits even of the Empire of Rome, for God was greater than Romulus. The new peoples had rights as human souls to participate in the benefits of the Church. And whither St. Augustine pointed, St. Leo and St. Gregory led. The old world was left to fall to pieces of its own decay. The dead were left to bury their dead.

When the Popes began again their work of reconstruction the precedent of the basilicas was followed. The heathen temples were not overthrown, but hallowed into Christian use. All that was good in these younger peoples, their reverence for women, their detestation of idolatrous worship, their love of nature, their fearlessness, their freedom, their enthusiasm, was not destroyed, but fulfilled. A chivalrous devotion to the Maiden Mother, an architecture inspired by nature, emancipation from slavery, and the Crusades betoken the Church's use of her new subjects. The pressura gentium abates. There is no longer a huddling, crowding, overlaying of Christendom. A new epoch leaps into being. The Popes create that strange paradox—civilized barbarism. They have broken the entanglement of Imperial Rome. Like John at the Latin Gate, the Church emerges from her trial purior et vegetior, purified and with renewed energy.

The resulting stage of the world's history we call by the name of feudalism. It is Christendom's new form, though in general it stands for many social processes in many different lands that shade down from the sixth to the fifteenth century. But it enabled the Church once more to fit herself in with human life. She takes her position, no mean one, in the world's polity. A theory is broached by which she accepts by the will of the people the hegemony of the nations. She transfers the Empire from Greek to German, and in recompense is allowed to sit in judgment on each elected representative of the new line of Cæsars. She crowns the emperors, anoints the kings, stands by and hallows the newly dubbed knights. Her Bishops sit in the royal council chambers and help in the efficient working of the courts of justice. Her clerics are a race apart, to be judged by their own laws and their own judges. Yet for all this she made no little return. She spread abroad brightness, color, joy amid the working classes. She did her best to garner the precious grains of the rich classic harvest. She diffused the light of knowledge among peoples who sat in darkness. She tilled fields and drained fens, and built cathedrals and universities, and broke out into art and music and song. She took tithes from her people, but gave tithes also to her people of what was most precious in all the world. She set high a moral excellence in king and Bishop, in monk and knight, in burgher and hind that makes the Ages of Faith an astonishing epoch, without equal or rival in the records of the children of men.

But alas! for human weakness! She became enriched; eventually she became enslaved. She became even as she had become upon the latter days of the Roman Empire, entangled with a system. Even St. Bernard saw it necessary to exhort the Pope to follow not Cæsar, but the Apostles. Here once again there comes the visitation of God. A new spirit began to walk abroad. The old theories were in their turn breaking up. Fresh theories began to be mooted different, divergent, yet somehow bearing a common impress. From the fifteenth century onwards the zeitgeist was heavy with the new learning. It seemed at first but an enthusiasm for literature. It talked much about Greek manuscripts and Latin classics. It built shrines to Plato and doffed its cap at the mention of Aristotle's name. It even took up the morality of the ancient world, giving truth again to Epicurus and Zeno. It affected the workings of men's minds in every department of life. It grafted itself on national feeling, sympathized with the lawyers of Philippe le Bel, praised the outrage of Anagni, which had wrung even from Dante (for whom Boniface VIII. was a lost soul) a hot, passionate protest. It worked out its way through long underground

passages, chasing its ideal down far-reaching corridors, peering for it behind the arras. The unsubstantial ghost was at length brought to light, or rather it stalked gauntly out into the open. Men saw and recognized it and called it the spirit of secularization. But its real name was different, more hideous. It was but one side of the classic spirit, one side—over-developed—of mediæval feudalism. It was when naked and unashamed nothing but royal absolutism in State, rank erastianism in Church. The leaders of the world were great men, of astonishing genius, of versatile powers, of wonderful address. They were lions, but as Bacon fitly held them to be, "lions under the throne." How would the Church deal with this world grown so strange? The Imperial Pope, the Papal Emperor tramping, journeying to Bethlehem as we see them in the frescoes of Gozzoli and others, had journeyed into eternity. Their place in the world's hierarchy knew them no more. All that they stood for had fallen with them. Many, indeed, looked back, clung to these mediæval hopes, and worked for their return. But it was not to be. Once more the Church was forced to go out from her splendid dwellings, once more to leave the dead to bury their dead.

It was not now the physical pressure of hordes flooding Europe from East to West with successive waves, but it was a spring of water rising from the Church's own depths that threatened to destroy and overturn all. The incident of Julius II. and Bramante at the rebuilding of St. Peter's is a symbol. The Pope agreed to every condition. Honored and traditional decorations, treasures, pictures, statues that were loved by the people were sacrificed to the new artistic ideals. He only refused his assent when Bramante wished to move the position of the Tomb of the Apostles. desire for change was intended, said Julius, to affect even the rock upon which the Church was built. Perhaps at no other epoch had the Church of God more difficulty in endeavoring to adapt herself to contemporary politics. For the first time in her history she seemed quite unable to find where her foot might rest in the flood. She became utterly restless. Theologians threw out schemes for making the Church and absolutism somehow in compromise. In this Paolo Sarpi is a type of many liberal churchmen. But his efforts availed little. For there was quite a host of writers who, insisting on the teaching of Aquinas, justified tyrannicide as an extreme measure, and tyrannicide was an abomination in the eves of the new statesmen. Moreover, the Church could not surrender the Catholic aspect of the faith, so she lost the Northern peoples, whose rationalistic ideals had been so enormously increased. She lost also, even over the Latin races, her true jurisdiction. For in

France, Spain, Portugal and in the Italian States the ecclesiastical body was completely under government. Politically and socially the Church in every land could no longer call itself with truth the Church Catholic. From the Renaissance to the Revolution the faith ceased to tell with force on human life. Only in her burst of missionary zeal in the new countries, in her spirit of reform in discipline and morals in the old and in the bright galaxy of her saints do we see any patent showings of her divinity. The pressura idearum paralyzed her and forced her for the time to step right out of the world's working.

With the Revolution the Church reasserted her influence on social life. It gave the Church once more an opportunity to take up the burden of empire. For the Revolution was no mere outburst of destruction. It came as a conclusion, necessary, inevitable, legitimate to a long series of causes. It was built up on a succession of terrible evils, untempered for the most part by the consolations of religion, for the clergy of France were out of sympathy, certainly out of touch, with the people. When the crash came there were to be found, it is true, many ecclesiastics worthy of the traditions of the French Church. Yet, on the whole, it was rather as martyrs than as apostles. They were ready to die for their faith; but had no idea how to teach their flocks to live by it.

The Revolution fatally followed on the evils of absolutism. When its fury was spent the eternal problem faced the Church, occasioned by the ever-recurring pressura gentium, or rather, as always in the latter days, pressura idearum. The old question was asked again, though couched in a newer language: How should the Church bear herself to the new peoples? It is still subjudice. The end is not yet, though after a hundred years the problem is fast reaching its crucial issue, for it is plain now that the Revolution meant no mere upheaval, but a rearrangement of society under the rule of the workingman. Said Lacordaire: "Si la Revolution n'eût étè qu'un crime, elle eût expiré au pied de l'echafaud de Louis XV."6 It could not have been a mere crime, though undoubtedly crimes neither few nor small were part of its deaththroes. Indeed, the Church has stood to gain enormously by it. She once more finds herself included in the people's life. She is stronger, more dignified, more respected, more loved than at any time since the Renaissance. As once she assisted at the baptism of Constantine and of Clovis, so now she has witnessed the christening of the workingman. Leo XIII., the People's Pope, wrote his Rerum Novarum and other encyclicals to teach the whole duty of labor. Lacordaire, Ozanam, Montalembert; Wiseman, Manning,

<sup>6</sup> La loi de l'Histoire.

Spalding; Kettler, Windthorst, Lueger, have worked out the attitude of the Church to the people. They have not feared to teach the gospel of freedom of the Church untrammeled by government veto, of education freed from the cramping fetters of dogmatic agnosticism, of social reform founded on the dignity and rights of labor. These wise and broadminded leaders have had the official blessing of three successive Popes. The present Pontiff, himself called, like the first of his own great line, from a lowly occupation to the priesthood and eventually to the solicitude of all the churches, has shown the same interest in the welfare of the masses. "La societé moderne," cried Lacordaire, "est l'expression des besoins de l'humanité, et par consequent elle est aussi l'expression des besoins de l'Eglise. Nous sentons aujourd'hui le besoin que nous avons les uns des autres; allons au-devant du monde, qui lui-même nous recherche et nous attend."

There have been and there are many who look back to the past with regret and look forward to the future with fear. They dislike the advance of a power which to them spells the breakup of all civilization. Their eyes dimly pierce through the veils that hide the future round about. Like St. Jerome, they weep disconsolate over a falling system. They would wish to bring back the quiet past.

On the other hand are many who look to the new forces as something sacrosanct. The new democracy, a Christian Socialism, they extol from many platforms as being the social organization ordained by the Master in His Gospel. They say that Christianity must be socialistic, that the Church is bound by her own spiritual laws to defend the oppressed and that the only defense of these oppressed now can come from a socialistic state. They echo the words of the labor leader at Leeds that Christ was the first trades unionist.

Both parties alike are impatient with the Church, the one that she will not join the hue and cry against the Socialists, the other that she will not join her millions of children to the ranks of the new forces. Yet the action of the Church, to those who have eyes to see, is justified by history. She has never joined herself to any social or political hierarchic arrangement. She is greater than any, vaster, older. She cannot cramp herself down to adopt any as her own, or identify herself with any. She will outlive them all. St. Jerome thought all was lost when Rome was sacked in 409; St. Augustine built the Church upon the inrushing peoples. Both empire and peoples have gone, yet the Church remains. Constantine, Clovis, Charlemagne and Charles V. are to-day but the shadows of names once great. They were denounced by their

<sup>7</sup> Euloge sen Daniel O'Connell.

opponents, deified by their upholders. The Church knew them to be but men, whose ideas were no more to be woven into the texture of the creed than any of the passing phrases of the world's progress. For the Church, as Pope Pius X. has announced to the Sillonists, is bound to no political or social system. She is neither monarchic nor aristocratic nor democratic, but theocratic, though it may well be that democracy, aristocracy, monarchy, all need her help for their efficient working. Certain it is that the people's rule—if it is to be just and fair—must be based on Christian morals, of which the Church is the great guardian.

She is bound to no old, outworn system. As Leo XIII. wrote in one of his pastorals as a young Bishop: "The Church is tied to no dead thing, save to the corpse that hangs on Calvary." But she is neither to be identified with any passing human organization, for she is greater than all. She denounced modern liberalism in the sixties, when it endeavored to base itself on unbelief; she denounces Socialism so long as it denies the individual right to private property. Yet as pure economic solutions of modern conditions she has not one word to say either to one or to the other. She sits in judgment on them so long as it is a question of moral justice or injustice, but when the debate has turned political she leaves her children to work out the problem by the light of their own consciences.

There has always been in each crisis of the Church's history this constant pressura gentium. It has meant for a while trouble and storm, then, when the elements have settled and there is calm, the Church finds the new conditions quite as favorable, often more favorable than the old. So was it in her struggle with the Gentiles, with the Northern races bursting from the officina gentium (Jordandés), with the Renaissance in all its absolutist tyranny. So will it be with the new democracy in its socialistic dress. For the Church is in no way effete. She can breast the floods to-day with the same vehemence as she has breasted them of old. She is not failing or in decay, for she is only in her teens. She has not yet come of age in centuries. Even when Socialism shall have grown retrograde and a new theory have come into the field, the Church will be found at her old work of baptizing into Christ each movement of the world. She alone will be found unafraid "of the divine sunstroke that threatens the road to Damascus."

BEDE JARRETT, O. P.

London, England.

s Tablet, Vol. 116, No. 3,670, September 10, 1910, p. 405.

## IRELAND ERE THE DAWN OF HISTORY.

ONG before the huts of Rome had turned to marble and its rough pillars to towering columns; long before the Comitium laws had begun to be passed for more than a pastoral people whose herds dotted the still green Seven Hills, dim, shadowy colonies flitted like moths round our Western isle, landed, lived, fought and faded in the twilight of time, leaving a few facts of history to be filtered from an ocean of romance.

When mighty monarchs giving names to misty, long-forgotten dynasties reigned in the cradle lands of the human race, man had touched and trodden on the soil of Ireland and sounded its deep forests with curious awe.

Romance, ever busy leavening the measure of fact till no fact remains, sends visitors to our wintry isle from the burning sands and eternal summer of Assyria and Phœnicia centuries before the flood. The most interesting of these antediluvian wanderers was Ceasar, daughter of Bith, whose story, related in something of the "green glasses" style, runs sadly thus: When Noah was constructing the Ark and warning the world of its approaching destruction, Bith and his daughter grew fearful and applied to the patriarch for apartments in the ship, which request the latter was unable to grant. Thus repulsed, Bith and his family had recourse to an idol, which gave them the very rational advice to build a boat themselves and embark. This they did, and Ceasar, with her husband and some others, committed themselves to the mercy of the waves. After seven years they landed on the western coast of Ireland, but as their arrival took place precisely forty days before the Deluge, as might be expected, their sojourn in the island was neither prolonged nor eventful.1

Ireland from its situation has been identified with Ogygia, where the nymph Calypso endeavored by her blandishments to persuade Ulysses to remain and forget Penelope, with her never-ending tapestry, and his own home in Ithaca.<sup>2</sup> It is mentioned by Orpheus, a writer of the sixth century before Christ, as one of the islands on which the fabled Argonauts touched.<sup>8</sup>

It would be as absurd to waste time in recounting or discussing all the legends which have risen up around this early period of Ireland's existence as it would be to discuss the rival merits, with regard to history, of Sinbad the Sailor and Rip Van Winkle. This

<sup>1</sup> Keating, Hist. of Ireland, Vol. I., p. 30.

<sup>2-8</sup> Dalton, Historical Sketch of Irish Antiquities, Royal Irish Academy, 1830, Vol. XVI., Part II., p. 27.

flotsam of legend which has gathered on the sea of time can be left untouched to gratify the poetic and curious who try to piece together and elaborate our bardic annals. The early annalists of our country in trying to connect link by link the limits of our history with the existence of the first inhabitant of the globe threw the chain far out into the darkness, and we have always failed to draw it safely back again.

The prevailing idea of reaching the first root of each genealogical tree necessitated the filling up of hiatuses with imaginary names and gave to our early history the aspect of an epic of romance and distorted fact.

Even in those colonies which the common consent of history admits to the dignity of consideration there is no chronological coherence, and, after a heartbreaking wading through figures and periods, most chroniclers have either arranged the dates according to their own fancy or on the doubtful authority of some ancient poems. They count infallibly from the Deluge, and centuries and years become kaleidoscopically jumbled and come out delightfully intricate and puzzling.

The wisest amongst them were contented with a humble confession of impotence, and as this seems the safest course to adopt, we shall not stop to discuss chronological tables so extravagantly strained and contorted.

When the waters of the flood—so romance gravely narrates—had abated and the earth was dry for one hundred and forty years, and when the Tower of Babel was still spoken of by its living builders, we have the first account of human footsteps in Ireland. A messenger named Athna, sent by Nion, some early explorer, to examine the soil of Ireland, returned to his master with a handful of grass and called the land "the woody isle." His master did not remain, however, to colonize his discovery, but passed on and left the lonely isle to the care of its irrational population, which roamed about unacquainted with the form of man. Thus the ancient poems—the early chroniclers—and among later ones Keating.

These halcyon days of the brute creation lasted for almost two centuries longer, till a parracide, Parthalon, fleeing from Greece, found refuge here. In spite of the distance of time which separates this wanderer—whom, however, modern criticism is inclined to dismiss as no more than a name—from us, old chroniclers are amusingly exact in describing his arrival and stay in the island. If there was any foundation for the elaborate and detailed account which they treat us to, it certainly was microscopic enough to justify one's doubting its reality, since critical history admits the

<sup>4</sup> Keating, Hist. of Ireland, Vol. I., p. 38.

impossibility of accepting even the existence of the Greek murderer. Nevertheless, we find related with surprising minuteness the names, statistics, etc., of these old world fugitives and have a pedigree tracing Parthalon's ancestry back to Magog, son of Japhet, and great father of the Scythian race.

However, granting that Parthalon did come, the reasons for his coming do not reflect credit on his character, and it is, perhaps, not unfortunate that, in spite of his recommendation on the score of antiquity, circumstances prevented him from becoming the progenitor of the Irish race. He came from Greece, and the occasion of his exchanging its luxurious softness of climate for the stormy uncertainty of the outpost of the Western world was an attempt to obtain the crown of his native country, culminating in the murder of his father and mother. Failing in his design, like another Cain, he took his people, to the number of about one thousand, and fled from the sight of man. Steering past Sicily and the Pillars of Hercules, fortune drove the wind-tossed fugitives out into the Western Ocean, on to the shores of Munster, where they landed at a place called Inbher Sceine. They disembarked on Wednesday, the 4th of May. Note the precision!—day and date called back out of the darkness of prehistoric night by the untiring energy or fertile imagination of our annalists. Parthalon's attendants were his wife and three sons, with their wives and one thousand soldiers. Fearing to pierce the thick, mysterious woods which covered their newly found home, they probably reembarked, as we read that the regal residence was fixed at Inish Samer (Ballyshannon), which was some distance from the place of their original landing. Inish Samer means the island of Samer—the name of a greyhound that met its death here under tragic circumstances, which the chronicler does not disdain minutely to relate. Clipped of its poetic plumage, the story tells that the wife of Parthalon was faithless to him, and when called upon to account for her guilty action, instead of showing penitence and remorse, she shamelessly defended her conduct. whereupon her husband, in a fit of resentment, seized her favorite hound, Samer, and dashed it to pieces against the ground. It is the first instance of jealousy and female inconstancy in Ireland; it commenced early, and, as seven bitter centuries stand to prove, we cannot forget that it was unfortunately not the last.<sup>5</sup>

During the lifetime of the Greek colonist and his posterity in the island seven lakes broke out, one of which sprung from the grave that they were digging for Leighline, one of the chieftain's sons. Thirty years after his arrival Parthalon died, and some centuries later his entire people perished of a plague which carried



<sup>5</sup> Keating, Hist. of Ireland, p. 41.

off nine thousand in one week on the plains of Howth, near Dublin. The colony seems, in process of time, to have abandoned their Donegal settlement, en masse, and sought some point nearer to their distant Eastern home. The memory of this unanimous exit is said to be preserved in the name of Tallaght, "the plague monument."

Haverty remarks that this first distemper was caused by the corrupting bodies of the Formorians—enterprising gentlemen of whom more anon.<sup>7</sup>

The kingdom was divided on Parthalon's death between his four sons. An old poet observes that—mirabile dictu—and in spite of their father's bad example, the four princes lived in perfect friendship and fraternal unity—a convincing proof, perhaps, that the whole colony perished and had no connection with the subsequent Irish race.

Again—for the last time—the heavy stillness of death lay on the land until one morning's sun revealed the white-sailed ships of Nemedius hovering cautiously near our shores. He landed, and Ireland slept in peace no more. No longer monarch of a desert kingdom, the savage wolf withdrew into its woody fortress and learned to fear a stronger power than itself. The world had now passed its infant stage, and large, accessible tracts of land no longer remained undiscovered or unoccupied.

Yet modern historical critics plead the impossibility of grasping a tangible form behind the shadowy name of this second colonist and throw the beginnings of our history into later times.

Nemedius, like his predecessor, was descended from Magog and was also of the Scythian race. There is an impossible legend that he came as heir to Parthalon to take possession of Ireland on that chieftain's death. From the same ancestor descended the Firbolgs, De Danaans and Gadelians, and although these tribes were dispersed in as many different lands, they still preserved their original Gaelic tongue; a fact which—if it be a fact—seems strange, considering the absence of a written language and the tendency to change which characterized the early dialects after the dispersion of Babel.

Nemedius looms out of the thick fogs of the Euxine with his fleet of thirty ships and one thousand followers, while yet the dark waters which washed the strange shores of Colchis retained their romantic mystery of the polished Greek. He also brought four sons, from one of whom were descended the Firbolgs, a colony which possessed Ireland at a later period. During his stay in the



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Keating, Haverty, Hist. of Ireland. Joyce, Irish Names of Places, I., 161. Four Masters, A. M. 2.820.

<sup>7</sup> Haverty, Hist, of Ireland, p. 2.

island several other lakes and rivers made their appearance, amongst which we recognize the names of Ennel and Deravaragh, in Westmeath; the others cannot be identified with certainty. One can imagine the painful anxiety of these old colonists seeing their few plains turned into lakes and their humble villages into miniature replicas of Venice or Stockholm.

Twelve years after the advent of Nemedius, Macha, his wife, being gathered to her fathers, bequeathed a name and a tomb to Armagh.\*

In spite of the paucity of the human race at this time and the lands crying aloud for occupation, our visitors were not long permitted to enjoy their new home in peace and had many stiff conflicts with pirates, whose nomadic instincts rendered a settled life of industry distasteful and who recognized in the little colony an inviting prey.

These freebooters were generally called Formorians, a name translated by some as sea-robber and by others as marine sovereign; but perhaps there was little distinction between these titles at an age when notions of law and duty were ill defined. As others were monarchs on land, why could they not be kings on sea, although

They sank a few more ships, 'tis true, Than a well-bred monarch ought to do?

They were the descendants of Shem and lived in Africa, from whence they fled, fearing to become, by cohabitation, involved in the effects of the curse which Noah had bequeathed to his second son. They were the scourge of the Nemedians and form no inappropriate prototype of the Norsemen or Danes in the ceaseless repetition of history. This resemblance has been urged as a reason for discrediting their existence; it being asserted that the annalists did actually mean the Norse invaders of a later century.

Flashing across the primitive stage of Irish history, they vanish in the gloom, leaving a confused tangle of Nemedians and Firbolgs in their train. Their existence is so feebly supported by authority that, in general, modern authorities deny that such a people lived.

Nevertheless, their wars were sometimes punctuated by agreements, and the pirates often stooped to honest labor. Four Formorian builders were employed by Nemedius to erect two palaces, and on the day on which they were completed the jealous old king took pains to prevent any buildings outshining his own in magnificence by ordering the architects to be put to death. It was a con-

<sup>8</sup> Keating, Hist. of Ireland, p. 51.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Flaherty, in his "Ogygla" (L, 18), maintains that the Formorians were Northmen.

venient if primitive way of showing his appreciation for their labors. which method was, perhaps, also strongly recommended by its economy.

Ireland at this time was still almost completely covered by woods, and the king's next consideration was to remove some of these, in order to enlarge the existing clear spaces. He was engaged in these works of general utility when the arrival of the pirates gave him pause.

Our bardic chroniclers relate that when the marauders arrived Nemedius successfully opposed them in three battles, but in the fourth engagement, in Leinster, the old chieftain was defeated and died soon after of broken heart, on the island of Barrymore, near Cork. When this bulwark had been disposed of, the wretched inhabitants were left at the mercy of the Africans, who commenced systematically reducing them to slavery and revenging their losses in the first three battles. More and Conuing were the commanders of the invaders.

The existence of taxation to support a large military and naval establishment gives something of a modern coloring to the transactions of these spectres of the past, for our historians relate that on the 1st of November each year the early possessors of the land were compelled to march up with two-thirds of their children for slavery and two-thirds of their cattle and milk.<sup>10</sup>

A female tax collector was employed by the conquerors, and as she was not noted for the softer feminine qualities of pity and kindness, the place where she extracted the involuntary contributions received the sinister appellation of the "field of violence or compulsion." Naturally, such a state of things did not bear the stamp of perpetuity and was doomed to, at least, mutation.

The oppressed Nemedians united under three generals with a force of 30,000 fighting men—where they came from is a puzzle—on land and a similar number on sea. In the first engagement fortune favored them, and Conuing, one of their tyrannical oppressors, was defeated and slain; but the pursuing victors encountered the ill-omened ships of Morc on the coast at Tor Inish<sup>11</sup> and the contest was renewed on the shore. The combatants strove until the advancing tide had converted the battlefield into an island and cut off all retreat, so that those who escaped the sword perished in the waves. The ships of Morc proved useful, and the luckless Nemedians again went under. Three of their officers fled to Greece, one of whom was Simon Breac, the leader of the Firbolgs.

Once more the female tax collector resumed her invidious func-



<sup>10</sup> Keating, Hist. of Ireland, p. 55; Haverty, His. of Ireland, p. 5.

<sup>11</sup> Opposite Tory Island (Tor Inish).

tions, and the inhabitants sunk into a lethargic despair, the consequences of shattered hope, from which the arrival of the Firbolgs finally aroused them.

This, the third colony, came also from Greece, whither fleeing to escape the Formorian oppression they had exchanged Scylla for Charybdis and found tax masters in whom "the quality of mercy was not strained." The name "Firbolg," comprised from the words "fear," a man, and "bolg," a bag, and meaning "bagman," was a souvenir of their servitude and derived its origin from the labor at which their Attic masters employed them, namely, to fill sacks with clay and carry them to the summits of the barren mountains of Greece to prepare the soil for building purposes. 12-18

The slaves soon tired of this monotonous and unenviable state of existence, and one night, as a result of preconcerted arrangement, their chieftains seized the Grecian shipping, and embarking with their families, enrolled themselves in the more merciful service of Neptune. Slaigne, one of these leaders, is still recorded in the name of the River Slaney, in Wexford, at the mouth of which he landed.

Under the first two colonies the designation of the island was merely an eponym, but the Firbolgs called their new land "Inis Alga," or the "noble island." Eight monarchs, covering a space of fifty-six years, furnish us with our first regular dynasty. Eochy, the last of these, might be styled the Firbolg Justinian, as chroniclers attribute to him the earliest code of laws that flourished in the island. Some of the most extravagant of these chroniclers—with an eye for the appropriate—place Eochy exactly contemporary with Minos, the celebrated legislator, whose probity and love of justice merited for him a judgment seat in the sable world. From the wife of this last Firbolg prince, Tailte, we have the name Tailtean, afterwards famous for its fair (now Teltown, in the County Meath.)<sup>14</sup>

After the Firbolgs we come to a people whose mysterious and romantic characteristics seem to modern writers an infallible indication of their imaginary being. Their deeds and exploits render them fit denizens of the shadowy age which tradition assigns to them, and in comparison with them their predecessors seem commonplace and real. This people was the Tuatha de Danaan, who conquered the island during the reign of Eochy. They formed the posterity of the third son of Nemedius, and, like the other colonies, hailed from Greece. They came from Achaia or from

<sup>12</sup> MacFirliss, Tract on the Firbolgs.

<sup>13</sup> Keating, Hist. of Ireland, p. 58.

<sup>14</sup> Flaherty, Ogygia, III., 9.

near the city of Athens, where they had learned those little necromantic tricks which they practiced with such signal success on the old folks at home when they landed in Ireland.

Among their other accomplishments they possessed that of raising the dead—rather substantially, too, and not merely in appearance, as their story shows. Their departure from the land of their adoption was in connection with this dead-raising department of science. We may here observe, en passant, that it seems strange that a race which possessed the phœnix-like ability of raising its dead and so renewing itself should have perished even more completely than the thicker-headed Firbolgs. But poetry is ready with the answer that the Tuatha de Danaan all became fairies and, of course, live on.

During a war between Assyria and Athens, the former country, then at the height of its power (in agreement with the imaginary chronology), invaded Greece with an overwhelming army. The De Danaan threw in their lot with their Grecian friends, and their practice of resuscitating the departed came in uncommonly useful after the battles, so much so that the Easterns commenced to despair of a task which would have floored Sisypus and of which there could be but one inevitable result. It is somewhat discouraging to encounter the men one killed in yesterday's battle in the fight of to-day.

The Assyrians, accordingly, took counsel with a learned Druid to defeat the skill of the enchanters. The recipe suggested by the sage was that they should stick a stake of wood into the bodies of the slain Athenians after the battle. Filled with courage at the simple remedy and the prospect of putting an end to their perpetual-motion problem, the Easterns attacked and routed their enemies. After the battle they followed the Druid's advice and succeeded in outwitting the necromancers. The latter, consulting for their own safety, now that the superior strength of the invaders must eventually prevail, quietly decamped under Nuadha of the Silver Hand, and left their allies to their own resources.<sup>18</sup>

At first they sailed to Scandinavia, where their great learning insured to them a welcome. The Northmen gave four cities—Falias, Finnias, Gorias and Murias—in which to erect schools for the education of the youth of the country, and here our travelers taught with great success. After a short time, however, they shipped for Scotland, where they remained seven years. From Scandinavia they carried away, whether surreptitiously or otherwise history fails to mention, four curiosities of antiquity which played a part of no small importance in the land where they finally settled.

<sup>15</sup> Keating, Hist. of Ireland, p. 67.

The first of these was the Lia Fail, or stone of destiny, which was brought from Falias by the enterprising professor who instructed the population there. This stone had the virtue of being surprisingly disturbed and of emitting a strange thunderlike noise whenever any one of the royal house of Scythia was crowned upon it. It remained in Ireland until the fifth century after Christ, when Feargus, the first king of Scotland, obtained it from the Irish monarch, and it lay in Scone Abbey till Edward I. carried it into England. At present it is supposed to lie in the coronation chair at Westminster, though Dr. Petrie maintained, with little probability, however, that it is still to be identified with the stone which covers the spot called the "Croppie's grave" on Tara Hill. 14

Like the other wonderful things in pagan Ireland, it lost its virtue at the Nativity of our Saviour, when the reign of idols passed away. It is noteworthy that the royal family of the Stuarts, who were descended through Feargus from the Scythian kings, succeeded to the English throne most unexpectedly on account of the virginity of Queen Elizabeth, some centuries after the removal of the Lia Fail from Scotland.

The De Danaan whom fortune had placed in Gorias succeeded in bearing thence a wonderful sword. From Finias came a spear with some surprising qualities, and Murias supplied a cauldron, which, perhaps, proved of some utility on the subsequent voyage.

The Tuatha de Danaan arrived in Ireland in the month of May, and to show that it was their intention to remain, they burned their ships and cut off all retreat. Romance records that their march into the centre of the island was hidden from mortal eves by a thick, diabolically invoked vapor, which enveloped the invaders. History remarks that they probably landed during a fog and had penetrated some distance inland before its dissipation revealed them to the astonished inhabitants. Clio rudely tears asunder what Calliope weaves with so much care! Thus discovered, they sent a challenge to the King Eochy to yield the kingdom or fight for it. Not relishing acquiescent abdication, Eochy fought, but the Tuatha de Danaan employed their magic arts with their accustomed skill and success, and the Firbolgs suffered a defeat, with a loss of 10,000 or, according to others, of 100,000 killed on Judging from these figures, the average Irish family must have been no joke when the world was young.

The fight took place at South Moyturey, near Lough Corrib, called Moyturey of Cong. The Cairn of Eochy, who laid down his life with his crown is still to be seen on the shore near Ballysadare,

<sup>18</sup> Petrie, History and Antiquities of Tara; Keating, Hist. of Ireland, p. 71; Joyce, Ancient Ireland, Vol. I., 45, 278; IL, 83.

in the County Sligo, 17 O'Donovan observes that it is a popular belief that the tide can never cover it.18 Thus the island changed owners and the new race held possession for two centuries.

Some historians hold that the Tuatha de Danaan were so called because they were descended from Danaan, a female of the line of Nemedius; but the commoner opinion assigns as the origin of the name their threefold division into tribes. The first of these divisions consisted of the Tuatha, or nobility; the second of Dee, or druids, literally gods; and the third dee Danaan, or poets, Dan signifying "art," also a "poem" or "song."19

Brvan, Iuchor and Iuchorba—the three sons of Danaan—excelled the others in their magical acquirements, and as with all primitive peoples they owed their apotheosis to their astounding accomplishments. To Ogma, another of the De Danaan, is attributed the invention of Ogham—the simple style of writing which prevailed in most Irish inscriptions till the introduction of Christianity and even afterwards.<sup>20</sup> The space of time occupied by the stay of this colony is divided between nine monarchs who constitute our second dynasty. The first of these was Nuadha of the Silver Hand, a valiant champion, round whom a vapor of romantic legend floats, successfully concealing his real character and person, if a real person existed. He was so called from the possession of a silver member which had all the good without the bad qualities of his lost hand. This he lost in the first battle with the Firbolgs, and as its loss constituted a blemish, he was debarred from the government until it could be replaced, the crown being given to Breas of the Formorian tribe. The physician of Nuadha took seven years to affix the metal limb to the royal person, and when it was attached his son endowed it with life, so that Nuadha, luckier than Midas, saw his hand turned to silver without its losing its flexibility or power. Dr. Douglas Hyde in his "Literary History of Ireland" quotes an old poem (having, it need hardly be remarked, little historical value) of which Breas is the hero, or rather villain, as it does not by any means paint a flattering portrait of him. The poet represents the chieftains and princes complaining of the way in which Breas received their visits and the want of regal entertainment which marked the Formorian's palace. No poets, nor jesters, nor jugglers were called out to delight the guests, and worst insult of all, the king was so sparing and economical in his banquets that "the breath of the chieftains did not smell of beer."21

<sup>17</sup> Haverty, Hist. of Ireland, p. 5; Flaherty, Ogygia, III., 9.
18 Note in Four Masters, I., 16.
19 Keating, Hist. of Ireland, p. 76.
20 D. Hyde, Literary Hist. of Ireland, XI., 113.
21 Douglas Hyde, Literary History, XXIII., 284.

When Breas was deposed, as his conduct certainly deserved, he had the great want of politeness to protest and excited a civil war between his friends (the Firbolgs and Formorians) and the De In the first battle, which the poem describes in vivid detail, Nuadha was killed by Balor, a Formorian giant, who himself met his death at the hands of Lewy of the long hand, Goliathlike, with a stone from a sling. This fight is known as the battle of North Moyturey.<sup>22</sup> In spite of these two crushing defeats, the Firbolgs were by no means exterminated and continued to give trouble occasionally. They dwelt in Connaught, and we read afterwards of an independent king of the Firbolgs named Srang, who reigned contemporaneously with the Tuatha de Danaan.28 Moreover, some Irish families trace their ancestry back to the Firbolgs, and none seem willing to crown their pedigree with a De Danaan name. The latter all became fairies, and Irishmen always preferred a distant to a close connection with such beings.24

The third king was Lewy of the long hand, who instituted the celebrated fair at Teltown, which was held on the 1st of August annually in honor of his foster mother. Dagda More, who succeeded him, was buried on the banks of the Boyne between Slane and Drogheda. Then follow two monarchs of lesser note, and finally we come to the reign of the last three De Danaan kings whose queens gave three names to the island which their husbands governed. These designations, Banba, Eire and Fodhla, tradition has rendered familiar to all. The reason why the name of Eire seems to predominate in its application to Ireland is because when the Milesians landed the husband of Eire reigned.<sup>26</sup>

These princes governed the land each alternate year, and are known in history by names derived from the different forms of religious worship which they practiced. Thus the first was called MacCuill, because he adored a log of wood. MacCeacht's religious affections centred round a plough, while MacGrain had the sun for his deity. Prosaic history again steps in and suggests that perhaps the first was noted for his tendency to cut down trees, the second for his agricultural propensities and that the last alone might justly be called a son of the sun from his god.

Just one other character deserves mention in connection with the Tuatha de Danaan, namely, Manannan MacLir, King of Mona or Man, who, strangely practical for the romantic age in which he lived, dealt in wholesale merchandise and grew rich as Crœsus,

<sup>22</sup> O'Rorke, Hist. of Sligo, II., xxx., 260-270.

<sup>23</sup> MacFirliss, Tract on the Firbolgs.

<sup>24</sup> Donovan, Four Masters, I., 24.

<sup>25</sup> Keating, Hist. of Ireland, 81; Douglas Hyyde, Literary History, V., 48.

while his neighbors chivalrously chopped and sliced each other. He met his death near Lough Corrib probably while engaged enlarging his stock.<sup>26</sup> The name MacLir means "Son of the Sea," and O'Donovan remarks that there is a tradition in Derry that the spirit of MacLir lives in an enchanted castle opposite Inishowen and appears riding over the waves every seven years.<sup>27</sup>

In the reign of the three brothers the Milesians came to the land which they had seen with the mighty telescope from their towers in Spain, and the De Danaan and their memory were swept away like children's sand castles on the beach.

Here our history stops, and though the wanderings of the Gadelians and their sailing "from a land beyond the sea" can in no way be reckoned modern history, yet from their arrival the morning mists are dispelled and we see the sun commence to tint the waves.

Looking back over these old histories one question always suggests itself, and this sketch, slight though it be, would be very incomplete were we to finish it by steering clear of the difficulty. We always ask ourselves, How much of this can be taken for fact and how much must be consigned to the domains of pure fiction? None of us would think of accepting it with the unquestioning faith of children. We first of necessity try to explain away or totally reject the extraordinary and apply historical criteria to what remains, but even after a strict examination so much is fiction intertwined with fact that we find it impossible to draw a definite line of distinction.

In the first place, let it be understood that if we bring testimony in proof of the historical value of these early traditions it is merely a contention for the central facts, such as the existence of the colonies, their sailing hither and perhaps the principal battles, etc. We wash our hands of all dates and chronology and leave the details an open question.

Modern historical criticism grows more skeptical about these early wanderers, and some of the greatest authorities, such as Dr. Douglas Hyde, recognize only in the traditions an Irish mythology and in the characters so many gods. He says: "There is over it all a shadowy sense of vagueness, vastness, uncertainty." And concludes that particularly in the Tuatha de Danaan we are face to face with an Irish Pantheon.<sup>28</sup>

Dr. Joyce consigns these visitors to the mythological cycle and is inclined to deny the authenticity of the first Milesian kings also. He observes in his "Social History of Ancient Ireland:" "As to



<sup>26</sup> Douglas Hyde, Literary History, V., 54.

<sup>27</sup> Donovan, Four Masters, III., 532.

<sup>28</sup> Literary Hist., XXIV., 293.

the records of the very early kings, they cannot, of course, be received as history, but neither should they be rejected altogether; it is as much a fault to be too skeptical as to be too credulous."20

Nevertheless, in spite of the euhemerism of modern historians, the arguments usually urged in favor of our earliest inhabitants seem pleading.

If we go back into the last centuries and examine the opinions of historians up to the middle of the nineteenth century we shall see that all their attempts were directed to try and reconcile tradition with history and none of them altogether denied some historical foundation to the traditions.

MacGeoghegan sees no reason for doubting the existence of these old colonists, and Keating, lost in a labyrinth of fable and legend and vainly tugging at his Ariadne thread of ancient poetry, goes to great pains to prove that all contrary opinions are mere prejudices. O'Flaherty, Charles O'Conor and others in the eighteenth century held the same opinion about the reality of the early tribes. In the nineteenth century we have O'Donovan and Petrie standing in defense of the existence of our Eastern visitors, and Thomas Moore, though skeptical, thinks that at least the Firbolgs and De Danaan were real personages.80 Later on in the century Haverty in his Irish history wrote: "However they may be enveloped in fable, we have sufficient reason for believing them to be founded on historical fact and that they are not lightly to be set aside when nothing better than conjecture can be substituted."81

The reasons which induced these writers to think that the early inhabitants of our isle were not the shadowy beings that romance would make them seem to be briefly as follows:

First, the great antiquity which the unanimous voice of all historians accords to our island. Camden, whom none will accuse of partiality, remarks: "From the deepest sources of antiquity the history of the Irish is taken, so that in comparison with them that of other nations is but a novelty and a beginning."32 In a poem, "The Argonauts," written about the sixth century before Christ, mention is made of Ireland under the name of Iernis, while Britain is passed over in silence, and it is thought that Ireland was well known to the Phœnicians about the time of Homer. For the development of this argument the reader can be referred to Moore's "History of Ireland," where the author brings forward a great number of examples of the knowledge which the earliest peoples had of Ireland, and thus proves the great antiquity of the island.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Ancient Ireland, v. I., c. III., Part I., 68.
<sup>80</sup> Literary History, V. 47, 48; Dr. Joyce, Irish Place Names.
<sup>81</sup> Haverty, Hist, of Ireland, p. 4.

<sup>32</sup> MacGeoghegan, Hist. of Ireland, note, chap. II., 28 (edition 1844).

Secondly, there is nothing absurd in the assertion that Ireland could have been colonized and well known to travelers while the sister isle remained a deserted and lonely land, though some hold that all the colonies who arrived on the western island passed through England. Moore asserts in proof of their separate colonization the fact that the two countries suffered very different vicissitudes in their early histories. The Romans held military possession of England for four centuries, and in spite of their fearless, enterprising disposition we have every reason to believe that during all that time the presence of a legionary was unknown in the neighboring isle.<sup>88</sup>

Granting that the first colonists came from the South, via Spain—and it is historically certain that the Mediterranean and its bordering countries formed the earliest seat of civilization long before venturesome travelers penetrated the forests of Hungary or braved Alpine snows—it is not improbable that ships sailing more or less at random out into the Atlantic Ocean would strike Ireland sooner than England.

In our earliest history we led a separate, independent existence, with little connection with outside lands, and found enough to talk about in our own secluded world.

Thirdly. Although it is admitted that among primitive peoples oral traditions were sometimes transmitted from generation to generation with surprising fidelity and exactness, nevertheless, the breath of time would dim the bright silver of truth and fable and legend usually became intricately intermingled with fact. So it would prove a strong argument against the veracity and reliability of Irish annals if our ancestors could be proved ignorant of a written language. But it seems placed beyond a doubt that long before the coming of St. Patrick a written language flourished and was widely known to the learned men in Ireland, and our only difficulty is in probing the darkness to discover the first appearance of Ogham. Dr. Joyce in several places in his social history and Dr. Douglas Hyde in a special chapter of his "Literary History of Ireland" discuss the antiquity of the Ogham characters.<sup>34</sup>

Fourthly. Nor does it seem possible to indict the Irish annalists on the charge of carelessness or intentional negligence in their writings, as amongst a host of witnesses for the defense the following examples of accuracy brought forward by Moore, Dr. Joyce and others would sufficiently exculpate them:

The date of an eclipse which took place on the 1st of May in the year 664 A. D. is recorded by an historian, and its truth has



<sup>88</sup> Moore, Hist. of Ireland, VIII., 164.

<sup>34</sup> Literary Hist., XI., 109.

been proved by modern astronomical observation. The Venerable Bede, writing only half a century after the event, mistakes the date and gives the 3d of May. The historian in that age could not have employed scientific means to discover the time of the eclipse and must have had ocular proof of its appearance.<sup>35</sup>

The account of the high tide in Dublin Bay during the battle of Clontarf is another case where personal experience has been proved by subsequent investigations.

Fifthly. We must confess ourselves baffled in trying to discover the first period in which our country's annals commenced to be recorded.<sup>36</sup> The oldest writings that we have make reference to still older manuscripts, and they stretch back indefinitely and beyond recall. That the Irish respected the historical profession and gave all facilities for study, etc., is certain from what we know of our history. Each chieftain considered his rank very inadequately supported if he did not possess amongst his regular retinue an historical writer who chanted the exploits of his lord and his clan.<sup>37</sup>

Our forefathers were a conservative people and treasured customs in proportion to their antiquity, but we read of no custom which was treasured like the custom of having and supporting bards and historians. Their conservatism is characteristically exemplified by the following story:

About the time of the Christian era King Conor MacNessa, King of Ulster, organized a tournament, at which the greatest knights of Erin contended. Hither came Cuchulain in his seventh year, and despite his tender age his achievements were so astonishing that the King deemed the "enfant terrible" worthy of the accolade and knighted him. Hence came the custom of dubbing the sons of chieftains, princes, etc., knights at the age of seven years. And it remained unchanged until long after the English invasion of Ireland. When Prince John, after plucking the beards of the princes who came to meet him at Waterford, felt some political remorse for his disgraceful conduct, he offered to knight his visitors, but they replied that they had that honor conferred on them in their seventh year. A century later we have the testimony of Froissart that the custom still continued and only gradually disappeared.

Sixthly. There is a remarkable concord and consistency in the old accounts and deviations and differences are only in the details,



<sup>25</sup> Literary History, IV., 39; Moore, Hist. of Ireland, VIII., 166; Joyce, Ancient Ireland, Vol. I., Pt. II., XIV., 515.

<sup>86</sup> Joyce, Ancient Ireland, I., XV., 531; Literary History, VIL, 71.

<sup>37</sup> Ancient Ireland, I., 65 and 528,

while all admit the salient points. The historians were always bards also, and if the traditions have come down to us principally in poetry, there is no reason why, when we have successfully or unsuccessfully brushed away the poetic embellishments, that we should not behold some real life happenings. The early Greek poets handed down historical events and personages which were none the less true for their artistic clothing. The fact that they were in poetry rather insured their safe transmission from mouth to mouth in an age when only the very learned could read.

Seventhly. The geographical position of Ireland. This argument for the real existence of our earliest visitors is urged by Petrie and Pinkerton.<sup>58</sup> A colony could have lived and perished here unknown to the world and only left internal traces of its life. We can scarcely look to England or any neighboring nation for confirmation of the assertions of our bards, as there is little evidence of relations with foreign lands in our very early history.

Finally, it is customary to adduce the testimony of the historical and topographical remains preserved in our old place names.<sup>30</sup> As a parting shot we might remark that several Irish families—at least up to the eighteenth century—claim descent from the Firbolgs.

These are the principal proofs advanced by writers for the reality of the existence of the old Irish colonists; and though modern historical criticism seems to deny their value, nevertheless they cannot be passed over as unworthy of consideration.

As has been stated, the dates and years are an exaggerated monstrosity which would require an elastic credulity to accept, but even this could not directly invalidate the truth of the central facts. Thomas Moore in his history<sup>40</sup> affirms that the ancient Egyptians boasted of a period of 11,340 years between two kings, Menes and Lethon, and yet the two monarchs truly lived—the hyperbole did not affect the reality.

The Romans had their Romulus and Remus—they believed in them and were proud of them—later ages thought them myths—but modern research tends to show that they lived and modeled the kernel of the empire of the Cæsars.<sup>41</sup> May it not be the same with us? We accept the existence of Greeks and Romans as certain, though the authority is not much stronger than that brought forward by our own historians for our own forefathers.

At any rate, let us treat these old traditions gently and not tear them to shreds by a superficial, prejudiced criticism, for sometimes when with heavy eyes and heavier hearts we pore over the blood

<sup>28</sup> Joyce, Ancient Ireland, Vol. L. III., 69.

<sup>39</sup> Literary History, V., 47, 48; Dr. Joyce, Irish Place names.

<sup>40</sup> V. 75.

<sup>41</sup> Lanciani, Rome in the Light of Recent Discovery.

and tear-stained pages of our country's annals and sadly ponder the useless "what might have been" it may lighten our minds to close the dreary volume and turn to the brighter contemplation of "Ireland ere the dawn of history."

SHAUN MACSHANE.

# THE PHILOSOPHY OF LITERATURE.

THE aim proposed in this article is to find and establish those rules of writing, to follow which gives, ceteris paribus, Literature. Looked at from another point of view, its aim may be said to propose a complete philosophic explanation of all the precepts commonly given in text-books and manuals. Again, it may be looked on as furnishing an entire code of criticism, a solid rock always to be relied on and fallen back on in every emergency.

With these remarks we start immediately on our subject by laying down a definition of Literature, and say it is the beautiful expression of thought by speech. This definition will immediately be seen to divide itself up into two parts, one general—"the beautiful expression of thought"—this is art; and one particular "by speech," by which Literature is differentiated from the other arts, e. g., statuary, the expression of an ideal by carving, etc. The first part is still further divided up into the two notions, of Beauty, and of the expression of thought, by which art is differentiated from that other manifestation of beauty—nature.

These three notions we shall take up in turn, beginning with the more general, Beauty, and descending to Art and Speech. In all this discussion we must bear in mind that we are not studying each idea in and for itself, but solely as each is an element of the definition of literature. With this caution we briefly proceed.

#### I. BEAUTY.

It seems strange that while nothing is so common, we might say, as beauty, such great difficulty should be experienced in defining it. Because of the number and variety of beautiful objects, because of frequent disagreements as to what is beautiful, attempts at classification, and still more at definition, have usually proved futile; then, too, where some have succeeded, they have only partially succeeded; they touch only one side of the question, they give only snapshots from one standpoint.

We shall try not to imitate this latter process, and shall present the subject under all its aspects, with the assurance that it is only in uniting all the points of view that the true definition can be found.

The whole question, then, naturally falls into two grand divisions, the beautiful, its nature and effects on us; this is the science of æsthetics proper; and the applications and realizations of Beauty; this is Art. Putting aside for the moment the latter, let us take the former division. Immediately it, in its turn, falls into two considerations; that of the nature of beauty, its objective side; that of its effects on us, the subjective side. Of these, the first completes the second, and gives us our whole looked-for theory.

I. First of all, everybody will admit that the feeling evoked in us by beauty is one of pleasure. In a very general way, then, the æsthetic emotion is a pleasure. We are now sure that we have an idea that contains the notion we seek; we will gradually draw it in closer until we have caught just the precise definition needed. The æsthetic emotion is a pleasure, but not every pleasure is the æsthetic emotion; far from it. We must first discover, then, what kind of a pleasure it is. First, however, what is pleasure?

God, in creating man, put into him an irresistible need of action. In its last analysis, this need of action is his tendency towards perfection. Now, the satisfaction of this need we call by the name of happiness, and when this happiness is incomplete and limited to the satisfaction of some one particular desire it is called pleasure.<sup>1</sup>

What, then, is pleasure? It is the "repose" of a faculty in the object it pursues. Now, for a faculty to repose in its object, far from meaning cessation from action, means the fullest and completest activity. But "the maximum of activity must be obtained with a minimum of fatigue." The faculty gives full play to all its forces in possessing its object, and it has its pleasure in accomplishing its end—to act.

But are we going to admit that every pleasure resulting from the full activity of every faculty is æsthetic pleasure? No; it is clear at the first glance. For, first of all, the activity of every faculty does not give æsthetic pleasure; nor does every activity of the faculties that are concerned here give it, either. As to the first point: We are forced, before all, to establish with what faculties the pleasure of beauty is concerned and with what it is not, and say at once, it is only concerned with the cognitive faculties, the senses of sight and hearing, the understanding, the reason.

This is proved by experience. We do not say we have had beau-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Rabier, E., Leçons de Philosophic, II., p. 633, and De Smedt, Essal de Phil. de Literature.



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Aristotle, Ethics, Lib. x., c. iv., and Maher, Psychology, p. 222.

tiful exercise, or "a beautiful smell," or that chocolates have a beautiful taste. That only is beautiful which has to do with knowledge, that is clear. The pleasure is an intellectual one. St. Thomas sums this up very well.<sup>3</sup> "It is of the nature of beauty," he says, "to satisfy the appetites by its mere aspect, or the mere knowledge of it; hence only those senses are concerned with beauty that are especially cognitive. Besides, we do not call odors and tastes beautiful," etc.

So, then, it is only within the range of the pleasures of the cognitive faculties that æsthetic pleasure lies. But once again, the two pleasures are not identical, i. e., every faculty activity is not an æsthetic activity, for here we are led to distinguish two more shades of thought. According to the aim sought, every activity is either interested or disinterested. It is the distinction between work and play. To take an example. We are examining, say, the theory of Probabilism. We do so to settle a case of conscience, and we are said to be "interested." We do it merely for the sake of doing so, and we are disinterested. In the latter case the pleasure the faculties give us by being put in full action is æsthetic. We divert all our forces to the immediate object of seeking the answer, but we take a pleasure, nevertheless, and the pleasure is æsthetic.

To sum up, we can, then, say in a general manner that when the activity is cognitive, and that disinterested, its satisfaction gives æsthetic pleasure. This is a considerable modification of the definition we started out with, but one careful process of elimination assures us it is the right one. All the ideas it contains are also clear, and the reader is in a position to grasp this first step in our march toward the definition of beauty.

2. But it is only a first step. It has indeed been placed as the sole definition obtainable of beauty by Kant, Schiller and many modern English æsthetes; indeed, all whose subjectivist tendencies force them to it.

Their position is plain. Taking for granted that there is no such thing as objective beauty, they give as its definition all that provokes this disinterested faculty-play. We will go one step towards the other extreme, taking our place in the middle—always the safe place. Admitting beauty to be in great part determined by the subject—his circumstances, frame of mind, etc.—we can at least say in a more defined way what it is objectively.

It is plain that the theory thus far developed explains only half of the problem. Why is the faculty satisfied? What and of what

<sup>8</sup> Summa, 1, 2ae. 27. 1, ad 8.

<sup>4</sup> Rabier, ibid, 632, 507.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> G. Sortais, Traité de philosophie, Vol. II., p. 698.

nature is the object in which it "reposes?" You will say everything that causes it disinterested satisfaction. But that is a circle, and circles are not satisfying. Why does it cause satisfaction? That is the question we must face and set ourselves to answer.

The answer is plain enough.

The æsthetic emotion is primarily concerned with the mind. Looked at in this light, the need of action we have spoken of becomes a need to know. Our mind is made to know, as an animal is made to eat and sleep, and as a knife is made to cut and a gun to shoot. That is its end, and it results from its nature and the nature of things. Now, once that need is satisfied, it reposes there, it has enough for the present with the object it has found. And if its activity has been "æsthetic," in the sense we have defined, the resultant pleasure is æsthetic, and the object, we know, must be beautiful. But what is the object? That is precisely the question. What is it that makes it beautiful? What, too, is this need of the mind? What is the mind made to know?

Metaphysicians answer by one word, "Being." In Latin they call it "ens" and the French call it "être," both of which words are ever so much more expressive than our own. But however unsatisfactory the word, the idea is of the commonest, as are most of the ideas metaphysicians set themselves to define.

When we say the mind is made to know, and to know being, we only say it seeks the reality, i. e., that which is. It thirsts for contact with what is, and for nothing else under the sun; for the very simple reason, perhaps, that there is nothing else under the sun, or beyond it, than that which is. But in this particular case we mean also to say that it seeks it under precisely this aspect, as being. The range of our mind is infinite; everything that is is knowable, and as such capable of satisfying our mind. Now, we gather up from all sides this idea of being and set it up in one grand transcendental quality of all things, and we say the "Supreme Being," that in which there is nothing but being is God. In us there are many contradictions, much that is unintelligible, i. e., much that is non-being, much imperfection. In God there is naught such; all is perfection and that perfection is to be. And we say, moreover, that a thing has "more being" in proportion as it approaches the Supreme Being—if we can be said to approach the infinite. A thing has more being as it is more perfect, more real, more Godlike. animal has more being than a plant, and man more than an animal, and so on.

These ideas once well defined, we can go on. Our way is now clear. The mind is made to know, to know being. It thirsts after being. By being, by the reality, by that which is, it is satisfied.

Its full activities are set in motion, in one grand sweeping act, by being—and that, for it, is pleasure. And what gives it pleasure? Being. Therefore, beauty is nothing else than—Being. And a thing is more beautiful in proportion as it has more being, as it accomplishes more in itself its eternal type in the Supreme Being above and comprehending all.

Objectively, then, the Beautiful is nothing else than Being,<sup>6</sup> the end and aim of all intellectual activity. It may be called the Plenitude of Being,<sup>7</sup> because a thing is more beautiful in proportion as it has more being. So a poem, a landscape, a painting please the more they show the mind of what the mind delights in.

But beauty is far from being completely that, as far indeed from that as it is far from being something merely subjective. What is it, then? The both together. This is the point, then, to be brought here. The two parts of this theory cannot be separated; one completes the other, either is incomplete alone. "Being" satisfies the cognitive faculties and so gives them pleasure, yes; but it is only on condition that their activity is a disinterested one, that there is æsthetic pleasure; and consequently beauty connoted in the object.

These are the two determining conditions of beauty. One completes the other, and together they form the definition of the Beautiful. "Whenever a thing appears to us exactly as it ought to be, possessing all possible good qualities, corresponding to a definite ideal and realizing the type of its species, it astonishes us, charms us; we gather from it an æsthetic impression." Granted; but only on condition that it is perceived by a faculty at play, acting disinterestedly. We take little pleasure in a problem of mathematics if in view of building a house or laying out a garden; but we might were we working out the problem for the mere sake of doing it.

A very important proof of this, and one that will recur frequently, is this: Beauty pleases by its form, not its matter. In the interested activity we seek what is, for some good to be got from that; when disinterested or æsthetic, it stops at its exterior dress, which is enough to satisfy its contemplation; it halts and considers the voice or tone of the messenger, and not the grave or gay import of the message. In the latter we make the shell our aim; in the former we push past it to get at the kernel within. "In the presence of a

<sup>6</sup> This is recognized by more than one—e. g., by Taine, where one would least expect to find it (Philosophie de l'Art, I., 48): "Art is philosophy, metaphysics in a sensible form." Now, the object of all metaphysics is being. And De Wulf (Rev.-Neo-Schol., 1907, p. 492): "Æsthetics is a study of metaphysics, because the object of both is being."

<sup>7</sup> Ch. Boucaud, L'amour et l'être, Rev. de phil., Jan., 1907, p. 31.

<sup>8</sup> Paul Sourian, Le Beauté Rationelle, p. 113.

<sup>9</sup> Henri Poincaré (quoted by J. Verest in Manuel de Lit., p. 33).

real hero or a real Tartuffe æsthetic pleasure is not possible, but once the form is separated from the matter and presented in a work of art, play can come in and even the fearful be beautiful."<sup>10</sup> In this discursive faculty-play the form sought is nothing in the concrete but the realization of the Divine ideal type. And we shall see later on how Beauty is sought because at its base lies Divine Beauty Itself. This is a remarkable confirmation of our theory. Another is this: We know that it is the form that gives being to a thing; this is why beauty, which is, after all, being, is in the form. The theory, then, holds closely together.

This, therefore, is our acquisition, the result of our search: Beauty is being—perfection,<sup>11</sup> if you will—perceived by the cognitive faculties in the disinterested play of their activity.

This would be the place to go into long explanations of the progress in the perception of beauty, the relativity of beauty, etc., but we shall not do it. We will content ourselves with a few interesting and more concrete applications of the theory before passing on to the second part of this discussion.

First of all, a particular glance at the faculties here concerned, and after that a remark on how beauty is manifested in nature.

That only those faculties which more particularly bring us knowledge are concerned is clear. These faculties are twofold, sensible and spiritual. Of the senses, only the so-called superior ones, sight and hearing, can perceive beauty.<sup>12</sup> The taste, etc., are not æsthetic because they are inseparably connected with the preservation of life, i. e., all their activity is interested; and this is why we say the taste of meat is good, not beautiful. In other words, the form is inseparable from the matter in this case, and so the faculty cannot dwell on it alone.<sup>18</sup>

For the same reason the higher senses are æsthetic. They can abstract from the form, dwell on it, admire it, contemplate it. If we examine the particular cases, everywhere we see the general law confirmed. In the words of Spenser: "Reautiful sounds are those that cause the greatest pleasure." And Aristotle: "That there is a pleasure in every act of the perceptive faculty is plain, for we say sights and sounds are pleasant. Those sounds are beautiful that set the ear faculty in pleasant and harmonious motion.

Again, the eye sees colors and forms. Here again every activity means pleasure, and the higher the excitation and the smaller the



<sup>10</sup> Rabier, op. oit., p. 639.

<sup>11</sup> As Sourian (op. cit., p. 106), without our addition.

<sup>12</sup> De Smedt, La Théorie du beau, pp. 12-13.

<sup>13</sup> Rabier, op. cit., p. 635.

<sup>14</sup> Quoted by Rabier, ibid, p. 637.

<sup>15</sup> Ethics, x., 4.

fatigue, the greater the pleasure. Red and orange do not "go well together," because, for physiological reasons, the optic nerve is too violently wrenched in comparing them. There is no harmonious activity. Again, curved lines are more beautiful than broken ones for the same reason of causing a smoother activity. And movement, the third object of sight, is more beautiful when horizontal than when vertical, because the eye is rested thereby.

The same can be repeated for the higher faculties. All said of the senses is true for the imagination as well, where the same operations are interiorly reported and repeated.<sup>18</sup> For the emotions it is still the same. Sober activity pleases, violent hurts and displeases. Likewise even a theory can be very beautiful, because the intelligence finds there a ground to use disinterestedly its highest activity, to find the truth. And the same for the will. Everywhere the conclusion is the same,<sup>19</sup> the violent activity displeases, and what causes it is hideous, deformed, ugly; while that is pleasant, admirable, beautiful, that provokes a sweet, rich and harmonious activity of the faculty that makes it its object.

Again, take beauty as it is found in nature. Why and in what degree is nature beautiful? All by symbolism, especially in the inorganic world. Indeed, this is the fundamental law of all symbolism. Nature is only beautiful except as it mirrors higher life, first man and then God. The ocean suggests eternity and is beautiful, as is the mountain that recalls majesty and power. So much is this true that the greatest perfection of the inorganic world is to be symbolic of what is higher.<sup>20</sup> "Nature is beautiful as it mirrors, realizes, the form, the idea type of the Divine ideal;"<sup>21</sup> its power to please us is at its highest when it suggests the greatness, nobleness, goodness of God.

A third remark to make explains further the wording of the definition. We said that Beauty is being. Is, then, everything that exists, that has being, beautiful? In what does beauty differ from the object of the intelligence and will, which is also being? A first answer is made by calling attention to the other part of the definition, where the second essential is insisted on, the disinterested activity of the faculties. But another idea may be brought forward that will considerably enlighten the question. It is this: Being can be sought for itself or for some ulterior end. When sought for an end, for the matter, it is good or true according as it strikes the

<sup>16</sup> Grant Allen, Rev. Philosophique, v., 91.

<sup>17</sup> Sully, Rev. Phil., ix., 498.

<sup>18</sup> De Smedt, Essai, etc., p. 16.

<sup>19</sup> Id., ibid, p. 20.

<sup>20</sup> Labre, Philosophie, I., 338-339.

<sup>21</sup> Verest, op.cit., p. 857.

will-passion, love—or the mind—understanding, reason; when it is sought for itself, for its form, it is beautiful in relation to all the faculties. The two extremes are inseparable. Beauty, goodness, truth, exist, inasmuch as they round out a faculty; at bottom they are one.

This seems the proper place to point out that we are not neglecting what is very evidently an important element in the perception of beauty. That is the emotional element. It is true that this enters in greatly, but just as true that it is only secondary. The sensible emotion, the "trembling of the soul," that rises in us at sight of beauty is the aftermath of the thrill our cognitive faculties receive. It runs all along the gamut of our being, starting in the high regions of the mind and ending by reverberating all up and down the profoundest depths of our hearts. It is the deeper echo that follows the higher and clearer call of the mind; deeper, but secondary, nevertheless, in time and importance.

But these fields of thought are poor and barren compared with the grand perspectives that open out before us on taking another point of view.

The reader will have noticed that there is a progress in the perception of beauty, which is nothing else than the natural progress the mind makes in its wider experience. The uncivilized savage is ravished at the sight of an old silk hat; we have gone further in our appreciation. And as there is a progress of nations, so there is one of individuals. Now, what is this progress in its last analysis? We have in us an incontrovertible tendency to an end. Since we are intelligent creatures, this tendency, for our mind, is towards the Supreme Being, the only thing that can satisfy us perfectly, because for that we are made and, in some sort, proportioned. Our experience of beauty is a constant progress towards this end; every time we see something more beautiful we see something nearer the Supreme and Eternal Beauty.<sup>22</sup> And the æsthetic emotion we feel at the sight of that is nothing more at bottom than our love—the love of every being-for the Supreme Being whence comes all being, the tendency of every nature towards God.28

Man loves being; there is the motor-force of the universe,<sup>24</sup> and this love of beauty, of the fullness of being, is his proper and essential feeling as a man.

Hence we shall be perfectly satisfied with the Beatific Vision,<sup>26</sup> because then we shall see Being in its greatest possible fullness,



<sup>22</sup> Labre, op. oit., I., 339; De Smedt, Théorie, etc., end.; luis. xiii., 1-6.

<sup>28</sup> Verest, op. cit., p. 386.

<sup>24</sup> Rev. de Phil., l. c.

<sup>28</sup> Гыд.

and there and there only the activities of our soul's faculties will be fully occupied and satisfied, because only then shall we have reached our final end. There Being and Love, the sources of all beauty, will be perfectly united. All Beauty comes from God, because a thing is beautiful only as it mirrors God, the Supreme Being, Beauty Itself.<sup>26</sup>

This is the grand source and well-spring of the spiritual life, for here man is interested in Being for its sake alone. Here his activities are disinterested. Now, the Supremest of Beings is God; hence the march of the saint to God. The saint is the best of artists, says Plato,<sup>27</sup> "because he ceaselessly labors to produce in his soul the image of the highest Beauty, Absolute Beauty, God;" and we, seeing more than the pagan, can fill in his words—"because he produces in his soul the Ideal Beauty incarnate, Jesus Christ."

The essence, then, of the artistic, scientific and mystical lives is one and the same. "The psychology of the philosopher and that of the saint are little different from that of the poet. They are, all three, lovers of Being; the poet suggests its interesting and mysterious problem, the philosopher examines it and the saint resolves it. Art, Science, Religion—they are the three great stages in the soul's grand pursuit of Being."<sup>29</sup>

Two consequences of this interesting doctrine are worth glancing at. We see now, of course, what is the Ugly. Anybody knows it is the contrary of Beauty. We can go further. God is all Beauty; then, sin which is committed against God is the original ugliness; so a sin against created beauty is what we call the Ugly.<sup>30</sup> Then, too, we have here the only true solution of the problem of the Ethics of Art. Sin is essentially ugly. Hence any artist that introduces the immoral into a work of art commits a fatal error; his work is for that very reason not a work of art, because for that very reason essentially ugly. But more of this later.

Besides the essential elements of beauty, there are others that, while not essential, are still conditions of beauty. Though useful, we can do no more than briefly indicate them, believing it useless to dwell on any, especially as they have been so fully developed by many who posit them as definitions. A concise analytic view will suffice.

They naturally fall into two classes—those governing the object and those governing the subject. Now, the object must have a

<sup>26</sup> De Smedt, 1. c.; of. luis. xiii., 1-6.

<sup>27</sup> Symposium, 209, A., B.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. "Jesus, the All-Beautiful," ch. I. (Burns & Oates).

<sup>29</sup> Ch. Boucaud, Rev. de Phil., l. c. p. 36.

<sup>30</sup> Verest, op. oit., pp. 357-358.

certain perfection in itself.31 This perfection means first of all proportion and order.<sup>32</sup> If considered with regard to itself solely, this order will in its turn be called moderation; that is to say, it will not be beautiful unless it be of a just proportion in itself, not too small nor too large to be perfect in its kind.83 The Jungfrau and a violet are beautiful, because they fulfill the perfection of their being. Again, if this proportion or order be considered with regard to its parts or to its surroundings,34 it is called harmony. Harmony of the parts demands two conditions, variety and a unity injected into it.86 Hence, to be beautiful a thing must realize its ideal type of perfection—both the Objective ideal, the Divine Idea and the Subjective ideal as our idea of the first.36 Then capping all these must be a certain splendor,<sup>37</sup> or, in other words, the perfection must not only be there, but be conspicuous, must have force, or "evidence."38 Of course, none of these things make beauty; they are but its conditions, not its definition; a flower, a landscape are not beautiful because they are perfect, proportioned, moderate, harmonious, varied and unified, but when they are all this.

The same remark applies to the two conditions required on the part of the subject. These are, first, that the interior appreciation of the beauty of a picture, a flower, must be made at one blow, one flash of intuition.<sup>39</sup> This intuition is followed by an emotion—not a sensation, but an emotion, "the trembling of the soul"—that makes the scene or the object seem rich and full to us, and once more sets a-light that love which is at base our love of the All-Beautiful, God. Here, too, must be observed that hierarchy of the faculties that Père Loughaye<sup>40</sup> puts at the base of all æsthetic emotion. It is that in the activity of the faculties each should have the importance its dignity demands, and no more and no less than that. The imagination, then, and still more the passions, must have no undue predominance over the higher, spiritual faculties, and

<sup>31</sup> S. Thom., I., 398, adds to the conditions proportion and splendor; a third perfection, embracing both. Cf. Sourian, 106.

<sup>82</sup> Given as beauty's definition by not a few.

<sup>33</sup> So when S. Thomas says "quae diminuta sunt, eo ipso turpia sunt" (I. 39, 8c.), this is what he means.

<sup>84</sup> This seems to be Taine's definition of beauty. Cf. Phil. de l'Art.

<sup>35</sup> Given as the definition of beauty by P. André (Essai sur le Beau) and Cousin (Du vrai, du bien, du beau, leçon, vii.e). Jouffroy (Cours d'esthétique, leç., 38), with Hegel (Esthética, L.), gives as definition "the expression of the soul." All these definitions manifestly err from taking one side only of the question. "Non soli et toti conveniunt."

<sup>36</sup> This is explained fully in its place. Cf. p. 24.

<sup>87</sup> Verest (op. cit., p. 36) calls beauty "la splendeur du vrai."

<sup>38</sup> As Sourian, op. cit., p. 115.

<sup>89</sup> Rabier, op. oit., pp. 624-625, and Mercier, Ontologie, pp. 503, 572.

<sup>40</sup> Théorie des Belles-Lettres, pp. 9, 19, 27.

any artist who persists in breaking this hierarchy commits a fundamental sin against art and prepares the way to intellectual anarchy.

#### 2. ART.

It is now time to pass to the second consideration, to take the second step in this inquiry into the nature of Literature. We have built up one element thereof; we now lay on it the first materials of the second. We have said Literature is one species of art; that art, which expresses itself by speech; just as sculpture is expression by carving, and so on. More of that later. Art we have defined as the beautiful expression of thought. What beauty is we know. Let us now see its place in the natural expression of man's thought.

The nature of the work of art—what makes it art—and its production; these are the two subjects of our inquiry.

Most people give for the aim of art the realization of the beautiful in the concrete, and as an ulterior aim, arousing æsthetic pleasure. Our definition can agree with this, and yet go one step further. For on what condition is a thing beautiful? That it shows us more "being." And on what condition will the fullness of being rouse æsthetic pleasure? That it be perceived with an æsthetic activity. But the æsthetic activity only concerns itself with the form in the beautiful object. Hence in art what causes æsthetic pleasure is the form. Now, in art the form is the expression, and so the essential foundation of art is the form of a thing, or beautiful expression. Therefore, the real end of art, given as the expression of beauty, becomes the beautiful expression of our thought; that is to say, that which is beautiful in art is the form, the expression; art's aim, which is to produce beauty, does so in the expression. The expression is beautiful, not necessarily the thought expressed. This follows from all that has been said.

The same idea can be brought out by looking at the question from another viewpoint. In art two distinct periods are recognized, conception and execution. In the former the elements are disposed, the matter is prepared. That, man cannot create, neither can he make it beautiful. It will be so in proportion as he penetrates further into the inner recesses of the mystery of being, but even there he must take it as he finds it; and some men find more, some less. But what man can create is the form. In the execution of his idea he can put more or less beauty. This is why the artist can make the ugly beautiful; the matter may be ugly, but the form is beautiful, and it is precisely inasmuch as he can do this that a man is an artist. So the inside of a peasant's hut can become beautiful on the canvas of a Teniers, and the man who can do this we call an artist.

It must be remarked here that we draw a sharp distinction between expression and execution The expression of an ideal, the form we mean to give it, is made before any concrete manifestation appears, i. e., before the ideal is realized, executed. It is the confusion of these two ideas that led to the false definition of art.

The formula "the expression of beauty" cannot stand for art. Firstly, according to the two infallible tests of a definition, all expression of beauty is not art—it might be badly expressed, for instance—and again, all art is not the expression of beauty, for sometimes the ugly is expressed in art, and in true art, too. It is made beautiful in the expression, in the form in which it, the matter, is encased. On the other hand, all art is the beautiful expression of thought. A man is an artist because he can express his thought, be it the most commonplace; in a beautiful manner, be it in verse or in marble. And all beautiful expression of thought is art, because the form, if beautiful, must infallibly cause æsthetic emotion, which is the universal and general idea of the aim of art.

Again, art work is essentially concrete; abstractions cannot be made the subject of art,<sup>42</sup> except as concreted; no man ever carved an abstract statue; an idea is realized, and the more beautifully it is realized the 'greater is the value of the masterpiece. As for the element of thought in the process, we shall examine it further on and see that the idea is not necessarily beautiful, that the beautiful does not enter into the concept of art until we begin to treat of expression.

Now, it is plain to all who think for a moment that a thing is not the same in nature and in art. The violet is not the same in the wood as on the canvas. Wherein precisely does this difference lie? In the fact that art exceeds, surpasses nature, goes beyond her in beauty. Why is this? Their ends differ; nature looks to have all things useful and good; art prescinds from this and looks to make an ideal world as beautiful as possible, and concentrates all her efforts to that. She is not bound down to all that nature is. In art the reality of the object disappears; the form alone remains. Now, in nature all that is ugly, disagreeable, contradictory, comes from the matter. Once eliminate that and the æsthetic activity finds nothing to hinder it, nothing to jar on it, since all the jarring elements are the material ones. It is Matter that displeases—i. e., imperfection, etc.—and it is by hypothesis absent in art. In nature, however, it is of necessity always present, painfully so, we might even say. This is why nature is surpassed by art; this at the same time affords a further insight into the nature of art.



<sup>41</sup> By "conversion." "Soli et toti definito convenire debet."

<sup>42</sup> Verest, op. cit., p. 346.

A further one is seen in a most beautiful and interesting comparison that might be made between the Divine Creation and the production of a work of art.<sup>48</sup> It is an extremely true one and might be carried very far. We shall sketch an outline or two.

In creation there is both beauty and use; we seek things for themselves or in an interested aim. Art takes only one of these to produce a beautiful object only, to give food only to a disinterested faculty. In God's works this food is furnished by the form, as we have seen; this is the element the artist takes from it. Again, God sees all things in Himself, in His own Infinite Essence: He sees there the idea-type, the exemplary cause; these, then, He, by an act of His will, realizes, and creation is accomplished. So does the artist see the objects of his creation, not indeed in his essence-but on the curtain of his mind; and in realizing them he produces a work of art. God's work is "to His own image and likeness." So is the artist's; his work bears his own character stamped on it; it is as he sees it; he cannot keep himself out of it, however "objective" his work may be. This is what Bacon means when he says: "Ars, homo additus naturæ." "So artistic masterpieces are signs and symbols of the human ideal, just as created beings are signs and symbols of the Divine Thought."44 And Father Faber says: "Creatures are God's works of art, His special ideas, His music, His poem."45 So when St. John says: "In the beginning was the Word," he is speaking of this Eternal expression of God to himself of His Divine Eternal Thought; just so, in a manner transcendentally inferior, the artist expresses his thought by the "inner word" (verbum interius) long before he ever touches pen to paper or chisel to the block of marble. Many other resemblances could be brought out, resemblances, but, be it noted, infinitely different in degree and nature; let these suffice.

We can say, then, in summing up, that the fundamental principle of art is to equal the actual execution to the idea preconceived, that beauty enters into art inasmuch as the matter is clothed in a beautiful expression, that this "expression" is already made before the actual execution; that the aim of art is to cause æsthetic pleasure by a concrete work, and that this is done by the beautiful expression of a thought—idea or emotion—of the artist. The value and perfection of a work of art is in proportion to the conformity of the execution to the idea; its beauty is in its form.

2. Let us now take up the two elements in art—the two factors

<sup>43</sup> It is developed at length in Rev. de Phil. (1903, p. 392, et seq.), Art et Science, by G. Sortais.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid, p. 392.

<sup>45</sup> Bethlehem.

that compose its nature—and look at each in concrete detail, that is, in reference to the actual production of a work of art. In every process of art there are two distinct periods, that of conception and that of execution. In the whole operation of producing a finished masterpiece these may intermingle—the poet may "think with his pen," as very frequently happens; but into the limning of each individual trait taken separately these two always enter, one before the other, the flash of genius that first sees the landscape in the imagination, and the handiwork that follows.

The production of a work of art is essentially a psychological process—and an interesting one—and as such we shall consider it.

The first step is the presentation, the evolution, the perfection of the idea. Outside the artist's mind is nature. As his eve roves over its landscapes, its life, its movement, he fixes on one idea. Now, this first germ-idea anybody may have. The artist goes further. The seed falls in good ground and the idea takes root. His attention is fixed on it, it becomes interesting, then absorbs his sensibility, his desires, his passions—he loves it for the fullness of being it contains. This is genius. Being an artist, he thinks of producing that idea; the idea has started on its journey through the mind; its terminus will be concrete reproduction. Now, this aim is present to the artist from the start, so the idea does not turn up the way to pure intellectuality; it turns down towards the sensible; it becomes incarnated in a living image. Then it goes on, and as it goes it gathers to it, by association, all kindred ideas and emotions by its way. These ideas, images and emotions have rested where they were first put, in the artist's apprenticeship, when he went around begging from nature, studying her, borrowing from her. Now they are aroused by the master-idea and rally round it.

Here, then, is one chief idea, and a pell-mell mass of other ideas, relevant and irrelevant, around it. Then commences another work, more active on the part of the artist. He sets before him this one idea to be brought out, one effect to be achieved, one "dominant character to stand forth." Then from among that mass of other ideas he selects the means to the end before him. Those that will not help he dismisses, to use another time. Those that will help he selects. This is the task of "taste." Now, these means will be the component and subordinate elements of the masterpiece. They will not suit just as they are; they must be changed to fit, made to bear more directly on the chief idea. They must all converge on that. They must be shaped to make a graceful and shapely vessel;

<sup>46</sup> Taine, Phil. de l'Art, Vol. II., p. 3. Poe insists on this for the short story.



they must be sawed and planed, fitted to the grand whole. And then finally, when this is done, when the idea of his work is perfectly formed, when all is subordinated and in place, then the idea which was planted in the beginning has sprung up into—the ideal. Henceforth all his efforts will be to realize this ideal in the concrete.

But first let us look at the value of each of the ideas thus far exposed.

Before all, what led the artist to go through all these phases? What was he aiming at? What guided him in the long labor of rejecting and selecting and changing his means? It was the sight of one thing—an ideal; all was looking to that. Of course, we must admit that in this process the conceptions borrowed from nature do undergo a metamorphosis, a sublimation—a transfiguration, if you will; that is, there is an ideal in art. On that point rests the whole theory of art.

Two ideals must be distinguished between at the outset. We have seen that every created thing is created, inasmuch as it is a realization of an ideal type, the exemplary cause of its perfection. This is the objective ideal; it is eternal, divine, the Thought of God. Now man, who has this necessary, fatal tendency to the Infinite feels it in this case, too, and this other ideal we have spoken of before (p. 23)—the subjective ideal—is his striving to reach that perfect eternal ideal of each thing; it is his idea of what that is in itself. He does not see it, nor reach it directly, but he has a tendency to find out what is the perfection of the object before him. So, in a certain way, those writers are justified who insist so strongly that the ideal is not one single fixed type for each thing. To all practical purposes it is not; each man conceives his ideal differently. This is the reason why no matter how old a thought may be it can always be made new by individual thought, if only a man will do it.

This process of idealization is usual, necessary, just. Imitation is not art; art is not art if it imitates perfectly. The photograph is not a work of art. Art is imitative, yes; but the thing is imitated as I see it, as it passes through my mind and is executed by my hand. In this fact lies the implicit condemnation of the school of Realism. In reality there are two points of view, Idealism and Realism. Undue pressure on either leads to vice and error. Many are the reasons for this. Not the least is the fact that, no matter how hard an artist may try, he cannot imitate exactly, he cannot keep out of his work his own personality—his own or a borrowed one. Then, by the very conditions of art it is impossible; the candle flame—with fire and light—cannot be reproduced on the canvas; it must be subjected to art's conditions; music is not a mere mocking-

bird song of the noises of nature.<sup>47</sup>. Imitation is a contradiction,<sup>48</sup> art is not nature, nature is better than any imitation, and, as we have seen, art surpasses, goes beyond nature, in unity and general beauty. If it does not, it ceases to be art.<sup>49</sup>

On the other hand, pure idealism is equally reprehensible and impossible in practice. It is the mean, the joining of the two, that strikes the true note; the artist must not turn his face away from nature, he must not turn away from the mirror he will hold up to her; but, on the other hand, he will not, as a true artist, servilely copy her; he cannot if he would, for his impression must pass through the will of his mind; it will come out as he conceives its type of perfection—and this is the true, the only tenable Idealism. It can be expressed in one word—Interpretation; the artist interprets nature; he seizes her relations, coördinates them, presents them in unity, sounds just the precise notes he catches of that

. . . still sad music of humanity,
. . . that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things.

The artist exists only on account of nature; she is mistress, he is messenger; but he reports his message in his own way.

Another notion or two on the ideal, for greater clearness. The ideal is the middle stage between conception and execution; the former culminates in it, the latter strives after it, just as the former was striving after the objective ideal. This ideal we speak of is the internal expression of his idea of perfection; the execution is his mere effort to realize that expression as best he can with the hard, unwieldy clay of words. The ideal is a sensible, internal form in the imagination; the work of art is a sensible form—external, in fact, and more or less resembling the ideal.

By sin creation is a wreck, a sad and dreary ruin. And sin is essentially ugly. Ugly are its effects. But the mind can rebuild this ugly ruin; it can withhold its gaze from the defects of poor, maimed nature, and see in her only what she ought to have been, what God meant her to be. This is idealizing. It is the mystic gaze of the privileged one who is admitted to look at things in their beginnings, as they are in the creating hand of God, to whom it is given to conceive, more nearly than the rest of men, what was and is for ever the sublime, transcendent Thought of God in

<sup>49</sup> Besides, art is freed from the laws nature is subjected to—of time and space, teleological and physical. Art rises above nature. Of. Rabier, op. oft., p. 649.



<sup>47</sup> Mercier, Ontologie, p. 600.

<sup>48</sup> Of course, this does not refer to "imitation," such as it is, given as a practice exercise in writing, painting, etc. That is imitation of another piece of art. We are speaking of direct imitation of nature.

contemplation of His own ineffable Essence. This will be the ideal man, an equation with that which God meant him to be.

Before passing to the second step in art—the execution of the realization of the ideal, a look must be cast at what intervenes. The ideal is conceived; what makes the artist speak it out? What has made him think all along of speaking it out? Whence is the force behind that rushing torrent of beauty? What is its nature? The answer is, inspiration. But what is inspiration, that motor force, the gift of artists only? In part we have already stated it, but more remains to be said.

Kant and the German school<sup>50</sup> give as one of the qualities of the æsthetic emotion Universality, by which they mean a force compelling us to speak out what we have seen. A better word given is Sociability. It is evident that they refer to inspiration; it is one step forward. The researches of some modern psychologists can help us accomplish the task. Among these we find a law<sup>51</sup> known as "the Dynamic Law of Ideas." Briefly it is this: every idea tends to the act it represents or recalls. The idea, once received, "intellectualizes" itself, i. e., turns off to the abstract, or transfers itself to the organism, along the nerves, until it results, fatally, in the act; it becomes incarnate. Two things conduce to the latter effect; the idea's "quality"—i. e., the more sensible, rich in image, concrete, it is, the stronger the propulsion and its "quantity"-i. e., the greater and stronger the associations it rouses up and gathers to itself as it goes along the stronger again is the compelling force. Now, nowhere are these two conditions realized as in the artist, and this, joined to that subtle force, which we cannot define, known as genius, constitutes "the fine frenzy" we call inspiration.

The idea is now trembling on the verge of realization; the artist, pushed forward by all the force of inspiration behind him, sets his hand to the task. And at the outset let us recall once more a caution we have repeated elsewhere, that there is a distinction between expression and execution. Whether the artist conceive all his work beforehand or part by part, pen in hand, "think on paper," in either case the ideal is expressed, before being "concreted," either in whole or in part.

The artist's task is, now, to realize as best he may, this internal expression of his ideal. For, as we have seen, not only is perfection and beautiful conception of the ideal demanded of him, but,

<sup>51</sup> It has been well explained and developed, with another end in view, in an excellent book by l'Abbé Eymieu, Le Gouvernement de soi-même, pp. 28-121.



<sup>50</sup> Schiller, etc., followed in France by Renouvier and Rabier.

as a second law, perfect and beautiful correspondence to that conception in its outward manifestation. Indeed, it might even be said that he is not an artist, at least for the general public, except on condition of producing a work of art. On the other hand, what of the multitudes of unknown men and women there are in the world, those "mute, inglorious Miltons," who cannot, by force of circumstance, speak out, or "trace with the magic hand of chance" those "huge cloudy symbols of a high romance" their prophetic eyes discern. Are they not as truly artists as all the Grays and Keats and Miltons that have lived?<sup>52</sup>

What is the difference, then, between this army of unfortunates and those who have given us our glorious masterpieces of statuary or song? It is the possession of this second great condition of art—power of expression, skill, command over their instrument, be it chisel or vocabulary. It is also a difference of character. The true artist is a man of strong coördinating faculties, vigorous, energetic will, be powerful mental synthesis, indomitable courage and resolution. Again, he is a man of taste; he can distinguish the good and the bad in his own work and modify it or add to it accordingly. There is a constant effort, an unceasing supervision over his hand; he always goes at high pressure, putting forth his very best every moment, and yet there must reign over all the most perfect spontaneity.

Add all this together and it is easily seen that we have not robbed the artist of any of his glory, but given it him in double measure, since his is not only the merit of a beautiful conception, but also of having seized that fleeting image with strong, compelling hands and chained it, still palpitating, to an imperishable concrete form. His instrument is skill, his guide is taste, his motive power is force of will; above all sits the transcendent form of genius, below is his material, be it words or oil or stone; and the product is the undying masterpiece.

That is all very nice from our point of view; from the artist's it is different. His is a weary lot, to be condemned eternally to gaze on Beauty, to yearn after her passionately—and never to grasp her to his satisfaction; her shade slips through his outstretched arms, and he is left desolate as any Æneas. It is to this disproportion between his ideal and his fulfillment that F. W. H. Myers

<sup>54</sup> There are exceptions, of course. We are speaking of artists in the production of a consistent masterpiece.



<sup>52</sup> An affirmative answer is given by A. C. Benson, "From a College Window," pp. 155-156, while De Wulf, Rev. Neo-Scholastique ('07, p. 491) goes so far as to call artists all who can love a work of art.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> At least as far as their profession is concerned. Sometimes will-power is lacking to them in all other respects.

greatly attributes the pathos of Virgil.<sup>55</sup> Besides, what the artist does attain is at the cost of infinite pains, pains of preparation, pains of actual work. Indeed, we might say that, did he not feel this weariness and disgust at his own work, he would be no artist. His vision must always surpass his execution, else his vision is no artist's. God only is truly the Creator, only He can produce what He sees just as He sees it, only He can have perfect proportion between his thought and his work. "Ipse dixit et facta sunt." Not so the artist; to him it is not given to tell the world all he knows and sees.<sup>57</sup>

Le Meilleur demeure en moi-même Mes vrais vers ne seront parlus.<sup>58</sup>

To him it is not granted to express the divine; he must be content to bear with the puny conditions of this life of spirit chained to matter.

One other word before passing to the study of the third element of Literature. Expression is of two kinds. Expression, properly speaking, has for office to produce in the soul a certain activity. But there is another kind of expression whose effect is to evoke a still further activity than that at first caused. 59 It is called suggestion and, by some, poetry.60 This poetry is in prose or verse, statues or temples, canvas or music, and a sculptor, a painter, a musician is a poet inasmuch as he can evoke this further activity. Very frequently this activity will be one of another order than the one first caused; if the senses are involved, as almost always, it will be one of another sense. An example will make this clear. Take that famous painting of Millet, "The Angelus." In the foreground, the two praying peasants; then a long stretch of field, then, on the horizon, a church. The eye is well pleased with the tranquil But has it no message for the ear as well? Do we not hear something on looking on this picture? Yes; that whole space of field is filled with the riotous sound of the village church bells; and we seem to hear it, too. Thus did the artist make his picture. intentionally, no doubt, suggestive as well as descriptive.

The act on our part takes place in the imagination; there one sense calls out to another, new memories are brought up, new perspectives lined out, whole vistas of hitherto undreamed-of thought are opened out, suggested by the "poetry" of the work. As this device has a large place in literature, the idea will return.

<sup>55</sup> Classical Essays, Vol. II. Essay on Virgil.

<sup>56</sup> Ps. xxxii.. 9.

<sup>57</sup> Rev. de Phil., Sortais, '03, p. 337.

<sup>54</sup> Sully Prudhomme.

<sup>59</sup> Mercier, op. oit., pp. 512-513.

<sup>60</sup> Rabier, op. cit., pp. 641-642.

### 3. SPEECH.

Thus far we have described the two general elements in the definition of Literature. It remains to make the application of these to the particular case of the subject in hand. We have studied beauty and the beautiful expression of thought. Let us go on to that which distinguishes literature from other modes of expression, expression by speech.

By the definition it is laid down that literature is an art. This definition has some need of defense, since it is often enough attacked. Art is beautiful expression in general. But thought is expressed in more ways than one; there is expression of an ideal in marble, in colors, in sounds, in speech; by reason of the special nature of man, this last mode is the most perfect, and when it is done beautifully it is an art.

But the objection comes in here, is not poetry the only art? Those who say this, such men as V. Cousin, Levèque, etc., lay down the principle that if in anything beauty is not sought for its own sake it is not an art; and of course they assume that only in poetry is this condition verified. Their error is that they have forgotten that in art it is the beauty of form only that is essential. If there is beauty in the matter, too, so much the better. Hence it follows that another aim can be followed as regards the matter. And so eloquence and history can follow other aims than the mere search for beauty for itself and still be arts, provided the expression is beautiful. All speech is transference of thought, and literature is perfect transference of thought. But on what condition is it perfect? On the condition that the expression is beautiful; the reader will recall what we mean by beautiful. Hence this beauty may be sought in the matter and the form or expression, as in poetry; or in the form only, there being another aim as regards the subject-matter, as happens in eloquence and history, which are therefore arts as much as poetry.

An examination of other proofs will afford further light on the true nature of literature. One of these is taken from the conflict between literature and morality. Often it is a dilemma, no literature or no morality. But according to our distinction between the twofold aim of art, the escape from the dilemma, if there is really one, is to admit that the aim of art must always be subjected to the moral law. Indeed, the distinction bears us out wonderfully. The two aims must never go against the moral law—that is the principle. Now, the aim of the form never can; else it is not beautiful, but ugly, and ceases to be literature. But the matter can, for its aim is always free. It is, then, from this side that ethics gets its hold on literature.

Again, the artist is he who can encase his thought in a beautiful form, and since beauty means more perfection of being, i. e., that which is instinct with more that appeals to the ideal of men, it is clear that this can be done by all the kinds of speech, as well as by poetry.

In the other branches of literature, then, beauty is sought for itself sufficiently to make them arts. For seek beauty in your expression and you are an artist, and you can go and seek any other aim you please in your subject-matter, provided it be a morally good one. Wordsworth sought to uplift his fellows to diviner things; Tyrtæus wrote his songs to cheer the Spartans on to victory, yet both are artists, just as Cicero is an artist, and Thucydides and Herodotus. They sought beauty for itself, but they sought it in the expression—enough, we have seen, to make them artists.

The definition once secure and free from attack, it remains to see what principles will preside at the development and growth of literature.

That literature has its fixed laws and principles will hardly be denied. Yet they are no more created by the critics than the laws of nature are by scientists. They exist, and are gathered in from all sides in the masterpieces by the student. They differ in small particulars with the different schools, for taste is an affair of personal feeling and individual likes, but they will always be guided in the essentials by the intellectual principles that repose secure above it.<sup>61</sup>

Men are sociable animals. It is their nature that, normally, they cannot live alone; there must always be reaction of one upon another, else there is no unison, no satisfaction of the social need. The instrument of this intercourse is speech, transference of the thought of one from his own mind to his fellows'. All this is mere banality. Now, Literature is nothing else than the best speech done, thought-transference beautifully and perfectly done.

At this point we pause and recall the attention to the two elements of art enlarged on above, idealization or conception, and execution. In literature these are nothing else than the framing of our ideal and the expressing of it in words. Here we have the material for the two principal laws of literature. They follow naturally and are universal. From them in turn can be deduced less general ones, and from these the particular principles that preside at the work of composition and of criticism.

The two principal laws are founded on the true proportion between two objective relations—the object and the thought, the

<sup>61</sup> Cf. Loughaye, Théorie des Belles-Lettres, pp. 81-89, where he proves that there is an "absolute" in art.

thought and the expression; i. e., the thought or idealization should correspond truly, at base, to the object, and the expression must reproduce exactly the thought. The first of these principles is nothing more than the old scholastic definition of truth—"adæquatio rei et intellectus." As for the second, the expression or execution is said exactly to reproduce the thought, when it makes the same impression, moral and intellectual, on the hearer or reader as the object has on the speaker or writer.

The corollaries of this doctrine are several. The closer the thought produced in the hearer is to the original thought the better is the expression. Any fault in either of the two processes—thought or expression—makes a defect in the ultimate work. The less the thought corresponds to the object and the less the expression corresponds in every way to it the worse it is. The most beautiful and perfect form in itself, but not in proportion to the thought—or indirectly to the object—is worthless; the two laws go together. Hence the test of imperfection and perfection lies in these two laws; they are fundamental and universal, but still very general.

The first is more important than the second of these two laws; the first is an affair of the spirit, the second of matter; the first guides the work of the head, the second that of the hand; the first demands inspiration, the second mere technical skill, while as far as the work of art is concerned, all is done before the second comes in to play.

Now, it becomes necessary to analyze these two principles, to see just what they mean, just where they are to be applied.

At a general glance at the problem one perceives at once two facts and their immediate consequences. One fact is that the object of literature is infinitely various and the other is that the thinking subject is stubbornly individual. Hence it follows that the mind must accommodate itself to all the varying phases of what is subjected to its consideration, but that at the same time it must not try to avoid, indeed cannot help, imprinting on things its own individuality; style must be true to nature, but true to itself as well. Literature is the resultant of these two forces. This must be borne in mind, for it influences all that follows.

Let us take up now the first and more important principle. A mere glance at it as it has been formulated above would suffice to let it be seen that it contains three elements. There is the object conceived, the thinking subject and the object and subject taken together or the object in the grasp of the subject. We will take each of these in succession.

At the threshold of the discussion an object confronts us that must be answered. It is said that the law holds good for objects

that exist, but what about the case where there is no object, where the mind dwells only on fictions. We may merely say that the case never entirely exists and that the objection is based on a false conception of the matter, and that such a false conception would lead to the extreme school of idealists, which we have pointed out as the opposite of the extreme Realist school. In short, neither must the mind reproduce the object such as it is, nor yet entirely on what is ideal, but must keep the mean between the two.

Now, what is the range of the objects of literary work? It is twofold, nature and man. There is a third, God, but it embraces, in a transcendent way, the other two. For man has been defined a tendency to the Infinite, and when this tendency is expressed the instrument of expression is speech. However, the term of the tendency cannot be attained directly; it must be reached in its reflections, which are those two objects of literary work, nature and man. It will be noted that this corresponds closely to what was said above of beauty, that it is, in its last analysis, but a reflection of God, of the Infinite Beauty when it exists in nature, is but one of its created external manifestations, a necessary condition of our state.

Hence, it might be said in passing, comes a fuller understanding of why this first law exists and of what it implies, viz., an obligation to express the thought in a beautiful manner, that is, in short, man, in that perfect speech which is literature, must be finally true, beyond and across nature and man, to the Supreme Ideal according to which they are both fashioned.

Nature, the first of these two objects, can be considered by the author or poet in regard to itself, to man, to God. We will do so, and with the intention of bringing out its role in the making of a piece of literature. Thus we shall have discussed the first of the objects of literary work, of what is to be said, leaving the other part, how it is to be said, till later on.

For a poet or a prose writer to consider and describe nature only for herself and in nature is in this respect mere materialism. Yet there are many such, and where we would least expect it. Take, for example, the "Cloud" of Shelley, who, for all that is said of his mysticism, is, after all, one of the most materialistic of all our poets. The poem in question is a mere description—exquisitely beautiful, beyond all doubt—but nothing more. Lamartine has said that "even in nature the earth is only the scenery," the background; man is the interesting figure; and our principle bids us be true to nature.

So the key to nature is man; this was also the guiding principle of Wordsworth. Between nature and man there is an established

harmony. Now, harmony means sympathy and resemblance. And these in turn recall two remarkable psychological facts. We know well that certain sites agree with certain of our moods, and again, that certain other sites, for a mind in repose, induce other moods. Thus, why does the ocean always seem to agree with sadness? Chryseis walks the shore of the "loud-sounding sea," bewailing his stolen child, and the wronged Achilles sits him down and gazes through his tears over the "wine-dark deep" and calls to his seagoddess mother. And Matthew Arnold stands on the beach at Dover and bewails the ebbing Sea of Faith. These are but a few of the striking and well-known instances of what happens often in our daily life. Thus it is that

Tears, idle tears . . . Rise in the heart and gather to the eyes, In looking on the happy autumn fields, And thinking of the days that are no more.

The literary consequences of these two facts are far-reaching and great, and may be said to supply the motive and matter for the greater part of our poetry, and especially that of the nineteenth century. Nature we interpret according to our own emotions and call the autumn fields happy and the rainy day sad; while the matter for comparison, contrast, simile, is enormous.

Last of all, across and through nature we reach to God, the Infinite One. There are four special ways in which we look at Him in nature, as Creator, as Immanent in Nature, as acting in nature by coöperation and preservation, and as Nature's archetype.<sup>68</sup> It means simply this, that, without at all being a Pantheist, man must have a pure conception of nature, i. e., a conception free from sense, and this he only has by rising above and across it, up to God. Take, for example, that beautiful passage in the Excursion on the Sea-Shell<sup>64</sup> and the child listening within it for tidings of the Ocean; and the poet says that the universe is "even such a shell" to the Eye of Faith, and goes on:

And there are times, I doubt not, when to you it doth impart Authentic tidings of invisible things.

We pass by the pagan apotheosis of separate Nature-forces, and through the phenomena that strike the eye we embrace the invisible but only True, Good and Beautiful. This is the source of all symbolism in literature and also the reason why so many of our poets in their mystical view, by pressing unduly on the Immanence of

<sup>64</sup> Cf. in English Poets-Ward, Vol. IV., p. 80.



<sup>62</sup> Loughaye, p. 159, op. cit. In much of this part of our subject we are but adapting to our plan some of the excellent ideas of this author.

<sup>68</sup> Loughaye, op. cit., pp. 179 et seq.

God, have come to Pantheism—a conception that will be found to be running like an undertone through much of our English poetry.

The next object of our view is Man, who can be considered in his physical or in his moral aspect.

The study and admiration of physical man is insisted on by Taine<sup>68</sup>—and unjustly, it seems to us—as the dominating characteristic of pagan Greece. It is again a materialistic conception, if we neglect to bring out what it is gives the body—"the human form divine"—the physiognomy in repose or in movement—its true beauty. This is the soul that interpenetrates it, informs it, shines out of it. Once more our general law guides us here, for in man it is spirit that dominates matter; so must it in literature, and man's physical appearance be described only as a stepping stone to that which lies within,<sup>66</sup> the beauty of the soul of which it is the sensible expression. This is in particular the great object of drama, fiction and history.

What will the result be? The soul of man pictured as it is or as it should be? If it is entirely the latter, our conception is no longer true to the object, and we shall have a fine collection of pious figure-heads. What, then, is the solution? This; there are always in fiction, etc., certain characters with which the reader is in some sort identified; for them his sympathy is won, from their point of view the other characters and the incidents are viewed, and into their thoughts he is given entrance. These should be ideal. The others—the antagonistic ones especially may be as bad as we like—always provided they are antipathetic. This balance is demanded by one principle, which would be otherwise at fault and is perfectly justified by the facts.

God is transcendently above these two objects. He is aimed at across man and nature; to Him we penetrate; Him, as it were, we see. We interpret finite beings in terms of the Infinite, and as this process becomes more and more conscious the mystical element enters in more and more closely. But the soul does not get at God directly. It is condemned likewise to give its own imprint to things. This is why the power of invention is unlimited, and also why the artist is doomed never to reach perfect execution. He is in a constant struggle to fling himself over the barriers of this world to the Infinite Beyond. And when he does catch at some of the Divine Essence there comes another struggle to keep it aloft, not defiled with the slime of matter.

es Phil. de l'Art, Vol. II. He is pleading a pet thesis, viz., that the dominating character of each period buds out in a corresponding branch of art predominating in that period, and as he chooses sculpture as such a one for Greece, the reason for his contention is plain.

<sup>66</sup> An almost too evident effort to do this is to be found in C. Bronte's "Jane Eyre."

The next element our analysis lays bare in this first principle is the faculties of the soul themselves. It will be remembered we said that the subjective part of beauty lies in its stirring and satisfying the activity of our faculties. A word on each of these faculties with reference to its literary influence and value. Their simple forms are, first of all, the intellect with its ceaseless demand for the reality, for truth in all its clearness and brilliancy; then there is the will that just as necessarily longs for goodness, with its joy at getting a grasp of a concrete good and the consequent fullness of activity; then the senses—especially of sight and hearing, in literature—that delight in certain changes and harmonies of color and sound, and the imagination, faculty of creation, of idealization, of association, of reproduction, resuming in itself all the joys and sorrows of the other faculties, and, last of all, the passions, all summed up in one word, love.

The complex forms of activity are very much more closely connected with literature. These are, principally, habit, which if followed and catered to causes us pleasure, and if contradicted, sorrow; then the highest combined action of the will and intellect—the sublimest force in literature—the religious sentiment, which is man's natural longing for the Infinite Good and a straining to compass it. After that comes that sensuous pleasure of the imagination called reverie, which is a free permission to that faculty to flit about unrestrained, touching lightly and sipping quickly on only the beautiful. Then, last of all, a deeper and more human sentiment, called sympathy. Its influence is very great in letters, and it is one of the greatest principles in art. Jouffroy<sup>67</sup> calls it the fundamental æsthetic emotion. It is evoked by the image of the state of him who suffers such and such emotions and causes the same in us. For, being especially concrete and strong,68 it tends most forcefully to reproduce itself in action. But it is not as strong as the original, nor subject to the judgments of conscience, hence not unquiet nor uneasy; it has not the same uncomfortable effects as genuine pain and fear and can be abandoned at will. In short, it is sorrow and woe, with all the elements of suffering eliminated and only those of beauty remaining. Thus, sad accounts please us and are called beautiful, which feeling is not at all experienced by him who really suffers. The result, then, of all this on literature is the general rule that all that causes real suffering to any faculty is to be shunned and only that cultivated that pleases the faculty. The effects of this will appear more fully later on.

Little now remains to be said of the last element of our analysis,



<sup>67</sup> Cours d'Esthétique, pp. 34-35.

<sup>68</sup> Cf. above, p. 27.

the object in the grasp of the subject. From all that precedes what we have to say is clear. The aim of all idealization is to take man, with his movement and life, and raise him to his best. People sneer at the word "ideal," or at best look suspicious, because of the mistaken idea that it means something vague and abstract. Their scorn would turn to love and admiration did they see that it means not only the intellectual side of man pushed to perfection, but also the emotional side. We do not chase away the passions; we keep them, but we ennoble them.

So we see that in the light of a truly spiritualistic philosophy this principle becomes merely the expression of our imperative need of truth, and truth in its highest form, beauty.

The Second Principle, as we have said, is less important and demands less attention, except in one part—where it touches the idea and exigencies of style. This is, in a way, most important of all. We have up to this dwelt chiefly on what should form the matter of literature, of what the author should say; we shall now treat of how it should be said, though, strictly speaking, as we have seen—this belongs to the first principle also. But it is so closely united with this latter, and, after all, the internal expression is so closely connected with the external, that for all practical purposes it is useless to separate them.

It is this external expression that is aimed at by the Second Principle; hence, too, of course the internal. The outward manifestation of his idea must correspond as nearly as possible to the idea. And when will this equation exist? We answer without hesitation, when his words produce the same impression on the soul of his hearer or reader as it has on his. This is the pervading idea of all this part of the problem, the relation that the writer must always keep before him with his reader.

One of the first consequences of this thought is to recall with new vigor an old, almost discredited, idea. His work must rouse the æsthetic activity of his reader's faculties. It does so in three ways, by convincing, by persuading, by pleasing; maybe not all three at once, but those are the ways. That is to say, his means will be the true, the good, the beautiful, and he will by their help address himself to the mind, the will and again to the whole soul in full, well-ordered activity.

But the chief portion of literature ruled by this second principle is that of style. Two men might have the selfsame thought and yet might and invariably will express it differently; both will observe this second law of writing, and still one will write better than the other. What makes the difference? Style. And what is Style? Style in general is the manner and peculiarity in which a man acts

and in which he differs from others' manners. In writing it is the manner proper to his own individual self. It is the effort of a man to get that equality between his own ideal and its external realization. Now, one man may set the ideal of his thought before him the same as another, but the ideal of its expression is always different. Hence it is true that style is an individual thing, yet we say ordinarily that such a man has no style and another has one. What is meant is that the first has not a good style. Hence it follows that style admits of degrees and so can be improved. What is wanted is to get at what rules its origin and growth. This can be done by a simple application of our second principle to an analysis of the idea of style itself.

Style depends on the way the writer uses two things; words, that stand for ideas, and phrases, that stand for thoughts. By ideas is meant simple concepts of a thing, abstract or concrete, such as table, virtue, book; by thoughts, the judgments we express by propositions or sentences. Our plan is here marked out for us. We shall look at words and phrases successively with reference to the impression they can make on each of the faculties of man.

The principle applies first to words with regard to the mind, whose particular object is truth. And here we must bear in mind that as there is only one way of saying just what we think and as we think it, so there is only one word to express our precise idea with all its nuances—the shades of meaning our own individuality. our point of view, circumstances, etc., give it. This is precision and propriety of diction. The importance of this choice of words is immense. Some one has said:60 "If our words are not precise, the ideas they arouse will not be precise; if his ideas are not precise, the reader's principles are not assured, and if he has no assured principles, he will take no vigorous resolutions." Which reminds us of a certain sad story that ends: "and all for the want of a horseshoe nail." And indeed the application is striking. But there is a more important conclusion still, that of the necessity of precision in the ideas themselves. And the importance is all the more great, as the predominance of spirit over matter is established and needful.

With regard to the imagination and the use of words we have but to recall that eulogy of Virgil: "All the grace of all the Muses often flowering in a single word," and to point to Tennyson himself as a striking example of what is to be brought out. As the correct word is demanded by the mind for the truth of a pure idea, so is the picturesque word needed by the imagination for the right image; the two cases are the same, only in the one it is image and in the other idea.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. Loughaye, op. oit., p. 316.

As for the emotions, there is no need here to recall how one word can stir up a whole lot of emotional uneasiness, and then how important it is in good style to use just the right word and use it rightly. This it is given only to great writers like Bossuet to master fully; but in a more or less excellent degree all popular speakers and orators call on it to a great extent; hence the birth of a whole troop of slogans, maxims, epigrams, that live in the people's mind and stir them to feeling and to action.

The effect of all this care and study of words will be to make the writer free from their tyranny and from any Micawber-like devotion to the sound of senseless combinations, than which tyranny and devotion hardly any can be imagined more debasing for an author.

The second element in style, the phrase or sentence, corresponds to the thought or mental judgment. Such judgments are of two kinds, implicit and explicit. The first has also been called the complex idea, and is expressed by a combination such as "a good boy," "le bon Dieu," "a poor man," where a judgment is clearly implied. The literary consequence of a study of this form is the necessity of justness of attribute as regards the demands of the mind, and as for what the imagination requires, the "picturesque epithet." The function of these parasites is to complete the incomplete notion contained in the noun or to add further truthfulness of life and color to the image it conveys, to bring out the delicate shade of meaning the *nuance*, or to touch a new shade of coloring into the whole picture.

One caution must be observed, however, and in this the writer will be imitating nature, i. e., in her frugality. Economy and even austerity of epithets is a real necessity for a finished artist, as it seems to be an invariable drag on the wings of youth. It is not lack of color or imagination that is recommended, but a frugality in epithet, a restraint on the impulse to fling whole daubs of color on the canvas, when a few skillful touches will bring out the picture just as well or better. Indeed, if a writer uses up all his epithets on everything and anything he will have no more to use when he really needs them. Besides, if he uses them too much, they will wear out, and, like new money, quickly lose their sheen, and finally come to stand for nothing at all.

Then comes now, last of all, the full sentence, that stands for the developed thought, adequately expressed. Then, to follow our proposed plan, the mind first puts it under observation and there comes with it its eternal demand for truth. Now, a judgment is true, according to Aristotle, when it expresses a relation that in objective reality really exists, false when it expresses what is not so. From this-still following Aristotle-come the three essential conditions the mind lays on the phrase. The sentence or group of sentences must be clear, brief and one. It will have clearness when the true relation of above stands out fully, with nothing to veil it from us; brevity when the same relation is set forth with no undue encumbrance of words; unity when well defined and cut off from all that is not itself. Clearness is autonomy of the thought, an individual and clear-cut existence won for it. There are no rules for it; it depends most of all on clearness of thought, and the only rule for that is assiduity and perseverance in thinking. Of itself the thought, if persevered in long enough, throws down all the barriers between us and it. Brevity, or more correctly, relative brevity, means not to say everything in few words—that is evident—but to say everything only in as few words as it demands; no superfluity, no parasites, no foreign elements, no parentheses. All this means courage—courage to reject some wellturned phrase the writer is proud of, but which does not bear directly on the idea. And last of all, unity is the injection of one directing principle into the mass of conflicting elements—the subordinating of the parts with a view to showing up the whole. rules for it are many; the one real rule is to have one idea, to group all around that and cast away all that does not throw it into relief, keeping the order of climax, keeping together the details that go together.

There is but one exception to these three conditions, and that is not more than an apparent one. It is that quality which is called commonly suggestiveness or allusiveness. It is the staple of all poetry and indeed made by some the definition of poetry. Its virtue consists in this, that it does not tell all, but by a slight touch rouses up a train of thought in the reader, which carries him beyond what is actually said, but is really implied. It is the culmination of art and the triumph of persevering thought, and is only to be used as the writer approaches more and more the purely literary and gets away from the exact formulas of mathematics and business.

But besides these purely intellectual elements there are two others that are absolutely necessary in literature; they are the imaginative and the emotional elements. Their necessity arises from the comparison of the phrase with the sensibility and the imagination.

What is the imaginative style? First of all, it does not mean fiction, nor yet again a figurative style, or one abounding in comparisons. It does mean anything that in addition to helping us to understand the thought, makes us see it. To see the truth in a concrete, sensible form, to use the image rather than the idea, to

<sup>70</sup> Cf. above, p. 30.

choose in every case the word that carries a picture rather than a mere cold conception—this is the sum of that impression we have when we come from reading some author and say: "He has an imaginative style."

Another result of the influence of the imagination in the phrase is this: This faculty has a way of seizing first of all on the most attractive feature of a picture, like a child that likes the gaudy color. It must be humored. And so to catch its eye the good writer puts in a striking place the salient feature of any thought. The importance of all this is easily seized through what we have called above the "dynamic law of ideas." If the idea enters the mind bare and pale with an abstract light, it intellectualizes itself, loses itself in the chilly mists of mere speculation. If, on the contrary, it becomes charged with sense and concreteness, it takes a strong hold not only on the sensible part of the soul, but even, as has been shown, on the motor nerves, forcing them to action. Now, this incarnation of thought is done by the imagination only. Hence its great role in all good writing. Then, besides, since the æsthetic emotion is in the full activity of all the faculties, and since the imagination is the only path to some of them, its importance is still further shown.

Much of what we have said of the imagination applies also to the emotions, for these also require the truth in the concrete, the salient character, etc. It has, indeed, been said of oratory that "in proportion as it is a thing of the intellect it will fail, and as a matter of the heart it will succeed," and the same may be said of all writing that aims at being truly literary.

The conclusion, then, of all this is the need of the same guidance of the reason in matters of sense and of the steady gaze that focuses itself on the object till the latter stands out concrete and clear.

The last consideration with regard to style is the influence on the phrase of the external senses. As we have seen, the only two of the senses connected with our subject are sight and hearing; of these the sense of sight is only indirectly connected with literature, and that through the imagination. So we are here only concerned with sound and hearing.

There is only one law regarding the sound of the phrase, and that is a negative one. The sound must never offend the ear or obstruct the meaning; we are not bound to flatter the ear nor consciously help the meaning. The reason for this rule is that in halting the action of external perception the work of the understanding is halted, too, which is contrary to the general law of faculty-activity. This halting of the organ is done in three prin-

<sup>71</sup> Loughaye, op. oit., p. 420.

cipal ways, by hiatus, by assurance, by a succession of rough vowel or consonant sounds.

But while there is no strict obligation to flatter the ear, the literary masterpiece is not well off without it—unless, indeed, the roughness is made up in another way, as in the case of Carlyle or Browning. But for all that, the power of sounds is great, not for themselves, but for what they symbolize. As in nature certain sounds evoke certain emotions, so in art the music of the phrase tames the soul. This power of sound over sense is great in its proper measure. We shall examine the power it has over each of the faculties, remembering that the only reason why it is considered at all is that it really can provoke faculty-activity and thus assist the thought. This aid is given in three ways, by harmony, by melody, by rhythm.

Harmony is a chord, a single set of sounds grouped together, in a word or syllable. It is the basic element of the two following qualities. Melody is a succession of several pleasing sounds, grouped with a view to promoting in its own way the effect of the sense. In this respect literature is superior to music, which lacks the more properly expressive element and has only sound. A beautiful example of melody in prose is Demosthenes' famous description of the arrival in the evening at Athens of the news of the battle of Platea.<sup>72</sup> Rhythm is a grouping of sounds in beautiful fashion, but with a sensible and visible proportion of sonorous groups recurring with periodicity. This is used chiefly in poetry and is carried to its furthest use in the refrain of a song. It differs from melody in that melody is a general quality, a general effect of a work of art, while rhythm is a special—the most important instance of it. The strange hypnotic power of sound on the soul is well known and deserves a more extended study than we can give it. A few general traits must suffice.

The rule enforced by the imagination is that, while respecting the thought, the sound (abstraction now made of all sense) more or less brings up before our eyes the intended image, without the help of the meaning. One particularly striking usage of this is "onomatopœia," where the representative power of mere sounds is pushed to its extreme.

The subtle effect of sound on the emotions is chiefly noticed in music and is well described in Dryden's "Alexander's Feast," whose sub-title is, by the way, "The Power of Music." However, this connection with certain states of the soul is vague enough and only touches such general emotions as sadness, joy, anger, pride, etc.

The reason now comes on the scene with her ever-recurring demand to be respected as the queen, and we do not dispute her right.

<sup>72</sup> De Corona, 169.

But in this demand she can be helped by even the music of writing. Thus the logical operation of the thought is greatly aided by the rhythm of the period and of repetition, and this is precisely the reason for the existence of these two forms in eloquence. Again, the memory is helped by a striking combination of sound, as happens in epigrams, for instance, whose sharp staccato cadence remains long ringing in the ear, thus forwarding the aim of the speaker.

This general study of the nature of style is now finished. In summing up this remark might be made: that in general, style is the man himself—as Buffon said—while it differs with each individual and has his own peculiar stamp of character. It is not a mere knowledge of the technique of language, nor yet a command over one's vocabulary. These things are indispensable conditions, but only conditions. Many may come thus far and yet have no style. It is here that the soul enters in, as may readily be admitted by one familiar with the tone of all Newman's writings, for example; like a picture of Reubens, it is recognizable anywhere. In short, there is only one style, but that one is infinitely various.

We will finish this paper with a word on the Aim to be pursued by a writer, a subject touched on here more than once, and especially in vindicating our definition of literature. It is possible, we have seen, to pursue, in this case, two aims simultaneously, that of the form, that of the matter. The aim of the form is fixed. for any writer who wishes to produce literature. It is the quest of the beautiful. The aim of the matter is free, for the free will of man; that is, absolutely speaking. But viewed from a moral point of view it is not free, any more than sin is in any other walk of life. But it is not always that the error is made in the choice of an aim for the matter. Sometimes a writer like Wordsworth, in his eagerness for the goodness of the second aim, forgets the first, and the result is the hideous banalities that permit it to be said of him what Veuillot said of Victor Hugo: "No one ever wrote more beautiful or more ugly verses."

It is this division of the aim that permits the science of aim and motive, ethics, to gain a foothold in the domain of art. This science rules the aim of the matter, since that of the form is already fixed and that, we have seen, entirely in harmony with it. The second aim can be manifold, provided it squares with the moral law. It may be to instruct, to enlighten, to uplift, as in the case just quoted of Wordsworth. It may be any other, but provided always it be compatible with the laws of beauty, and of God.

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## FRANCIS PAUL LIBERMANN.

HE approaching beatification of the Ven. Francis Paul Libermann will be an event of unique interest. Conversions from Judaism to Catholicism are rare; rarer still is the elevation of convert Jews to the Christian priesthood; but the fact of a Jew being raised to the honors of the altar is, we believe, both so singular and striking as to rivet the attention of the whole Catholic world upon the religious attitude of that ancient and interesting race towards the Church, which, it may be assumed, is about to confer this signal distinction upon one of its members. "Humanly speaking," writes Archbishop Croke in the preface to the life of the founder of the Congregation of the Holy Heart of Mary, "it is no easy matter to effect the conversion of a Jew. The grace of God is, of course, omnipotent; but what I mean to say is that there are peculiar circumstances connected with the history and training of the Hebrew people which are the reverse of favorable to conversions amongst them. They may be said, indeed, to have an inborn or hereditary hatred of the religion, no less than of the name and followers of Jesus Christ. Jewish converts are, consequently, very rare, and, when met with at all, are found for the most part to have belonged to the humbler and less prejudiced classes of their countrymen." Libermann was an exception to this general rule. He belonged to the higher or educated class of Jews, from whom the rabbins, masters in Israel and leaders of thought among the most intellectual section of the Hebrews, are drawn. Steeped from his youth in an atmosphere of Judaism of the most rigid and recondite type, he possessed whatever culture of mind is possible to one reared in such a narrow and exclusive school, where rabbinical learning is concentrated upon the pedantic conservation of antique teachings and traditions.

The fifth son of a Jewish rabbin, zealous to fanaticism for the punctilious observance of the Mosaic law and held in high esteem among his co-religionists for his great Talmudic learning, he was born on April 12, 1804, at Saverne, in Alsace—now, since its re-incorporation with Germany, called Elsass—and, in accordance with Jewish usage, circumcised when eight days old and given the name of Jacob. His childhood was not a happy one. Though of a naturally delicate constitution, which should have insured more regard for his health, he was brutally ill used by a cruel master, whose rough treatment of the sickly child brought on additional infirmities, traces of which he retained all his life. His mother, Lia Haller, died in 1813. The deprivation did not mean so much to him as to

a Christian child. Among the Jews the mother's share in the education and up-bringing of children is secondary to that of the father, particularly when, as in this instance, the head of the household is a rabbin. Although but little care seems to have been bestowed upon his body, his mind was steeped in an atmosphere of the strictest Judaism, and nothing was left undone to imbue him with an aversion to Christianity until the very sight of a priest filled him with fear and horror. It is an error to suppose that young Israelites are formed on the Old Testament. It is the teaching of the Talmud that is instilled into them. This work, the compilation of generations of Pharisees, is a corpus of doctrines and usages in twelve folio volumes, the main purport of which is to interpret the Mosaic Law in conformity with the spirit of oral traditions. handed down from sire to son for ages. It exhales in every page a hatred of Christ and of the Christian name instinct with the spirit of the deicidal race who in Pilate's presence clamored for the crucifixion of the Just One, crying out: "His blood be upon us and upon our children." In after years Libermann related how, as a child, when he saw the parish priest of Saverne, wearing his surplice and stole, returning from the cemetery, the very sight of vestments and cross so terrified him that he ran into the nearest shop and hid behind the counter; and when, on another occasion, he met him on the road coming from a sick call he hurriedly climbed over a wall and scampered through the fields. Initiated from his infancy in the wording of the Law, at thirteen he was solemnly and legally inducted into the synagogue, and began the intricate study of philology and Talmudic exegesis. To become a learned and distinguished rabbin was then the sole object of his desires, in furtherance of which his father sent him to the rabbinical school of Metz, from which it was intended he should proceed to that of Paris.

Meanwhile his eldest brother, Samson, after attaining the extreme limits of Talmudic studies, abandoned the project of becoming a rabbin, and, having qualified in medicine, became one of the leading physicians in the town and district of Strasburg. Having already conceived a distaste for the sophisms of the Talmud, his belief in Judaism was shaken, and coming across a copy of the New Testament it captured and captivated him and his wife at the first reading. The "still, small voice" had spoken; its whisperings touched their hearts. Under that first vague impression they formed the resolution and promised, if Providence granted them a son, to present him, not to the synagogue, but to the Church of Christ. Grace had sown the seeds of faith in their souls; they fructified in a congenial soil, and on the 15th of March, 1824, Dr. Libermann and his wife were received into the Catholic Church.

When they heard of his conversion the rabbin of Saverne and the whole family put on mourning, as if for a funeral. The young student at Metz, bewailing his brother's "apostasy," went to Strasburg to win him back to the synagogue, but only to hear from his sister-in-law these remarkable words, consciously or unconsciously prophetic: "You shall one day be not only a Christian like ourselves, but a priest and an apostle."

The conversion of his brothers, Felkel and Samuel, brought about by Dr. Libermann's zeal, was to precede the fulfillment of this prophecy. The story of his own conversion Jacob related in 1850 to M. Gamon, a director of St. Sulpice in the Solitude of Issy, near "I was about twenty years of age," he said, "when it pleased God to begin the work of my conversion. Until then I had studied the Talmud under the direction of my father, who was a distinguished rabbin. He was pleased with my progress and flattered himself with the thought that I would one day be the worthy inheritor of his office, his science and the high esteem in which he was held among his co-religionists. About the period of which I speak he determined to send me to Metz to complete my studies. His object in doing so was less the acquisition of a science which I could as well have learned from him than to give me an occasion for displaying my knowledge and my talents and to render me eminent amongst the rabbins, who came in great numbers to be instructed in this town. He gave me letters of introduction for two professors of the Israelitic school, one of whom had been his pupil and the other his friend. It was then that the merciful design of Providence began to make itself felt in my regard. God, who wished to draw me from the error in which I was plunged, disposed my heart by causing me to meet with disappointments and ill treatment which I had by no means expected. Until then I had lived in Judaism in good faith, without in the least suspecting that I was in error; but about that time I fell into a kind of religious indifference, which in a few months brought me to a state of utter infidelity. In the meantime I read the Bible, but with distrust; its miracles discouraged me, and I believed them no longer. At this period my elder brother, then a medical doctor at Strasburg, embraced Christianity. I at first attributed such a step on his part to natural motives. I thought that he had found himself in the same state of mind as myself regarding the Jewish religion; yet I blamed him for having by his abjuration plunged our parents into grief. Nevertheless, I did not fall out with him. We even commenced at this time an epistolary correspondence, which I began by highly censuring him for the step he had taken and by exposing to him my opinions on the miracles of the Bible. I told him, among other

things, that, were those miracles true, the conduct of God would be unaccountable, and that it was impossible to understand why God should have wrought so many wonders for our idolatrous and faithless fathers, when He no longer does the same in favor of their children, who have served Him so long and with such perfect fidelity. I concluded that those ancient miracles should be rejected as an invention of the imagination and of the credulity of our forefathers. My brother replied that he firmly believed the miracles of the Bible, that God worked no more miracles¹ at the present day because they were no longer necessary; that the Messiah having come, God needed not to dispose His people to receive Him; that all the prodigies of the Old Testament had no other object than to prepare that great event.

"This letter made some impression on me. I said to myself that my brother had gone through the same studies as I had, yet I still persisted in attributing his conversion to human motives, and the effect produced by his letter was soon destroyed. The doubt which had taken hold of my mind was too deeply rooted to yield to so slight an effort. God in His goodness had prepared other and stronger ones.

"At this time one of my fellow-students showed me a Hebrew book without punctuation, which he could not read, because he was just beginning the study of Hebrew. I ran over its contents with great eagerness; it was the Gospel translated into Hebrew. I was very much struck by this reading. But here again the numerous miracles wrought by our Lord Jesus Christ were lying as so many new obstacles on my path.

"I began to read the 'Emile' of Rousseau. Who could imagine that this work, so calculated to shake the faith of a believer, was one of the means God chose to lead me to the true religion? It was in the 'Confession du Vicaire Savoyard' that I found the passage which struck me. There Rousseau exposes the reasons for and against the divinity of Jesus Christ, and he concludes with these words: 'I have not been hitherto in a position to know what a rabbin of Amsterdam would reply to that.'

"I could not help avowing to myself that I did not see, either, what answer might be given to this question. Such were my dispositions at this period, and yet the work of my conversion did not make much progress. It was then I learned that two more of my brothers, who lived at Paris, had just been received into the bosom

<sup>1</sup> This, of course, is the crude expression of a neophyte, and, if interpreted literally to the foot of the letter, would savor of the old-fashioned Protestant view on the subject of miracles, which, far from having ceased, are of continuous occurrence and one of the notes of the holiness of the true Church.

of the Catholic Church. This moved my soul to its very depths, for I foresaw that I, too, might ultimately follow their example. Thank God! this so happened. I had a great love for my brothers, and I suffered at the thought of the isolation in which I would soon find myself in my father's house. I had a friend who shared my views with regard to religion. I saw him often. Our studies and our walks were almost in common. He advised me to go to Paris to see M. Drach, who was already converted, and to examine seriously what I was to do before taking on myself the obligations of the rabbinic profession. I fully agreed to this proposition. But I should have my father's approval, and this was no easy thing to obtain. To write to him about my projects would have been the surest means of frustrating them. I therefore decided on going to settle matters orally. I arrived at Saverne very fatigued, having made my journey on foot. My father allowed me a little rest before speaking to me of his fears; but before the end of the day he sent for me. He wished, without further delay, to clear up his doubts. There was an easy means at his disposal; he had only to question me on my studies, and, in particular, on the Talmud. My answers would be the surest test of my application. He knew well that there is no possibility of imposing on a master in a subject which demands so much labor, memory, talent and practice as the study of the Talmud. This work, though not beyond the stretch of an ordinary mind, requires an acute and ready intelligence to be accurately rendered and properly explained. . . . Only those who have studied its contents long and recently could ever be able to interpret them with that facility which characterizes the true Talmudists. father was of their number, and in ten minutes all his suspicions in my regard would have been changed into sad realities had not the Almighty, who wished to bring about my conversion, hastened to my assistance, almost miraculously.

"The first of my father's questions was precisely one on which it is impossible to pass without showing the exact state of one's knowledge. For two years I had almost entirely neglected the study of the Talmud, and what I knew I had learned with dislike, having read it as one who only wishes to save appearances. However, I had scarcely heard the question when an abundant light illumined my mind and showed me all that I should say. I was myself in the greatest astonishment. I could not account for such facility in explaining things which I had hardly read. I marveled exceedingly at seeing the vivacity and promptitude with which my mind seized upon all that was obscure and enigmatical in the passage which was about to decide my journey. But my father was still more amazed than myself; he was overwhelmed with joy and happi-

ness, as he found that I was still worthy of him and that his fears and the unfavorable suspicions which had been put into his mind concerning me were entirely groundless. He embraced me tenderly and bathed my face with his tears. 'I truly had suspicions,' he said, 'that they were again calumniating you when they accused you of spending your time in studying Latin and neglecting to acquire the knowledge necessary for your profession.' And he showed me all the letters he had received on this subject.

"Permission to go to Paris was soon afterwards granted, and, despite the warnings that he received that I was going to join my brothers and do as they had done, he could not believe such a thing. He gave me a letter for the rabbin Deutz (the father of the Deutz who betrayed the Duchess of Berry); but as from another quarter I was recommended to M. Drach, I addressed myself to him. However, some time afterwards I delivered my letter to M. Deutz; I even, by way of formality, asked him for a book, which I returned soon after, and then visited him no more.

"I spent a few days with my brother, and I was greatly surprised at his happiness. I was, however, still very far from being changed and converted. M. Drach found a place for me at the College Stanislaus, whither he conducted me himself. I was led into a cell and there left alone, with two works by Lhomond, the 'History of Christian Doctrine' and the 'History of Religion.' This was for me a most trying moment. The profound solitude, the appearance of that room admitting the light through a small window in the roof, the thought of being so far from home, from my parents and acquaintances, all tended to plunge my soul into intense sadness. My heart was oppressed with the most awful melancholy. Then it was that, remembering the God of my fathers, I threw myself on my knees and conjured Him to enlighten me in my search after the true religion. I besought Him, if the faith of the Christians was the true one, to make it known to me; but if it was false, to remove me at once from the reach of its influence. ever near to those who invoke Him from the inmost depths of their hearts, heard my prayer. I was immediately enlightened; I saw the truth; faith penetrated my mind and my heart. Having commenced the reading of Lhomond, I easily and firmly adhered to all that is related therein about the life and death of Jesus Christ. Even the mystery of the Eucharist, rather imprudently submitted to my meditations, in no way disheartened me. I believed all without From that moment my most ardent desire was to be regenerated in the sacred waters of baptism. That happiness was soon to be granted me. I was immediately prepared for this august sacrament, which I received on Christmas Eve, 1826. On this

festival I was likewise admitted to partake of the Blessed Eucharist."

Baptized by the Abbé Auger, the sponsors being Baron François de Mallet and the Countess Aglaé-Marie d'Heuze, he took the names of Francis and Mary, to which he added that of Paul, the ardent defender of the Mosaic Law, for whom henceforward he cherished a special devotion. With a heart overflowing with joy, after nearly twenty-three years of moral captivity, he was released from the bondage of Judaism, having overcome all the difficulties that retarded his deliverance. "I cannot sufficiently admire," he says, "the marvelous change which took place in me at the moment the water of baptism was poured upon my forehead. I became truly a new man. All my doubts and fears disappeared in an instant. The ecclesiastical costume, for which I still felt something of that extraordinary repugnance which is characteristic of the Jewish nation, no longer appeared to me under the same aspect. I now felt for it a sentiment of love rather than one of fear. But, above all, I felt an invincible strength and courage to practice the Christian law. I experienced a sort of sweet affection for everything connected with my new belief." To one of his most intimate friends to whom he laid bare his soul he said: "Ah! mon cher, to tell you what I then experienced would be impossible. At the moment the sacred water began to flow on my forehead it seemed to me that I was in another world. I saw myself, as it were, in the middle of an immense globe of fire. I felt as if living no longer an earthly life; I no longer heard or saw anything of what was going on around me; I was led almost mechanically through all the ceremonies which follow baptism." The narrater adds: "Never shall I forget his description of this species of ecstasy, the remembrance of which, after an interval of more than forty years, still presents itself to my mind in all its freshness." Speaking to another fellow-student of his baptism and the exorcisms, he said that he physically felt his deliverance from the spirit of darkness and that he then experienced a violent commotion. "Whilst uttering these words," says the student, "he felt a strong, sensible impression, which, like an electric spark, vividly communicated itself to us all." On leaving the baptismal font he promised the Lord to consecrate himself to His service in the sacred ministry; which shows that, along with other graces, he then received his vocation to the priesthood. But serious obstacles and a severe trial, a cruel cross, were to interpose themselves between the conception of this desire and its fulfillment. He was so backward in Latin and so feeble in body that it was doubtful whether he would be able to endure the mental and physical strain of a long seminary course. Besides, he was entirely without means. Providence, however, provided what

was needful, and through the charity of some pious ladies and the kindness of his directors, the Abbés Auger and Buquet, he got a place in the seminary of the Missions of France, and was tonsured on June 3, 1827, by Mgr. de Quelen, who sent him to St. Sulpice, the house in which he was first placed, having been exclusively founded for the purpose of preparing preachers for the Church of France, a mission to which he did not aspire.

"My entrance into the Seminary of St. Sulpice," he recalls, "was for me an epoch of joys and blessings. The Abbé George, afterwards Bishop of Perigueux, was appointed my 'good angel.' The great charity with which he fulfilled his function edified me extremely, and caused me to love more and more a religion which inspires such sweet and wonderful sentiments." St. Sulpice was then a school of saints. Its inmates breathed an atmosphere of holiness. It was a nursery of sacerdotal vocations, in which were being trained for the service of the Church of France a corps d'élite of future apostolic priests and prelates. Lamennais had not yet fallen, he was still noted for his piety and devotion to the Church, he was still a power for good, and some of his most distinguished disciples were to be found among the Sulpicians. Libermann was in a congenial environment. From the first he was an exemplary seminarist. Continually occupied, from morning till night, in the study of theology, he did not seek the knowledge which inflates, but the science which sanctifies. Like St. Thomas of Aguin, it was before the crucifix he chiefly studied. He gradually came to be the apostle of the seminary. "Have you heard the little Jew speak of the good God?" were the whispered words that passed from mouth to mouth among his fellow-students. "At an early period," says his English biographer, "he heard an interior voice urging him, who could as yet hardly express himself in a new tongue, to speak the language of God. He who seemed to be overwhelmed by his natural timidity and inexperience, who understood his position of a stranger and of a neophyte, had to overlook all that, to treat of spiritual matters, in presence of the friends of Calixte Freze, the disciples of Frayssinous, of De Lammenais or of Father McCarthy. This he did, and with such striking success that he attracted general attention." He drew his knowledge more from meditation than reading, though he was a hard reader. He was a type of the interior man. His life was a hidden one. He did not pose as a censor or model. "During five years," he wrote, "I have neither judged nor examined anything." Humility was always his favorite virtue. He received the gift of tears in an eminent degree and a great attraction to the Blessed Sacrament.

It is customary at St. Sulpice for the seminarists to spend half an

hour before the Blessed Sacrament every week. Mgr. Dupont des Loges, who was there in his time and had to draw up the list of adorers, arranged to have Libermann with him during the adoration. "I had every reason to congratulate myself on this innocent expedient," he relates. "How often did I contemplate him at my side, in a sort of ecstasy, his breast heaving with burning sighs, his countenance on fire, his eyes half open and overflowing with silent tears, presenting a picture somewhat similar to that of St. Aloysius at the foot of the altar!" Another of his fellow-students says: "His piety was proverbial amongst us, and there was connected with his person a spirit of holiness and respect which partook of veneration. . . . To express all I feel, when I compare him with those of my good confrères whose piety and virtue have left in me the most salutary impressions, I find none who has surpassed him, none to whom I might have more spontaneously and more truly applied the words, 'He is a saint.'" He was so regarded by all who knew him then. One who occupied a room next to his tells how he "was often awakened in the middle of the night by the sound of the hard strokes of the discipline with which he lacerated his body, already so weakened by sickness." But his heart was still more lacerated by the stern and unbending attitude of his father, who strove by persuasion and intimidation to lead him back to Judaism. "M. Drach, sole confidant of their correspondence," says his biographer, "could not recall to mind, without a feeling of horror, the letters of the frenzied rabbin of Saverne, his imprecations against his Christian sons and his blasphemies against our Divine Redeemer and our holy religion." When the time drew near for his definite breaking with the world by the reception of the sub-deaconship, the letters from home became more and more vehement. One of them was delivered to him during recreation, as customary. He could not peruse it without moistening it with his tears in presence of his fellow-students. They saw him overwhelmed with anguish and unable, amid his sobs, to refrain from uttering these words of the martyrs: "But I am a Christian! I am a Christian!" In a long and very touching reply Libermann gave to his father all the motives of his conversion, established by evident proofs the divinity of the Christian religion and implored him to follow his example with all his family. This letter remained unanswered, and shortly after the heart of the holy seminarist was plunged into the deepest grief by the sad intelligence that his beloved father had died an obstinate Jew.

After he received the four minors at the hands of Mgr. de Quelen, on December 20, 1828, and was on the eve of being promoted to the sub-diaconate, the course seemed clear in front of

him, and there was every probability of his being elevated to the priesthood. Though he suffered somewhat from nervous overstrain and was revolving the idea of retiring for a time from the seminary, he remained at St. Sulpice. But the very day before he was to receive the first of the major orders he was stricken with a malady, one of the most painful and distressing known, the cause and cure of which has up to this hour baffled medical science—epilepsy. For ten years he was to remain an epileptic, debarred by this diriment impediment from the priesthood. The Hand which smote Saul of Tarsus on the road to Damascus smote him on his way to the altar; but it is a Hand that smites but to heal, and it entered into the mysterious designs of Providence that he was to bear the burden of this heavy cross for a full decade. He was after receiving his call, passing his examination and making his preparatory retreat when the blow fell. As he was standing in front of the fireplace in the room of his spiritual director the first fit prostrated him. He was stricken with this malady, almost as painful to witness as to endure, exactly at the age—twenty-five—when, according to Hippocrates, it is usually incurable.

In addition to this physical malady, he had to endure for five years that spiritual malady known as spiritual aridity, an interior sense of bitterness and desolation invading his soul. He carried this twofold cross, this martyrdom of soul and body, in a spirit of perfect resignation. Like the Curé of Ars, he had learned to love his cross, and spoke of epilepsy as "his dear malady." In him, in the words of the Apostle, virtue was made perfect in infirmity. We learn from a letter which, in his humility, he recommended to be burned, that during his seminary course he passed through all the phases of the spiritual life, into states which not only his directors, but even the best mystical treatises did not sufficiently explain.<sup>2</sup> One of his directors, M. Gallais, did not hesitate to declare publicly that in his opinion there was not a soul in France more advanced in mental prayer than M. Libermann.

On the 16th of July, 1831, on the festival especially consecrated in the seminary to the priesthood of our Lord, whilst during Mass he was meditating on the mystery of the day, and renewing, no doubt, the humble confession of his unworthiness, the Divine Master, as if to answer his thoughts, deigned to show Himself to him, in a distinct and sensible form, as Supreme Pontiff. He saw the Redeemer, His hands streaming with light and graces, ranging around Him all the students of the seminary, going through their ranks, giving to each one a share of His bountiful gifts, excepting only himself. At the same time our Lord seemed to offer him to his

<sup>2 &</sup>quot;Life," by Rev. Prosper Goepfert, p. 92.

companions, and, as it were, to place at his disposal the treasures He had distributed to them all. He soon after related this vision to his spiritual director. Another extraordinary fact is related by a lady—one of the witnesses who gave evidence in the process of the Ordinary, for the introduction of the cause of Father Libermann. On the day of her consecration to the Blessed Virgin, while she was assisting at Mass at St. Sulpice, she saw around the head of the seminarist who was attending the priest (M. Faillon) a luminous aureola which was of such brilliancy that she thought for a moment his garments were on fire. She learned afterwards that the young seminarist was Jacob Libermann, a son of the rabbin of Saverne. In after years he became her spiritual director, and as such addressed to her several of his admirable letters of direction.

To the double cross he was carrying another was added. The revolution of 1830, which led to the dissolution of several charitable associations, scattered a large portion of the funds destined for the education of ecclesiastical students in the Seminary of Paris. Libermann, an orphan and an epileptic, was told he could not be kept. When M. Carbon, with affectionate solicitude, asked him what would become of him: "I cannot return to the world," he replied; "God, I am confident, will provide for my wants." The heads of the seminary were so touched that they revoked their decision and resolved to retain him in their house at Issy.

At this time there used to be an interval of fourteen or fifteen months between one fit and another. But more than once he was stricken down as if by a thunderbolt. On one occasion he nearly lost his life in a violent attack which seized him as he was near the top of the stairs in the philosophers' seminary. The sudden shock might have thrown him backwards and precipitated him downstairs; he saw his danger and uttered a loud cry, which brought to his assistance all the occupants of the adjoining apartments. He was borne to the infirmary in fearful convulsions. As every one who has had any experience of such cases knows, the afflicted ones, after such crises, are subject to a depressing dullness and gloomy morbidity. But when Libermann recovered his senses he recovered his wonted serenity.

"I know," said the doctor who was called to him, "what disturbances such crises produce in all the senses, and even in the innermost part of the soul. I have found him tranquil and almost happy; he must be either an angel or a saint." But he had to purchase such peace of soul at the price of self-conquest. One day as he was passing over a bridge in Paris, in company with a seminarist, who was then in great affliction, he endeavored to console him

<sup>3</sup> Op. cit., pp. 95-96.

as best he could, when his companion, more and more disturbed, abruptly said: "It is always very well to give these advices when you are yourself happy and peaceful. It is easy to perceive by your tone and your appearance that you have never passed through such trials." "Ah! mon cher," he replied, "I do not wish you to pass through the painful ordeal through which I have passed. grant that life may never be such a burden to you as it is to me! I can hardly pass over a bridge without being assailed by the thought of throwing myself into the river, to put an end to my sufferings. But the sight of my Jesus sustains me and gives me patience." And all this time he was enduring a spiritual agony, that state which St. Mary Magdalen of Pazzi described as "the lions' den" and he in turn called "the tomb of Lazarus." For more than four years he was thus morally entombed; all his faculties absorbed, his body broken and weakened, his soul made captive and desolate, his entire being overwhelmed with affliction—an object of repugnance to himself and to others. In the most hidden corners of the Santo Camino or kneeling before the statue of "Our Lady of the Poor" he sought relief in prayer. At length in him were verified the words: "After a storm there cometh a calm, and after tears and weeping Thou pourest in joyfulness."

The cholera epidemic, which afforded the Sulpicians an opportunity of exercising that spirit of apostolic zeal and self-sacrifice which animated them, showed the heroism of the budding saint in Libermann, who was the leader of the corps d'élite chosen to minister to the sick and dying at the risk of their own lives, although Providence did not exact that proof of their devotedness. Another field for the exercise of his zeal was an unobtrusive apostolate in his own family, which extended from 1826 to 1852. After his conversion his thoughts and his heart went out to his parents, relatives and friends and the seven millions of self-deluded Jews who blindly clung to the cerements of a dead past-"lost sheep of the House of Israel." Neither prayers nor persuasions, entreaties or arguments were omitted in his unwearied efforts to convert his father; but this consolation was denied him. He was more successful with other members of his family, and had the happiness of seeing five of his brothers become Catholics and his spiritual brethren. One of his nieces embraced the religious state and died in the odor of sanctity; a nephew and four nieces consecrated themselves to the service of God.

His four years' apostolate among the students in the Issy Seminary (1833-1837) was productive of wonderful results. He revived primitive fervor, the spirit of Olier and De Condren, in the three Sulpician houses of Paris, Issy and La Solitude or the novitiate;

beginning in the porter's lodge, where he first addressed himself to the simplest souls, a few pious servants; then going to the infirmary or assisting newcomers, carrying their trunks, leading them to their rooms, which he swept, or making their beds. Next he gradually acquired an influence over the students, even the most advanced in their studies, uniting the more fervent in an association, which held "pious meetings" for their mutual edification. It was an epoch when an attraction towards scientific research was beginning to display itself, the epoch of Cuvier, who gave so great an impulse to the scientific school he founded. M. Pinault, a recent conquest from the State University, who had been a professor at the Ecole Normale and a member of the Geological Society of Paris, and who had abandoned brilliant prospects to enter the seminary in order to devote himself to the education of aspirants to the priesthood, increased among the students a love of erudition and science. They formed themselves into a select group and on walk-days discussed literature, poetry, philosophy and geology, everything except asceticism and piety, and were called, with a slight tinge of irony, "les scientifiques." Libermann by his conversation diverted their thoughts occasionally to a higher science—the science of the saints. professor began to regard his growing influence with uneasiness and suspicion, until one day, by the humility with which he received a public and severe rebuke, he disarmed his distrust and drew from him the observation: "Decidedly, this is either a saint or a superior man, and in either case he must be tolerated." This very professor became his chief cooperator in the reform of the two seminaries of Issy and St. Sulpice. "Believing himself for ever excluded from the priesthood," says his English biographer,4 "he wished at least to animate with the sacerdotal spirit the numerous phalanx of the levites, who were soon to be engaged in the midst of the world in the arduous work of the salvation and sanctification of souls."

In a short time two-thirds of the students at Issy were enrolled in his association. The growing group of talented and fervent young men he gathered round him formed the nucleus of his future congregation. "He possessed," says one of them, "a particular gift for directing souls and helping them to advance on the way of perfection. . . . God had given M. Libermann great and clear lights concerning souls and the interior ways and operations of grace. He would in an instant read a soul through and through; he even seemed to have known it beforehand, and to have derived his knowledge from a kind of inspiration." His influence was so extraordinary that in a single year nearly fifty seminarists entered on the religious life or became missioners in infidel countries.

<sup>4</sup> Op. cit., p. 141.

His first disciples and cooperators in laying the foundation of a new religious society were Frederic Le Vavasseur and Eugene Tisserand. The former belonged to a family who descended from Jacques Le Vavasseur, a Calvinist, saved, when a child of seven years, by some Catholics from the massacre of St. Bartholomew's day (1572) and who became a member of the true Church and the head of a numerous family who gave many distinguished men to the State, particularly to the legal and military professions. Born on the island of Bourbon in 1811, when it was crowded with Negro slaves, who were reduced to a most degraded condition, he was destined to become the apostle of the blacks. Tisserand, the son of a Creole mother, and descended from a former Governor of San Domingo, was likewise greatly interested in the salvation of the Negroes. The coming together of these three kindred spirits was the genesis of a great work which, later on, became the Congregation of the Holy Ghost and the Holy Heart of Mary. "Two seminarists," says Father Goepfert, "the one rejected from the ecclesiastical state as incapable, the other despairing of being able to pursue his studies, both compelled to rely for their principal chance of success on an indigent acolyte, who, being stricken with a hideous and, in most cases, an incurable malady, was for ten years excluded from holy orders; and even this feeble support was soon to be separated from them and apparently called to another destination. On this triple foundation God will, however, build up a work according to His own heart and in favor of the most destitute souls upon earth."

This simple, suffering, humble acolyte—so humble that he was consumed with the love of abjection and contempt, who loved to be despised and looked upon as a man of no great value—was made master of novices while still only in minor orders. About 1826 Pere Blanchard revived the pious institute which had been founded by Pere Eudes, the first apostle of devotion to the Sacred Heart, but which had been swept away by the destructive torrent of irreligion which flooded France at the time of the great Revolution and which, even yet, has not subsided. When his successor, the Abbé Louis, a Breton priest, applied to St. Sulpice for an auxiliary in directing the novitiate at Rennes, "Take M. Libermann with you," they said; "he is, it is true, only in minor orders, but he is as good as a priest."

His hunger of humiliations was gratified to the full. Having been lifted up, he was cast down. On the 27th of February, 1838, the vigil of the feast of the Immaculate Heart of Mary, the whole community assembled at the hour of Vespers to hear one of its members speak on the richness and goodness of this admirable Heart. The master of novitiates was unexpectedly requested to give the accustomed conference. As he was beginning to speak, "all at once," writes an eyewitness, "he fell to the ground, struck by a violent attack of epilepsy; and whilst he remained stretched on the pavement before our sorrowing eyes, we witnessed for more than a quarter of an hour all the sad effects of this awful malady. The following night he had to be watched, and he remained for several days under the influence of the attack." It was the last, but the most painful and humiliating. Until the close of 1839 the crises of his malady were less frequent and less painful; in most cases they were but slight faintings. Several considered his infirmity as a trial to preserve in him the spirit of humility, union with God and total abandonment to His will. "Indeed," writes one of his novices, M. Poirier, afterwards Bishop of Roseau and one of the most zealous propagators of the faith in North America, who considered as a special favor of Providence the time he spent with him in the novitiate of the Eudists, "I am in no way surprised that he was delivered from it at the moment appointed by Divine Providence. I even feel convinced that by conferring such a favor on His servant the Lord has wished to give him a pledge of His protection and a sign of His approval of a work undertaken for His glory."

It was before the altar and under the auspices of Our Lady of Victories in the celebrated church in Paris dedicated under that invocation that the first idea of Libermann's society was conceived. There, their hearts throbbing with sympathetic emotion, on the feast of the Purification in 1839 they heard the saintly Abbé Desgenettes recommend for the first time to the prayers of a large congregation the conversion and salvation of the Negro race, an intention they had suggested to the pious pastor. Sown in such soil and in such an atmosphere, the project struck root. New recruits joined their ranks: the number of future missioners increased rapidly: students distinguished by their talents or piety rallied round the promoters, although the founder regarded himself as "a useless vessel in the Church of God . . . a piece of worm-eaten wood, to which the fire takes only stealthily and with difficulty, and that gives neither heat nor light to anybody . . . a paralytic who wishes to move, but cannot." whose "desires are immense, but altogether fruitless." To a seminary director he wrote: "In the utter nothingness in which I am, the only thing left me is to prepare for death." Having spent several months in interior agony at the foot of the cross, he thought of retiring into solitude and living on alms, relying solely on Providence. He took counsel with his former directors, the Paris Sulpicians, but the light he sought was elusive and did not yet fully dawn upon him. It was on the feast of the Apostles SS. Simon and Jude, after a fervent Communion, that for the first time the Lord spoke to his heart in clear tones and that his real vocation revealed itself. He already foresaw that the extraordinary ardor manifested at St. Sulpice for the apostolate of the blacks would soon cool down in many and that the Lord had designed him, poor as he was, to become the founder of a new society of missionaries.<sup>3</sup>

His resoluteness was subjected to the usual tests, such as we find them now and again in religious biographies. When he told the superior of the Eudists, the latter said his idea was an illusion of the devil and an effect of self-love, and a person of eminent virtue, to whom he had confided his secret, censured most severely and treated as imprudent his intention of going to Rome. A lady in Dijon, upon whom he called on his way from Paris to Lyons and who had such a veneration for him that she would write to him only on bended knees, describes his appearance as "in a clean soutane, his head uncovered and bent down," he uttered "some unintelligible words," and "appeared so humble, so recollected, so gentle, so unhappy," that she "felt entirely moved." After laying his cares and intentions at the feet of our Lady in her sanctuary at Fourvières, where he humbly solicited, but was rudely refused, permission to serve Mass, he spent three weeks in Lyons as the guest of the family of the Abbé Ozanam, a former fellow-student at St. Sulpice. When he laid his plan before the superior of a religious community, who received him coldly, he began to laugh heartily, gave him no answer, and abruptly left the room. In a joint letter to his brother and sister he wrote: "I have quitted Rennes. I have no longer on earth a single creature in whom I can confide. have nothing; I do not know what shall become of me, how I shall ever be able to live. I will lead a contemptible, forgotten, neglected life, a life lost according to the world; I will have the disapproval of a great number of those who formerly loved and esteemed me; I shall, perhaps, be treated as a proud and senseless man, be despised and even persecuted. . . Look on me as a man dead and buried. Pray God for the good of my soul and the accomplishment of His most holy will."

Accompanied by Paul de la Brunière, then a sub-deacon, destined, as a priest of the Seminary of Foreign Missions, to meet a martyr's death at the hands of the long-haired Tartars, he proceeded to Rome, where, along with his companion, he had audience of Gregory XVI. On this occasion took place a remarkable incident, thus related by M. Drach to Father Schwindenhammer: "In furnishing notes of the life of our dear Father Libermann of blessed memory I forgot

<sup>5</sup> Goepfert, op. cit., p. 215.

a remarkable fact which I discovered in the diary, wherein each evening I note down the chief incidents of the day. On the 17th of February, 1840, I presented to His Holiness Gregory XVI. the Abbé Libermann and his friend, the Abbé de la Brunière. The Sovereign Pontiff laid his hand on the head of the Abbè Libermann and leaned upon it with visible emotion. When the two ecclesiastics had retired, the Pope asked me, in a voice which betrayed his feelings, 'Who is he whose head I have touched?' I gave His Holiness a brief history of the neophyte. The Pope then said these very words: 'Sara un Santo' ('He will be a saint')" In the brief account Libermann himself gave of the audience, which was very short, he says: "His Holiness received me with admirable kindness, bade me persevere, and gave me his blessing. . . . You cannot conceive the great consolation one experiences on seeing the Vicar of our Lord on earth."

When De la Brunière left him to go on the foreign missions, Libermann, we are told, remained at Rome in complete abandonment, feeble in health and reduced to almost extreme poverty, without bread, without clothing, without a friend. Still, he did not lose heart or faith. His faith was of that sterling character that, fire-tried by tribulations, it became the purer, brighter and more unalloyed with any dross of human weakness. When almost insurmountable obstacles barred the way to the realization of his project, he wrote to a friend: "The difficulties to which you refer are great, and may or may not increase in future; but I do not understand how a man with the least atom of faith can put forward such objections. If only easy things should be undertaken, what would have become of the Church? St. Peter and St. John would have continued to fish in the Lake of Tiberias and St. Paul would never have left Jerusalem. I can easily conceive how a man who thinks himself something and who relies on his own strength may stop before an obstacle; but how can any one be frightened by a difficulty when he depends solely on our Adorable Master?" Without a counsellor or protector, persons were far from favoring his Some spoke of his project as "an absurdity," others called him "the imprudent solicitor," while a Breton priest frankly told him that it was "a chimerical illusion," reprimanded him for his temerity and tried to free him from "his pretension to become a founder." To the question, "Do you know what it is to found a religious order, being, as you are, in so wretched a condition?" he simply replied by asking what did St. Ignatius Loyola possess when he laid the foundations of his institute? "He had only his

<sup>•</sup> Letter dated Rome, 10th August, 1855, quoted by Father Goepfert, op. oft., p. 285.

bag and his discipline, and see how his society flourishes. Is not Providence the same to-day as it was then? Depending upon it, I am rich enough." He consulted a priest who was then held in high repute of sanctity throughout the Pontifical States; this priest, cold and reserved, listened inattentively, and as soon as he had finished stood up, and, without uttering a word, left him. A celebrated ecstatica of the Tyrol, to whom he wrote, never replied. He laid before Mgr. Cadolini, Secretary of the Propaganda, a memoir or exposition of his project. The reply which reached him eight days afterwards was that before any definite decision could be given he should be a priest. His position appeared hopeless. Repulsed in Rome, he was reviled in France. He was accused of going to Rome to deceive the Pope, that he might be promoted to holy orders. Even his confessor went so far as to forbid him to speak any further of his project. Still his confidence in God was unshaken; while he devoted himself to meditation, good works, the practice of virtues to the heroic degree, ardent and continual prayer, poverty to the extent of mendicity, mortification of body and spirit, visits to hospitals and prisons, the catechising of poor children and the like. He lived in a little garret, quite under the roof of the humble house of M. Patriarca, in the Vicolo del Pinaco. It was so near the tiles that he could not stand erect in it; a lumber room, where peasants coming into Rome to sell their wares would occasionally pass the night, it being divided into two compartments. A few pigeons were its only constant visitors. For the use of this comfortless loft he paid a crown a month. Giving up one of the compartments to his visitors, the pigeons, he reserved for himself the worse of the two, which he furnished with a chair, a table and a mattress laid on the floor and covered with a single blanket. A stone was his pillow. His crucifix, with which he never parted, he placed upon the table, and on the wall he hung a picture of St. Francis of Assisi. He had to make his own bed, brush his own clothes and shoes and keep his room or attic in order. His dietary was in keeping with these poor surroundings, what was barely sufficient to keep body and soul together. After a light breakfast he partook at midday of a single meal at the common table, contenting himself with the humble fare of the poor people who rented the house. A small quantity of bread usually sufficed for his supper. He was so poor that he often was not able to pay the postage of the letters he received from France on spiritual matters. More than once he had to mix among the poor, to receive the soup which every evening was distributed at the doors of certain religious communities. On one occasion the Abbé Ozanam, penetrating into his little room under the rafters, found him suffering from fever, stretched on a mattress, having only his one blanket to cover him. Beside him was a vessel of water, in which he moistened some crusts of bread. The visitor was so struck by this sight that thirty years afterwards he remembered it vividly. The only visits he paid were to his friend and former catechist, M. Drach, like himself the son of a Jewish rabbin, and who was then librarian of Propaganda.

Such was his belief and trust in Providence that when there was seemingly not the least prospect of success, when he had not the least idea under whose patronage his disciples would exercise their apostolate, when he did not even presume to solicit the establishment of a missionary congregation, he was already deeply interested in the welfare of his as yet unformed spiritual family and felt irresistibly impelled to draw up rules for their guidance. It was when visiting the seven great Roman basilicas and the principal sanctuaries of our Lady in search of light, for as yet he was like one walking and working in a mist, that the thought suddenly struck him "that he should consecrate his work to the Holy Heart of Mary." "Like a luminous ray," says his English biographer, "it flashed across his mind, and in an instant revealed to him a world of light, devotion and confidence. Darkness and indecision had disappeared; he had found the rallying point, and he perceived in one distinct glance the whole plan of the rules in all its extent and details. His soul overflowed with ineffable delight, and it was then that he traced these first lines that adorn the frontispiece of the rules of the new institute and that will ever remain one of its most cherished mottoes: 'All for the greater glory of our Heavenly Father in Jesus Christ, through the Divine Spirit and in union with the most holy Heart of Mary.' M. Libermann had found the name of his society, and from that moment he experienced no difficulty in writing, classifying and explaining the rules for the 'Missionaries of the Holy Heart of Mary."

He spent the whole summer of 1840 writing the rules<sup>7</sup> and the "Great Commentary" as well as his "Commentary on the Gospel of St. John." Some of his first followers, not having his strong faith, did not share his firm confidence; several, discouraged by difficulties, gave up the project. For these defections he was consoled by the Pope's paternal encouragement, conveyed to him in a letter from Cardinal Fransoni, Prefect of Propaganda, who assigned as episcopal protector of the nascent congregation, Mgr. Allen Collier, Vicar Apostolic of the Mauritius, a distinguished member of



<sup>7</sup> His first rule differed little from that of regulars who have no solemn vows or from that mitigated form which governs most modern congregations.

<sup>8</sup> The latter work is lost.

the English branch of the Order of St. Benedict. Having finished his rules towards the end of autumn, he left Rome in November, 1840, on foot, half-clad, his clothes not having been renewed for a long time. His cloak was composed of many patches, without any regard to quality, shape or color, roughly kept together by means of pins and threads, as best he could. In a letter to a friend he calls himself "a very poor man, both physically and morally. My outward appearance," he wrote, "is so miserable that several times during my travels I was taken for a malefactor and on the point of being cast into prison. All in and about me is common and repulsive." During a pilgrimage to Loreto his strongly marked Jewish face, emaciated by suffering, exposed him to many insults. Some one having secretly ripped up all the old pieces of his mantle, he had to hurriedly re-sew them or replace them by others still more incongruous. Children hooted him as soon as he made his appearance in every village in this patchwork garb. In more than one town the police had to interfere. To avoid incarceration as a suspicious vagrant he had to produce his papers for their inspection. In trudging through the lonesome valleys of Umbri towards Spoleto he narrowly escaped falling into the hands of prowling brigands. For all these humiliations and sufferings he was compensated by the happiness of kneeling in the Holy House of Nazareth, which his Jewish ancestors, his tribe, his family, perhaps, had gazed upon eighteen hundred years before. "The strength which he needed for the labors of his life," says Father Goepfert, "was communicated to him in the workshop of St. Joseph, and the light which he required streamed upon him in abundance through the window of the Angel Gabriel."

It is related that one evening, in the neighborhood of Assisi, he left the main road to visit the tomb of a saint, held in great veneration in that district. Entering a village at a rather late hour, cold, hungry and weary, he went from house to house asking for a night's lodging. Every door was pitilessly closed against him. Continuing his way along the road, he discerned a dim light from an humble solitary cottage. There he was received with great kindness, though its charitable inmates were in deep affliction. little daughter, suffering acute pain, seemed at the last extremity; her shrieks were most piteous. Her afflicted parents were almost in despair, when the holy stranger, moved with compassion, said to them: "My good people, you do not know what to do; have confidence in God and in His saints. I have just come from the pilgrimage of 'the saint,' and I have brought with me the grains of a tree which grows quite near her tomb. Put some of these grains into a glass of water and give it to your child to drink."

"For eight days," replied the father, "she has been unable to swallow the least thing, even water." However, in obedience to the advice, the good man, with a lively faith, hastened to present to the sufferer a glass of water thus prepared. "Leave it to me," said the servant of God. "You have faith; one drop is sufficient;" and, dipping his fingers in the water, he simply moistened the child's lips. At once the pains disappeared; the little patient slept soundly all night, and when, on the morrow, the saint set out on his journey he left the little child entirely restored and her parents filled with joy and gratitude.

On his return to Rome a letter from his brother conveyed to him the joyful news that Mgr. de Ræs, the then recently nominated coadjutor of Mgr. de Tréverne, Bishop of Strasburg, was willing to ordain him sub-deacon. Having entered Rome on the feast of the Epiphany, January 6, 1840, he guitted it on the 7th of the same month in the following year, with the firm determination of becoming a priest and of devoting his life to God and to the salvation of souls through the future Society of the Holy Heart of Mary. He received the sub-diaconate during the ember days of Trinity (5th June, 1841) and was ordained deacon on the feast of the Martyr St. Laurence (10th August). On Saturday, the 18th of September, 1841, the ceremony which gave to the Church one of the holiest priests of our age took place in the private chapel of the episcopal palace at Amiens, the Abbé de Brandt being the Bishop's solitary assistant. That very day he wrote a joint letter to his brother and sister, prefaced with the words "Misericordias Domini in æternum cantabo!" in which he communicated to them the glad intelligence. "I have to announce to you," he said, "the great mercy and ineffable bounty of our Lord Jesus Christ towards an unworthy servant, who does not deserve even to pronounce His holy name. I have been ordained priest this morning. God only knows what I have received on this great day! For it cannot be conceived either by man or angel." On the feast of the Apostle St. Matthew he said his first Mass in the house of his benefactresses, the Sisters of Louvencourt. His priestly blessing descended on adopted orphans, images, says his biographer, of the abandoned souls, which were now more than ever the portion of his inheritance. On the following Saturday, after a new thanksgiving of three days, he celebrated his second Mass at the altar of Notre Dame des Victoires, assisted by the saintly M. Desgenettes and surrounded by M. M. Le Vavasseur, Tisserand and Collin. This was the first community Mass of the Society of the Holy Heart of Mary, which thus sprang up where it was first conceived, before the altar and under the auspices of Our Lady of Victories. To all who assisted at the Mass he seemed

more an angel than a man; yet he told M. Drach that he very often ascended the altar "with trembling."

On the 27th of September, 1841, the novitiate was opened at the village of La Neuville with three members, two priests, Libermann and Frederick Le Vavasseur, and a sub-deacon, Marcellin Collin. They lived in the practice of the strictest poverty, subsisting almost exclusively on alms. As happens when truly spiritual men band themselves together for any work, entered upon in utter self-forgetfulness and self-abnegation, the devil, who is ever intent upon thwarting good, raises up opposition. Libermann had hardly been ordained when the Bishop of Amiens, Mgr. Mioland, was besieged by visitors who told him that he had been deceived; that he had imposed hands upon an adventurer of doubtful doctrine and changeable disposition, who pursued at random every sort of good work, and under cover of the priesthood carried on a long series of intrigues at Rome, Paris and Strasburg; that he had opened his diocese to a rash and dangerous enterprise, which would create widespread scandal and confusion. He was perplexed and was on the point of writing to M. Carbon at St. Sulpice, when it chanced that one of the directors, on his way from Boulogne to Paris, visited him. He told him all about his uneasiness, whereupon M. Mollevant said: "My Lord, it is the noblest deed of your life."

At first things looked like failure. For two years they were left alone. At the close of 1843 they only numbered twelve, including one in the Mauritius. But they doubled their numbers from 1843 to the end of 1844. Though their numbers increased, their resources did not increase. Still poor, they had to buy their own provisions at the village or town and draw water from a neighboring fountain. They literally "took no thought of the morrow" and cast their care upon Providence. It never failed them.

From the beginning Libermann was most desirous of seeing the rule strictly observed. He set the example, being, as his biographer calls him, the living rule of his community. He insisted especially on the spirit of interior life, the spirit of sacrifice and on the virtues of charity, zeal and humility. No virtue was dearer to him than charity. He assisted with special care those who were tempted or afflicted, his kindness for scrupulous souls being often carried to heroism. He had the gift of reading consciences and knew the interior state of a soul by infused light. He has been frequently compared to St. Francis de Sales, on account of the gentle manner with which he conducted souls to God.

As the congregation expanded, so did its work. Missions were confided to it in the Mauritius, Bourbon, Hayti, Australia, Guiana and Africa. They were summoned to take their share in the gigantic

work of evangelizing eight hundred millions of souls in the vast field of Catholic missions, calling to their aid "coadjutor brothers."

A further development of the society meanwhile took place in France. In 1844 was established the "House of the Holy Heart of Mary" at Noyon, in the suburbs of Amiens. Another branch house was founded at Bordeaux, at the request of M. Germainville, the well-known apostle of the soldiers, who, with his characteristic earnestness, entreated that his "dear friends of the barracks" and the poor workingmen of France should be looked upon with the same zealous eye as the forsaken black races of Africa. The acquisition of Notre Dame du Gard, formerly in the possession of the Cistercians till the great French Revolution, enabled Libermann to establish the senior scholasticate and the novitiate of the coadjutor brothers.

In 1848 it was incorporated in the restored Society of the Holy Ghost, the two forming one body, under the title of the Congregation of the Holy Ghost and of the Holy Heart of Mary, in virtue of a decree of Propaganda, Father Libermann being appointed first superior general, an office he held down to his death in 1852.

One of the first fruits of his zeal in the high office to which he had been raised was to procure the erection of bishoprics in the islands of Martinique, Guadaloupe and Bourbon, thus solving a difficult problem, one which had baffled all the efforts of his predecessors—the constitution of the colonial clergy. "Of all the evils which afflict the Church in the French colonies," he wrote to Cardinal Fransoni, "the abuse of power on the part of the Governors appears to me to be the greatest. Ecclesiastical authority is weakened, paralyzed and degraded. The priests are considered as mere Government officials and the influence of evil authority over them is all-powerful. The ordinance which obliges ecclesiastical superiors to give to the temporal power an account of the conduct of their clergy needs no comment, as it carries its spirit within itself." To remedy this entailed a great amount of labor. "During several months," he said afterwards, "I have lived the life of a galley slave, but it was necessary to take a little trouble for these poor colonies." In this he showed he was not only an exemplary priest, but a skillful negotiator and able administrator.

It being impossible to personally direct each missioner, he composed for the guidance of all his subjects his "Instructions to the Missioners." He was instrumental, after his arrival in Paris, of starting an ecclesiastical conference under the patronage of St. John the Evangelist, composed of priests for their mutual help and edification in the exercise of the ministry. Both he and his priests had the direction of several religious communities. When M. le Pré-

vost, founder of the Brothers of St. Vincent de Paul, was about establishing in Paris in 1851 an institution for the education of the orphans of the working classes, he consulted Libermann. never left him," he said, "without carrying away some new light on the spiritual life, without especially being penetrated by a more lively desire of consecrating ourselves, soul and body, to the service of God in works of zeal and charity." Libermann likewise welcomed and encouraged the Little Sisters of the Poor on their arrival in Paris, aided them liberally by his alms and sent them his priests to act as chaplains. He never ceased to bestow the most assiduous care on the "Œuvre de la Sainte Famille," which in those revolutionary times rendered immense service in one of the most illreputed quarters. Despite his many occupations, he would never refuse admittance to any one; "for who knows," he would say, "if it is not God who sends me these souls?" The Seminary of the Holv Ghost was, in the centre of Paris, a focus of charity and apostolic zeal, and a shelter constantly open to every class—to soldiers, apprentices, workmen, orphans, in a word, to all who stood<sup>9</sup> in need of spiritual or corporal succor.

The seminary also gradually became the rallying centre to which were drawn the most lettered among the French clergy, men who subsequently became distinguished either by their exalted virtues or positions or their contributions to sacred science and Catholic literature. "Yet," says Mgr. Freppel, "nothing was more remote from the mind of the venerable Libermann than the desire of playing any part whatsoever in the affairs of the Church. But God, who delights in exalting the humble, was pleased to honor His servant in proportion to his humility. Around him gathered that indefatigable writer who has had the merit of restoring the true principles of history, by proving that the Catholic Church is the beginning and end of the movement of all ages; that illustrious Cardinal<sup>11</sup> who, despite the still prevailing Jansenistic severities, secured complete triumph for the wise teachings of the greatest moral theologian of modern times;12 that learned Benedictine18 who, before assuming the purple, shed such new lustre on the glories of French learning; that canonist, as humble as he was learned, whose numerous writings have redressed so many errors."14

In a chapter of the English biography Father Goepfert gives an illuminative analysis of his writings and doctrines in which he is

Goepfert, p. 430.
 The Abbé Rohrbacher.

<sup>11</sup> Cardinal Gousset, Archbishop of Reims.

<sup>12</sup> St. Alphonsus Liguori.

<sup>18</sup> Cardinal Pitra, author of many learned works, who wrote the first French biography of Libermann.

<sup>14</sup> The Abbé Dominic Bouix.

shown to have been a consummate master of the spiritual life. In three treatises on "The Interior Life," on "Mental Prayer" and "Affective Mental Prayer," he treated these difficult points as a profound theologian, as a sound ascetic, in a word, as a saint who only describes the paths which he has trodden himself. "Whilst reading with respectful amazement over the numerous autograph writings of the venerable servant of God," says Father Goepfert, "we could not refrain from having the desire to see all his works soon published and take their place by the side of the works of St. Francis de Sales or St. Alphonsus Liguori." 16

He possessed in a high degree that science which is superior to all human science—the science of the saints. This science is embodied in his spiritual letters. The arrival of a letter from Father Libermann was an event among the seminarists, who disputed for the leaves and sometimes for the pieces. Copies, collections and extracts were made, which crossed the seas, to console and strengthen missioners to the farthest extremities of the earth. Many, especially those treating of Christian, religious and sacerdotal perfection, were carefully collected and edited in lithographed copies, for the special use of members of his institute. Yielding to pressing solicitations, his disciples have published two volumes of these letters.17 Priests who had any of them in their possession regarded them "as a sacred deposit," which they piously preserved, and novice mistresses in convents found them of the greatest assistance "in the interior formation of souls." "Among the servants of God for whom I cherish a special devotion," writes a Dominican Father, "the venerable Libermann holds one of the first places. This devotion sprang up within me whilst reading his life, and it increased whilst perusing his letters. Few readings have done me as much good as these letters. I found in them the high strengthening doctrine of M. Olier, with all the unction and simplicity of St. Bonaventure." Cardinal Donnet, Archbishop of Bordeaux, wrote of them in a letter to the superior general: "They are the work of a saint very advanced in spirituality. . . . Father Libermann depicts himself in his writings. He reveals to us a beautiful soul entirely united to God and desirous, above all, to bring after him all those to whom he addresses himself. . . . His letters are real treatises on spiritual devotion."

He accomplished a great work in a short time. "In a few years,"

<sup>15</sup> Biog., p. 440.

<sup>16</sup> Op. oit., p. 448.

<sup>17 &</sup>quot;Lettres Spirituelles du Vénérable Libermann," two vols. in 8vo., xiv.-688-679 pp. Paris: Librairie Poussielque Frèrés, Rue Cassette, 27. Many letters have been lost. His letters date back to his conversion and during the twelve years he remained in minor orders.

says his English biographer, "he sowed the seed of every virtue in the souls of thousands of levites, religious, priests and apostles in particular; he endowed the Church with a religious society, established many houses and missions, promoted the erection of three Vicariates Apostolic and of three bishoprics, sent his missioners to the most desolate regions of the earth and peopled heaven with his disciples and the souls saved by their apostolic labors." 18

Having worked while there was light, there came to him, as to all, the night time when man can work no longer. The laborer had to quit the field which he had tilled and sown and where he reaped an abundant harvest. "Provided I live for ten years," he said to one of his disciples in 1842, "I ask no more, and I feel certain that it will be so." "Have you had any revelation to that effect?" was the query. "I have felt something like an interior voice, which gave me this assurance," was the response. It was while visiting Notre Dame du Gard, on the 3d of December, 1851, he was seized with his last illness After Christmas he recovered sufficient strength to be able to go to Paris, there, says Father Goepfert, to sanctify by his last sufferings and holy death the mother house of his religious family. Among the numerous visitors were M. Desgenettes, Rohrbacher, Ravignan and Augustin Cochin, the great pulpit orator saying to the last named: "Come with me; let us go and see how saints die." He suffered a martyrdom, the intensity of his pains betraying itself in frequent exclamations, such as "Humanly speaking, it is insupportable!" "O, my God! Oh! how I suffer! What a martyrdom!" His death took place on the 2d of February, 1852, feast of the Purification, which is also that of the Presentation of Jesus in the Temple, while the community were chanting in the chapel the vespers of the feast and had just intoned the verse of the "Magnificat:" Deposuit potentes de sede, et exaltavit humilesthe words being distinctly audible in the room of the dying founder. Father Le Vavasseur afterwards closed his eyelids during the "Gloria Patri." Father Schwindenhammer, whom he had designated as his successor, notes the appropriate coincidence of the Purification and the day, Monday, being the day consecrated to the Holy Ghost, "thus uniting more closely," he says, "the two branches that constitute our society, as well as the two devotions which should be the object of our special worship." They laid him to rest, as he wished, within the enclosure of Notre Dame du Gard in an humble vault hewn out at the foot of the cemetery cross, the place of his sepulture being marked by a modest monument.

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<sup>18</sup> Op. cit., p. 454.

## TALLEYRAND'S CONVERSION.

II.

≺ALLEYRAND was soon to discover that his marriage was one of the greatest mistakes of a life which-despite the judgment of the world to the contrary—was fruitful in extraordinary degree of mistakes and of things worse than mistakes. M. De Lacombe says that he entered into formal union with Madame Grand "to put an end to scandal, and the scandal was redoubled; he thought to escape from a false position and he chained himself to it forever." That Napoleon had a considerable share in leading him into the sin and folly which he committed is unquestionable. The First Consul, however disregardful he might be himself of the laws of personal morality, realized perfectly well that the relations which every one believed to exist between the ex-Bishop of Autun and Madame Grand were an outrage against all the canons of public and private decency. In his masterful fashion he sought to end an intolerable condition of things by pretending to think that the Pope had really left Talleyrand free to marry. That he did not actually believe anything of the kind is proved by the fact that—when he became Emperor and set up his Imperial Court—he refused to receive Madame Grand at the Tuilleries. M. De Lacombe says that "Talleyrand soon recognized his mistake. The world was hard upon him. Those who loved him were grieved; his old mother shed tears. Seeing the bad effect produced, the First Consul forgot the day after the marriage that on the eve he had pushed his Minister into it. He always treated Madame Talleyrand coldly, often 'rudely.' It is said that when she appeared at the Tuilleries as a bride<sup>1</sup> for the first time he met her with this greeting: 'I hope the good conduct of Citoyenne Talleyrand will cause the levity of Madame Grand to be forgotten.' Putting on an ingenuous air, she replied: 'On that point I cannot do better than to follow the example of Citoyenne Bonaparte.' The First Consul, who did not like receiving lessons, turned away with angry eyes. From the very first he tried to keep her away from court by his affronts, and at last, as Emperor, her access to it. When Pius VII. came to Paris in 1804 he expressly stipulated that Madame de Talleyrand was not to be presented to him; and there was a new crop of sarcasms in the court and all over the town."2 Talleyrand pretended to take no notice of the evidences daily

forthcoming that the public regarded his so-called marriage as null

1 This refers to the Consular receptions.

<sup>2 &</sup>quot;Talleyrand the Man," p. 184.

and void and as being simply a scandal the more. To the world he maintained an imperturbable calm, even while his heart must have been filled with anxieties and his mind with doubts. In her memoirs Madame de Rémusat says of him at this time:

"He tried to escape from the bitterness of his thoughts by an absolutely artificial life. Public affairs helped him by giving him occupation, and such time as they left on his hands he spent at the gaming table. Always surrounded by a numerous court, he gave his mornings to business, his evenings to the theatre and his night to cards, never exposing himself to a tedious 'tête-à-tête' with his wife, or to the dangers of a solitude which would have afforded an opportunity for too serious reflection. Ever seeking distraction, he never sought sleep until he had insured it by extreme fatigue."

The life led by Talleyrand and his so-called wife at this time was, regarded from a sane or Catholic standpoint, absolutely ridiculous. It was, however, a part of the scheme which Napoleon had formed of creating the semblance of a new aristocracy and making Paris again a centre of gaiety, luxury and extravagance. All the higher members of the civil and military services were paid gigantic salaries on, however, the distinct understanding that they were to spend them in splendid living. The First Consul and future Emperor had fully grasped the truth that money distributed by the State in this way, while keeping the people contented by remunerative employment, eventually flows back to the national coffers through various channels, that provided by the tax-gatherers being not the least productive of revenue. M. De Lacombe says that: "In her amusing journal Madame de Cazenove d'Arleus, a very witty woman, whose brother-in-law had a post in the Ministry, has described an evening party to which she was invited on the 16th of February, 1803, as she was passing through Paris. There was a line of carriages in the Rue du Bac; the courtyard of the Hotel Galliffet was full to overflowing; every one had to wait their turn to advance. One arrived at last; went up the wide staircase bright with flowers and lights, which quite dazzled. M. de Talleyrand, calm and very pale, in a suit of red velvet embroidered in gold, received the guests in the first salon. Further on, Madame de Talleyrand, 'tall, beautiful and well dressed, awaited their homage. All the Ambassadors resident in Paris, all the princes and princesses, all the women who wished to keep a footing in that circle, passed in and out and bowed themselves down. The men in embroidered suits, wearing their orders; the women in velvet, a good deal of white satin and dresses of white crêpe, others in black lace; quantities of diamonds.' The feature of the evening

was the apparition of the Envoy of Tunis, 'a tall man in a turban, with very black moustache, a gray robe, trimmed with ermine over embroidered red trousers. He passed through the double line of stars, orders and bedizened coats, prostrating himself, until he reached Madame de Tallevrand.' Such evenings were not rare at Talleyrand's house. So long as the Empire lasted, whether he was in favor or in disgrace, Minister, Vice Grand Elector or Grand Chamberlain, his salons always exercised the same attraction; the notabilities of the whole world passed through them, as through a gigantic magic lantern." When Napoleon created the ex-Bishop of Autun Prince de Bénèvent and Madame Grand called herself Princess de Bénèvent, the same kind of thing was continued, but on a still more lavish and magnificent scale. Moreover, the illassorted couple gave countless private dances and card parties, to which only their most intimate friends were invited. Both lived in a perfect whirlwind or whirlpool of gaiety and social dissipation. Talleyrand's main thought was to escape from thought.

M. De Lacombe points out that through all his metamorphoses Talleyrand remained a man of former times. As a dignitary of the Empire he retained the flavor of those precious evenings when as Abbé de Périgord he had achieved a sudden reputation by a few witty words. He was an unrivaled talker, he knew how to speak of serious things lightly and competently, evoke memories, tell anecdotes, set the spark to a train of wit. "If M. de Talleyrand's conversation could be bought, I should ruin myself on it!" said Madame de Stäel while they were still friends. A charmed circle often gathered round him in the evening, with Madame de Tallevrand at the head. She sat bolt upright in her armchair, rather stiff and awkward in her gorgeous array, her hair wreathed with flowers even when she was growing old. She did not speak much. husband's lady friends treated her almost as an intruder. were to be seen the Duchesse de Luynes, and the Princesse de Vaudemont, the Vicomtesse de Laval, Aimée de Coigny, first Duchesse de Fleury, and then Madame de Montrond; later on Madame de Rémusat, trying 'by the sweat of her brow' to say something witty: Madame de Flahaut, later on Madame de Souza, a charming Italian lady, gay and learned; a Polish lady with a glass eye, which made her profile look strange; the Comtesse Tyskiewitz, sister of the famous cavalry soldier, Prince Poniatowski. These and such as these would greet Madame de Talleyrand when they arrived and when they left, that was all. If Talleyrand kept silence or sat down to the whist table the conversation languished, and the poor Princesse de Bénèvent, who took no interest in anything but the weather, questions of etiquette and genealogical prob-

lems, was not capable of reviving it. But her salon was always crowded, and she was happy. That the poor woman was very grand looking all authorities appear to be agreed. Unfortunately, they are equally unanimous in describing her as being extremely unintellectual and almost uneducated. It is, perhaps, only charitable to ascribe her many errors as much to these defects as to deliberate rejection of the law of God. Her deathbed repentance almost seems to justify this view. Long before this event, however, she had been completely separated from Talleyrand. The poor Princesse-if she can properly be given the title-was absolutely reckless as regards her good name; scandalous gossip arose; and there were constant domestic dissensions. Besides, with the dawn of the Restoration a continuance of the alliance between the ill-assorted pair became an impossibility, if only because of the fact that, while Louis XVIII. desired to retain the matchless diplomatic skill of Talleyrand in the service of the State, the latter was equally and honestly desirous of serving France. Never were his talents exercised more effectively than at the Congress of Vienna, wheresupported by Castlereagh, who represented England—he secured for the envoy of the Pope the position of president of the deliberations and eventually the restoration to the Holy See of the temporal sovereignty of the States of the Church. There was not, however, and there could not possibly be any room found at the royal court for the so-called "wife" of the ex-Bishop of Autun. If the thing had been even remotely possible, the satiric papers of Paris were determined to make it impossible. Paragraphs of the most offensive kind were published. A specimen of these may be quoted. This was printed as if it were an item of genuine fashionable intelligence:

"Paris, 6th May, 1816.—Yesterday after Mass the Bishop of Autun had the honor of presenting his wife to the son of St. Louis."

The jibe was a very blackguard one, but it is necessary to quote it in order to show how Paris—always cynical—regarded both its Sovereign and his Minister for Foreign Affairs. After Waterloo and the final overthrow of Napoleon, when both Louis XVIII. and Talleyrand were once more reëstablished in the capital, the latter realized that the continuance of his crazy alliance was impossible. It was a scandal against public propriety which Catholic opinion—then dominant at court—would not tolerate. Under these circumstances, he installed his niece, Comtesse Edmond de Perigord, as head of his household, across the threshold of which that lady registered solemn vows Madame Grand should never pass. So far as the latter was concerned, the arrangement of a separation was entirely a matter of money. She knew perfectly well that

Talleyrand's main purpose was to keep her out of Paris, where her presence made him contemptible and ridiculous. The Comtesse wanted her permanently exiled to England, but eventually it was agreed as a compromise that she should fix her residence at Pontdes-Sains, Talleyrand allowing her a generous annuity. In 1817, however, she could stand quietude no longer and suddenly appeared Talleyrand was both annoyed and puzzled, but he was resolved to avoid anything in the nature of a public quarrel. Accordingly, he consented to continue the annuity, if she refrained from creating any further scandal. At first she rented a villa in the suburbs at Auteuil, but eventually settled down in a house in the Rue de Lille. Here she set up a kind of salon of her own, entertaining from time to time various notabilities, French, English, Irish and Americans. One of her numerous guests, for example, was Tom Moore. In the matter of servants, furniture, equipage, etc., the income provided by Talleyrand enabled her to maintain the state befitting the title of Princesse de Bénèvent. The armorial bearings of the Talleyrands were blazoned on all the fittings of the mansion, but from her so-called husband she was as completely separated as if a decree of divorce had legally annulled the marriage, which was no marriage. At the same time the grace of God was working a miracle in her heart and soul.

We must let M. De Lacombe tell the story: "On Monday, the 7th of December, 1835, the Archbishop of Paris, Mgr. de Quélen, was giving audience in the parlor of the Dames de Saint Michel, in the Rue Saint Jacques, whose convent was his favorite retreat since the pillage of his episcopal palace and of his chateau at Conflans. It was about 6 o'clock in the afternoon. All at once he was informed that a lady insisted on seeing him, and that it was a case of a sick call. The Archbishop interrupted his audience; the lady entered; she was the Duchesse d'Esclignac, née Talleyrand-Périgord.8 She explained hastily that her aunt, the Princesse de Tallevrand, was dying and wished to make her confession. There was not a moment to lose; the doctors did not think that she could last the night. Mgr. de Quélen did not hesitate; his apostolic zeal is well known; he often used to say: 'I would go a hundred miles to save a soul.' Although he was holding his council at that moment, he got into the Duchesse d'Esclignac's carriage with his two Grand Vicars, Abbé Quentin and Abbé Affre,4 and drove to the Rue de Lille. The interview between Mgr. de Quélen and Madame de Talleyrand was very touching. As soon as the Archbishop came

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> She was the daughter of Baron Boson de Talleyrand-Périgord, the second brother of Talleyrand.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Assassinated afterwards, when Archbishop of Paris.

into the room the invalid raised herself upon her pillows with murmured thanks and immediately made her confession with grave simplicity. Then she asked that her friends and servants, who had withdrawn into the next room, should be called back; these were the Duchesse d'Esclignac, the Comtesse de Champeron, the Marquise de Vins de Pezac, the Abbés Affre and Quentin and her two lady's-maids. As soon as they had taken their places round her bed she said in a voice which was still firm: 'I am glad to be reconciled with God, and, after asking His pardon, I beg pardon of men for any scandal I have caused.' All present were moved and kept silence. Mgr. de Quélen sent the Abbé Ouentin to the parish Church of St. Thomas Aguinas for the Viaticum and holy oils. Presently the Princesse, who had fallen back breathless on her pillow, asked for the Archbishop once more; she wished to speak to him in private. First she questioned him as to her condition, and as he only replied with vague encouragements, she understood the truth. Showing no sign of trouble, she sent her lady companion for two caskets, one of wood, the other of red morocco, locked and tied up with white silk ribbon and sealed in wax with her arms. When they were in the Archbishop's hands she said: 'If I get well, you will give them back to me; if not, give them to the Duchesse d'Esclignac.' She also gave him a sum of 2,000 francs in bank notes for the poor. Mgr. de Ouélen asked her to devote it to the charity of the cholera orphans, and she con-Then she begged him twice over that he would himself recommend all those in her service to M. de Talleyrand. Meanwhile the Abbé Ouentin and the curé of Saint Antoine had arrived. The Princesse was left to recollect herself for a few moments. Then Mgr. de Quélen, showing her the Host, exhorted her to piety, resignation and confidence; he administered the Viaticum and Extreme Unction and recited the prayers for the dying." At 9 o'clock that night the Archbishop left the house. Madame de Talleyrand lived two days longer, but peacefully expired in the early morning of the 10th of December, 1835.

That same morning the Duchesse de Dino, hearing that the Princesse was in her agony, thought it right to acquaint Talleyrand with the fact. Imperturbable as ever, he answered in words which the Duchesse, not unnaturally, has recorded "surprised" her. The reply was significant while callous. It was: "This simplifies my position very much." More than a year before—in the autumn of 1834—Talleyrand had consented at last to admit that his years were so many he might without discredit claim a spell of earthly repose. He retired from the public service in a veritable blaze of

<sup>5 &</sup>quot;Talleyrand the Man," pp. 209, 210, 211.

glory. As Ambassador for France at the Court of St. James he had brought about the actual accomplishment of the dream he had dreamt forty years before, in the days of his visionary republicanism, and established a genuine alliance between his own country and Great Britain. "He had done more; thanks to him, the independence of Belgium, the safeguard of the northern frontier, had been recognized. And he had just signed the Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance, which, by binding together France, England, Spain and Portugal in favor of the Peninsular, seemed, in the words of Mignet, to oppose the union of the West to that of the North in the interests of the great constitutional cause on the Continent. The veteran diplomatist seemed like its arbitrator."6 Tallevrand had labored, and labored successfully, to set the stamp of the principles of the Revolution on the public conscience of Europe. Henceforth the decision of a mere brute majority-nicknamed "Constitutionalism"—was to reign supreme. The nations which had sacrificed and suffered most in resisting by force of arms the doctrines of 1792 were at last cajoled by this extraordinary old man into giving them peaceful acceptance. The effects of his achievement are still visible in a lowering of the moral tone of the whole Continent. Whether or not Talleyrand and the statesmen of various nations who yielded to his wiles ever realized the inevitable result of their proceedings would be impossible to decide without entering upon an investigation too large for us. We must cor.tent ourselves with merely noting facts. As M. De Lacombe puts it: "Talleyrand felt weary, ill and infirm. His withered legs could not support him; he was subject to palpitations and fainting fits; sometimes when speaking or walking he was obliged to stop short to take breath. He suffered from that incurable disease, old age; he had completed his eightieth year. One by one his contemporaries disappeared from the world, some into retirement, some into their graves. In July, 1834, he had heard Earl Grey's farewell to active politics in the upper chamber of the English Parliament. On his return to France a few weeks later he heard of the death of his old friend, Princesse Tyskiewitz, née Poniatowski."8 The Duchesse de Dino writing on the 5th of November, 1834, to the Baron de Barante, said:

<sup>6 &</sup>quot;Talleyrand the Man," p. 217.

Talleyrand translated the following passage from Grey's speech and kept it in a pocketbook which he always carried: "At an advanced age a man might be able to discharge the duties of the office I hold under ordinary and easy circumstances, yet, considering the present condition of affairs. I felt that the duties imposed on me were too much for my strength, and that therefore I should be justified in retiring."

"Again I have had the painful task of announcing a fresh loss to M. De Talleyrand, a sad mission which has been too frequent in the last two years! The worst of it is that at M. De Talleyrand's age it is not only a grief, but a warning. It moves and upsets me more than it does him. He is so calm, but that does not make him resigned to the gradual withering of his legs. He is irritable and impatient. Sometimes it amounts to discouragement, and he sinks into gloomy thoughts."

A week later—on the 13th of November—Talleyrand wrote from Valençay to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, practically insisting on the King accepting his resignation of office as Ambassador at London. The letter contained a distinct reference to a sense of spiritual responsibility, realization of which was to become more and more apparent. The ex-Bishop of Autun wrote:

"My great age, the infirmities which are its natural consequence, the repose which it renders advisable, and the thoughts which it suggests, makes this very natural step not only justifiable, but almost a duty."

Even in his retirement Talleyrand maintained a stately household, gave periodical receptions, at which all whom were worth knowing in Paris were present. He was a constant visitor at the Royal Palace and mingled to a considerable extent in the highest ranks of society, diplomatic, official and literary. Occasionally he was seized by an almost pathetic desire to revisit the scenes of his youth. "On these days he would order his carriage, take his grandniece. Pauline de Périgord, with him and drive to distant and unfashionable quarters. The old man sought the traces of his past there. In the Faubourg Saint Jacques he would show his companion the house where he lived with his nurse until he was four years old; it was there that a fall from a chest of drawers caused his lameness and cast a shadow over his whole life. Sometimes, in the neighborhood of the Sorbonne, he would stop before the Lycée Saint Louis, formerly the College d'Harcourt, and remember that he had been a pupil there. Sometimes, near Nôtre Dame, before the ruins of the episcopal palace, sacked in the riots, he would relate anecdotes of his uncle, Cardinal de Talleyrand-Périgord. But Saint Sulpice attracted him oftenest. He would alight and, leaning silently on the young girl's arm, stroll haphazard through the gloomy little streets unchanged by time: the Rue Garancière, where he was born; the Rue Feron, upon which his seminary cell overlooked. Friendly phantoms, shades of bygone days, came out to him from the gray façades. One night he went into the church with Pauline and stayed there for a long time, pensive and silent. Then he said suddenly: 'I was baptized here,' and was silent once

more." "Talleyrand spent as much time as possible at his country house at Valencay, where he loved to play the part of a bountiful and Catholic lord of the manor. His brief amusements were the initiation and inspection of arboricultural and agricultural operations, and nearly all his leisure was spent in the woods and fields or amidst the budding hedge rows. He seemed to rejoice in getting rid of the glamor of the court and the city in the pure sunlight which illumined the hills and vales. When not at Valencay he was generally to be found at the rural home of Madame De Dino, at Rochecotte, in Touraine. We are told that: "When he was made Mayor of Valençay in 1826 he was as delighted as a child. He bought a house to make a town hall; he sent for the nuns of Saint André to keep a girls' school; he founded a free pharmacy, and he organized distributions of bread, wood, linen and money for the poor. In 1836 he rebuilt the church steeple which the vandals of the Terror had pulled down. He gave his mind unweariedly to all these little matters." He attended Mass regularly every Sunday, and the Duchesse de Dino says that "nothing would have induced him to miss it." He constantly read the works of Bossuet, and concerning his study of these his niece has left on record an interesting statement contained in one of her letters to the Abbé Dupanloup. In this she wrote:

"One day in the summer of 1835 my uncle sent for me. I found him reading in his room. 'Come here,' he said to me; 'I want to show you how mysteries should be spoken of; read, read aloud, and read slowly.' I read as follows: 'In the year of the world 4000 Jesus Christ, son of Abraham in time and son of God in eternity, was born of a virgin.' 'Learn that passage by heart,' said M. De Talleyrand, 'and see with what authority and simplicity all the mysteries are concentrated in those few lines. Thus and thus only should holy things be spoken of. They must be imposed, not explained; that is the only way to get them accepted; no other way is of any use, for doubt begins when authority fails; and authority, tradition, the master, are only to be found sufficiently in the Catholic Church.'"

Again, as so often before, it is necessary to quote M. De Lacombe, who says that "Talleyrand had given himself up completely to his duties as lord of the manor; he gave it precedence over all others. Here is an example: In the spring of 1837 he had accompanied the court to Fontainbleau for the marriage of the Duc d'Orleans. He was overwhelmed with attentions; the King lodged him in the superb apartments of Madame de Maintenon; he had a place, among the first, everywhere; and he enjoyed these honors.

<sup>9 &</sup>quot;Talleyrand the Man," pp. 221, 222.

Suddenly he remembered that the Archbishop of Bourges, Mgr. de Villèle, was coming to Valençay on his rounds to administer confirmation. To Valençay! His mind was quickly made up. He would leave Fontainbleau. But the King had invited him to Versailles to the grand feasts for the inauguration of the Museum; he would not go. He got into his traveling carriage with his inseparable Pauline; the postilion took the stages at full speed. They arrived before M. De Villèle; and no one could say that in passing through Valencav my Lord Archbishop had not been the guest of Prince de Talleyrand."10 The young girl named in the foregoing passage may fairly enough be described as Talleyrand's angelguardian. We read on: "Receiving the poor on the feast of Saint Charles and the Archbishop of Bourges on the day of confirmation, always and everywhere we find the same innocent figure by Talleyrand's side. Pauline-Pauline de Périgord, the future Marquise de Castellane. Saint Beuve has said somewhere: 'If there was a good aide to M. De Talleyrand in his extreme old age, it was this piece of pure affection.' Talleyrand loved his grandniece tenderly. Born in 1820, she was more than a child and less than a woman. inherited her mother's incomparable grace, charm of mind and elevation of thought; but she had something more: a soul of crystal, clear and radiant. Talleyrand called her 'the angel of my house,' and he could not do without her. When they were separated he at Paris or taking the waters, she at the seaside—he wrote to her nearly every day. They are charming letters, light, easy and full of freshness. He gives her news and advice and tells her anecdotes; he is affectionate above all; his old heart seems to grow young again when he speaks to this young girl." The aged statesman evidently possessed that reverence for youth and innocence which all save the irrevocably bad invariably cherish. Pauline was destined to be the chief human factor in securing his salvation. By way of introduction to his description of the facts connected with the actual reconciliation to the Church, M. De Lacombe writes as follows: "The pious death of Prince Talleyrand in the year 1838 was a great event. It caused surprise at the time, when Voltaire reigned supreme.11 There were sly smiles, incredulous airs, criticism and raillery; and some good Christians seemed as disappointed as were the unbelievers. A death like that of Grégoire or Montlosier would have been applauded. A young statesman, who has sometimes been compared to the Prince de Bénèvent, though he

<sup>10 &</sup>quot;Talleyrand the Man," p. 229.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Of course, what the writer means is that the spirit and principles of the cynical philosopher were dominant in the higher classes of the society of the time.

was never his equal, said in the very ante-chamber of the dead: "M. De Talleyrand did not know how to die like a politician." To which the Duchesse de Dion, who overheard his remark, replied: "At least, he died like an honest man." An old survivor of the emigration said: "After duping men, the Bishop of Autun has tried to dupe God." Madame de Girardin welcomed the guests of her salon, where the Vicomte de Launay used to try the effect of the witticisms of his "Lettres Parisiennes," with these words: "Well, is it true? They say that M. De Talleyrand's death was a proof of his savoir vivre." Doudan, who echoed the sentiments of the austere house of Duc Victor de Broglie, wrote to Guizot on the same subject: "It seems to me that the eighteenth century has cut a sorry figure. . . . It is evident that, among its other shortcomings, it does not know how to die." Even the Duchesse de Broglie, whose soul was too serious for jesting or judging, was disconcerted.

"This scene of M. De Talleyrand's is very strange," she wrote to the Baron de Barante. "Please God, He spoke Himself to his heart and whispered what no human voice can utter. I hope and believe it; God sounds all hearts and consciences; He is the God of truth and compassion."

As to the Comtesse de Boigne, grande dame turned gossip, she has devoted a whole chapter of her memoirs to collecting every scrap of tittle-tattle concerning the last scene of the life of the ex-Bishop of Autun. There was only Mgr. de Quélen to rejoice sincerely, with his whole heart, on the day when he hung an exvoto of gratitude in the sanctuary of Notre Dame de la Deliverande; and perhaps Prince Metternich, who on hearing that his former colleague in the Congress of Vienna had bidden farewell to this world, declared solemnly:

"The gratitude of Europe and of all good souls is due to those who contributed to this beautiful death."

The truth, as M. De Lacombe points out, is that "Talleyrand's reconciliation with the Church was not accomplished in an hour, as some have asserted. It was preparing a long time ahead. Talleyrand thought of it for years, and others round him thought of it for many more." Not one of these was more insistent in effort and prayer than his aged uncle, Alexandre Angélique de Talleyrand-Périgord, whom the Revolution found Archbishop-Duke of Rheims and the Restoration made Cardinal Archbishop of Paris. It was a personal matter with this holy prelate. In M. De Lacombe's words: "When his masters at Saint Sulpice doubted the Abbé Périgord's vocation and M. De Beaumont delayed his admission to the priesthood, he had welcomed him to his Diocese of

Rheims, and had allowed him to be ordained in the chapel of his episcopal palace; he had made him his Vicar General and a canon of his cathedral. The memory of this had remained like a raw wound in the upright and law-abiding conscience of M. De Talleyrand-Périgord, who was regarded as a model of all episcopal virtues, and he had sworn to win back to God the soul of the priest he had failed to give Him. As soon as he returned to Paris as Grand Almoner of France he sought his nephew's company and overwhelmed him with kindness. He attracted him to his house and tried by consulting him to interest him in the affairs of the Church. Mgr. de Quélen told Abbé Dupanloup later on that during the difficult negotiations for the Concardat of 1817 Mgr. De Talleyrand-Périgord often sent him to the Rue Saint Florentin in the morning to get the advice of the negotiator of the Concordat of 1801. When the Grand Almoner became Archbishop of Paris their relations grew still closer. It was no longer an exchange of politeness, but of invitations; and the ex-Bishop of Autun was to be seen taking his place at ecclesiastical dinners with Cardinal de Bausset, Cardinal de la Luzerne, M. Feutrier, the future Bishop of Beauvais, M. Borderies, the future Bishop of Versailles, M. Fravsinous, the founder of the celebrated conferences of Saint Sulpice, the Coadjutor, M. de Quélen, the Vicars General, the superior of the Seminary of Saint Sulpice, M. Duclau, etc. Talleyrand adapted himself; he responded to his uncle's advances and multiplied his visits, and when the Cardinal was ill he spent a short time with him nearly every day. Did matters go any further? Did Mgr. Talleyrand, who felt that death was approaching, venture to broach the redoubtable subject in the course of some intimate conversation? We do not know. He died on the 20th of October, 1821, and his last word was to bequeath to M. De Quélen, his coadjutor and successor, the soul of Prince Talleyrand to be saved."12

The new Archbishop of Paris was not united by any tie of family affection or sense of personal responsibility for his sad career to the Prince. On the contrary, we are told that "M. De Quélen, who had pursued his way, without faltering, through all the storms of the Revolution, felt for Talleyrand, the founder of the Constitutional Church, the married Bishop, something less than liking, a kind of instinctive repulsion. He admitted and regretted it. In the life of Cardinal de Périgord he only visited the ex-Bishop of Autun from a sense of duty—an unfortunate attitude, for it is not by duty, but by love, that a soul is won. Meanwhile, before the sense of duty worked the miracle of arousing love in Mgr. de Quélen, the ice grew thicker for a time between the successor of

<sup>12 &</sup>quot;Talleyrand the Man," pp. 247, 248, 249.

Mgr. de Talleyrand and his nephew. Who would break it?" It was broken sooner than even the new Archbishop or any one else could have expected. Towards the close of 1823 there was published the "Mémorial de Sainte Hélène." In reviewing its contents some writers in the Paris press made them the basis of fierce attack on many of the chief advisers of Napoleon while First Consul, and especially in connection with the arrest and murder of the Duc d'Enghien. Tremendous charges were made, and in replying to some of these which implicated himself the Duc de Rovigo Savary—in a pamphlet which he issued—sought to cast the main responsibility for a foul crime on Talleyrand. The result was the flowing of a deluge of very black ink. The whole career of the ex-Bishop of Autun was made the theme of vitriolic com-Faults which Talleyrand himself had, perhaps, half forgotten were mercilessly exposed to the light of day. The King, Louis XVIII., chivalrously stood by the aged statesman who was now his Grand Chamberlain, but the latter felt acutely the opprobrium which was showered upon him. In his agony of mind he uttered to some one a murmur of amazement or regret that no word of sympathy had come to him from the episcopal palace. The complaint was borne to Mgr. de Quélen, and it touched his heart. Almost immediately he wrote Talleyrand as follows:

"Prince, the apparent wrong with which you reproach me conceals a very real one, which may explain and I hope justify in your eyes the indifference of which you accuse me. . . . It is that I have delayed until to-day to fulfill an obligation towards you which has weighed upon me for some years—a sacred engagement given to that venerable patriarch who was your uncle and my spiritual father; a duty imposed upon me by his kindness, which his death has left entirely to me, and which I have reproached myself every moment for putting off so long, from the instant when I received his last sigh and his last blessing, the duty of urgently imploring you, by every claim it is possible for me to invoke, to remember what religion, the Church, France, your friends and your family expect from you at the end of your career; and of what is required of you for the care and salvation of your soul, so soon to enter its eternal home.

"This, Prince, I confess is what I have delayed too long in saying to you, this is what has made me so reserved. The embarrassment I felt in broaching such a subject to you has made me dread, shun and even fly from your approach and from meeting you, for fear of speaking too soon or of faltering when my speech should be free and assured; or for fear of not finding you disposed to listen to me, and thus indefinitely postponing the hour which

my ardent hopes and fervent prayers never cease to call upon. Until to-day I have never found courage to address you, but knowing that God, who raises the dead, has no need of men in working the greatest miracles, I have dared to ask Him to work that of your conversion, however difficult it may appear, and only in eternity will you know all the violence I have tried to do in heaven and all that which is still being done in my diocese to obtain it. It is sufficient to tell you now that I have never ascended to the altar without bearing you with me, that not a single day has passed that my last prayer has not been for you, and that I have often prayed for you during the night.

"Unfortunate causes, which it is useless to examine now, have drawn you into deplorable consequences and terrible aberrations. I do not mean only in the eyes of the world, which you must leave, and whose judgments, whatever they may be, have often very little influence upon our fate, but before God, whose judgment must decide your eternal happiness or misery. These errors and aberrations have not, I dare to hope, entirely robbed you of your faith. Why should you abandon the hope it leaves to those who come at the last hour? Why should you not employ the years which are left to you in settling your account and effacing with one stroke, as Bossuet says, the enormous debts which the divine mercy remits to those who ask it humbly and sincerely?

"As a Bishop you have caused great affliction to the Church, but you have not hated her. Console her now—that Church who surrounded you with her highest honors, who offered and gave you her highest honors, who offered and gave you her riches and who has not lost the right nor the power of covering you once more with glory in the days of her poverty and abasement. Console her by an example such as she has not seen even in her best days, and which perhaps you alone can show her, an example whose influence may be so strong and happy upon many who, like you, have to make reparation.

"As a Frenchman, what services did you not render to monarchy after our disasters! Even kings owe you their crowns; you have won their gratitude, and you may still force them to admiration by assuring to yourself an immortal crown, which revolutions cannot steal or tarnish, and which I cannot convince myself you have renounced forever."

The Archbishop proceeded to remind Talleyrand of his old teachers at Saint Sulpice, of his pious ancestors and relatives, of his uncle the Cardinal, "leaving to men a memory full of blessings," and of his saintly grandmother; continuing as follows:

"Do you not wish to be reunited to them after having won by

repentance the praise upon earth and the recompense in heaven which they merited by their innocence? What can hold you back, Prince? The illusions of life have passed away; your career is ended; public life can now be nothing but a pastime to you; you have left the political whirlpool and the scene in which others have appeared. Your reputation has nothing to lose by your return; the more open it is, the more it will win you the consideration and esteem of all sensible men, of all those who are good, virtuous and honest. As to the wicked, light and mocking spirits and those who are unfortunate enough to have no more belief in repentance than in virtue . . . what do they matter to you? Fear not those who are powerless to harm the soul; but fear rather Him who can cast both body and soul into hell.

"Few, perhaps, have ever addressed you in such language, Prince. I confess that if my soul is relieved it is also in need of rest. I have done my duty by you as a Bishop and as a friend. . . . Good-bye, Prince, good-bye. You have seen the face of this world change; soon it will pass away for you and with you. Whether I precede or follow you, there is a supreme tribunal before which we will meet again; will it be to part forever? The separations of this world are nothing to those whom faith will reunite; but they will be cruel for those who are to be cut off eternally from the company of the elect." 18

Twelve years were to elapse before this letter produced the full fruit it was intended to bring forth, but it at least secured the creation of friendly relations between Mgr. de Quélen and Talleyrand, the preservation of which both jealously guarded henceforth. Talleyrand kept up a pretty constant correspondence with the Archbishop, and once, when he heard that his Grace proposed to found a house in Paris for advanced theological studies, sent him 10,000 francs, with these words: "To help my Lord Archbishop to raise the ancient Sorbonne, or to supplement it." M. De Lacombe says that all these things kept hope alive in M. de Quélen's heart. He was always on the watch for anything which would bring him into closer contact with Talleyrand. Under pretext of good works, he frequently saw Madame de Dino, feeling that she would be his ally, though he knew she had no personal liking for him. He tried to get some light through her upon the secret workings of the soul he coveted. He sent word to the Prince by her that he was being thought of and prayed for; and he was very disconsolate sometimes because he could not rouse that apostolic zeal in her which consumed himself. The conversion of Talleyrand had become his fixed idea. He never swerved from it in the midst of the

<sup>18 &</sup>quot;Talleyrand the Man," pp. 250, 251, 252, 253, 254.

tribulations which came upon him with the July Revolution; the pillage of his episcopal palace, threats against his person, insult and calumny from a certain portion of the press, to say nothing of the bitter grief he felt at the death of Grégoire and the revolt of Lammenais. Talleyrand was now at the London embassy, where he was an eminent figure, and the Duchesse de Dino was with him. The Archbishop never saw them now; he only heard of them from time to time in the newspapers, but he was praying still. In September, 1834, when he was staying with one of his brothers in Normandy, he knelt in the sanctuary of Notre Dame de la Déliverande and prayed: "Oh, my God, I ask for the conversion of M. De Talleyrand. I offer my life to obtain it, and I willingly consent never to hear of it if only I can obtain it!" From that time this was his prayer every night. The prayer was answered as only God can answer. •

On the 16th of January, 1834, the Archbishop wrote to Cardinal Lambruschini in Rome asking him to submit the following questions to the Pope: What should be his attitude in case Prince Talleyrand, ex-Bishop of Autun, should have recourse to his ministry? What should be his attitude in case he should die impenitent? The answer from the Vatican was prompt and clear. It was complete not only in the instructions it conveyed to Mgr. de Quélen, but also in its definition of the position of Talleyrand as a member of the Church. The following is a translation of the Cardinal's letter:

"It was not until yesterday that I was able to procure the honor of placing myself at the feet of the Holy Father; and in accordance with his orders I have to signify to you as follows:

- "(1) In the event of the spiritual case you mention, His Holiness grants you the most ample faculties, without restriction, even those which require special mention.
- "(2) You are authorized to delegate these faculties to the two Archbishops of Bourges and Tours, whom you mention, where the person in question may be at the time of his death, or to any other Bishop at need, according to your choice.
- "(3) The only measure emanating from the Holy See during the Pontificate of Pius VII. in favor of the ex-Bishop you mention was to restore him to the lay communion, 'salva obligatione perpetuæ castitatis servandæ,' upon which point no dispensation was ever granted.
  - "(4) Before using the faculties delegated to you on his behalf,

<sup>14</sup> That which deposed Charles X. and installed on the throne Louis Phillipe—the Citizen King of the French—son of the regicide Duke of Orleans, Phillipe Egalite, one of the basest of Voltairean princes.



repentance and sufficient reparation, which he owes to the Church and the faithful, will be required. I say sufficient because the case of the ex-Bishop in question is not to be confounded with that of Grégoire. The latter was a schismatic; the other is not. He was reduced by the act of the Church to the lay communion. This difference should not be lost sight of by your Eminence, to whose charity, discretion and prudence it is left absolutely to decide the exterior method of reparation, even "per verba generalia," which you may think proper to exact.

- "(5) It is not thought fitting at present to send the letter or Brief of which your Eminence speaks with laudable zeal; but when occasion serves, and when you think it prudent, you may inform the person in question of the Holy Father's sorrow and affliction and of the consolation he will derive from his return.
- "(6) In case he does not openly refuse the sacraments at the hour of death, it is thought that ecclesiastical burial cannot be refused.

"Moreover, my Lord, His Holiness desires me to assure you that he will pray with all his heart and will ask prayers for the important work of charity and mercy with which you are concerned and which is most worthy of your pastoral zeal." <sup>15</sup>

When, in December, 1835, the so-called "Princess de Talleyrand" died, Mgr. de Quélen began with redoubled devotion his siege of the Prince's soul. On the 12th of that month he wrote the ex-Bishop of Autun once more in the following words:

"Prince: A lady whom you will easily recognize without its being necessary for one to give her the name to which the civil law entitles her, but which the ecclesiastical law forbids me to employ, has just died in the Rue de Bourbon, No. 87, after expressing a desire to be reconciled to God, asking pardon in the presence of witnesses for the scandal which she might have caused, and receiving the sacraments of the Church. The Lord, ever full of mercy towards those who return to Him in the sincerity of their heart, deigned to make use of my ministry to offer this soul the assistance of His grace before summoning it to appear before His judgment. May this news, Prince, be to you as it is to us, a source of consolation and hope. What joy in heaven and on earth; what a happiness for you, if, warned by this blow which death has struck almost at your door, you should also hasten to profit by the few short instants which remain to you to settle the affairs of your eternity!

"You are aware, dear Prince, of the duty laid upon me by the title of pastor and by the memory of the venerable Cardinal who

<sup>15 &</sup>quot;Talleyrand the Man," pp. 256, 257.

bequeathed to me, for you especially, all his solicitude and all his tenderness. It is in order to fulfill this duty, without restriction, that I seize this solemn opportunity to implore you to think and labor without delay for the salvation of your soul, which at your age, with its infirmities, is in peril every moment. It is for this reason that I now renew the entreaties which I sent you twelve years ago at this season, in a letter of the 8th of December, 1823, the draft of which has been recovered from the ruins of the episcopal palace and restored to me.

"Therefore, I conjure you, Prince, in the name of Jesus Christ, our brother, pastor, redeemer and our God; in the name of the most holy and immaculate Virgin Mary, His Mother, assured refuge of the greatest sinners, whom you learned to invoke in your youth; in the name of the Sovereign Pontiff, who in granting me the most ample faculties in your behalf, has authorized me to make known to you his grief and affection and the consolation he will derive from your return; in the name of Cardinal de Périgord, to whom it is impossible you should not wish to be reunited; in the name of your family, to which I belong in virtue of the sacred hand which associated me with one of its illustrious heads; in the name of your true friends, of whom I venture to call myself one of the first; shall I add in the name of my trials and tribulations, accepted, endured and offered unceasingly for you; return, return promptly and sincerely to your faith, to your heart and to your conscience. The judge is at your door; you will appear before his tribunal after a long, painful and stormy career. Reconcile yourself with your clamorous conscience whilst there is still time, whilst you are still upon the road, before the end of the day which is drawing to its close; do not expose yourself to falling guilty into the hands of the living God, and to passing from them into those of the executors of His eternal vengeance.

"As ambassador of Jesus Christ to the souls of my diocese, special delegate of the Holy See to yours, furnished with ample powers, charged by my office to bring you words of reconciliation, there is no need, Prince, for me to point out to you the conditions of this peace offered to you by the all-powerful and merciful King of the Universe. You know them as well as any one. You know also that the less reserved you are the more generous He will be.

"The deceased asked me several times to recommend all those in her service to your kindness. . . . I now acquit myself, Prince, of this deathbed commission, which I promised to fulfill. I would do so in person if I thought you had heard and understood the prayer of a heart so devoted to you, and if I could hope that my presence would not be unwelcome to you, because my prayers

had obtained from you a consent, in exchange for which I would willingly sacrifice my life a thousand times.

"Accept, Prince, the tender and respectful homage and affection with which I remain your very humble and obedient servant.

"HYACINTHE, Archbishop of Paris."

These burning words did really touch the heart and soul of Talleyrand. Stirred to emotion, he thus replied:

"Monseigneur: The filial respect which you keep for one who loved you paternally has again shown itself in a manner which touches me very much. I should have liked to express to you in person the high esteem I have for your kindness, but a prolonged indisposition confines me to the house; I have therefore requested Madame de Dino to take you this letter and enter into certain explanations with you, which I hope will prove to you, Monseigneur, the sincere attachment, respect and high esteem with which I beg you to accept my homage.

## "PRINCE DE TALLEYRAND."

On the next day, the 13th of December, the ex-Bishop wrote to the Archbishop announcing that he would call at the episcopal palace "in the course of the week," but before he could fulfill this intention he became seriously unwell, and it became clear that the thread of life might snap at almost any moment. Terribly alarmed, Madame de Dino sought Mgr. de Quélen, to know what was to be done. The old heart was nearly pumped out, and, if it suddenly ceased to act, the most deplorable consequences might ensue. The Archbishop recognized the dangers of the situation and summoned a council of eminent theologians and of near friends of the Prince to consider it. At this meeting a draft of the recantation to which Talleyrand must give his adhesion, if he was to receive the sacraments of the Church, was approved. It covered all the public transgressions of his life, in the following words:

"I, the undersigned, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, Duc de Dino, Prince de Talleyrand, Peer of France, ex-Ambassador in England, being attacked by an illness which may at any moment end my days, in presence of the witnesses here named, declare before God that I wish to die in the faith, obedience and communion of our Mother the Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church, in which I had the happiness to be born. I abjure, condemn and retract everything in my words, writings or actions which may be contrary to her dogmas, morals and discipline, especially my participation in the schism of the civil constitution of the clergy and the marriage, illicit and null according to the canon law, which I unfortunately contracted before the sacred altars, by means of

an arbitrary and forced interpretation given to a Brief of the Sovereign Pontiff Pius VII., which only restored me to secular functions and reduced me to the lay communion without dispensing me from the bond of perpetual chastity which I was to observe because of my ordination and the indelible character of my episcopal consecration. I sincerely ask pardon of God for all the faults and scandals of my life, desiring to be reconciled to Him by receiving the sacraments of the Church.

"I also abjure and condemn everything in the writings, letters or memoirs which may appear under my name which may be in the least contrary to the present declaration, which I deliver into the hands of the Archbishop of Paris, authorizing and requesting him to give it such publicity as he may think proper.

"Given in Paris, the ----."

This draft the Archbishop sent to M. Benzelin, the curé of the Madeline, with full instructions as to how it was to be used. the first place, Mgr. de Ouélen pointed out that, even "in articulo mortis," absolution cannot be given to certain persons unless they have first made reparation for the public scandal they have caused. "Therefore, you must in the first place," continued His Grace, "exact repentance and sufficient reparation which the person in question owes to the Church and the faithful. You will exact this reparation in your own person, and not through another." The curé was further instructed to take steps to make known to all the priests of his parish that he alone was charged with "this act of the exterior tribunal." As to the reparation to be exacted, he was told that it was to be found in a packet sealed with the episcopal arms, which he was not to open until he entered the sick room. Archbishop went on to say that when Talleyrand had signed the document, "if there is no time to lose, and it is not possible to consult me, you may begin to hear his confession and give him absolution 'in articulo mortis,' but if the sick man should be too weak to sign, then a verbal adhesion expressed in the presence of witnesses would suffice, on condition that 'before the administration of the sacraments the witnesses attest the said adhesion in writing." Finally it was pointed out: "You may possibly be summoned to the dying too late, and those about him may assure you that he has verbally adhered to a declaration similar to that which I send you, a duplicate of which has been given to them. In such a case you will request them to commit to writing the assurance which they have given you." The duplicate referred to had been placed in the hands of the Duchesse de Dino. In September, 1836, Talleyrand invited the Archbishop to visit him at Valençay. His Grace accepted the invitation, and the Prince was supremely delighted,

but unfortunately at the last moment he was detained in Paris and compelled to send an apology. A great opportunity was thus lost. Mgr. Dupanloup has preserved an anecdote related to him by the Duchesse de Dino which casts much light on Talleyrand's real attitude towards religion at this time. This is the story as she told it:

."One Sunday after hearing Mass with my uncle in the chapel at Valençay I lingered after every one else to pray for a little while. He waited for me at the door, and when I appeared he said: 'What prayer were you saying just now?' 'I was saying the Pater; it is the prayer I say oftenest.' 'You are right; it is a beautiful prayer. . . . But for myself,' he continued after a moment's hesitation, 'there is another that touches me more and suits me better . . . the Salve Regina.' 'What? A prayer to the Blessed Virgin?' 'Yes,' he replied. 'Do you not pray to the Blessed Virgin?' 'Oh, yes; but not so often.' 'You are wrong! You should say the Salve Regina above all; it will do you good. Come and sit down. I will teach it to you, for I know it by heart. I will teach it to you in Latin and make you understand it.' Then he began the Salve Regina, accentuating it solemnly and explaining each word. Then he repeated it in Latin, interrupting himself at every moment with exclamations: 'Did you ever hear anything so sweet and consoling? "Salve Regina, mater misericordiæ;" those words are delightful." "Vica, dulcedo et spes nostra, salve;" 'our life, our sweetness and our hope! Learn them by heart and say them often; they will do you good.' So he continued reciting and commenting on each invocation till he reached the last: 'O clemens, ô pia, ô dulcis Virgo Maria!' Then he made me repeat it several times before him, to fix it in my memory. I know it by heart now, and I have never read it in any book; I learned it only from him."

Evidently the Duchesse de Dino owed little to her early instructors in religion, but the days of her youth were those of the Revolution. Day by day Talleyrand was in receipt of letters telling him how good priests and nuns were besieging heaven with prayers for his conversion. He seems to have rather liked these. At any rate, they never offended him, and he generally preserved the missives and the medals and other pious emblems they constantly contained. Gradually, but none the less certainly, he was returning to God. It is impossible, however, in the space at our disposal to quote at length all the evidences on this point collected by M. De Lacombe. We must hasten to Tuesday morning, 27th of March, 1838, when Madame de Dino went to her uncle's room to inquire how he had passed the night. Almost immediately the latter showed her a touching letter which he had received from the Abbé Dupanloup

and which drew tears from her eyes. When she had finished reading, Talleyrand said:

"This is not the time for emotion; all this is a serious matter." He added: "If I were to fall seriously ill, I would send for a priest. Do you think Abbé Dupanloup would be willing to come?"

"I have no doubt of it," replied the Duchesse; "but he could be of no use to you unless you had first returned to your true state, which you have unfortunately left."

"Yes, yes; I know there is something I must do with regard to Rome. I have been thinking of it for quite a long time."

"Since when?" Madame de Dino could not help asking in her surprise.

"Since the last time the Archbishop of Bourges came to Valençay, and also since Abbé Taury was there. I wondered then why the Archbishop did not speak of it, since he was more directly my pastor there; and why that good Sulpician said nothing to me."

The Duchesse seized her uncle's hands, and standing before him with her eyes full of tears, she said:

"But why wait for them to speak? Why not take the step so honorable to yourself, so consoling to the Church and all men, spontaneously, freely and generously? You would find Rome well disposed, I know. The Archbishop of Paris is greatly attached to you. Try."

"I do not refuse," replied Talleyrand. "There is something I must do, I know that very well. But do you know what they require of me? Tell me."

Madame de Dino explained that he must offer reparation for the part he had taken in creating and establishing the civil constitution of the clergy, in circulating the so-called Constitutional Bishops and for the scandal of his "marriage," contracted in violation of the laws of the Church. At first the old man was inclined to plead that he had been released from all his sacerdotal obligations by the Pope, but the Duchesse soon disillusioned him on this Shortly afterwards he went to his lawyers, opened his political testament, which was in the latter's keeping, and wrote at the head of it: "I declare, in the first place, that I die in the Roman, Catholic and Apostolic religion." Moreover, in this document he had written in 1836, with reference to his union with Madame Grand: "I was free." These words he altered and read: "I thought I was free." It was obvious that Talleyrand realized that the time had come when he must act. M. De Lacombe tells us that his conduct puzzled those around him. "He who generally feared solitude now sought it. They noticed that he sat at his writing table, crossing out, thinking and reading over what he had written; if he heard an indiscreet step approaching he concealed his manuscript and took up a book. What did it mean? One morning as Madame de Dino was starting for the Sacré Cœur at Conflans, where Mgr. de Ouélen was to preside at a distribution of prizes to the cholera orphans, the mystery was solved." Talleyrand handed her a quantity of manuscript, a kind of apologia, an avowal that his intentions had been always good whatever his errors, that he had always been attached to the Church and sought to serve it, although "the respect I owe to the memory of those who gave me life does not prohibit me from saving that all my youth was directed towards a profession for which I was not born." The document made no mention of his marriage. It was defensive and exculpating, but it was clearly not what was needful under the circumstances, and the Archbishop of Paris made this clear to Madame de Dino, who conveyed his words to her uncle. Mgr. de Quélen was not content with merely verbal communications. He wrote in the plainest terms, showing the impossibility of the mere explanation offered by Talleyrand being accepted. Regarded at its best, this simply amounted to a plea that the writer had constantly sought to serve the Church by preferring opportunism to either truth or principle. Abbé Dupanloup took the same view of the document as did the Archbishop. Matters, however, were approaching a crisis.

On Monday, May 14, the Duchesse de Dino sent an urgent message to the Abbé Dupanloup. Talleyrand was on his deathbed. The previous Saturday evening, while entertaining guests, he had been seized with illness, shivering, pains and temporary insensibility. A gangrenous anthrax had developed and had to be cut out by his surgeon. At a time when anæsthetics were unknown, the pain was horrible, but Talleyrand never murmured during the operation. By Tuesday all hope of recovery was gone. On that day the Abbé was first received in the room of the sick man, who had, however, rallied in marvelous manner. His visitor pointed out the uselessness of the document he had sent to the Archbishop and presented instead two papers, one a general disavowal, retractation and prayer for forgiveness of his errors, as well as a profession of faith: the other a letter in nearly similar terms to the Pope. Talleyrand read these carefully and asked permission to keep them. The Abbé, of course, consented, and serious conversation regarding spiritual concerns followed. The entire of Wednesday was spent by the holy priest in the sick chamber, Talleyrand repeatedly declaring the pleasure the Abbé's presence gave him and his desire to be reconciled to the Church. At 6 o'clock on Thursday morning, in full possession of his senses, he signed

the two documents in full "Charles Maurice Prince de Talleyrand." When the Abbé came upon the scene, after saying Mass, he heard Talleyrand's confession and gave him absolution. Extreme Unction was administered and the prayers for the dying recited. At half-past 3 on the afternoon of that day, the 17th of May, 1838, the ex-Bishop of Autun passed before the tribunal of God, conscious to the last, praying fervently and wearing round his neck the medal of the Immaculate Conception—the insignia of the ever Blessed Mother of God, for whom he had ever cherished a sentiment of devotion.

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## ITALIAN "UNIFICATION"—ITS BEGINNING AND ITS RESULTS.

HE terms "unification" and "assimilation" are, phonetically, not quite so euphonious as "that blessed word, 'Mesopotamia,'" but they have acquired a distinct value in recent years as diplomatic arguments. "Annexation" was a harsh-sounding term; "centralization" had a suggestion of Cæsarism in its significance. "Unification," on the contrary, inspires thoughts of celestial order and "assimilation" the merging of the lines that make the rainbow. Ancient Rome did not know such a term as "unification." It honestly set up its sign as engaged in the business of annexation and empire-building. But our nomenclature changes with the requirements of a new ethical standard, which impresses the necessity of assuming a virtue if we have it not and eschewing the brutal language of the Bismarckian school of statesmen.

The real meaning of Italian "unification" was not developed at the beginning of the movement for the liberation of Italy from the Austrian yoke. There was no thought at that time of sweeping away the Temporal Power. This power was racy of the soil—pure Italian. That of the Austrians was foreign and unsympathetic, while that of the Popes throbbed with sympathy for the people. The Austrian rule attracted nobody to Italy. The Papacy, on the other hand, attracted millions every year. When Bonaparte carried the Popes off as prisoners Rome was stabbed to the heart. Its commerce was destroyed, its population was plunged into pauperism. Art was ruined, literature blighted. It is interesting to note that connoisseurs one and all agree in denouncing the hideousness of modern art as exhibited in the architecture and statuary

in Rome of to-day. The era of the rococo was the era of extravagance carried to excess, and, like the indulgence in a debauch, sure to bring its own remedy by reason of the nausea that follows. But the age of the unnatural and the monstrous, as exemplified in the Victor Emmanuel monument, gives no promise of a chastening surfeit; it indicates the paranoia stage in artistic taste, the hopeless darkening of the intellect. It is a very significant fact that the strongest note of grief and indignation over the paralysis of intellect which the festivities over the "unification" called forth came from publications which reflect the mind of the cream of English Protestantism. In "The Saturday Review" a scathing arraignment of the bad taste of the Italian Government, in regard to the tolerance shown the insulters of the Papacy by the House of Savoy, preceded the beginning of the noisy and garish racket. The "Review" said: "Had the conduct of the Italian Government throughout been marked by scrupulous moderation, by strict adherence to solemn engagements, and by respect for the religion of the vast majority of its own subjects, a Vatican completely intransigeant would indeed have found little support outside. Unfortunately, both the action and inaction of successive Italian governments have left no choice to those who, without being Roman Catholics, are compelled by policy or conviction, or a mere sense of decency, to show some respect for the Roman Church. No one can believe that the Italian royal house feels comfortable in the existing condition of things." This is not very reassuring to the cocksure class of publicists who try to reason the reading world into the belief that things are finally settled as far as the Papacy and the Kingdom of Italy are concerned. There have been a good many such "final" settlements in the long centuries since the Papacy was forced by events to assume the heavy burden of the Temporal Power, but the end is not yet.

Roman history teaches at least one lesson that ought never to be forgotten—the fickleness of the people. In every town the statue of the Emperor was everywhere in evidence, and in every town when it became known that the same despot was no more the statues were promptly taken down and roped and then dragged through the mire. The "Review" mercilessly dissects the pretensions of the House of Savoy to have any claim to the allegiance of the Roman aristocracy or the Roman plebs, saying: "The insecurity of its existing tenure probably explains the grotesque insistence upon the virtues of the first monarch of United Italy. There is not a town of any importance throughout the peninsula where that distinguished sovereign is not to be seen in stone or bronze on a prancing steed, in the centre of the principal square.

This exaggerated emphasis of really considerable merits is likely to injure the very object for which it is employed, but it reaches the height of absurdity and touches the extreme limits of bad taste in the monstrosity which rears its ponderous bulk over against the Forum and will remain a monument not to a great king, who in so far as he was great does not need it, but of the senseless extravagance, the ill taste and the mean jealousy of the New Italy. For the ultimate object is not to commemorate the 'Honest King,' but to insult the Pope."

If we desire to trace the genesis of Italian "unification" to its primal source, we shall have to go back to a period when society in Europe was in a state of volcanic convulsion resembling that of parturient nature when planets and suns were projected into space and began that majestic whirling that has ever since continued. The time that witnessed the marriage of Bonaparte and Josephine Beauharnois, widow of a general of the Army of the Rhine, whom the Directory had sent to wed "La Mere Guillotine" because of his failure to do wonders with his sans-culotte soldiers. He had just then laid before the French Directory and Carnot, the famous War Minister, a plan for the invasion of Italy so simple and yet so ingenious in idea, so bold in conception and so entirely original that the "organizer of victory," after carefully going over its details, instantly decided on accepting it and entrusting its execution to the head that had conceived it. Twelve days after his marriage to the beautiful widow (who had barely escaped sharing her husband's fate by the downfall of Robespierre) he was at the head of the Army of Italy on the road toward the Alps, bent on crossing those giant sentinels, but by routes different from those chosen by his great exemplar, the Carthaginian Hannibal. "Army of Italy," for all its grandiose title, was very little better in composition when it started on its ambitious enterprise than Falstaff's imaginary "ragged regiment," more dangerous to its friends than France's enemies. The troops were half-starved and half-naked, they had no money wherewith to purchase food, and as they advanced on their melancholy way the population disappeared on their approach and left the land almost as bare as though a pest of locusts had descended and ravaged it. When Bonaparte had painfully pushed along to Nice, he issued a proclamation, a model of sub-heroic incitement to deeds of valor:

"Soldiers! You are almost naked, half-starved. The Government owes you much, and can give you nothing. Your patience, your courage, in the midst of these rocks, are admirable; but they reflect no splendor on your arms. I am about to conduct you into the most fertile plains on the earth. Fertile provinces, opulent cities,

will soon be in your power; there you will find rich harvests, honor and glory. Soldiers of Italy, will you fail in courage?"

Can any one not blinded by military hero-worship and the false ethics of military law fail to see in such an address the keynote of the policy which has since been developed by the House of Savoy, whose territory was the first to feel the terrors of its practical application by the naked and hungry crowd whom Bonaparte had whipped and starved into desperate and irresistible soldiers? Piedmont, which was the first to feel the foot of the military mob on its neck, is now the heir-at-law of its corsair policy. By the victory of Bonaparte at Montenotte, Piedmont's soil was laid open to the conqueror, and the King of Piedmont and Sardinia was forced to abandon the alliance with Austria which had long kept him in power and throw himself instead into the arms of the French Republic.

"With the French invasion," writes the eminent English historian, Alison, "commenced a long period of suffering; tyranny under the name of liberty, rapine under the name of generosity, excitement among the poor, spoliation among the rich, clamor in public against the nobility and adulation of them in private; use made of the lovers of freedom by those who despised them, and revolt against tyranny by those who aimed only at being tyrants; general praise of liberty in words and universal extinction of it in action; the stripping of churches, the robbery of hospitals; the leveling of the palaces of the great and the destruction of the cottages of the poor; all that military license has of most terrible, all that despotic authority has of most oppressive. Then did her people feel that neither riches of soil nor glories of recollection, neither a southern sun nor the perfection of art can save a nation from destruction if it has lost the vigor to inherit or the courage to defend them."

It is not necessary to dwell upon the direful disasters which overtook unhappy Italy once her soil was begun to be overrun by the triumphant hordes of the new democracy. The long reign of misery and disgrace did not end until the cannon of Waterloo had pronounced sentence of deposition against the Corsican autocrat, and he had in the meanwhile captured Rome and sent two Popes as prisoners of his from its sheltering walls. He had driven the iron of persecution deep into the souls of the downtrodden people; but if he did he had also taught them the way in which to combat the tyranny that is irresistible by day by utilizing the advantages of the night. It was under the oppression of the French in that bitter era that the terrible antidote of the midnight secret society was invented.

It is difficult to fix the time or the occasion when the idea of the secret society for the substitution of personal vengeance for the public vengeance of the law, exacted for the public good and the purgation of the general weal, began to be known as an organized system, in various countries. It is a fact pretty well agreed upon that in the larger islands of the Mediterranean Sea the practice of the vendetta had been so long existent as to be recognized as a sort of religious cult, a family or tribal obligation devolving on the next mate of the family of a murdered man. This practice or custom necessarily drew different members of the families or clans into association in what was known as a blood bond. From the islands it spread in course of time to the mainland; and from the mountaineers of Italy and Albania and Montenegro to the towns and cities, until the secret societies covered the entire State and the Vehm-Gericht, or midnight secret tribunal, in the Middle Ages, had almost entirely supplanted the tribunals of the civil law just as we find to be the case in Italy to-day in regard to the Mafia, the Camorra and other associations of criminal men. bonari was, and may still be, for aught the outside world knows, the most formidable of these dreadful secret combinations. It is international in its character, though for some years its active work seems to have been confined to the Italian Peninsula; but after its establishment in Italy the revolutionary system which its members sedulously inculcated began soon to spread to Spain and Portugal and France, and we behold it more active in the latter countries than even in Italy to-day.

The first Carbonari were bands of men who got their living by making charcoal. In Italy and France this product is largely used for industrial and domestic purposes, and its manufacture gives employment to many people in the rural and hilly districts in the south of Europe. Italy numbered a hundred thousand Carbonari in 1820, says the biographer of Pope Leo XIII., Monsignor Bernard O'Reilly. But all of these, he says, were not hostile to the Church or to religion in general. At the beginning the movements which tended toward a banding of the whole membership in one mighty organization had many contributory elementsdreamers of many types, the Illumanati, the Voltaireans, the Jacobins, the Jansenists. These visionary individuals had many followers—for the army of the disinterested is always self-recruiting and automatic in the processes of leadership and filling up of gaps as the prisons close on the more dangerous and vociferous members. Perhaps one of the most reliable authorities on the origin and composition of the Carbonari, the aims and cult of the organization, is Neibuhr. In a letter to Madame Hensler, one of his closest friends, he wrote from Rome, under date of October, 1820, as follows:

"They were originally nothing more than a development of Freemasonry, and it might perhaps be said that all the Freemasons in Italy are Carbonari, or Guelphs, or Adolphs, etc., though the converse would not hold good; for the derived associations have attained a much wider extent than the parent society. When the French invaded Italy in 1796, and occupied Rome in 1798, Naples in 1799, the revolution had been prepared in the lodges of the Freemasons, and, with a few exceptions, all the Freemasons declared for it, The generation who were then growing up, without affection for anything, striving only after commotion, still harbored under the French rule a longing for ferment and change, while the elder generation, especially those whom we term cultivated people, attached themselves with joy to the government of Bonaparte, whose legislation afforded them the realization of all that according to their system they demanded as that without which there can be no salvation; viz.: new codes of law, equal inheritance, the removal of all corporations, convents, etc., some of which measures were wholesome, some injudicious and some vitally pernicious. When the name Carbonari came into use I do not know; but the class already existed in the provinces under Murat. They did not, however, attain much importance till afterwards, when they were joined by the party of Murat, which certainly was a curious amalgamation. They have the greatest variety of objects, from the unity of all Italy under a Bonapartean to her dissolution into a federative republic. Of course, by far the majority of them simply follow their leaders blindfold, and large numbers have no object, that is, they only desire anarchy. The tendency to a federative republic prevails, however, to the greatest extent among those who have the most practical truth in their views, as it does in Spain and Portugal, which the revolutionists would divide into seven republics. To this the armies are opposed, except in so far as their chiefs may influence them on the condition of becoming presidents themselves. The conspiracy lately discovered at Naples to murder the Ministers shows what we have to expect when the Parliament shall be assembled. There are numbers of the clergy among the Carbonari, especially monks, who lost their taste for a conventual life during the secularization; they have many members, too, among the inferior nobility. A part of the higher nobles were with them also at first, attracted by the promise of an aristocratic Constitution."

When Mazzini and Garibaldi succeeded in their ambitious efforts to gain control of this wild elephant, as the hitherto aimless but terribly formidable organization may figuratively be styled, the real objective was soon made clear enough. It was the destruction of the Papacy, both as a spiritual and as a temporal institution.

When Cardinal Pecci (afterwards Pope Leo XIII.) was in Belgium as Papal Nuncio he wrote a remarkable pastoral on "The Temporal Dominion of the Popes," in the course of which he quoted the official declaration of the Central Lodge of the Carbonari in Italy, which stated that: "Our final purpose is that of Voltaire and the French Revolution—the total annihilation of Catholicism and the Christian idea itself."

If "history repeats itself" in the psychical world as the physical, the period of which we are now treating was par excellence the age of the idealists and the dreamers. It was, not unnaturally, also the age of charlatans. In this respect it resembled this our own age, when fake religions like Dowieism and Eddyism and a hundred other minor "isms" can pass for cults worthy of serious people's attention. In the days of '48, when revolution was endemic, it might be said, over a great part of Europe, odic force, animal magnetism and spiritualism were the great fashionable scientific fads of the time. These hedonisms did not form part of the revolutionary programme, as a general rule, but they assisted it indirectly by diverting the thoughts of people into wild, uncertain and bewildering channels and loosening the anchors of faith from their old and settled moorings, leaving the ship of reason to be drawn by the irresistible currents of defection and agnosticism; so that many men who would be otherwise sane enough became so blinded by false reasoning as to fail to perceive the danger of lending countenance to separate attacks on settled government, in different places, for those who led such attacks were careful at first to keep hidden the fact that they were only part of the grand design that underlay the whole movement. In France and Italy the spiritualistic or mesmeristic gatherings were more or less in sympathy with the revolutionary impulse of the time, while in Great Britain and the United States the seances were attended rather by those who were attracted by curiosity or the prospect of reaping some profit from the weaknesses of the gullible by pandering to their love of the mysterious and the awesome. Amongst the notable pastorals issued by Cardinal Pecci was one that sounded a very impressive note of warning on the dangers of the craze over "The Abuses of Magnetism." It was published in 1857 and was so ingeniously phrased as to afford no pretext for describing it as a political manifesto, nor yet as an attack upon the truths of science or the domain of scientific research, to both of which the enemies of the Church are constantly misrepresenting her attitude as that of an enemy. Cardinal Pecci had been well prepared to discharge this delicate duty effectively. His early studies in theology had been carried out in the famous University of the Sapienza. In this institution the professor of theology was Father Perrone and the prefect of studies a master no less exalted, Father Madera. These two teachers had set up an academy for the particular purpose of cultivating the art of defending the truths of the Revealed Word and the whole body of theological science as it was affected by the discoveries of physical science. During young Pecci's sojourn in the schools of Rome two solemn disputations were held in the hall of the Sapienza University. Four of the cleverest of the students prepared an attack on the doctrines of the Church, based on the most difficult of the problems presented by the apparent irreconcilability of the supernatural dogmas with the physical facts of nature and the laws of the visible universe, as relied on by rationalism and materialism.

Another agency of leagued disorder with which Cardinal Pecci had to deal then and later on was the new Socialism of Lassalle and Karl Marx. It has been a strident and raucous force since that time, and is so more than ever, perhaps, now and here in the United States. This new Socialism Leo XIII. demonstrated later on in his magnificent Encyclical beginning with "Quod Apostolici Muneris" (1878), on the genesis and character of Socialism, was nothing more or less than the natural fruit of the diffusion of the sixteenth century doctrines on the subject of human society in its relations to the Divine law and the derivation of human authority. This derivation of Socialism threw German rulers and theorists into as great a tempest of fury as Pope Pius X.'s recent reference to the Lutheran celebrations in the Empire. But dates have, like dead languages, their priceless uses. They may pass, but they leave an immutable fact in every case as a witness that cannot be either bribed or intimidated on a question of truth which may be vital to the existence of human society. It was in the sixteenth century that the Novum Organum, the new Humanism, bobbed up like a horrible buffoon at a wedding feast, to turn the festivity into a "dance of Death."

So bold an exposure of the aims and guiles of the Socialists as was given first by Pope Pius IX. and later by his immediate predecessor was little relished by the statesmen who in Italy, in France and in Germany found it good policy to make friends with all theorists and enemies of none—even with political assassination propagandists. Though the time was to come when the assassin's poniard was to bring woe into the household of the ambitious Savoyards, no royal fulmination was ever heard against the dreadful gospel incessantly being taught by the man whom the thirsting disciples blasphemously styled "the Master," in mockery of the attitude of the disciples of Him who taught the gospel

of patience, peace and love of enemies. With a degree of hypocrisy that is profoundly sickening, the King of Sardinia kept on assuring the Pope, as his troops kept pushing on the work of conquest in the Papal States by successive usurpations, that he was a fervent Catholic and a loval adherent of His Holiness. While these filial assurances were being respectfully tendered the King's Ministers, Cavour, Minghetti, and others were in constant communication with the leaders of the men whose ideas of liberty were written with the "silver point" of the dagger or proclaimed to the world with the voice of the bomb and the crash of the infernal machine. The cynicism of the conspirators, as they rushed around the world calling for aid and sympathy in their warfare against order and constituted authority was truly amazing. They were fighting for constitutional government, they did not hesitate to proclaim aloud. The apostate priest, Alessandro Gavazzi, who followed Archbishop Bedini from one American city to another with the object of procuring his assassination, had the coolness to address to the Government of Lord Palmerston a letter containing this innocent avowal:

"We fight for the sole purpose of uniting all Italy under the Constitutional sceptre of Victor Emmanuel. Let Englishmen repudiate the idea that there is anything republican in the present movement, since the most ardent advocates of republicanism have sacrificed their views to the great cause of our independence, unity and constitutional liberties. Be sure that if there is no intervention in our fighting we shall survive to crown our dear Victor Emmanuel King of Italy."

Thus one wing of the army of the secret oath. Another, acting under the direct orders of Mazzini and Garibaldi, used different watchwords. They were soldiers of the Republican Revolution and hated the pretensions of monarchy. They were led by the two men who embodied the grand principle of "The Thought and the Action." They were taught by expert surgeons, practicing upon corpses of men gotten from the hospitals, the fine art of murder anatomy. Each eager student was initiated into the science of the arterial system, so that there need be no unnecessary waste of effort on the part of the men of action when the men of thought had directed that a blow be struck for Republican liberty against "Constitutional sceptres!"

And all this deception and double dealing was embarked in for the purpose of gratifying the ambition of the petty monarch who has come down to history as the "Honest King!"

This question of Italian "unification" under one civil ruler had often been mooted in the course of the centuries, from the time

of Cola da Rienzo down to those of Napoleon Bonaparte. latter had endeavored to settle it after the Alexandrine method by seizing the Patrimony of Peter and making the Pope a peripatetic prisoner as he moved, like Tamerlane, along his skull-paved highways of conquest. When his invertebrate nephew came to be Emperor he, in obedience to the oath he had taken as a member of the Italian Carbonari, proposed that Italy be united under a civil monarchy, but both M. Guizot and M. Thiers resisted the proposal with great strenuousness. In a former article we gave a telling passage from M. Guizot's writings on the subject; now we shall quote M. Thiers. In a memorable speech delivered by that eminent statesman and patriot, before the French Corps Legislatif, upon the subject of German and Italian unification (March, 1867), he said, inter alia: "When distinguished Italians have spoken to me of unity I have said to them: 'No, no; never! For my part, I will never consent to it;' and if at the time when that question came up I had the honor to hold in my hand the affairs of France I would not have consented to it. I will say to you, even, that upon that question (pardon me for being personal) the friendship, very ardent and sincere, which existed between Monsieur Cavour and me has been interrupted." Thus said the foremost statesman of that epoch, the most disinterested and self-sacrificing, as he proved himself to be on more than one occasion—the man who saved France from greater dismemberment than she suffered when she lay bleeding and prostrate, like a gladiator in the Colosseum, at the foot of Prussia-a victim of the guilty ambition and egotism of Louis Napoleon, the former Carbonari member and special constable of England. M. Thiers was a Protestant Frenchman, as was M. Guizot, the former Prime Minister of Louis Philippe. Thiers was a genuine Republican; Guizot was a genuine Monarchist; yet both were agreed on the cardinal principle of European policy at that particular time, viz., that the Pope and the Papacy were absolutely necessary not only to the balance of power in Europe, but to the peace of the world. By the terms of the Treaty of Villafranca, in 1859, after the battles of Magenta and Solferino had been fought, all the straggling monarchies and principalities of the Italian Peninsula were united, save the Papal States, under Victor Emmanuel, with the questionable title of King of Italy. Eleven years later, when the Franco-German War had been fought and the Emperor of the French had paid the penalty of his ambition, the question of the Papal States immediately came upon the political tapis. In Dr. J. S. C. Abbott's book on "Italy" (Story of the Nations series) the larger aspects of the problem then presented are thus impartially arranged and summarized:

"The question respecting the Papal States now became exceedingly embarrassing and difficult of solution. There was no monarch in Europe who was better entitled to his realms than the Pope. There was no sovereign more solemnly hallowed by time and by the recognition for centuries of all the courts in Europe than the Papal sovereignty. Neither Victoria nor Alexander nor Francis Joseph could present a more indubitable claim to the crown which each of them wore. The question arose, 'What right have Sardinia and Lombardy and Naples and Tuscany and other minor States to unite and by the power of their combined armies seize upon the possessions of the Pope and annex them to their realms? The Pope had neither made nor menaced any aggression against them. He had done nothing whatever to warrant the hostile invasion of his territory.'

"And again, the enormous wealth expended in rearing the magnificent Cathedral of St. Peter, innumerable other churches, the gorgeous pile of the Vatican and in filling them with the treasures of art, belonged, not to the city of Rome, but to the universal Catholic Church, of which the Pope was the recognized head. It would be difficult to count the money value of these treasures of architecture and of art. The sum amounted to millions upon millions, obtained by gifts from devout Catholics through many centuries and from all the Catholic world. 'What right,' it was asked, 'have surrounding kingdoms and duchies to unite and by the might of their resistless armies to grasp these treasures?' The Pope was the recognized spiritual head of two hundred millions of subjects in Europe. This was their property, which they had intrusted to the keeping of the temporal and spiritual Sovereign of the States in the midst of which this property was deposited.

"Again, it was asserted that it was essential to the welfare of Europe that the Pope should enjoy so much of temporal sovereignty as should render him independent. The moral power, swayed by the Pope, was immense almost beyond comprehension. It was not consistent with the safety of Europe that the King of Italy, or the King of Austria, or any other Sovereign, should be permitted to annex the Papal States to his dominions, and thus compel the Holy Father to become his subject."

Dr. Abbott's work propounds the theory that Victor Emmanuel had no alternative, when the French were withdrawn from Rome, but to seize the city and repress disorder. The defense is plausible, but it can hardly hold water. The natural reply to it is that the forces of disorder had been sent into Rome and the Papal States furtively by the agents of the Italian Government for the very purpose of creating disorders, and so afford the pretext which the

Government needed. But the most anti-Papal historians are forced to admit the utterly untenable and indefensible character of the pretext. It was the Governmental press in Florence that first raised the cry, "On to Rome!" and shouted triumphantly that the hour of doom for the Temporal Power had struck and that the power must be extinguished. The Italian Government had raised a demon, and it was his slave. There was as much danger for Victor Emmanuel's throne as for the Pope's, for Mazzini and Garibaldi hated monarchy in any shape. It was the firm determination of these infidel plotters to reëstablish in Rome the Republic, ushered in with the murder of the eminent and enlightened statesman, Count Rossi, in 1848. The journal "Italia" of September 15, 1870, declared openly that "the Italian democracy had seen in the question of the capital too good a pretext to perpetuate agitation to permit it to escape them." Caught thus "between the devil and the deep sea." the wretched intriguing Monarchy determined to forestall the strategy of its whilom tools and seize the stake for which they had been playing while ostensibly playing it for the House of Savoy. The Pope was helpless and friendless. He could do no more than protest and make a show of resistance against an invader, it was plainly seen; and so the desperate plunge was determined on by the Janus-faced King and his pliant Ministerial tools. On the 7th of September the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs in Florence issued a circular to the Cabinets of Europe. in which he stated that the interests of the Italian Monarchy demanded immediate action in taking possession of the States of the Church. "The security of Italy," he wrote, "renders it essential that an end should be put to a state of things which maintains in the heart of the peninsula a theocratical government in open hostility to Italy, and which, by its own confession, can only subsist by means of foreign intervention, and whose territory offers a base of operations to all the elements of disorder."

This pretext was as bold a falsehood as any lying Talleyrand ever propounded. Napoleon's commissaries whom he sent to the Papal States to administer them during the captivity of the two Popes, Pius VI. and VII., found them wonderfully well administered, prosperous and contented. We have already shown, from the careful reports drawn up by the Count de Tournon, how excellent was the administration of the Ecclesiastical States, how ample the provisions for the public weal, in education, in hospital service,

<sup>1</sup> Elementary instruction is afforded to the people of the Roman States with a liberality such as few countries can boast of. In the city of Rome alone eight schools kept by the religious congregations "Scholarum Piarum" and "Samaschi," fifty-two schools, called "regionare," or district, for boys, and an equal number for girls, are opened to the poor, some

in provision for the needs of the poor, in the supervision of the department of finance,<sup>2</sup> how crimeless was the rural population (before the Sardinian agents were sent among them to raise discontent and preach disloyalty).

Then a bolder step was determined on. The court at Florence sent a letter to the Pope by Count Ponza di San Martino, of Sardinia. This document, which was very deferentially worded, announced to the Holy Father the determination of the Italian Government to take possession of the States of the Church and to constitute Rome the capital of United Italy. The Pope was assured of the profound respect with which the Italian Government would still regard his spiritual power. But he was informed that it was one of the necessities of the times that he would be deprived of his Temporal Power; and he was entreated to submit to the inevitable with as good a grace as possible.

The reply of the Pope, which was a very laconic and emphatic refusal, was given in a formal audience granted the Ambassador on the 10th of September, 1870. The very next day—Sunday, September 11—the troops of Victor Emmanuel crossed the frontier and entered the States of the Church. The Pope, conscious that any resistance would be unavailing, commanded that there should be only such show of force at the gates of Rome as to prove to the world that his realms were wrested from him by military violence.

So fell—for the present—the oldest sovereignty in the Christian world. It did not fall by the will of the people of that sovereignty, but by the act of a brigand power external to the Papal States, aided by the daggers of an assassin horde and the buccaneering tactics of a foreign swashbuckler and mercenary adventurer. Campbell's threnody on the downfall of Poland is touchingly eloquent over the subject. The crimelessness of Sarmatia is blazoned so as to move the reader to tears, like the woes of Hecuba. What crime was there to be laid at the doors of the Papacy as justification for tearing the crown from the Pope and seizing his territory with robber hand? gratis, and the rest for a fee of about two francs per month. In the country towns and villages there are masters, paid by the municipal fund, who teach reading writing and arithmetic, so that not a single child need remain deprived of the first elements of education. But here, as elsewhere, either poor parents neglect to send their children to school, or the latter, being destitute of the means and leisure, soon forget the little they had learned.—De Tournon, Vol. II., page 81.

<sup>2</sup>On examining the Papal finances we were struck by the fact of the equal distribution of the public taxation of which the clergy and the nobility have always borne their share in proportion to their properties, like the commonest villager; exemptions and privileges which in other countries have engendered so much hostility against these classes have been for ages unknown in Papal Rome.—De Tournon, Vol. II., page 61.

Many great tragedies have darkened the course of human justice in the dealing of nation with nation, but the remotest annals fail to furnish any analogy to the drama of the outrage on the ancient Kingdom of the Temporal Power. Its sacrilege was not only directed against a spiritual supremacy that was accepted as a matter of Divine ordinance, but against the moral law in the civil realm whose integrity is recognized as essential to the institutions of civilization and the stability of responsible governments. breach of faith so monstrous was ever before beheld. Even Mahometans had always respected the rights of the Holy See and the honor and dignity of its Temporal Power. It remained for degarroter against the most venerable figure in the whole civilized Freemasons and assassins to put such an affront upon the conscience of Christendom as to use the means of the highway robber and the garotter against the most venerable figure in the whole civilized world, simply because, in the mysterious ways of Providence, a chance of war put it in their power so to do. It is well that such should be the only title of the House of Savoy to the possession of the Quirinal and the mastery of Rome. From men who have been suckled by wolves the mildness and innocence of lambs cannot be expected. Those who have only such title as force gives them over imprescriptible and historic right cannot expect any better treatment than they themselves applied when the hour comes as it must eventually come, unless the whole experience of the world's vicissitudes is to be nullified in this case—for the final JOHN J. O'SHEA. risorgemento.

Philadelphia.

### CRITICISMS IN KANT.

#### KANT AND THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

DMIRABLY adapted as are the pages of a quarterly magazine for the discussion of grave problems, such a mode of discussion is, unfortunately, not without its attendant drawbacks. Owing to the variety of subjects discussed in the popular review, the number of pages assignable to any particular one is necessarily limited. It thus not infrequently happens that, unless it is to outrun all the conventional limitations of magazine publication, a serious and important dissertation is compelled to halt in the middle of its prearranged arguments—just as in the serial story the chapter breaks off at the point of most intense interest. the story, however, the interruption serves but to whet the appetite for further details; while in the philosophical discussion the thread of the argument is broken in twain and the subsequent connection loses much of its force and power. Divisions of this kind, while wholly unavoidable, become a positive detriment where the arguments are cumulative in their force. Cardinal Newman was of opinion that all the arguments for the divine mission of the Church are cumulative in their evidence, although each possesses its own individual power for conviction. The same may be said of the arguments for the existence of God. It is true that in these criticisms of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" we are not engaged in any way of proving the existence of the Supreme Being; but our task, while wholly distinct from, is cousin-german to it. It is the disproof of the fallacious arguments by which Kant imagines that he has succeeded in discrediting the proofs hitherto accepted by the world for the existence of the author and creator of the universe. And here, too, while each argument stands on its own impregnable foundation, the separation of them deprives them of the cumulative force which must necessarily result from presenting them together arrayed as one organic whole.

It thus happens that while our criticisms of Kant's position laid down in our last article are conclusive and unanswerable, their efficacy would have been doubly enhanced had we been able to add to them the crowning argument which should have formed, as it were, the capstone of the whole. Divorced from its mates, this argument, it is true, is irrefragable, but when presented with the others, it seems to us it would be difficult for the most resolute and thoroughgoing Kantian to parry it or make any successful defense against their united force. For this reason we may be

permitted to recapitulate as briefly as possible the substance of the arguments in our last article.

The arguments by which Kant attempts to justify his rejection of the accepted proofs for the existence of God are twofold in character. First, he denies objective validity to the argument from causality as applied to the existence of God; that is, he denies objective reality to the necessary Being which is forced upon us by the laws of reason as the inevitable conclusion from the existence of the contingent to the existence of its cause. Secondly, he maintains that, since we can never meet with the Supreme Being in experience, there can be submitted no conclusive argument for the existence of God.

These two objections are practically one, the first deriving whatever efficacy or force it possesses from the second. Kant imagined that the human mind was related to the knowledge of God as to no other form of knowledge. Consequently, he made the attempt to isolate this knowledge, to place it in a class by itself, and at it, thus singled out and alone, to point the finger of scorn. There could hardly be anything more shallow than Kant's ineffectual attempt on this point, and there is certainly nothing which so betrays the utter untrustworthiness of Kant as a leader of thought in the investigation of serious problems. For the existence of God is far from being the only truth which cannot be empirically demonstrated. Our knowledge upon this point does not, by any means, stand alone. If we are to reject everything as false which we cannot experimentally prove, or, to use Kant's phrase, which we can never meet with in experience, we must begin at the very beginning and reject all the primary principles on which all our empirical knowledge rests. If Kant's contention be sound upon this point, then does he overturn the very foundations themselves on which all experience is based, and all our empirical knowledge becomes nothing but mere illusion. The validity of all our knowledge in experience rests wholly and entirely on the truth of the principles of causality and the truth of the principle of contradiction. Kant himself freely admits them. Take away the truth of these and all experience means nothing but illusion. Before we can take one single step in the realm of empirical knowledge the truth of these principles must be accepted; nevertheless, it will be difficult for Kant to show experimentally that these principles are possessed of objective validity. They are prior to all experience. Their apodictic certainty cannot be empirically demonstrated; nevertheless, it is through them, and through them alone, that we can give any meaning at all to experience. Nothing is easier than to deceive ourselves upon this point, however, as Kant has done. It will not do to say, as

Kant does, that the application of these principles in experience proves their truth. To make such an assertion with Kant would be to fall into the most vicious kind of all vicious circles. To take these principles for truths and then interpret experience by them, and then to turn about and maintain that since they successfully interpret experience for us their truth is thereby proved, would be a petitio principii for which the back form pupil would deserve a flogging. Unless they are true prior to their application in experience, all their interpretation of experience for us may be nothing but delusion. What is necessary is the acceptance of these principles prior to and before all experience—the admission that these principles are true, independent of all experience, and they cannot mislead us. Unless this is true, we can have no guarantee whatever that all our empirical knowledge is not mere illusion, and that in following these principles we are but building on the shifting sands of the desert. This is so true that it is incontrovertible. Here, then, are whole realms of knowledge where we can have no empirical proof of the objective validity of the truths which we accept. Consequently, when Kant rejects the proofs for the existence of God, because the conclusion to which reason leads us on this point cannot be shown to possess objective validity, he is but undermining the very foundation on which all our empirical knowledge rests.

The blow is aimed at the existence of God; but it strikes down with it all other knowledge as well. Kant's astuteness in attempting to isolate the existence of God and make it the scapegoat of knowledge proves to be a boomerang which is more destructive to all our empirical knowledge than to the object of his attack, and which would reduce it all to mere illusion. That Kant's reasoning on this point has imposed upon the world is all the more surprising, because in order to arrive at his strange conclusion he had been compelled to violently contradict himself; and there was only necessary for his full refutation an appeal from Philip drunk to Philip sober. It is the philosophical value of a logical necessity that Kant has been obliged to call in question when he draws his insane conclusion which outrages all the laws of reason. This logical necessity he had the temerity not only to question, but to try to discredit in order to maintain his foolish point. All that is necessary to show that on this point Kant was ready to blow hot and cold with the same breath when it served his point was to place in deadly parallel his own contradictory views upon the subject as we do here. The objective validity of a logical necessity Kant admits when he will, and this, too, he rejects when he listeth.

### Look first on this:

Nevertheless, this pure, logical necessity has exerted so powerful an illusion that after having formed of a thing a concept a priori so constituted that it seemed to include existence in its sphere, people thought they could conclude with certainty that, because existence belongs necessarily to the object of that concept, provided always that I accept the thing as given (existing), its existence also must necessarily be accepted (according to the rule of identity), and the Being therefore must itself be absolutely necessary.

### And then on this:

Thus the concept of cause, which asserts under a presupposed condition, the necessity of an effect, would become false if it rested only on some subjective necessity implanted in us of connecting certain empirical representations according to the rule of causal relation. I should not be able to say that the effect is connected with the cause in the object (that is, by necessity), but I am so constituted that I cannot think these representations as connected in any other way. This is exactly what the skeptic most desires, for in that case all our knowledge, resting on the supposed objective validity of our judgments, is nothing but mere illusion. (Italics ours.)

The importance or value of Kant's contention on the subject of the proofs for the existence of God may, we think, be safely left to the silly contradiction between these two statements. Nevertheless, it is difficult to restrain the natural impulse to characterize in its proper terms Kant's barefaced jugglery in his unscrupulous misrepresentation of this all-important problem. The contradictory statements show that it was not from ignorance that Kant resorted to misrepresentation and palpable fallacy.

In his second objection to the proofs for the existence of God he tells us that since we can never meet with the Supreme Being in experience we can never be convinced of the existence of such a Being. That any one with the slightest pretensions to the name of philosopher should advance this as a reasonable argument seems at first hardly credible; but that such a shallow statement should be accepted as the Ultima Thule of all philosophical inquiry—as has been done in the modern philosophical world—is not calculated to inspire respect for our modern intellectuality. And, save the mark! these are the scholars that sneer at Aristotle and Aquinas, at Plato and Augustine! Kant himself, in his sane moments, was perfectly capable of understanding—and did understand perfectly—the utter futility of his own audacious contentions. In his insane

ambition, however, "to leave a treasure to posterity," he did not scruple for a moment to argue against his own sane convictions. As we have already said, he believed he was perfectly safe in here advancing absurd arguments and giving utterance to palpable nonsense and meaningless contradictions, relying on the abstruseness of the subject to shield him from detection. But, as we have just said, if we are to reject all knowledge that is not empirical, what becomes of our empirical knowledge, since it rests wholly on our a priori knowledge, which is the very reverse of empirical? Is the knowledge of God from reason the only knowledge that is not empirical? What of the empirical nature of the principles on which all experience depends and without which experience can have no meaning of any kind? What of the truth of the principles of contradiction and causality? What of the nature of substance? Can Kant make an affidavit that in any body-whether corporeal or incorporeal—a substance really exists? Not at all. We accept the truth because we must; but of this substance we can have no such thing as sense-experience. This substance can never be met with in experience. What, then, of its objective reality? causality and contradiction and substance, besides various other notions to which Kant as a philosopher dare not deny existence, and consequently objective reality, cannot be shown empirically to possess objective validity, where is the philosophical consistency in accepting these fully and rejecting wholly the existence of God, because it cannot be empirically demonstrated? That there is then a knowledge a priori which we must accept if we are to interpret experience at all, and that this knowledge a priori can never be met with in experience is a fact which will not admit of contradiction. No one understood this better than Kant, for again and again he reverts to the subject, and even asks bluntly: "For whence should experience take its certainty if all the rules which it follows were again and again empirical?" And again he asks himself the question, "whether there exists a knowledge independent of experience, and even of all impressions of the senses?" To this he has no hesitation in answering that there exists such a knowledge independent of experience and all sense impressions. "That there really exists in our knowledge such necessary, and in the strictest sense, universal and therefore pure judgments a priori, it is easy to show." And he instances in proof the principles of mathematics in science; and in philosophy—or the region of the understanding—the principle of causality. But how, in the face of all this, Kant could for a moment think of maintaining that he was justified in rejecting the existence of God or the proofs therefor, because the existence of God can never come within the range of our

experience, is, as Lord Dundreary would put it, one of those things which no fellow can find out. As a standing conundrum it is equaled only by its concomitant problem: Why Kant should have so many duped followers upon this point? Possibly, however, the latter is not a conundrum at all, and that the answer to it may be: Because the said followers are incapable of forming an opinion one way or the other or of comprehending the absurdity of their position. The calm, easy assurance with which ignorance or incapacity for philosophical principles, entrenched on its lordly heights, where it is complacently seated on its lofty throne, emancipated from the thraldom of knowledge and the trammels of logical conclusions, looks down with a mingling of infinite pity and everlasting scorn upon those who are unreasonable enough to decline such emancipation, is something to command, if not our admiration, at least our wonderment and surprise. Kant rejects the argument from causality for the existence of God because the objective validity of this conclusion can never be met with in experience. Yet he asks at the same time: "Whence should experience take its certainty if all the rules which it follows were again and again empirical?" Aye! there's the rub. Whence does experience take its certainty? It cannot be from experience. Experience can never be its own voucher. It can never furnish its own guarantee. There must be some other warranty for the truth of experience; and as Kant himself is constrained to admit, this warranty is furnished only by the truth of a priori principles. So that in the long run at the bottom of all our empirical knowledge or knowledge in experience there lies-and must lie-the truth of principles which cannot be empirically demonstrated. And on the truth of these principles which cannot be empirically demonstrated rests the entire superstructure of all man's empirical knowledge. To this the followers And Kant himself, while he of Kant seem to be totally blind. fully understood it, in his insane attempt to give the world a new species of metaphysic, resolutely ignored it, and fell into the glaring absurdity of accepting all this as truth, though it is independent of experience and at the same time rejecting the existence of God because we cannot bring this existence into experience. It is not a little surprising, too, that this feature of Kant's absurd, inconsistent, illogical and contradictory philosophy has hitherto escaped the critics. Yet there is no denying it. And its exposition is all that is necessary to overthrow the entire Kantian contention regarding the proofs for the existence of God.

But one absurdity leads inevitably to another, and in order to give color to his claim against logical necessity, Kant sinks deeper into the mire, coolly undertaking to maintain that the universal

proposition that every effect must have a cause is not universal at all, and that even here the principle of causality is not efficacious, and, consequently, we have the greatest of all effects—the world without any cause. In other words, he tells us that the principle of causality is valid only for experience and has no place or meaning outside experience. Now, it must not be supposed that Kant regards this world as self-existent. By no means. He regards the world as an effect, but denies existence to the cause of this effect. Hence the world must be an effect without a cause. is to be remarked that he does not advance any argument in proof of this preposterous statement, beyond the general one in which he endeavors to maintain that all his categories (cause and effect among them) have no validity outside of experience, and treatment of this argument must be postponed until we deal with the categories directly. Here, then, we have to deal only with the conclusionnot with the argument for it—that the principle of causality is valid only for experience and has no efficacy outside of it. As has already been quoted, Kant tells us:

"If we were thinking only of the form of the world, the manner of its composition and its change, and tried to infer from this cause totally different from the world, this would be again a judgment of the speculative reason only; because the object here is not an object of any possible experience. In this case the principle of causality, which is valid within the field of experience only and utterly useless, nay, meaningless, outside it, would be totally diverted from its proper destination." And still more emphatically he says:

"From something that happens (the empirically contingent) as an effect, to infer a cause, is a principle of natural, though not of speculative knowledge. For if we no longer use it as a principle involving the condition of possible experience and, leaving out everything that is empirical, try to apply it to the contingent in general, there does not remain the smallest justification of such a synthetical proposition, showing how from something which is there can be a transition to something totally different, which we call cause; nay, in such purely speculative application the concepts both of cause and of the contingent lose all meaning, the objective reality of which would be made intelligible in the concrete."

There are two objections interwoven here by Kant with much ingenuity; one that is merely intimated, viz., that we cannot grasp the contingent, for the entire contingent cannot be the object of empirical knowledge, and the other that the principle of causality has no validity except in experience. As Kant nowhere develops the first, it may be passed over, and we shall deal only with the second.

Now, it may be said at the very outset here that it is perfectly true that we cannot verify the statement that the principle of causality is true outside of experience, for the simple reason that we cannot go outside experience to demonstrate it. We cannot outstrip our senses and we cannot transcend experience, whether internal or external. By the very nature of the terms this is impossible, for wherever the individual goes he manufactures experience; consequently, we can never transcend experience. It is true, then, that we cannot by actual demonstration show that the principle of causality is valid outside of experience. But to build any kind of an argument on this inability is to cavil on the tenth part of a hair. The argument carries with it about as much weight as if we were to argue that in the twenty-fifth century the principle of causality would be without objective validity, but not one whit more. We cannot either reach outside of experience or reach forward to the twenty-fifth century to bring forth proof to the contrary. And if any one were to object that, since the principle of causality has objective validity in the twentieth century, we may consequently rest assured that it will be valid also in the twentyfifth; in like manner it could be retorted that, since the principle of causality is valid in experience, we may rest assured that it has validity outside experience also and throughout the whole realm of truth. The snap-game species of argument may be useful in politics, but it is wholly out of place in philosophy. And this is what Kant uses here. This of itself would be a sufficient answer to Kant on this point; but let us examine the matter further.

Whence does the principle of causality derive its character of apodictic certainty? Certainly not from experience. It is wholly independent of all experience, and according to Kant is one of the categories or concepts that make experience possible. Since, then, instead of being dependent on experience, it is wholly independent of experience, both in its origin and nature—so much so, indeed, that experience is largely dependent upon it—how can it be claimed with even the faintest shadow of plausibility that the principle is valid only in experience? Consequently, since it is wholly independent of experience and derives nothing therefrom, the only legitimate conclusion is that it is an illumination of the mind by special knowledge, which it receives—not from experience—but from the realm of universal truth. This truth and knowledge man possesses he knows not how; but one thing is certain, that it is wholly independent of experience. Consequently, the only conclusion that is at all legitimate in the premises is that the principle of causality has universal validity everywhere the empire of truth extends; and this conclusion must stand until shaken by its disproof.

Are we to believe that there is a realm where we can have effects without causes? Shall we say that the principle of causality is true in experience and false outside experience?

But the real meaning of the objection, when followed to its lair, lies in the fact that, being outside experience, we cannot prove that the principle of causality has validity there. In other words, we cannot verify it. Indeed, this is the real kernel in all the objections of this nature against the supernatural. But there are few objections so baseless or senseless. For, first of all, it may be replied that while we cannot bring forward any verification of the validity of cause outside experience, neither can Kant or his followers bring forward anything like disproof of its validity. The one is as impossible of verification as the other. The whole argument of Kant rests on mere assertion. But what Kant seems to have overlooked completely here is that such a method of arguing is simply undermining all certainty, and he will soon discover that if on these flimsy pretexts he questions the validity of cause and effect outside of experience, he must soon be prepared to defend its validity in experience. For having opened the doors to doubt in the matter, the doubt will soon enter everywhere. If verification be always demanded as the test of the truth of a logical necessity, we shall soon be obliged to drop much of our vaunted knowledge within experience. A thoroughgoing skeptic armed with this principle of verification would soon make havoc with whole provinces of our boasted speculative and even practical knowledge. The whole future—even to-morrow—is outside experience, and no one can say with certainty that the sun will rise to-morrow. It is beyond Nor will it do to claim that past experience must be our guide. For if we begin to question the value of the primary principles of reason because they cannot in certain cases be verified, our thoroughgoing skeptic may justly tell us our past experience can be no guide for the future, inasmuch as we have only the past as a teacher. He may tell us that the past—even of all human experience—is but a small section of experience, and the future of experience may reverse the whole experience of the past. He may tell us there may be periods of progression and periods of regression, of evolution and involution, and that during the periods of regression and involution all past experience may be reversed. Should he thus argue and tell us that even to-morrow the law of inversion should begin and our past experience would be worthless. Kant and his followers must remain dumb, since they cannot verify the validity of their principles in the future. But such a skeptic would be quite as fully justified in denying the validity of the principle of causality in the thirtieth century as Kant is in questioning its validity outside experience as he calls it. Kant is, therefore, handling a two-edged sword and is at the same time quarrying beneath the foundations of all certainty when he questions the universal validity of cause and effect throughout the whole realm of truth.

But the real fact is that, even were Kant's contention true which it is not-that the principle of causality has no validity outside experience, it would not help him here at all. For in the proof of the existence of a cause for the contingent we are not using the principle outside of experience, but wholly within experience. Kant is forced to admit the principle that everything in experience must have a cause and that, at least in experience, the principle of causality is operative and even necessary. Every effect in experience must have a cause; but the contingent is wholly and entirely within experience, and it is this effect-in experience, and not outside it—for which the cause is demanded. Consequently, according to Kant's own principle that the principle of causality is valid and necessary in experience, though invalid outside of it, the existence of the cause for the contingent is imperatively necessary. Consequently, it is only a brazen assumption to say that, when we are applying the principle of causality to the world, we are using it outside experience. Shall we admit, then, with Kant that cause and effect have no application here? Then we have the greatest of all effects in experience without a cause and the principle of causality failing in the realm of experience itself. The recklessness of Kant's reasoning in this sphere is absolutely senseless and opposed to all the laws of reason. At the same time, Kant was shrewd enough to perceive this objection and its overwhelming force against his reckless and insane statements. He, however, took particular pains not even to hint at it. But in his own astute fashion he tried to meet it without vouchsafing it even the slightest recognition. For it was doubtless this objection Kant had in mind and which he wished to forestall when he invented the ridiculous plea mentioned in the early part of this article—that the whole of the contingent-since we cannot grasp it as such-is a transcendental idea and consequently does not belong to experience. He evidently wished by this absurd plea to place not only the cause, but the contingent itself, outside experience, and thus by his ingenious fiction place both the contingent and its cause outside the province of the principle of causality, which he maintains is valid only for experience. Removing both outside experience, they become, of course, unapproachable by the principle of cause and effect. As Kant, however, does not elaborate the process by which he places the contingent among the transcendentals (!) we need

not follow up this point here. The direct answer, then, to Kant's assertion that the principle of causality has no validity outside experience is, first, that Kant cannot know whether or no this is a fact; secondly, that the principle itself is wholly independent of experience and derives not one single iota of its validity from experience, although it helps to interpret experience for us, and that since its validity is drawn not from experience, but from we know not whence, its validity must be conceded independent of experience, and consequently outside of experience; thirdly, that such is its validity independent of experience, that it is absolutely necessary in order to give a meaning to much of experience, and a large portion of experience would be meaningless without it; hence the validity which it brings with it into experience and which gives meaning to so much of experience must have been obtained outside experience, and therefore it is valid there; and fourthly, whether or no it is valid outside of experience is of little consequence here; for the problem to be solved—the cause of the existence of the contingent—is not outside experience at all, but very much in experience, since it is the sum total of all experience for which we are seeking the cause. And if we deny that the principle of causality has validity in this solution, we have the anomaly of the sum total of all effects without any cause at all, or to use Kant's own words, beneath the contingent "the foundation sinks, unless it rests upon the immovable rock of that which is absolutely necessary, and this itself hangs without a support if without and beneath it there be empty space and everything be not filled by it, so that no room be left for a why—in fact, if it be not infinite in reality."

But after the tragedy comes the farce. Kant having excluded the Supreme Being from all claims to existence, from all claim to recognition by reason, from the realm of causality, from all claim to consideration as the first great and necessary cause of all thingsin a word, having excluded it from the realm of logical conclusion altogether and having shown—as he thinks—the impossibility of admitting the existence of God as the first cause or otherwise, proceeds to tell us-risum teneatis-that, nevertheless, though God does not exist, we must make believe that He does, for otherwise all our knowledge becomes nonsense without meaning of any kind. In other words, Kant finds himself compelled to bring back this selfsame Supreme Being and install it exactly in the place from which he so summarily excluded it. What is more, he cannot make one single step in empirical knowledge until he does this. Reason herself compels him to restore this highest reality to the throne from which he has expelled it. Perhaps no other philosopher before or after Kant ever gave expression to absurdity equal to that in which he tells us that, although we must deny existence to the Supreme Being, reason compels us to pretend that this Being exists and that we are forced by reason to consider all things "as if" they had sprung from this Supreme Being. This will seem so incredible that we must quote Kant himself. Attempting to explain that the idea of the Supreme Being has no objective reality, he says:

"The idea . . . means no more than that reason requires us to consider all connection in the world according to the principle of a systematical unity, and, therefore, as if the whole of it had sprung from a single all-embracing Being, as its highest and all-sufficient cause."

That is, while Kant rejects all proofs for the existence of this "all-embracing" and "all-sufficient" reality or Being and will not admit of its existence at any cost, he is forced to the absurd statement that, nevertheless, "reason requires us to consider all connection in the world . . . as if the whole of it had sprung from this single all-embracing Being." And again Kant tells us:

"Thus I say that the concept of a highest intelligence is a mere idea, that is, that its objective validity is not to consist in its referring directly to any object (for in that case we should not be able to justify its objective validity); but that it is only a schema, arranged according to the conditions of the highest unity of reason, of the concept of a thing in general, serving only to obtain the greatest systematical unity in the empirical use of reason, by helping us, as it were, to deduce the object of experience from the imagined object of that idea as its ground or cause. Thus we are led to say, for instance, that the things of the world must be considered as if (italics Kant's own) they owed their existence to some supreme intelligence."

And again:

"The supposition, therefore, which reason makes of a Supreme Being as the highest cause is relative only, devised for the sake of the systematical unity in the world of sense and a mere something in the idea, while we have no concept of what it may be by itself. Thus we are able to understand why we require the idea of an original Being, necessary by itself, with reference to all that is given to the senses as existing, but can never have the slightest conception of it and of its absolute necessity."

And again he tells us:

"This Being, demanded by reason (ens rationis ratiocinata), is no doubt a mere idea, and not therefore received as something absolutely real and real by itself. It is only admitted problematically . . . in order to enable us to look upon the connection

of things in the world of sense, as if they had their ground in that Being, the real object being to found upon it that systematical unity which is indispensable to reason, helpful in every way to the empirical knowledge of the understanding and never a hindrance to it."

And again:

"We ought not to derive the order and systematical unity of the world from a supreme intelligence, but borrow from the idea of a supremely wise cause the rule according to which reason may best be used for her own satisfaction in the connection of causes and effects in the world."

Here, then, although we are not allowed to assert the existence of a Supreme Being, we are nevertheless told that we must suppose the existence of such a Being and reason as if such a Being existed; that reason requires this supposition; that all our reasoning must proceed according to this supposition; that reason requires this idea of an original Being; and since Kant arbitrarily refuses to let reason have the reality, reason must make believe that it is in possession of this reality and proceed as if the Supreme Being really existed. Nay, this method of cheating itself into false beliefs Kant calls a maxim of reason, a rule of reason, and he establishes it as a "regulative principle" to guide reason in her search after knowledge. Now, this notion is so preposterous that it seems to be an offspring of bedlam; yet Kant devotes pages to its development. He denies existence to the Supreme Being when it is demanded by a logical necessity and maintains that this logical necessity of a Supreme Being is without objective reality; and then he tells us that the requirements of reason are such that we must always pretend that this Being, to which he has denied existence, does really exist. He tells us that unless we thus prevaricate we can have no knowledge of things at all; that unless we lie to ourselves and make believe that a Supreme Being exists where it does not, we can never have that systematical unity of knowledge which reason requires and without which it will not rest satisfied. And reason requires not merely the notion or the idea, but it must believe as true that this Supreme Being exists, and so imperative is it upon this point that Kant is forced to humor reason, to deceive it, to impose a false belief upon it, to foist upon it a supposition for a reality, and make it believe that the reality is actually there when it is not. In everything else reason seems to be quite a respectable faculty on which implicit reliance may be placed; here, however, she is a wilful dame and will have her way at any costeven if she has to lie in the attainment of her ends. And she is not only wilful and illogical, but extremely whimsical. She will

not, if we are to believe Kant, accept the existence of the Supreme Being which the laws of logical necessity—backed by the principle of causality-force upon her. This existence, according to Kant, is rejected as false. But while she rejects this as false, she invents a fiction of her own which, Kant admits, has no existence of any kind and declares that this is precisely what she wanted from the outset; and so she makes pretense of believing—both to herself and others —that the pretended Being has actual existence. And why does reason act in this capricious manner? Kant tells us reason requires this existence for the systematical unity of her ideas. systematical unity in her ideas reason is like a spoiled child and cries until she gets it; and so Kant is forced to give her the stuffed baby of existence and pretend to her it is reality, and her tears cease at once. She is satisfied wholly with this counterfeit existence of the Supreme Being. And this counterfeit existence of a Supreme Being which Kant finds necessary to appease reason, after he has torn from her the genuine reality, Kant calls a regulative principle of reason.

And here Kant's philosophy rests. On this falsehood as a foundation reason rests the unity of all her knowledge. Without this counterfeit we can have no systematical unity of truth or knowledge at all; but this falsehood once established, all knowledge is at once regulated, falls into perfect order and becomes systematic enough to meet all—even the most fastidious—demands of reason. This regulative principle sets all things to rights. And with this absurdity as the final word of philosophy Kant seems perfectly content to rest. He started out to probe reason to the very core—to find out her last word on human knowledge and its possibility—to find a therefore for every wherefore; and this is the grand anticlimax of all. According to Kant, then, all the clocks of empirical truth are regulated by a falsehood, and without this fundamental falsehood we can have no unity of truth at all.

"We have not the slightest ground to admit absolutely," he tells us, "the object of that idea (the Supreme Being), for what could enable or even justify us in believing or asserting a Being of the highest perfection and absolutely necessary from its very nature on the strength of its concept only, except the world with reference to which alone such an hypothesis may be called necessary? We then perceive that the idea of it, like all speculative ideas, means no more than that reason requires us to consider all connection in the world according to the principles of a systematical unity, and, therefore, as if the whole of it had sprung from a single all-embracing Being as its highest and all-sufficient cause."

But why should reason require a falsehood? If there be no

such existence, why does reason cry like a spoiled child until we admit there is? Why does reason require a lie as the basis of all empirical truth? Why does she—wilful jade that she is—insist upon a great philosopher like Kant making himself and all knowledge ridiculous? These are questions which do not seem to have occurred to Kant at all. He seems to rest perfectly satisfied with his discovery of a counterfeit truth as the basis on which rests all our empirical knowledge. And thus, instead of resting philosophy on a solid foundation, we find it hanging in midair. Kant started out to give us the key to reason and all her processes and workings. He wishes to reduce all knowledge to a mere knowledge of the senses, and here is where he lands us. It would be difficult to find anything more superficial or more irrational than this regulative principle of Kant, whose colossal absurdity seems to have been overlooked by Kant's critics. This regulative principle fills too large a space in Kant's system, however, to be dismissed with a few remarks at the end of an article, and we may return to it some day. Meanwhile—and it is the reason of introducing it here—we have seen that while Kant haughtily rejects the existence of the Supreme Being as a reality, he is forced to suppose it as a mere fiction and to proceed in all his reasoning as if the Supreme Being really existed. for otherwise he can find no systematical unity in all his empirical knowledge and nothing has any meaning. Sensible people will, of course, conclude that there is one explanation of all this, viz., that Kant's rejection of the reality is the source of all his trouble and absurdity; that this rejection is illogical, capricious and ridiculous in the extreme, and that, indirectly, Kant thus gives us one of the very strongest proofs for the existence of God.

So much, then, for Kant's objections to the proofs for the existence of God. We have, however, glanced merely at his general reasons. Some day, too, we may return to his particular arguments. which present a very tempting covey. But to meet Kant with an overwhelming answer to all his superficial—though apparently profound—contention, all this was unnecessary. Even if all that we have said were of no value—and it defies answer, we believe—there would remain one argument in itself sufficient for the complete overthrow of all Kant's sophistry upon this point. It is this: Kant's rejection of the proofs for the existence of God rests, as we have seen, on a twofold foundation: The Supreme Being, he tells us, does not admit of objective reality, and we can never meet with this Supreme Being in experience. Now, is it the workings of the law of retributive justice that makes precisely these two selfsame objections to be absolutely fatal to Kant's philosophy of the "categories?" As Kant expounds these famous concepts they can never

be met with in experience, nor can all the ingenuity of Kant invest them with objective reality. Yet the categories are the very corner-stone of all Kant's metaphysics. These removed, the whole foundation of his philosophy in the "Critique of Pure Reason" is removed. But the elaboration of the proof of this must be reserved for another occasion.

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Lima, N. Y.

## LITTERAE ENCYCLICAE.

AD PATRIARCHAS PRIMATES ARCHIEPISCOPOS EPISCOPOS ALIORUMQUE
LOCORUM ORDINARIOS PACEM ET COMMUNIONEM CUM
APOSTOLICA SEDE HABENTES.

### PIUS PP. X.

Venerabiles Fratres Salutem et Apostolicam Benedictionem.

AMDUDUM in Lusitania incredibilem quemdam cursum fieri per omnem immanitatem facinorum ad Ecclesiam opprimendam, vobis quidem omnibus, Venerabiles Fratres, satis cognitum arbitramur. Nam, ubi status eius civitatis in formam conversus est reipublicae, continuo coepisse, aliud ex alio, sanciri talia quae inexpiabile religionis catholicae spirent odium, quis ignorat? Violenter pelli de medio vidimus familias religiosorum, atque hos, maximam partem, dure inhumaniterque e Lusitanis exterminari finibus. Vidimus, ob studium pertinax omnem disciplinam civilem profanandi nullumque religiosae rei vestigium in actione vitae communis relinquendi, expungi de numero festorum festos Ecclesiae dies: iuri iurando insitam religionis notam detrahi; festinanter legem de divortiis condi; praeceptionem doctrinae christianae a scholis publicis excludi. Denique, ut alia omittamus quae persegui longum est, vehementius ab his Antistites sacrorum peti, duosque e spectatissimis Episcopis, Portugalliensem et Beiensem, viros cum integritate vitae tum magnis in patriam Ecclesiamque promeritis illustres, de sedibus honoris sui deturbari. Quum autem novi gubernatores Lusitaniae tot tantaque ederent imperiosae libidinis exempla, scitis quam patienter quam moderate sese adversus eos Apostolica haec Sedes gesserit. Equidem summa diligentia duximus cavendum, ne quidquam ageremus, quod posset contra Rempublicam hostiliter actum videri. Nonnulla enim spe tenebamur fore, ut ii aliquando saniora inirent consilia, ac de iniuriis illatis aliquo tandem pacto Ecclesiae satisfacerent. Verum tota re Nos fefellit animus: ecce nefario operi tamquam fastigium imponunt pessimae ac perniciosissimae promulgatione legis de Civitatis ab Ecclesiae rationibus separandis. Iamvero vulnus tam gravi iuri et dignitati inustum religionis catholicae toleranter ferre ac praeterire silentio haudquaquam apostolici religio officii Nos patitur. Quapropter his vos litteris appellamus, Venerabiles Fratres, universoque nomini christiano omnem huius facti indignitatem denuntiamus.

Principio legem, de qua loquimur, absurdum quiddam esse et monstruosum apparet ex eo, quod rem publicam divini cultus esse expertem statuit, quasi vero non ab Ipso, qui conditor et conservator est rerum omnium, cum homines singuli tum consociatio quaevis hominum et communitas pendeat: item quod catholicae religionis observantia solvit Lusitaniam, eius inquimus religionis, quae huic genti maximo semper praesidio et ornamento fuit, quamque universitas fere civium profitetur. Sed tamen, esto: placuit tantam civitatis Ecclesiaeque coniunctionem, eamque sollemni pactorum fide confirmatam, discindi. Hoc posito discidio, consentaneum profecto erat omittere Ecclesiam et sinere ut communi libertate ac iure uteretur, quo quisque civis et honesta quaeque civium societas utitur. Quod totum contra est. Nam a separatione quidem haec lex nomen habet, re tamen ipsa eam habet vim, ut Ecclesia in externis bonis ad extremum inopiae spoliando redigat, in iis autem quae sunt sacrae potestatis ac spiritus, in servitutem reipublicae opprimendo tradat:

Et primum, quod attinet ad res externas, ita se Lusitana Respublica ab Ecclesia segregat, ut nihil omnino ei relinquat unde tueri decus Domus Dei, sacricolas alere, multiplicia caritatis pietatisque exercere munia possit. Etenim, huius praescripto legis, non solum quascumque res Ecclesia mobiles immobiles obtinet, ex earum possessione, quamvis optimo iure parta, detruditur; verum etiam quaevis ei potestas adimitur quidquam sibi in posterum acquirendi. Statuitur quidem, ut certa civium corpora divino cultui exercendo praesideant: verum quae his datur facultas ad accipiendum quidquid in eam causam oblatum sit, mirum quam angustis terminis circumscribitur. Praeterea, quibus obligationibus obstricti, cives catholici aliquid vel subsidii vel stipendii suo quisque curioni praestare consueverunt, eas extinguit lex ac perimit, prohibens, ne quid iam eo nomine exigatur. Utique sinit, ut ipsi sumptibus in divinum cultum faciendis catholici homines voluntaria stipis collatione provideant; sed tamen jubet de summa ob eam rem conflata detrahi tertiam partem et in officia beneficentiae civilis insumi. Atque ad haec omnia illud velut cumulus accedit, quod ex hac lege aedificia quae deinceps comparari aut exstrui contingat in usum sacrorum, ea, cum definitus annorum numerus effluxerit, submotis possessoribus legitimis nec iis factis indemnibus, in publicum referentur.

De rebus vero, in quibus sacra Ecclesia potestas proprie versatur, multo est gravius multoque perniciosius ludibrium Separationis huius, quae, uti diximus, ad indignam ipsius Ecclesiae recidit servitutem. Primum omnium, Hierarchia prorsus, tamquam ignorata, negligitur. Si qua de hominibus sacri ordinis mentio fit, ideo fit, ut interdicatur eis, ne ullo se modo ordinationi religiosi cultus immisceant. Omnis ea cura demandata est consociationibus laicorum, quae institutae iam sint, aut futurae sint, beneficentiae causa, et quidem institutae ad normam disciplinae civilis, ex auctoritate Reipublicae, nulla ut ratione ab Ecclesiae potestate pendeant. Quod si de consociatione, cui sit hoc muneris deferendum, clerici cum laicis

dissenserint, aut inter laicos ipsos non convenerit, diiudicanda res relinquitur non Ecclesiae sed arbitrio Reipublicae, quae sola in hisce institutis dominatur. Atque in constituendo divino cultu usque adeo recto res rei Lusitanae non patiuntur locum esse Clero, ut aperte praescriptum et statutum sit, non posse, qui religionis ministeriis sint addicti, aut in decurias parochiarum cooptari aut in partem vocari administrationis vel regiminis consociationum, quas memoravimus: qua quidem praescriptione nihil iniquius aut intolerabilius cogitari potest, cum clericorum ordinem in ea ipsa re, qua praestat, inferiorem, quam ceteros cives, conditione faciat.

Ouibus autem vinculis Lusitana lex constringat et implicet Ecclesiae libertatem, vix credibile est: adeo cum institutis horum temporum atque etiam cum publicis libertatum omnium praeconiis pugnat res: adeo est humano quovis civilique populo indigna. sanctum est gravibus paenis, ne qua sacrorum antistitum acta mandari typis, ullove pacto, ne intra parietes quidem templorum, proponi populo liceat, nisi concessu Reipublicae. Praeterea interdictum, extra sacrarum aedium limina, ne, inconsulta Republica, caeremoniarum quid celebretur, ne qua pompa circumducatur, ne quis ornamenta sacra neve ipsam vestem talarem gerat. Item vetitum, non modo ad monumenta publica, sed etiam ad aedes privatorum quidquam apponi quod catholicam religionem sapiat; at minime vetitum, quod catholicos offendat. Item societatem coire religionis pietatisque colendae gratia, non licet: cuius quidem generis societates eodem plane habentur loco atque illae nefariae, quae scelerum causa conflentur. Ad haec, cum concessum' sit omnibus civibus ad suum arbitrium uti posse rebus suis, catholicis tamen contra ius fasque importune coangustatur potestas huiusmodi, si quid de suo attributum velint solandis piorum manibus aut sumptibus divini cultus suppeditandis: et quae id genus pie statuta iam sunt, impie deformata convertuntur in alios usus, violatis testamentis et voluntatibus auctorum. Denique Respublica—id quod maxime est acerbum et grave-non dubitat regnum invadere auctoritatis Ecclesiae, ac plura de ea re praescribere, quae cum ad ipsam sacri ordinis constitutionem spectent praecipuas curas Ecclesiae sibi vindicant: de disciplina dicimus et institutione sacrae iuventutis. Neque enim solum cogit alumnos Cleri, ut doctrinae et litterarum studiis, quae theologiam antecedunt, in lyceis publicis dent operam, ubi ipsorum integritas fidei, ob alienum a Deo Ecclesiaque institutionis genus, praesentissimis sane periculis est obiecta: verum in domesticam etiam Seminariorum vitam temperationemque sese infert Respublica, sibique ius arrogat designandi doctores, probandi libros. sacra Clericorum studia moderandi. Ita vetera in usum revocantur scita Regalistarum; quae quidem molestissimam arrogantiani habuerunt, dum Civitatis Ecclesiaeque concordia stetit, nunc vero, quum Civitas sibi cum Ecclesia nihil iam vult esse, nonne pugnantia et plena insaniae videantur? Quid, quod etiam ad Cleri depravandos mores atque ad incitandam defectionem a praepositis suis hanc apprime factam legem dixeris? Nam et certas pensiones ex aerario assignat iis, qui sint, antistitum auctoritate, a sacris abstinere iussi, et singularibus beneficiis sacerdotes ornat, qui, suorum officiorum misere immemores, ausi fuerint attentare nuptias, et, quod referre piget, eadem beneficia ad participem fructusque, si qui fuerint superstites, sacrilegae coniunctionis extendit.

Postremo parum est quod Ecclesiae Lusitanae, suis despoliatae bonis, servile prope jugum imponit Respublica, nisi etiam nitatur, quantum potest, hinc ipsam e gremio catholicae unitatis deque complexu Ecclesiae Romanae divellere, illinc impedire, quominus religiosis Lusitaniae rebus Apostolica Sedes auctoritatem providentiamque suam adhibeat. Itaque ex hac lege, ne Romani quident Pontificis iussa pervulgari, nisi concessum sit publice, licet. Pariter sacerdoti, qui apud aliquod athenaeum, Pontificia auctoritate constitutum, academicos in sacris disciplinis gradus consecutus sit, etiam si theologiae spatium domi confecerit, sacris fungi muneribus non licet. In quo planum est, quid velit Respublica: nempe efficere, ut adolescentes clerici, qui perfici sese et perporiri in studiis optimis cupiunt, ne ob eam causam conveniant in hanc urbem, principem catholici nominis; ubi certe proclivius, quam usquam alibi factu est, ut et mentes incorrupta christianae doctrinae veritate, et animi sincera in Apostolicam Sedam pietate ac fide conformentur. Haec, praetermissis aliis, quae quidem non minus habent iniquitatis, haec igitur praecipua sunt improbae huius legis capita.

Itaque, admonente Nos Apostolici conscientià officii ut, in tanta importunitate et audacia inimicorum Dei, dignitatem et decus Religionis vigilantissime tueamur, ac sacro sancta Ecclesiae catholicae iura conservemus, Nos legem de Lusitana Republica Ecclesiaque separandis, quae Deum contemnit, professionemque catholicam repudiat; quae pacta sollemniter conventa inter Lusitaniam et Apostolicam Sedem, ius naturae ac gentium violando, rescindit; quae Ecclesiam de iustissima rerum suarum possessione deturbat; quae ipsam Ecclesiae libertatem opprimit divinamque constitutionem pervertit; quae denique maiestatem Pontificatus Romani, Episcoporum ordinem, Clerum populumque Lusitaniae atque adeo catholicos homines, quotquot sunt orbis terrae, iniuria contumeliaque afficit, pro apostolica auctoritate Nostra improbamus, damnamus, reiicimus. Ouum autem vehementer conquerimur huiusmodi latam, sanctam, propositam in publicum esse legem, sollemnemque cum omnibus, quicumque rei auctores ac participes fuerunt, expostulationem facimus, tum vero quidquid ibi contra inviolata Ecclesiae iura statutum est, nullum atque inane et esse et habendum esse edicimus ac denuntiamus.

Profecto haec difficillima tempora, quibus Lusitania, post indictum publice Religioni bellum, conflictatur, magnam Nobis sollicitudinem tristitiamque efficiunt. Dolemus nimirum tot malorum spectaculo, quae gentem, Nobis penitus dilectam, premunt; angimur exspectatione acerbiorum rerum, quae certe eidem impendent, nisi qui praesunt, mature se ad officium revocarint. Sed vestra Nos eximia virtus, Venerabiles Fratres, qui Lusitanam gubernatis Ecclesiam, Clerique istius ardor vestrae virtuti mirabiliter concinens, valde consolatur, bonamque spem affert, fore istic aliquando res, Deo adiuvante, meliores. Vos enim omnes non sane securitatis rationem aut commodi, sed officii et dignitatis habuistis nuper, cum iniquam discidii legem palam et libere indignando repudiastis; cum una voce professi estis malle vos vestrorum iactura bonorum sacri muneris redimere libertatem, quam pro mercedula pacisci servitutem; cum denique negastis ullo unquam aut astu aut impetu inimicorum posse vestram cum Romano Pontifice conjunctionem labefactari. Ista quidem, quae in conspectu Ecclesiae universae dedistis, fidei, constantiae magnique animi praeclara documenta, sciatis cum voluptati bonis omnibus, tum vobis honori, tum ipsi laboranti Lusitaniae emolumento fuisse non mediocri. Quare pergite, ut instituistis, Religionis causam, quacum salus ipsa communis patriae connexa est, agere proviribus: sed videte in primis, ut et ipsi inter vos, et christianus populus vobiscum, et omnes cum hac Beati Petri Cathedra summam consensionem et concordiam retineatis diligenter et confirmetis. Hoc enim auctoribus nefariae legis propositum est, quod diximus: non a Republica (ut videri volunt) separare Ecclesiam Lusitanam, quam despoliant opprimuntque, sed a Vicario Iesu Christi. Quod si tali hominum consilio ac sceleri occurere atque obsistere omni vos ope studueritis, iam rebus Lusitaniae catholicae commode per vos consultum fuerit. Nos interea, pro singulari qua vos diligimus caritate. Deo omnipotenti supplices erimus, ut diligentiae studioque vestro bonus faveat. Vos autem rogamus, reliqui orbis catholici Antistites, ut id ipsum officii tam necessario tempore sollicitis e Lusitania fratribus praestare velitis.

Auspicem vero divinorum munerum ac testem benevolentiae Nostrae, vobis omnibus, Venerabiles fratres, et Clero populoque vestro Apostolicam benedictionem peramanter impertimus.

Datum Romae apud S. Petrum die XXIV. mensis Maii, in festo Dominae Nostrae Mariae, adiutricis christianorum, anno MCMXI., Pontificatus Nostri octavo.

PIUS PP. X.



### ON THE CHURCH IN PORTUGAL.

ENCYCLICAL LETTER OF HIS HOLINESS PIUS X., BY DIVINE PROVIDENCE, POPE.

TO THE PATRIARCHS, PRIMATES, ARCHBISHOPS, BISHOPS AND OTHER ORDINARIES, IN PEACE AND COMMUNION WITH THE APOSTOLIC SEE.

Venerable Brethren, Health and the Apostolic Benediction.

7 E THINK, venerable brethren, it is well known to you all already that in Portugal the incredible course has been taken of oppressing the Church by all manner of savage deeds. For every one is aware that when the form of government in that State was changed into a Republic there began to be sanctioned, one after another, measures breathing an implacable hatred of the Catholic religion. We have seen the religious communities violently banished and for the most part driven in a harsh and inhuman manner from the confines of Portugal. We have seen that, owing to an obstinate desire of giving a profane character to every civil regulation and of leaving not a trace of religion in public life, the feast days of the Church have been expunged from the number of public holidays; the oath taken in courts of justice deprived of its religious character; a law on divorce passed in haste; the teaching of religious doctrine excluded from the public schools. Finally, passing over other things-for it would take too long to enter fully into the subject—we have seen the Bishops vehemently attacked by the same people and two of the most distinguished of them—the Bishops of Oporto and Beja, men notable for their integrity of life and for their great service to their country and the Church—cast forth from their sees. Although the new rulers of Portugal gave so many and such extraordinary examples of wanton tyranny, you know how patiently and how moderately this Holy See has acted towards them. Indeed, we have taken the greatest care lest anything we might do should be regarded as an act of hostility towards the Republic. We entertained some hope that they would sooner or later adopt sane counsels and by an agreement with the Church give satisfaction for the wrongs which had been done. But we were altogether deceived. They crown their wicked work by the promulgation of the evil and most pernicious law separating Church and State. Our apostolic duty would not permit us by any means to pass over in silence the infliction of such a serious wound on the rights and dignity of the Catholic religion. Wherefore, venerable brethren, we address

you in this letter and we denounce the baseness of these proceedings to the whole Christian world.

That the law of which we speak is something absurd and monstrous is evident in the first place from the fact that it is laid down that the State is not bound to preserve public worship, as if it was not dependent on Him who is the founder and preserver of all things, both of men individually and of every association and community of human beings. It also releases Portugal from the duty of observing Catholic worship, that religion which has always been the greatest support and ornament to the people of Portugal and which nearly all the citizens profess. But let us go on; it pleased the Government to sever such a connection between Church and State, one which was confirmed by solemn pacts. The severance being made, it surely was but right to set free the Church and to allow her the common rights and liberties enjoyed by every citizen and every honorable society of citizens. But quite the contrary has taken place; for although this law is called a law of separation, in reality it is of such a character that it reduces the Church in externals by spoliation to extreme indigence, whilst as regards spiritual matters it places it in servitude and in a state of persecution under the Republic.

And, first of all, as to external affairs, the Republic of Portugal separates itself from the Church in such a way that it leaves her absolutely nothing to provide for the dignity of the house of God, to support the sacred ministers and to discharge the many duties of charity and piety. For by this law not only is the Church deprived of all her possessions, movable and immovable, although justly obtained, but all power of acquiring anything for herself in the future is taken away. It is indeed decreed that corporate bodies of the citizens should have authority over public worship, but it is surprising how narrowly their power of receiving anything offered for that purpose is circumscribed. Moreover, the law removes and does away with the obligation binding Catholic citizens who were accustomed to give anything for the support or salaries of their clergy, forbidding that any demand of that kind should be made. It permits that Catholics should by voluntary collection provide for the expense of divine worship, but it orders that of the sum raised for that purpose a third part must be devoted to works of civil beneficence. To complete the injustice, the buildings which may in future be bought or erected for worship are, after a certain number of years, to be taken away from the legitimate possessors and to be used by the State without any indemnity being made to them.

But in matters which specially concern the sacred province of

the Church, the mockery of this separation is much more serious and more ruinous, being a measure which, as we have said, reduces the Church to an unworthy condition of slavery. First of all, the hierarchy is altogether put aside and ignored. If mention is made of clerics, it is done so in order that they may be forbidden to take any part in the regulations for religious worship. All that duty is entrusted to associations of laymen which have been established or will be established for the purpose of benevolence and established, indeed, according to State discipline on the authority of the Republic, so that they may not in any way depend upon the power of the Church. If clerics are at variance with laymen as to the association that is to discharge that duty, or if there is a disagreement on the point amongst the laymen themselves, the settlement of the matter is left not to the Church, but to the decision of the Republic, which alone rules in these affairs. And in the provision for divine worship no place is left for the priest, as it is openly decreed and laid down that those who are ministers of religion cannot be chosen on the parochial committees, or be associated with the administration, or join in the work of the associations I have mentioned—an arrangement than which nothing could be more unjust or more intolerable, inasmuch as it makes the position of the priest inferior to that of the other citizens in the very matter with which he is specially qualified to deal.

The bonds by which the Portuguese law binds and restricts the liberty of the Church are almost incredible—so much so that the state of affairs is a reproach to the institutions of the present day and to the common ideas of present day public liberties, and is unworthy of any humane and civilized people. For instance, it is decreed under heavy penalties that no communication from the Bishops must be put in type under any circumstances, and that it must not be read to the people, even within the walls of the churches, unless by permission of the Republic. Moreover, it is forbidden, unless authority is obtained from the Republic, to celebrate any ceremony outside the precincts of the sacred buildings, to use pomp at any function, or to wear sacred vestments, or even the cassock itself. It is also forbidden to put up not only on public monuments, but even on the houses of private individuals, anything concerning the Catholic religion; but not at all forbidden to put up what may offend Catholics. Likewise, it is unlawful to form a society for the promotion of religion and piety; such societies being treated in the same way as those vile ones which are formed for the perpetration of crime. Furthermore, whilst all citizens are allowed to do what they like with their own, in the case of the Catholics, contrary to what is right and just, the power

of doing so is inconveniently narrowed if they desire to give anything either for the benefit of the souls of the dead or to make better provision for public worship; and the pious gifts already made for this purpose have been impiously converted to other uses, the testaments and wishes of the givers being violated. In finea thing that is particularly serious and bitter—the Republic does not hesitate to interfere in the province of the Church's authority and to lay down a number of rules regarding a matter which, as it concerns the very formation of the clergy, the Church claims for herself as a subject of particular care, namely, the discipline and teaching of clerical students. Not only does the State compel those students to make the studies in science and literature which precede the theological course in public schools where the integrity of their faith, owing to the fact that the teaching is dissociated from God and the Church, is in the gravest peril, but the Republic interferes also in the domestic life and government of the seminaries, and arrogates to itself the right of appointing the teachers, approving of the books and directing the sacred studies of the Thus what were known of old as the royal privileges are revived—claims which when there was peace between Church and State, betrayed most irksome arrogance; now that the State wants to have nothing to do with the Church, do they not appear to savor of a spirit of warfare and complete insanity? Nay, would you not say that this law was specially made to corrupt the morals of clerics and to stir them to rebellion against their superiors? For it both assigns certain pensions to those who have been suspended by their Bishops and grants special advantages to those who, wretchedly forgetful of their offices, shall form nuptial unions, and, shameful to relate, it extends the same benefits to the women and children in case any of them survive.

Finally, it was to be expected that the Republic, having despoiled the Portuguese Church of its possessions and having subjected it to an almost servile yoke, would endeavor to wrench it away from Catholic unity and the bosom of the Roman Church, and would prevent the Apostolic See from exercising its authority and its care with regard to religious affairs in Portugal. Accordingly by this law not even the orders of the Roman Pontiff may be published without public permission. In the same way a priest who may have obtained his theological degrees in any college established by Pontifical authority, even if he has made his theological course at home, will not be allowed to officiate. It is clear what the Republic's object is in this, namely, to prevent older clerics who desire to perfect and polish themselves in the highest studies from going to Rome, the centre of Christianity, where certainly more

readily than anywhere else, their minds would be strengthened by the truth of Christian doctrine and their souls by sincere faith and piety towards the Apostolic See. Passing over other things not less iniquitous, these are the principal points in this wicked law.

Wherefore as a sense of our apostolic duty prompts, in view of this insolence and audacity of the enemies of God, that we should vigilantly guard the dignity and honor of religion and preserve the rights of the Holy Catholic Church, we of our apostolic authority reprobate, condemn and reject the law separating Church and State in Portugal which makes no account of God, and repudiates the Catholic creed, which, violating the laws of nature and of nations, breaks covenants solemnly entered into between Portugal and the Apostolic See, which thrusts out the Church from the just possession of her own property, which oppresses the liberty of the Church and perverts her divine constitution, and which, finally, treats with insult and contumely the majesty of the Roman Pontiff, the episcopal order and the clergy and people of Portugal, and even Catholics throughout the whole world. And whilst we complain in the strongest manner that a law of this kind should be passed, sanctioned and brought forward in public and solemnly expostulate with all who have prepared it or taken part in the work, we proclaim and announce that whatsoever it contains contrary to the inviolable rights of the Church is null and void, and is to be so held.

Assuredly these difficult times, in which Portugal after war has been publicly proclaimed against religion is in a state of agitation, bring us great anxiety and sorrow. For we grieve at the sight of so many evils which oppress a people very dear to us; we are troubled by the expectation that something worse will happen unless those who are at the head of affairs come to a sense of duty in time. But, venerable brethren, the eminent virtue shown by you who rule the Church in Portugal and the fervor of the clergy, admirably harmonizing with that virtue, greatly console us and afford the strong hope that with God's help things will improve there sooner or later. For undoubtedly you all were influenced not by thoughts of your own security or convenience, but of duty and of the dignity of your office when lately you openly and freely repudiated with indignation the law of separation; with one voice you declared that you preferred to purchase the liberty of your sacred office by the loss of your property than to suffer slavery for a small payment; when in fine you stated that your union with the Roman Pontiff could never be shaken either by craft or open attack. Be assured that those splendid proofs of faith, constancy and greatness of soul which you gave in the sight of the whole

Church were the source of no small pleasure to all good men, of honor to yourselves and of profit to distressed Portugal. Wherefore, continue, as you have resolved to do, to defend to the best of your strength the cause of religion with which is bound up the salvation of your common country; but see, above all, that both you among yourselves, and the Christian people with you, and all with this See of Blessed Peter earnestly maintain and uphold the closest union and concord. For the design of the authors of this odious law is what we have spoken of-not to separate the Portuguese Church, which they despoiled and oppressed (as they wish to make it appear) from the Republic, but from the Vicar of Jesus Christ. If with all your might you strive to meet and resist such a design and crime on the part of these men you will provide well for the interests of Catholic Portugal. Meanwhile, in accordance with the special love which we bear you, we shall pray to Almighty God to be good enough to favor your earnestness and your zeal.

And you, the prelates of the rest of the Catholic world, we ask that you should discharge the same duty in this time of need on behalf of the troubled brethren in Portugal.

As an augury of divine blessings and a proof of our good will we lovingly impart the apostolic benediction to you all, venerable brethren, and to your clergy and people.

Given at St. Peter's, Rome, on the 24th May, the feast of Our Blessed Lady Help of Christians, in the year 1911, the eighth of our pontificate.

PIUS X., POPE.

# Book Reviews

THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA. An International Work of Reference on the Constitution, Doctrine, Discipline and History of the Catholic Church. In fifteen volumes. Vol. XI. New Mex—Phil,

The editors of the Encyclopedia acknowledge that the hearty recognition accorded to the first ten volumes has stimulated them to renewed effort, and that as a result, the present volume may be said to reflect the combined confidence of both critic and collaborator. They also call attention to the uniformity of purpose which the twelve hundred odd contributors have come to feel through a deeper familiarity with the nature of the enterprise, and to the added excellence which it has imparted to the eleventh volume, that renders it still more attractive. They say truthfully that the real test of any standard work of reference is the extent to which bias and prejudice have been eliminated and the disinterested exposition of facts that come within its province. Never for an instant have the editors lost sight of the guiding principles laid down at the outset; never, once, has a subject been treated with any other aim in view than that of furnishing adequate, direct, uncolored and first handed information. As an indication that the zeal and vigor with which the work has been carried on have not in any way been relaxed, they point to an entire new page of qualified contributors. The subjects treated in the present volume seem to present an unusual variety of more than ordinary interest, although if we were to look back we should probably find that we had said the same thing about each of the preceding volumes. It can be said truthfully of each one, for each is a collection of detached papers on subjects of almost universal interest, and in very many cases the information is practically inaccessible in any other form. For this reason, as has been said several times before, each volume has a distinct and immediate value which should urge the reader or student to come into possession of the work as soon as possible. A glance at Volume XI. draws attention to several individual excellencies. For instance, as an illustration of how carefully the editors choose contributors, we notice that Rev. Horace K. Mann, whose great "Lives of the Popes in the Middle Ages" has already reached the eighth volume, contributes several articles on the Popes; that Rev. E. A. D'Alton. whose complete "History of Ireland," in three large volumes, has just been finished, has written on several Irish subjects; and that Rev. Thomas Slater, S. J., whose excellent work on "Moral Theology" in English has attracted widespread attention and commendation, treats several moral subjects.

A striking example of local historical value of the book is found in the histories of the dioceses of the country that are appearing in regular order. In the present volume we have New York, Philadelphia, Ogdensburg and Omaha. Of special interest are Nueva Segovia and Nueva Caceres, in the Philippines, and Panama. We must confess we cannot see why the Diocese of New York should occupy nine pages, with eight illustrations, while but three pages of text, with no illustrations, are devoted to Philadelphia. do not wish to make comparisons, but we think that they would show that the relative importance of the dioceses calls for different spacing. A splendid illustration of the complete treatment of a subject may be found in Dr. Hanna's very interesting, informing and learned article on "Penance." It could be used without change for a lecture or sermon. One might go on indefinitely quoting, but enough has been said to excite the interest of every earnest Catholic and to induce him to desire the book and to strive to obtain The publishers are ready to make terms of the most favorable kind to suit all classes.

HISTORY OF IRELAND from the earliest times to the present day. By Rev. E. A. D'Alton, LL. D., M. R. I. A. In three volumes. Vol. III. From 1782-1908. New York: Benziger Brothers. London: The Gresham Publishing Company.

Now that Father D'Alton's "History of Ireland" has been completed, we recall with interest what Archbishop Healy, of Tuam, a well-known Irish historian, said about the writer and his work when the first volume appeared. On that occasion he wrote:

"Some people may be disposed to ask if there were real need of a new history of Ireland, seeing that there are so many already in the hands of the public. Yet it is difficult, if not impossible, to find a really good history of our country—what might be fairly described as an all-round good history—full, accurate, well written and impartial. If the Rev. Mr. D'Alton has not yet accomplished this task, he has certainly made a praiseworthy beginning. This is the first volume of what is intended to be a three volume work, giving a complete history of Ireland from its remotest origins down to our own time. It is an ambitious task, which cannot be accomplished without much learning, courage and perseverance.

"The first volume of this general history gives evidence that he possesses many of the most essential qualities of an historical writer. His style is easy and limpid; in description, as well as in narration, he is vivid and frequently picturesque; he possesses the critical faculty in a high degree, and holds the scales of historical justice with an even hand. Moreover, he is a painstaking writer in verify-

ing his authorities; he has the great advantage of a good knowledge of the Gaelic tongue, which enables him to consult for himself the original sources of our earlier history, and he has not failed to utilize all the State Papers and other official documents which the nineteenth century has produced in such profusion.

"The time is eminently favorable for such a work as this. The Gaelic revival is still a rising tide, and young Irishmen, and Irishwomen also, are anxiously seeking for authoritative information on the history, the literature, the language and the antiquities of their country. Here they will find a work that will go far to satisfy their requirements in these respects, and we have no doubt that many of them will eagerly avail themselves of the opportunities that it offers."

The complete work more than justifies these words of commendation spoken in the beginning. The learned author lived up to his standard with that constant improvement that comes with earnest zealous effort, and the result is a complete, compact, interesting and trustworthy history of Ireland, which was badly needed and should be widely read.

THE SPIRIT OF ST. FRANCIS DE SALES. By His Friend, Jean Pierre Camus, Bishop of Belley. New and enlarged edition, with a preface by His Grace the Archbishop of Westminster. Translated by J. S. 12mo., pp. 510. Burns & Oates, London. Benziger Brothers, New York.

"The spirit of a saint we may, perhaps, regard as the underlying characteristic which pervades all his thoughts, words and acts. It is the note which sounds throughout the constant persevering harmony which makes the holiness of his life. Circumstances change. He grows from childhood to boyhood; from youth to manhood. His time of preparation is unnoticed by the world until the moment comes when he is called to a public activity which arrests attention. And essentially he remains the same. In private as in public, in intimate conversations as in writings or discourses, in the direction of individual consciences as in the conduct of matters of wide importance, there is a characteristic note which identifies him and marks him off apart even from other heroes of sanctity.

"We owe to a keen and close observer a knowledge of the spirit of St. Francis de Sales for which we cannot be too grateful. Let it be granted that Mgr. Camus had a very prolific imagination; that he had an unconscious tendency to embroider facts; that he read a meaning into words which their speaker had no thought of imparting to them. When all such allowances have been made, we must still admit that he has given to us a picture of the saint which we should be loath to lose; and that his description of what

the saint habitually thought and felt has made Saint Francis de Sales a close personal friend to many to whom otherwise he would have remained a mere chance acquaintance."

Surely this is a book to be grateful for. It is a blessed thing to become intimately acquainted with any saint, and to be able to imbibe his spirit, even in small degree, but he is thrice blest who gets close to St. Francis de Sales. This is made possible now because of the appearance of this fuller work, which takes the place of a brief abridgement, which was all that we had heretofore. It is also made easy because, as the writer of the Preface says:

"The Bishop of Belley, while a devoted admirer, was at the same time a critical observer of his saintly friend. He wanted to know the reason of what he saw, he did not always approve and he was sufficiently indiscreet to put questions which, probably, no one else would have dared to frame. And thus we know more about St. Francis than about any other saint, and we owe real gratitude to his very candid, talkative and outspoken episcopal colleague."

These two volumes of cases appear about the same time, and Father Slater's preface explains so well the purpose of such works, at the same time setting forth his plan, that we shall print it as an introduction. He says:

"Few, if any, of those for whom this book is intended will be disposed to deny the usefulness and necessity of casuistry for the ecclesiastical student and the confessor. If the priest's work in the cure of souls and in the confessional is to be done fruitfully and if disastrous mistakes are to be prevented as far as possible, previous and solid training is absolutely necessary. Mere speculative knowledge is not sufficient to fit the priest for his work. His duty is to guide souls according to the principles of the Catholic faith, and a merely speculative knowledge of those principles will not enable him to perform the task imposed upon him. Nobody supposes that book knowledge alone will fit the judge or doctor for the practical work of the law courts and the sickroom. As little will a knowledge of speculative theology fit the priest for the work that he has to do. He is both a judge and a doctor. Only the cases that he has to decide are often more intricate than those which are heard in the law courts, and the

CASES OF CONSCIENCE for English-Speaking Countries, solved by Rev. Thomas Slater, S. J., St. Beuno's College, St. Asaph. Vol. I. 8vo., pp. 351. New York: Benziger Bros.

THE CASUIST. A Collection of Cases in Moral and Pastoral Theology. Vol. III., with an Index of Subjects of the Entire Series. 8vo., pp. 346. New York: Joseph F. Wagner.

diseases which he is called upon to heal are more difficult to diagnose accurately and to prescribe for than are those of the body. It adds to the difficulty that such practical training for their profession as the judge and the lawyer get is not possible in the case of the priest. The medical student walks the wards of the hospitals and observes how cases of bodily disease are treated by an expert. The judge usually has a long preparatory training in the practice of the law. No such practical training is possible for the young aspirant to the priesthood. The next best thing to actual experience in the cure of souls is to provide him with books such as this, where the principles which he has already learned are applied to concrete cases.

"For many years past my official duties have laid on me the task of providing such practical cases for the students under my care. I have always striven to keep the end steadily in view. The moral principles were supposed to be already known. What was wanted was to train the young student so that he might be able to detect at once what principles were to be applied to a given concrete case and to train his judgment so that he might apply those principles correctly. In this volume I have collected together the greater part of the cases that I have given on the general treatises of Moral Theology, the Commandments of God and the Precepts of the Church. I reserve the others for a second volume. I think the experienced reader will acknowledge that the cases are practical and real, such as are met with in actual life. The questions put after each case are intended to indicate some of the chief principles which have to be applied in the case and the practical solution is given at the end. I have not thought it necessary in this book to give full answers to the questions proposed. They are book questions, and the answers to them may be found for the most part in any of the text-books of Moral Theology. For convenience I have often given a reference to my 'Manual of Moral Theology.' I thought it advisable to keep the cases in Latin, as they were drawn up in that language, but as English is largely used in the conference cases of the clergy, the answers to the questions and the solutions are almost wholly given in English."

Those who are familiar with Father Slater's work on "Moral Theology" need not be told that his cases are clear and practical and that they answer the purpose for which he produces them, namely, to make theory serviceable.

As to the "Casuist," we are glad to be able to repeat all that we said in favor of the previous volumes and to withdraw the adverse criticism which we made when the first volume appeared. At that

time we said that the name of the solver of the case or the source from which it was taken ought to be given. In the present volume that is done. We repeat what we said previously, that the cases are unusually practical and that they really solve difficult questions that are arising now in our very midst. A glance at a few of them will make this clear. For instance, several cases on the various phases of the New Marriage Law, the question of assisting at Spiritual Seances, the question of the marriage of a Roman Catholic and an Oriental Schismatic, the question of Sanatio in Radice, the Use of the Stomach-pump before and after Holy Communion, the Burial of Suicides. These are a few examples which show clearly that the book has real, practical, immediate value.

HISTORY OF DOGMAS. By J. Tixeront. Translated from the fifth French edition by H. L. B. Vol. I. The Antenicene Theology. 12mo., pp. 437. St. Louis: B. Herder. 1910.

"This volume is the first of a History of Dogmas in Ancient Theology, which at first was intended to be complete in one volume; its importance, however, is so great, and the material for its composition so abundant, as to have obliged me to divide it into two parts. The eagerness with which this first volume has been called for has decided me not to delay the printing of it until the second is ready. Besides, it treats of a well-defined epoch and, strictly speaking, constitutes by itself an independent whole.

"The method adopted in its composition is the method which, later on, I call synthetic, viz.: I have generally followed the chronological order, setting forth at the same time all the doctrine of each author or document, and following up, so to speak, the history of all the dogmas. Any other method was scarcely practical, because of the character of the epoch to be described: an epoch when great controversies had not yet arisen and strictly socalled definitions on the part of the Church had not yet been made. I am fully aware that such a method may put theologians to some inconvenience; for, while they are anxious to have, grouped together, all the texts referring to a certain subject, in the present work they are obliged, in order to find those texts, to go through the whole book. But although such an inconvenience can scarcely be avoided, I have tried to remove it, as much as I could, by placing at the end of the volume an analytical table by means of which it will be easy to make out, in a short time, the series of testimonies and teachings of the first three centuries on this or that point of doctrine.

"Notes, placed at the beginning of chapters or paragraphs, give

lists of the principal works referring to the author or subject in question; which lists it will be easy to complete by consulting U. Chevalier's 'Repertoire des Sources Historiques du Moyen Age, Bio-bibliographie,' a second edition of which is now being published, and O. Bardenhewer's 'Geschicte der Altkirchlichen Litteratur.'"

The author has carried out his plan faithfully, clearly and learnedly. The result is an interesting and valuable book, which all readers will desire to see completed soon.

ESSAYS. By Rev. Henry Ignatius Dudley Ryder. Edited by Francis Bacchus, of the Oratory, Birmingham. With a frontispiece. 8vo., pp. 322. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co.

The personality of the author arrests the attention of the reader before he turns to the essays in this volume. His name is known to the largest number, probably by his answers to Littledale's "Plain Reasons Against Joining the Church of Rome." But that book, excellent though it is, does not indicate the strength of Father Ryder's mind and character, because Littledale was not an antagonist worthy of a great mind, nor were his "Plain Reasons" of sufficient weight to call forth the full power of an able man.

Father Ryder was an exceptional man. He was born in what might be called the later transition period in English ecclesiastical history, on the 3d of January, 1837. His father, George Dudley Ryder, was at that time a clergyman of the Church of England. His grandfather, Bishop Ryder, was the first evangelical to be promoted to the episcopate. Newman held him in great veneration.

Father Ryder's mother was a Miss Sargent, whose two sisters married Bishop Wilberforce and Dr. Manning respectively, the latter afterwards Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster.

Father Ryder's childhood was passed at his father's rectory at Easton, near Winchester. While he was yet a young boy his father resigned his living and made his submission to the Catholic Church. Father Ryder's life-long connection with Newman and the Oratory began as a private pupil, when he was about twelve years old. When he was nearly eighteen he wished to become a member of the Birmingham Oratory, but by his father's advice postponed action, and in the meantime spent a year at the English College in Rome and some months at the Catholic University in Dublin, of which Newman was Rector. In December, 1856, he began his Oratorian novitiate, and in 1863 he was ordained priest. He died October 7, 1907, the last survivor of those whose names are recorded at the end of the "Apologia." From boyhood he was in-

timately associated with Cardinal Newman, and succeeded him as Superior of the Oratorians.

Like many other able men, Father Ryder did not write much for publication. Of the ten essays in this volume eight have already appeared in other publications. The subjects treated are: "Spee, a Jesuit Reformer and Poet," "Revelations of the After-World," "Savonarola," "M. Emery, Superior of St. Sulpice," "Auricular Confession," "The Pope and the Anglican Archbishops," "Ritualism, Roman Catholicism and Converts," "On Certain Ecclesiastical Miracles," "The Ethics of War," "The Passion of the Past," "Some Memories of a Prison Chaplain," "Purcell's Life of Manning."

They are all excellent and tempt us to wish for more, but the two not previously published, namely, "Auricular Confession," written in 1899, and "Purcell's Life of Manning," written in 1896, merit special attention. In the former, after answering some attacks on the practice and answering some objections to it, he treats the subject historically, devoting special attention to our own Dr. Lea on the same subject. The last essay is the most interesting of all. Father Ryder was the pupil, the companion, the life-long friend and admirer of Cardinal Newman. But he was also the nephew of Cardinal Manning with all the love and loyalty that such a nephew should have for such an uncle. Surely no one could be found more able or better fitted to discuss Purcell's bungling. Cardinal Vaughan thought so, and hence invited Father Ryder to review "Manning's Life" for the "Dublin Review." He could not be tempted to depart from the fixed habit of reticence which he had always maintained in regard to the estrangement between Newman and Manning. He did, however, communicate his thoughts to a few intimate friends, who induced him to write them down, and the public is permitted to see them now for the first time. The universal verdict will be that it is a pity they did not appear sooner.

We have here a very full treatise and collection of instructions on Prayer and the Virtues and Vices. The first volume treats of Prayer in General, the Lord's Prayer, taking up each petition in turn and the Hail Mary.

The second volume treats of Faith, Hope and Charity, Sin, the Capital Sins in turn and the Beatitudes.

A COMPENDIUM OF CATECHETICAL INSTRUCTION. Edited by Rev. John Hagan, Vice Rector, Irish College, Rome. Two volumes. 8vo., pp. 527. Vol. I., On Prayer; Vol. II., On the Virtues and Vices. New York: Benziger Brothers.

This is the manner of treatment: First, the Roman Catechism is quoted in full, then follows the text of the Catechism of Pius X. and then several instructions by Raineri. The extent of the treatment may be learned by looking at the first chapter on Prayer in General. Here we have twenty pages from the Roman Catechism, two pages from the Catechism of Pius X. and four instructions by Raineri covering twenty-nine pages. fifty-three pages altogether devoted to Prayer in General. A better book of the kind could not be made. The Roman Catechism is a foundation that will last for all time, the Catechism of the present Holy Father, who has done so much to impress the importance of the study of the Catechism on the whole world, has a present special value that can hardly be exaggerated, and it may with equal truth be said that the instructions of Raineri cannot be surpassed for clearness, completeness and unction. If this book were read in Catholic families, a rapid growth in holiness would surely follow. If it were preached in Catholic pulpits, large, wakeful congregations would attend, and many conversions would be made.

LANDS OF THE SOUTHERN CROSS: A visit to South America. By Rev. Charles
Warren Currier, Ph. D., Washington, D. C. Spanish-American Publication Society. 12mo., cloth bound, pp. 400. About fifty illustrations.

The author writes from personal observation and study. He has recently returned from a voyage, almost around the South American continent, having represented the United States at the International Congress of Americanists at Buenos Aires, which was part of the programme of the Argentine centennial celebration of the anniversary of its independence.

The book deals with Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Colombia, Panama and the West Indies from many standpoints, and, incidentally, with Paraguay and Bolivia. The history, literature, inhabitants, buildings, manners and customs, as well as resources, industry and commerce of the various countries, all receive their share of attention. The author furnishes, moreover, many a practical hint to the traveler contemplating a journey to the Southern hemisphere.

He carries the reader with him along the greater portion of the Atlantic coast of South America, tarries for some time in the wonderful capital of the Argentine Republic and crosses the sublime Argentine-Chilean Cordilleras, passing through the newly constructed tunnel, 12,000 feet high. On the Pacific coast the old Spanish civilization is studied, together with the wonders of the Land of

the Incas. The return journey is made through the Canal Zone on the Isthmus and along some untrodden paths in the West Indies.

The work under consideration is a welcome addition to the general literature of South America, which, though increasing, is still scanty.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS IN THE ANCIENT CHURCH. A Study in the History of Dogma. By Dr. J. P. Kirsch, Professor of Patrology and Christian Archæology in the University of Freiburg (Switzerland). Translated with the author's permission by John R. McKee, of the Oratory. 12mo., pp. 272. St. Louis: B. Herder.

"The treatise on the Communion of Saints now presented to the reader in an English translation, although written some ten years ago, seems singularly useful at the present time. In such works as 'Les saints successeurs des dieux," by M. P. Saintyves, and M. Solomon Reinach's "Orpheus," the attempt is made to trace the beliefs and practices connected with this article of the creed to a pagan origin. The best answer to this attack on an integral portion of the Catholic creed is to be found in the representation of the facts as they present themselves to a frank and intelligent investigator such as Professor Kirsch. His treatise is so simple in construction and so plain in its conclusion that any description of its method and contents is superfluous. In the face of the assertions made by the writers named above, it is surely desirable that all, both Catholics and non-Catholics, should have placed before them so excellent a restatement of the Church's faith concerning the Communion of Saints as Dr. Kirsch has here given us."

It is a hopeful sign that this doctrine is attracting more attention even in the Protestant world, is beginning to be better understood and more widely practiced and that the saints are gradually coming to possess the kingdom from which they seemed all but entirely banished in the sixteenth century.

CHARACTER-GLIMPSES OF MOST REV. WILLIAM HENRY ELDER, D. D., Second Archishop of Cincinnati, 12mo., pp. 181. Illustrated. New York: Pustet & Co.

Cardinal Gibbons' epigraph at the beginning of this volume would be sufficient justification for its publication, even if we did not know anything more of the subject. His Eminence says: "Archbishop Elder was the glory of the Priesthood and the ornament of the Episcopate which he adorned for nearly fifty years by his apostolic life." The book itself is made up almost entirely

of correspondence, but of such a varied nature and so well chosen as to give an excellent picture of the boy and man and indisputable proof of his real goodness. The first was written by him to his younger brother Charles, when the writer was thirteen years old and a student at Mount St. Mary's College in 1832. The last was a reply to some inquiries of a Protestant clergyman, dated September 2, 1904. The whole collection, written to persons of different ages and stations of life, in time of sorrow, joy or doubt, discussing questions of faith, morality, doctrine and political economy, furnishes a valuable contribution to American ecclesiastical biography and gives splendid examples of epistolary literature, well worthy of imitation.

The editor, who remains hidden, is to be heartily congratulated on the success of the work.

THE LIVES OF THE POPES IN THE MIDDLE AGES. By Rev. Horace K. Mann. Vol. VII., 1073-1099. Vol. VIII., 1099-1133. St. Louis: B. Herder.

It is most gratifying to the Catholic reviewer to be able to announce two such admirable books on the Papacy as this and Pastor's history by two such sterling and competent historians and covering so many full years. They treat of two very important periods, and supplementing each other as they do, they place before us a wealth of Catholic truth that is abundant and an array of facts that are irresistible. It is only a comparatively short time since we were dependent almost entirely on Protestant authors for this history. Some of them were blindly prejudiced and incompetent and unscrupulous; others were earnest, studious and truthful, as far as their circumstances would permit; but none of them could write true Catholic history in the full sense, because only a Catholic can see things from the Catholic point of view, and that is essential to truth. Dr. Mann's work is making remarkable progress, and he is bringing to the making of each volume that same enthusiasm, learning, zeal and courage which marked him in the beginning as the man for the work. It is a most valuable acquisition to Catholic history.

This is an important work on a very interesting subject, and it will attract widespread attention. The author gives every evidence

THE DAWN OF MODERN ENGLAND. Being a History of the Reformation in England. 1509-1525. By Carlos B. Lumsden, Barrister-at-Law. 12mo., pp. 303. New York and London: Longmans, Green & Co.

of the scholarly, zealous and fair historian who earnestly seeks for the truth, and his assurance that his work is the result of several years of toil was hardly necessary. It is his intention to continue the work down to the execution of Charles I. in 1649, and this, of course, will require many more volumes. Those who examine this volume will wish him health and life to continue.

# THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC

# QUARTERLY REVIEW

"Contributors to the QUARTERLY will be allowed all proper freedom in the expression of their thoughts outside the domain of defined doctrines, the REVIEW not holding itself responsible for the individual opinions of its contributors."

(Extract from Salutatory, July, 1890.)

VOL. XXXVI.—OCTOBER, 1911—No. 144.

## THE SECOND MARTYRDOM OF MARY STUART.

T IS a remarkable coincidence that the cause for the beatificaits announcement, be the signal for the beginning of a fresh campaign of calumny, all over the English-speaking world, respecting her character. Were the movers in this discreditable business persons who possessed any respect for the Catholic processes of beatification and canonization, one might give them credit for a right motive in zealously guarding the great posthumous honors of the Church from profanation. In her lifetime Mary was accused by her Calvinistic enemies in Scotland as being privy to or having prompted the murder of her husband, Lord Darnley; but after due trial was cleared of all blame. She was afterwards accused of having loved Earl Bothwell while his first wife was living. The charge has been sifted, and, duress having been shown, she is found blameless in that matter, too. Now she is being tried once more. The mode in which this cruel injustice is being wrought is inexpressibly detestable. It is not enough that this Queen of many woes paid with her life for the crime of having offended the crowned embodiment of English Protestant malice, but her memory must be blackened and her crown of womanly honor sought to be torn from her brows by heartless defamers who hate her for her virtues and gloat over the memory of her misfortunes as so many fitting punishments for the crime of opposing the march of Presbyterian Protestantism in her dominions. For that temerity she will never be forgiven by the followers of Calvin who write in the press. "She was accused of murder and adultery," re-

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marked "The Independent" recently; but the writer omitted (inadvertently, let us hope) to mention that she was tacitly acquitted of both charges. The chief defamers of the unfortunate Queen, in modern days, have been James Anthony Froude and a swarm of lesser lights of English literature; in earlier years Friedrich von Raumer, a Prussian aristocrat and diplomatist, who wrote a "History of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries" and other ambitious works of an historical and biographical character. strong Protestant bias ran through his writings, as may well be expected, considering his nativity and religious and political training. Robert Buchanan, a Scottish historian of Mary's own epoch, was another of those whose religious bias helped to darken the Queen's reputation. On the other hand, Dr. Robertson, a Scotch Protestant historian, and Miss Agnes Strickland, another Protestant one, deeply read and most painstaking in their researches, gave Mary fair treatment in their historical works. Mr. Andrew Lang, who is also a most painstaking investigator of such matters, has examined all the State papers connected with Queen Mary's life, imprisonment, trial and death, and made out a strong case for the exoneration of the ill-fated lady from the dreadful charges leveled at her by her bitter enemies. But there seems to be an unappeasable intention to maintain the guilt of the royal lady, right or wrong, on the part of some Protestant writers—all the more malignant since the question of beatification was raised and acted on in a preliminary way. A vile play called "Sir Walter Raleigh" is one of the agencies now being employed to sustain the thesis that the Queen was a thoroughly bad woman and one who ought to be consigned to excoriation and infamy rather than given the honors of saintship. This play is being put on the stage in all the principal theatres of Great Britain and Ireland. It arouses the long-dormant fires of sectarian hate wherever it is presented, and is bitterly resented by the Catholic portion of the population as a gross insult to the Catholic religion. All the villainous inventions of Froude and other defamers of the Oueen were accepted as gospel truth by the authors of this calumnious play, and are nightly presented in action on the stage. Whole passages have been taken bodily from Froude by the anonymous author or authors—for the writers had not the courage to give their names to the farrago. Now, of Froude another English historian whose name is a synonym for scholarship and impartiality, Mr. Freeman, the author of "The Norman Conquest" and other great historical works, said that "he was a man of talent and learning, but was afflicted with an incurable habit of mendacity, and his mind was so twisted that he could not bring

himself to tell the truth, even if he had the wish to do so." These are the strongest words that one historian could write of another, and they were written deliberately, and no one ever thought of interposing on behalf of the man whom they consigned to infamy as an incurable and chronic falsifier and liar.

Father Ambrose Coleman, O. P., having had his attention called to the offensive and unjust things attributed to Queen Mary and her religion in the play of "Sir Walter Raleigh," denounced it as a plagiarism (for the most part) from Froude's malignant "history." He wrote a lengthy refutation of its principal falsehoods for "The Catholic Times," of London.

In opening his subject he said: "Froude labors in his history of the trial and execution of Mary Queen of Scots to prove two things which are not only untrue, but are most distasteful and horrifying to the feelings of Catholics. These two points, too, are brought out in the play 'Sir Walter Raleigh.' First, that the Pope and the Jesuits and other priests were implicated in plots against Elizabeth's life. 'The assassination of Elizabeth,' he says, 'was the first idea of the most devout of Catholic priests.' Again: 'The original instigator (of the Babington plot) appears to have been John Ballard, one of the two Jesuits who had sought and obtained the sanction of Gregory XIII. to the Oueen's murder.' Secondly, that Mary Queen of Scots was a criminal, irreligious, a hypocrite and a participator in plots against Elizabeth. 'She was a bad woman,' he says, 'disguised in the livery of a martyr, and if in any sense she was suffering for her religion it was because she had shown herself capable of those detestable crimes which in the sixteenth century appeared to be the proper fruits of it.' He also says that 'it would be affectation to credit her with a genuine feeling of religion.' We cannot read Froude's account of Mary's execution without thinking he must have been actuated by diabolical malice in penning it. Every step she took, every word she uttered at that awful moment, is twisted by him into a proof of her hypocrisy. 'She died with a lie upon her lips,' he says. Mr. Arthur Innes, in his 'England Under the Tudors,' published in 1905, says: 'Mr. Froude is dramatically at his best in telling the story, but his partisan bias is correspondingly emphasized.' It is well to have the opinion of a Protestant historian on Froude, though he puts it very mildly. We may say on our part that Froude, though dramatically at his best in this account, is historically at his worst, that calumny of the living. But in spite of Froude's calumnies, the memory of Mary Queen of Scots is still a cherished heirloom to the Catholics of these isles and far beyond."

The charge that Mary had been guilty of murder related to the blowing up of the residence known as Kirk o' Field, outside Edinburgh walls. There was a ruined church or chapel close by the house, and a churchyard. A passage called Thieves' Row ran just outside the city wall and up to Darnley's house, which had an exit on the sinister-named alley. Lord Darnley had been occupying the house near the ruined church, which had been fitted up for him by the Oueen, while staying in Edinburgh awaiting the baptism of their son (afterwards King James I. of Great Britain and VI. of Scotland). The great Scottish lords hated Darnley, because they suspected that he was secretly laboring with the Catholic lords in England to undo Knox's reformation work in Scotland by means of a combination of forces on the border land between the two kingdoms. There had been estrangement between the Queen and her husband ever since the murder of David Rizzio, her secretary, in which outrage Darnley was by slanderous tongues reported to have been implicated. But the real cause of the coolness would appear to be the rough and disrespectful demeanor of Darnley towards the royal lady his wife. Roughness and wild behavior were common characteristics of the Scottish nobles at that illiterate period, it is pretty generally admitted. Many instances of it are found in Scott's novels, as well as in the more formal Scottish histories. Faction fighting, abductions and cattle rieving were, along with hunting the deer, the great pastimes of the Highland chiefs. The age was crude in most European countries, but in Scotland it was in many respects barbarous, because of the feuds of the great houses. Mr. Andrew Lang, by his vivid picture of what Queen Mary found it when she landed from the deck of a French ship, enables one to fancy what sort of a bed of roses the dainty royal lady, brought up amid all the luxury and elegance of the French Court, was called to when fate brought her the Scottish crown. Knox and his iconoclasts had been at work before her arrival, and the results are thus depicted by Mr.

"Mary rode through a land of new-made ruins, black with fire, not yet green with ivy. On every side wherever monks had lived and labored and dealt alms and written manuscripts desolation met Mary's eyes. The altars were desecrated, the illumined manuscripts were burned, the religious skulked in lay dress or had fled to France, or stood under the showers of missiles on the pillory. It was a land of fallen fanes and of stubborn blind keeps with scarce a window that she passed through, with horse and litter, lace and gold and velvet, troops of gallants and girls. In the black tall Tolbooth lurked the engines of torture that were to strain or crush

the limbs of Bothwell's Lambs. Often must Mary have seen on the skyline the gallows tree and the fruits which that tree bore and the flocking ravens; one of that company followed Darnley and her from Glasgow, and perched ominous on the roof of Kirk o' Field, croaking loudly on the day of the murder. So writes Nau, Mary's secretary, informed, probably, by one of her attendants."

As to Edinburgh itself, when long after Mary's time that cluster of tall rookeries was known by the suggestive appellation of "Auld Reekie" because of its foul smells, what must have been its sanitary and unsightly condition two centuries earlier? Mr. Lang gives some idea of its savage characteristics:

"The monasteries of the Franciscans and Dominicans lay on either side of St. Mary in the Fields or Kirk o' Field, with its college quadrangle and wide gardens. But in Mary's day the monastic buildings and several churches lay in ruins owing to the recent reform of the Christian religion and to English invaders. The palaces of the Cowgate and the Canongate were the homes of the nobles; the wynds were crowded with burgesses, tradesmen, 'prentices and the throng of artisans. These were less godly than the burgesses—were a fickle and fiery mob, ready to run for spears or use their tools to defend their Mayday sport of Robin Hood against the preachers and the Bible-loving middle class. Brawls were common, the artisans besieging the Magistrates in the Tolbooth, or the rival followings of two lairds or lords coming to pistol shots or swordstrokes on the causeway, while burgesses handed spears to their friends from the windows. Among popular pleasures were the stake, at which witches and murderesses of masters or husbands were burned; and the pillory, where every one might throw what came handy at a Catholic priest, and the pits in the Norloch, where fornicators were ducked. The town gates were adorned with spikes, on which were impaled the heads of sinners against the law."

It is important that account be taken of these general conditions of the Scottish capital and Scottish society, as well as of the whole moral atmosphere of Scotland, as affected by the Calvinistic upheaval, at the period under survey. In especial it ought to be noted that magic and witchcraft loomed largely in the life of that dark period, and lent a lurid horror to the many tragic dramas that were enacted before fawning pedantic judges and under the forbidding roofs of structures like the Tolbooth of "Auld Reekie," which was likewise known as "The Heart of Mid-Lothian." Scott pictures some of them in his stories dealing with "Bonnie Dundee" and the Covenanters and the rieving Highland caterans and the

dark superstitions and eerie rites of the fierce clansmen as they prepared for war. These conditions being duly weighed and absorbed, it will not be difficult to comprehend why the name and fame of Mary Stuart became clouded in course of time and why it proved so easy to get up a prejudice against her so intense and unpitying as to consign her memory to infamy without any demand for the real facts on which so cruel a verdict had been found.

The murder that is referred to in the charge against Queen Mary was that of her second husband, Lord Henry Darnley, a son of the Earl of Lennox. The motive for this crime, her enemies allege, was revenge for the murder of her secretary, David Rizzio. This murder was instigated by Darnley, as some historians say, because of jealousy of the favor which the Oueen had shown towards the secretary. The murder, and all the papers relative to it that could be procured, were inquired into by a commission of the Scotch Lords at Edinburgh, and subsequently by a commission of English Lords at Westminster, and nothing reliable to connect the Queen in any way with the foul deed was forthcoming. Bothwell was accused of having been one of a group of Lords who had signed a "band"—or entered into a conspiracy, to which each put his signature—to kill Darnley. The legal process against Bothwell was formally opened in the law courts in Edinburgh in the April following the murder (February, 1567). Lord Lennox, in evident dread lest some matter injurious to his son's own reputation should be revealed at the inquiry, tried to have the process put off, and Queen Elizabeth sent a special request to the same end. But the Queen of Scots was firm in her determination to have the crime fully investigated and the criminals brought to justice. The "process" accordingly opened. It began on April 12, and as a result of the investigations Bothwell was "cleansed," according to the legal phraseology of the time, and Lord Huntly and other nobles who were accused along with him of complicity in a conspiracy had their lands restored to them by decree of Parliament. On the same night there was a meeting of several noblemen and ecclesiastics at Ainslie's tavern in Edinburgh, at which there was another "band" entered into, declaring that as Bothwell is, and has been judicially found, innocent of Darnley's death, the signatories bind themselves to defend his (Bothwell's) course and advance his marriage with Queen Mary.

It is wholly untrue to state, as "The Independent" did not hesitate to state, that the Queen of Scots was "accused of murder." Her name did not appear in any legal or official reference to the assassination of her husband; neither was there any reference to that tragedy when, much later on, she was formally accused, by

Elizabeth's orders, of conspiracy against her life and power, while a prisoner in one of her strongholds and a discrowned and friendless Queen. By what warranty is such a frigthtful accusation made? On the rambling, unsifted, self-contradictory and transparently malignant gossip of the "historian," George Buchanan, a contemporary writer, and the swarm of scandalmongers, but bad story-tellers, who furnished most of the materials for the Lennox MSS. Scotland was not the only country wherein at that time the pen of the scandalmonger was to him more than a purse of gold. With the "Reformation" wave there was swept in a vast shoal of sharks who settled down to gorge themselves on the mass of putrid defamation about the Old Church and its adherents and champions that had been sedulously garnered and tended by earlier writers, as if in anticipation of the advent of a ready market and a greedy demand. The Scottish capital was the chief storm centre of religious fury for many years, and pen and press were continuously busy in supplying the pabulum that was most desiderated by the fierce assailants of the old order. Buchanan wrote a narrative on the subject of Darnley's murder, which he called the "Detection." The story is a mass of falsehoods and concoctions, so clumsy as to make one wonder how he had the effrontery to publish some of them in view of what had been published to prove they were inventions, between the time when they were written by him and the time that the pretended events which he related were denied in public by some of those who participated in the murder, as they were being led to the gallows or the stake, to suffer torture and death for their crime. Buchanan's story of the behavior of Mary and Bothwell and Darnley, prior to and shortly after the murder of the latter, paints Mary in a light as infamous as any of the wicked women of Scripture or the Italian romances. Not Jezebel or Messalina or Catherine de Medici, not even Ninon de l'Enclos, wickedest of all women, could compare to Mary in the openness and shamelessness of her infidelity to her husband while he lay ill at Kirk o' Field. Such would appear to be the case, according to Buchanan. Mary was accused by other slanderers of the appalling design of getting rid of both her husband and her child. A volume called "The Book of Articles," a companion one to Buchanan's "Detection," says that she determined while at Craigmillar to get rid of both her husband and her son by murder. At the time she was said to have been planning this unnatural crime the State papers show that she was writing to Archbishop Beaton in Paris asking him to endeavor to have the honor of the titular captaincy of the Scots Guard in France conferred upon her son by the French sovereign. Lord Lennox, Darnley's father, in his MSS. accusations, says that the Queen went to Stirling, in the April following Darnley's murder, in order to

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see her son and to try to poison him. Is it likely that if the Queen could possibly be so steeped in unnatural sin as to think of such a crime she would entrust the knowledge of it to anybody about the Court? Lennox was himself the victim of self-poison when he penned the dreadful accusation. He hated the Oueen with a ferocity that left him powerless to perceive that he was writing rank nonsense that no man of common understanding would believe. How far this man was answerable for the folly that had brought down vengeance upon his son's head it is not possible in the meagre knowledge of their intercourse, at that lamentable period, to pronounce an opinion. Yet anybody who goes through the manuscripts that he has left must conclude that he was an evil adviser at that critical time to a young man who had offended the Queen as he had done, in many inexcusable ways, and who was by nature singularly obstinate, irascible and self-opinionated, as all authorities agree that Darnley was.

In the consideration of the problems of this tragic story the reader should not leave out of sight the fact of Mary's position as a royal personage who had duties and responsibilities, of a very important and delicate nature at times, to discharge. She was obliged to maintain and defend the rights of the Scottish Crown, and any attempt to infringe upon these, or offer her own person indignity, was punishable, by Scottish law, as in the case of the English Crown, too, as treason—a crime demanding the death penalty as well as precedent torture.

There is not the slightest doubt but that Darnley was the prime mover in the plot to assassinate the Queen's Italian secretary, David Rizzio. His mind had been filled with vengeful thoughts by the talk of his rough companions about the intimacy-criminal intimacy they disloyally represented it to be-between the Queen and the talented foreigner. It was enough that both were Catholics -Papists-children of the Scarlet Woman that sat upon the seven hills at Rome. It is the law of England to-day that criminal intimacy with a Queen, even at her own solicitation, is high treason. Similar severities were prescribed in the Scottish law, save in regard to the matter of consent. It was also treasonable to slander the reputation of the sovereign, male or female. Yet during Mary's reign the most infamous calumnies were spread by her enemies concerning her conduct with various men of her Court and Council -Rizzio, Darnley (before the marriage), Bothwell, Lethington and some others. Darnley himself before his death had given out the most shocking slander concerning the Queen, his wife, that any person in the form of a man could utter-that is to say, if Lennox, his crafty and ambitious father, can be, in any statement

whatever, relied on. Lennox says that Darnley, his son, told him that shortly before the birth of his son the Queen had advised him to take a mistress, and said if possible to let the mistress be Lady Moray, because she hated that nobleman, and if he, her husband, could make him "wear horns," she (Mary) "would never love him the worse" (for it). The lengths to which the Scottish nobles of that era were prepared to go in vilification of this unhappy Catholic lady were simply astounding. Darnley himself was one of the most reckless of these lawbreakers. His conduct with regard to Rizzio's slaughter was that of a vulgar bravo and cutthroat, rather than a King, as he pretended he was. He got up a blood band with the other lords whom he secured to do the actual butchery. The document is extant. It is entitled a "Band of Assurance for Murder," and is cited by Goodall, one of the contemporary chroniclers. In it Darnley guaranteed his allies and accomplices against the blood-feud of the "great persons," these meaning, Mr. Lang thinks, the Earls Bothwell, Atholl and Huntly. "The deed," it proceeds to say, may chance to be done in presence of the Queen's Majesty, within her palace of Holyrood House. The preamble goes to show that it was believed that the murder she would be compelled to witness, as in Rizzio's case, might in her pregnant condition cause her to die from shock. In any event, she was to be morally disgraced. Mr. Lang denounces the barbarous ruffianism of these noble traitors with an earnestness that proves the depth of an honest indignation at so great a disgrace being put upon the Scottish name by unmanly and cowardly brutes —as these conspirators undoubtedly were, every single one of them. "So unscrupulous were Mary's foes," he writes, "that Cecil told De Foix, the French Ambassador in London, how Rizzio had been slain in Mary's arms; reginam nefario stupro polluens. Cecil well knew that this was a lie; and it is natural to disbelieve every statement of a convicted liar and traitor like Darnley." Darnley then had used those abominable words regarding his beautiful and pious Catholic wife, Mary Stuart! Could the depth of masculine degeneracy have any lower level than this?

Jealousy is a maddening aberration, making those who are stirred by the passion so irrational that they know no restraint in word or deed. Darnley had been made jealous by the tales of the crew who were spying upon the Queen, his wife, black-hearted villains, ever on the watch to find some movement of hers that would furnish a seeming ground for inference of an evil intent behind it. The incident of the handkerchief in the play of "Othello" well illustrates the ease with which the most innocent act in all the world may be translated into a trick of dissembling lasciviousness,

watching its opportunities for indulgence. Every word and act of Queen Mary's at this period of her life were secretly noted and transmitted by the spies to the treacherous Cecil, the ancestor of the late Marquis of Salisbury; and we have seen how the story lost nothing in the transmission when it came to be told again by the villain who paid for it. Later on it was Walsingham who hired the spies and transmitted their information to the deadly enemy of Mary Stuart, the poison-fanged Elizabeth Tudor. spy system was initiated by the Protestant nobles at the Scottish Court, and John Knox, the foaming, frothing reformer and iconoclast, had no small share in its introduction. Darnley's motives. however detestable, are at least intelligible. But what excuse can be offered for the malevolence of men like George Buchanan for the concoction of tales so horrible as they pieced together to destroy the reputation of their lawful sovereign? What imaginations must they have had, when they could actually describe on paper, as if they had been eye-witnesses of the scene, what took place between the Queen and Bothwell, when they surreptitiously met at Alloa and Stirling and sundry other rendezvous, to give rein to their lawless passion for each other (according to these inventors) before the marriage which Bothwell forced on her when she was his prisoner. Buchanan is bold enough to say that the Queen became sick from excessive indulgence of this criminal passion. He undertakes to utter this odious calumny without offering a particle of proof in support of it. To whom would either of the guilty parties, had there been an iota of truth in the statement, confide so awful a secret?

Mary was "accused of adultery and murder," as "The Independent" charges, but who accused her and what was the verdict? She was never formally accused by any responsible tribunal, but she was made the object of vile attacks by a cowardly crew of moral assassins because she professed and practiced the religion they detested and sought to destroy. Mr. Lang, an honest Protestant investigator, has analyzed the whole story, and found her to be a wronged woman. He sums up the reasons they had for their hate, and they are cogent ones, it will be seen.

Bothwell, the Machiavelli in the tragic story of Mary Stuart was a typical Scot in the realm of adventure. He was of the clan Hepburn—a sort of Young Lochinvar in matters of love, and a sort of Ballie Nicol Jarvie in matters of business. Having been born and brought up on the matchless military training ground, Nature's academy, so to speak, the Scottish Border, he would have been a phenomenon had he not been a good fighter. The Hepburns had been from time imprescriptible pirates, smugglers, free-

booters and men who loved not the tribe of gaugers and excisemen. James Hepburn, the Bothwell of Oueen Mary's time, was a "canny Scot," as regards party and religion, in the truest sense of that term. He was alternately on the side of the upper and the under dogs, as the far-flung conflict between Catholic and Huguenot, Puritan and Pope's man, swayed up and down, hither and thither, as the strength of either party rose or fell for the time being. Young Hepburn was a soldier in the service of Mary of Guise, as Scottish Regent, and saw some tough fighting when she fell out with the Protestant Lords of the Congregation. He tried to "feather his nest" in the campaign, as the diary of the siege of Leith shows. He is shown to have been very active in robbing peaceful traders and travelers in the neighborhood. He was one of those who condemned the Earl of Arran (in contumacy) to death as being the cause of the Protestant rebellion in Scotland. He captured Cockburn of Ormiston, who was conveying English gold to the Lords of the Congregation—and incidentally, it may be inferred, "assimilated" the booty for himself. The Cockburns, in retaliation, attacked his castle at Crichton, and sacked it, but he contrived to get away beyond their reach. He challenged the Earl of Arran to single combat, but that worthy had not much stomach for fighting, and left Bothwell to swagger as cock of the walk. Bothwell was sent by the Regent Mary to ask help from France, and on the journey he carried away Anna Throndssön, a Norwegian lady, to whom he had been betrothed, and after a little while deserted her. Then he was married privately, or became "handfasted" to the widow of Sir Walter Scott of Buccleugh, Janet Beaton, niece of Cardinal Beaton, who is described by Scott in "The Lady of the Lake" as the Wizard Lady of Branxholme. This lady was afterwards charged, when the murder of Darnley was being investigated, as one of those who had helped Bothwell to win the heart of Queen Mary by means of her magic arts. Later it was reported that the doughty Bothwell had no fewer than three wives all living, but only one of these, Lady Jane Gordon, sister of Earl Huntly, was known to have been legally married. Scottish marriage laws were, and are still, the loosest in all the world, as the trial of the Yelverton case in Dublin many years ago abundantly proved. Bothwell would appear to have had a winning way, notwithstanding a certain domineering and bullying manner, with the fair sex; and must have had a tongue like that of Richard Earl of Gloucester, who boasted that he could "wheedle with the devil" by means of it, when he could get out of the scrapes of - cosmopolitan marital entanglements so easily as he is shown to have done. The forger was no less busy, at that time, with his

false pen than the slanderer with his false tongue. A number of documents, contained in a casket, were relied on by the defamers of Queen Mary to show that she was as evil in her heart as they endeavored to prove her by fabricated stories of her conduct. Mr. Lang has carefully gone through these and found that forgery was artfully mixed with the genuine handwriting of the Queen to establish the charge that there was guilt in her relations with Bothwell before that masterful adventurer succeeded in getting her into his power to terrorize her into glutting his traitorous ambition.

Mary Stuart's lot was to be slandered horribly during her whole lifetime, once she had passed her girlhood. Slander was the grand hedonism of the age, and in the courts of royalty it held especial high revel. The fact that the young Queen persisted in her attachment to the old religion, which was the special object of the Reformers' slanders, was per se a reason why venomous tongues and pens should make of her life a target. Mr. Lang says that while Bothwell was in France it was reported of him that he spread a story regarding Queen Mary the most frightful that an evil mind could conceive. She was branded as having entered into incestuous relations with her uncle. Cardinal Beaton. The Reformers had evidently been reading the Italian romancists, the story of the Cenci, and the legends of the Borgia gens. The extreme Protestants, who clamored for the blood of all "idolators," as they styled the Catholics, by making an alliance with the political chiefs in Scotland, were at that time led by two very able but slippery tacticians, Earls Moray and Lethington, who both entertained the grand hope of seeing the crowns of England and Scotland united in Queen Mary or her issue. But when they had the plan for a meeting of the two Oueens well under way they found them all awry when it came to the point of getting Elizabeth to designate Mary as her successor. Elizabeth regarded the proposal as tantamount to one asking her to sign her own death warrant. Neither would she listen to any proposals for marriage for either herself or Mary Stuart. Marriage was utterly repugnant to Elizabeth's scheme of life; she desired perfect freedom for all her actions and her volatile affections, or passions. Hence Moray and Lethington found their assiduous labors of love to be completely fruitless, so far as the British Queen was concerned; and in a short time afterwards the Scottish Queen, after pardoning the treason of Earl Lennox, had seen and admired his son, Henry, Lord Darnley, who was as a Catholic hated by the greater number of Scotch nobles of the more powerful order, who were almost to a man Knoxite Calvinists.

Mary gave desperate umbrage to all these by marrying Darnley.

despite their threats; and they resented the step by assembling in arms, at the instigation of her cousin Elizabeth. Mary gave to Bothwell, about the same time, the high post of Border Governor, to which Darnley's father, Lennox, aspired; and this angered Darnley, who, with all his handsome person, had the small mind that denotes men born not to govern, but to sulk and conspire. this juncture the trouble about the Queen's Italian secretary, David Rizzio, began to agitate the circle at Holyrood, and to make matters more disagreeable to Darnley, the Queen granted a pardon to the Hamiltons, who had been in rebellion and were as much detested by the Lennox folks as any intruding foreign favorites could be. Then Darnley's father, Lennox, who had had to seek pardon for his own treason, began to stir up discontent against the Queen's rule and insidiouly throw out hints, at first dark, then open, in regard to their sovereign's honor. David Rizzio was accused of having secured from the Queen the pardon for the Hamiltons, and that was enough for the ambitious Lennoxes, who themselves aspired to the crown of Scotland. The "Book of Articles," put in against Mary at the time of the investigation into Darnley's murder, in Edinburgh, was substantially an indictment, clause by clause, and the charges were supplied mainly by Lennox. grand object aimed at by that scheming traitor was to prove a motive in Mary's mind for the removal of her husband, his son, by murder, and that motive was her criminal passion for Bothwell. She it was, according to this archdefamer, who contrived, in coöperation with her guilty lover, to have Darnley brought to Edinburgh for treatment when he was ill, and arranged to have the house blown up, after she had failed in a plan to have him removed by poison. Mary was further charged with having tried to induce Bothwell to get rid of his wife (Lady Jane Gordon), of whom she was said to be intensely jealous, by poison. Lang is enabled to declare, from comparison of the letters cited in the "Book af Articles," with Lennox's infamous charges, that the author had access to Cecil's "Journal"—he goes so far, indeed, as to conjecture that it was one and the same hand that wrote both these alleged proofs of Mary's guilt—proofs which frequently contradict in one sentence what is alleged in a previous or subsequent one. These documents are freely mentioned in the records of the respective commissions which examined the facts as to Darnley's murder, both in Edinburgh and Westminster, but there was never any actual trial of the case, inasmuch as Elizabeth acted with such duplicity that Mary would not agree to recognize her right to jurisdiction or to sanction the procedure that was proposed to her by Elizabeth's malevolent emissaries and go-betweens.

There was a mass of manuscripts relative to the case that was sufficient to bewilder the most clear-headed and patient. Mr. Lang has gone very sedulously over the most important portions of this, and he has shown that the hand of the forger had been so cleverly employed in the work of blackening Mary's character as to make the investigator almost ready to "Doubt Truth to be a liar," in the words of the love-distraught wooer of Ophelia. So much for the imputation that because the Queen of Scots was accused of murder she was, therefore, to be held guilty of the foul crime. She was ready to face those who invented the accusation, but they were not allowed by Elizabeth to go into proof of their charges—no doubt for the most excellent of reasons.

As for the other imputation, that she was accused of adultery, the facts relied on by Mr. Lang are, in several particulars, entirely at variance with the theory of Mary's guilt, in relation to Bothwell. They show that Bothwell was supported by many of the Scotch nobles, and in fact urged to seize the Oueen and use force to coerce her to marry him, after he had gotten a divorce from his wife, Lady Jane Gordon-which he did, on the ground of a consanguinity which was not discovered when he had made application for a license to marry that lady. There is no doubt whatever that Bothwell's designs against his beautiful sovereign were as brutal and merciless as those of Tarquin toward Lucretia, and that he was aided and abetted in that foul treason by a large number of the semi-savage Scotch nobles—the same crew who murdered David Rizzio in her presence and when she was advanced in pregnancy, with the hideous design that thereby her unborn offspring might be killed or rendered idiotic—a design that in King James' regard seemed not to have been altogether a failure, for he never could bear, it is said, the sight of a sword being pulled from its scabbard, and was not remarkable for any intellectual ability, save in theological subtleties and love of tedious controversy.

Three weeks before the Queen's confinement she was represented by Lennox (says Buchanan's "Detection") as trying to induce Darnley to make love to Lady Moray and make her his mistress, for the mere purpose of gratifying the Queen's dislike of Moray, and making him, as she is reported as saying, "wear horns." Darnley told this story, not only to his father, Lennox, but to a servant of his. The idea of a woman on the eve of a crisis that might end in death conceiving such a grotesquely horrible plot against her own marital right and honor is the perfection, surely, of clumsy malice in invention.

"Whatever Mary's feelings toward Darnley," says Mr. Lang, in

discussing this sickening slander, "when making an inventory of her jewels for bequests in case she and her child both died, she left her husband a number of beautiful objects, including the red enamel ring with which he wedded her. Whatever her feelings toward Moray, she lodged him and Argyll in the Castle during her labor. 'Huntly and Bothwell would also have lodged there, but were refused.' (Robertson's 'Inventories' is the authority relied on.) Sir James Melville (writing in old age) declares that Huntly and Lesley, Bishop of Ross, 'envied the favor that the Queen showed unto the Earl of Moray,' and wished her to 'put him in ward,' as dangerous. Melville dissuaded Mary from this course, and she admitted Moray to the Castle, while rejecting Huntly and Bothwell." Melville was no friend of Mary's in early life; he wrote this of her in his old age. Was this the conduct of a vile wanton or that of a noble Christian lady, on the verge of the greatest trial a woman has to face in life? Moray was, so far from being objectionable to the Queen, deep in her favor at that very time, so much so that she confided to him the dangerous secret that the Pope had sent her money. She well knew, at the same time, that Darnley was intriguing against her because of her favor toward Moray, and was trying to get pressure brought to bear on her to have George Douglas, Darnley's henchman in the Rizzio assassination, pardoned and allowed to return from exile. Mary's passion for Bothwell began, according to Lennox, almost at the moment when she had recovered from the pangs and troubles of her accouchement. She had illicit intercourse with him at the very same time as he was being thwarted by her in his and Darnley's plots to ruin Moray and Lethington, the Secretary of State. Mary, according to Buchanan, incontinently went off to Alloa, along with Bothwell and his "crew of pirates," and joined in disgraceful reveling there with them. Touching this same period, Lennox gives a different story. He says she went to Stirling "before her month," when even women of low degree keep to the house, and "took her pleasure in most uncomely manner, arraied in homely sort, dancing about the market cross of the town." Evidently Buchanan and Lennox are "Arcades ambo" on this subject—liars both.

Mary and Darnley and Moray and Bothwell went a-hunting in Meggetdale, and Mary went to work to reconcile all parties, but she and Darnley had a furious quarrel, and he set spies to keep surveillance over her conduct. It was at this period (September, 1566) that Buchanan, probably inspired by Lennox, makes the intrigue between the Queen and Bothwell take a criminal turn. The Queen was in Edinburgh, working at the budget and finance in the Exchequer House. There was a pleasant garden in the rear of that building, and a chamber where the Queen took her rest after this tedious labor was over for the day. Into this apartment Bothwell gained entrance through the treachery of an attendant, Lady Reres, where he overcame Mary's virute by force. "She was betrayed into his hands by Lady Reres," wrote Buchanan. Later on the same credible historian alleges that Mary, while a prisoner of Bothwell's, was induced to consent to marry him by reason of the fact that he had forcibly violated her. If the Queen had had any guilty love for the brutish noble, why should he be driven to the disgraceful extremity of forcing that which was already his by guilty consent?

Similarly with regard to the wounding of Bothwell by a Border robber, Buchanan avers that she rode like a madwoman to Hermitage, his residence, when she heard of the matter, and on her return to Jedburgh to prepare for his reception there she got sick because of their excessive indulgence in their passion—a very singular line of behavior for a very sick man and a very anxious woman, as Mary is represented to have been at the time. Mr. Lang says:

"All this is false. Mary stayed at least five days in Jedburgh before she rode to Hermitage, whither, says Nau (her secretary), Moray accompanied them. She fell ill on October 17—a week before Bothwell's arrival at Jedburgh. On October 25 she was despaired of, and some thought she had passed away. Bothwell arrived in a letter about October 25. These were no fit circumstances for 'their old pastime,' which 'they took so openly, as they seemed to fear nothing more than lest their wickedness should be unknown."

At the precise time that Buchanan was penning such atrocious calumnies about his Queen the French Ambassador, Du Croc, was writing to his sovereign about her thus: "I never saw Her Majesty so much beloved, esteemed and honored." (October 17.)

Mr. Lang takes very great pains to show that Buchanan's accusations, as well as Lennox's, are in many important particulars utterly worthless as historical evidence as to the private life of Queen Mary, yet he treats other portions of the same writers' statements as evidently deserving of serious attention as bearing on correlated transactions of the same period. This is, it may not unreasonably appear, a work of supererogation. When the patient critic has shown them to be false witnesses as to the most serious crimes they could allege against man or woman, no weight need be attached to any other charge they make or evidence they adduce. Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, is a rule that still holds good.

We have most valuable testimony on this momentous subject in the notes of Dr. Lingard touching the actual life of the Queen at the very time chosen by Buchanan and Lennox to blast her fame in the eyes of the world. His evidence is taken from the works of contemporary writers-Keith, Maitland, Laing, Chalmers Shortly before the falling out between the Queen and Darnley over the murder of Rizzio, the story was put forward that she was then living in the most shameful adultery with Bothwell. It is impossible, says Lingard, to reconcile such a statement with the testimony of those who were present when the Queen exhorted Darnley to explain his motives of discontent. "Her Majesty said that she had a clear conscience, that in all her life she had done no action which could anywise prejudge (prejudice) his or her own honor; nevertheless, as she might perhaps have given offense without design, she was willing to make amends as far as he should desire, and therefore prayed him not to dissemble the occasion of his displeasure, if he had any, nor to spare her in the least matter."

Darnley, the narrative goes on (and this is the official report presented to the Lords of Council) replied that she had not given him any occasion for discontent. To this the Lords add these significant words: "We testify that, as far as things could come to our knowledge, he has had no ground of complaint, but, on the contrary, that he has the very best reason to look upon himself as one of the most fortunate princes in Christendom, could he but know his own happiness." The Lords who signed this declaration were, it should be remembered, Protestant adherents, Knox followers, men who hated the Queen's religion, but could not but love her for her grace and queenly dignity. How does this testimony look beside that of the wretched scribe, Buchanan, depicting the Queen as scampering off like a drunken courtesan to dance like a wood nymph around the market place at Stirling and play the wanton almost in public along with the man who afterwards abducted her? Maitland, says Dr. Lingard, sent a copy of this letter to the Archbishop of Glasgow, to be forwarded to the King of France, the Queen mother, and the Cardinal of Lorraine. was confirmed by letters on the same subject from Du Croc, the Ambassador, and Sir James Melville.

As for the charge of Buchanan that the Queen rode, like a woman distraught, from Jedburgh to Hermitage Castle (twenty miles), when she heard that Bothwell had been wounded by an outlaw, to bring him back to have him nursed under her own supervision, Dr. Lingard shows that she allowed eight days to pass ere going to Hermitage, and that she returned to Jedburgh

the same day. This is the testimony of Chalmers, one of the contemporary historians; he says that "her visit might be for a political purpose, as he (Bothwell) was Lieutenant of the Border, and as she ordered a mass of papers to be forwarded to him the next day."

It is not necessary to the purpose of this paper to follow the melancholy story of Mary's life, from the dismal period when she was placed in the power of a brutal subject, to be banished by his fellow lords and driven into the hands of her enemy, the Eng-To examine, so far as possible, into the truth or falsity of the statement that Mary was guilty of the murder of her husband, Lord Henry Darnley, and afterwards of adultery with the ringleader of the assassins, Earl Bothwell, was all that the limits of this article would permit. Bothwell was tried by the Lords immediately on the appearance of a placard in Edinburgh accusing him and several of his dependents of the crime. The accuser was unknown. He was not content with implicating the Earl; he said also "the Queen herself assented thereto." Lennox, the murdered man's father, who left no stone unturned to discover the instigators of the crime, did not find anything to show that the Queen had any privity in the mysterious tragedy, else he would have found some means of gratifying his venom against his sovereign in connection with the anonymous placard. As to Bothwell, he demanded a speedy trial, and when the process was over and there was no direct proof of guilt forthcoming, Bothwell issued a public challenge to combat to any accuser—"according to usage and the laws of war"-who thought it incumbent on him to repeat the accusation. There was none forthcoming. Hence Bothwell was legally and formally acquitted of the charge of murder as regards the Queen's husband. This being so, the Queen must necessarily have been held blameless as to the same transaction. crime was a political and not a personal one, not arising out of such a thing as a guilty amour, does not admit of a single doubt. Those who desire to gain the truth as to the conspiracy and the real underlying motives for its foundation had better take up Dr. Lingard's narrative of the events, which led up to the Scottish Reformation and the enthronement of Mary Stuart. Therein they will find that the division of the Church and the Crown lands among the Scottish nobility was a dominant factor in the motives of those who contrived the murder of Darnley, inasmuch as his connection with the Catholic nobles and their adherents in England made him a host of open and secret enemies; and here is one reason why the theory that his wife, the Catholic Queen of Scotland, who would be more likely to shield him than to have any part in his taking off, should be suspected of guilt in the matter.

"It is acknowledged by all," says Lingard, "that the Queen acted, at first, as an innocent woman would have acted. She lamented the fate of a husband to whom she had been so lately reconciled. She expressed a suspicion that it had been intended to involve her in the same destruction, and she repeatedly announced her resolution to take ample vengeance on the authors of so flagitious a crime. Her chamber, according to custom on the death of a king, was hung with black; the light of the day was excluded, and in darkness and solitude she received the few who were admitted to offer their respects or condolence. . . . Judicial inquiries were instituted, and a proclamation was issued offering rewards in money and land for the discovery and apprehension of the murderers, with a full pardon to any one of the party who would accuse his accomplices."

So much for the insinuation contained in the statement that the Oueen "was accused of murder." She was never so accused, except by anonymous insinuations, and only such unconscionable writers as Buchanan and Froude have ventured to make insinuations tantamount to direct charges, and charges as tantamount to a verdict of guilty. Writers with consciences and honor and reputations to preserve, such as Miss Strickland and Mr. Andrew Lang, do not accept the malice of maligners as historical evidence. They have examined all the facts, as far as these were procurable, and these speak strongly against the theory of any connivance of the Oueen in the plot that made her a widow for the second time. The murderers, whoever they were, must certainly have been members of that nefarious gang of nobles who banded themselves together, under oath and blood bond, to bring about her seizure by Bothwell and her enforced marriage with that reprobate adventurer. The accusation of adultery rests upon similar shady and questionable foundations. Lingard cites the testimony of Du Croc, the French Ambassador, who had visited the Oueen on the day of her marriage to Bothwell. Although nominally free then, guards were posted all about the passages leading to the Queen's apartments, and nobody was allowed to visit the Queen or speak to her except in the presence of Bothwell. The Ambassador testified in letters to the King of France that he found her very sorrowful. and that she had told him she never would be cheerful again, and had no wish but to die. Mary had written to the Archbishop of Glasgow, as regards the marriage, that it was "accompanied with force," and Sir James Melville, who had been taken prisoner along with her, declared that expression meant what he had reason to believe, the marriage was preceded by violation, for the very purpose of procuring the Queen's consent. The explanation, if accepted,

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shatters the theory of guilty love prior to the marriage, and proves the authors of the calumnies, Buchanan and Lennox, to be the basest sort of disloyal defamers, creatures who disgraced the form of man by attacking a defenseless woman, for the vilest personal ends.

As for the subsequent life and ultimate fate of the unhappy Mary there is no controversy over anything involving her personal character as in the memorable Darnley-Bothwell episode. She was done to death for religious and political reasons by one of the foulest conspiracies, mainly built on a system of diabolical forgeries and perjured testimony of spies, all contrived by the Machiavellian Minister of Elizabeth, Walsingham. The truth of the conspiracy and the methods by which it was carried out have all been unfolded by the State papers bearing on the subject of "The Babington Conspiracy." It is one of the blackest chapters in the long volume of English evildoing in regard to both Scotland and Ireland. Mary herself knew full well that her religion was the principal reason why she was imprisoned and kept in prison for eighteen years. Jealousy of her beauty was, no doubt, a factor in the course adopted toward her by the ill-favored and artificial relative who held her in keeping; and there were several minor motives as well. But the fierce hatred of the Catholic religion and the fears of a Catholic restoration in the British Isles were the great impelling forces that led to Mary's tragic end.

When Mary Stuart was convicted of plotting against the Queen of England, the Lords and Commons sent a couple of commissioners to the Castle at Fotheringay to apprise her of the fact. In doing so they told her that the Parliament had concluded that no security for Elizabeth's person or the reformed religion was possible while she (Queen Mary) lived. The high-spirited Stuart indignantly denied the charge of plotting against her Tudor relative, and declared that her real crime was adherence to the religion of her fathers—a crime of which she was proud, and for which she would be happy to lay down her life. When the day of her execution arrived, Fletcher, Dean of Peterborough, began a course of moral torture while she was preparing for the fatal moment by prayer. She prayed in Latin for the enemies who were sending her to death, for Christ's afflicted Church, for her son James, for her cousin, Elizabeth; and holding up her crucifix, implored: "As Thine arms, O Lord, were stretched out upon the cross, so receive me into the arms of Thy mercy, and forgive me my sins." Fletcher and other Protestant onlookers objected to her resorting to "such Popish trumperies, but she repelled their rudeness with royal dignity. So she died, like a martyr, with no word of fear, but a prayer for her enemies on her unwincing and beautiful lips.

Shortly before her execution the Queen wrote thus to her relative, the Duke of Guise: "My good cousin, I bid you, whom I best love on earth, farewell, since, in virtue of an unjust sentence, I am about to die, in such fashion as, God be praised, none of our family, and still less of my station, ever did before. Do you thank God thereof, for upon this earth I was useless to His and the Church's cause, but hope that death may prove my steadfastness to the faith and my willingness to die for the maintenance and restoration of the Catholic Church in this unhappy island. And although never executioner yet dipped his hand in our blood, be not you, my friend, ashamed for this; for the judgment of heretics and Church enemies, who have no right over me, a free Queen, is honorable before God and profitable to the children of the Church. Did I belong to the former, this blow should not light upon me. All of our house have been persecuted by that sect, as your good father, with whom I hope to be received into mercy by the just Judge.

"I commend to you my poor servants and the payment of my debts, and entreat a pious foundation for my soul, not at your cost, but after the manner that you will hear from my disconsolate servants, the witnesses of my last tragedy. May God bless you, your wife, children, brothers and cousin, and all of his! The blessing of God, and that which I would bestow upon my children be upon yours, whom I no less commend to God than my son, the unhappy and deceived!

"God give you grace to endure through life in the service of the Church! Never may this honor depart from our family, but men, like women, be ever ready (setting aside all other worldly considerations) to shed their blood for the upholding of the faith! As for me, I hold myself, on father's and mother's side, born to make the offering of my blood, and I have no purpose to degenerate. Jesus, who was crucified for us, and all holy martyrs, make us by their intercession worthy to offer up our bodies for His honor!

"Fotheringay, Thursday, 24th November.

"They have taken away my canopy, thinking to degrade me. Since then my warden came, and proffered to write about it to the Queen, that having been done not by her order, but upon advice of certain counsellors. I showed them on that canopy, instead of my arms, my Saviour's cross. You will hear the whole matter. Since then they have been quieter.

"Your affectionate cousin and perfect friend,
"MARY, Queen of Scotland, Dowager Queen of France."

That document ought to settle for ever the question as to the claim of Mary Stuart to be considered one of the white-robed

company who sealed their devotion to Christ with their rich lifeblood, one might without presumption be permitted to think. No doubt it will have due weight with the sage ecclesiastics whose privilege it will be to say the deciding word on that momentous point.

JOHN J. O'SHEA.

Philadelphia.

### CHURCH AND STATE.

#### VII.

#### THE MONOPHYSITE CONTROVERSY.

HE apparent unanimity of the Fathers of Chalcedon, and the enthusiasm with which they had greeted the Tome of Pope Leo the Great, must have seemed to pious Christians of the fifth century the happy prelude to a long and much needed period of concord between the various parties that, in the East more particularly, had for many years disturbed the peace of the Church. Such a forecast, unfortunately, would have been destined never to be realized. For no sooner was the Council of Chalcedon dissolved than it became evident that little dependence on this, as on so many other occasions, could be placed on the perseverance in any given convictions of the Bishops of the Eastern empire.

In the present instance two chief causes operated to disturb the short-lived harmony of Chalcedon. The first of these was that, owing to the insistance of the Papal Legates, the question in debate was now so clearly defined that there was no longer a possibility of mistaking its meaning, a fact not at all to the taste, for example, of the Bishops who loved to pose as followers of St. Cyril of Alexandria. But while these extremists might have given considerable trouble at Alexandria, it may be doubted whether the monophysites would have met with any success worthy of moment in the East had not the Council of Chalcedon raised another issue whose ill effects were destined to continue long after the monophysite controversy was buried in oblivion. This issue was the status of the Bishop of Constantinople in the Christian hierarchy.

In previous papers we have seen that, from the time of the erection of Constantinople into the capital of the empire, its episcopal throne was an objection of ambition eagerly sought after by

Eastern prelates. Eusebius of Nicomedia established a precedent in this respect and did not scruple to violate a canon of the Church, which at that date was regarded as inviolable, prohibiting the transfer of Bishops from one see to another. It was also in the order of things that the incumbent of Constantinople should by reason of his proximity to the court become one of the most important ecclesiastical personages in the Empire. Thus, that the question of the new status of the Bishop of the capital should arise was inevitable, for it could hardly be expected that he would remain content merely as a suffragan of the Archbishop of Heraclea.

The first Council of Constantinople (381) attempted a solution of the problem by an enactment to the effect that henceforth the Bishop of Constantinople should take rank before even the two great Oriental Patriarchs of Alexandria and Antioch and immediately after the Pope. But this elevation was merely one of rank and conveyed no jurisdiction. Actually, however, during the seventy following years, the influence of the Bishop of Constantinople in the ecclesiastical provinces adjoining the capital was all-important, which being the case, the Council of Chalcedon adopted a canon (28) regularizing the situation by extending his jurisdiction over the provinces of Thrace, Pontus and Asia, thus creating a patriarchate of Constantinople. The See of Jerusalem was at the same time elevated to patriarchal rank and its jurisdiction extended at the expense of the Patriarch of Antioch.

Whatever justification there may have been in the circumstances of the case for this act of the Council of Chalcedon, the authors of canon 28 made the mistake of advancing as the only reason for an act of so great moment the claim that, because of its civil rank, Constantinople was entitled to second place in the Christian hierarchy, at the same time suggesting that the uncontested primacy of Rome was due solely to its importance as the ancient capital of the Empire. "The Fathers" (of Nice), they say, "with reason accorded to the See of old Rome its privileges, because it was the imperial city." But the Fathers of Nice did nothing of the kind: they merely recognized the well-known fact of Rome's primacy and made no pretense of conferring on the Apostolic See an authority which it had enjoyed from the beginning. specious reason being the best to hand, the Council of Chalcedon adopted this, and thereby at a critical moment introduced a new source of discord into a sufficiently complicated situation.

For Leo the Great was not the type of Pope who would let pass unchallenged the introduction into the canon law of the Church of a principle so vicious that it was capable of undermining all hierarchical authority. That the Fathers of Chalcedon feared this consequence is apparent from their letter to Leo announcing the results of the council. They begin by greeting the Pope in the most flattering terms. They have reveled, they assure Leo, as at an imperial banquet, in the spiritual food wherewith Christ has supplied them through his great dogmatic letter. They have deposed Dioscorus and condemned Eutyches, knowing that the Pope as their chief was present in spirit, as the head over the members, approving of their conduct and all but visible to them through the wisdom of his representatives. They have also decided upon certain other matters which, they are persuaded, His "Holiness will accept and ratify," to their great satisfaction and that of "the most devout and Christ-loving Emperors." True, Leo's representatives vehemently opposed what they allude to, namely, the elevation of Constantinople in rank and jurisdiction, but only because the legates wished the initiative in the matter to be taken by the Pope him-But the case was urgent, and they considered the meeting of the council opportune for its settlement, confident of his approval and knowing he would take the broad view that "every success of the children redounds to the parent's glory." Accordingly, they conclude, "we entreat that you honor our decision with your assent, and as we have yielded to the head our agreement in things honorable, so may the head also fulfill for the children what is fitting. For thus will our pious Emperors be treated with due regard, who have ratified your Holiness' judgment as law, and the See of Constantinople will receive its recompense for having always displayed such loyalty on matters of religion towards you, and for having so zealously linked itself to you in full agreement."1

The Emperor, as well as Anatolius, also addressed the Pope with a view to obtaining his approval of the contentious canon. But Leo soon made it clear that he would never sanction the proposed arrangement relative to the Bishop of Constantinople. The reasons for his attitude are found in his letters on this subject to his various Eastern correspondents. Replying to the Emperor, in the first place, the Pope, after congratulating Marcian on the success of the recent council, goes on to express his surprise that the council and the Emperor should, by their action relative to Constantinople, have taken the risk of again disturbing the peace of the Universal Church to gratify the selfish ambition of an individual. first place, continues the Pope, the antecedents of Anatolius are more than dubious. He is known to have obtained his position through the favor of the Emperor and his ordination at the hands of Dioscorus of Alexandria. In spite of these suspicious antecedents the Pope, through regard for the piety of Marcian and wish-

<sup>1</sup> S. Leo M. Ep. 98,

ing to be kind rather than just to Anatolius, had entertained hopes that the latter's elevation to the bishopric of the capital might turn out well. But now he finds Anatolius more ambitious than ever. The Pope has no objection to the exalted rank of the royal city of Constantinople, but the Emperor must remember that things secular stand on a different basis from things divine, and that there can be no sure building save on that rock which the Lord has laid for a foundation. "Let it be enough," therefore, "for Anatolius that by the aid of your piety and by my favor and approval he has obtained the bishopric of so great a city. Let him not disdain a city which is royal, though he cannot make it an Apostolic See, and let him on no account hope that he can rise by doing injury to others. For the privileges of the churches, determined by the canons of the Holy Fathers and fixed by the decrees of the Nicene Synod, cannot be overthrown by any unscrupulous act, nor disturbed by any innovation." The charge of defending this determination of the first general council is committed to the Pope, who would be untrue to his office were he to permit the gratification of the wish of a single Bishop at the expense of all.2

In his reply to the letter of Anatolius the Pope enters more fully into the canonical side of the proposed innovation. Leo is greatly grieved that the Bishop of Constantinople has, in disregard, as the Pope believes, of the Nicene canons, endeavored, by taking advantage of the temporary eclipse of the Church of Alexandria, to obtain for himself second place in the hierarchy. Nor will Alexandria be the only sufferer by the new arrangement, for Antioch will lose third place and various metropolitans will be deprived of their ancient honors. As to the ordinance of the first Council of Constantinople, Rome knows nothing of it, since it was never brought to the attention of the Apostolic See. Moreover, the claim that those most concerned had agreed to the proposed arrangement is more specious than accurate; if they yielded, it was either through modesty or sheer weariness. But it is incumbent on the Pope to see that their ancient rights are not usurped by Anatolius. rights of provincial primates may not be overthrown, nor metropolitan Bishops be defrauded of privileges based on antiquity. The See of Alexandria may not lose any of that dignity which it merited through St. Mark, the evangelist and disciple of St. Peter, nor may the splendor of so great a Church be obscured by another's clouds, Dioscorus having fallen through his persistence in impiety. The Church of Antioch, too, in which first, at the preaching of the blessed Apostle Peter, the Christian name arose, must continue in the position assigned it by the Fathers. . . . For the see is

<sup>2</sup> S. Leo M. Ep. 104.

on a different footing to the holders of it, and each individual's chief honor is his own integrity."

Meanwhile the East was awaiting news from Rome as to whether or not the Pope approved of the Council of Chalcedon, for, it seems, Leo had sent no reply to the official letter of the Bishops. This omission, we learn from a letter of Marcian to Leo, was being taken advantage of by the monophysites who were proclaiming through the Orient that the Pope had actually disapproved of the acts of the council. "We are extremely surprised," writes the Emperor, "that after the Council of Chalcedon and the letters addressed to you by the venerable Bishops, informing you of what had been done, we have not received from your clemency any response to be read in the churches and thus carry your approval to the knowledge of all. Let your Holiness deign to send such a letter certifying to all the churches and all the peoples that you ratify the acts of the council."

The Pope's answer, dated March 21, 453, informs the Emperor that his letter to Anatolius was sufficient evidence of his approval of the council, had not the latter, because of the rebuke it contained of his ambition, withheld it from publication. He now, as the Emperor requests, sends a formal letter, addressed to the Bishops, ratifying all that they had done at Chalcedon, with the exception of the twenty-eighth canon. Only the first part of this letter, however, was read to the people; all that referred to the 28th canon was omitted. Some further suspicious actions on his part led the Pope to break off all correspondence with Anatolius, until in 454. at the intervention of the Emperor, a reconciliation was effected. Anatolius, in resuming correspondence with Leo, pleaded that not he, but the Bishops, had taken the initiative in regard to his elevation, and that, in any event, the enactment of the council relative to Constantinople was invalid without the approval of His Holiness.4 But while Anatolius thus seemed to resign his newly acquired dignity and to acquiesce in the decision of Rome, nevertheless, from this time both he and his successors assumed and exercised all the jurisdiction which the rejected canon attempted to confer.

While this question was occupying the attention of Rome and Constantinople resistance to the dogmatic decree of Chalcedon was making headway in the Orient. It began at Jerusalem, whither the news of the council's determination had been brought by a monk named Theodosius. According to the story told by this personage, the Bishops at Chalcedon, including their own Bishop, Juvenal, had betrayed the faith. This version of the case was

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> S. Leo M. Ep. 106.

<sup>4</sup> S. Leo M. Ep. 132.

readily accepted, with rather unpleasant consequences for Juvenal, who, with his new patriarchal honors, must have expected a triumphal entry into his episcopal city. Instead of this, Juvenal, on his return, found popular opinion, through the efforts of Theodosius, aided and abetted by Eudocia, the widow of Theodosius II., so decidedly adverse, that he was obliged to seek aid at Constantinople. Nothing less than a military expedition on a small scale was necessary to restore him.

In Alexandria, also, serious trouble arose over the deposition and exile of Dioscorus and the appointment of his successor, Proterius. So aroused were the Alexandrians by these acts that serious rioting occurred, during which a body of troops called out to preserve order were driven by the mob into the serapeum and burned alive. After this the presence of a strong military force was necessary to hold the city in control. The situation became even worse after the death of Dioscorus (454), when a schismatic Patriarch of Alexandria was elected in the person of Timothy Ælurus. Timothy, however, was also condemned to exile by the imperial authorities, an act which so exasperated his adherents that on Holy Thursday, 457, they murdered the orthodox Patriarch Proterius. Just at this time the firm hand of the Emperor Marcian was withdrawn by death from the helm of state, and his successor, the Emperor Leo, ascended the throne.

The monophysite question continued to occupy general attention throughout the reign of Leo I. (457-474), but no event of decisive importance occurred during this period. Timothy Ælurus remained in exile, first at Gangra and subsequently in the Crimea, but the Alexandrians declined to accept the orthodox successor of Proterius, Timothy Salophaciolus. The successor of Leo, his son-in-law, Zeno, lost his throne within a year after his accession, and a new development in the long-drawn-out controversy occurred when Basiliscus assumed the reins of empire.

For one of the earliest acts of Basiliscus was to pronounce in favor of the monophysites. The long exile of Timothy Ælurus now came to an end, and the monophysite Patriarch was received at Constantinople, on his journey homeward, with the greatest consideration. At his suggestion, indeed, Basiliscus issued an "encyclical" in which the Emperor commanded that "the most holy Bishops in every church" should anathematize and commit to the flames "the so-called Tome of Leo and all things said and done at Chalcedon." More than five hundred Eastern Bishops obeyed this imperial order. Acacius, however, at this time Bishop of Constantinople, although he had previously shown some leanings to-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Evagrius, H. E. III. 4.

wards monophysitism, declined to accept the decision of the royal Pontiff.

After this successful debut Timothy Ælurus held a synod at Ephesus, the members of which accepted the imperial encyclical, and even addressed a letter to Basiliscus, exhorting him to remain steadfast in the policy he had inaugurated. In return for his coldness towards Ælurus the synod now withdrew the province of Asia from the jurisdiction of Acacius and conferred on the Bishop of Ephesus the right to consecrate its metropolitans. After these achievements the synod dissolved and Timothy continued his journey to Alexandria, where he was received with great rejoicings.

But the monophysite victory was destined at this time to be of short duration. The hostility of Constantinople, both lay and monastic, with Acacius at its head, to the religious policy of Basiliscus, proved a fatal obstacle to its success, and it was too late when the ephemeral Emperor realized that he had adopted the losing cause. He attempted, indeed, to retrace his steps and issued an anti-encyclical annulling the previous encyclical. But the dethroned Zeno was already marching on the capital, at the head of the troops which, under his Isaurian fellow-countrymen, the Generals Illus and Trocundus, had been sent to capture him. At his approach Basiliscus fled from Constantinople, and subsequently, with his family, perished of hunger in Cappadocia.

A reaction at once took place in the ecclesiastical situation. The Bishops of the province of Asia were among the earliest to express their regrets, and wrote a "repentant memorial" to Acacius, whose authority they had so lately repudiated, imploring pardon and explaining that they had accepted the encyclical of Basiliscus under compulsion. Timothy Ælurus was saved by death (477) from again treading the path of exile, but his see remained obstinately monophysite, and a monophysite successor, Peter Mongus, was ordained in his place. Timothy Salophaciolus, the orthodox Patriarch, was, indeed, officially reinstated and Mongus compelled to go into retirement. But the Alexandrian monophysites, although they greatly esteemed Salophaciolus, would not accept him as their Patriarch, and demanded at Constantinople that after his death Peter Mongus should be recognized as his successor.

The Catholic Alexandrians, however, would not agree to this, and petitioned Zeno, through a priest named John Talaia, for the appointment of an orthodox Patriarch. But the Emperor was just then preparing to carry out his Henoticon policy and compelled Talaia to promise that he would not endeavor to obtain the Catholic succession at Alexandria.

The conditions at Antioch and Jerusalem were scarcely more

satisfactory than those at Alexandria; a continuous struggle for supremacy had for many years been carried on in both of these cities between orthodox and monophysite. With a view to ending this state of things in the Eastern Church, Acacius of Constantinople, who had thus far well served the cause of orthodoxy, advised the Emperor to adopt a new policy, which, he thought, would bring order out of the existing chaos. But while the end was laudable, the means of effecting it were, to say the least, peculiar. At the instance of Acacius, Zeno issued a decree, afterwards known as the Henoticon, addressed to the Bishops, clergy, monks and faithful of Alexandria, Egypt, Libya and Pentapolis, exhorting all of these to return to union with the Universal Church, on certain conditions which he thought they would readily accept. The two principal features of the Henoticon were its insistance on the creeds of Nice and Constantinople and its practical rejection of the Council of Chalcedon. Nestorius was anathematized, as well as Eutyches (the Alexandrians themselves had long since rejected the views of the latter personage) and the anathematisms of St. Cyril were formally accepted. All reference to the question of the natures of Christ, as well as to the Tome of Pope Leo, was studiously avoided. "And these things," concluded the royal Pontiff, "we write, not as setting forth a new form of faith, but for your assurance. And every one who has held or holds any other opinion, either at the present or at any other time, whether at Chalcedon or in any other synod whatsoever, we anathematize."6

The Henoticon was, of course, accepted by Acacius, by Peter Mongus, who thereby obtained recognition as Patriarch of Alexandria, and by Martyrius of Jerusalem. Those Bishops who declined to obey the imperial mandate were deposed, among them being John Calandion of Antioch, whose rival, Peter the Fuller, obtained his place. But events soon proved that union on the basis of silence on essential points was not likely to be of a lasting character. The Alexandrians, in the first place, were not satisfied even with the concessions of the Henoticon, and demanded nothing less than an explicit repudiation of the Tome and the Council of Chalcedon. Their intransigent attitude caused Peter Mongus no small embarrassment, from which he endeavored to escape by means which brought on him the stigma of "time-server" and "double-dealer." The Patriarch's versatility, indeed, was surprising, for while on the one hand he assured Acacius that he was convinced by "the most powerful proofs" adduced by the Patriarch of Constantinople in support of the contention that Chalcedon was in complete accord-



Evagrius, H. E. III. 14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Evagrius, H. E. III. 17.

ance with Nice, on the other hand, the adherents of Mongus in Alexandria were occupied in circulating a fictitious correspondence, representing Acacius as rejecting the former of these councils, imploring the favor of his Alexandrian colleague, and even accepting a penance imposed on him by Peter. His efforts, however, were only partially successful, for a body of malcontents, whom he was unable to satisfy, broke off relations with him and organized themselves into a schismatic body known as "the headless ones" (acephali).

A second and still more fatal obstacle to the success of the Henoticon was the pronounced opposition of Old Rome. Acacius and Zeno, in drawing up their union formula, had acted as though no such person as the Pope existed. These two dignitaries, indeed, seemed to regard themselves as the most important factors in the Universal Church, and to imagine that the Constantinopolitan chiefs of Church and State could, at will, undo the work of an œcumenical council. The Pope, therefore, knew nothing of the result of their joint deliberations until the Henoticon had been launched upon the Eastern world. The first news on the subject appears to have been brought to Rome by the exiled Patriarch of Alexandria, John Talaia, and subsequently by the orthodox monks of Constantinople. Thereupon, Pope Felix III. (483-492) at once took steps to undo the mischief, and with this end in view an embassy of two Bishops, Misenus and Vitalis, and a defensor proceeded to Constantinople, bearing with them a citation for Acacius to answer for his conduct before a Roman synod. The envoys were also entrusted with a letter from the Pope to Zeno exhorting the Emperor to uphold the Council of Chalcedon and not to tolerate further the onward march of heresy. But the Papal Legates proved unworthy of their commission, and, partly by misrepresentations, partly by threats, allowed themselves to be circumvented, so that they assisted in Constantinople at a solemn religious function in which the name of Peter Mongus was recited in the diptychs. Thus were the people of the capital led to believe that Pope Felix approved of the Henoticon.

But the orthodox monks of the monastery of the Accemetæ saw through the manœuvres of Acacius and hastened to inform the Pope of the fall of his legates. Whereupon Felix summoned a council at Rome, which pronounced upon the unfaithful envoys sentence of excommunication and deposition. Acacius also, because of his failure to obey the Papal summons and his conduct towards the legates, was deposed and excommunicated.

This sentence of the Roman Synod was forwarded to Constantinople by the Defensor Tutus, who, with some difficulty, suc-

ceeded in placing it in the hands of the Accemetæ. These undertook its delivery, and after several failures one of the brethren succeeded in attaching it to the pallium of the Patriarch during a ceremony in St. Sophia. The response of Acacius to the sentence completed the rupture between East and West; he caused the name of Felix to be removed from the diptychs and punished the daring monastic offenders against his dignity, some with imprisonment, some with death.

The bearer of the sentence of Acacius brought also a letter from the Pope to the Emperor in which Felix reproached Zeno for the manner in which his legates had been treated, and gave him the choice of communion with Peter the Apostle or with Peter Mongus. In all matters strictly religious, wrote the Pope, the Emperor must make up his mind to learn rather than to teach; according to the divine constitution of the Church royalty itself, in matters of faith, is subject to the priests of God.<sup>8</sup> But Zeno took no heed of this remonstrance and gave his full support to the excommunicated Patriarch of Constantinople. Thus began the Acacian schism between East and West, which continued during the next thirty-five years (484-519). All opposition in the East was stamped out by Emperor and Patriarch, and numerous exiled Bishops joined John Talaia at Rome, to await better days.

Acacius died in 489, and his successor, Flavita or Flavitas, immediately after his election, made advances to Rome. Felix III., however, declined to receive him into communion, because of his refusal to break off relations with Peter Mongus and to remove the name of Acacius from the diptychs. Flavita died a few months after his election, and his successor, Euphemius, went still further in his efforts towards reconciliation with the West; he broke with Peter Mongus and restored the Pope's name to the diptychs. But he declined to fulfill the third condition for reunion by refusing to remove from the diptychs the names of his two predecessors. In all other respects Euphemius was entirely orthodox.

The Emperor Zeno died in April, 491, and, having no direct heirs, his brother Longinus endeavored to obtain the succession. But the widow of Zeno, the Empress Ariadne, pronounced for the Silentiary Anastasius (491-518), who thus, with the hand of the Empress, obtained the imperial prize.

The new Emperor was suspected in Constantinople of leaning towards manichæism, and in consequence the Patriarch Euphemius, before the enthronement, insisted on his signing a document to the effect that he would maintain the faith inviolate; in other words, that he would accept the Council of Chalcedon. But the Emperor,

<sup>•</sup> Felix III., Ep. VIII. 5.

adopting a policy of laissez faire, did not live up to his word, and gave orders that Chalcedon should neither be proclaimed nor repudiated. This policy, however, pleased nobody, and in his endeavor to carry it out the Emperor was obliged to exile both Chalcedonians and anti-Chalcedonians. Euphemius himself was deposed on a charge of heresy, made by the monophysite Patriarch of Alexandria, Athanasius (496); from this date Anastasius began to lean more and more towards monophysitism.

While Eastern Emperors, sometimes assisted by Patriarchs, were thus attempting to regulate Church matters according to their own will, the ideas of the Popes on the question of the relations of the Church to the civil power were gradually assuming definite form. And it was time that they should, for in the East, more than ever before since the death of Marcian, the Emperors had been acting as though they were entitled to rule the Church as well as the State by divine right, while their claim to such authority was only too generally acknowledged in their dominions, practically if not theoretically.

If such an usurpation on the part of the State were to continue, then it would be only a question of time until the Church would be merely a department of the civil government. Pope Felix III., as we have seen, had expressed himself strongly on this point, but it was his successor, Pope Gelasius I. (492-496), who formulated the theory of Church and State which has ever since been regarded as the earliest clear expression on the question of the respective spheres of the two powers. The occasion of this pronouncement was a correspondence between Gelasius and the Emperor which originated in the following manner. After Theodoric had defeated his rival, Odoacer, and assumed in Italy the title of king, he sent to Constantinople two ambassadors. Faustus and Irenæus, to obtain from the Emperor approval of his action. The ecclesiastical situation between East and West, among other matters, was discussed at the court with the king's representatives. The Emperor complained of having been condemned by the Pope and expressed his surprise that Gelasius had not written to him by the ambassadors. The Patriarch Euphemius, on his part, complained that Acacius had been condemned by Pope Felix alone, which, he claimed, was in violation of the canons.

In reply to these allegations the Pope answered that, in the first place, Acacius, having practically repudiated the Council of Chalcedon, had condemned himself. The consequence of this act was that not only the Pope, but every Bishop, was bound to break with the late Bishop of Constantinople. Euphemius, continues Gelasius,

Dvagrius, H. E. III. 30.

talks of violated canons. But is it not the canons which decree that all disputes shall, in the last resort, be judged at Rome, and that from the decisions of Rome there is no appeal? Now, Acacius knew quite well that Timothy Ælurus, Peter of Antioch and other Bishops had been deposed by the Apostolic See; yet he, after the acceptance by these Bishops of the Henoticon, restored them to communion, thereby presuming to reverse a decision of the Pope.

Moreover, by what authority were the orthodox Bishops of Alexandria and Antioch, the second and third sees in Christendom, with many other Bishops, expelled from their dioceses? Yet, while all this has been done by the secular and religious powers of Constantinople, these same powers now complain of being separated from communion with Rome. Further still, Acacius never, as the Greeks allege, asked pardon of the Apostolic See; on the contrary, he resisted to the end all the Pope's efforts to win him back to orthodoxy. As to the present state of the question Euphemius must understand that the supreme authority in matters religious rests in the Apostolic See, whereas, on the other hand, the civil rulers, as Christians, are to be judged by Bishops, and particularly by the Vicar of St. Peter. No Christian, no matter how exalted his position, may arrogate the right to judge in things divine; the ruler who would do so is merely a persecutor.<sup>10</sup>

Replying next to the Emperor the Pope, first of all, defends himself against the charge of discourtesy.<sup>11</sup> He reminds Anastasius that when, some time before, the imperial ambassadors were in Rome they everywhere announced that they had been ordered by their master to hold no communication with the Pope. Which being the case, Gelasius fails to understand how the Emperor can regard it as an offense to receive no communication from himself. Then, evidently having in mind the arbitrary methods of Anastasius and his imperial predecessors of dealing with religious questions, the Pope defines, for the benefit of the Emperor, the proper domain, in the Christian dispensation, of the secular ruler. "August Emperor," he writes, "this world is governed by two powers: by the sacred authority of Pontiffs and the royal power. Of these the responsibility laid upon priests is by far the weightier, since they will have to account to God even for kings. You know, dearest son, that although in dignity you are exalted above all other men. yet in all religious matters you devoutly bow your head to those who are charged with the administration of things holy, to whom you look for the means of salvation. Furthermore, in all that regards the reception and administration of the sacraments you must



<sup>10</sup> Gelas. L Ep. 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Gelas. L. Ep. 8.

acknowledge that, far from having any right to command, you are bound to obey; that in matters of this order you are dependent on their judgment, and that consequently you have no right to attempt to subject them to your will. For if the ministers of religion, knowing that authority in all worldly affairs rightly belongs to you, readily obey you, is it not equally becoming that you in turn should, in the religious sphere, obey those who are charged with the disposition of our august mysteries? Everybody knows that it is a duty of Bishops to speak boldly in defense of religion when occasion demands, and that, on the other hand, which God forbid, those who despise their authority run grave risk of salvation. But if the faithful thus owe submission to Bishops in general, who worthily direct the interests of religion, how much more do they not owe submission to the Bishop of that see to whom God has assigned preëminence over all Bishops."<sup>12</sup>

In another of his works, speaking of the separation of spiritual from secular authority in the Christian dispensation, Pope Gelasius says that in former times there were, like Melchisedech, individuals who legitimately exercised the priestly as well as the royal office, and that Satan imitated this practice among pagans, so that, for example, the Roman Emperors were also Supreme Pontiffs. But Christ our Lord, mindful of human frailty, and knowing that it would be an aid to salvation, forever separated the two spheres, the consequence being that henceforth Christian rulers, on the one hand, need the services of Bishops in seeking the way of eternal life, and, on the other hand, Bishops depend in temporal matters upon the civil rulers.

Therefore, when the civil power endeavors to encroach upon the spiritual domain, every priest worthy of the name is in duty bound to resist the attempted usurpation. Thus did Nathan, the prophet, in the case of David, and in Christian times Ambrose of Milan separated from communion the Emperor Theodosius. Pope Leo also rebuked the younger Theodosius in the affair of the latrocinium, Pope Hilary the Emperor Anthemius and Popes Simplicius and Felix the Emperors Basiliscus and Zeno.<sup>18</sup>

Pope Anastasius II., who, in 496, succeeded Gelasius, adopted a more friendly attitude than that of his immediate predecessors towards the Emperor of the same name. This did not mean, however, as the party in Rome hostile to his policy seemed to think, that the Pope was disposed to sacrifice the principle at issue. What he did was to resume the custom of notifying the Emperor of his election. A delegation of two Bishops bearing his letters arrived



<sup>12</sup> Gelasius I. Ep. XII. 2.

<sup>18</sup> Gelasius I, Ep. XXVI. 11.

at Constantinople, where the pacific tone of his communications made a favorable impression. The Pope had also authorized his legates to enter into relations with the Apocrisiarius at Constantinople of the schismatic Patriarch of Alexandria, while he himself, through the deacon Photinus, effected a reconcilation with Bishop Andrew of Thessalonica, one of the most uncompromising of Acacians.

But these conciliatory acts of the Pope appear to have been regarded by two different parties as merely weakness. In Rome the intransigents would not hear of concessions, whereas, on the other hand, Theodoric's ambassador at Constantinople, the consular Festus, gave the Emperor the assurance that he would persuade the Pope to go so far even as to accept the Henoticon.

Pope Anastasius II. died, however, before Festus had an opportunity of attempting to try on him his powers of persuasion, but in the election of his successor Festus is found taking a leading part. The candidate he favored was the priest Laurentius, while a majority of the clergy and people gave their votes to the deacon Symmachus. The result was a double election and subsequently an appeal to King Theodoric to act as arbitrator in the dispute. Theodoric decided that the rightful Pope was he who was first ordained and had with him a majority of the electors. These conditions being found on the side of Symmachus, he was declared Pope; his unsuccessful competitor was given the bishopric of Nocera.

But this arrangement of matters did not at all reconcile Festus and the senatorial party, who were his chief supporters, to their defeat. Their hostility to Symmachus manifested itself anew about the beginning of the year 501, when they charged the Pope before King Theodoric with having celebrated Easter on the wrong date. Symmachus was cited to the royal court to answer this puerile accusation, but on arriving at Ravenna he accidentally discovered that other and much graver charges were being prepared against him by his enemies; whereupon, declining to walk into the trap, he immediately returned to Rome.

This sudden departure, however, unfavorably impressed the king, who now all the more readily listened to the new accusations, the most serious of which were that the Pope was guilty of a grave moral lapse and had unlawfully disposed of Church property. In the absence of the accused the Arian King took it upon himself to appoint a Visitor, in the person of the Bishop of Altino, to proceed to Rome, for the purpose of renewing the Paschal ceremonies, after which, he decided, a synod would be convened to examine into the other accusations against Symmachus.

The synod thus ordered met in April or May, 501, and held its

first session in the basilica of S. Maria in Trastevere. But the Bishops were not at all satisfied as to the manner of their convocation, and their first act was to protest that Theodoric had no authority to convene an ecclesiastical council. Only the Pope, they maintained, could lawfully call them together, and even had the Pope summoned them to Rome, they, as Bishops, had no authority to pronounce judgment on one who held the preëminent dignity of successor of St. Peter.

To these protests the King replied that the Pope had consented to the convocation of the council, an assertion which Symmachus confirmed. The Pope then agreed to waive his prerogative of being judged by no tribunal, but on condition that the Visitor should previously be dismissed and the churches be restored to his direction. Theodoric, however, declined to accept these stipulations, and the synod dissolved without accomplishing anything.

A second attempt to end the trouble was made by Theodoric some months later. He again summoned the Bishops of Italy to meet in Rome, September 1, 501, and at the same time sent three royal officials to reassure the Pope as to his intentions and obtain his consent to appear before the new synod. Symmachus agreed to this proposal, and the second synod met in the church of Santa Croce. But while the Pope, accompanied by the royal officials, was crossing the city from St. Peter's, where he resided, to Santa Croce, he and his escort were assailed with such violence by the partisans of Festus that, but for the intervention of his royal escort, he would have lost his life. Symmachus thereupon returned to St. Peter's, and, naturally, while such conditions prevailed, declined making a second attempt to appear before the assembly at Santa Croce. This refusal put an end to the synod, for the Fathers again declined to judge the Pope without the Pope's consent. Their decision they communicated to Theodoric in the following terms: "We may not," they inform the king, "proceed further. According to the canons, all Bishops may appeal to the Pope, but what is to be done when the Pope himself is in question? In his absence we can neither judge him, nor declare him contumacious, because, in the first place, in the beginning, he presented himself before the judges, and, above all, because no one has ever yet seen a Pope judged by Bishops." Before the dissolution of the synod the Bishops exhorted the priests who sided with the senatorial party to return to obedience. But the parties addressed declined to follow this advice, and the schism continued, for, though a majority of the clergy and people were with Symmachus, the Senate and an influential minority of ecclesiastics were strongly opposed to him.

In a still further effort to reconcile parties at Rome a synod

composed of eighty-one Bishops and thirty-seven Roman priests met the following year (502) in St. Peter's, under the presidency of the Pope. The only business of importance transacted, however, related to Church property. By order of the Pope the deacon Hormisdas read to the council a document bearing on this subject, having reference to the decision of an assembly of the Roman clergy, held in the mausoleum of St. Petronilla, adjoining St. Peter's, some twenty years earlier, in the interregnum following the death of Pope Simplicius. The tenor of this document was to the effect that, at the suggestion of Cæsina Basilius, Prefect of the pretorium to King Odoacer, the aforesaid priests had adopted a resolution prohibiting the future Pope from alienating Church property, and in addition a claim was made in behalf of Odoacer that he should have the right of confirming the Pope about to be elected.

The assembly of 502 listened with indignation to the reading of this production, which showed a barbarian king endeavoring to emulate in their pretensions over the Church the Eastern emperors. The synod at once pronounced the decree null and void and prohibited the civil authorities from in future enacting laws relative to ecclesiastical property.

The question of principle thus disposed of, Pope Symmachus, who had been accused by his adversaries of squandering the goods of the Church, at once issued, with the assent of the synod, a decree in the same sense as that just revoked, only more precise in its regulations; in future no Pope might alienate, by sale or exchange, the property of the Church, the revenues from which were to be expended for the maintenance of the clergy, of prisoners and strangers.

The enemies of Symmachus maintained their attitude of opposition several years after this date. This they were able to do by the indirect connivance of Theodoric, who, weary of unsuccessful efforts to settle the Roman question, permitted the senatorial party to bring back to Rome the old rival of Symmachus, Laurentius, again in the character of anti-Pope. Eventually, however, Theodoric was persuaded by Dioscorus, deacon of Alexandria, to suppress the activities of Festus, the chief cause of all the trouble; this done, opposition to the Pope in a great measure disappeared and Laurentius passed the remainder of his days in retirement.

Hormisdas succeeded Symmachus on the Papal throne in 514, and appears to have been a candidate acceptable to all parties in Rome. This fact proved all the more fortunate in that, within a few months after his accession, advances were again made by Constantinople to the Pope with a view to bringing to an end the schism that, for too long a period, had divided East and West.

The circumstances under which negotiations were again resumed were as follows. After the deposition in 511 of the Patriarch Macedonius II., a priest named Timothy, persona grata to the Emperor Anastasius, was chosen his successor. The new Patriarch accepted the Henoticon, but in his synodica he observed complete silence as to the Tome and Chalcedon. John Nikaiotes, of Alexandria, attempted to draw from Timothy an explicit declaration on these two points, but received a rebuke for his pains. Yet the two Patriarchs entered into communion, although Nikaiotes openly repudiated the Tome and the council. Alexandria and Constantinople being thus again united, the Emperor experienced little further difficulty in obtaining for his Patriarch general recognition; the Bishops of Palestine and Syria, however, merely received the synodica of Timothy, which was free from heresy, but declined to approve the deposition of Macedonius. The orthodox leaders in the Orient, Flavian, Patriarch of Antioch, and Elias of Jerusalem, were deposed, and monophysite successors, Severus at Antioch, John in Jerusalem, appointed in their stead.

But popular opposition to the Emperor's will in his capital still continued, and at one time became so serious as almost to cost Anastasius his throne. It appears that some years before this crisis in the reign of Anastasius, and while Macedonius still occupied the patriarchal chair, a party of monophysites, on a certain occasion, had attempted, first in a chapel of the imperial palace and later in the basilica of St. Sophia, to sing the Trisagion with the heretical addition, "Who for us was crucified." A riot followed of so grave a character that the Emperor was for the moment obliged to yield. But after the exile of Macedonius, Anastasius renewed the attempt to introduce monophysitism into the liturgy through the chanting of a phrase distinctively monophysite in signification. Accordingly, by imperial direction, on a Sunday in November, 512, the choir of St. Sophia again chanted the heretical ending to the Trisagion. The result again was a riot, which in the course of a few days developed into a rebellion of such proportions that the aged Emperor, in the Circus Maximus, proffered his resignation of the imperial sceptre. The people, however, for the second time, accepted his assurances and left him in peace.

But, as usual with Anastasius, the insincerity of his yielding became apparent the first favorable opportunity. He began his reign probably wholly indifferent to the religious issue, whereas towards its close, he demanded explicit acceptance of the Henoticon, and therefore when circumstances, after the incident described in the Circus Maximus, seemed propitious, persecution of the Chalcedonians again became the order of the day.

The consequence was a new revolt, this time headed by an officer of the imperial army, of Gothic descent, named Vitalian. Vitalian was not in reality much interested in the theological controversy that distracted the empire, but he had personal grievances against the Emperor which he saw a way of avenging by a pretense of zeal for orthodoxy. The rebellious officer, accordingly, at the head of an army of Huns, devastated the provinces of Thrace and Mysia, after which, advancing on Constantinople, he inflicted a disastrous defeat on Hypatius, the Emperor's nephew, who had been sent against him with an army of 80,000 men. In a naval engagement Vitalian was also victorious, and thus was able to advance to the neighborhood of the capital, where the Emperor was compelled to accept his terms.

These terms included the appointment of Vitalian as Magister Militum of Thrace, the restoration of the banished orthodox Bishops, especially Macedonius and Flavian, to their sees, and the convocation of a general council at Heraclea, in Thrace, under the presidency of the Pope.

In fulfillment of the last part of this convention Anastasius wrote to Pope Hormisdas two letters, dated December 28, 514, and March 28, 515, to which the latter responded in a friendly manner. Subsequently the Pope sent a delegation, headed by Ennodius, Bishop of Ticinum, to Constantinople for the purpose of continuing negotiations for the reunion of the Eastern and Western portions of the Church.

The conditions laid down by Hormisdas to this end were presented with all due moderation, but on examination they were found to be substantially the same as those demanded by his predecessors. The Pope asked, first of all, recognition of the Council of Chalcedon and the acceptance of Leo's Tome. In the next place he stipulated that Nestorius, Eutyches, Dioscorus, Acacius and their followers should be condemned, and, finally, that the exiled orthodox Bishops should be restored, particular cases to be judged on their merits by the Apostolic See.

The Emperor yielded on all points, save that of the condemnation of Acacius, which, he claimed, public opinion in the East would not tolerate. It is more than likely, however, that the defeat, shortly after the opening of negotiations, of Vitalian by Justin, the future Emperor, had rendered Anastasius indifferent to the ending of the schism. Still, the feeling on the subject in Constantinople was too strong, the desire for reunion too ardent, to allow the matter to drop altogether. In July of the following year (516), accordingly, Anastasius sent two court officers, Theopompus and Severianus, to Rome with letters for the Pope and the Senate. The Pope

was not at all pleased that two laymen, whom he subsequently discovered to lean towards monophysitism, had been entrusted with ecclesiastical negotiations. Indeed, Hormisdas began to have serious doubts as to the good faith of the Orientals, as we learn from a letter he wrote at this time to Avitus, Bishop of Vienne. "As to the Greeks," declared the Pope, "they proffer vows of peace with the mouth rather than with the heart, and their words are more fair than their acts." However, he continued negotiations and dispatched to the East a second embassy. But neither party would yield the point at issue, the consequence being that things remained in statu quo until the sudden death of Anastasius, July 8, 518. Some months previously the Patriarch Timothy had preceded the Emperor to the grave and was succeeded by John II., a Patriarch, who, while at heart orthodox, yet had subscribed the condemnation of the Council of Chalcedon.

The successor of Anastasius was his Captain of the Guard, Justin, the conqueror of Vitalian, who in religious matters proved an adherent of orthodoxy. The consequences of this fact were soon apparent in ecclesiastical affairs. A first indication of the changed conditions manifested itself in the conduct of the Patriarch John, who, at the urgent demand of the people, publicly professed the faith of Chalcedon and restored to the diptychs the names of Pope Leo, Euphemius and Macedonius. To give greater authority to this act the Patriarch convened a synod which met at Constantinople, July 20, 518, under the presidency of the Archbishop of Heraclea. Forty-three Bishops were present, but the Patriarch did not assist at the sessions. The synod approved of what the Patriarch had already done, and through John, at the request of the orthodox monks of the capital, petitioned the Emperor for the restoration of the exiled Bishops. The council also condemned and deposed Severus, the monophysite Patriarch of Antioch.

Three synods held the same year, in Jerusalem, in Tyre and Syria II., followed the lead of Constantinople, and in general throughout the empire a reaction towards orthodoxy began with the accession of Justin. Negotiations were again resumed with Rome by a letter from the Patriarch John informing Pope Hormisdas of the decisions of the Synod of Constantinople. The Patriarch asked that a new embassy be sent to the East for the purpose of ending the schism. A letter of like tenor was sent to Hormisdas by the Emperor's nephew, Count Justinian, inviting the Pope in person to Constantinople, and, in the event of his acceptance being impossible, requesting him to send plenipotentiaries. The invitation was forwarded to Rome by a high court functionary, Count Gratus.

In reply the Pope sent an embassy consisting of two Bishops, a priest and two deacons, with a Libellus which was to be signed by every Bishop who desired to enter into communion with Rome. This formula demanded the explicit condemnation of Acacius, the author of the schism, but made some concession on the question of his successors, the well-intentioned Patriarchs Euphemius and Macedonius, who were condemned only indirectly: "similarly," it read, "we anathematize Acacius, formerly Bishop of Constantinople, who made himself accomplice and follower of these heretics (Eutyches. Dioscorus, etc.), together with all who persevered in their fellowship and communion." Seeing no way out of the matter, since everybody wanted reunion, the Patriarch John subscribed the Libellus, and subsequently the names of the three Patriarchs, Acacius, Euphemius and Macedonius, with those of the Emperors Zeno and Anastasius, were, in the presence of the Papal Legates, removed from the diptychs.

Thus ended the first serious breach between Rome and Constantinople. To regard the outcome merely as a triumph of an ambitious Papacy over the civil power, as is frequently done, is wholly to mistake the character of the issue between Eastern and Western Christendom at the beginning of the sixth century. Briefly stated, this was the right of the Church to freedom of action in her own sphere, a right, as we have seen, ignored and set aside in a more flagrant manner by the Emperors Zeno, Basiliscus and Anastasius than even by any of their predecessors. The two former of these Emperors went so far as to anathematize those who would not accept their pronouncements in a matter of faith, and all three agreed in rejecting the dogmatic decision of an occumenical council, substituting in its place a dogmatic decision of their own.

Were such acts allowed to pass unchallenged, the Church would soon have degenerated into a mere governmental department of the State. In the East, we have seen, no serious resistance to their action was attempted, but, on the contrary, an ambitious Patriarch of Constantinople, Acacius, threw all the weight of his influence into the opposite scale. In other words, Acacius was guilty of doing all in his power to establish a precedent which would enslave the Church of which he was one of the highest officials. Yet some sentimentalists regard the Pope's insistance, in the reign of Justin, on excluding his name from the diptychs of the Church he betrayed as cruel!

The Popes of this period, on the other hand, with the growing consciousness of their responsibilities noted in a previous paper, would make no compromise of essential principles. They realized to the full that they were the divinely appointed guardians of the

deposit of the faith, and that in consequence, no matter how apparently advantageous a compromise like the Henoticon might at first sight appear, they could not, without betrayal of trust, accept this via media out of the difficulty. Had Felix III., Gelasius or Hormisdas followed the lead of Acacius in rejecting an œcumenical council in favor of an imperial pronouncement on a question of faith, the authority of conciliar decisions would have been forever undermined. But so far were these Popes from acting in this way that, however much allowance they might be disposed to make for Euphemius and Macedonius, yet even these, because they persisted to the end in upholding Acacius, had to be regarded as schismatics and as such excluded from communion with the Universal Church.

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## THE WORDSWORTHIAN THEORY OF SOLITUDE.

I learned betimes to stand unpropped,
And independent musings pleased me so,
That spells seemed on me when I was alone.
Yet could I only cleave to solitude
In lonely places; if a throng was near,
That way I leaned by nature. For my heart
Was social, and loved idleness and joy.

—The Prelude.

E ARE all acquainted with the Wordsworth of "independent musings" and strange cleavings to solitude; but the Wordsworth whose heart was social, the lover of idleness and joy, must speak from the pages of "The Prelude" or else forever hold his peace. And yet, once he has spoken, we discern that the poet knew his own heart. The recluse is the complement of the lover of society, and both may be clearly traced through the simple intricacies of the Wordsworthian palimpsest. century the author of "The Prelude" lived in the romantic seclusion of Grasmere Vale, first at Dove Cottage, near the northern end of the lake, and later at Rydal Mount, on the road to Ambleside. There he marveled at the echoing shout of the cuckoo, mysteriously reflected from the slanting hillsides; there, while wandering "lonely as a cloud," he chanced upon the daffodils and attended their dance without an invitation; there, as a boy, with his sister Dorothy, he chased the butterfly, a very hunter, rushing on his prey.

> With leaps and springs I followed on from brake to bush; But she, God love her, feared to brush The dust from off its wings.

Dorothy never counted for society; she was the poet's other self. In long walks with her under the blue witchery of encalmed skies, past daisy-rimmed riverbeds, he spelled out the meaning of the fair vistas before him. From that first childish uplift of the heart upon beholding a rainbow over a Westmoreland meadow, his sympathies ripened and deepened until his soul compassed a charity so catholic that it embraced not only the thrilling harmonies of "the deep power of joy," but also the subtler minor chords of "the still sad music of humanity." The deep power of joy rings clear and triumphant in many of the shorter poems, such as "To the Green Linnet," "To a Highland Girl" and "The Primrose of the Rock;" the still sad music of humanity becomes thematic in the story of Margaret, the afflicted; in the tale of the old Cumberland Beggar; in the impressive annals of the leech-gatherer on the lonely moor, and in the melancholy narrative of the forsaken Michael sitting broken-hearted against the gray stone pile that never grew to be a sheepcote. Thus there are two sides to Wordsworth, a social and a solitary. In virtue of the one he holds that "the mind of man is a thousand times more beautiful than the earth on which he dwells:" that man himself is the crown of all visible natures. "a being first in every capability of rapture, through the divine effect of power and love." In virtue of the other, he writes:

> When from our better selves we have too long Been parted by the hurrying world and droop, Sick of its business, of its pleasures tired, How gracious, how benign, is Solitude.

Wordsworth was a social solitary who loved not man the less, but nature more. Since solitude is the test of the strong, the laureled are predestined to loneliness. All the saints have loved the desert. The Master Himself set the example. Of His thirty-three years here on earth thirty belong to the period known as the hidden life and only three to the public ministry. When Paul received the revelation which was to determine the future course of his days he records that he conferred not with flesh and blood, but went into the fastnesses of Arabia. It was three years before he came forth, and then it was for the purpose of spending fifteen days in conference with the chief of the Apostles. Elijah within his secret cave; John the Baptist crying out from his wilderness; Thomas a'Kempis meditating in his narrow cell; Loyola framing his high plans in the sepulchral grotto of Manresa—such men are isolated of necessity by the largeness of their aims and the altitude of their souls. Even genius of a natural order requires protection from the free-for-all fumes of publicity. The vine-clad hills of Italy produced Virgil; an exile more bitter than death nourished the soul of Dante; the bonny fields of Ayrshire gave us Burns; and Surrey and the Isle of Wight are jointly responsible for Tennyson. "An artist," says Ruskin, "should be fit for the best society and should keep out of it." Chopin, Wagner and Beethoven lived their higher lives when they followed this advice; Bunyan, Milton and Cervantes are never-dying examples of the efficacy of its application. Bunyan saw the light of the New Jerusalem through the iron gratings of Bedford Jail; Milton closed his eyes upon the gardens of earth before he opened them upon the garden of Paradise, and Cervantes in prison with his one poor arm wrote our gladdest, and all but our saddest book, and called it "Don Quixote."

But there are diseased and distorted forms of solitariness. Byron and Thoreau are of this cynical, satirical, misanthropic type. Byron, though never an out-and-out pessimist, had his fits of rebellion against the constituted order of things. Then out of the quakerent vents of his volcanic soul he would send forth harmonies of hate:

I have not loved the world, nor the world me. I have not flattered its rank birth, nor bowed To its idolatries a patient knee, Nor coined my cheek to smiles, nor cried aloud In worship of an echo. In the crowd They could not deem me one of such; I stood Among them, but none of them.

Yet must we not forget that other Byron—the courageous republican, the liberal in politics; the hater of despotism in every form; the martyr to the revival of the Hellenic spirit and the restoration of the glory that was Greece. His outbursts against man and society are transitory eclipses of his truer, deeper self. Thoreau was more consistent in his incivism. In his hermitage at Walden he had three chairs, "one for solitude, two for friendship and three for society." "But," he hastens to explain, "I never found the companion that was so companionable as solitude. While I have the friendship of the seasons I trust that nothing can make life a burden to me. . . . Why should I be lonely? Is not our planet in the Milky Way?" His sentiments on retirement and the healing power of nature are uniformly sound; the stars are not more numberless than the hearts that they have comforted. But when after pages of rarely beautiful, natural description we come suddenly into an icy sea of scorn drifting manward we begin uneasily to reach for charts and compasses. There is no wisdom in trusting a pilot who is not a lover of his kind. "The names of men," he writes, "are as cheap and meaningless as Bose and Tray, the names of dogs. I will not allow mere names to make distinctions for me; but still see all men in herds. . . . more men than usual lately, and well as I was acquainted with one, I am surprised to find what vulgar fellows they are. They

do a little business each day to pay their board; then they congregate in sitting rooms and feebly fabulate and paddle in the social slush." To his disdain for mankind in general he joins a towering approval of himself. "I am not afraid of praise," he writes, "for I have tried it on myself. The stars and I belong to a mutual admiration society." And again: "Mine is a sugar to sweeten sugar with; if you will listen to me, I will sweeten your whole life." Strange misdirection of love, attempting to live from within, when of necessity it must fare forth to enrich the heart of a brother before it can return to gladden the sender. Poor Thoreau! He harmed himself more than anybody else with the dreary burden of his Walden philosophy.

To the dreamer at Grasmere were unfolded the sibylline leaves of the same green and blue book bound within earth and sky. He, too, was a lover of streams and woods. But he lingered in their mossy haunts not to brood over imagined woes, nursing contempt and hatred for the kindly race of men. Solitude for him was opportunity for a threefold commerce: communion with nature, with his own soul and with God. For as Sir Thomas Browne opined, "there is no such thing as solitude, nor anything that can be said to be alone and by itself, save God, who is His own circle and can subsist by Himself." Wordsworth was too sweetly reasonable to gloom much over his own miseries. Refreshed and strengthened by meditation upon the glories of creation and the divine perfections of their fashioner, he descended from the mountains of contemplation bearing tidings of joy to the valley-dwellers below. Nature smiled upon him and he smiled back in return. Through his sonnets on the River Duddon we may glimpse the reaction of his heart to that external world which sometimes seemed so unreal to him, as he tells us in one of his notes, that he was forced to grasp at a wall or a tree to recall himself from tempting abysses of idealism back to the commonplaces of a workaday realism. Come and see this stream, he invites his readers. And as we walk by his side the music of his words blends with the murmur of the torrent. Duddon is fairer than Bandusia, beloved of the Sabine farmer, he continues. It outrivals the flower-margined fountains of Persia and the ice-arched rapids of the Alps. Along its banks hang clustering alders, quivering aspens and silver colomades of birch. The birds jubilate in its thickets; the bees ply their harmless robberies among its flowers. Wild strawberry, trembling eyebright and purple thyme enamel its emerald bed. The rill widens into a brook, the brook into a bridge-spanned ribbon of light with hamlets, chapels, towns and towers nestling in its ever-widening valley. It reaches the plain of Donnerdale, and here the poet would

willingly linger, for this valley is haunted by memories of faces smiling in death and by ghosted dreams of a past that is gone beyond recall. But the river rushes on impatiently to join the Thames; bards may come and bards may go, but it flows on forever. And the current has its desire. Its waters mingle with the lordly volume of the London stream and its spirit is at rest. At rest, but with no visible cessation of its flowing:

Still glides the stream, and shall forever glide, .
The Form remains; the Function never dies;
While we, the brave, the mighty and the wise,
We men, who in our morn of youth defled
The elements, must vanish; be it so.
Enough if something from our hands have power
To live and act and serve the future hour,
And if, as toward the silent tomb we go,
Through love, through hope, through faith's transcendent dower,
We feel that we are greater than we know.

The River Duddon reveals Wordsworth in a passive mood, his senses open to the light and color, the form and substance of earth and sky and water. But he knew moments of profounder imaginative insight when his soul became intensely responsive to the symbolic significance of nature, to the possible directness of its mediation between God and man as the ever-renewed hem of a garment in whose touch lay strength and healing. He had something of that cast of mind which prompted the ancient Greeks to believe that every lovely grove and blue-topped knoll in Hellas screened a presiding deity; something of that tendency to a mystical translation of things material which led Newman to conceive the cosmos as the unfolding of a divine schema through the activity of angelic intelligences. The latter thesis converts the so-called laws of nature into methods adopted by choirs invisible for the furthering of that "one divine far-off event towards which the whole creation moves." Such a point of view has doubtless some obscure association with those animistic and pan-psychic explanations of force and matter which crop out from time to time in ancient philosophies and modern heresies under titles as various as the fantasies of their framers. It vivifies the inanimate and brings it nearer to man. So near, indeed, that for Wordsworth the dividing line between his perceptive powers and the perceived world at times fades out completely, leaving him to dream dimly of mortal life as swinging between two eternities—zeons of existence prior to this earthly one and cycles sempiternal beyond the lotus-crowned portals of the Ivory Gate. As for the informing spirit of the universe, he could imagine it only as an omnipresent principle of motion, a worldsoul, multiple-mooded as life, invariable and irrevocable as the tomb. These are "the obstinate questionings, failings from us, vanishings, blank misgivings of a creature moving about in worlds not realized"

which inspire a song of thanks and praise in the "Ode on the Intimations of Immortality." For these vague stirrings of unrest are the shadowy recollections of that life before life when the soul stood winged before the archetypal truth which is one with all beauty and goodness. Through these fugitive moments of vivid reminiscence he regains his vision of nature as an ideal personality, a conserver of golden arcana for the elect, an angel with a flaming sword pacing the shores "of that immortal sea which brought us hither." And youth, he tells us, is the time for these high visionings, these illuminating remembrances of the divine perfections; solitary study, intense desire and meditative peace are the inspiring conditions. He recalls how in his own early days, turning the mind in upon herself, he "pored, watched, expected, listened, spread his thoughts;" how he experienced "visitings of the upholder of the tranquil soul;" and how he was as sensitive to these visitings as waters to skyey influences, as obedient as an Æolian harp to the magic touchings of the wind. And at last when the years had rolled round, when the orient light of youth had faded into the gray of common day, though nothing could bring back his boyhood's sense of splendor in the grass, of glory in the flower, still he concludes:

> We shall grieve not, rather find Strength in what remains behind; In the primal sympathy Which, having been, must ever be; In the soothing thoughts that spring Out of human suffering; In the faith that looks through death; In years that bring the philosophic mind.

His sympathy with nature was, as he tells us himself, "a passion, a rapture often, an immediate love ever at hand." And yet he is not, as we so often read, simply a poet of nature. His theme is that of all great singers—the soul of man. And there is nothing) year factoring finer or sweeter, nothing better worth singing about in all the world. His delight in solitude is largely delight in introspective contemplation of his own unuttered yearnings, his airy imaginations, the creative energy of his own volitional powers. He glorified both soul and body. The picture of the shepherd in "The Prelude" "beyond the boundary line of a hill-shadow," standing with arms upraised against the setting sun, "like an aerial cross stationed alone upon a spiry rock of the Chartreuse for worship" is unforgettable. "Thus," the poet continues.

> "was man Ennobled outwardly before my sight, And thus my heart was early introduced To an unconscious love and reverence Of human nature; hence the human form To me became an index of delight, Of grace and honor, power and worthiness."

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While his primary impulses may have been as social as "The Prelude" proclaims, it is evident that his knowledge of the heart of man is the product of solitary speculation rather than the residue of experimental contact with the world of human kind. Only a right beautiful soul can rejoice and be glad in its own society. We may forego self-approval in a crowd, but we must have it in a hermitage. There was no narrow egotism in Wordsworth's reverent faith in his own soul. Never did he forget that solemn matin hour when, after a night spent in dancing, gayety and mirth, he walked home alone through the coolness of the wind-swept mountain paths. While his senses were drinking in the beauty of the dawn-drenched peaks his heart was accepting a call to the transcendent service of poethood. "I made no vows," he writes in all simplicity, "but vows were made for me; bond unknown to me was given, that I should be, else sinning greatly, a dedicated spirit." This ordination as an hierophant of the beautiful was preceded by a novitiate of solitude. When a boy at Cambridge he had "relaxed the bonds of indolent society" at times to live his own life in his own way. An overfondness for freedom made him turn from all restraints and conventions, even from regulations of his own making. He reveled in a "luxurious gloom of choice," in "pensive skies, sad days, twilight rather than dawn, autumn than spring." And he dreamed of noble aims and worthy deeds, dreams which came true at last, as dreams always do in the end. He aspired even to the stars. He recognized his own wistful longings as fit themes for harmonies that should endure; his own soul as worthy of fellowship with the immortals.

Those were the days Which also first emboldened me to trust With firmness, hitherto but slightly touched By such a daring thought, that I might leave Some monument behind me which pure hearts Should reverence.

From nature, through man to God; this is the Platonic ladder of the ascent of love. And this is the order of its awakening in the calm placidities of Wordsworth's soul. Solitude for him is, as the neo-Platonist Plotinus would have phrased it, "a flight of the alone to the Alone." For him the end of life is not action, but impassioned contemplation; not having or doing, but a certain attitude of mind born of the soul's exultation as it gazes upon "the colorless, formless, intangible essence" of the Phaedrus. To those experiencing this rapture earth and man become palpable revelations of the Unseen; the meanest flower that blows is linked with all that is best in the universe; and the stars with their marshaled mazes of light point to order, purpose, even love, as the basic explanation of things. The stars fill his being with

A pleasure quiet and profound, a sense Of permanent and universal sway And paramount belief; there, recognized A type, for finite natures, of the one Supreme Existence, the surpassing life Which to the boundaries of space and time, Of melancholy space and doleful time, Superior and incapable of exchange, Nor touched by welterings of passion, is And hath the name of—God.

But being a mystic, he is not satisfied with any disclosure of the divine nature short of an actual unveiling. He seeks immediate experience of God. He is familiar with those ecstasies

In which the burden of the mystery, In which the heavy and the weary weight Of all this unintelligible world Is lightened; that serene and blessed mood In which the affections gently lead us on, Until the breath of this corporeal frame And even the motion of our human blood Almost suspended, we are laid asleep In body, and become a living soul, While with an eye made quiet by the power Of harmony and the deep power of joy, We see into the life of things.

No wonder he loves solitude when it brings him such visions beatific. No wonder the words recluse, alone, seclusion, hermitage and others of kindred connotation are more numerous than any others in his treasury of favorites. No wonder that his heart went out to monks and monasteries; that "the silence visible and perpetual calm" of the Grand Chartreuse should have appealed to him so strongly. He never experienced a sense of loneliness. His hours apart from men were filled with the silences of nature and of God—silences more soul-satisfying than the most haunting melodies of human love, when love attempts utterance.

Thus the Wordsworthian theory of solitude is thoroughly social in its implications. It has nothing in common with the diseased agoraphobia of a churlish Diogenes, a pessimistic Calvin or a selfcentred Thoreau. The aspects of solitude cannot be studied to advantage in these azotic forms. The social solitaries set the norm for all those not especially called to the heights of a purely contemplative life. This norm requires rhythmic alternations of solitude and society in about equal proportions. Noble souls are as sensitive to the harmonies of social life as they are to the melodies of individual life. It is perfectly natural at times to desire isolation. One cannot live forever before the crowd; there are moments and aspirations that are unsharable. Even the genial author of the "Biglow Papers" complains of "the times when he's unsocial as a stone, and sort of suffocates to be alone." It is also perfectly natural to desire sympathy and companionship. Love and friendship are holy things. "For fate," we read in one of the "Aristoclean

Dialogues," "which has decreed that there shall be no friendship among the evil, has also ordained that there shall be friendship among the good." Wordsworth was of those who can love and be loved. To his sister and to his wife he opened his soul without reservation; to Coleridge he gave the one deep friendship of his life. Coleridge was a frequent caller at Dove Cottage. Dorothy writes in her journal delightful records of these delightful visits. On one such occasion, she tells us, "we paced the gardens until moonrise, at I o'clock, brother, Coleridge and I. Then I read Spenser to them, and we had a midnight tea." To this same small white house came Southey, De Quincey, Humphry Davy, Walter Scott, with his wife, and many another notable. They were always sure of a cordial welcome, of Dorothy's warm hospitality and the sursum corda of Wordsworth's lofty soul. But in addition to this life with men, the soul of the singer at Grasmere led another and a deeper one, a life "retired as noontide dew, or fountain in a noontide grove." Alone with nature and with God he set himself the task of working out a theory of Beauty which should be all inclusive—a rainbow arc with Truth and Goodness for its limiting points. This was to be his cenotaph, his monument that should merit the admiring reverence of the pure of heart. And he accomplished his purpose. The world is richer for his days at Cambridge, for his "leanings to the throng," his "unprofitable talks at morning" and the desultory reading done in "hours of idleness and joy:" richer, too, for the long years at Grasmere when the small spaces of Dove Cottage or the larger ones in the house on Rydal Mount echoed with the converse of good friends and true; but richest, no doubt, in the harvest of those quiet moods, when he gave himself up to "independent musings;" when he escaped the world of sense and ventured forth into the deeps of the spiritual universe. In those moments of vision he never knew whether he was in the body or out of the body, but only that some mighty joy had overshadowed his soul, and that it gladdened him to be alone.

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## BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH PROTESTANTISM.\*

HE appearance of the third volume of Professor Gairdner's great historical work, "Lollardy and the Reformation in England," shows that that distinguished writer is determined to persevere with the task to which he has devoted the remaining years of his life, that, namely, of tracing the story of the origin of English Protestantism. In his earlier volumes Mr. Gairdner showed in the clearest possible manner that the first of the so-called English Reformers were the natural successors of the earlier Lollards, whose wild, blasphemous and immoral doctrines closely resembled in many respects those of the latter-day Modernists. The Professor is himself a Protestant, but he is an honest searcher after truth, and although his inherited prejudices still hamper him in some degree, his sincere desire to maintain absolute impartiality generally enables him to keep them under control. It was, of course, as impossible for him as it is impossible for any trustworthy Catholic historian to ignore the existence of certain grave scandals in ecclesiastical administration and in the management of certain religious houses, but he never seeks to confer on these an exaggerated importance or to misrepresent them as indicating the defectiveness of the doctrinal teaching of the So far from this being the case, he labors constantly to make plain that the religious theories promulgated by the Lollards and their successors were rightly condemned as heresies when first advanced, that those who thus condemned them were necessarily the best judges of what did and what did not accord with Catholic orthodoxy, and that, if they were heresies when first broached, nothing which has since occurred can have made them less heretical than they then were. From this standpoint Professor Gairdner refuses to allow himself to be moved by the angry expostulations of several Anglican writers of note, who realize that his line of argument completely knocks the bottom out of what is known as the theory of continuity, claiming as it does for the present Established or State Church of England lineal or continuous descent from the ancient Catholic Church which existed within that realm. If it were only for the steadfastness with which Mr. Gairdner upholds this view, Catholics would owe him a debt of gratitude, best repaid by fervent prayers that Almighty God may yet, in His infinite love and mercy, grant him grace and light sufficient to enable him to accept the true faith. The fact that he

<sup>\* &</sup>quot;Lollardy and the Reformation in England," by James Gairdner, C. B., LL. D., D. Litt. London, Macmillan & Co., Ltd., Vol. III.

is not yet able to do this only makes it the more clear to him that Catholicity is a creed separate and distinct in itself and that, whatever else it may be, it can never be and never has been either Lollardism or Protestantism. Therefore, he recognizes that to the true Catholic any system of religious teaching not Catholicism never has been and never can be anything but heretical and, therefore, un-Catholic. The truth of this proposition is as self-evident as any ever formulated by Euclid and proportionately deep is the chagrin of the Professor's Anglican critics.

The decrees of the Council of Trent, like the condemnation of Modernism by our present Holy Father, Pope Pius X., are alone sufficient to make clear to even the least well-informed Catholic that in both epochs certain manifestations of indiscipline and unbelief were visible, but it would be as palpably absurd at one period, as at the other, to argue that the upholders of the errors condemned, whether of conduct or of creed, were in accordance with Catholic discipline or doctrine. It is, unhappily, true that both Lollardism and Protestantism owed their foundation and propagation mainly to recreant clerics, acting in unison with avaricious and insubordinate laics. The actual difference between the modern Socialist and Wat Tyler and his brother Lollards was not so very great after all. So far as Protestantism-of the Reformation type—is concerned, after Elizabeth and James I. had moulded it to their own liking, it is abundantly evident that it became, as it still remains, a kind of hermaphrodite combination of heresy and Catholicism. The most cursory examination of the creed of the English Established Church will make plain to every one who cares to investigate it that it consists simply of a series of rejections of Catholic beliefs and of a series of acceptances of certain remnants of such beliefs. The resulting patchwork is alone sufficient to show that Anglicanism is merely a nondescript conglomeration or compromise which under no circumstances can ever have been entitled to be called Catholicism. Under such circumstances the continuity theory is something worse than ridiculous, and most reasonable folk will agree with Professor Gairdner when he says: "We shall never appreciate truly the ideas of our ancestors if we do not weigh their words; and I do not see how we are to understand their words if we presume that they continually misapplied them. They surely had some reason for calling heresy that which they did call heresy. And though, of course, as compared with ourselves, they were very ignorant in many things, yet on the whole they knew what they meant by the words they used just as well as we do." The contention is surely a valid one. Moreover, the mediæval Church—just as the Church of to-day—has

had ample warrant and justification in the counsels of St. Paul for banning and excluding heretics. Indeed, it was precisely on the principles laid down by the great Apostle that the Church has always acted in the past and still continues to act. The Professor says that the rulers of the Catholic Church "avoided the company of men marked as heretics whenever it was found that they could not be affected by admonitions; and the Church, when it failed to reconcile them, cast them off by excommunication, that they might not contaminate others. That was the utmost that the Church could do to them; and no one could treat another as an irreclaimable heretic until the Church had pronounced judgment upon him to that effect." No doubt, then, a great many very cruel and terrible things not seldom followed, but the mere fact that they did is the best possible proof that the secular body fully approved the decision of the spiritual. In connection with these we are reminded that: "Heresy being accounted a social danger, the penalty was a question concerning civil order rather than ecclesiastical. Burning for heresy, in truth, was not instituted by the Church, though the odium of it, in later times, was generally thrown upon the Bishops. Bishops may, no doubt, have approved of it as a painful necessity, just as at the present day they may approve of capital punishment for murder." The comparison seems quite natural and obvious, because heresy, if it is anything, is assuredly a murdering of the soul through the poisoning of conscience. From the days of the Lollards to our own time that which is now styled Protestantism has been undergoing a constant process of change, continuously disintegrating and ever drifting further and further away from the original basis of errors which was its first foundation. Lollardism begot Protestantism, but what has not Protestantism conceived and produced? Even now, after so many centuries. Modernism—the latest child of Protestantism -is only Lollardism revived-Lollardism with all its blasphemy, foulness and paganism. Progress is impossible for heresy unless it be progress of the kind which the reeling wanderer makes in the trackless and destroying sands of the desert in which he is doomed to perish. When Henry VIII. came to die he thought he was leaving England a stable religion. He had got rid of the Pope and substituted himself, but he had no mind for chaos. He had enriched himself and most of his subordinates by the plunder of the Church and of God's altars, but he clung to the Mass and the Most Holy Sacrament with a confidence unsurpassable when he came to die. The belief and practices he bequeathed to his Church of England are as completely banned to-day by the Parliament of Westminster as if they never existed. We are reminded

that "The King himself, apart from declining physical health, was probably worn out before he died by the constant strain put upon him by circumstances which were largely of his own creation. He must keep out the jurisdiction of 'the Bishop of Rome,' and even the use of the name by which other Christians called him." His other anxieties, domestic, international and financial, were tremendous, while, if he thought at all, his spiritual outlook must have been appalling. In the midst of his manifold perplexities he made his will, and in this testament proclaimed his faith in the Most Holy Sacrament—"left here with us in His Church militant" and invoked the prayers of the Blessed Virgin Mary and all the holy company of heaven at the hour of his death and through eternity. Moreover, he ordained that Mass should be celebrated at his funeral, while the deans and canons of Windsor were bequeathed lands worth £600 yearly to provide two priests to say Masses in perpetuity at "the altar to be made where we have before appointed our tomb to be made." A sermon was to be preached at Windsor every Sunday in the year to invoke prayers for his soul, while four solemn "obits," or requiems, were to be sung. This was the "Reformation" as it started. Professor Gairdner tells us what it became. It is well worth while following his narrative.

There can be no reasonable doubt that when Henry VIII. came to die and was making his will, invoking the intercession of the saints, as well as ordering the offering of the Most Holy Sacrifice of the Mass for the benefit of his soul, he desired to leave the religion of England-so far as doctrine was concerned-practically intact, save as regards the headship of the Church. Of his sin of schism he seems to have died unrepentant—he certainly offered no reparation for his rejection of the authority of the Holy See-but he shrank from the guilt of formal heresy in sacramental matters. As Dr. Gairdner says: "As regards the future of religion and government, it does not appear that the dying King, however penitent for his past evil ways, had any thought of giving up royal supremacy for his son, or of anything that looked like going backwards. The will, it is true, is silent upon this subject, but silence could only mean continuance of an existing rule. the executors were already committed to the repudiation of Papal supremacy, and the only man who would have brought it back was purposely left out of the King's will." This was Stephen Gardiner, Bishop of Winchester, who had long been one of the most capable, and certainly not the most scrupulous of Henry's advisers and instruments. In the old days of the divorce proceedings this prelate had been Wolsey's facile agent in carrying on the negotiations in Rome which resulted in the sad severance of England from the Papacy. Created Bishop of Winchester before this took place, he was ready enough, when it became an accomplished fact, to write and labor in defense of the new prerogative assumed by the tyrannous King, and to argue that to him, and not to the successor of St. Peter, belonged the supreme rulership of the Church in England. Nevertheless, he stood manfully for the preservation of the olden creed and practices in other respects, and seems to have generally been able to secure the countenance and support of Henry. To him was mainly due the enactment of the famous statute of the Six Articles which formally conferred the approval of Parliament on all the principal rules and beliefs of the Catholic Church in matters disciplinary and sacramental, denouncing against all who transgressed or renounced them penalties both tremendous and sanguinary. On the accession of Mary he was appointed Lord High Chancellor of England, and appears to have died fully repentant of the opportunism and subserviency which led him to forsake his sworn allegiance to the Holy See. On his deathbed he is said to have cried out: "I have denied with Peter, I have gone out with Peter, but I have not wept with Peter." Obviously, the omission of Gardiner's name from the roll of Henry's executors seems to indicate that his royal master was more indifferent as to the future of religion than his directions concerning his own funeral rites would at first glance indicate. The Tudor King was no fool, and he must have known perfectly well that the men to whom he specifically confided the guardianship of his boy son, Edward VI., as well as the practical rulership of his realm, were all imbued with the spirit of Lollardism and hostile to the olden teaching of the Church. It says something for Gardiner that, despite his initial fault, he opposed them persistently and suffered much rather than abandon sacred principles. Indeed, his acceptance of the royal supremacy may not inconceivably have been the outcome of a mistaken notion that by thus pandering to Henry's ambition and anger he might secure the defense and permanence of the majority of those essential articles of the Catholic faith which he knew to be in danger at the hands of the Lollardist faction. If this was his idea, it was marvellously well fulfilled so long as the King lived, simply because the latter trusted him and was generally content to accept his advice. When Henry died, however, chaos was inevitable. Those placed in office simply hated Gardiner and the teachings he upheld. The Bishop of Winchester only then realized how fatal to the authority, dignity and influence of the prelates of the Church in England had been the readiness displayed by him and others of their number to abandon their lovalty to the Vicar of Christ. If the successor of St. Peter was no longer head of the Church, what degree of respect or immunity from secular control could the Bishop of Winchester, whom he had appointed, hope to preserve? If one layman, in the person of Henry VIII., could lawfully rule the Church, why should not a group of two ecclesiastics and fourteen laymen—the King's executors—rule it equally lawfully? There really was not, nor is there now, any logical negative reply to these questions. One of the ecclesiastics was Cranmer, the other Bishop Tunstall, of Durham, a faithful copyist of Gardiner's time-serving tactics—willing to abandon the Pope if he could only purchase security for the sacraments. Personally, however, he was much less able and influential than the Bishop of Winchester, who possessed something approaching a European reputation.

Gardiner was soon to learn with the demise of Henry had come the end of any seeming usefulness of the new Catholicity separate from the Papacy. As promptly as possible he ordered a Solemn High Mass for Henry VIII. to be offered at Southwark; but certain players fixed the precise day, hour and locality for a burlesque performance in order to see which function would be most largely attended, as they themselves averred. These ribald folk were retainers of Lord Oxford's. Gardiner sent an urgent protest to Secretary Paget-one of the executors-urging him to prevent the outrage; but Dr. Gairdner has not been able to discover that his remonstrance was vouchsafed any real attention. One of the first acts of the late King's executors was to issue to all the Bishops of the kingdom new licenses to exercise episcopal jurisdiction in renewal of those granted unto them by Henry. Paget had the issuing of these licenses, and when Gardiner objected that they were unnecessary, replied expressing the satirical hope that he "could have such pliable will as could bear the reformation that should be thought meet for the quiet of the realm." Clearly, the spirit of Lollardism was about to assert itself, and Paget knew that he could with impunity jeer even at the Bishop of Winchester. Shortly after this certain divines were appointed to preach Lenten sermons in the presence of the boy King. They were all favorers of the "New Learning," as it was the fashion to style Lollardism or Protestantism, and their discourses were so redolent of heresy that Gardiner felt compelled to send a solemn protest to the Lord Protector Somerset, urging him to have a care how far he ventured to allow the essentials of religion to be assailed, at any rate while the King was still only a minor. Dr. Gairdner points out that in taking this line Gardiner maintained his consistency. He "had accepted royal supremacy under Henry VIII. as a virtual necessity, and had even defended it to an extent which he after-

wards regretted; for, being required to write, he had gone the length of palliating, if not actually vindicating, the executions of saintly men like Fisher and More." On all sides were evidences of impending change—everywhere demands for what was called "reform." Clearest proof of all! Archbishop Cranmer himselfin the words of the contemporary chronicler—"this year did eat meat openly in Lent in the hall of Lambeth, the like of which was never seen since England was a Christian country." The opportunist attitude so successfully kept up by Gardiner for years could not be maintained much longer. The extremists, the Lollardists, were determined to carry to the uttermost their carefully planned campaign for the destruction of Catholicity, and part of their scheme to this end involved the promotion of riots throughout the country. These outbreaks were ostensibly movements of the lower classes, whose theological scruples had been suddenly stirred by realization that images of our Lord, our Lady and the saints were unscriptural. The device was a shallow one, but it was intended to show the need for further and immediate alterations in the religion bequeathed to the nation by Henry VIII.

The Bishop was now fully realizing the folly of the course he had adopted and that a policy of mean opportunism could not possibly preserve the standards of religion. Henceforth he maintained a different attitude and one which reflected much more credit on him. He had already protested strongly against some of Ridley's sermons and against the preaching of most of the divines appointed by the Protector, in the name of the boy King, to deliver a series of Lenten addresses. Several of these orators openly and wantonly assailed Catholic teaching and in a special manner the observance of the holy season of Lent by fasting and penance. The whole thing, of course, was the outcome of a huge conspiracy. On the 3d of May, 1547, he was compelled to make further complaint regarding outrages which were being committed at Portsmouth, within his own Diocese of Winchester, which were merely typical of what was being witnessed in many other places. This protest was addressed to one Captain Vaughan, who appears to have been placed in a position of authority in that town by Somerset. Gardiner said that he had been informed of "a great and detestable innovation" therein, the images of our Saviour and the saints having been pulled down and destroyed. He declared that he wrote to both the Captain and the Mayor, because he regarded them as the King's chief ministers in the locality, and added that if things had not gone too far and the so-called Reformers, or as he rightly styled them, the Lollards, were not entirely beyond admonition, he would send a special preacher on the following Sunday to see what he could do to bring them to repentance, while he would never either preach himself or ask any other priest to preach to a crowd bent on the destruction of the sacred images; "for, as Scripture willeth us, we should cast no precious stones before hogs." He declared that those engaged in the iconoclastic campaign were hogs and worse than hogs, pointing out that: "In England they were called Lollards, who, denying images, thought there withal the crafts of painting and graving to be generally superfluous and naught, and against God's laws." Further, he declared that in Germany those who maintained that opinion were accounted the dregs of Luther's brewings, and Luther himself had written a book against them. When in Germany he had seen with his own eyes the images standing in all the churches wherein Luther was held in estimation. Still further, he pointed out that images were documents which even the unlettered could read.

Vaughan's method of treating this communication was to send it on to the Protector, to whom Gardiner had also written. Somerset dealt with the remonstrance in very leisurely fashion, and there can be no doubt that he desired the removal of the crucifixes and other holy figures. When his reply was sent at last it was a very elaborate document, and Mr. Gairdner expresses the theory that it was drafted by Cranmer. It opened with a suggestion that the Bishop was too easily alarmed and flurried and that the best way of preserving the statues from more widespread destruction was to display no anxiety when any of them were demolished. It was admitted that Henry had not desired the destruction of all images, but only of "such as did adulterate God's glory," and it was asked how could it be worse to burn a statue than a copy of the Bible, which was often done when certain people objected to a particular translation. Somerset, it will be seen, was merely jibing at Gardiner. Finally it was pretty plainly declared that wherever images became a cause of contention they were better removed than retained, and that had Gardiner acted on this principal there would have been no mob violence at Portsmouth. however, this elaborate piece of insolence had reached Gardiner the latter had again written Somerset complaining that he was allowing various unorthodox books to be put into circulation. the worst of these were from the pen of Bale, afterwards to become one of the Reformed Bishops. One of these eulogized Anne Askew, whom Henry VIII. burned because she denied the Real Presence, and the other offered equally extravagant homage to Luther, whose errors the late King had taken particular pleasure in confuting. On all sides there was a wild license in the matter of writing, and the most fantastic doctrines were being offered to the people, as if the Protector and his colleagues were bent on subverting all definite religion, although it was quite certain that Henry had desired nothing of the kind. Abominable songs and doggerel rhymes ridiculing the sacraments were being chanted in the streets, without effort to stay the scandal.

To this remonstrance Somerset replied in terms very similar to those in which he had answered the previous one. He declared that he conceived it originated mainly in the Bishop's great fear of innovations—a fear which he did not blame. He went on, however, to point out that the world was never so quiet or united that printers, players and preachers would not set forth somewhat of their own heads of which the magistrates were unaware. Gardiner had seen more than he had of those objectionable rhymes; but he must not lay them to the Protector's charge. Even under the tyranny of Rome, Pasquin spoke freely, and during the late reign in England many such things were unpunished. It seemed that Gardiner had been very much dissatisfied with the recent alleged recantation of Dr. Richard Smith, which seems, however, to have been genuine enough. To the Bishop of Winchester he was "omnis homo mendax," but Somerset insisted that he was a learned man and his recantation voluntary. As for Lent, the Protector saw no reason for its absolute abolition, unless the King with his Council issued an order to this effect. Inasmuch as he dominated both King and Council, Gardiner was unlikely to attach undue weight to this assurance. Finally, the Bishop was reminded that quiet might be as easily broken by jealousy as by carelessness. It will be seen that Somerset was merely fencing and playing with his Lordship, who already realized what a fool he had been and that the remnants of the Catholic faith in England was in dire peril. Once more he wrote to the Protector, telling of the outrages he had witnessed at Portsmouth, of a figure of the crucified Saviour with an eye drilled out and a hole cut in its side, as well as of his failure to arrest the guilty persons because they had been helped across the seas. In the course of this letter he gave a very interesting account of his relations with Henry VIII., which showed that that choleric monarch could on occasion tolerate frank advice, although when first offered he might resent it. The picture he drew showed the licentious King in better case than might be expected from his usual behavior. The truth probably is that Henry, whose natural ability for statecraft was undeniable, realizing that the more of the canonically appointed Bishops he could retain by him after his breach with the Pope the better it would be for himself, was determined not to quarrel with Gardiner. At any rate, the latter told Somerset that:

"When I saw in my doings was no hurt, and sometimes, by the occasion thereof, the matter amended, I was not so coy as always to reverse my argument; nor, so that his affairs went well, did I ever trouble myself whether he made me a wanton or not. And when such as were privy to his letters directed unto me were afraid I had been in high displeasure (for the terms of the letters sounded so), yet I myself feared it nothing at all. I esteemed him, as he was, a wise prince; and whatsoever he wrote or said for the present, he would after consider the matter as wisely as any man, and neither hurt nor inwardly disfavor him that had been bold with him; whereof I serve for a proof, for no man could do me hurt during his life. And when he gave me the bishopric of Winchester he said he had often squared with me, but he loved me never the worse; and for a token thereof gave me the bishopric. And once, when he had been vehement with me in the presence of the Earl of Wiltshire, and saw me dismayed with it, he took me apart into his bed chamber and comforted me, and said that his displeasure was not so much to me as I did take it; but he misliked the matter, and he durst more boldly direct his speech to me than to the Earl of Wiltshire. And from that day forward he could not put me out of courage, but if any displeasant words passed from him, as they did sometimes, I folded them up in 'the matter;' which hindered me a little. For I was reported unto him that I stooped not and was stubborn, and he had commended unto me certain men's gentle nature (as he called it) that wept at every of his words; and methought that my nature was as gentle as theirs, for I was sorry when he was moved. But else I know when the displeasure was not justly grounded in me, I had no cause to take thought, nor was I at any time in all my life miscontent or grudging at anything done by him, I thank God for it."

It is quite evident that something like mutual affection united Henry VIII. and the Bishop of Winchester, but it must not be forgotten that the latter had secured the confidence of the tyrant by an unscrupulous subserviency to his purposes, involving a base violation of his episcopal oath of loyalty to the Vicar of Christ. Indeed, it is abundantly plain that even at the time now under review Gardiner was still far from having returned to his true allegiance and was still cherishing the dream which he had helped to nurture in the fevered brain of Henry, that, namely, of a national Church under the headship of a lay sovereign and a lay Parliament. The best evidence of this is that while he was protesting to Somerset any alteration in the ancient Catholic ritual, or in the doctrine or sacraments of the Church, he was pointing out that: "Nothing would serve the policy of the Bishop of Rome

better than an alteration of religion during the King's minority, suggesting that whenever his authority was abolished religion would be changed with every change of government." This, of course, was the argument of a man who sought the perpetuation of schism.

At this precise moment, however, Cranmer, Archbishop of Canterbury, was pushing forward one of those schemes for the Lollardising of the Church in England to the accomplishment of which Gardiner so strongly objected and to the success of which his close association with Henry VIII. had been so long an obstacle. Two further letters from him to Somerset, both written in June, makes this plain. Cranmer was reviving a proposal for the use of certain homilies which had been the subject of discussion in convocation five years before (in 1542). Nothing had been done about them then, and Gardiner did not think it advisable, or even legitimate, to take action upon them now. It might even revive the "vain rumors" that had been stopped by the Protector's proclamation. The Archbishop's authority, however, prevailed, and the "First Book of Homilies" was issued on the 31st of July. The royal injunctions of Edward VI. were also issued on the same day. The Protector and the Archbishop had resolved to make some alterations in the King's name, even during his minority. Commenting on this development, Professor Gairdner says: "And thus began a new stage of the infant Reformation. A policy of innovation had triumphed, and royal supremacy was now to be the warrant even for acts done in a minority. Royal supremacy! Many men had been ill enough reconciled to that principle even in the days of Henry VIII. But it had been established in his days, not only by extraordinary skill and diplomacy in the first place, bringing about the submission of the clergy and the Act of Supremacy itself, but also by the ruthless way it was enforced against two or three small bands of martyrs, who could not be persuaded to give up allegiance to Rome. A few victims, brutally executed, were naturally quite enough; very few cared to follow them and merit death for the Pope's sake; and when Rome's authority was abolished there was no other authority in spiritual matters but the King's. Besides, in such things the majority of his subjects would naturally find it easier to trust a King who seemed so well versed in questions alike of Church and State. If this great, powerful, diplomatic sovereign knew his own ground in a controversy with the Pope, even though he did carry matters somewhat further than any of his predecessors had done, who among all his faithful liegemen was likely to take exception to his acts? But the authority of a boy stood quite on a different footing; and even in ordinary matters of government his father had attempted to guard against serious changes being made during any minority which might occur after his own day. For just after his marriage with Jane Seymour in 1536, the year before young Edward was born, Henry VIII. had procured an Act of Parliament to be passed, giving any of his successors who should come to the throne under age power to annul by letters patent any Acts of Parliament that had been passed during his earlier years as soon as he should reach the age of twenty-four. This statute, if it were allowed to remain in force, could not but act as a very serious restraint on unnecessary legislation during the minority; and it certainly seems to have been regarded by those who knew it as a provision that ought to have been respected. But of course no Act of Parliament could bind a future legislature, and as Somerset found it inconvenient he very soon got it repealed, as will presently be shown. Meanwhile, however, he was not to be restrained from doing precisely as he intended to do, even in matters concerning the Church." To the new "Homilies," Bonner, Bishop of London, refused to give more than a modified acceptance, while Gardiner refused to recognize them at all. Both were arrested and imprisoned in the Tower.

Gardiner had rejected the "Homilies" on the ground that they contained novel and heretical matter. Cranmer had him brought from the Tower to the house of the Dean of St. Paul's to discuss with him the "Homily on Salvation," but he could not accept the arguments with which he was sought to be convinced, and when the debate was over he wrote to Somerset: "Where Scripture and doctors want (fail) my Lord of Canterbury would fall to arguing and overcome me, that am called the sophister, by sophistry." A little later he wrote again: "I am charged that all the realm hath received these homilies without contradiction, save I: whereunto I answer, I think they have not read what I have read in these books." Even now, however, in the very midst of his battle for liberty, if not for life, he could not refrain from gibing at the Pope. Let us hear Professor Gairdner: "There was absolutely no justification for his cruel imprisonment except that he had an opinion of his own, for which he was prepared to give reasons. He was quite ready to yield to weightier reasons if they could be produced, and he had not been guilty of one act of disobedience. He pointed out that Cranmer's teaching on justification was, even by his own words, 'We be justified by faith without all works of the law: charity is a work of the law: ergo, we are justified without charity'—a conclusion which, even as a scholastic exercise, it would be difficult to defend; and Gardiner was ready to produce an answer made twelve hundred years before. But it was not necessary to import scholastic questions into 'the use and practice'

of the Church of England. 'And it was a terrible matter to think on,' he adds, 'to see such a contention to rise upon a matter not necessary to be spoken of. Wherein, if my Lord of Canterbury will needs travail, my judgment is that he shall never persuade that faith excludeth charity in justification, unless he borrow of your Grace's authority prisons; and then he shall percase have some agree unto it, as poor men kneel at Rome when the Bishop there goeth by-that is to say, are knocked on the head with a halbert if they kneel not; for that is one piece of the office of the Bishop of Rome's guard." All this time the Bishop was very ill, suffering much from his close imprisonment in the noisome atmosphere of the Tower, but his confinement gave him ample leisure to study the "Homilies," with the result that he declared them, as a whole, to be an "abomination." By this time the mob of London had got into the habit of assaulting and generally misusing priests whom they met in the thoroughfares of the city. So gross was the conduct of the assailants of the clergy even Somerset felt obliged to put some check on it. Accordingly, the following proclamation was issued:

"Forasmuch as the misorders of the serving men and other young and light persons and apprentices in London towards priests and those that go in scholars' gowns like priests hath of late, both in Westminster Hall and in other places of the City of London, been so great that not only it hath offended many men, but also (might?) have given great occasion, if on the parts of the said priests more wisdom and discretion had not been showed than of the other, of sedition and murder, or, at the least, of such other inconveniences as are not to be suffered in a commonwealth; as to the King's Highness and his most entirely beloved uncle, the Duke of Somerset, Governor of his most Royal Person and Protector of all his realms, dominions and subjects and the rest of his Majesty's Council, hath been credibly and certainly reported and showed: For reformation whereof the King's Majesty, by the advice of his said most dear uncle and other his Majesty's Council, willeth and straitly commandeth that no serving man nor apprentice or any other person, whatsoever he or they be, shall use hereafter such insolency and evil demeanor towards priests as reveling, tossing of them, taking violently their caps and tippets from them without just title or cause, nor otherwise to use them than as becometh the King's most loving subjects, one to do towards another, upon pain that whosoever shall do the contrary, and be upon the same taken with the manner, or if he shall appear upon complaint made by sufficient trial of witness or otherwise before the King's Highness' Council, or the Mayor, Sheriffs or other sufficient judges

to whom the complaint shall be made, the person thereof to be guilty; that then such offender or offenders, according to the quality of the fact for the time and place where it was committed, to suffer pain of imprisonment or other corporal pain to the example of all others, as to the discretion of the said Lord Protector, the King's Majesty's Council or of the judges before whom the same is proved, seem convenient, which shall be such that by the punishment of a few all others may be afraid to use such insolency, violency and ill demeanor against any of the King's Majesty's subjects.

## "God Save the King."

The compliment paid to the clergy in this proclamation for refraining from reprisals against their assailants not improbably signifies that they had many sturdy sympathizers whom they restrained. Somerset did not want the streets of the English capital filled with brawling rioters. Moreover, the first Parliament of the young King's reign had just been opened by him in person on the 4th of November—the proclamation was issued on the 12th—and although that assembly was packed from stem to stern, the Protector wanted all the leisure he could find to devote to its management.

Simultaneously with the opening of Parliament the two Houses of Convocation had assembled, and it was well known that the minor clergy, at any rate, were mostly desirous of securing to the Church some share of the liberties of which it had been deprived under Henry VIII. Four petitions were presented, respectively as follows:

"First, that ecclesiastical laws may be made and established in this realm by thirty-two persons, or so many as shall please the King's Majesty to name or appoint, according to the effect of a late statute made in the thirty-fifth year of the most noble King and of the most famous memory, King Henry VIII., so that all judges ecclesiastical, proceeding after those laws, may be without danger and peril.

"Also, that according to the ancient customs of this realm, and the tenor of the King's writs for the summoning of the Parliament, which be now, and ever have been, directed to the Bishops of every diocese, the clergy of the Lower House of Convocation may be adjoined and associated with the Lower House of Parliament; or else that all such statutes and ordinances as shall be made concerning all matters of religion and causes ecclesiastical, may not pass without the sight and assent of the said clergy.

"Also, that whereas, by the commandment of King Henry VIII.,

certain prelates and other learned men were appointed to alter the service in the Church, and to devise other convenient and uniform order therein, who according to the same appointment did make certain books, as they be informed; their request is that the said books may be seen and perused by them, for a better expedition of divine service to be set forth accordingly.

"Also, that men being called to spiritual promotions or benefices may have some allowance for their necessary living and other charges, to be sustained and borne, concerning the said benefices, in the first year wherein they pay the first-fruits."

Cranmer, who presided, favored none of these proposals, and they eventually came to nothing. He insisted that what was wanted most of all was such a reform of the Church as would get rid of "the remaining Papal abuses." By these words he referred to most of-the sacraments, as well as other things. No one, however, can tell the story of what actually happened better than Professor Gairdner. He says: "As early as the 12th of November a bill 'for the Sacrament of the Altar' was read in that house for the first time, and it obtained a second reading on the 15th. Moreover, on the 17th it was again read twice; but whether this particular bill went further is not clear. On the 26th a bill for receiving the sacrament under both kinds was read a first time. This was singular, for the proposal was not laid before Convocation till four days later. Then on the 3d of December a bill was introduced 'for the Sacrament of the Body and Blood of Christ,' which was committed to the judges, Marvin and Portman. On the 7th it seems to have been read a second time, and on the 10th it passed, notwithstanding the opposition of Bishops Bonner, of London; Thirlby, of Norwich; Skyp, of Hereford; Heath, of Worcester, and Day, of Chichester. It then went down into the Commons, where it received four successive readings and passed on the 17th. How to interpret all these facts precisely we do not know; but the definite issue was an Act of Parliament (I. Edw. VI., cap. I) punishing revilers of the sacrament and ordering that it should be hereafter administered in both kinds. And the reasons by which the former part of the Act was justified may undoubtedly be pondered with some profit historically. For in the preamble, among other things, we read as follows:

"The said sacrament . . . has been of late marvelously abused by such manner of men before rehearsed, who of wickedness, or else of ignorance and want of learning, for certain abuses heretofore committed of some in misusing thereof, having condemned in their hearts and speech the whole thing, and contemptuously depraved, despised or reasoned the same most holy and blessed

sacrament, and not only disputed and received unreverently and ungodly of that most high mystery, but also, in their sermons, preachings, readings, lectures, communications, arguments, talks, rhymes, songs, plays or jests, name or call it by such vile and unscennly words as Christian ears do abhor to hear rehearsed."

It was not without difficulty this measure, changing the entire system of administration of the Most Holy Sacrament, was forced through the House of Commons, while still greater opposition had to be overcome in the House of Lords, wherein it was first introduced. Here Gardiner could not play the part he would undoubtedly have liked to take, while eleven of the Bishops, whose sympathies were with him, were prevented attending. The five, however, who were present fought the bill step by step, and when it was passed in their despite, entered a solemn protest in the journals of the House.

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## CATHOLICISM AND ENGLISH LITERATURE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

T.

E PROPOSE in the following pages to examine the influence of Catholicism on three English Protestant authors of the eighteenth century, viz., the poet William Cowper; the author of "Robinson Crusoe," Daniel Defoe, and the novelist Samuel Richardson, premising that in Cowper's case the effect of intercourse with Catholics on his writings was almost entirely negative in its action, though on his private life it had a most salutary and happy influence. It was a ray of sunshine piercing the terrible gloom which overshadowed his soul from time to time, the gloom of religious mania, that most mysterious of all God's chastisements, into the direct presence of which we shrink from entering without due reverence, for we feel we are upon holy ground. It is with his life as expressed in his most delightful letters, rather than with his poetry, that we shall have to deal to illustrate the theme of this article.

William Cowper was born on November 26, 1731, at Great Berkhampstead, Hertfordshire, of which place his father was the rector; he was delicate from his infancy; he lost his mother, whose

picture he has immortalized in one of his poems, in 1737, and in 1741 was sent to Westminster School, where the gentle, sensitive boy suffered much from the tyranny and positive cruelty of his schoolfellows; on leaving school at eighteen he was articled for three years to a solicitor, a Mr. Chapman, and in 1748 entered the Middle Temple to finish his studies as a barrister. It was while living here that his first derangement attacked him in 1753. recovered from this and did not have another attack of melancholia until ten years later. He then left London and went at first to St. Alban's, to be under the medical care of a Dr. Cotton, for whom he always retained a warm affection. He now gave up his profession, for which he never seems to have had any attraction, and on recovering from his mental trouble gradually gave himself up to the pursuit of literature, for which he had always had a strong liking, and in 1765 went to Huntingdon to live. While here he made the acquaintance of William Unwin, a celebrated Evangelical clergyman, and his wife, and became a convert to the strictest form of Evangelicalism.

The two great religious movements of the time were among dissenters in Methodism, with Whitfield and Wesley as the leaders, and in the Established Church, Evangelicalism, where a form of Quietism also prevailed. The Methodists were far the most numerous; to them belonged the lower middle classes, while the Evangelical party embraced the clergy and the upper middle classes, with Lady Huntingdon at the head.

The acquaintanceship with the Unwins soon ripened into friendship, and culminated in the poet going to live with them, till Mr. Unwin was killed, two years later. As Cowper's attacks of madness always took the form of religious mania, the life at Huntingdon must have been especially bad for him, for the greater part of their days was spent in reading the Bible and attending church services and prayer meetings.

Mrs. Unwin was much younger than her husband, and at this time vas, even according to Lady Hesketh, Cowper's first cousin, who had no love for her, cheerful and blessed with a fund of quiet humor, though at the same time she was prim and extremely Puritanical. She seems to have been homely in her manner and tastes, rarely going into the little society the neighborhood offered and devoting herself to the care of Cowper, when his attacks of melancholia came on, with extraordinary devotion. After Mr. Unwin's death Cowper continued to live with his widow for the rest of her life; indeed, it was said that he contemplated marrying her, but this is denied by Southey in his life of Cowper, who says that

<sup>1 &</sup>quot;On the Receipt of My Mother's Picture," Cowper's poems.

their relations were always those of a son and a mother. In one of Lady Hesketh's letters<sup>2</sup> she says that the poet once told her that he had always looked upon Mrs. Unwin, who was seven years older than himself, as a mother. From the beginning of their acquaintance Cowper had been greatly drawn to her, and she for her part, being a woman of strong affections, lavished a mother's love and care upon the poet, whom she always addressed as Mr. Cowper, while he called her by her Christian name, Mary. His beautiful well-known lines "To Mary" are addressed to her.

In September, 1767, Mrs. Unwin and Cowper moved to Olney, into a dismal, prison-like, tumble-down old house near the worst part of Olney, which in its best locality is a most unattractive town, and the only person Cowper was on visiting terms with there was the curate, the celebrated John Newton, who was the magnet which drew Mrs. Unwin and the poet to Olney. The vicar was one Moses Brown, a pluralist and a non-resident parson, while John Newton was one of the most shining lights of the Evangelical Revival.

Mr. Newton acted as a sort of Protestant director to both Mrs. Unwin and Cowper, and showed his practical sense by making them move out of the damp, gloomy house they had chosen to one adjoining his in a better part of the town. His influence, however, had a disastrous effect on the sensitive, shy, delicate Cowper, whom he made pray aloud at public meetings and sent to visit the poor, and kept both him and Mrs. Unwin in a continual round of religious exercises, without allowing them any distractions, and as might have been foreseen, the unhappy poet was soon seized with another attack of melancholia. Seeing it coming on, Mr. Newton asked Cowper to contribute to the celebrated volume of Olney Hymns he was about to publish, but about this time the only brother of William Cowper died, and another derangement was the result. He now believed himself cut off entirely from Almighty God, and his mental sufferings were acute. For sixteen months Mrs. Unwin attended him with unwearying devotion, when Cowper moved to the vicarage where Mr. Newton lived, and refused to leave until, after bearing it for several months, Mr. Newton sent for Dr. Cotton, and under his care the poet recovered. Soon after this Mr. Newton left Olney for St. Mary's, Woolnoth, in London, to which he had been promoted, and his departure was a very good thing for Cowper, whose soul he left to the care of a dissenting minister named Bull, who introduced the poet to the writings of

<sup>2 &</sup>quot;Letters of Lady Hesketh."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Cowper's best hymns in this collection were "Hark, My Soul, It Is the Lord;" "God Moves in a Mysterious Way," "There Is a Fountain Filled With Blood" and "Jesus, Where'er Thy People Meet."

Madame Guyon, the Quietist, and set him to translate them, and the result was some of his most beautiful poems, breathing as they do a most passionate love for God and showing an intimate knowledge of the interior life, and its heights and depths, its lights and shadows, expressed in exquisitely musical verse.

The following verses, taken from a long poem "On the Vicissitudes Experienced in the Christian Life," will exemplify this:

My peace of heart is fied; I know not where My happy hours, like shadows, pass'd away; Their sweet remembrance doubles all my care, Night darker seems succeeding such a day.

Has hell a pain I would not gladly bear, So Thy severe displeasure might subside? Hopeless of ease, I seem already there, My life extinguished and yet death denied.

When Love departs, a chaos wide and vast And dark as hell is opened in the soul. When love returns, the gloomy scene is past; No tempests shake her, and no fears control

Live Thou and reign forever, dearest Lord!
My last, least offering I present Thee now.
Renounce me, leave me, and be still adored;
Slay me, my God, and I applaud the blow.

Cowper now gave himself up to various occupations, besides that of writing, of which the chief were drawing, gardening and carpentering, in all of which he excelled. He made a greenhouse in the garden, which they used as a summer house, in which he spent a good deal of time writing or drawing, with his favorite pets, some tame hares, at his feet.

Mrs. Unwin, now recognizing how necessary mental occupation was for him, if another attack of melancholia was to be warded off, suggested he should write a poem on "The Progress of Error." This he did, and followed it with "Truth, Hope, Expostulation, Charity," etc., which were published in book form. This first volume was badly reviewed, but the reviewer quoted the poet's own lines in criticism of it:

The cold harangue, and cold as it is clear, Falls soporific on the listless ear.

Newton wrote a very serious preface to this first book, which, written under his influence and Mrs. Unwin's, would never have survived if it had not been followed by "The Task," suggested by a very different kind of person, Lady Austen, a young, beautiful, cultured, vivacious widow, who had seen a great deal of the world and traveled a good deal, and was almost too lively for Cowper. He was introduced to this charming woman in 1781, and she so fascinated the poet and Mrs. Unwin that she took up her abode close to them for some months. She told Cowper the story of

<sup>4</sup> Cowper's poems.

John Gilpin one evening, and he lay awake most of the night laughing over it, and the next morning sat down and wrote his immortal verses<sup>6</sup> on this "citizen of credit and renown." She also suggested "The Sofa," which afterwards grew into "The Task," which was to Evangelicalism very much what "Paradise Lost" was to Puritanism, and had a great success.

Charming and lively a companion as Lady Austen was, her influence on Cowper's life was rather disturbing than restful or happy, for she unfortunately fell in love with him, and they quarreled. The first quarrel took place a year after their friendship began; they used to correspond, and in some of Lady Austen's letters she, who always idealized everybody, took such an exaggerated and sentimental view of his gifts, that he reproved her for it, and she took offense and sent him such an angry letter that the poet declared their friendship was at an end and could never be renewed. This quarrel was made up by the lady sending Cowper some ruffles she worked for him, and in return he laid his next volume of poems at her feet, and she took a house at Clifton large enough to enable her to entertain Cowper and Mrs. Unwin, as well as other visitors, and proposed to invite them to come and stay with her. But a final rupture took place between them in 1774, when the poet discovered, what was obvious to any one else at the time of their first quarrel, that the charming widow was in love with him, and he who did not reciprocate this feeling, but desired that their friendship should be on platonic lines, wrote her a letter, which is unfortunately not included in the four large volumes of his Letters, since Lady Austen committed it to the flames as soon as read, and thus terminated what might perhaps have been a pleasant friendship for Cowper. He felt he owed too much to Mrs. Unwin to contemplate marriage with any one else, and no doubt he also felt that it would be very wrong of him to marry, subject as he was to these recurring fits of religious mania. Lady Austen recovered from this disappointment sufficiently to marry a Frenchman, named Tardiff, a year or two later; but she passed out of Cowper's life when she burned his offending letter.

There was one other person to whom he was much attached, and who also exercised a beneficial influence on him, before he made the acquaintance of the Throckmortons, and this was his first cousin, Lady Hesketh, a buxom, affectionate widow, to whom many of his letters are addressed, and who from time to time came to stay with him, but she cordially disliked Mrs. Unwin, though they managed to get on very well together, especially during the earlier years

<sup>&</sup>quot;Letters of William Cowper," four volumes.



<sup>5 &</sup>quot;The History of John Gilpin," by W. Cowper.

of their acquaintance, when Lady Hesketh was very grateful to her for her care of her cousin during his terrible attacks. Later, after Mrs. Unwin had had a stroke of paralysis, Lady Hesketh thought her very irritable and exacting and that the devotion poor Cowper then showed her was bad for him and aggravated his own malady, as it probably did.

About the time of his final rupture with Lady Austen his acquaintance with the Throckmortons, a Catholic family, began, and for the rest of his life this friendship was a most beneficial and happy element in it. Mr. and Mrs. Throckmorton, afterwards Sir John and Lady Throckmorton, lived at Weston Hall, about a mile from Cowper's house at Olney. John Throckmorton and his brother George were the sons of an old Catholic baronet, Sir Robert Throckmorton, of Buckland. They were both highly cultivated men and delightful companions for poor Cowper. The John Throckmortons were quite young married people when Cowper first knew them, and Mrs. John, as she was then called, is described as very charming, handsome, kind and cheerful. Ever since Mrs. Unwin and Cowper went to live at Olney they had had a key given them to the Throckmortons' delightful grounds, and enjoyed the privilege, which they greatly appreciated, of walking in them, and when the young couple came to settle down at Weston Underwood, they invited the poet and Mrs. Unwin to a garden party to see a balloon ascend, and they both went.

Another day they were caught in a storm while walking in the park and took shelter under a large elm. Mrs. John saw them and asked them into the house, and from that day a friendship sprang up between the two families, which was never interrupted and contributed some of the happiest years to the tragically sad life of the poet.

Terrible as the anguish of his attacks was, their severity was to some extent mitigated by the fact that Cowper was able to attribute them entirely to the hand of God, and to accept them as coming from Him. The awful mystery of insanity was no mystery to him, since it was so clear to his strong faith in Providence that the diseases of the mind were just as much a visitation from Almighty God as any bodily illness. After his second derangement he labored under the delusion that he was lost, and in one of his Letters says that for many years he never even ventured to ask so much as a blessing on his food. In another of his Letters he says: "A king may forbid a man to appear before him, and it were strange if the King of kings could not do the same. I know it to be His will that I should not enter into His presence now. When the prohibition is taken off I shall enter, but in the meantime I

should neither please myself nor Him by entering." In a letter dated August 14, 1784, to William Unwin, Mrs. Unwin's son, a constant correspondent and a great friend of Cowper's, he says: "I hear that Mr. Throckmorton is making another balloon, a paper one, containing sixteen quires. It is to fly upon the wings of ignited spirits, and I hope to be invited to see it ascend."

In the next letter we read that he was invited, but that the ascent took place at 10 o'clock at night, and that it was too dark for them to go, but in the following letter it is recorded that they went and watched the ascent by daylight.

In the first book of "The Task" the following lines refer to John Throckmorton:

Thanks to Benevolus, he spares me yet These chestnuts ranged in corresponding lines.

Frequent mention is made in the letters of presents of game and fish from the Throckmortons, showing the kindly relations existing between the two houses. In 1785 Mr. Throckmorton gave Cowper the key to his kitchen garden, with permission to eat the fruit when they liked, and this was a great favor, as this key had never been given to any one before, since this garden was the Throckmortons' own favorite walk. Mr. Throckmorton had just cut down a place called the Spinney, which had been Cowper's favorite resort, so admission to the kitchen garden atoned for this.

After first making the acquaintance of the Throckmortons, Cowper, writing to his friend, William Unwin, says: "They are Papists, but much more amiable than many Protestants." In a letter to Lady Hesketh in 1786 he says: "Nothing can be more obliging than the behavior of the Throckmortons has ever been to us." In this letter he describes how Mr. Throckmorton's bailiff had made a most annoying mistake, and instead of topping some shrubs as told, he had cut them all down in a certain charming serpentine walk in the grounds at Weston in his master's absence from home, and Mrs. Throckmorton told Cowper she had never seen her husband so angry in her life.

Trifling incidents like this form a large part of the matter of the letters, but they are told in so delightful a style that they never seem insignificant. The great charm of Cowper's letters was that they were so perfectly natural. He never wrote with any ulterior thought of future publication, but just for the sake of writing to please his friends, and to keep them "au courant" with all that happened in his daily life.

In 1786 Mrs. Unwin and Cowper moved into a house at Weston, belonging to the Throckmortons. It was large and convenient and in the middle of what the poet declared was one of the prettiest villages in England. It was the kind generosity of Lady Hesketh that enabled them to make this move. Here they were able to enjoy access daily to all the gardens and grounds belonging to the Throckmortons, and the intimacy between the two families increased.

Cowper writes: "The more I see of the 'Frogs," as he soon got to call the Throckmortons, "the more I like them. He is the most accomplished man of his years that I ever remember to have seen. She is cheerful and good-natured to the first degree, and is, as I suppose you know, a niece of Lord Petre's. His reserve and mine wear off, and he talks with great pleasure of the comfort he proposes to himself from our winter evening conversations. His purpose seems to be that we should spend them alternately with each other. Lady Hesketh transcribes for me now. When she is gone, Mrs. Throckmorton will take up that business, and will be my lady of the ink-bottle for the rest of the winter. She solicited herself that office."

The move from Olney to Weston Underwood did not please the bigoted Olney people at all, for at that time Catholics were looked upon with feelings of horror by Protestants, especially by Evangelicals, and Cowper, writing to Mr. Newton about this time, says that the Olney people have already reported that he has turned Papist. "You will know how to treat a lie like this, which proves nothing but the malignity of its author."

We are apt to forget in the twentieth century, when so much toleration is shown in England to the members of the Catholic Church, how bitter was the animosity borne against them in Cowper's day. We also forget another thing we should do well to remember, namely, that the bulk of the English people are still Protestant to the backbone. Outwardly they are more tolerant because more civilized, but inwardly their hatred of the Catholic religion is as deeply rooted as ever, except among a few Ritualists. In the eighteenth century Mass was said in London in what were called Mass-houses in the greatest secrecy, very often in a garret, but most frequently in public houses or small inns. A favorite Mass-house was the Ship, in Little Turnstile, Holborn, and another much frequented was in Cockpit Alley, Drury lane. Dr. Burton in his "Life of Bishop Challoner" tells us that the Bishop used to preach to people in one of these public houses, where they sat round a table with a jug of beer in front of them, in case they were interrupted and arrested. The door was always carefully guarded and people were only admitted by a password. Sometimes the floor

<sup>7 &</sup>quot;Life and Times of Bishop Challener," by Edwin H. Burton. Long-mans, 1909.



of the room above could be opened, so that persons in the upper story could also hear the sermon. Priests had to go about disguised as laymen, for their presence in England was forbidden.

In private letters Catholics had to employ code words, lest their letters should fall into Protestant hands and they be betrayed. They also used aliases. Thus, the Pope was written of as Mr. Abraham, Bishop Petre as Mr. White and Dr. Challoner as Willard. There was no career for Catholics in England; they could not enter Parliament, nor were any of the professions open to them until the first Catholic Relief Acts of 1778 and 1791 were passed, which restored the elementary rights of inheritance and purchase of land and also made the presence of priests less dangerous. The second Act of Catholic Emancipation passed in 1829 made it lawful for Catholics to worship God in their own way, and removed other heavy civil disabilities. The passing of the first Acts led to the Lord George Gordon riots against Catholics in 1780, when the Bavarian and Sardinian Catholic chapels were wrecked by the Protestant mob and many houses of Catholics burned and the Bank of England and Newgate were attacked. Bishop Challoner was searched for with the intention of killing him, but he managed to escape, and died the following year.

All this being so, it will be seen that for Cowper, associated as he was with the vanguard of Evangelicalism, to be on intimate terms with such influential Catholics as the Throckmortons, required some courage on his part if he did not wish to lose his Protestant friends. At this time the chapels attached to the houses of Catholic noblemen and gentlemen were centres of Catholicism. There was always a priest and generally a congregation, even if a small one, on a Catholic estate; but these missions were precarious, for if the owner fell away from the faith or died, unless he was succeeded by a Catholic, the chapel was closed and the congregation dispersed. Even in London the only permanent chapels were those of the foreign embassies. Sir Robert Throckmorton's estate of Buckland, near Farringdon, was one on which the Mass had never died out since the Reformation. The Throckmortons had a resident chaplain, a Dr. Gregson, who became an intimate friend of our poet, and contributed much to lighten his unhappy lot, for when the Throckmortons were abroad or in London, Dr. Gregson remained at Weston Underwood in charge of the mission.

In one of his letters to Lady Hesketh, Cowper tells her that Dr. Gregson, whom he calls "the good-natured padre," had offered to transcribe for him during Mrs. Frog's absence in London, and that he had accepted the offer. The poet was at this time engaged in translating Homer, and he continues thus: "I have already in-

vited the good padre in general terms, and he shall positively dine here next week, whether he will or not. I do not at all suspect that his kindness to Protestants has anything insidious in it, any more than I suspect that he transcribes Homer for me with a view for my conversion. He would find me a tough piece of business, I can tell him; for when I had no religion at all I had yet a terrible dread of the Pope. How much more now?"

In August, 1787, he writes "that Mr. George Throckmorton is now at the Hall. I thought I had known the brothers long enough to find out all their accomplishments, but I was mistaken." He now tells how they showed him a large portfolio filled with architectural drawings, executed by them both, in a most masterly manner, among others one of the Pantheon, in Rome."

Mr. John Throckmorton was an excellent landlord, and Cowper called him a "peerless neighbor," and writes that if he were asked who approached nearest to him in all his amiable qualities and qualifications, he should say his brother George.

In a letter to Lady Hesketh, Cowper mentions a queer but trifling little coincidence which happened as he was dining one evening with the Throckmortons. He had toothache badly and managed to draw his tooth in the middle of dinner, and discovered afterwards that Mrs. Throckmorton, who sat next him, being in a similar dilemma, drew hers also without either being aware what feats of amateur dentistry the other was performing. Cowper's tooth was so loose that he could neither eat nor speak till he had got rid of it. George Throckmorton and his youngest brother, Francis, and Mrs. Frog once played a practical joke upon Cowper. There was a curate at Weston named Canniford, whom the poet cordially hated, and one morning shortly after the curate had received a snubbing from the author of "The Task," the post brought Cowper a letter purporting to come from Mr. Canniford, who "presented his compliments to Mr. Cowper, and having heard that his friends from the Hall were going to dine with him the next day, he took the liberty to invite himself to eat a bit of mutton with him, being sure Mr. Cowper would be happy to introduce him to his friends."

Cowper was at first completely taken in, and said he knew the man was equal to it, and then he discovered that the envelope was directed by Mrs. Frog and the name Canniford spelled with a K.

In 1788 George Throckmorton became Cowper's transcriber, and pleased the poet very much by telling him that, having compared his fourth book of the "Iliad" with Pope's, he verily believes that Cowper will beat him, and is convinced that Pope spoiled his version by using rhyme. Cowper spent five years on his translation

of Homer, which was published by subscription. He says of him in one of his letters "that Homer inculcates constantly the belief in a Providence; that he insists much on the duty of charity towards the poor and the stranger, and on the respect that is due to superiors and especially to our seniors, and dwells on the expediency and necessity of prayer and piety towards the gods, a piety mistaken, indeed, in its object, but exemplary for the punctuality of its performance. Thousands who will not learn from Scripture to ask a blessing either on their actions or their food may learn it if they please from Homer."

In one of his lighter moods Cowper, writing to his friend, the Presbyterian minister, William Bull, says he "supposes Homer was a Presbyterian, as he understands that the Church of England will have nothing to do with him; as for himself, he wishes he were a Hottentot or even a dissenter, so that his views of a hereafter were more comfortable."

Cowper was very shy, and also in a lighter mood he wrote in one of his letters these couplets:

Here sit I Calling myself shy, Yet have just published, by-the-by, Two great volumes of poetry.

At Olney he lived the life of a hermit because he had no neighbors with whom he could associate, but at Weston he was visited by all round him and went out also. He was very fond of children, and when the Throckmortons were away the little Giffords, who lived with them, were left at Weston, and Cowper often mentions them in his letters to Mrs. Frog; he made a point of seeing them every day in the Throckmortons' absence and tells her anecdotes about them. One day the little boy, Tom Gifford, sent him a sprig of box, which Cowper acknowledged thus:

Dear Tom, my muse this moment sounds your praise, And turns at once your sprig of box to bays.

All the poet's letters to Mrs. Frog and also all those to Mrs. George Throckmorton or Courtenay, for George Throckmorton took that name on his marriage, were in a light and happy vein. The congregation at the chapel at Weston Underwood in Cowper's time, including dependents and servants, numbered about two hundred. The chapel was formed out of one of the attics on the west side of the house. When the house was rebuilt in the nineteenth century two or three hiding holes were found, one of which was under the chapel communicating with it by a trap door.

Sir John Throckmorton was a member of the Catholic Committee and an opponent of Bishop Milner, who was at the head of

those Bishops and Catholics who were not favorable to the Catholic application to Parliament for relief from some of their disabilities which the Catholic Committee were about to present. Cowper, writing to a friend in 1779, says apropos to this opposition: "I find from Mr. Throckmorton, who has just returned from London, that the Catholic application to Parliament is not likely to speed at present. The Bishop of London is not favorable to it, and he leads all the other Bishops, and the Bishops all together lead Mr. Pitt (then Prime Minister). The Chancellor is much their friend." Writing to his dear Mrs. Frog on March 21, this same year, he tells her he has just produced the poem on his mother's picture, and adds: "I am glad that your bill is not likely to come on this year. It will be introduced with much more probability of success when the present heat has somewhat abated. That our present episcopacy should carry things with so high a hand and that you should have to pay double price for living in your own country are two grievances that I cannot bear."

John Throckmorton took a very active part in the passing of the Acts of relief and in the great Catholic Emancipation Act, and Cowper, who was a strong Whig, thoroughly sympathized with these bills, in spite of his equally strong Protestantism. Writing in March, 1791, to Mrs. Frog, who had returned home sooner than her husband, who was detained by this business in London, Cowper says: "Tell Mr. Frog with my love that my charity for his religion will be all exhausted if it prove the occasion of keeping him in town all the summer. I have none even now for those who have thrown impediments in your way, though of your own persuasion. The doctor (Gregson) dines with us to-day, and I shall endeavor to learn from him what can possibly be their motives, for they are out of the reach of our most ingenious conjecture. I hope, however, that, maugre all such opposition, you will soon hold your lands on the same terms as others and be as rich as Providence designed you should be."

In this year two odes by Horace were recently discovered in Rome, and Mrs. Throckmorton transcribed them there for Cowper, and he wrote some verses to her on her transcript beginning:

Maria, could Horace have guessed
What honour awaited his ode,
To his own little volume addressed
The honour which you have bestowed,
Who have traced it in characters here,
So elegant, even and neat,
He had laughed at the critical sneer
Which he seems to have trembled to meet.

Cowper suppressed a very bitter passage about Catholics in "The

<sup>8</sup> Cowper's poems.

Task" on account of his friendship with the Throckmortons, but this was the only direct influence on his writing their acquaintance ever had. His letters show how bitterly anti-Catholic he was; nevertheless, his Whigism made him averse to all illiberality of treatment of Catholics. Thus, writing to his friend, Mr. Hill, he says: "The dissenters, I think, Catholics and others, have a right to the privileges of all other Englishmen, because to deprive them is persecution, and persecution on any account, but especially on a religious one, is an abomination."

Cowper was a very strict Sabbatarian, and in his "Progress of Error" attacked Charles Wesley because he sometimes fished on Sunday, saying that when he had prayed and preached the Sabbath down he concluded the day with wire and catgut, and asked:

If apostolic gravity be free To play the fool on Sundays, why not we? If he the tinkling harpsichord regards As inoffensive, why not cards?<sup>9</sup>

Wesley once shocked Cowper by telling Lady Austen that it was quite lawful to allow young people to go to Ranelagh or Vauxhall, that there was nothing wrong in them, and that, in fact, the denial would be unreasonable, and therefore wrong.

He was most Puritanical in many of his ideas and had a horror of what he erroneously considered to savor of idolatry, as the following passage in one of his letters will show: "He that kneels before a picture of Christ is an idolator, but he whose heart the sight of such a picture kindles a warm remembrance of the Saviour's suffering must be a Christian. To love Christ is the greatest dignity of man, be that affection wrought in him how it may."

In 1791 the series of letters to a schoolmaster of a very ignorant type, named Samuel Teedon, began. This man, whom Goldwin Smith calls a charlatan, for the next few years exercised a most detrimental influence over Cowper, who at first looked upon him as rather a bore, but afterwards got to look up to him as an oracle. Teedon pretended to have revelations, which he and Cowper both called "notices," and he professed to interpret the visions and dreams which Cowper told him he had seen and dreamt. For two years and a half a most voluminous correspondence took place between the two, who sometimes wrote more than once a day to each other, for Teedon lived near Cowper.

During this period Cowper did nothing without consulting Teedon, who after praying would write and say he had received such and such a "notice" from heaven on the subject in question, and Cowper would then act upon it, whether the "notice" concerned

<sup>9 &</sup>quot;Progress of Error," Cowper's poems.

a visit to his new friend, the poet Hayley, or whether it referred to writing or not writing on such and such a subject. Teedon thought himself to be a special favorite of Providence, and Cowper got to think so, too, while he always thought himself the object of God's abhorrence. From the year 1791 to 1794 Teedon and Cowper saw or wrote to each other every day.

The darkest part of the poet's life dates from this time. In December, 1791, Mrs. Unwin had her first stroke of paralysis, and from this time the relations between the two were so far changed that from henceforth it was Cowper who devoted himself to the care of his former attendant, giving up the greater part of his time to amusing and waiting upon his old friend with the tenderness of a son. From now his mental suffering was more or less constant, gradually as time went on deepening into profound melancholia and ending in actual madness, but this was not yet.

In 1702 old Sir Robert Throckmorton died, and John Throckmorton succeeded to the title, and he and Lady Throckmorton now left Weston Underwood and went to Buckland to live, but Cowper missed them less than he would otherwise have done, because their place at Weston was taken by George Throckmorton, now George Courtenay, and his wife, Catherina, neé Stapleton, a great favorite of the poet, to whom he addressed several poems. In May, 1792, Mrs. Unwin had a second stroke of paralysis, much worse than the first. It happened while the poet Hayley was staying with them, and he was a great comfort to both of them in this trial, which was a terrible blow to poor Cowper, who watched and nursed her and administered the electrical operation which was tried, but ineffectually, to restore her. From this time poor Mrs. Unwin seems to have been a great object and a very trying and exacting patient, but that cannot excuse Lady Hesketh of great want of charity in writing of her as she did as "the enchantress" and chafing against poor Cowper's unwearying devotion to her, who had in former days been such a blessing to him when plunged in melancholia. Writing to a friend in 1792 he says: "My nocturnal experiences are of the most terrible kind. I live a life of terror." Mrs. Unwin's illness took from him all power to study; all thoughts of Homer and Milton were driven to a distance.

There is nothing in any of Cowper's correspondence to suggest that he ever discussed religion with either the Throckmortons or their chaplain, Dr. Gregson, who seems to have been a medical man as well as a priest, since he attended Mrs. Unwin in her illness, as we gather from some of the Letters. In July, 1792, the Courtenays returned to Weston from their honeymoon, and Cowper, writing to Lady Throckmorton, says of his first visit to them:

"George flew into the court to meet me, and Catharina spranginto my arms." There was always a playful tone in all his letters to Lady Throckmorton and Catharina, even when Mrs. Unwin was very ill and he suffering from mental depression. His last letter to Lady Throckmorton was in 1792, but he continued to correspond with Mrs. Courtenay for some years before the final shadow enveloped him.

In the early autumn of 1792 he and Mrs. Unwin went to stay for six weeks with the poet Hayley at his beautiful place, Eartham, and Cowper, writing to Catharina, says he had no conception that a poet could be the owner of such a paradise, but hastens to add that she must not think that amid all these beauties he will forget the peaceful but less splendid Weston, which he assures her will be as dear as ever to him on his return. In another letter to Catharina, from Eartham, he congratulates her on Sir John and Lady Throckmorton having departed from Paris two days before the terrible 10th of August, when the people of Paris rose armed and forced the Tuilleries and cut the Swiss Guards to pieces. Cowper's sympathies were all with the Parisians, and he wished them liberty, but he had the grace to be shocked by their sanguinary conduct. His daily toast for them was Sobriety and Freedom. In this letter he sends his love to Dr. Gregson and begs-Catharina to let him know how his patient, Mrs. Unwin, is get-ting on.

In his letters to Catharina there is not a word of despondency, while all those to Teedon, written at the same date, teem with melancholy reflections and despairing thoughts, and in his correspondence with his friend, Mr. Rose, and the poet Hayley he constantly refers to his mental and spiritual sufferings. The Olney doctors wasted his strength with their drastic remedies, such as bleeding, emetics and other methods of the time, when he was suffering from an attack of melancholia.

In 1794 he and Mrs. Unwin were moved to Norfolk, where they lived the rest of their lives with a relative of the poet's, the Rev. John Johnson, and his pleasant friendship with the Throckmortons and Courtenays was thus interrupted and never renewed, and after a while poor Cowper was too ill to correspond with his beloved Catharina. Mrs. Unwin died two years after their move to Norfolk at East Dereham, and Cowper survived her four years, during which time Sir John Throckmorton paid him a visit, having had a fall from his horse on his way, and this is the last we hear of these Catholic friends who contributed so many happy hours to one of the saddest of lives.

After Mrs. Unwin's death he continued to work again at his.

away," one of his best minor poems, was written, in which he alludes to his own misery in the two concluding lines:

But I, beneath a rougher sea, Am 'whelmed in deeper gulfs than he.

He died at East Dereham on April 25, 1800, and is buried in the churchyard there.

When we recall how bitter and deep were the feelings with which Catholics and the Catholic religion were regarded in England in the eighteenth century we cannot help speculating on what the many admirers of Cowper would have said and felt had they known that the great Evangelical poet was for many years on terms of great intimacy with some "Papists," whom he counted among his greatest friends. Their feelings of horror can only be imagined by those who have experienced the intense bitterness of Protestants of the type then so common in England against Catholics, a bitterness increased as it is even to-day by their hopeless ignorance and misapprehension of Catholic dogmas and practice.

II.

The influence of Catholicity upon the great pamphleteer of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries was more extraordinary than upon William Cowper, first because he lived much earlier, dying the very year poor Cowper was born, consequently before any of the disabilities under which Catholics lived were removed; secondly, because this influence was shown in the most popular book that has perhaps ever been written in the English language, a book written for and read by a public plunged in the deepest depths of Protestantism, and yet presenting, apparently in spite of the author, a picture of a Catholic priest who realized the writer's highest ideal not only of morality, but of Christianity.

We wonder how many readers of "Robinson Crusoe," be they Catholic or Protestant, remember that the finest, the noblest, the most Christian character in the book, the man with the highest ideals, is not Crusoe, nor Friday, but the Catholic priest, a young French Benedictine monk, who was rescued from shipwreck by the captain of Crusoe's ship, in which he was returning in the second part of the story to visit his island and the Spaniards he had left there. Daniel Defoe was an audacious man, but that he should have had the audacity to paint such a picture and present it to his readers at that particular time of day is amazing. It is in the presumption that many admirers of that most delightful romance, the parent of the modern novel, have forgotten the finished

portrait of a holy Catholic priest which Defoe has painted that we propose to pause a few minutes before the picture and examine its beauty.

Daniel Defoe, who was born in 1661, was the son of a butcher. an influential Nonconformist, and was himself intended for a Nonconformist minister; but this career was abandoned, and Defoe set up as a hosier in Cheapside. Upon the death of Charles II. in 1685 the great controversy which had been raging for several years as to whether the King's brother, the Duke of York, who was a Catholic, should on that account be excluded from the throne, ended in his accession under the title of James II., but Defoe felt so strongly on the subject that he joined Monmouth's rebellion and fought against the King at Sedgmoor, and to avoid being hanged by Judge Jeffreys, he absented himself from England and went to Spain and Portugal, ostensibly on business. On his return he Legan his career as a pamphleteer. At that time the form English literature preferred to assume was the pamphlet, which frequently was as long as a moderate-sized volume. The occasion was the King's Declaration for Liberty of Conscience in England, in which he as King set aside the penal laws against Catholics for the sake of their religion, and also against all dissenters from the Established Church.

Upon this Defoe published three pamphlets explaining to Dissenters, who had expressed their thanks to the King, that there was no need to thank a king for setting himself above the laws, though the laws might be some they would fain see abolished. Defoe was a born pamphleteer; he wrote tersely and naturally and drove his arguments home with great force, and he became immensely popular in this line, until in 1702 he landed himself in Newgate and the pillory. William III. died from a fall from his horse on March 8, 1702, and the accession of Queen Anne led to a renewal of petty spite, if not actual persecution, against Nonconformists, which prompted Defoe to write his celebrated pamphlet, called "The Shortest Way With Dissenters," in which he advocated that whosoever should be found in a conventicle should be banished and the preacher hanged. Commentators differ as to the interpretation to be put upon this pamphlet, some maintaining that he was satirizing the proposals of the day and writing with fine irony, while more modern critics maintain that he was not ironical at all, but was expressing his own opinion as to the best way to deal with Dissenters.

He was sentenced to stand three days in the pillory and thrown into Newgate Gaol by the Tory Government then in power on a charge of seditious libel. He now became a popular hero, till

Harley released him and employed him in Edinburgh as a Government spy or secret agent. Here he was instrumental in promoting the Union of England and Scotland, for which he enjoyed a small pension for a time, but he got into trouble again at the close of Queen Anne's reign by his writing, and was once more sent to Newgate, till the Oueen released him in 1713. He now found his enemies were so bitter against him that his health broke down, and on his recovery he thought it better to give up political fireworks and take to fiction, and in 1719 produced his masterpiece, "Robinson Crusoe," which was followed by his other great work of imagination, "The Journal of the Plague," and that by other fiction. Perhaps Defoe, who had been abused by Whigs and Tories, High churchmen and Dissenters in turn, and had suffered at the hands of both political parties, wished to be revenged on his Protestant persecutors by presenting his readers with the picture of a Catholic priest as the embodiment of the highest virtue. Perhaps a nobler motive actuated him and truth compelled him to give us the portrait we will now examine.

There were two priests who were rescued in the story from ship-wreck, an old man who nearly went mad with joy and this young Benedictine who on being taken on board Crusoe's vessel "threw himself flat on his face, prostrating himself in thankfulness for his deliverance, in which I unhappily and unseasonably disturbed him, really thinking he had been in a swoon; but he spake calmly; thanked me; told me he was giving God thanks for his deliverance; begged me to leave him for a few moments, and that next to his Maker he would give me thanks, and continued in that posture about three minutes." This is the way in which the priest is introduced to us. Crusoe is surprised, but greatly edified, and the Benedictine, whom Defoe also calls the Abbé, now endeavors to modify the transports of his companions, who are beside themselves with joy.

Defoe, by making the priest prostrate himself, recognizes that Catholics worship God with their bodies as well as with their souls and spirits. In describing him he thinks it necessary to apologize to his readers for his virtues, which he does in the following terms: "It is true that this man was a Roman, and perhaps it may give offense to some hereafter if I leave anything extraordinary upon record of a man, whom before I begin I must set him out in just colors and represent in terms very much to his disadvantage in the account of Protestants; first, as that he was a Papist; secondly, a Popish priest; and thirdly, a French Popish priest. But justice demands of me to give him a due character, and I must

<sup>10 &</sup>quot;Robinson Crusoe," Part II.

say he was a grave, sober, pious and most religious person, exact in his life, extensive in his charity and exemplary in almost everything that he did. What, then, can any one say against my being very sensible of the value of such a man, notwithstanding his profession, though it may be my opinion as well as the opinion of others who shall read this that he was mistaken?"

Defoe evidently recognized that he was running grave risks in venturing to put a true portrait of a good Catholic priest before his readers, but he does not shrink from the task, and goes on to describe his first conversation with the Abbé on religion.

The priest says that although it is doubtless his duty to use his utmost endeavors to bring all the souls he can to the knowledge of the truth and to embrace the Catholic doctrine, still as he is there under Crusoe's permission and in his family, he is bound in justice to his kindness as well as in decency and good manners to be under his government, so he shall not enter into any debates on religion without Crusoe's leave.

Crusoe says he is not the first Catholic he has conversed with without falling into any inconvenience, and the Benedictine then says that though perhaps they would not join with him in prayer, yet he hopes that he may pray for them, and will do so also for a safe voyage. When they reach the island, after staying there for a few days, the priest goes to Crusoe and tells him with a very grave face and after a long preamble that there are three obstacles to God's blessing on his island which he would gladly see removed. Crusoe is very much astonished and inquires what these obstacles are, and in the answer we see the high moral principles by which the priest is governed.

"First," says the priest, "you have four Englishmen here who have taken women from among the savages and had children by them and are living with them without being married in any way, as the laws of God and man demand." He then goes on to explain to Crusoe that although he had no clergyman there to marry these people, yet that "the sacrament of matrimony consists not only in the mutual consent of the parties to take one another as man and wife, but in the formal and legal obligation that there is in the contract to compel the man and woman at all times to acknowledge and own each other. Now, these men may when they please abandon these women, disown their children, leave them to perish and take other women and marry them while these are living. How can God be honored in this unlawful liberty?"

For the first time this formal contract seems to have struck Crusoe, and he confesses to himself that he had been guilty of great neglect, but he tries to excuse himself by saying that it took place

in his absence; but the priest won't listen to this, and says that he can put an end to the scandal at once by legally and effectually marrying them now by a written contract, signed and witnessed.

He then brings his second complaint against Crusoe, which is that these men had lived with these women for seven years, taught them to speak English and even to read it, yet had never said one word to them about the Christian religion, nor even taught them that there is a God or a worship, or that their own religion was false. He concludes by saying that although he and Crusoe do not acknowledge each other's religion, yet that they should both be glad to see these poor heathen taught the general principles of the Christian religion.

Crusoe, far from being offended, is so pleased that he takes the priest in his arms and embraces him, confessing that he himself till now has scarcely known what it is to be a Christian, and that he has missed the most essential part of the Christian religion, namely, to love the interest of the Christian Church and the good of other men's souls.

Here we pause for a moment to ask if it was not extraordinary that Defoe, a most bigoted Dissenter, himself writing at a time when no Catholic priest dared to show himself openly in England, when it was criminal to say or hear Mass, when the very name of Catholic was a reproach, should have dared to represent his ideal Christian as a Catholic priest, better versed in the true knowledge of Christian principles than himself? Is not it extraordinary, too, that the book in which he did this should have had a larger circulation and enjoyed a greater popularity than almost any other work of fiction and that among all sorts and conditions of Protestants? Surely this is one of the greater ironies of life.

The young monk then asks permission to teach these savages the fundamental truths of the Christian religion, and receives permission to do so. He then goes on to say that it is a maxim that ought to be received among all Christians, that the Christian religion ought to be propagated by all possible means, and that on this account the Catholic Church sends missionaries at the risk of their lives into all countries, and suggests that Crusoe should embrace the opportunity of converting the thirty-six souls on his island. Crusoe excuses himself from undertaking the task, as he is leaving shortly, but suggests that the Benedictine should remain and accomplish it. The priest says he will willingly undertake the work and thanks God for giving him such a call.

Defoe now testifies to his belief in the supernatural graces of this young monk by making Crusoe say: "I discovered a kind of rapture on his face as he spoke thus to me, his eyes sparkled like fire,

his face glowed, his color went and came as if he had been fainting as he answered:

"Yes, sir; I would give Christ and the Blessed Virgin thanks all my days if I could be made the least happy instrument in saving the souls of these poor men, though I was never more to set foot off this island or see my native country." All that he asks is that Crusoe will leave Friday with him to interpret, but Crusoe objects to this, because he has made Friday a Protestant, so he agrees to leave Friday's father, who can speak Spanish. Robinson Crusoe sets to work himself and succeeds in converting the worst vagabond on the island, Will Atkins, and his savage wife to Christianity, and was amazed at the priest's joy at this conversion, seeing it was not to Catholicism, and questions him about it.

"Sir," says the young priest, "I am a Catholic of the Roman Church and a priest of the Order of St. Benedict, and I embrace all the principles of the Roman faith, yet, if you will believe me, I do not look upon you who are reformed without some charity. I dare not say, though I know it is our opinion, that you cannot be saved. I will by no means limit the mercy of Christ so far as to think that He cannot receive you into the bosom of His Church in a way to us unperceivable, and I hope you may have the same charity for us." He then goes on to explain that there is a great difference between a Protestant and a pagan who knows not God and says that he would rejoice if all the savages in America were to be brought to pray to God, though as Protestants at first, firmly believing that God would bring them into the pale of the true Church when He should see good.

Crusoe is represented as astounded at the priest's charity, and reflects that if such a temper were universal we might all be brought to be Catholics, whatever Church we belonged to; but he spoils this admission by saying that if all the members of his own persuasion were endowed with the same moderation they might soon all be Protestants, a climax his Benedictine friend could not have echoed.

Crusoe then gets the priest to talk to Will Atkins' wife, and thus comments on his discourse: "Surely, never was such a sermon preached by a Popish priest in these latter ages of the world, and as I told him I thought that he had all the knowledge, all the sincerity of a Christian without the errors of a Roman Catholic, and that I took him to be such a clergyman as the Roman Bishops were before the Church of Rome assumed spiritual sovereignty over the consciences of men."

Crusoe then gets the Benedictine to baptize the woman, and afterwards to marry her and Atkins, and Defoe then makes him,

after resisting for a long time, consent to marry the three other couples on the island before the women have been baptized.

It is difficult to see why this young, enthusiastic priest did not remain on the island to minister to the Spanish Catholics there, instead of which he leaves with Crusoe, who first exacts a promise from Catholics and Protestants that they will all agree to live together in peace, Catholics on one side of the island and Protestants on the other side.

We are never told that the Spaniards ever availed themselves of the presence of this priest, during his stay on the island, to obtain the sacraments, but probably Defoe knew his public too well to venture upon describing this, so we must rest content in feeling sure that so religious a man as this French priest is represented to be would never have remained on the island three weeks without ministering to the spiritual wants of the members of his own communion, and probably arranged with them before he left either to return himself or send another priest to take charge of their souls, or at least to visit them periodically.

This, however, Defoe did not venture to record; the marvelous thing is that he dared to immortalize such a charming portrait of an ideal Catholic priest in a book intended for and read by millions of Protestants.

## III.

Samuel Richardson, the originator of the English novel as distinguished from romance, was born in 1689 and died in 1761. He, therefore, was a contemporary of both Defoe and William Cowper, being born just as Defoe was beginning his career as a pamphleteer, and dying when Cowper was still living in Chambers in the Temple. It was a skeptical age, but Richardson, though a Protestant, was a deeply religious man, and his novels all have a high moral and religious tone, so much so that his first work of fiction, "Pamela," which attained an immense sale, was recommended from the pulpit. This was published in 1740, and was followed by his greatest work, "Clarissa Harlowe," in 1748, and then in 1753 appeared the book which concerns us, "The History of Sir Charles Grandison."

This, like all Richardson's novels, was written in the form of letters. To us of the twentieth century it appears a highly sentimental work, dealing as it does largely with the passion of love and depending for its main interest on the minute and subtle analysis of the human heart which it displays. Compared with a present-day novel it is as a miniature painting to an impressionist portrait. It is its excess of detail which gives it its sense of reality.

We are, however, not here concerned with its merits or demerits;

it is not the dramatic skill, nor the genius for pathos, nor the power of graphic description of the author that we wish to point out, but it is to call attention to the noble portrait of a Catholic girl, ready to sacrifice the lover to whom she was so passionately attached, that the effort cost her a temporary loss of reason for the sake of her religion. It will perhaps be remembered by those who have read "The History of Sir Charles Grandison" that there are two sets of characters in the book, about thirty-five English Protestants and fourteen Italians, all of whom are, of course, Catholics, and these last the hero, Sir Charles Grandison, who is a very Admirable Crichton of perfection, makes acquaintance with during his travels in Italy. Clementina, the unfortunate heroine of this most melancholy episode in Sir Charles Grandison's life, is the daughter of the Marchese and Marchesa della Porretta, an Italian family of almost princely rank, with whom Grandison becomes acquainted at Bologna, and is soon on very intimate terms, especially with Clementina, to whom he acts as tutor, teaching her English, and the youngest son, Jeronymo, whose life he saved.

The Porrettas intend Clementina to marry the Count of Belvedere, a handsome, gallant, sensible man with a large fortune and a Catholic, but unfortunately Clementina falls desperately in love with Sir Charles Grandison, who to some extent reciprocates her affection, but the Porretta family oppose the match on account of the difference in religion. Clementina is a very devout girl, and so steadfast in her faith that we are told it was with great difficulty that her parents could prevent her "from assuming the veil."

This was the time of the rebellion of young Charles Stuart, and in Italy it was confidently believed that he would be successful and that the restoration of Catholicism in England would be the result, and poor Clementina flattered herself that her "heretic lover would take refuge in the bosom of his holy mother the Church." But this does not come off, and to cut a very long story very short, Clementina is so madly in love that her reason is in danger, and at the same time she is at first determined not to marry a heretic. She then falls into the deepest melancholy, and her parents discover her passion for their friend, Sir Charles Grandison, and negotiations are entered into with him, to see if any satisfactory arrangement can be arrived at, but they find that Grandison is as much attached to his faith as Clementina is to hers and as much convinced of its truth.

Sir Charles now offers to live one year in Italy and one in Eng-

<sup>11 &</sup>quot;The History of Sir Charles Grandison and the Honorable Miss Byron," by Samuel Richardson. Hoff, 1793.



land by turns if Clementina will marry him and live with him. and would even be content to pass only three months in his own country, while as to religious difficulties he proposed to leave her entire liberty to follow her religion, and in case of children by the marriage he agreed that the daughters should be brought up Catholics, the sons Protestants, which it was presumed the Pope would sanction, as there were precedents for it. Clementina would have consented to this, but the whole Porretta family, except Jeronymo, violently opposed it, mainly on religious grounds, but also because they thought it derogatory to their own honor, as they considered Sir Charles an obscure man. Richardson was blamed by some of his critics for making Sir Charles agree to allow the daughters of his proposed union to be brought up as Catholics. After Sir Charles Grandison had left Bologna, which does not happen till some terribly painful scenes have taken place with Clementina and her family, the poor girl loses her reason and is placed with an aunt and cousins, who treat her with great severity and unkindness, putting her into a strait-waistcoat as a punishment, and through three or four volumes of this tremendously long novel, which was originally published in seven volumes, Clementina is a victim to melancholia. She recovers before the end of the book, and finally, after Sir Charles is married to Miss Byron, she, moved more by duty to her parents than by love, consents to become the wife of her faithful lover, the Count of Belvedere, with whom, being of the same faith, she will suffer from no religious complications. But she previously elopes from her parents' house to escape the persuasions to marry the Count. Possibly Richardson could not bring himself to overcome his Protestant prejudices against the religious life sufficiently to make her a nun, which in real life would most likely have been her fate and which Clementina renounced in deference to the wishes of her family, so he did the next best thing for her happiness by marrying her to one of her own religion. He has drawn a most attractive portrait of poor Clementina and depicted the mental struggle she went through with elaborate detail as well as graphic power. Her religion amounted to a passion, scarcely less strong than her love for Sir Charles Grandison, and if she brought herself to consent to marrying a heretic, it was in the hope of his ultimate conversion that she did so.

The author has been just to his Catholic characters and has shown how deep and strong and uncompromising was their faith, while at the same time he made it very clear that Grandison had not the smallest inclination to abandon his own religion, but was equally steadfast. He has credited Clementina with the very high-

est motives and principles and insisted upon her devotion and piety, representing her as "struggling nobly with her own heart because of her duty and her religion and resolved to die rather than encourage a wish that was not warranted by both." We know no character in English fiction touched with a deeper pathos than the beautiful, delicate, deeply religious Clementina, whose concern for the soul of the man she loved runs through the whole of her delirium, while the accounts of the way her aunt and cousins treat her when suffering from melancholia, produced by the mental suffering to which she has been subjected, are heartrending, and the author, with his love of detail, spares us nothing. Clementina is no mere lovesick maiden, but a noble woman, whose deep faith and constancy to the Catholic religion place insuperable obstacles in the way of what she firmly believes to be her only earthly happiness, since she loves Grandison with all the warmth of her southern nature.

The tragedy of the story is based upon the irreconilable differences between the two religions of Catholicism and Protestantism. These differences constitute the great interest of the novel and lift it on to a higher plane of literature than a mere love-story, for they deal with the realities of life. Written as it was at the time when Bonnie Prince Charlie was fighting for the throne and published a few years after his defeat at Culloden, when all hopes of the restoration of the Catholic religion were at an end, it is small wonder that the book caused such a sensation as it did and had such a large circulation, for the very fair picture it gives of Catholics must have made it read among them, as well as among Richardson's co-religionists.

The story would appeal to Catholics and Protestants alike, for doubtless there were many instances in the real life of the day of lovers separated by their respective creeds, though we will hope not many who took it to heart so disastrously as poor Clementina.

There can be little doubt that it was the fact that the Stuart cause was trembling in the balance when Richardson was writing this book that suggested the subject and also gave him the courage to publish it, for it was ticklish work in those days, to say a word in favor of a religion so hated in England as was the Catholic faith, and had there not been a chance of the Young Pretender succeeding, we doubt whether we should ever have sighed over the sorrows of the brave and beautiful Clementina, whose steadfastness to her religion may well be an example to all Catholic girls with Protestant lovers.

It is noteworthy that while all Clementina's objections to Grandison are the difference in their religion, Richardson makes the other

members of her family take a lower ground also, for their objections are partly based upon considerations of position, wealth and family. He makes Clementina's second brother, the Bishop, a most zealous Catholic and most uncompromising in his judgments of Protestants, allowing no salvation to any outside the pale of Holy Church. In his arguments with Grandison the Bishop gets very warm and says the author does his cause no good thereby; but he makes it pretty clear that it is the soul of his sister's lover that he desires to capture, far more than to secure him as Clementina's husband.

Father Marescotti, Clementina's confessor, is described as taking a very harsh view of the poor girl's infatuation for Grandison. Writing to her Protestant friend, Mrs. Beaumont, she says: "Father Marescotti, though he now loves the man, suggests that my late disorder might be a judgment upon me for suffering my heart to be engaged by the heretic."

Nevertheless, Father Marescotti is said to have been a very worthy priest, certain to obtain promotion for his merits, and after Clementina's elopement to escape marrying the Count of Belvedere he takes a much gentler view of this escapade and sets aside her self-accusations and forgives her as freely as her adoring parents have done when she offers to submit to any penance he may inflict.

One of the remarkable features of this novel is the charity with which the various Protestant characters treat those of the Catholic faith. The author has not only dealt fairly with the Catholics in his story himself, but he has made his Protestant characters respect them and recognize their high principles and other good points, while at the same time they never for a moment swerve from their own religious standpoint. Indeed, one of the great lessons to be learned from this novel, eminently didactic in tone, is charity to those who are of another faith.

F. M. STEELE.

Stroud, England.

## CRITICISMS IN KANT.

## KANT AND THE CATEGORIES.

MONG the arguments which we have used to expose the impotency of Kant's objections against the proofs for the existence of God, the retorsio argumenti, it may be noticed, holds the chief place. We have shown that if Kant's contention be valid when he argues that the absolutely necessary being which reason postulates as the cause of the contingent, has no objective validity-inasmuch as we can never meet with this necessary being in experience, and consequently its existence can never be empirically demonstrated—the same argument applies with even greater force to our empirical knowledge, as far at least as it rests on the principles of causality and contradiction; both of which Kant accepts in their fullness, and both of which he admits as the partial foundation at least of our empirical knowledge. Kant, too, admits that these principles are not borrowed either from experience or from reflection on experience; that they are a priori principles which exist in the mind wholly independent of experience: and that on the truth of these principles, as on a foundation, the truth of much of experience, and consequently of much of our empirical knowledge, rests. Yet the objective validity of these a priori principles, much as we all prize them, can never be empirically demonstrated, and the underlying reality can never be met with in experience. Consequently if Kant's objections to the proofs for the existence of the necessary being have any weight or value, they have a still greater force against the objective validity of the truth of the principles of contradiction and causality, and consequently expose our empirical knowledge to the charge of being mere deceitful illusion. Nay, more; the proofs for the existence of the necessary being as the cause of the contingent have claims on objective validity which the principles of contradiction and causality by no means possess; for the existence of the necessary being as the cause of the contingent is demanded by reason as an absolute logical necessity. Hence Kant's objections to our possession of any knowledge of the Supreme Being rebounds with redoubled force against the validity of our empirical knowledge.

It is not, however, merely against the principles of causality and contradiction that Kant's objections can be retorted. They apply with equal force against all the Kantian categories; and as these categories, according to Kant, are the very foundation of all our empirical knowledge, so that without them experience itself

is impossible, it follows that if these categories possess no more objective validity than Kant will admit for the existence of the Supreme Being, then all experience and all empirical knowledge is open to the same objection which Kant urges so strongly against the existence of God. All our empirical knowledge in that case would be mere illusion. The object of this article will be to show this; that is, that Kant cannot claim for his categories objective validity of any kind, according to his own principles; for they can never be met with in experience, and we can never have any empirical knowledge whatever regarding them. Consequently, all our empirical knowledge is open to precisely the same objections which Kant urges against the existence of God.

The value and importance of the categories in the Kantian system of metaphysics can hardly be overrated. Not only is this true, but it would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of the part which these same categories have played, ever since Kant's day, in the realm of philosophy. We may go even further still, and yet be within the limits of truth, if we say that, since Kant's time, no other factor has been so predominant in determining human opinion in its estimate of the value of man's knowledge, or in determining the extent of that knowledge, as have these same categories. Hence a word of exposition of their meaning and importance may not be out of place before we come to determine the real value of them.

The categories constitute the great central fortress in the Kantian metaphysics. They are regarded as the invincible stronghold of the great Kantian system. They are at once the boasted pride and vaunted strength of Kant's entire philosophy. They are even the mighty bulwarks which guard the entire realm of modern philosophical error. They have done for Kant what the discovery of gravitation has done for Newton, what the discovery of the earth's motion has done for Copernicus and Galileo, what the discovery of electricity has done for Franklin-they have blazoned Kant's name on the eternal scroll of fame. It is the categories which constitute Kant's chief claim to glory and immortality. Neither the "transcendental æsthetic" with its new notions of space and time, nor his bizarre and spectacular "antinomies," nor his elaborate "paralogisms of reason," nor his ingenious but transparent "ideal of pure reason" could ever have brought him fame. We may eliminate all these-important though he regarded them-from his system and his name will still shine with undiminished lustre; but if we remove the categories, the light of Kant's glory is immediately extinguished. It is to the categories that Kant's worshippers will point when they want to prove to you his incontrovertible claims

to greatness. It is to them Kant himself turns when he wishes to impress us with the inestimable, untold, and priceless value "of the treasure left to posterity"-as he himself does not hesitate to designate it. It is to the categories Ludwig Noiré refers when, in a fit of Kantian ecstasy, he tells us: "The palm of valor belongs to the hero of thought who has plunged into the obscurest abysses of the human mind and, with almost superhuman calm, has succeeded in emerging with the key to the mystery in his hand." The "key to the mystery" is the categories. The categories are Kant's great discovery. Their discovery revolutionized all philosophy and gave a new meaning to the term knowledge. It set bounds to the limits of man's knowledge which had hitherto been regarded as boundless in its possibilities. With the discovery of the categories Kant was enabled to say to knowledge: Thus far shalt thou go and no farther. At least, so men thought; and so to-day tens of thousands of men who have adopted Kant's categories as marking the limit line of human knowledge, think. It is to them that even so staid and sober a philosopher as was the late illustrious philologist, Max Müller, referred, when he called them "a central thought which forms a real rest and entrenched ground on the onward march of human intellect," and, when again he said, we have to thank Kant "that we know now all that can be known about the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul and the existence of God." The categories, he believed, marked the boundary line beyond which human reason cannot pass. Or, to quote Noiré again: "It was reserved for Kant to sound the furthest depths of human reason, and so forever to disperse the anxious doubts by which it was beset, to establish its just and inalienable claims, as well as to determine for all time the boundaries beyond which it must not venture, under penalty of losing itself upon the shoreless ocean of vain imaginations and wild and empty speculation." Kant himself was troubled by no false modesty regarding the merits of his belauded discovery. He had no hesitation in boldly proclaiming his own praise and did not shrink through any false notions of modesty from attempting to place his own discovery alongside of that of Copernicus. He swaggeringly assures us: "We have here the same case as with the first thought of Copernicus, who, not being able to get on in the explanation of the movements of the heavenly bodies, as long as he assumed that all the stars turned around the spectator, tried whether he could not succeed better by assuming the spectator to be turning and the stars to be at rest. A similar experiment may be tried in metaphysics, as far as the intuition of objects is concerned." And again he tells us: "I also propose in this preface my own view of metaphysics, which has

so many analogies with the Copernican hypothesis." The categories are "the heavenly bodies" in Kant's theory, the transfer of which from a state of motion to a state of fixedness and rest effected a complete revolution in the world of metaphysics. They are the axis on which all modern philosophy revolves; and their discovery by Kant—as he supposed—has revolutionized our notions of knowledge as completely as the Copernican discovery revolutionized men's knowledge of the heavenly bodies. Nay, more; it is not merely the world of philosophy or of metaphysics that the so-called discovery of the categories has affected; the transformation reaches out to the ultimate limit of our world of knowledge. The categories, then, are at once the foundation and the crown of all Kant's greatness and glory. In the construction of the vast and imposing philosophical edifice which he has given the world, and which is supposed to last for all time, the categories are to be met with everywhere. They are the foundation. They are the keystone of the triumphal arch of entry. They support the entire edifice. Or perhaps it would be more correct to say that Kant's twelve categories are the twelve pillars which support the gigantic nave of the great philosophical cathedral with all its massive weight and strength, and that all the aisles, and wings, and dimly lighted chapels, and strange corridors, and curious dormers, with their new outlook on the field of knowledge, borrow all their light, their strength, their false beauty, their symmetry, from the main structure of which the categories are the majestic columns. Certain it is that if the categories fall, all the rest of the structure falls with them. The huge philosophical temple of knowledge is constructed around the categories which form a lofty, extensive, gigantic middle court which opens into all the others, and gives light, and color, and character to the remaining portions of the edifice. It is on the categories—and on the categories only—that Kant's claim to glory and immortality rests. Once more; it is to the categories Noiré alludes when again he tells us of Kant: "He was to show why all earlier speculation had broken down, and must have broken down: he alone succeeded in solving all the contradictions and paradoxes in which the reason was entangled and explaining them completely in accordance with their own nature, as he dropped the sounding line into depths which as yet no mortal mind had dared to fathom, and brought from thence to the light of day news of the primary conditions and eternal postulates of reason." All this extravagant language and exaggeration of values applies to the categories, and to them alone. They constitute the essence of the vaunted treasure and are the rich bullion of the boasted capital which Kant so posterity has complacently taken "the treasure" at its donor's which posterity has complacently taken "the treasure" at its donor's valuation and hoarded it away among the world's archives of learning, without ever stopping to question whether it may not be, after all, hoarding a mere treasure of gold bricks.

It is not a little singular that, in spite of the fundamental position which the categories hold in the Kantian system, and in spite of the overmastering influence which they possess in determining the modern meaning of the term knowledge, not one reader in a thousand seems to understand the meaning, and not one in ten thousand seems to question the validity, of the categories as Kant interprets them. Much as the Kantian values these possessions, we find but few of the critics of the Kantian philosophy who seem to have grasped at all the significance of the part played by the categories not only in the Kantian theories, but even in the whole system of Kantian philosophy, while fewer still comprehend their determining power in deciding what is and what is not to be regarded as real knowledge in the present age of the world. Yet nearly all the present day errors both in philosophy and religion, and absolutely all the errors in the present day theory of knowledge, are traceable directly to Kant-and, in Kant, directly to his theory of the categories. The exclusion of God and the supernatural from the realm of knowledge, so loftily insisted on in latter-day systems, is the direct result of the categories—indeed was the avowed purpose of Kant's theory regarding them. Agnosticism in its various forms springs from one root, and that root is the Kantian category. The entire philosophy of the unknowable of Herbert Spencer is but the accommodation of the Kantian category to English-speaking thought. Even those who reject Kant's philosophy on other points seem to be spellbound by his manipulation of the categories, and cling to them, while they utterly reject the transcendental æsthetic and the antinomies. Acute philosophers seem to overlook the point at which reasoning runs into sophistry and to miss the fallacy in the category altogether. Doubtless it is due to the difficulty of following Kant through the tortuous and obscure path—as he himself called it—that so many reject all else in Kant as unsound, and yet accept the categories as the discovery of the ages. Catholic philosophy seems to have passed the categories over entirely as a terra incognita or a darkest Africa, where attempts at exploration were useless, because of the tangle and brush; so trackless was the region and impenetrable the forest in which the leader himself admitted that the path was difficult to find. Even our own American philosopher—the only one amongst us who professedly undertook to refute all the Kantian errors, the late Dr. Brownson—seems, with all his acuteness, to have missed completely the true significance of the Kantian category, its relation to the Kantian system of philosophy, and especially its relation to the modern theory of human knowledge. This last he, indeed, misses so utterly that he seems to think that all that is necessary is to dispute, merely as a scholastic question, whether the categories are objective or subjective. He does not seem to have even remotely apprehended the vast and momentous consequences which result from their subjectivity, or to have at all suspected that Kant's sole and primary object in elaborating his categories as forms of the subject was to bring about these momentous consequences and amazing results. Indeed, there are few even of Kant's followers who seem to grasp the full meaning of the Kantian category, or, grasping it, who are never unmindful—when treating of it—of its vast scope and sweeping consequences. For this reason we shall try to explain the Kantian category, so that even the most ordinary understanding may be able to grasp its meaning and the wayfaring man understand the peculiarity of its nature.

Aristotle it was who first discovered that human knowledge has the tendency to run in certain grooves; and to run thus spontaneously. In other words, all human knowledge lends itself to classification under certain heads, of which Aristotle at first picked up ten. Aristotle's categories were substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, time, place, situation and habit. To these he added five others a little later. We have, for example, the notion of substance running through entire classes of thought and knowledge almost without consciousness of the fact on our part. For instance, we see water in the liquid state; to-night's frost will change into a solid form; in the tea kettle and steam engine it assumes the form of vapor. Here under the various forms we have change, but underlying each form we realize there is one and the same something which is permanent and does not change, and this we call substance. It is the same with the substance of the wood which we see under different forms—now as a growing tree, now as a piece of furniture, now as a dwelling place for man, now as a ship that sails upon the Beneath all the appearances or forms we recognize the substance of wood. A close scrutiny of our knowledge will disclose the interesting fact that certain and numerous facts of our knowledge include this category of permanent substance that remains underneath all changes. And thus in certain forms of knowledge we look for the category of substance. Again, when we come upon an unusual object—or even an unusual situation—the question arises spontaneously in the mind: Why is this thus? In other words, we find that the category of cause lies in the mind unconsciously and that another class of facts within our knowledge

range themselves under the head of cause. Thus we have the category of cause. Or again, we look at the world in its extent and variety, and we also know that in spite of its extent and variety it is one. By close attention to nature or even to art we find confronting us everywhere quantity which is divisible into its component parts, and again we perceive that an extensive province of our knowledge falls under the head of quantity, another under the head of unity, another under the head of number or plurality, and so on. Now, substance, quantity, unity, plurality, cause, etc., etc., are what are called the categories; and the question naturally arises: Whence come the categories? Where do we get these concepts which arise spontaneously in the mind? Aristotle attributed them to the objects perceived; or, perhaps, better still, thought that they have their foundation in the object perceived, and thus impressed themselves on the mind perceiving. Hence, according to Aristotle, they belong, properly speaking, to the objects of which we predicate them. Locke, on the other hand, regarded them as abstractions from experience. These abstract notions or categories arose from experience or reflection on experience; and David Hume was of the same opinion. Since Kant's time Victor Cousin reduced the number of the categories to two. Brownson seemed to lean to Cousin's enumeration, though he intimated that, in his opinion, the number could be increased to four. Thus we see that all our thinking and all our knowledge falls quite naturally under certain heads or classes, and these heads or classes into which knowledge naturally falls. Aristotle called categories or predicaments. Hence, speaking in a general way, the general notions of cause and effect, of substance and accident, of unity and plurality, of existence and nonexistence, of reality, negation, etc., etc., are what philosophers term categories. We might call them abstract notions, but in so close a scrutiny the term might be misleading, for Kant flatly denies that they are abstractions. The general notion or concept, then, under which the understanding places each separate particle of knowledge is called the category. The category is then the furrow or the channel of thought into which knowledge naturally and spontaneously runs. The category is general. For example, we do not say that the rotation of the earth on its axis causing day and night is a category, or that gravitation which causes the falling of bodies is a category. These are particular instances of the category of cause, but they are not the category itself. The category—of cause, for example—is the general notion or concept of causality which compels us to look for a cause for everything; and so on of the other categories. The category in each instance is the general notion or concept.

Now, Kant's notion of the categories was entirely different from that of Aristotle on the one hand and that of Locke and Hume on the other; and under Kant's hand they become endowed with the most tremendous importance and the most momentous significance. Kant's theory is that the categories do not belong to the object at all, as Aristotle believed; neither are they abstractions from experience and from reflection on experience, as Locke and Hume thought. They are, according to Kant's opinion, forms that exist in the mind, and in the mind only. Thus, when I look at a house, a ship, an automobile, a commonwealth, the universe, and behold the unity and at the same time the divisibility of any of these into their component parts, this unity or this divisibility does not belong to the objects—the house, ship, automobile, state, universe; this unity, this divisibility, is a form existing in my own mind prior to all experience of objects; and when the mind comes into contact with the objects, these objects are forced to take the form or mould previously existing in my understanding and lying there prepared for the objects of experience with which my mind may come in contact. Consequently all my knowledge and all my experience must shape itself in accordance with these forms of thought which have existed in my mind from the very beginning. The categories, then, according to Kant, are nothing more or less than mental moulds of knowledge. Our experience of objects-indeed our entire empirical knowledge-must therefore conform to these moulds or forms of the understanding, just as the molten metal must take the form of the mould into which it is poured. The categories of cause, unity, quantity, divisibility, substance, etc., etc., are forms existing in the mind; and the objects with which the mind comes in contact, if they are to become part of our knowledge, must assume these forms already existing and prepared in the mind. But unity, divisibility, quantity, substance, cause, etc., do not belong to the objects at all. The objects have these forms pressed upon them by the mind in which only they exist. These forms may be likened to the die or the inscription on the seal. They impress their forms on the objects which we meet with in experience; but the unity, divisibility, quantity, etc., no more belong to the objects of which we predicate them than the impression on the die belongs to the sheet-metal for which it is intended or than the inscription on the seal belongs to the wax. These forms are indeed intended for objects as we meet them in experience; but they belong wholly to, and are part, of the mind. As the die is intended for the sheet-metal and as the inscription on the seal is intended for the wax, so these forms in the mind are intended for the objects to be met with in experience, and they "lie prepared" in the mind for this purpose. Hence Kant's categories belong wholly to the mind of which they are forms. This is the essential difference between the Kantian categories and the Aristotelian predicaments. And it is here that the Copernican parallel appears. As the motion was transferred by Copernicus from the heavenly bodies to the spectator, so the forms or categories are transferred by Kant from objects to the mind in which they lie prepared ready for experience. Moreover, the Kantian categories are real and actual. That is, they have an actual existence—not an imaginary one—in the mind or human understanding. They are actual forms. It is the failure to comprehend the real meaning of the categories that lies at the bottom of all the errors which have proceeded from the Kantian philosophy.

Perhaps some may be inclined to think that we have placed too much emphasis on the fact that Kant's categories are mental moulds. But the fact is that they are this and nothing else; and those who have failed to thus interpret them have missed Kant's meaning completely. Indeed, we are of opinion that Kant stands till this day unrefuted for the simple reason that philosophers have failed to grasp the full meaning of the Kantian categories or to understand the important part which they play in the Kantian system of knowledge. That the view we have given of them here is the true one does not admit of question. Kant himself leaves no room for doubt upon this point. The categories, according to Kant, are the "fundamental concepts"—the "primary concepts" which make experience possible. The concept of cause is the Kantian category of cause. The concept of unity is the Kantian category of unity. The concept of substance is the Kantian category of substance. These notions or ideas or concepts of cause in general, number in general, quantity in general, substance in general, etc., etc., are what Kant calls the categories, and in speaking of the categories he uses interchangeably the terms concept and category. Everywhere he treats of the categories as the primary concepts and calls them now categories, now concepts indiscriminately. Possibly, it is owing to this interchange of terms-category and concept—that so many have failed to grasp the meaning of the Kantian categories. Of course, Kant also uses the term concept for concepts, or ideas: but he also uses it for "the concepts of the understanding" over and over again; that is, for the categories. Now, regarding these categories—or concepts—he tells us at the outset:

"By analytic of concepts I do not understand their analysis, or the ordinary process in philosophical disquisitions of dissecting any given concepts according to their contents, and thus rendering them more distinct; but a hitherto seldom attempted dissection of

the faculty of the understanding itself, with the sole object of discovering the possibility of concepts a priori, by looking for them nowhere but in the understanding itself as their birthplace, and analyzing the pure use of the understanding."

Here, it will be observed, Kant attempts a "dissection of the faculty of the understanding" for the purpose of "discovering the possibility of concepts a priori;" that is, of the categories, and he expects to discover them "by looking for them nowhere but in the understanding itself as their birthplace." And he adds:

"We shall follow up the pure concepts to their first germs and beginnings in the human understanding, in which they lie prepared, till at last, on the occasion of experience, they become developed and are represented by the same understanding in their full purity, freed from all inherent empirical conditions."

Kant here lays down his programme and tells us that his object is to trace the categories (the pure concepts) to their origin in the human understanding. In this understanding "they lie prepared." There they have their "first germ and beginnings." There they are prepared and lie waiting in anticipation of experience, and Kant's object is to exhibit them as thus lying prepared for usage in experience; and, before this usage in experience, as "freed from all inherent empirical conditions."

Here, then, Kant plainly shows that he regards the concepts of quantity, quality, cause, substance, etc., as something which have a real, actual, positive existence in the mind. They are not merely imaginary or possible. They are not to be derived from experience. Much less are they to be attributed to the object. They belong to the mind and to the mind only. In the mind they lie prepared; and they have been prepared there for use in experience. He adds:

"When we watch any faculty of knowledge, different concepts characteristic of that faculty, manifest themselves according to different circumstances, which, as the observation has been carried on for a longer or shorter time, or with more or less accuracy, may be gathered up into a more or less complete collection."

It is therefore by watching this faculty of knowledge we discover the categories, and Kant assures us that:

"Transcendental philosophy has this advantage, but also the duty of discovering its concepts according to a fixed principle. As they spring pure and unmixed from the understanding as an absolute unity, they must be connected with each other, according to one concept or idea. This connection supplies us at the same time with a rule, according to which the place of each pure concept of the understanding and the systematical completeness of all of them

can be determined a priori, instead of being dependent on arbitrary choice or chance."

Here we have them declared as belonging solely to the understanding; and not only that, but the number of the categories and their places in the understanding arise, we are told, from their connection in the understanding. And again he likens them—sparing though he is of illustration—to moulds or compartments in the understanding. He tells us:

"The compartments exist; they have only to be filled, and with a systematic topic like the present the proper place to which each concept belongs cannot easily be missed, nor compartments be passed over which are still empty."

Thus we see that Kant regards these categories or fundamental concepts of the understanding as real, as having real objective validity, and as independent of and prior to all experience. They are moulds in the understanding, formed and prepared there for the purpose of having experience poured into them. Experience takes these forms; and thus all our knowledge takes on the form of the categories. Without these categories or forms of the understanding we could have no experience and consequently no knowledge; and to these categories all experience and all knowledge must conform; that is, all our knowledge and all our experience must assume the form of those categories which have preëxisted in the mind and which were already prepared there for the purpose in anticipation of experience. That this is also Kant's notion admits of no question. Having explained that "all phenomena must conform to that formal condition of sensibility, because it is through it alone that they appear, that is, that they are given and empirically seen," he asks:

"Now the question arises whether there are not also antecedent concepts a priori, forming conditions under which alone something can be, if not seen, yet thought as an object in general (that is, as a category); for in that case all empirical knowledge of objects would necessarily conform to such concepts, it being impossible that anything should become an object of experience without them?" And he answers this question later in this fashion:

"Now, I maintain that the categories of which we are speaking are nothing but the conditions of thought in any possible experience, as much as space and time contain the conditions of the intuitions which form experience. These categories, therefore, are fundamental concepts by which we think objects of all phenomena in general, and have therefore a priori objective validity."

And again after leading his readers through the dark valley he thus concludes:



"It must be admitted, therefore, that there exist in the understanding pure forms of knowledge a priori, which contain the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of the imagination in reference to all possible phenomena. These are the categories, that is, the pure concepts of the understanding. The empirical knowledge of man contains, therefore, by necessity an understanding which refers to all objects of the senses, though by intuition only and by its synthesis through imagination, and all phenomena, as data of a possible experience, must conform to these categories."

We could go on multiplying quotations indefinitely to show what, in Kant's system, is the true meaning and scope of the categories. Sed sat sufficit. From what we have seen it is quite evident that, according to Kant's view, the categories belong not to objects at They belong wholly to the understanding. They are forms of the understanding-mental moulds into which experience is poured and whose form experience, and consequently all our empirical knowledge, must assume. To them all objects, all phenomena, all experience must conform. Without them we can have no experience and no knowledge. It is the categories that make experience possible. It is the categories, therefore, which make all knowledge possible. They are intended for use only in experience. And lastly, they can never be applied to objects outside experience. Kant's theory of knowledge therefore includes: (1) That the categories are mental moulds of thought; (2) that through them—and through them only—can human knowledge be acquired; (3) that they are intended for experience, consequently the only knowledge we can have is empirical knowledge; (4) that being intended for use only in experience, everything that is outside of experience is excluded from knowledge. Now, this is a very ambitious programme. Kant's categories, it is plain, have an exceedingly wide scope and sweep the entire field of experience and of knowledge. They are of far-reaching import; and for humanity tremendous issues hang upon their truth or falsity. They should. therefore, admit of no shadow of doubt. They should carry with them from the very first the assurance of apodictic certainty. There should be no manner of question about their objective validity, which should be clear beyond all question. Unless they can be shown to have a real existence in the mind—as Kant claims they have—all our empirical knowledge is but mere illusion, since, according to Kant, all our experience and all our knowledge rest upon their truth. Should Kant's first hypothesis be false (and it is nothing more than a hypothesis which he claims to have demonstrated as true) all our empirical knowledge sinks into the abyss, according to Kant's metaphysic. In other words, if these forms of the understanding be not actualities—if these mental moulds in the understanding possess not objective reality—either we know nothing at all or Kant's entire system of philosophy is the purest quintessence of philosophical humbug. The question then arises: Have Kant's categories a real existence? Do they possess objective validity? Has Kant been able to prove that the categories are what he claims them to be? Are they actual forms existing in the mind and to which experience must conform? Have they no application in speculative inquiries outside experience? Granted that his theory of the purely subjective character of the categories be true, do the astonishing consequences, which Kant claims, follow from his theory? These are the questions on which the entire value of the entire Kantian system of philosophy hinges. If all these questions can be answered affirmatively, then is Kant the chief among all philosophers. If even some of them must be answered negatively, Kant must take his place among the great impostors who have earned the contempt of mankind. If they cannot be answered at all, the presumption and assurance of Kant in claiming that he has answered them affirmatively must be estimated at its true worth, and the value of all our empirical knowledge, which, Kant tells us, rests upon the objective validity of the categories, becomes uncertain and fluctuating, and we are unable to say whether we know anything.

Now, if the true meaning of the Kantian categories, as forms of the mind or moulds of the understanding, be kept steadily in view, it will become at once evident that to answer these questions becomes an utter impossibility. According to Kant's own reasoning, these concepts of the understanding which he calls the categories become at once—according to his explanation—what he calls "concepts of pure reason" as well as concepts of the understanding. Now, the concepts of pure reason are, according to the Kantian canons, contraband of knowledge. They are the cosmological problem, the psychological problem and the theological problem. And Kant calls these "concepts of pure reason" or "transcendental ideas," for the simple reason that he wishes to put them outside the pale of knowledge altogether; the pretext under which he claims that he is forced to thus exclude them from knowledge being that the objects of these pure concepts of reason -or transcendental ideas-"can never be given empirically, and therefore lie entirely outside the domain of the pure understanding." Now, it is certain that the categories, as Kant represents them, are nothing else but deduced concepts "arising from pure reason," that they, too, never can be given "empirically" and that "they, too, lie entirely outside the domain of the pure understanding." But Kant ejects from the realm of knowledge the unity of it is without objective reality. He does the same with the immortality of the soul. Kant places these questions outside the realm of knowlpirical knowledge of the soul's immortality; but he never dreams that in his categories he has, as far as empirical knowledge is concerned, precisely the same problem as in the soul's unity and immortality. Whether the soul is one and immortal presents no more difficulty to the intellect than the question whether the categories of cause, substance, unity, etc., are forms of the mind or moulds existing in the human understanding. These forms of the mind—or categories—"can never be given empirically," any more than can the unity and immortality of the soul; and these forms of the understanding-although it is claimed that they have existence in the understanding-"lie entirely outside the domain of the pure understanding" as completely as the notions of the soul's unity and immortality. According to Kant's own principles of knowledge, then, it is an utter impossibility to show that these categories have objective reality. Let us go into this question a little further, so that even the most prejudiced Kantian cannot fail to grasp it.

Now, in order to refute Kant's entire claims for his categories, it is not by any means necessary to show that these categories are not forms of the understanding. We may concede that they are actual mental moulds wholly independent of all experience and purely subjective, and vet Kant's momentous conclusions will hardly follow from them. It is not with his Copernican theory of the categories—their transfer from object to subject—that we here take issue. It is to the use to which Kant applies them that we wish here to direct attention. He uses them as a lever to overthrow the proofs for the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. It was for this purpose he invented them. All, then, that is necessary in order to completely discredit them is to show that for this very laudable purpose they are entirely ineffectual. In this case his Copernican theory is not disproved—nor is any disproof attempted; it is merely rendered harmless and powerless. But in showing that the categories are ineffectual to discredit the existence of God and the immortality of the soul or to exclude them from all title to the name of knowledge, there incidentally arises a new question, the answer to which is disastrous to Kant's entire philosophy, and which completely erases from the chart of knowledge all knowledge that is empirical; and this is the exact reversal of the end for which Kant invented his theory of the categories. Kant claims that nothing can be knowledge which does not come to us through the categories. But whence comes Kant's knowledge of the categories? This single question overturns Kant's theory of knowledge. Does it come through the categories? And if it does not, according to Kant's theory, it cannot be knowledge at all. Yet, according to Kant, on this no-knowledge-at-all of the categories all our empirical knowledge is based.

Kant's objections against the proofs for the existence of God, the unity and immortality of the soul, etc., etc., are that they cannot be shown to have objective reality. The concepts of these are empty concepts, we are told. And they are empty concepts, because their objects can never be given empirically. These objects lie entirely outside the domain of the pure understanding. There can be no proof of the existence of God and therefore no certainty of it, we are told, because we cannot show that His existence-although postulated by reason as an absolute necessity—has objective validity. For in order to show that this existence has any objective validity it would be necessary, Kant says, that we should have an empirical knowledge of it: in other words, it is necessary that we be able to meet with it in experience. But this existence can never be met with in the course of any possible experience—Kant means any mundane experience—and consequently can never be empirically known. These are Kant's arguments. Now, it is remarkable that these selfsame objections can be urged with even greater force against Kant's own categories. Not all the labors of Kant, or all his ingenuity-genius, if you will-has been able to show that these categories of Kant possess objective validity or that they can ever be met with in the course of any human experience. To show that they can be met with in the course of experience is an utter and absolute impossibility. To say that we can ever meet with these mental moulds of knowledge in experience would be to utter an absurdity. In his most extraordinary "Deduction of the Categories" Kant's whole effort has been directed to show that these categories possess objective validity. In this impossible task he, of course, ignominiously fails. Kant's absolute and necessary failure here has never been recognized by the critics-whether disciples or adversaries; partly owing to the obscurity in which he shrouded the process of his labors, and partly owing to the gigantic bluff in which he had the audacity to claim that he had proved what is, according to his own principles, impossible of proof. We never can have any empirical knowledge that the categories exist in the understanding as forms of the mind or moulds for experience. And we never can meet with those forms or moulds in experience any more than we can meet in experience with the unity and immortality of the soul. Yet Kant maintains that without this empirical knowledge and unless we can meet with

them in experience we can never have knowledge of things, while he at the same time maintains that he has proved that these categories exist as forms in the human understanding. Audacity of this kind becomes too overwhelming for speech. And people have been satisfied in so abstruse a study to accept Kant's conclusions on the authority of his own word. Let us see whether Kant has succeeded in proving that these Kantian concepts or categories have objective validity, or whether they can ever be met with in the course of any experience. We are, of course, speaking here of the categories in the Kantian sense; that is, as forms of the mind or mental moulds of the understanding.

Now, we must not for a moment confound—as Kant continually does—the Kantian categories with the application of the categories in experience. We have seen the meaning of the categories in the ordinary acceptation of philosophers; and we have also seen their meaning in the Kantian system. We must, above all, keep before our minds the true meaning of the categories in the Kantian metaphysics—something which Kant himself egregiously failed to do. Kant's categories are primary concepts—fundamental concepts which are in the mind independent of all experience and before all experience. They are in the mind for use in experience. They make experience possible; and without them there can be no experience at all. Nevertheless, their existence is wholly independent of experience. Now, there is no doubt that of the twelve categories, which Kant enumerates as the only forms which our knowledge can assume, we over and over again make particular application in experience; that is, we use the categories in experience. In other words, we apply, in experience, the general concept or category. For example, when we speak of the attraction of gravitation as the cause of falling bodies, we are applying in a particular instance, in experience, our general concept of cause, or the category of cause. This, however, is by no means meeting with the object corresponding to the concept of cause in general, or in other words, with the object which corresponds to the category of cause, in experience. It is but the particular application to an object in experience of the general concept—or the category -of cause. This distinction must be determinedly insisted upon; otherwise we shall fall into confusion, and, as Kant has so frequently done, confound things which are essentially different. It is, however, quite manifest that from the various causes with which we meet in daily experience we can rise to the notion of cause in general; and the question arises, what is this notion of cause in general? The cause of the seasons, the cause of day and night, the cause of illness, the cause of happiness, the cause of fluctuations

in stocks—all are but particular applications of the notion or concept of cause in general. These particular applications of the notion of cause in general always take place in experience; but the object of the notion of cause in general is never in experience. The object which corresponds with our notion of cause in general—or our general notion of cause—even if we grant that the notion has objective validity, can never be met with in any experience. Or let us take the category of substance. We perceive that under the appearances of clouds, water, ice, snow, etc., there is a permanent substance which always remains. This is a particular application, in experience, of the concept of substance in general. That is, we meet with a particular substance in experience. But what is this concept of substance in general? It is quite plain that from our notions of the substance in water, in wood, in wine, in clay, etc., we can rise to the concept of substance in general, or the general concept of substance. But what is this general concept of substance? Can this general concept ever be met with in experience? Is there an object that corresponds to this general concept of substance? That is, can the object which it represents—if it really represents an object—ever be met with in any experience? And so of all the other categories; for the categories are nothing else than these concepts in general or general concepts, the particular application of which we daily encounter in our common experience. Now, it is quite manifest that there is the widest possible difference, therefore, between the concept of cause in general-or the category of cause-and the application of this general idea in a particular instance. The object corresponding to the general concept of cause we never meet with in experience, if indeed there be at all such an object; while particular causes are of daily and hourly occurrence in experience. The categories are here on precisely the same plane—as far as experience is concerned—as our abstract notions, such as goodness or sweetness or whiteness, etc. We meet daily with particular instances of goodness and sweetness and whiteness; that is, with objects which are good and sweet, etc.; but who has ever encountered in experience the objective reality of these notions; that is, with the objects corresponding to the abstract notions of goodness or sweetness? It is precisely the same with the categories. Now, it is the confounding of these two essentially different concepts, the notion of cause in general and the notion of some cause in particular, that has been the source of endless error and confusion, and which has led Kant to so successfully deceive himself and dupe his disciples. He is eternally confounding these two widely different concepts. We have mentioned merely the categories of cause and substance; but the same is true of all the other categories; for the

category is merely the general notion or concept to which we refer each particular instance as we meet with it in experience. It is quite evident, however, that the general concept is never met with in any experience and never can be met with (we do not even know what it is) in any experience. Now, this general concept is nothing else but the category, for which it is only another name; and it is quite manifest that the particular application of the category in experience is widely different from the category or general concept itself. We know that the cause of a railroad holocaust is a broken rail. There we have the particular cause and we meet with it in experience. But what is the meaning of the concept, cause in general, which causes us to look for particular causes in every incident as well as in every accident of experience? The answer is: we do not know. But certain it is that this answer which we do not even know-can never become the object of any experience. Hence while we have particular causes in almost every moment of experience, that which constitutes the objective reality of the notion of cause in general—if it have objective reality in other words, of the category of cause, can never be met with in any experience. The same is true of all the other categories. From the very nature of the case this is so. We do not know what this objective reality is. And what is more, we do not know whether there is such an objective reality at all. Now, this is true of the categories in the Aristotelian sense, and in the sense of Locke and Hume. But it is doubly true of Kant's categories, which are forms of the mind or mental moulds, and which therefore can never be given in experience.

Now, Kant maintains that while he cannot define the categories or concepts in general, he at least knows what they are collectively. And he tells us they are forms of the understanding prepared for the reception of experience—mental moulds into which experience is poured. And he further maintains that as such: that is, as forms of the understanding or mental moulds of knowledge, they not only have objective validity, but they can be met with in experience. Now, whether these forms of the mind have objective validity, that is, whether they exist at all, is an open question, which, if true, should be susceptible of demonstration, and Kant thinks that he has demonstrated it to be true in his deduction of the categories; while the question whether these forms of the mind can ever be met with in the course of any experience is so wild and extravagant that merely to formulate it is to answer it conclusively in the negative. It needs no argument whatever to show its utter impossibility. Nevertheless, Kant confuses the particular application in experience of the general concept—or category—with

the general concept or category itself, and thinks that he has thus at once both proved the objective validity of his categories and demonstrated that these same categories can be met with in experience. If, however, we only keep in mind the distinction between the meaning of the general concept; that is, of the concept in general, or the category, and the particular application of that term in any particular instance in experience—we shall avoid Kant's ridiculous mistake. The abstract concept, then, of cause cannot be shown to have objective validity; and if it has objective validity, the object of that abstract concept can never be met with in any experience; while in any particular or concrete cause the objective validity is immediately apparent and is also part of experience. Now, Kant's blunder consists in claiming that the objective validity in any particular concrete cause, together with the fact that we meet with this object in experience, is a sufficient proof of the objective validity of the abstract concept of cause, or cause in general—and hence of the category of cause; and that it also proves that the object of cause in general can be met with in experience. But it is quite evident that if we show the objective validity in any particular cause, we do not thereby show also the objective validity of the general concept of cause. And it is equally evident that, when we show that the object of any particular concrete cause can be met with in experience, we do not thereby prove that the objective validity of cause in general may also be met with in experience. Yet this is the only proof that Kant gives that his categories or mental forms of the understanding possess objective validity, and that they can be met with in experience. Whether there be any object to correspond to the abstract notion or concept of cause is not proven, and, moreover, is a problem which does not admit of proof. And the same is true of the entire list of the categories. Whether or not they possess objective reality; and, if they do, what is the nature of that reality, are problems which hardly admit of solution in the present state of man's intellectual equipment. If Aristotle regarded the categories as belonging entirely to the object; if others regard them as the joint product of the mind and the object; if Locke and Hume regarded them as mere mental abstractions derived from experience and reflection on experience; and if, finally, Kant regarded them as belonging solely to the mind, it is easy to see that the question whether they possess objective validity at all does not admit of an easy answer; while the question: what is the nature of that reality? is wholly impossible of answer. Kant has brought forward no proof whatever to warrant us in following him in the belief that the categories belong wholly and solely to the under-

standing; and, from the nature of his claim, it is also impossible for him to bring forward any proof by which he can show that they at all exist as forms of the mind, or moulds of the understanding to which objects must conform. He cannot reach such a conclusion by any process of ratiocination. And he cannot show it from experience; for the simple reason that they can never come into experience. Kant's audacious attempt to prove by a deduction from principles of reason, or of the understanding, that his categories possess objective validity is merely another attempt at an Icarian flight. We have not the space here to follow him in his attempted deduction of the categories. This must be reserved for another article. All that we can do here is to emphasize the fact that Kant has quite unconsciously prepared beforehand the grave for all his contentions, and that his doctrine of the categories cancels completely everything that he has said by way of disparagement of the proofs for the existence of God and the unity and immortality of the soul. His great objections to the admission of these to the rank and title of knowledge applies with still greater force to his own categories. Kant maintains that these doctrines, both of philosophy and religion, cannot be shown to possess objective validity. The objects of them can never be met with in the course of any experience. They can never attain to the dignity of empirical knowledge, for they can never be empirically known. This is his grand indictment of these doctrines. And then with serene self-complacency he proceeds to elaborate his theory of the categories and leaves them even more openly exposed to the very objections which he urges against the proscribed dogmas than are the philosophical and theological doctrines which he has labored so hard to discredit. He prepared with much ingenuity and labor a trap which he thought could not fail to prove fatal to the doomed doctrines. And then with eyes wide open and mind intently fixed on the intellectual victims whose funeral pyre he has already prepared, he walks directly into the trap he had arranged for the fated dogmas. What could be more certain than that the existence of God can never be experimentally shown? What escape was there when the challenge came: produce your First Cause in experience? Who could dare to answer in the affirmative when asked whether the unity or immortality of the human soul could be empirically demonstrated? There was certainly no escape left for the fated problems when Kant, the master genius, manipulated the device by which the value of knowledge was to be henceforth and forever tested, and then stepped forward with his peremptory challenge. The pretentious dogmas had run their course. At least, such was Kant's fond belief. Empirical reality became the slogan of knowledge, and these truths could never be empirically known. What wonder that the empirical test of truth was applauded as the most masterful intellectual achievement of the ages? Men were so dazzled by the brilliancy of the exploit which "held up the key to the mystery" of human knowledge that they forgot to examine the nature of the key or to scrutinize it closely. But, alas! for the vanity of all human triumphs—even in the realm of transcendental ideas. itself will be found on close investigation to be tainted with the very illegitimacy in knowledge against which it was to close the door; and all Kant's ingenuity and deep-laid plot are worse than His triumph becomes worse than ignominious failure; it is fatuity. He was so intent in invalidating as knowledge the esteem of God and the immortality of the soul, and establishing empirical knowledge as the only true kind of knowledge, that he failed to see that in the attempt he had completely shattered beyond hope of repair the very foundations of his empirical knowledge. deed, his fatuity here may be justly compared to that of a man seated on the branch of a tree who industriously saws away at the branch-between himself and the trunk. He built his vast and ambitious edifice on the quicksand of the categories, and the entire metaphysical edifice, and with it the entire edifice of human knowledge sinks into the abyss. For if the existence of God be excluded from recognition as knowledge for the sole reason that we can never have an empirical demonstration of its truth, and that we can never meet with the First and necessary cause of the universe in the course of any experience, what shall be said of the categories—those forms of the understanding—those mental moulds of knowledge—on which the truth of all our empirical knowledge, according to the teaching of Kant, must rest? Who has shown that these categories, as mental moulds of knowledge, can ever be met with in any experience? Who can give an empirical demonstration that they at all exist? And yet all our empirical knowledge, according to Kant, rests on these and these alone. if the test of truth be, as Kant puts it, whether we may be able to meet with a reality in the course of a possible experience; and if these categories or mental forms of knowledge can never be met with in any experience; and if, furthermore, the entire universe of empirical knowledge rests, as on a foundation, on those categories which we can never meet with in any possible experience, what, then, becomes of the value of our empirical knowledge? We can never prove that these categories in the Kantian sense exist at all. We have no means of ascertaining whether Kant's theory of the categories is true or false. What, then,

becomes of the knowledge that is based upon them? The affinity, however, between the Kantian categories as mental moulds of knowledge and the unity and immortality of the soul is much closer than the affinity between the Kantian categories and the existence of God. Now, if Kant claims that we must reject the doctrines of the soul's unity and immortality because we can never meet with these in experience—because "their object can never be given empirically," as Kant puts it-how can we be seriously asked to build up the entire empire of empirical knowledge on mental moulds or forms of the understanding, since these forms "can never be given empirically?" Are these forms of the understanding ever likely to be given empirically? Can we hope that they will ever come into any experience? Are they not precisely in the same relation to experience as are the soul's unity and immortality? The unity and immortality of the soul are conditions or characters of the soul, it is true, and as such can never be empirically known -they can never come into experience; but the categories or forms of the understanding or mental moulds belong to the soul also and to the soul exclusively; for the understanding is nothing else but a faculty of the soul. Consequently there is no more probability—or possibility, if you will—that the categories can ever be given in experience than that the immortality of the soul can ever be thus given. What Kant completely overlooked was: to test his own formula-to test his own ingeniously constructed device for determining what was and what was not to be admitted as knowledge—to test his own categories as forms of the mind by the same rigidness which he applied to the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. These must be excluded from knowledge because they can never be empirically known, for they can never come into any human experience. But can the categories ever be empirically known? Can they ever come into experience? This question Kant forgot to ask. The philosophers since Kant's day have forgotten to ask it, and it is now asked, we believe, for the first time

Nor can it be said that in his deduction of the categories Kant has shown that they are given empirically. It is a fact that the soul's immortality can never be empirically known; but it is an equally certain fact that the categories as forms of the understanding can never be empirically given. Consequently Kant's categories are lamentably wanting in what Kant himself claims to be the essentials of legitimate knowledge. But should any enthusiastic Kantian undertake to claim that Kant's so-called deduction of the categories establishes them as empirical knowledge, in spite of the fact that it is impossible to have them empirically given,

it will be only necessary to remind him that Kant has peremptorily excluded from experience-and consequently from knowledgethe unity and immortality of the soul, in spite of the cogent arguments in favor of these doctrines; and that in the case of the existence of God or the First and necessary cause, Kant sets his face like flint against the admission of it as knowledge—in spite of the fact that reason demands this necessary cause, in spite of the fact that the existence of the necessary first cause is an absolute logical necessity, in spite of the fact that reason is so peremptory on this point that the existence of God becomes an apodictic conclusion of reason compelling unquestioning assent, and in spite of the fact that notwithstanding his rejection of the existence of the necessary being, Kant himself is compelled to make believe that this necessary being exists and constrains reason to prevaricate and counterfeit an existence which he finds himself forced to accept while he persistently denies it. Now, why does Kant fly in the face of all logic? Why does he take up arms against reason on this point? Why does he trebly stultify himself by first proving with an apodictic certainty the existence of God, then rejecting that existence, and finally bringing back this existence which he has rejected, taking a negative picture of it, and setting up this shadow of the reality as an absolutely necessary regulative principle of reason? For the simple reason that, as he tells us, we can never meet with the object which corresponds to the existence of God in experience. It can never be given empirically. Now, if the invincible proofs for the existence of God with all their overwhelming cogency and apodictic certainty must count for nothing against the fact that the object of all this absolute logical necessity can never be given in the course of any experience, we cannot see how the mass of obscurity-with all its mists and fogs -which Kant has given us for argument in his deduction of the categories, should stand for a single instant against the palpable fact that these categories can never be met with in the course of any experience. There is no escape from this argument. It is Kant's own argument turned against himself; and Kant is hoist with his own petard.

But possibly some Kantian may say that the categories are given in experience, that we have empirical knowledge of them, and this is precisely what Kant himself, with his extraordinary capacity for juggling, has himself maintained. The Kantian will say that, for example, when we meet with a particular cause in experience we have the category of cause empirically given. If we say that a man's intemperance is the cause of his misery we meet with the category of cause in experience; and so of all the other categories.

Now, Kant has so confused matters here that nothing but clear thinking can give us the true state of the case. It was for this reason that at the very outset we insisted on the wide difference between the meaning of the category—or the concept in general and the particular application of this concept in experience. Now, it requires only a moment's reflection for any clear mind, unbiased by theories, to understand that when we meet with a particular cause in experience we do not thereby meet with the objective reality which corresponds with the concept of cause in general. For, as we have just seen, we meet only with one particular cause, and the empirical reality in one particular cause can never be the objective reality of the concept of cause in general. Neither can the aggregate of reality in all particular causes ever be the objective reality of the notion of cause in general, or the category. Consequently, when we meet with particular instances of cause we are by no means meeting in experience with the objective reality which corresponds with our notion of cause in general, and therefore we have not thereby given to us empirically the objective reality of the category. So true is this that it is a debatable question whether there be an objective reality at all which corresponds with our notion of cause in general—the general concept of cause—the abstract notion of cause-or the category; under all of which names is known the general concept of cause. And if perchance this general concept of cause has objective reality, no philosopher, not even Kant, claims to know what it is. And what is true of cause is true also of all the other categories—substance, quantity, unity, quality, etc., etc. It is therefore perfectly clear that when in experience we meet with particular instances of the category we are by no means meeting with the category itself, any more than when we meet with one man we are meeting with all humanity. And this is true whether we regard the categories in the Aristotelian sense or in the sense in which Locke interpreted them. Consquently, there can be no claim whatever that when we meet with particular instances of the category in experience we are thereby meeting with the category itself.

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Now, when we come to the categories of Kant what, in this regard was improbable, in others becomes at once impossible. For according to Kant, the categories are forms existing in the understanding—mental moulds—"compartments"—which actually "exist" in the mind; and nothing could be much more absurd than to claim that, for instance, when we meet with a particular instance of cause, we were thereby meeting in experience with the mental "compartments" of cause, and that the existence of this mental compartment is thereby proved. We do not even know that these

"compartments," or moulds, or forms of the understanding, exist at all. Kant gratuitously asserts that they exist; but he by no means proves it. Nothing could well be more absurd, however, than to maintain that when we met with a case of cause, for instance, where intemperance had caused poverty, we should proceed to maintain that we had met in experience a case of the mental mould of cause in our mind or the mental compartment of cause which existed there. All that we have met with is a case where the cause of poverty was intemperance. that we met with was intemperance, and it would be the height of folly to claim that we had met with in experience a piece of Kant's psychological mechanism. We would have, in such a case, the objective effort of poverty following upon the objective cause of intemperance, with a more or less distinct notion of the former being produced by the latter, or with a vague notion of cause and effect; but who shall say that we have here met in experience the indefinite and indeterminate object which corresponds to the abstract notion of cause in general; and who above all will assert that we have made an empirical acquaintance with Kant's category of cause; or, in other words, with the mental "compartment" which Kant would have us believe exists in the understanding, and which moulds certain portions of our experience into the form of cause? Hence it would be the height of absurdity to maintain that we can meet with in experience those mental moulds of knowledge which Kant calls the categories. Hence his categories can never be empirically given. The categories of Kant, then, can never be met with in experience any more than the unity and immortality of the soul can be met with in experience or than the existence of the necessary cause can be met with in experience. There can be no manner of appeal from this conclusion. No more than the immortality of the soul or than the existence of God can these forms of the mind or understanding ever be given in any human experience. Thus we see that Kant is again hoist with his own petard. He invented the categories—or, more properly speaking, his interpretation of them-for the purpose of excluding the whole transcendental ideal; that is, the existence of God, the immortality of the soul and the future life-from the realm of knowledge, and forgot that the key by which he locked the door that excluded them was, by his own very terms of uncompromising exclusion debarred as effectually as the transcendental ideal itself.

Let us understand this clearly. The Kantian categories were invented to explain the meaning of human knowledge and also its extent. In other words, Kant undertook to explain what is unexplainable in human knowledge; and he does it by means of the

categories. His novel and bizarre application of these peculiarities in human knowledge confined all knowledge to human experience. We could have no knowledge of what could not be met with in experience. Mere ratiocination—even when it carried apodictic certainty—was inconcluisve. Induction from facts and deduction from principles nowhere led to knowledge, unless their conclusions bore the seal of empiricism. Nothing could be known unless known empirically. His explanation of the unexplainable is, as we have seen, that the categories exist in the mind as forms of the understanding or mental moulds into which experience is poured, and whose form experience—and consequently knowledge—takes. These categories or forms of the understanding are placed in the mind for the purpose of receiving experience. Without them experience would be impossible. They make experience possible for us. What is more, they exist only for experience. It is only the objects in experience that are received into these forms of the understanding or mental moulds, and that can assume the forms of the categories. But inasmuch as it is the categories only which can give us knowledge -for all knowledge must assume their forms-and inasmuch as they are for use only for objects in experience, and inasmuch as the transcendental ideas (the existence of God, the immortality of the soul and a future life) can never come into experience, it therefore follows that the transcendental ideas can never be touched by the categories which are intended only for objects in experience and for use in relation to the things of experience. This is, in brief, Kant's theory. It therefore follows—if Kant's philosophy be flawless—that we can have no knowledge whatever of the transcendental ideas; for being wholly outside experience and unattainable by it, they are out of the reach of the categories—and only by the categories can we acquire knowledge. This is the foundation of the entire Kantian system and it is also the basis of all modern agnosticism.

Now, where is the flaw in Kant's reasoning? The answer is that Kant has cut the ground completely from beneath his own feet when he tells us that all knowledge must come through the categories and through these from experience. But, if so, whence comes the knowledge of the categories? What assurance have we that this foundation of all knowledge is reliable? They can never be given in any experience. We can never meet with these forms in the understanding in any experience. They can never be empirically known. The transcendental ideas themselves are not more hopelessly outside the domain of experience than are these categories. For who shall dare to maintain that he can have empirical knowledge of these forms of the understanding or

mental moulds of knowledge? They may exist in the mind, it is true, but who would undertake to guarantee that he could ever produce them in experience? Consequently, the great flaw in Kant's philosophy is that the categories cannot, according to his own canons, ever enter into knowledge at all; for they can never enter into experience. Consequently, if Kant's reasoning be correct, they cannot be admitted into the realm of knowledge at all, any more than we can admit the immortality of the soul or the existence of God into experience.

But, according to Kant, all our empirical knowledge rests on the truth of his categories. Now, if all our empirical knowledge rests upon the categories as its only foundation; and if the categories cannot be known at all, what becomes of the certainty of our empirical knowledge? We have here precisely the old pagan theory of the universe paralleled in modern philosophy. The ancients believed that the universe rested on the shoulders of a man; that the man stood on the back of an elephant; that the elephant was supported by a tortoise; but—what supported the tortoise? It is precisely the same with Kant's ingenious discovery of the categories. All our knowledge, according to the Kantian philosophy, rests for its truth on the truth of experience; but the truth of experience rests on the truth of Kant's theory of the categories; but who will guarantee the truth of the categories, or the fact of their existence at all as forms in the understanding, as Kant explains them? Who will show that they have objective validity as mental moulds of knowledge? They absolutely fail to meet Kant's own test of knowledge; that is, they can never be given in the course of any experience. Kant's own theory, therefore, assumes the form of a destructive boomerang which returns upon his own philosophy and leaves it maimed, broken and helpless among the philosophical wrecks of time. He thus leaves us without knowledge of any kind; for Kant's claim is that our only knowledge is empirical knowledge. But we have just shown that all our empirical knowledge rests on knowledge that is not empirical, that can never become empirical, and that has no other guarantee of any kind that is knowledge at all. What, then, if all our knowledge must be empirical?

Now, it is remarkable that this result never accrues in any other interpretation of the categories whether we take the Aristotelian, the Lockian, the Humean or any other explanation of these curious phenomena of human knowledge. It would be remarkable if Kant himself had never perceived this suicidal tendency of his own metaphysic. Our notion is that Kant did perceive the fatal flaw in his own work. We are of opinion that at the outset, before his mental

processes became clear to himself, he saw this vaguely, but argued stoutly against it, and possibly succeeded in blinding himself to the truth. Indeed, he seems to combat it indirectly. But that when he came to prepare the second edition of his work the distasteful truth dawned clearly upon him can, we think, be sustained by evidence. There is a remarkable fact which has puzzled the critics, namely, that when the famous second edition of the "Critique of Pure Reason" appeared there was found missing the entire section on rational psychology which had appeared boldly and openly in the first. Its disappearance in the second edition drew upon Kant's devoted head the wrath of many critics, but especially of Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer, angry because Kant's onslaught on rational psychology had been suppressed in the second edition, furiously assails Kant's memory and attributes the suppression to "fear of man, produced by the weakness of old age, which not only affects the head, but sometimes deprives the heart also of . . . firmness." He rightly compares the second edition thus maimed to "a man who has had one leg amputated and replaced by a wooden one;" and while we smile at the comparison, we must admit its justice; for in the section on rational psychology in which Kant assailed the simplicity of the soul, we have simply Kant's onslaught on the first of three transcendental ideas, as he calls them—the immortality of the soul, the existence of God and a future life: and that this portion of his artillery should be drawn off from the field altogether, while the continuous discharge of musketry on the other two fields should remain in all their unabated fury, is a very curious and unexplained problem. Schopenhauer's explanation that it was done through fear of the orthodox Prussian Government can hardly be accepted as satisfactory; for Kant's warfare on the two remaining transcendental ideas is retained in all its unmitigated fury in the second edition, and must have been just as objectionable to the orthodox Prussian rulers as the section in which he assails the simplicity of the soul. We are strongly of opinion that the omission of this section from the second edition was for a totally different reason. As we have already pointed out in this article, there is a very close affinity between the simplicity—or unity—or immortality—of the soul and the categories or forms of the understanding—as Kant explains them. there is but a single step from the one to the other. Kant doubtless perceived this at last, and perceived also that the grounds on which he tried to discredit the simplicity of the soul could be made equally destructive to the forms of the understanding, or his categories, inasmuch as to meet with the categories as forms of the understanding in experience is quite as difficult as to meet with the simplicity of the soul. Kant was doubtless astute enough to perceive that his species of warfare on the simplicity of the soul would be likely to suggest a similar warfare on his theory of the categories; and that if his warfare were well grounded, it would be equally destructive to his own theories; while if it were ill founded his theories would be valueless; so that whichever horn of the dilemma he took his contention against the transcendental ideas became completely discredited. Kant was no dunce. There are other indications that he was well aware of the unpleasant fact that his categories were exposed to this objection; and as the children of this world are wiser in their generation than the children of light, it was the part of wisdom to suppress anything that would suggest to his adversaries so fatal a weapon. We are strongly of opinion that herein lies the true reason why the "Parabolisms of Pure Reason" were omitted altogether from the second edition of the "Critique of Pure Reason."

To sum up briefly, what has been said in this article: We have shown beyond all possibility of contradiction that if Kant's arguments against the existence of God and the immortality of the soul possess any validity whatever, the same arguments can be turned with even more deadly effect against his own theory of the cate-If the former are to be rejected and placed outside the limits of legitimate knowledge, a fortiori are the categories to be rejected for a similar, and even for a stronger reason. If the object corresponding to the idea of the First necessary cause or corresponding to the simplicity of the soul is to be rejected because it can never come into any experience, the same logic compels us to summarily reject Kant's categories as forms of the understanding or mental moulds of knowledge; for neither can they ever come into any experience. And since, according to Kant, all our empirical knowledge rests on the categories for its foundation and certainty, it follows that all our empirical knowledge is less deserving of the title of knowledge than our knowledge of the existence of the First For the existence of the First necessary cause necessary cause. comes to us with all the certainty of an irresistible conclusion of reason which an absolute logical necessity forces upon us, whereas the categories, as forms of the understanding only, can produce nothing but conjecture to show that they possess any kind of objective validity whatever.

It will be seen that so far we have made no attempt to disprove Kant's theory of the categories. For our purpose here that is wholly unnecessary. The conclusions we have drawn do not depend on either the truth or falsity of Kant's theory of the categories. What we have shown is that, even if Kant's theory of the cate-

gories be true, the fangs of the serpent have been extracted. They become wholly ineffectual for the purpose for which they were invented. The great feat of engineering skill against the doctrines of Christianity becomes worthless in the very moment of its triumph. It cannot be moved against the enemy without shattering itself to pieces. This is all that was necessary for the complete overthrow of the Kantian theory of knowledge; for the end and object of the Kantian philosophy was to show what should be regarded as knowledge and what should be excluded from the title. The categories possessed the mysterious power—no one knew how, or why, or where—of deciding all this. We have exposed the mystery and unveiled the charm, so that even the untrained philosopher can hardly fail to understand wherein the secret lay and how utterly futile were all the pretensions which accompanied it. And thus falls the mighty Jericho of the categories. They are the last citadel in the Kantian realm. They gave life and strength and energy to the whole system. Without them the Kantian system would not have lived a decade. We have unmasked their pretensions and discovered their weakness. But their weakness is the whole strength of Kant.

We think, however, that in addition to being powerless, Kant's theory of the categories—as forms of the understanding—is absolutely false; and this we shall examine in another article. But whether it be true or false is a matter of indifference. We have shown beyond power of reply that as an engine of destruction it is useless. Should any one be inclined to dispute our claim, we can only ask them to point out wherein our contention has failed. There are in reality but two points in our whole argument—although, on account of the obscurity in which Kant had wrapped the problem, a lengthy exposition of the subject was necessary —the first being that Kant's theory of the categories is that they are actual forms of the understanding. No one can deny this. We have quoted Kant's own words at length to show that there can be no mistake about the matter. The second point is that, as such; that is, as forms of the understanding, these categories can never be met with in experience—a proposition which no man in his senses will undertake to dispute. According to Kant's doctrine, then, they can never be empirically known; and, according to the same authority, nothing can become knowledge unless known empirically. The conclusion is that, this being the case, the categories can lay no more claim to being knowledge-to say nothing of being the foundation of all empirical knowledge—than can the transcendental ideas of the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, for the utter exclusion of which Kant drew from his

inner consciousness the doctrine of the categories. And thus ignominiously falls the great Copernican discovery of Kant. Thus crumbles the last stronghold in the vaunted citadel. Of the conclusions we have no manner of doubt. That we have made these conclusions plain to our readers we would fain hope. If we have not, the fault is ours; for of the conclusion itself there can be no doubt. We have been obliged to write hastily and hurriedly, without time to weigh our words, and amid a thousand distractions and interruptions incidental to the work of a priest on the mission; whereas, the subject matter called for not only sustained and concentrated thought, but careful choice of expression. For the latter we have had no time. Our only regret is that we have not the leisure to present this argument as forcibly and irresistibly as we should like. Of its overwhelming and unanswerable conclusiveness we have not even the shadow of a doubt. The problem for solution which confronts the earnest Kantian may be put in a very few words. It is: If all our knowledge must be empirical knowledge. and if all our empirical knowledge must rest on knowledge that is not and never can be empirical, what is to be thought of our empirical knowledge? Making bricks without straw were an easy task compared with the solution. This brief summary is a true appraisal of "the treasure" which Kant left to posterity.

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## SOME RECENT WORKS ON THE REFORMATION.

Denifie, "Luther und Luthertum in der ersten Entwickelung." Secondedition. Mainz, 1904-1936.

Baudrillart, "The Catholic Church, the Renaissance and Protestantism." Translated by Mrs. Philip Gibbs. London, 1908.

Cristiani, "Luther et le Luthéranisme." Paris, 1909.

Köstlin, "Martin Luther, sein Leben und seine Schriften," Fifth edition. Berlin, 1903.

S IT possible to get an exact representation of historical events and personages? No doubt both the writer and the reader of history bring to it their preconceived notions, the bias of their taste and temperament. We must allow for the personal factor, as we should allow for the moist atmosphere that colors the distant hills purple—nay, more; on occasion we must thankfully admire the glamour of color on the hill and in the history, while not forgetting its nature. This is not the real difficulty. The real difficulty is that often both writer and reader approach their task without having any clear idea of the meaning of words. Some fundamental question may be begged in every sentence. For instance, what is "greatness?" What is "independence?" What constitutes the "religious" character? Is it more religious to be swayed by alternate emotions of exaltation and depression than to control and measure both by intellect and will? Is revolt really always more independent than voluntary submission? Is it greater to impersonate and therefore lead a widespread trend of thought than to resist it by force of conviction in a minority?

A page of definitions at the head of many books and articles would make marvelously for clearness.

These thoughts have arisen out of some articles on Luther appearing in the "Spectator" and the "Contemporary Review" some time ago. The following pages have, however, been written without any such immediate reference; indeed, without any other impulse than the intense interest and importance for all thoughtful minds of the questions discussed.

Denifie's monumental work is an investigation, with abundant references and quotations, into certain of Luther's writings; an analysis of some doctrines and his attitude towards them; an exposition of his principles and methods; and, through all, an elucidation of his character. In his powerful personality is the key to his doctrine and his influence.

Father Denisle had been many years studying "the two currents which are observable from the fourteenth century onwards, at least

<sup>2</sup> Contemporary Review, April, 1908; Literary Supplement.



<sup>1</sup> Spectator, 25 Jan., 1908; Art., "The Apocalypse."

in France and Germany: that of decline and decay in a great part of the secular and regular clergy and the current of moral renewal and recovery in the remaining part." "The mark and token of the decline was absence of self-control, aversion from every effort and the confession in act: I cannot resist. The law was felt to be a burden and a limit—and people acted accordingly." "The representatives of the other tendency, which corresponds to the higher part of man, are those circles of the secular and regular clergy, who, corresponding with their vocation and living in the following of Christ, longed for a reform of Christendom, and by word, writing and example, sometimes with all their power, sought to arrest the decay."

Their efforts were largely unavailing, and corruption often gained in one place the ground lost in another. "The satires of the Italian and German humanists against the corrupt clergy of their time did harm instead of good, and did not contribute in the least towards reform: for in their lives the authors were mostly still more tainted with the moral decay. It was different with some of the French humanists."

The situation develops suddenly and rapidly from about 1520, from the time, that is, when the nature and bearing of Luther's principles begin to be unmistakable. "From this time one meets at every step bands of ex-religious, renegade priests, who as if at a watchword have thrown overboard everything that hitherto was sacred to Christians and to them-who vie with each other in exposing to contempt the Mother Church, Mass, breviary, confessional, fasting-in short, every ecclesiastical institution-and with word and pen abuse the Pope as Antichrist, Bishops and churchmen as the children of the devil."7 They talk of priests' marriage, monks' marriage and defy opinion in the spirit of the words of their leader: 'A fig for scandal; necessity knows no law and gives no scandal." They emancipate themselves from restraint of every kind and erect the gratification of all natural impulses into a new law, invoking the name of Christ in self-justification: "Christ has made us free from all laws when they are contrary to God's commandments."8 "All those who want to lead an unrestrained life join the evangelicals," says a contemporary.9

Luther at first belonged rather to those who earnestly desired

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Denifie, p. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Denifle, p. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, p. 2.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, p. 4.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, p. 6.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. p. 7.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, p. 382; Barth. von Usingen.

a real reform. The problem was, therefore, how he came to stand, as he did, at the head of the group just described. The solution is found in his character. Denifle had to determine when and by what stages, extremely gradual as they were, Luther departed from Catholic teaching. "The sources of information themselves (for the most part Luther's own utterances) give completely different accounts of his development—writings contemporary with events in one sense, later writings in another, the Table Talk in a third." This variation, in itself a psychological indication of the highest importance, had hitherto not been taken into account.

Luther's earliest childhood was passed in poverty in Mansfeld. He was severely treated both at home and at school, and grew repressed and timid. The religious environment<sup>11</sup> was very similar to that of many places in our own day which lie away from the current of life in the big world. "Of ecclesiastical or anti-ecclesiastical movements there was no trace among the population. The traditional customs and conceptions of mediæval Catholicism reigned undisturbed."12 "The Mansfeld clergy seem to have kept free from the moral scandals that in other places became a chief cause of disaffection to the clergy"—so the biographer infers from the impression made on the boy Luther, though he quotes also some evidence to the contrary. He notes further that "Luther often dwelt in after years on the importance for children of the sight of religious pictures-very probably from his own experience. There were processions and religious plays to be seen, notably in the Mansfeld district. Nor were the Church and the children she had to educate so entirely destitute of true Christian teaching as is often thought. The Our Father, the Apostles' Creed and the Ten Commandments at least were thoroughly learned. Moreover, some short hymns in German had long been sung. Luther himself speaks of such fine old hymns and developed some of them for the use of the evangelical community.18

At the age of fourteen he went to school to Magdeburg, where he stayed only a year, and thence to Eisenach, where he lived for the first time in happy conditions and had kind friends. "At last he enjoyed connected and thorough teaching in the school attached to the parish church of St. George." The head master was "a

<sup>10</sup> Denifie, p. 428.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Most of what follows is taken from Köstlin, whose book is one of the standard Protestant biographies.

<sup>12</sup> Köstlin, I., pp. 21-22.

<sup>13</sup> We find Luther in the very flush of his success as a reformer and of his zeal for the Bible only, falling back on the Our Father, the Creed and the Commandments, to which he adds the Hail Mary as a kind of irreducible minimum for the instruction of the ignorant and simple. V. Köstlin, I., pp. 292, 544, 574.

learned man of some distinction and a poet,"14 that is to say, in this connection, a humanist.

In 1501 Luther went to the University of Erfurt. His father wished him to be a jurist, and family circumstances had so far improved that it was possible to provide the means of study. Luther took his bachelor's degree in philosophy in 1502, being the thirtieth of fifty-seven candidates, and that of master in 1505 as the second of seventeen. Logic, rhetoric and philosophy taught by scholastic professors did not then seem incompatible with humane learning. The two most distinguished professors of philosophy were Trutvetter and Usingen, who appear to have avoided the more extreme subtleties of decadent scholasticism, but to have followed the school of Occam rather than the older and sounder teachers. There was a real enthusiasm for classical studies at the University, and Luther read the chief Latin authors, though without distinguishing himself like some of his companions. He passed among his friends the "poets" rather as a learned philosopher.

"As to Luther's tendency and position with regard to the Church, there were not at the University any influences calculated to affect him very strongly either way-either in those philosophical studies which so far did not touch the purely theological domain or in his share in humanistic exercises and efforts."16 "Erfurt undeniably gave more scope for and impetus to a free movement of mind at that time than other universities. But even if one kept to strict Church views, one could share in humanistic studies there and have personal intercourse with the enthusiasts, without being shaken or molested in one's religious tenets."17 In fact, religion seems to have been taken for granted and not made a subject for study or discussion among the students. Luther says in his Table Talk (suspect, it is true, as a source of information) that he did not see a Bible until his twentieth year. Whether that be literally true or not—they were, of course, in every theological library he knew the extensive extracts in the Missal and loved the Psalms from his youth.10 He eventually found a copy of the Bible in the University library, but even then did not feel impelled to study it or any of the numerous commentaries that were in the library collection.

<sup>14</sup> Köstlin, I., p. 28.

<sup>18</sup> Luther writes in 1520 that he is "of the Occamist party," and again that he has "thoroughly drunk in" the views of that sect. V. Denifie, p. 595. Denifie shows that the ground for Luther's doctrine of the externality of the work of salvation and the mere imputation of justification was laid in his training in Occamist theology.

<sup>16</sup> Köstlin, I., p. 40.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, L. p. 43.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, L. p. 106.

He is described as "by nature a lively and merry young fellow."19 He delighted his companions with his singing and playing. the other hand, such evidence as exists shows that he was the victim of morbid fits of gloom and terror. His determination to become a religious was quite sudden. He had finished his philosophy and just begun his law course. According to the best supported account, he vowed to enter a convent if his life were spared during a terrific thunder storm; and carried out his purpose within a fortnight. The convent he chose "belonged to the Augustinian Order, to the congregation known as Observants, who had united for more regular discipline and observance of the venerable old rules."20 Reforms had been successfully carried through under the Vicars General Proles and Staupitz. Staupitz took this office in 1503 and visited Erfurt in 1504. "The regulations of the order for external life and religious exercises were moderately framed; they had been revised under Staupitz's direction." "Most of the preaching in Erfurt was done by these Augustinians and in a popular style, even in the town churches." There was in the convent a studium generale for the order. Luther on entering it turned his back on his legal studies, but he took his Plautus and Virgil with him. "Staupitz's constitutions prescribed eager reading, devout hearing and assiduous learning of the Scriptures."21 "Staupitz exhorted him personally above all things to make himself accurately familiar with the biblical text, that he might become a good theologian."23

Luther entered the convent in 1505, at the age of twenty-two, and was in charge of the novice master until his ordination in 1507. To this man he pays a remarkable tribute at a time when any such is enhanced by his general tone. This "excellent man" and "true Christian" recognized exceptional possibilities in Luther and, according to another valuable testimony of the year 1530, knew so well how to console him in his temptations that he was restored to peace of mind.

After this he passed directly under the prior's authority. In 1508 he was sent to the University of Wittenberg to teach philosophy, returned to Erfurt in 1509, made a journey to Rome probably in 1511 and went back to Wittenberg, where he became sub-prior in 1512 and regent of studies in the convent in 1515.

<sup>19</sup> Köstlin, I., p. 46.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. p. 49.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid. p. 55.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Ibid, p. 56. Köstlin attributes to Staupitz (p. 68) the, to his mind, supreme credit of moulding "the future reformer." He more than once puts this construction on utterances of Luther's advisers, which to a Catholic are the simplest expression of Catholic custom and common sense, <sup>23</sup> Deniffe, p. 384.

One side of his religious experience—for Luther all through his life appears in a twofold aspect, and with conflicting, even violently conflicting, impulses-may conveniently be summed up in Janssen's words: "Simple, unquestioning obedience to the rules of the order became distasteful to him. It was his duty to say his 'Horæ' daily, but, carried away by his passion for study, he often let weeks go by without taking his breviary in his hand; then he would try to make up all at once for past omissions, would shut himself up in his cell, touch neither food nor drink for several weeks, go without sleep and torture himself to such an extent that he was once nearly losing his senses. The prescribed rules of ascetic practice did not satisfy him. 'I imposed on myself additional penances,' he writes; 'I devised a special plan of discipline for myself. The seniors in my rule objected strongly to this irregularity, and they were right. I was a criminal self-torturer and self-destroyer, for I imposed on myself fastings, vigils and prayers beyond my powers of endurance. I wore myself out with self-mortifications, which is nothing less than self-murder."24 Still, in the earlier years Luther describes his state as a happy one. In 1507 he finds in monastic life something "exquisitely peaceful and divine."25 In 1512 he writes of it in glowing terms to his former teacher, Usingen. "When I was a candidate for the Augustinian Order," Usingen reminds him in 1529, "you could not sufficiently commend it to me. But now you are a derider and destroyer of it."28 In various writings he explains the religious life and dwells on its excellence. And so late as 1515 he says (the passage may serve as a specimen of many): "Wherefore I believe that it is better now to be a religious than for two hundred years back; for this reason, that until now monks went aside from the cross and it was a distinction to be a religious. Now once more they begin to displease men, even the good, because of the folly of the habit. For this is to be a religious, to be hateful and foolish to the world. But I know them to be most happy, if they had charity [sic] and more blessed than the hermits; because they are exposed to the cross and daily ignominy."27

But inward weakness and outward circumstances combined to Luther's undoing. We have seen his liability to gloom. He was also restless in his studies. He writes from Wittenberg in March, 1509: "If you wish to know how I am, thank God, I am well. The study is severe, especially of philosophy, which from the be-

<sup>24</sup> Janssen, "History of the German People," London, 1900, Vol. III., p. 83.

The quotation is not furnished with a reference in the English edition.

<sup>25</sup> Denifie, p. 887.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, p. 792.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid, p. 86.

ginning I would gladly have exchanged for theology; yes, for theology, which searches out the kernel of the nut, the pith of the wheat, the marrow of the bone."28 Moreover, he was intensely obstinate, a defect of which he frequently admits both the existence and the danger. He early gave signs of a headstrong determination to have his own way.29 One who attended his lectures at Wittenberg writes that when he was sent thither "those at Erfurt were not particularly sorry, for Martin would insist that he was right in all disputations and loved to quarrel." The same chronicler records that he was a "clever man," but "by nature arrogant,"30 and this arrogance grew apace. Nothing is written so large on Luther's life as a self-protecting and self-regarding violence of word and act which are the direct opposite of the qualities that we associate with the success of good principles and wise projects. Such, however, was the unruliness of his temperament that a modern psychological critic asks whether in his gravest outbreaks "he was more unfortunate or more guilty." In the event he could brook no contradiction. Melanchthon32 began to experience this in 1526, and writes in 1538: "You remember what a slavery it was when you were there. And yet you must know that he is becoming harsher than ever now." And again in 1548, after Luther's death: "I bore formerly also an almost odious slavery, inasmuch as Luther often yielded to his nature, in which contentiousness was not slight, more than was useful for himself or the common good."

The life at Wittenberg was anything but regular, which "explains much in Luther's career and that of his Wittenberg companions, especially Zwilling, notorious for his attacks on convents. He and others like him were later on the first to throw off the habit, storm convents, desecrate altars and so on." Even in 1509 during his first stay there Luther was entirely absorbed in business and in study. But in 1516 he wrote to Lang in Erfurt:

"I should want two secretaries, for the whole day long I do hardly anything but write letters; and so I do not know whether I do not continually repeat the same thing. I am community and table preacher; every day I am wanted to preach in the parish church; I am regent of studies, vicar of the district and therefore

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, p. 888.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> This seems to have been a family characteristic. Köstlin (op. cit., I., 11) says that "members and relatives of the Luther family appear most often among those inhabitants of Mohra who were brought to account for violently taking the law into their own hands."

<sup>30</sup> Denifle, pp. 764, 454.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Cristiani, p. 119.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, pp. 180-181.

<sup>32</sup> Denifie, p. 88.

eleven times a prior. I am in charge of the fish pond at Leitzkau, advocate in the negotiations about the Herzberg parish church, lecturer on St. Paul, co-lecturer on the Psalter. I seldom have full time to read the Hours and to celebrate; and there are in addition the personal temptations with the world, the flesh and the devil."<sup>36</sup> Another letter<sup>35</sup> of the year 1519 puts the effects of this mental and moral dissipation very clearly, and an utterance of 1535 gives a confirmatory testimony: "I myself in my day recited many of these canonical hours, alas! so that the psalm or the Hour was over before I noticed whether I was in the beginning or the middle."<sup>36</sup> The letter of 1516 is of extreme significance, especially as Luther was then (1515-1516) engaged on his "Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans," in which his later heresies are clearly reflected.<sup>87</sup>

At a time when he was still (1515-1516) upholding the principle of authority in his letters, lectures and writings and had not yet openly attacked any dogma of the Church, he shows an independent spirit of criticism. In the "Commentary on Romans" he sets up an exaggerated idea of Christian liberty, and advocates the abolition of fast days and a decrease in the number of festivals, "because the ignorant observe them so scrupulously as not to believe that there is any salvation without them." "So also it would be useful," he continues, "to purify and change almost the whole decree and to lessen the number of processions; nay, more, the ceremonies of prayers and ornaments, because these grow daily, and so, that faith and charity decrease by them, and avarice, pride, vainglory are nourished; nay, what is worse, that men hope to be saved by them, caring nothing for the inner life."38 The criticism came, as such criticisms most often come, from one whose own inner life was at variance with it.

The absence of recollection and the vice of overweening selfassertion undermined it and destroyed the availability of all external helps to it. His utterances about the passions run the gamut from struggle through helpless remorse to acquiescence. He came

<sup>84</sup> Denifle, p. 83.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, p. 99.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid. p. 462.

<sup>27</sup> P. H. Grisar, S. J., comes, independently of Denifie, to the same conclusions in an article in the literary supplement of the Kölnische Volkszeitung, 29 Oct., 1903: "Luther gradually lost the spirit of his order and the zeal of his earlier time; he became the spokesman of an apparently religious and even mystic tendency, which, however, was really lax. . . . The chief point is that, instead of the previously assumed peculiar fervor, it can be shown that there was a falling off in his ecclesiastical life and his observance of the rule before his estrangement from dogma."

<sup>38</sup> Denifle, p. 34.

to regard man's innate tendency to evil as irresistible; nay, as universal and overwhelming. He identified it with original sin, which, he asserted, is never remitted, but vitiates a man's whole nature and life, inevitably causes his actual sins and makes "justification" in the sense of a change and purification impossible. In accordance with this he put a new interpretation on certain texts of St. Paul. He "discovered" the Gospel to be "the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth" and "the justice of God revealed therein from faith unto faith."39 He states in 154040 many years after the event, it is true, but we are in a sense as much concerned with Luther's impressions about facts as with the facts themselves-that he had always learned that God's anger and His justice in punishing was revealed in the Gospel. "As often as I read the text I always wished that God had never revealed the Gospel. For who could love the God that is always angry, judging and condemning?" And yet in 1515 he had himself explained the text in accordance with tradition.41 But at last he "came through the enlightenment of the Holy Ghost to the joyous discovery that in that text there was no question of the punitive justice of God, but of passive justice, through which the merciful God justifies us through faith. Then the whole Scripture, nay, heaven itself, was opened to me."42

At the crucial time, about 1515, he explains pretty clearly in a sermon the connection in his mind between the impossibility of resisting concupiscence and the justification nevertheless possible for the sinner." God has imposed on us things impossible and above our strength. Because the law is spiritual and the wisdom of the flesh carnal, it cannot do anything towards fulfilling the law. Christ alone came to fulfill that which we cannot discharge. But Christ imparts to us his fulfillment by making Himself our hen, that we may fly under His wings and that by His fulfillment we also may fulfill the law."43 The passage is too long to quote, but it illustrates a use of current Catholic terminology without the corresponding ideas which is very characteristic and helped for years to confuse the issues. Much that Luther wrote in his beginnings was more or less susceptible of orthodox interpretation. But his studies in scholastic philosophy and theology are proved not to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup> Rom. i., 16-17.

<sup>40</sup> Denifie, p. 895.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Denifie, p. 448. In view of Protestant ignorance of this tradition, Denifie has made a laborious collection of testimonies to it in a separately published appendix to his Volume I., and has proved it also by a beautiful and suggestive chapter on the prayers in the missal and breviary (pp. 400-422).

<sup>42</sup> Ibid, p. 395.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, p. 433.

have been thorough.<sup>44</sup> Consequently, in default of a personal realization of the principles underlying the ordinary practice of the Church, it was all the easier to misconceive and falsify her fundamental teaching.

That there was this default is abundantly clear. Much has been made of Luther's late statements to the effect that he was for twenty years a fervent, even an extravagantly fervent, religious. The note of extravagance is self-condemnatory, and we have seen that by 1516, after only eleven years of religious life; he could no longer be described as fervent. At best he labored and tormented himself to acquire an assurance of God's favor on the strength of his works of penance, a practice which he afterwards scathingly attributed to religious in general. Indeed he seems to have conceived "our justice" as something absolutely natural to have made no allowance for divine help in the fulfillment of the law. In those agonizing crises already referred to he did not, at least on his own showing, exercise the virtues of faith and hope,46 which at a later period he confounded in one under the name of justifying faith; and set up as a discovery of his own and a substitute for all the virtues that, in the Catholic system, characterize the soul in its relation to God.

It would not be possible in a short space to follow Denisle in his exposure of Luther's fallacies and inconsistencies. Luther was necessarily entangled in difficulties when he sought to evolve a theological system different from the harmonious and mentally satisfying system of the Church. Nothing could be more untrue to fact than the conception of him as the champion of liberty and reason, against mediæval superstition and obscurantism. He attacked Church authority, it is true, but only to substitute his own wisdom. He aimed at supplanting scientific theology by common sense and a modicum of humane learning applied to the Scriptures.47 He arrogantly dismissed recognized teachers: "I would nearly swear that none of the scholastic theologians understands one chapter of the Gospel and the Bible; nay, not even one chapter of the philosopher Aristotle."48 In a sense he stood on rationalistic ground, and this germ, too, has had its natural growth; but he clung in his own person to a theological system divorced

<sup>44</sup> His studies do not seem to have been thorough in any direction. Creighton ("Hist, of the Papacy," Vol. VI., p. 63) says: "He was not a scholar; indeed, he never was at home in Greek, and knew no Hebrew." Significant facts in the case of a translator of the Bible.

<sup>45</sup> Denifle, p. 436.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, p. 462.

<sup>47</sup> Köstlin, I., p. 276.

<sup>48</sup> Denifie, p. 648.

from reason: "The Gospel is a doctrine of a kind that cannot, like the doctrine of the law, be understood by reason, but clearly is at variance with reason; for reason cannot grasp attributed justice, and not even in the saints is this cognition sufficiently firm."49 He asserts that "reason is opposed to faith. God alone can give faith and power of believing, against nature, against reason." "It is impossible for faith and reason to agree with each other." "The Sorbonne, the mother of errors, defined very badly that the same things are true in philosophy and theology; and impiously condemned those who asserted the contrary." "Although the saying is to be held that 'Everything true must agree with the truth,' nevertheless, the same thing is not true in different branches. In theology it is true that the Word was made flesh; in philosophy it is simply impossible and absurd."50 Blessed John Fisher wrote in 1523: "You consulted well for your opinions when you sought to disparage the authority of the Scholastics and even of Aristotle. For take away Logic, and straightway the means of overthrowing what is false and of establishing what is true will have disappeared. Take away Logic, and we shall all be like gladiators brandishing our swords in the darkness. If you abolish Logic, it will not at all surprise me that those arguments of yours appear sound to some people. But if you admit Logic, there is no one but will think them to be what they really are, that is mere sophisms."51

The most elementary Catholic notions were all confused or distorted in Luther's system, if system it can be called. Faith is nowhere clearly defined, but turns into a kind of self-evolved and self-reliant confidence that sin is no longer imputed to the believer on account of the merits of Christ. In 1515-1516 Luther had defined it as "nothing else but obedience of the mind,"52 though even then he had the strange idea that "every word that comes from the mouth of an ecclesiastical superior of a good and holy man is the Word of Christ."58 This faith was supposed to result in a happy certainty of salvation, but among the first Lutherans, as might be expected, the weakness of the position was painfully apparent. Luther had no other remedy for doubt than to stifle it or to distract the mind by pleasure and a reckless presumption; he explains it as a suggestion of Satan, or as due to the inherent weakness of human nature and the difficulty of the doctrine. It was undoubtedly difficult of acceptance and unavailing in hours of depression or remorse. Denifle notes after 1530, when it was

<sup>49</sup> Ibid, p. 608.

<sup>50</sup> Denifie, p. 638; years 1536-1539.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> Ibid, p. 621.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid, p. 627.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid, p. 467.

fairly widespread, "an increase of melancholy and depression, of anguish of conscience, despair of the grace of God, increase of suicides. Instead of a generation that, after more than a thousand years of oppression, doubt, anxious living and dying (such as is represented to have existed under the Papacy), is at last delivered from despair, fear and doubt by the joyful message of Luther to Christendom, we find a wretched generation, for which from 1530 onwards enough 'Consoling Booklets' cannot be written on the prevailing fear of death and of the anger of God, against gloom, melancholy, despair of God's grace and of the bliss of souls." \*\*

The notions of the Church, the priesthood, the sacraments, were essentially altered. Concupiscence, original sin, actual sin, mortal sin, venial sin, were all confounded. Indulgences lost their meaning; repentance became superfluous. The idea of sanctification vanished. Free will (in matters of salvation, as Luther carefully distinguishes) was denied altogether, and grace became a potent operation of God with which man is not even required to cooperate. This makes all direct voluntary service of God inconceivable and deprives all service of one's neighbor of any ideal motive; "that so a man may be a perfect Christian, within before God, Who does not need our works, by faith; without before men, to whom our faith is of no use, but our works or charity."55 The greatest and the first commandment is thus commented on: "The law demands that you should love God with your whole heart and your neighbor as yourself. But who is there, pray, that does this? For even the love of the saints is imperfect and often disturbed by fear, by diffidence, by impatience in adversity. What, then, becomes of faith informed by charity? If God will not consider you just unless you love Him with your whole heart and fulfill the law, you will never be justified."56 Luther bitterly resented the imputation that his doctrine of passive justification involved a denial of the necessity of good works. He did not mean that it should.<sup>57</sup> His theory, sadly belied by facts, was that they would flow naturally from faith. "Luther would never have been the leader of a great rebellion if he had clearly known whither he was tending,"58 or if he had realized the force of Erasmus' words to Melanchthon: "What is there more detestable in the world than

<sup>54</sup> Denifie, p. 782.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid, p. 721; year 1535.

<sup>56</sup> Denifle, p. 669.

<sup>67 &</sup>quot;To be sure he did not," says Denifie (p. 651), drawing another inference from a principle of Luther's. "But a man who presumes to pronounce sentence of death on a thousand years' past should surely consider his theories in such a way that they may be secure against fatal logical consequences."

<sup>58</sup> Creighton, "History of the Papacy," Vol. V., p. 89.

to expose ignorant people to hear public discussions on such subjects as good works, merits, good resolutions, pure heresies and to profess that our will is not free, that all happens necessarily, fatally and that it does not much matter what are or may be a man's actions?"<sup>50</sup>

Luther's evolution of doctrine has, of course, been represented as a gradual discovery of light and truth. But Denifle proves: that his early views were in accordance with the precedent and subsequent teaching of the Church; that his later views rested on more or less wilful and increasingly violent misrepresentations of that teaching; that these views were subjective, based entirely on individual experience; that they have no consistency; and that they involve the most fatal consequences.

"One feels that all this doctrine is the fruit of an unbalanced and anxious soul, desperately seeking interior repose and peace."60 But peace of conscience was not to be attained by it. Cristiani has an illuminating chapter entitled: "L'Etat d'âme de Luther après 1517." Luther, he says, may very well have believed at first that he was fighting in a good cause. He met with warm approval from esteemed and learned men: "On all sides there was an enthusiastic response to the passionate accents of an eloquence trivial, it is true, but always warm and moving."61 Then "around him at Wittenberg is a throng of eager youth from which already emerge men of undisputed talent like Melanchthon and Georg Wicel."62 Moreover, Luther did not see "the depth of the gulf that was opening between the Church and him." He was, "to use Möhler's expression, 'the plaything of passing feelings and of impressions of the moment." But the day came when he had to recognize "on the one hand that the Catholic world, though shaken, was not destroyed, and, on the other, that his own party, far from forming a Church, was breaking up into a thousand sects opposed and hostile to one another."68 "Oh, what it has cost me," he writes on November 28, 1521, "and what pains and difficulties have I not had, even relying on the best established texts of Holy Scripture, before succeeding, and hardly succeeding, in justifying myself in the eyes of my conscience." He asks himself: "Are you alone wise? Have all the rest deceived themselves? And if you were deluded! If you had sent all these souls astray! And if through you they saw themselves one day condemned to eternal torments!" "Throughout his life he was pursued by this objection of the in-

<sup>59</sup> Quoted by Baudrillart, p. 233.

<sup>60</sup> Cristiani, p. 83.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid, p. 159.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid. p. 160.

<sup>63</sup> Cristiani, p. 161.

defectibility of the Church. Here is one passage, amongst many, which reveals his difficulty: "There is another argument which it is excessively difficult to take from them [the Papists] and which we ourselves have much difficulty in resolving or refuting, all the more as we must grant that in the Papacy is the Word of God and the apostolate, and that from them we have received the Scriptures, baptism, the sacrament and the pulpit. Who, indeed, can rise up against the Church of which we say in the Creed: I believe in one Christian Church? Now, I find this Church in the Papacy, therefore I must obey. If I condemn it, I am excommunicated, rejected and condemned by God and by all the saints."

Luther broke definitely with the Church when he burned the Pope's Bull in 1520. His enforced leisure in the Wartburg he used to make a new translation of the New Testament in support of his personally evolved tenets, and in directing a violent attack on a great outstanding bulwark of the Catholic religion with his book, "De Votis Monasticis." It demands a special mention. This and other statements of Luther about the religious life have been subjected by Denisle, for the first time, to a critical examination which destroys the legend of a Luther driven out of the Church by the intolerable mediæval monastic system. Luther in 1519 calls the counsels "certain and shorter ways to fulfill the commandments of God more easily and happily."68 In 1521 he writes from the Wartburg: "Against the vows of religious and priests there is a strong conspiracy between Philip [Melanchthon] and me, to abolish and annul them."66 He already hates the words nun, monk, priest. Celibacy is the first point attacked. He wants to make it optional "as the Gospel demands; but how to manage it I do not yet clearly see."67 The solution lay in a free interpretation and adaptation of all the relative Scriptural passages, from which he gets a new view of the content of the vows. As Köstlin puts it, religious "have vowed a life under a yoke of law that is repugnant to the freedom that we have in faith in Christ, that we should impose such a life on ourselves as something necessary; faith makes all exterior things optional, the vows impose them."68 At one time Luther represents "religious as preëminently living according to the principle of justification by works and talks of the folly and iniquity of those who fast and pray themselves to death."69 He rails at "Augustinians, Franciscans, Dominicans and others" who have

<sup>64</sup> Ibid, pp. 165-166.

<sup>65</sup> Denifie, p. 38.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid, p. 40.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid, p. 305.

<sup>68</sup> Op. cit., L, 466.

<sup>69</sup> Denifle, p. 315.

forfeited the name of Christian, "for they have that by which they intend to be saved, their rule and vows." But again he makes the most of abuses, which he erects into a statement of general practice. Here his own argument against Carlstadt and the Bildersturm condemns him: "If we were to reject everything that is misused, what state of things would we have? There are many people who adore the sun, moon and stars; shall we therefore cast the stars from heaven and pull down the sun and moon?" Luther's utterances about the monastic life are clearly dictated by the memory of a past seen in the light of a violent revulsion and repugnance.

Luther's expressed views on the evolution of heretics, ranging as they do over a number of years, are illuminating. On the attitude of heretics to the Church (1514): "Heretics cannot themselves appear good, unless they represent the Church as bad, false and lying."<sup>72</sup> On their use of the Scriptures (1514): "This is the most hurtful kind of deception, namely, to stretch the Holy Scriptures by wicked glosses to a lie, that by such an authority the lie may become credible. For thus all heretics do not rely merely on reasons (though they begin with them and first establish what appeals to their reason), but also on the Scriptures, yet so that they stretch them to their own inventions of reason."78 On the necessity of a mission and the insubordination of the heretic (1515-1516): "Before everything it must be noticed that he who teaches be sent by God, like John. This is the strongest weapon with which to strike heretics. For without the testimony of God or of an authority confirmed by God, but of their own motion, relying on an appearance of piety they preach."74 "Heretics by no means recognize their error, but obstinately defend it and wish to seem Catholics." In 1514 he writes: "No heretic is overcome by warring and contending. Because every such is obstinate and hardened and incredulous to the Word. For he is wise in his own eyes, and therefore hard to persuade and prepared to yield to no one";76 and in 1527: "I have often said that it is not easily found that the author of a heresy was converted. I know no example, although those who are seduced can be converted, but the inventors commonly remain hardened; because St. Paul (Tit. iii., 10) says not in vain: 'A man that is a heretic after the first and second admonition avoid.' It is the nature of this sin to fight against grace."77

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70 Ibid, p. 317.
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<sup>71</sup> Ibid, p. 65; year 1522.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> Denifie, p. 18.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid, p. 628.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid, p. 496. 75 Ibid, p. 628.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid, p. 764. 77 Ibid, p. 479.

All these things apply literally to Luther himself. From the time that he became involved in controversy he read his preconceived ideas into all his authors, especially into the Scriptures. Ulrich Zasius, one of the foremost lawyers and humanists of the time, and at first strongly drawn to Luther's cause, writes: "Need I say that Luther with insolent effrontery interprets the whole Scripture of the Old and New Testaments, from the first book of the Bible to the end, against Popes and priests, as if God had had no other business from the beginning of the world than to thunder against the priesthood? With that clever forcing of the sense Luther extracts all this from the Scriptures; he alone does not see who will not see."78 In no instance is his method of interpretation more clearly seen than in his distinction between Law and Gospel, which gradually assume the character of irreconcilable antitheses, until, finally, we arrive at this definition of the Gospel: "The word Gospel is nothing else than a new, good, joyous message or doctrine and preaching which announces something that men are heartily glad to hear. That cannot be a law or commandment which demands something from us and impels and threatens punishment and damnation if we do not do it; for no one likes to hear that; and although one may teach both long and intensely and live up to it as far as possible, no consolation or joy follows from it because, after all, we can never satisfy the law so that it does not cease to urge and accuse us. Therefore to help us God had to send another preaching through His Son, from which we might have comfort and peace. And that was: Whoever believes and is baptized will be saved."79

The assurance with which, at all events in his later career, Luther set up his views as dogmas, led him to treat adversaries with abuse instead of argument, and abuse that shocked even his adherents, accustomed as they were to a coarse controversial tone. Speeches, sermons, books, pamphlets, songs, pictures, all vehicles were used for the purpose. The pamphlet was a Lutheran novelty. The country was regularly flooded by means of it with mockery and abuse of Church, Pope, clergy. Werstemius repeats on the word of a Lutheran whom he found busy distributing these publications that Germany was full of them in 1528. This man "produces on the spot a number of dialogues, some in Latin, some in German, illustrated and got up with some taste, but so foreign to the spirit of the Gospel that I never saw more execrable mockeries. Nevertheless, I praised them and asked if he had anything newer. 'Anything?' he begins; 'do you see these in French; how attractive

<sup>78</sup> Denifle, p. 334.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid, p. 799.

they are with pictures scattered all over them? I am taking these secretly to Liège, Limbourg, Namur, that they also may at length begin to appreciate the Lutheran Gospel."80 Sometimes the relative importance of text and picture was inverted. Or the pamphlets took the form of songs set to well-known melodies, often hymn tunes.

It would, however, be unjust to imply that Luther's appeal to the popular taste and to the natural man had only this side. His extension of the use of the German hymn and much writing and preaching of a devotional kind show another, which must have helped powerfully to blind ordinary people to his tendency. Religious emotion of a tense kind was compatible with all Luther's self-assertion and iconoclasm. Besides, the force of his personality was tremendous; and many instances are given where he shows kind feeling and tenderly human impulses. "Luther was a soul; a soul living, original and individual, but also profoundly German. 'I was born for my fellow-Germans,' said he, 'and I wish to serve them.' "81 He boasts of his ascendency over them in these terms: "I would undertake, if I wished, to preach my people easily back to the Papacy in two or three sermons."

Not that in the long run he relied on moral force only. Reformation was anything but a purely religious revolution. Ranke88 shows that the German princes looked on Luther as a possibly useful political tool. He himself made loud appeals to a national, anti-Roman spirit amongst princes, nobility and people. At one time representatives of the discontented German nobility, like Hutten and Sickingen, were his eager allies.84 He found himself gradually driven to invoking the secular arm in defense of the "Gospel." "The Zwinglian schism, the rise of the Anabaptists and the Peasants' War altered the aspect of affairs. Luther recognized in them the fruits of his theory of the right of private judgment and of dissent, and the moment had arrived to secure his Church against the application of the same dissolving principles which had served him to break off from his allegiance to Rome. The excesses of the social war threatened to deprive the movement of the sympathy of the higher classes, especially of the governments. and with the defeat of the peasants the popular phase of the Reformation came to an end on the Continent."85 "He in-

<sup>84</sup> V. Köstlin, pp. 301-310, 85 Acton, "The Protestant Theory of Persecution" in "History of Freedom and Other Essays," p. 155.



<sup>80</sup> Denifie, p. 838.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup> Baudrillart, Eng. ed., pp. 94-95.

<sup>82</sup> Denifie, p. 341.

<sup>83 &</sup>quot;Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation."

stantly turned from the people to the princes, impressed on his party that character of political dependence, and that habit of passive obedience to the State which it has ever since retained and gave it a stability it could never otherwise have acquired. The notion of liberty, whether civil or religious, was hateful to his despotic nature and contrary to his interpretation of Scripture."86 "Besides the consolatory doctrine of justification, he bribed the princes with the wealth of the Church, independence of ecclesiastical authority, facilities for polygamy and absolute power. Persuaded that the sovereign power would be on his side, he allowed no limits to its extent. The power thus concentrated in the hands of the rulers for the guardianship of the faith he wished to be used with the utmost severity against unregenerate men, in whom there was neither moral virtue nor civil rights, and from whom no good could come until they were converted. He therefore required that all crimes should be most cruelly punished and that the secular arm should be employed to convert where it did not destroy. The idea of mercy tempering justice he denounced as a Popish superstition."87

Contemporary opinions of Luther vary with the point of view of the utterer, from the disciple to whom he is "an angel of the living God"88 to Duke George of Saxony, who calls him "the coolest liar that has ever come under our notice."89 "It is remarkable," says Ranke with a tone of surprise, "what different impressions Luther made on those present [at the Diet of Worms]. The more distinguished Spaniards . . . found the monk crazy. netian [Contarini], who is indeed in the main very impartial, nevertheless remarks that Luther showed neither great learning, nor any particular judgment, nor blamelessness of life, and had not come up to people's expectations of him. Alexander's opinion of him can be imagined. But even the Emperor had got a similar impression. 'He,' he cried, 'will never make me a heretic.' "90 Luther's own disciples were not altogether satisfied with him. Melanchthon writes in 1525: "Would that Luther would keep silence. I hoped that with age and custom among so many evils he would become more gentle, but I see that he is becoming more vehement. . . . That afflicts me grievously."91 And in the same year he .describes him as an extremely irresponsible man. 92 Pirkheimer,

<sup>86</sup> Ibid, p. 156.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid, p. 162.

<sup>88</sup> Denifie, p. 811.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid, p. 126.

<sup>90</sup> Op. cit., I., p. 386.

<sup>91</sup> Denifle, p. 814.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid, p. 127,

once an adherent, thinks in 1529 that he must be "getting mad or driven by an evil spirit" 98

But both friends and enemies of the primitive Reformation testify with one voice that a vast deterioration of public morals coincided with its spread. Doctrinal Lutheranism found most of its first recruits and apostles among the corrupt section of the clergy, and they accepted it all the more easily as many of them "lived in great ignorance. 'I had then,' writes Wicel [referring to the time when he joined Luther], 'in all my life seen no doctor of the Church, to say nothing of reading one, wherefore I was easy to mislead; besides, it is a case of the German proverb: "It is easy to pipe to him that wants to dance."' A Lutheran visitation of parishes in Saxony was made at the instance of Melanchthon and by the authority of the Elector between 1527 and 1529. "It brought to light most desplorable facts. Everywhere the schools had gone down, where they had flourished under Catholicism. Around Wittenberg 145 parishes (not to count hnudreds of subdivisions) had only 21 schools. Elsewhere it was even worse. The preachers were sometimes ignorant and uncouth artisans. Ahorn was a weaver, Musel a baker, Seitenrode a cabinetmaker, who did not even know the Commandments."95 Worse charges The character of much evangelical preaching is thus described by Luther's disciple and intimate friend, Bugenhagen, in 1525: "You hear absolutely nothing from them except great, violent abuse of monks, of Papistical priests, of fasting on Friday, of good-for-nothing services and adornment of temples, of holy water and the rest, with which hitherto we have been misled; but the Gospel you do not hear from them."96 The evidence of those who at first greeted the Reformation with joy and hope is very striking. Pirkheimer wrote in 1527: "We hoped that the Romish rascality and roguery of the monks and priests was to be remedied; but, as one sees, things have got so much worse that the evangelical rascals have made those others seem pious." And Erasmus in 1529: "Monkery, to be sure, is now prostrate, but . . . it appears to me that there is rising up a new race of monks, much more wicked than the former, in as far as these were wicked. It is folly to exchange bad for bad, but madness to exchange bad for worse." And again in 1530: "Some that I had known before as pure, honest, guileless men, as soon as they joined the sect . . . became avaricious, quarrelsome, revengeful, calum-

<sup>98</sup> Ibid, p. 848.

<sup>94</sup> Denifie, p. 807.

<sup>95</sup> Cristiani, p. 841.

<sup>96</sup> Denifie, p. 335.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid, p. 19.

niatory, vain, of detestable morals; they seem to have laid aside even what is purely human." Wicel, who had been a Lutheran, writes of them in 1539 that "they live as if there were no God, they sin as if there were no hell, they pass through life like irrational animals." Such quotations, including frequent emphatic utterances of the leader himself, might be multiplied; let one suffice, chiefly for the sake of its conclusion, from Egranus, a Lutheran preacher, in 1543: "When one looks at the histories and stories of our ancestors, for eight hundred years, since the Germans became Christians, there have been no more unruly, culpable, wanton people among the German nation than at present, which chiefly comes from the doctrine by which good works are despised and rejected." On the doctrine by which good works are despised and rejected."

Such a state of things cried out for a remedy and did, in fact, improve. But how? "First through the intervention of the secular authority [invoked even by the Reformers themselves], which in order to avoid wholesale ruin in the moral quagmire was obliged to and did look after public morals. Then through the efforts of more serious Protestant theologians, and in the same way in which they attained an improvement in other respects, that is, by returning unconsciously more or less to Catholic principles, partly even in their statements of belief." "The natural thought and feeling of the individual leads in that direction," says Denifle. "The good Lutheran always stands much higher than Luther and his doctrine." "The soul is naturally Catholic." 100

The quick spread of the Reformation sounds in itself a note of warning; rapid success and a ready appeal have not been the lot of noble and elevating doctrines either before the time of Christ or since. The most indulgent and admiring students of the Reformation period are obliged to admit that Luther had his ignoble sides. "It was the misfortune of Luther," says Creighton, "that he rarely transcended the limits of his own surroundings." But the real leader and reformer rises superior to his age.

It would be outside the scope of the present essay to do more than hint at the complex religious, social and national conditions amidst which the Reformation had its rise. "The highly significant movements of religious and ecclesiastical life at the end of the Middle Ages concurred with those of the most important secular spheres—of general mental culture, of political, civic and social evolution. A religious reform could not possibly fail to be essentially determined by this connection; had to assume an attitude

<sup>98</sup> Ibid, p. 804.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid, p. 804.

<sup>100</sup> Denifie, pp. 296-297.

<sup>101 &</sup>quot;The Papacy," Vol. V., p. 117.

to these things, and inevitably exercised a certain influence on them."<sup>102</sup> These words are true in a sense hardly intended by the writer. There was a "mass of combustibles"<sup>108</sup> waiting to be set on fire, and Luther's personality was mainly responsible for the actual conflagration.

Denifle's book raised a great storm of indignation in Protestant Germany, as though the author had intended to deal a crushing blow to a national hero. Obviously it could not be for any Catholic a mere exercise of curiosity or malice, or anything but a painful and laborious task to set Luther in a true light against the background of his time. For if he was the father of Protestantism, he was a disloval son of the Catholic Church. In the interests of truth and justice the task had to be undertaken. The spectacle of the fair unity of the Church broken; of her office and teaching misunderstood, attacked and reviled; of her energies expended in repelling assaults and of so many of her children engaged in defending the outer walls who might have been content and happy to enjoy the pleasances within; of men of good will wayfaring painfully to her gates or by the mystery of God's providence wandering fruitlessly without; all this may well justify those who realize it in doing what they can to bring the same realization home to others.

M. RYAN.

Cork, Ireland.

<sup>102</sup> Köstlin, I., p. 7.

<sup>108</sup> Balmez, "European Civilization," p. 7.

#### THE BASIS OF SOCIOLOGY.

CHARACTERISTIC tendency of our time is the interest shown in the study of social problems. The impulse given by Rousseau and by the efforts at social reconstruction after the French Revolution has grown so deep and widespread that questions pertaining to Sociology occupy a leading place in academic and popular discussion. Taking a certain form in the collectivism of Fourier and San Simon, the movement with Comte assumed the name Sociology, which was eagerly taken up and expounded by the adherents of the evolution philosophy. It blended easily with the humanitarian movement then arising, which worked at times with a view to apply its philosophical principles, and at times aimed to achieve results by an appeal to the common sentiments of humanity. Thus Sociology is the new science which offers, as a warrant for its existence, the startling claim to present a unified view of human life and a body of guiding principles for the conduct of life. Religion once had this office; now, according to Comte, science, under the name of Sociology, has taken her place. In fact, looking back over the writings of the last fifty years we find the most prominent were those of the real or would-be social philosophers and reformers, as e. g., Tolstoi, Ibsen, Zola, Dickens, Hugo, Spencer, Mill and Comte. And to-day work of a most practical kind for the alleviation of human suffering brings those engaged in it sooner or later face to face with philosophical principles set forth by Sociologists. Hence Sociology, like Evolution, has become a modern watchword and fad. The newspapers are filled with it; the sociological novel presents its problems in concrete form; the workingman on the street or in labor unions unconsciously gives expression to its principles; its devotees glorify it as the panacea for every evil and the harbinger of the golden age; while the pulpit in many cases, putting aside the Gospel message, believes it has found Christ in sociological teaching. Even Socialism, which attacks the constituent principles of modern social order, arose from a study of society and shows the necessity of sound social knowledge. The purpose of the present article is to ask simply what is the basis of Sociology as a Science?

I.

# THE BASIS OF COMTE.

The word "Sociology" was coined by Auguste Comte, but its subject matter is among the oldest topics of human speculation. Philosopher, moralist and theologian in setting forth the nature of man and his relations to the world have to a greater or less extent dealt with the problem of society. Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Suarez, More, Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, have analyzed the relations existing between man and man. With Comte, however, the study of human society entered upon a new phase. His genius is shown not in a definitely constructed science, but rather in a method proposed and by him superficially applied, which resulted in a disposition to study social phenomena from an empirical point of view and along lines hitherto imperfectly explored. The fault of the method is that it is partial and exclusive. Rigid adherence to it shut out a source of knowledge absolutely essential for the investigation of human society, and gave to Sociology a one-sided and false development resulting in the inextricable confusion so apparent among sociological writers at the present day.

The Sociology of Comte must be studied over against its background of Positivism. The reaction against the absurdities of Hegel's metaphysics uniting with the rapid rise of the physical sciences resulted with Comte in this system of philosophy which has profoundly influenced modern thought. The essence of Posit-This maintains that the only source of ivism lies in its method. knowledge is observation of and experimentation on facts grasped by the senses alone. This implies that the material order of things only exists, that beyond the material order there is nothing. As a result, the supersensible and absolute, as e. g., God, soul, substance, cause, etc., are once and for all time removed from the scope of knowledge; in reality they are merely the product of the imagination. Men did believe that such notions represented something real, but do so no longer. In explanation Comte proposes the law of historic filiation, according to which mankind in its development has passed through three successive stages: (1) the theological or imaginative, illustrated in Fetishism, Polytheism and Monotheism; (2) the metaphysical or abstract, which explained existing things not by divine beings, but by abstract powers or essences; (3) the positive or scientific, which holds that the only realities are phenomena and their laws as revealed by physical To Comte the reason for the chaos in modern thought is the simultaneous use of these three philosophies; whereas, the scientific, being the final evolution of the intellect, is the most perfect and alone ought to prevail. The positive method with the law of historic filiation prepares the way for his classification of the sciences. This classification should be made, he contends, according to the degree of dependence among the different order of phenomena. Hence the law which obtains in the classification

is that the simplest and most general phenomena form a basis for the more complicated. Thus we have, in successive dependence, Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Physiology or Biology and Social Physics or Sociology. Psychology is viewed as a branch of Physiology, for it gives us the one true doctrine of man. Thus the sciences lead up to Sociology, i. e., the science of man in society, the crown of the scientific edifice.

In Social Dynamics and in the law of historic filiation Comte apparently holds a link with the older philosophy of History. In his method and in the classification of the sciences he inaugurates a new departure. He claims to have definitely annexed the social order to the realm of natural science. The law of historic filiation, upon which the classification of the sciences rests, is, he maintains, to Sociology what gravitation is to Astronomy. It proves Sociology to be a natural science, whose phenomena are developed according to invariable natural laws. Comte thought that society could be regenerated and saved by science alone. The natural laws of coexistence and of sequence that may be observed among social states He believed that and conditions could thus be clearly grasped. the statesman trained in the true spirit and principles of the positive philosophy could organize and guide society so as to ameliorate the conditions of its members. Thus Sociology is to the statesman what Astronomy is to navigators and Physiology is to the physician. Hence the purpose and crown of Positivism was Sociology. the effort to reconstruct society after the light and methods of modern science Positivism arose.

Comte set forth his views on the philosophy of knowledge and the theory of the sciences in the Cours de Philosophie Positive, published in 1842. In 1854 appeared the Systeme de Politique Positive, which contains his sociological programme. This embraces: (1) Social Statics, i. e., permanent conditions of social order; (2) Social Dynamics, i. e., his Philosophy of History; (3) Polity of the Future on Positivist lines, i. e., the doctrine of Altruism and the Religion of Humanity. In expounding this system of Sociology his guiding principles are: (1) Social phenomena, as objects of natural science, are controlled by laws admitting of scientific prevision. Thus the duty of the Sociologist is to search, in the language of physical science, for the laws and causes at work in society and to formulate their predictible effects: (2) appeal to Biology. Biological analysis of the social organism appears in his hands as a scientific fact justifying the claim for individual submission to the public weal, and thus furnishes a new basis for Ethics. (3) The doctrine of Altruism assumed as a definition of the moral ideal. (4) Appeal to History, for while Sociology was in reality based on Biology, yet decisive guidance was to be found in the wise man's study of human phenomena shown, as he says, in the history of the past. Thus Comte assimilates man's life to natural or animal existence and views the evolution of society as only the final term of a progression which has continued from the simplest vegetables or animals up to the ascendency of the intellectual and meral man.

II.

# BASIS OF PHYSICS.

In basing a science of society on a general theory of the existence and succession of social phenomena according to natural laws Comte gave form to an aspiration of his time. The fundamental conception of his Sociology, therefore, is expressed in the term "natural law." His explanation of its meaning is negative and vgaue. In the positive method and the classification of the sciences he expressly declares that the intellectual and moral have no distinctive departments as such. Hence he denies the word "natural" to these spheres of activity. He applies the term "natural" to the laws governing the phenomena of material or organic existence. Hence his Sociology gave rise to two parallel tendencies based upon the Physical and the Organic meaning of "natural law."

By using the term "Social Physics" to designate Sociology, and by the rigid mechanical conception of the forms in which the social principle works, Comte's system easily came into accord with the rising school of materialistic philosophy which culminated in the scientific materialism of Spencer, Tyndall and Huxley. While Tyndall and Huxley seemed content to explain the phenomena of mental, moral and organic life by materialistic principles, Spencer bent his genius to interpret society on the same lines. Hence his Sociology is in reality a department or phase of Physics.

Spencer's Cosmic Philosophy is based on (1) correlation of the physical forces which shows an underlying unity throughout the inorganic world; (2) organic evolution, which proclaims a like unity in the organic world; (3) the transition or evolution from one to the other must be made in terms of natural law. His evolution philosophy is therefore the assertion of the sufficiency of natural law, and to him natural law means physical law. Everything is to be explained in terms of matter and motion. Thus social evolution is a phase of evolution in general, yet the highest we know of, and the final outcome of the energy that is at work in the universe. Tyndall's conception of individual life as "a realm of physical and moral necessity" was applied by Spencer to society

as a whole. The natural history of man now becomes the natural history of society. So fixed is his conviction in the sway of blind and irrevocable forces that, contrary to Comte's opinion, he doubts the power of the statesman to do much in the way of interfering with the natural and actual course of social evolution. We may, he holds, at most learn to describe social forces, but must not presume to organize or control them.

Thus with Spencer Sociology proper is essentially descriptive and is based on the data of Ethnology and History. He writes: "the only History that is of practical value is what may be called Descriptive Sociology." He gives a lengthy discussion on primitive man with a view of finding there all that is needed to explain the social man in general. The real value of the discussion is that it served to make "primitive man" an intellectual fad of modern thought. In describing "primitive man" as warlike and cruel Spencer departs from the French school of Anthropologists who follow Rousseau, and shows the influence of Hobbes. Hence he states that in the beginning small social groups were constantly at war from their relation to a common food supply. Through this warfare the groups became united in great states where military pursuits could be given up for the arts of peace. Thus militarism is the first phase of social progress, which in the process of social evolution gives place to other successive and higher phases until perfect human nature is attained and perfect equilibrium is reached.

With Spencer life is adaptation of the organism to environment, or, as he tells us, "the correspondence of internal relations to external relations, initiated and directed by the external relations." Applied to society in the degree Spencer applied it, this principle was revolutionary. Society is explained in terms of progressive human nature adapting itself to changing conditions. Thus attention was drawn to the power of environment in individual and especially in social life. Our nature, like the oyster, is the product of adaptations to environment in the past, and we are at the mercy of our environment in the present. Evolution Psychology has accepted this as a fundamental principle, and the Psychological novelist has presented it in concrete form as the Gospel of modern It is the solution of George Eliot's "Daniel Deronda" and "Middlemarch." In Sociology Spencer's theory of environment has had great influence. It has given scientific color and form to the economic interpretation of history, which takes for environment the primary necessities of existence. Thus the Economists with Marx, Loria and Professor Kearsbey attempt to explain morals, laws and institutions by the economic production at any given time in vogue. But we live in a physical environment also. Hence the anthropo-geographical view of history or "Social Geography" which builds a Sociology on the basis of Geography, as shown in the writings of Mattenzi, Ferraro, Professor Geddes and Professor Ratzel. Other writers, e. g., Le Play school, combine the economic and geographical environments. Thus Vignes and Demoulins teach that nature determines work and reward, and work in turn fixes habits of life, forms of land tenure, customs of the family and of the community. Hence types of character are created. Environment is the law of life, but work, reward and tradition are its viziers. The physical environment thus indirectly leaves a stamp upon a nascent folk and we have a type and a geographical route for the explanation of society rather than the anthropological appeal to sex, race or anthropological type as shown in the shape of the head and as advocated by Ammon, La Pouge. Classon and Ripley. Finally, another writer speaks of the "Geology of human personality" and gravely assures us that "if we take a section through the various strata of society, we shall likewise find phenomena representing the eras of history" (Contemp. Rev., Vol. 87, page 552). Now, as a matter of fact, man can and does resist his environment. His efforts at progress are a reversal of the process of evolution. The underlying principle of social reform now universally admitted is that we can better our surroundings. In transforming our environment by the creation of an environment not only different from, but often opposed to. that furnished by nature alone, in moulding our characters along lines to a higher and more complete life than that marked out by natural laws, we show the utter falsity of any system of Ethics or of Sociology based on the determination of the physical forces.

To explain the structure of society Spencer employs the biological analysis. He calls society an organism because it grows by structural differentiation. But so, we may add, does a piece of complicated machinery. Society, he says, is an organism, in which the regulating system, i. e., government, appears as the analogue of the cerebral nervous system in the animal, the sustaining system, i. e., agriculture and industry, as the analogue of the alimentary tract, and the distributing system, i. e., commerce, as the analogue of the circulatory system. Professors Small and Vincent in their Manual faithfully reproduce this analogy, yet tell us that "Spencer's Sociology ends precisely where Sociology proper should begin." This criticism applies not to what Spencer has done, but to what he has failed to do. For they tell us that Spencer "has set a high standard for the descriptive social sciences; he has proposed conclusions which may be uncertain, but a safer philosophical structure than Spencer's must use a larger part of the foundation which he has laid," and that "Spencer matured a method which Comte could only by a very narrow margin save from contempt." But Spencer was content to analyze the structure of society; he failed to consider the structure as a whole composed of parts working together to achieve results. This task was taken up by Schäffle, Ratzenhover and Professor Small. Hence we read in the same manual: "there is no room in his (i. e., Spencer's) system for the theory and application of active in addition to passive Social Dynamics." In other words, Spencer gives us the Anatomy of human society; Professor Small takes this Anatomy and views it Physiologically as a structure fitted for work and performing that work. Thus, by the turn of a word, Spencer's entire system of Sociology based on Physics and ruled throughout by invariable laws of matter and motion, becomes a living thing and passes insensibly into the Biological conception of Sociology.

# III.

#### THE BASIS OF BIOLOGY.

Comte's attempt to treat society as a natural science resulted in the formation of another and far more powerful school than the Physical Sociology developed by Spencer. This is the school of Biological Sociology, different from yet somewhat akin to the former, so that, as we have seen, one easily fused into the other. In the classification of the sciences Comte ranks Sociology next to Biology and writes: "The necessity of taking the ensemble of Biology as the point of departure for Sociology is so incontestable that no one any longer dares to dispute it." This principle inspires the theories of Espinas, Perrier, Fouillee, Schäffle, Lilienfeld, Sergi. Gumplowicz and Novicow. From Biology Comte learned to regard society as an organism and the organic analogy forms the substance of his Sociology, just as the analogy to physical laws constitutes its form. With the publication of Darwin's "Origin of Species" the biological analogy forged to the front. of a natural growth based on a fundamental unity was applied to society, and has held a dominating influence upon Sociological studies. The controversy now being waged as to the transmission to offspring of acquired qualities shows that its influence is yet unshaken.

(1) The doctrine of organic evolution implies the common nature of man and brute. Man is merely the most exalted form of animal life, the last term of the zoological series and controlled, as Professors Ridgeway and Sutherland teach, by the same laws as the rest of the animal kingdom. This led to the explanation of the

higher, i. e., more distinctively human phenomena by the lower, i. e., in savage nations or in the animal world. The low traits in man were held to be the survivals of the animal or the savage. On this basis the Social Meliorism of Lester Ward rests. Hence the prominence given by Sociologists to the problem of human origins with a view to reconstruct primitive man. A new science was created, called Anthropology, whose aim was to set forth the true scientific doctrine of man as an individual and as associated in society. Topinard, its chief exponent, tells us that Anthropology properly so called is merely a chapter of Zoology, yet must be regarded as the foundation of Sociology, and accordingly divides Sociology into Animal Sociology and Human Sociology. Hence arose the comparative study of animal societies and human societies, proposed by Comte, amplified by Lilienfeld, Letourneau and Topinard, with the explicit aim of seeking in the former the cause and groundwork of the latter. While Darwin holds that sociality appeared with animal gregariousness and the advent of reason does not alter the animal impulses of gregarious creatures. but only extends them in range, and Lester Ward teaches that man originally was not a social animal and was descended from an animal that was not even gregarious by instinct, Topinard maintains that man sprang from social animals and animal societies in some ways are more perfect than human societies, because in them altruism holds sway in a more perfect form. Hence arose interminable discussions about primitive man and the primitive state of society carried on in the name and under the authority of science, but more fanciful than any metaphysical dreams Comte was wont to ridicule. To this also is due the confusion which exists even at the present day as to the proper scope and limitations of Biology, Zoology, Anthropology, Physiology, Psychology and Sociology.

(2) Professor Giddings says that modern Sociology is distinguished from previous sociological doctrine by the prominence given to the notion of the Social Organism. Darwin held that variability and adaptation to environment were the two fundamental laws of organic life, with selection as the means to obtain that adaptation. With the conviction that society itself was an organism, these two principles, which were considered sufficient to account for the development of the individual, were extended to societies, communities and nations. Just as the nature of the bee was moulded by the life of the hive, so human society was formed by the life of the community, which causes to develop in the individual certain capacities and organs not primarily for individual advantage, but for the gain of the community. Thus socialization devel-

oped the human brain and made man what he is. Karl Pearson tells us that the first function of science in national life is to show us what national life means and how the nation is a vast organism, subject as much to the great forces of evolution as any other gregarious type of life. And again, "a community of men is as subject as a community of ants or a herd of buffaloes to the laws which rule all organic nature. It is the herd, the tribe or the nation which forms the fundamental unit in the evolution of man." Thus society is an organism and man is a member of this organism, as a part of the whole, essentially dependent on the whole and bound to serve its interests. In doing so his nature evolves. Consciousness, morality, personality, all the qualities of his higher and social nature appear—called forth by the necessities of the environment and instruments for more complete harmony with the By virtue of the organic analogy the Biological environment. Sociologist gives new meaning to the statement of Aristotle that man is by nature a social animal, for the variability of an organic whole in constant interaction with an ever-changing environment has made him what he is. Hence the doctrine of the so-called moving equilibrium, physical with Spencer, biological with the followers of Darwin, which is held to be the essential basic element of progress in the evolution of the race. While Leslie Stephen finds, in the interaction of organism and environment, the source and explanation of Ethics, the Sociological writers, viewing the problem from a broader standpoint, see herein the cause and explanation of the social nature of man. Analyzed critically, the "moving equilibrium" is nothing real in itself, but merely a name applied to the social organism viewed at any definite moment of time in the progressive march. Its place and meaning in Sociology comes therefore from uniting the doctrine of the social organism with the theory of evolution.

(3) By far the most popular and characteristic element in Biological Sociology is the Darwinian doctrine of natural selection and struggle for existence. With the publication of "The Descent of Man," in 1871, the value of this teaching was grasped by the adherents of the Science-Philosophy. To Darwin natural selection is a biological hypothesis. He proposes to account for all living species by organisms, environment, heredity and variability. The first three sum up the struggle; all four give the result, i. e., selection. He takes for granted, but does not, nor can he in this way explain how matter should pass into life, or how animal should evolve into rational life. According to this teaching, there is nothing in the inherent nature of man by which his social nature can be rationally explained. It is merely the resultant of the tendencies,

to him accidental, as fostered by his particular environment. While Leslie Stephen, faithful to the older teaching, postulates a struggle, not between organisms, but between the individual and the claims of society, with a view to the fuller unfolding of life, and Sutherland teaches elimination, but not struggle, and Kidd holds for struggle without elimination, and Weissmann intensifies the struggle by making it the sole cause of progress; Galton proposes the new science of Eugenics which teaches that man, having now discovered the law of the survival of the fittest, shall utilize it for the high end of raising the race.

Darwin teaches that all living species have been marked off from each other and given a standing ground in nature by the working of natural selection upon minute and apparently casual variations. The means of natural selection has been the ceaseless struggle for existence. There is not room for all to live; those a little above the average are saved. The application of natural selection to society has extended the meaning of the term so as to include not only warfare, but strife of any kind. With plants and animals we find it in a crude form. As society increases it also develops in variety and complexity. Karl Pearson explains it both as warfare and as competition in manufacture and commerce. Bagehot applies it to states and political life. Darwin lays emphasis on the importance of group or tribal cohesion as a factor of success in the intertribal struggle. Society is viewed as a theatre of strife between classes, corporations and parties for the advancement of their respective interests. Loria, Vaccaro, Ratzenhover, Gumplowicz, Durkheim, Novicow set forth the forms, phases and laws of these struggles. Professor Small follows Professor S. Alexander in applying the struggle to types of ethical thought or conflict of ideals. Huxley's insight grasped the consequences of such doctrines. If reason teaches man that the whole animated cosmos has been and is controlled by a struggle for existence, what can man do but practice this blind selfishness throughout his life! Hence Huxley asserted that human morality was absolutely opposed to the cosmic process, and urged his hearers to be moral in spite of the nature of things. Drummond agrees with Huxley, but says Darwin's views were one-sided and holds that the true solution is found in the analysis of the Biological laws of sex. Drummond's doctrine of sex is physiological. So also Professor Thomas points out the influence of certain sex contrasts upon early social development. Kidd bases his Social Evolution on the biological laws of struggle, so that without struggle there is retrogression, but maintains that reason by developing selfishness interferes with struggle as a factor of progress; thus he introduces religion as a supernatural element which provides a sanction for social conduct. Again, as the aim of the struggle for existence was the evolution of the moral and social nature of man, and as Comte with his followers by sociality meant altruism, we begin to realize the startling contradiction, that Biological Sociology in proposing the doctrine of struggle as the law of progress bids us fight, and in setting forth the doctrine of Social Organism tells us we ought to live for the common good. Thus the crucial ethical problem of Egoism and Altruism comes to the front in Sociology and proves to be a stumbling block to the Sociologists who base their theories of society on the Science-Philosophy. Hence the Anthropologists with Topinard hold that "man as an animal and man as a member of society are contradictory," that "society is a compromise between the truths of science and the necessities of practical conduct," that the problem to be elucidated is "how has man changed from an egocentric to a sociocentric animal," and offer as a solution "Altruism in the form and as a species of differentiated and enlarged egoism." The Economists appeal to community of interests, and state that the social process is an assimilation brought about by a growing together of interests. The Sociologists even are not united in the answer to this difficulty. Some, e. g., the Social Psychologists, maintain that the fundamental social process is assimilation. Others adopt the theory of Lester Ward. Writing on the "Sociology of Political Parties ("American Journal of Sociology," Vol. XIII., page 2), he affirms that the underlying principle of political action is the same principle that underlies all forms of development and evolution in general. Political antagonism, he says, is a form of social synergy. Hence the parties that think they are opposing each other are simply working together for the accomplishment of an end of which they are unconscious. They are acting, he continues, in exactly the same way that hostile races act in the process of social assimilation, in the same way that organic beings act in the process of organic development, in the same way that cosmic forces act in the formation of solar and planetary systems. thus meets the difficulty by coining a new word—a word vague enough to have a physical, biological or psychological meaning, or perhaps all three meanings together, but which, when read in the context, suggests the mathematical formula of the "Parallelogram of the Forces." Others, accepting the Biological analogy, take into account also the complementary analogy based upon the comparison of a society with an individual organism and thence deduce the fact of coöperation. They maintain that just as coöperation is evident from the structure of the individual, so it can be traced among the members of the animal kingdom. Hence the view which

sees nothing but internecine strife in the animal world is one-sided and superficial. Topinard asserts that the struggle for existence is not so general or so merciless as the extreme disciples of Darwin would maintain. Schäffle considers society as a whole composed of parts working together to achieve results. Thus a Sociology based on "function" and "service" has evolved. While Ratzenhover teaches that "the conspicuous element in the history of the race is universal conflict of interests," yet he views civilization and adjustment as the resultants of social forces in the earliest stages. To him "Society is a process of adjustment by conflict between associated individuals." He proposes "the law of absolute hostility" as governing the earlier or biological stage of the process. Yet he maintains that the process viewed as a whole reveals another law. viz., "a law of diminuendo value governing the struggle phase and of crescendo value governing the socializing phase of the social process." Thus the analysis of the social struggle shows that "struggle and reciprocity are always to a certain extent functions of each other." Hence the process from barbarism to civilization is expressed in the formula "struggle based upon the narrowest selfishness, resolving itself gradually into a moralization that tends toward civilization inspired by the broadest selfishness." Thus "the tendency of the struggle is the common good of the individuals, the ultimate harmonization of all interests." The result, he says, "we call socialization or civilization" and "the process from unmitigated struggle toward relative socialization is always through gradual and largely unconscious adjustment of individual interests to widening circumferences of social interests"

### IV.

#### BASIS OF SOCIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY.

The theories of Schäffle and Ratzenhover, based originally on Biology, merge insensibly into Psychology. In his work on "Contemporary Social Science" Fouillée attempts to reconcile the Biological with the Psychological method in Sociology. Baldwin says that Psychology, modified, gives us the true clue to the nature of society and holds it to be a permanent advance that the biological analogy is giving place to a psychological analogy. Hence the disposition among Sociologists to put aside organic or economic conceptions and to adopt what is known as the psychological method, e. g., Fouillée, De Greef, Giddings, Durkheim, Tarde, Baldwin, Small and Ward. To give place and form to this transition a new science was created under the name of Sociological Psychology. Not only has the development of Sociological Science

from biological to psychological conceptions taken place along the lines of Comte's statement expressed in his classification of the sciences that Psychology as such is not a distinct science and should be regarded as merely a part of Physiology, but also the sphere of Sociological Psychology finds in Comte's later writings its initial impulse in the assertion that Sociology is the true Psychology, because it reveals to us the true nature of man. Therefore the effort to find a basis for Sociology in the science of Sociological Psychology is the last result of the positive method.

Professor E. A. Ross ("American Journal of Sociology," Vol. XIII., page 2) writes: "Social Psychology studies the psychic planes and currents that come into existence among men, in consequence of their association. It seeks to understand and account for those uniformities in feeling, belief or volition and hence in action, which are due to the interaction of human beings, i. e., Social Psychology differs from Sociology proper social causes. in that the former considers planes and currents, the latter groups Hence the former should precede the latter." and structures. These words take on clearer light when viewed in connection with Professor Caldwell's statement ("Contemporary Review," September, 1898) that "Psychology and Sociology have progressed pari passu during the last decades of the century since the time of Lazarus and Stanthal, the great founders of Comparative Psychology," and of Professor Small's assertion ("General Sociology," page 430) that "Biology and Psychology have to do with the individual in the making; Sociology wants to start with him as the finished product." The real difficulty, however, in getting a definite conception of what all this means is that modern Psychology is an evolutive integration based on a blending of the English association theory and the German apperceptive theory with no reference to a soul and no line of demarkation between sense knowledge and thought. It is a result, a product of the positive method, a comprehensive gathering together of the various and conflicting leading conceptions in modern psychological thought, with the purpose of reading a harmony of evolution in the processes of mental life.

(1) Modern Psychology dilates on the important part played by the feelings in human life. Comte, in line with the Materialism of the eighteenth century, had asserted the subordination of intellect to feeling. The Anthropologists with Topinard say man has inherited the social instinct or consolidated need of the social animals from which he has sprung. That feeling is the fundamental psychic fact is asserted by the Evolutionists, and puts them in harmony with the English school of Associationism. Psychology became an integration of associated feelings growing more refined

as the process was carried on. Thus Ratzenhover bases his Sociology on "interests" and Professor Small on "wants." When Professor Giddings declares that the socializing process is "assimilation" and the fundamental social fact is "consciousness of kind," and in another place states "there is hardly a single fact in the whole range of sociological knowledge that does not support the conclusion that the race was social before it was human and that its social qualities were the chief means of developing its human qualities"; or again, "there is no reason to doubt the continuity of animal and human society," we are made aware that "consciousness of kind" is a refinement of Physiological feeling found in animals as well as in man. Thus he speaks of ("Principles of Sociology") "zoogenic association," i. e., existing before man was born, "anthropogenic association," i. e., which effected the transformation from animal to man, yet assures us that "no existing society is anthropogenic," and "anthropologic association," i. e., in primitive man. To him association is one of the great cooperating causes of the origin of species and of the formation of types; it has developed speech, and speech in turn developed intelligence among animals and a human nature. This teaching is in harmony with the so-called Genetic Psychology. Thus Professor Baldwin writes: "The relations of individual development to race development are so intimate—the two are so identical, in fact, that no topic in the one can be treated with great clearness without assuming results in the other." ("Mental Development," Pref. VII.) When therefore ("Social and Ethical Interpretations") he treats Sociology from the viewpoint of Genetic Psychology he says, "man is a social outcome, rather than a social unit" and "the child in getting to be a person uses social means to that end in his lifehistory; and the animal in getting to be a species by natural selection in race-history survives by his use of the same means." Hence "the beginnings of social life are found in the animals." To him the fundamental social fact is "imitation," and by this is meant any form or degree of mental appropriation or assimilation. Man's social acts "are his because they are society's first: otherwise he would not have learned them nor have had any tendency to do them." Thus is formed "the socius, the common self of the group," "which normally grows up in the budding years." In this way the thought of the other person, i. e., the "alter," is built into the thought of one's self, i. e., the "ego." To Giddings and Baldwin society must be studied not as an organism, but as a psychological association. Yet their Psychology is in reality a developed phase of Physiology, and the biological theories of selection are found in the earlier stages of their developed system, and especially in

Professor Baldwin's principle of "Social heredity." The same line of thought is shown when Sociology is treated from the viewpoint of Physiological Psychology or of Cerebral Physiology. Thus Schäffle proposes to follow the method of Comte, Littré, Spencer and Lilienfeld, pushes the analogies of Biology far beyond the application of his predecessors, and completes his Social Science by drawing on the Experimental Psychology of the laboratories in Leipsic and Freiburg. Professors Small and Vincent in their Manual professedly set forth the principles of Schäffle, entitled Chapter IV. of Book III., "The Psycho-Physical Communicating Apparatus or the Social Nervous System," speak of the individual as "a communicating cell," "a terminal cell," "an end organ," and vet tells us that "the vital principle of society is phychical force." Further on we read, along the lines of Spencer's Superorganic Evolution: "Psychology gives us an account of mind as we know it in the individual; Sociological Psychology describes the phenomena that result from the combination and reaction of the cognitions, emotions and volitions of associated individuals. Inasmuch as the latter manifestations are a higher integration of individual Psychology, they may be said to form the subject-matter of Super-Psychology or an Ultra-Psychology. Schäffle and De Greef are its leaders." Hence they teach that "Social Psychology is a composite photograph, in which the thoughts of individuals combine to form a product different in some degree from each of its elements." In this way "social knowledge, judgment and will are formed." Professor Ross discards the biological analogy and likens society not to an "organism," but to a "brain." Thus as the cerebral Physiologist, e. g., Professor James, in his "Psychology," treats only the "brain states" of the individual and perceives nothing beyond them, so Sociologists with Professor Ross study the "brain states" of the community.

(2) Investigations on the subject of Hypnotism have furnished interesting chapters to modern Psychology. Their value is not confined to mental life; they are important also as giving a new theory of social cohesion. Thus the normal hypnotism of Tarde and the abnormal hypnotism of Le Bon are at the basis of their respective treatises on Sociology. Tarde takes the fundamental social fact to be "suggestive-imitation." For him the true type of the social man is a hypnotic creature, acting under suggestions from others, though he is not aware of it, and is under the illusion that he is himself. In harmony with this we have the "imitation" of Professor Baldwin, akin to the "assimilation" of Gumplowicz and Professor Giddings, which in turn can be traced back to the "sympathy" of Darwin, Adam Smith, Leslie Stephen and Sutherland, in itself

considered either as a physiological factor with a view to explain the origin of morality in the individual or as of biological utility to promote the growth and preservation of animal and human so-Tarde and Baldwin, however, hold that "imitation" is a psychic fact, and thereby offer a sharp contrast to Kidd, who teaches that reason is anti-social, because its action tends to promote our extreme selfishness, and that religion must be called in to counteract reason and promote sociality by its Gospel of altruism. In its ultimate analysis the Imitation method holds that the individual is not born, but made social; that his social character is something superadded through contact with others. Le Bon says that cohesion of men in society is largely spontaneous, and its simplest form is had in "the crowd." To him "the crowd" is a psychological unity, and as such its members are "in possession of a sort of collective mind, which makes them feel, think and act in a manner quite different from that in which each individual would feel, think or act were he isolated." In explanation he states that in the crowd men lose their acquired characters, by which they are distinguished one from another, and revert to their instincts which form the substratum of subconscious life common to them all. In an excited crowd the subconscious self rises to the surface. as in an analogous manner the subconscious self of the individual is laid bare by the hypnotist. In the crowd, therefore, we lose our private interests and become one with the feelings and thoughts of others. This crowd Psychology furnished to Le Bon the basis for his theory of social development.

(3) The Double Aspect theory of mind and matter, broached by Spencer, Clifford and the early Science-Philosophers, is an accepted theory in modern Philosophy. According to this view, the two series, i. e., the physical and the psychical, correspond to each other as being simply different aspects of the same substance. At the same time Schoppenhauer was teaching a Monism of Will and Von Hartmann was setting forth his Philosophy of the Unconscious. While the Monism of Science-Philosophy has its psychological phase in Physiological Psychology and Psycho-Physics, the metaphysics of the German thinkers suggested to Psychologists studies along the lines of the "subconscious self." Their further applications to the problems of Sociology were in line with the drift of modern thought and is seen in the writings of Lester Ward and Professor Small. Professor Small writes: "Attainment of the proposed end (i. e., for Sociology) seems to me to be assured through positive monism as Weltauschauung and through monistic positivism as heuristic method. Monism presents all being to us as the work of a unitary principle of all phenomena and incidentally \$\$ (#問題) 李賞 society as subject to the inclusive regularity of nature." Ward tells us "that society, which is the highest product of evolution, naturally depends on mind, which is the highest product of matter." And Professor Small assures us that "although Ward's Monism and his Social Psychology form a coherent and a continuous system, the most confident dualist might adopt Ward's exposition of social phenomena without modifying his dualistic presumption." To Ward and Small the phychic side of the physical process is not conscious throughout. Thus Ward holds that "what is, may be nature partially realized and that the destiny of nature is to realize itself completely through action by its conscious parts upon its unconscious parts." Professors Small and Vincent in their Manual have some curious passages about the "unconscious" in the social Thus "every social act is conscious from the individual, but not from the collective standpoint," "unconsciousness is a conspicuous characteristic of social activities and institutions," "social functions and growths are chiefly unconscious," "social consciousness, having effected changes in structures and functions, fades away." And in the same work (page 52) we read: "Whether mind is a property of matter or an energy distinct from matter, is a question of purely speculative interest to Sociologists, if both sides concede that the psychical is potent over the non-psychical." Now, what is the value of "speculative interest" and is the "interest purely speculative;" or why in a scientific treatise should "concessions" be sought, if not through a tacit admission that the theory cannot explain facts? It is impossible to understand, much less explain, such teaching. It shows to what strange extremes writers on Sociology may go on a blind trail after a positivistic method. They tell us that "general social doctrines can be justified only by the most minute research," they insist on the necessity of sound scientific principles, of exact data and of rigid application, yet they accept the most fanciful theories, rely on the slimmest possible analogies or abstractions and project more shadowy speculations than the a priori metaphysicians of the last century. When brought face to face with a difficulty, they naively ask their readers to overlook the difficulty to take certain things as granted. This is assumption, not science.

# V.

### CONCLUSION.

Such is a brief summary of the development and present condition of Sociology. Put forth by Comte as the supreme guide of life, set up by Topinard as the source from which all light is to come, claiming with Professor Ross sovereign authority in

the field of science, Scientific Sociology to-day is a hope, not a fact. Its name stands for no definite body of systematic knowledge, but for a mass of vague and conflicting, if not inchoate, speculations. Proclaimed the "inclusive social science" by Spencer and De Greef, the "coördinating science" by Professor Small, the "fundamental science" by Professor Giddings, it betrays a conspicuous absence of agreement as to its scope, principles or province. Its professors do not claim that it is a science. Thus Professor Giddings says "much Sociology is yet nothing more than careful and suggestive guesswork;" Professor Small calls it "an inchoate science," "a method rather than a body of secure results," and Lester Ward confesses that it is impossible to tell what Sociology is, except that it deals with social phenomena. What must be the social anarchy that is sure to follow on the application of such teaching for the uplifting of man and the betterment of society? In its development Sociology is dominated throughout by the fateful genius of Comte. He is the leader, and to him every phase owes its initiative. In practical results Sociology has not advanced one step beyond his standpoint. Professors Small and Vincent in their Manual expressly warn students not "to regard Comte as an authority in Sociology." Yet in the preface to "General Sociology" Professor Small writes: "Social philosophy is a point of view, first about the reality in question, and, second, about the ways of inquiring into reality. As yet it has very meagre doctrinal content as distinguished from its literature of scope and of method." No more expressive words could be found in giving a criticism as to Comte's contribution to Sociology. Its accredited leaders pass condemnation on its method and results. Just as Darwin's "Origin of Species" has put back for fifty years real progress in Biology, so the one-sided view of society under the influence of evolution and the positive method has had precisely the same effect in Sociology. Physical science has failed to explain man; it has failed also to explain society. The Science-Philosophy has distorted all branches of knowledge to which it has been applied. of the present article is to show its failure in Sociology and thus bring out in full relief the fundamental truth that the crucial problem of the past century and handed down to the present is the dignity of man and the true nature of the human mind. development of Sociology is a luminous illustration.

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THE JEWISH ESTIMATE OF JESUS OF NAZARETH.

HE attitude of the Jewish mind towards the Founder of the Christian religion cannot fail to present itself to a very great many as a subject exciting a large amount of curious and mysterious interest. Jesus of Nazareth, according to the flesh of the seed of Abraham, has, across the ages, been looked upon by His national brethren in the light of a moral leper. His memory held in abhorrence. He has been kept "outside the gate," despised rejected, reviled. Gentle, kind and, above all, exhibiting in His character signs of a most attractive type of manliness, there has, nevertheless, been one notable exception in the list of the people that have succumbed in admiration to the power of His charms. That exception has been the stock from which He Himself sprung, the rock from which He was hewn out, "His own people."

In treating of this subject the present writer dismisses out of mind at once the accusations so frequently leveled against the Jews of being, when face to face with the problem which Jesus of Nazareth presents to them, a "stiff-necked people," blinded partly by their own obstinacy and partly by the Divine Will. strange hardening of the heart by the Supreme Being, so that, "seeing they may not see, and hearing they may not understand," is a mystery which has often proved itself a stumbling block to the devout, and, as a question waiting for an answer, has always been the despair of the theologian. It is of all solemn matters the most solemn; and, implying as it does, great anger on the part of the Deity, and the worst punishment in consequence, it should not lightly be asserted about any particular individual or nation. Nor is there need to make use of the reason here. For explanations of a quite natural kind will most readily appear as we review the Jewish concept of the character of Christ since first that people was called upon to examine into the matter two thousand years ago.

Political interest absorbed that of every other nature in the Jewish mind at that time, and, as is well known, political interest was then centred in the expectation of a great temporal deliverer of the nation. Had it not been for this, the attitude of the Jews towards Jesus of Nazareth, even during the first years after the resurrection, would have been very different from what it actually was. Had the Romans not succeeded in taking Jerusalem at the close of the first century, and, even after that event, if the leaders of the New Faith could have seen their way clear to have joined with their compatriots in the fond hope that One must soon make His appearance who would establish the glorious "world to come," the centre of which would be Jerusalem, many things point to the

conclusion that the Jews would have settled down in regarding Jesus as the greatest personality their nation had produced after Moses. From the death of Christ down to the destruction of the Temple a large number of the inhabitants of Palestine were inclined to admit, and a great number did admit, that in Him the Israelite had witnessed the life and death of the suffering Messiah.

The legend of the suffering Messiah, or, to give him his true name, the Messiah ben Joseph, like so many other legends connected with Jewish history, strikes its roots in the Talmud and assumes flourishing and widespreading importance only in post-Talmudic literature. By the Middle Ages the legend of Messiah ben Joseph had become closely associated with that of Antichrist, as well as with that of Ben David the Messiah, properly so called. He was to wage war with Armillus, by which name the great enemy of the human race at the end of the world is designated. At the commencement of the contest Ben Joseph will be victorious. He will restore the Holy Land to the Jews, the sacred vessels, taken away by Titus, to the Temple, and their ancient prestige, lost for so many generations, to the Israelites. Then reverses will come. Armillus will prove himself the final victor. Ben Joseph will be slain and the children of Israel will be scattered in all directions, their courage displaced by the greatest fear of their enemies. Hereupon, the principal Messiah, Ben David, together with the Prophet Elias, is to appear. The remnant of Israel will again gather itself together. A fierce encounter is to take place between the Deliverer and Antichrist, ending in a signal victory for the former. All nations will now acknowledge the Jewish supremacy, and Jerusalem, for a second time and permanently, is to become the seat of divine worship, and Sion will become the residence of the Messiah. His reign is to be inaugurated by proceeding, with the Prophet Elias, to the gates of the city where the remains of the minor Messiah, Ben Joseph, lie buried, and these, together with the bodies of many of the dead, he will raise to life again.

Much more to the point, however, is the following extract from the Talmud itself. In commenting on the words of the Prophet Zacharias, c. xii., v. 12, "And the land shall mourn, every family apart, the family of David apart, and their wives apart," the question is asked why there shall be mourning in the world to come, and what nature such mourning will assume. Opinions are represented as divided, some maintaining that the lamentation on the part of the righteous of a joyful and grateful kind and on the part of the wicked of much bitterness will be because God at the end of all things will lead out Concupiscence—so often personified

in Talmudic literature—so that all may see it and will then put it to destruction. Others assert that the mourning will be on account of the death of the minor Messiah Ben Joseph:

"To what is this lamentation ascribed? There is a difference of opinion between Rabbi Dosa and Rabnan on the subject. The one says that this lamentation is on account of Messiah Ben Joseph, who will have been put to death, while the other says that it is because of Concupiscence then to be destroyed. This is the passage of Scripture adduced by those who suppose that the lamentation is on account of the Messiah Ben Joseph, 'they shall look unto me (sic) whom they have pierced, and they shall mourn for him as he that mourneth for his only begotten.'" (Succah lii., I.)

This idea of a suffering Messiah, as distinct from a glorious one, doubtless took its origin from texts of Scripture similar in nature to the above, of which many may be found in the Psalms and in the books of Isaiah, Jeremiah and Daniel; but at what precise time it assumed the shape in which it appears in the Talmud and the Aggadistic writings will always remain a mystery. When it is remembered, however, that the earlier portions of the Talmud are a second century record of what had been quite common Rabbinic talk for at least a hundred years previous to that date, a strong suspicion will force itself upon the Christian mind that this idea of an afflicted Messiah became a definite portion of Jewish thought from an entirely new light thrown upon the Messianic conception by the sufferings and the death of Jesus of Nazareth. Before the tragic event which took place on Mount Calvary the really intellectual Jew, as opposed to the worldly minded Sadducee and a certain class of fanatical Pharisee, had never bestowed much of his attention either upon the claims or upon the person of Christ. Calvary changed everything. The life of Jesus might, indeed, be looked upon as of interest, but to the Tew, thoughtful, upright, sincere in his faith and attached to the traditions of his fathers, there was nothing in it of transcendent importance. Others had wrought miracles, had mightily moved the common people, had given expression to thoughts sublimely beautiful and deeply philosophical. It was Jerusalem and Golgotha which made all the difference. There the Gallilean stood alone, unique, with a host of Scriptural passages pointing Him out as they had pointed out no one else; for what other had ever answered, as He had answered by the calamities He had undergone and by the disposition with which He had met them, to the description of the "man of sorrows" given by Isaiah or to Him whose "hands and feet were pierced," all of whose bones were numbered, mentioned by the Psalmist?

The air of Palestine, moreover, became charged, as it were, with this argument, the whole weight of which rested upon the sufferings of Christ. The Apostles laid stress upon the Crucifixion as they did upon no other feature of the Divine life. The space allotted to the description of it by the four Evangelists is out of all proportion with that thought to be sufficient for any other incident. Whatever else the Jew might fail to be impressed by, it was felt that his reason could not hold out against the passion of Christ viewed in the light of the prophecies of the Old Testament. For, much as succeeding generations have both sought and found in the Gospel nerrative of the circumstances attending the death of Christ one of the best incentives to piety and devotion, there can be no doubt that the primary, if not the only, object the sacred writers had in view was not to inspire, but to persuade. They wrote, as one of their number himself says, "that men might believe." And the particular class of men they wished most of all to convince were the members of their own nation. The Jews had made it their boast that for them the Scripture was the great, the final criterion by which everything natural and supernatural had to be decided. They esteemed it, moreover, almost as sure as an axiom that the law prophesied only of the Messiah and His days. To the Scriptures, therefore, the Apostles sent them; to the Law and the Prophets they appealed; and, although they felt strong in their appeal to the Life of their Master, they realized that they were absolutely unassailable when they pointed to His death and brought forward, one after another, the passages and texts from the Old Testament which found a fulfillment in the circumstances of that death alone.

Not without interest in this regard is the undoubted fact that the Jewish attitude towards Christ, as manifested in the Acts of the Apostles, is so different from what it had been during His public life. The "away with Him" of the Gospels is absent. There is no accusation against Him, now that He has departed out from their midst, bearing the least resemblance to those which fell frequently and bitterly from the lips of His countrymen while He stood in person before them. The words "Samaritan," "friend of sinners," "possessed by the devil," "evildoer," are no longer applied to Him. The silence with which the Jewish authorities appear to treat His memory becomes eloquent when we remember their for-For abuse is inclined to become more abusive still when the object of it is out of hearing; and if personalities are thought to be necessary against the founder of a system while he is present to hear them, and while he is simply putting forth his ideas, those personalities are, rightly or wrongly, thought to be more necessary when that founder is gone and his ideas are taking root and gaining ground. In their disputes with the Apostles the Jews leave the character of Jesus of Nazareth alone. Had some consideration, similar to that which now forced itself upon the minds of the Apostles, also obliged them to hesitate before they uttered the least word of blame against Him to whom before, in tongue and in deed, they had shown no mercy? On the first Easter the disciples going to Emmaus had received quite a new light on their views concerning the Messiah. The Scriptures were opened to them by Jesus Himself, and they saw that it was necessary that Christ should suffer. Were the Jews, too, for the first time, beginning to realize, not the precise truth held by the disciples, but at least this, that Jesus of Nazareth was the mysterious sufferer foretold by the prophets? How could they place themselves in opposition to such a one? Here was a part of the career of the Nazarene to which they were forced to give some kind of examination, and, unless they could positively make up their minds that He had absolutely no connection with the Person so carefully described by their wise men of old, they were obliged to treat His memory at least with respectful silence, and, at the same time, to spare His followers, so long as these did not cor travene the enactments of the Mosaic Law. No one can read the Acts of the Apostles without a feeling almost amounting to certainty that it was some kind of reflection like the above which actually did influence the attitude of the Jewish rulers towards the apostolic Christians. Their leaders are allowed to live unmolested in Jerusalem, and Christian preachers are permitted to teach in the synagogues; while, on the other hand, the Jewish Christian, as distinct from the Gentile, frequents in the synagogue the devotional services, is present at the sacrifices offered in the Temple, and complies with the requirements of the ceremonial law. Of course, there was persecution. Some of the members of the New Faith had to suffer. But it is difficult not to feel that such persecution was measured out, so far as the religious authorities were concerned, only to those who could not bring themselves to make use of that economy which the Apostles, more wise than the rest, thought it advisable in the beginning of things to employ.

Not that this softening is to be taken as a sign that the Jews as a nation were in the least degree inclined to accept what may be called the orthodox view concerning Jesus. At no period of their history, unfortunately, have they shown the least disposition to acknowledge Him to be the Son of God. The fear with which the mind of the thoughtful Jews was now rendered uneasy was not that God, after all, may have appeared in human form and,

unadored, cruelly handled, had passed through the midst of His chosen people, but rather that a grievous wrong had been done to a Jewish hero whose existence had been foretold and who, though human, was, nevertheless, of so exalted a position as to be justly regarded as a sort of minor Messiah.

That the state of the city of Jerusalem was completely sympathetic towards the person of our Lord at the outbreak of the war, the end of which was the fall of the city, seems quite evident from the well-known passage of Hegesippus concerning James, the socalled brother of Christ. This Apostle lived in Jerusalem not only unmolested, but esteemed and reverenced by all. Pharisees and Sadducees alike seek no incongruity in his being allowed, alone of all the citizens, to enter the holy places. They regard him as one of such authority among the people that he had but to speak and all would take his words for the truth. How can this general esteem felt for the first Bishop of Jerusalem be accounted for unless by the supposition that he was living in the midst of a population where all, high and low alike, were Christian in the same sense as they conceived him to be? They admired Jesus of They conceived hat that admiration and veneration were quite compatible with the Jewish religion as they had received it from their fathers. They knew of many who did openly so unite the two, making of Christianity only a phase of Judaism in the same sense as Essenism was a phase. They did not suspect that James had far outstripped such as these in his views; but they believed that he admitted only that which they themselves admitted, namely, that the Messiah of inferior rank had appeared in the person of Jesus, that He had been a great religious teacher, and that, in life and death, He shone forth in lustre never before witnessed among men. They found out their mistake. The rulers had become aware, says Hegesippus, that many of the citizens were acknowledging the Nazarene to be the Saviour of the world, professing, moreover, that He was to be looked for as coming again as the Judge of the living and the dead. The Apostle is approached and asked to use his influence, not to eliminate all admiration and respect for Jesus, but to recall the people to their former views. The whole city, they said, had embraced these exaggerated doctrines, and must be persuaded to renounce them. This would at once be accomplished were James publicly to condemn the offending There is no question of doing away with a qualified belief in Jesus. Matters had gone too far, that was all; and the Pharisees consider that this would be as sincerely regretted by the Apostle as it was by themselves. The end is well known. James the Just openly professes the opinions he has been called upon to condemn, and dies for the faith that is in him; "a true witness," says Hegesippus, "that Jesus is the Messiah."

The fall of Jerusalem deprived the Jewish race of its country. but, at the same time, it made devotion to the national faith more intense than it had been for at least a hundred years. It is very doubtful if Christianity itself received much advantage from the effect which the great catastrophe produced upon the inhabitant of Palestine. The Essenes in a body joined the ranks of the followers of Jesus, but while their mode of life and some of their practices had been already very similar to much contained in the new religion, they had never been found in the Holy Land itself in anything like the numbers in which they were to be met with in the adjacent countries. To the Palestinian Jew the Fall of the Capital acted as a divine call to greater strictness of life. Jehovah was offended. As, previously, He had allowed the Babylonian Captivity to take place in order to bring His people to a sense of the enormity of their negligence, so, now, the Roman arms had been victorious in order that the sword might cause the searching of hearts which the voice of prophets would have been quite powerless to bring about. And it produced in the soul of the Palestinian Jew a suspicion and an effect similar to that which the conquest of Rome, at the commencement of the fifth century, produced in that of the pagan Roman. For as these ascribed the capture of the Eternal City to the anger of the gods at the progress of Christianity, which had, by that time, left their temples deserted, so the Jews were haunted by the grave fear that too lenient a disposition had been shown by them towards the memory and the followers of Jesus of Nazareth, and that, therefore, Jehovah had left the Holy City to its fate. All sympathy with the Nazarene was now at an end. It became dangerous to express any opinion which might be interpreted as praise of Him. Twice had one of the most celebrated Rabbins of those times, Eliezer Ben Hyrcanos, been obliged openly to deny that he was a Christian because of his well-known

<sup>1 &</sup>quot;Certain, therefore, of those belonging to the seven heresies among the people, already described by me in the memorials, inquired of him what was the door of Jesus, and he said that He was the Saviour. Some from the number of these believed that Jesus was the Messiah. Many, therefore, also of the rulers believing, there was a tumult among the Jews, the scribes and Pharisees, saying that there was a danger of all the people looking for the coming of Jesus the Messiah. Assembling, therefore, together, they said to James, 'We entreat thee restrain the people, since they are gone astray after Jesus as though He were the Messiah. We entreat thee persuade all those that come hither for the Passover day about Jesus. For all of us believe thee.'" (Eusebius, H. E. Bk. II., c. 21.) It may be necessary to say that among other things which these heretics did not believe concerning our Lord were the doctrines of the resurrection and of the judgment. These they now accept from S. James,



admiration for Jesus, and, on one occasion, his Jewish enemies accused him to the pagan authorities as belonging to the new religion. We cannot doubt his own assertion that in no way was he inclined to separate himself from Judaism; but, at the same time, his admiration for Iesus seems evident from many passages in the Talmud in which Eliezer Ben Hyrcanos makes some of the loftiest sentiments of our Lord to appear as though they were his own. When asked if Iesus of Nazareth was in Paradise he evaded the question, too astute to affirm, and by so doing involve himself in endless persecution, too conscientious to deny what, as a sincere admirer of Christ, he was firmly convinced was the truth. Nothing, however, could save him in the end. He was excommunicated for disobedience to the decrees of the Sanhedrin and for arrogance manifested towards its principal members. It is much more probable that his admiration and sympathy with Jesus of Nazareth made him seem dangerous, and as he could not be convicted of being one of His followers, his arrogance and disobedience formed a pretext for getting him out of the way. He fraternized a great deal with the disciples of Christ after his excommunication, although to the end he strenuously maintained that he was a faithful adherent to Iudaism.

Even after the Fall of Jerusalem it is still conceivable that the great bulk of the intelligent members of the nation would have preserved a reverent attitude towards the Founder of Christianity had not the fact become more and more evident that to His followers the question of the advent of the glorious Messiah to restore Israel to its own again was closed. This was particularly felt during the rebellion of the false Messiah Bar Kokba in the time of Hadrian, the Roman Emperor. In vain were the Jewish Christians exhorted to rally to his standard. In vain did the tyrant, for a brief period the triumphant vanquisher of the imperial legions, persecute those who persisted in regarding Jesus as the Christ. Both his victories and his torments left the Christians unmoved. With serene confidence they awaited the only issue of the conflict which, after the prophecies of their Lord, they felt to be possible. It soon came. The fortunes of war changed sides. Final victory remained with the Romans, and, as is generally the case with a conqueror who has known important reverses in the beginning of a contest, the Romans made the rebellious Jews suffer all the more because of their initial success. Jerusalem was again destroyed; its people were sent away into exile, and the principal sign of that people's religion—circumcision—was forbidden, under the severest penalties, evermore to be practiced or countenanced. After this Christianity was seen to be the greatest enemy Judaism possessed. It stood

out openly as a religion, and its tendency any Jew that had eyes to see could see it, was completely to destroy that religion from which it had partly sprung. Zeal for the preservation of the faith of their fathers now produced in the breast of the Jew the most decided opposition to the New Religion, the violence of which became all the more bitter as the rapid strides of the great rival forced themselves upon the attention of all. Henceforth the attitude of the Jew towards the Christian faith was one of hostility, and that hostility took the character of Christ Himself as the principal object of attack.

The basis of this attack lies embedded in the intricate and embarrassing pages of the Talmud. When consulting this famous book, whether in relation to this subject or to any other, innumerable difficulties block the way which leads to a clear and definite view, at least when the inquirer is a Christian. Excepting as a reflection of the opinions held by the Rabbins, and as a record of what, in Jewish circles, during the third and succeeding centuries, were ideas commonly held and sometimes well, sometimes badly, expressed, there is hardly the least information which might be accepted as solid and sound history. The work has been called an encyclopedia, and while in some respects the title might be allowed as satisfactorily describing it, the one essential condition of an encyclopedia is absent. Of arrangement it has none. Without cohesion, without precision, no writer or list of writers has ever so completely run riot in a multitude of matters, no author or set of authors so entirely succumbed to the temptation of touching on subjects extraneous to the one in hand as have the learned Rabbins who compiled the Talmud. The effect upon the reader is consummate weariness, and very frequently an indefinable kind of bewilderment. Moreover, the embarrassment felt by the inquirer is rendered all the greater, perhaps irremovable, by the following assertion of Maimonides concerning the Talmud: "If one simply regards the appearance of these words and takes the sense of them as the letters present it, they will seem to him devoid of meaning and outside the limits of the intelligence. This was done purposely by our ancestors for certain wonderful reasons." The great reason given by Rabbi Judah in his book entitled Life is that of preventing Christians from despoiling the Jews of their sacred mysteries, "which they would have done long ago, as they have already done in regard to the Scriptures, perverting them and giving them a sense which they do not possess, had they not been bound up in the guise of certain astonishing fables." It is very evident, therefore, that little could be deduced from the Talmud on the subject under consideration were it not for the constant assertion of the majority of Jewish writers that certain cryptic utterances, to be met with there, find their real and only solution in the life of Jesus of Nazareth; and were it not also for the significant fact that the mediæval libels against Christ, promulgated by the Jews, show clearly the influence of the Talmudic passages in question. How obscure, how doubtful and how indirect these excerpts are in themselves may be gathered from the following, which is one of the principal of them. The writer is maintaining that, in the case of a false prophet, it is lawful to procure testimony against him from his own mouth by the employment of intrigue and artifice, and continues:

"Let a light be put in an inner room and witnesses be placed outside who, while they remain invisible to him (the culprit), shall be able both to see him and to hear what he says. Then he (a pretended disciple) will say to him, 'repeat to me that which already you have said to me apart;' and, should he do this, the former will answer, 'but how can we leave our God and serve other gods?' Now, should he express sorrow at this idea, it is well: but should he answer, 'it is our duty so to do,' or 'it would be a good thing so to act,' then the witnesses who are outside and hear him shall take him to the Judgment house and shall stone him to death. This was done to Ben Stada in Lud, who was hung on the eve of the Passover. Ben Stada is the same as Ben Pandira. Rabbi Chasda says that Stada or Pandira or Pappos, the son of Juda, was the husband's name, but I am of opinion that Stada was the name of the mother; that is, Mary the plaiter of women's hair." (Bab. Talmud Sanhedrin.)

From a passage of this nature, and from others equally obscure and indirect, one might well ask how it is possible to obtain any clear or definite idea of the Talmudic concept of our Lord. Impossible, however, as the task may seem, the vast majority of those who have bestowed much labor on the matter appear to be agreed in seeing the following well-marked outlines concerning Christ in the pages of the famous book, namely, that Jesus lived in the reign of Alexander or Janai, seventy years before the actual date; that his mother's name was Mary, his father's Pappos, his teacher's Joshua ben Perachiah, with whom he went down into Egypt. Here he became versed in the magic arts of the Egyptians, was disowned by his teacher, despoiled the magicians of their most profound secrets by means of an ignominious and, at the same time, an impossible trick, and, finally, returning to his own country, was put to death on the eve of the Passover in the suburbs of Jerusalem.

We see here nothing more or less than a reflection of the ordinary conversation about, or the common explanation of, the phenomenon

Iesus of Nazareth whenever, at the period of the third century, He came under Jewish consideration. Whether they cared to have it so or not, their celebrated countryman had become a part of the atmosphere of the times, and, as is the case generally in the unconscious inhaling of an atmosphere representing a line of thought or an intellectual system, their mind formed to itself the picture of a Jesus vague and indeterminate. It was hardly their fault that such was the case. They had no particular desire to read the New Testament; indeed, already that book had been placed under a ban by their religious leaders. Nevertheless, in a society such as that in which, in the large cities of the Empire, they found themselves, the One who had become the one topic of conversation forced Himself upon their unwilling ears. In the churches, in the schools, in the market places, in the houses, society in the third century was more occupied than at any time before or since in discussing the Gospel question, "What think ye of Christ; whose Son is He?" and even if a member of the orthodox faith were out of touch with the Jew, the latter found himself all the day long, and at every corner, brushing against some adherent of one or other of the innumerable sects to whom Christ was the centre of attraction. The Iew heard, and he received a confused impression of Jesus, such as a man receives on any subject about which he would fain hear nothing, but must, perforce, hear much, and that from dissentient lips. Prejudice did the rest. There was no desire to let the Nazarene figure in the pages of the Talmud. entered there naturally as an example or as an illustration. appears, to say the least, as a suspicious person, because, in the mind of the Jew, the nation seemed to have become disunited on account of Him-was still stunned by the blow which He had He had done no good. He had led astray many into idolatry. There was no reason to disbelieve in His miracles; but, then, had He not been brought up in a land where magic was practiced to perfection? His powers as a teacher were acknowledged; but, then again, the office of teacher had been undertaken by Him in defiance of the wise men in Israel, and His persistence in that office had been marked with the greatest arrogance. There was no need to admit his Virgin Birth; surely, they hint, that, at least, might be explained in a manner perfectly natural; perhaps the circumstances of His birth were scandalous.

Such are the suspicions and such the gossip of insinuation or of open assertion which the pages of the Talmud seem at least to reflect. Certainly the passages in which they are supposed to be reflected have been made to do service in centuries following on to Talmudic times for preventing the suspicion from passing

away; and in succeeding ages they became the fountain head, as it were, from which a bolder and a more decided attack upon the personal character of Jesus took its origin. Still, it ought to be mentioned that the greatest difference of opinion exists at the present moment in the ranks of Jewish scholars with regard to those Talmudic utterances. It is most difficult to decide whether the strange person ushered into those pages under the word Peloni, a certain one, is intended for Jesus or for any other real individual, or simply as a means of giving some kind of life to an illustration for which, in every language, a certain man is a convenient formula. The familiar assertion, again, that this indeterminate expression was employed because of the objection which the Jews of those days had to the very name of Jesus is hardly borne out by the fact that some manuscripts of the Talmud really present the name itself, while one Jewish writer at least is of opinion that the reason of this omission of the word Jesus was to prevent Superstition, since, at the time of the compilation of the Talmud, the members of Judaism themselves made use of it as a beneficent charm. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that, although the Talmud is responsible for sowing the seed which afterwards in the Middle Ages sprung up into so strong a tree of infamous slander against the person of Jesus, it is yet in the Talmud itself that a kind of regret is evinced for His crucifixion and a tenderer estimate of Him appears to be advocated.2

Doubtful as the general attitude of the Jewish mind towards Jesus may be said to have been during the second and third centuries, the same attitude from at least the sixth century right through the Middle Ages is quite clear and decided. It was one of open and implacable hostility to the person of the Founder of the Christian religion. The hint thrown out by the Talmudic writers that the circumstances surrounding His birth were of a seriously reprehensible nature now took the shape of an assertion. Jesus of Nazareth was base born and, therefore, capable of anything and of everything that was bad.

It is difficult to assign the precise date of the commencement of this Jewish calumny which was afterwards, in the pages of the mediæval *Toldoth Jesu*, to become the fountain head from which every other evil action ascribed to Christ was made to flow. It is to be met with in a well-known passage of Origen's refutation of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Regarding the death penalty the Talmud is equally emphatic, showing unmistakably that the condemnation of Jesus did not find general approval by the later rabbis, and such masters as Rabbi Akibah and Rabbi Tarphon are reported as saying: "Had we been members of the Sanhedrin there never would have been passed a death sentence." (See Danziger's "Jewish Forerunners of Christianity," p. 278.)

objections brought by Celsus against Christianity, but it should be noticed that, although the objector places the infamous slander in the mouth of a Jew, it is by no means clear that the Jew was not an imaginary person, and that the author of the libel, in this instance, was not Celsus the pagan himself. Tertullian, a little earlier, at the end of his treatise, De Spectaculis, seems to glance at assertions of an uncomplimentary nature made concerning the Virgin Birth, but here again the assertions are not quite plain and there is nothing to prove that the whole passage is more than a mere oratorical enumeration of objections, some of which Tertullian conceives may only possibly arise and which he swiftly dismisses with a word.<sup>8</sup> Indirect evidence, however, that the very worst construction was being put by the Jews upon the miraculous nativity of our Lord exists in the account of a strange, apocryphal trial of the Blessed Virgin set forth by the Christians in the reign of the Emperor Justinian. The fact that this narration of the examination of Mary before the Sanhedrin in which the Mother of Christ is made to give the strongest confirmatory testimony of the Incarnation, is made to emanate from Theodosius, the Chief Rabbi in Justinian's reign, seems to point to the conclusion that the calumny had become common and had to be refuted in a manner which might particularly appeal to the Jewish community.4

Whatever may have been the real date when first of all this sinister view of the earthly origin of Christ took shape in the Jewish mind, there can be no doubt that it formed the most important feature of its attitude towards Jesus in the Middle Ages, and is responsible for much of the suffering to which that unfortunate race was subjected. The view is to be found in the Toldoth, the circumstances, in some manuscripts, being dwelt upon at length, while in others they are mentioned more soberly and succinctly although in all they are put before the reader as connected with an event which did not, strange to say, reflect so much discredit upon thse imaginary parents of the Nazarene as it portended infamy and wickedness inherent in His own character. It did not

<sup>\*</sup>Quale autem spectaculem in proximo est adventus jam indubitati jam superbi, jam triumphantis? . . . Hic est ille (dicam) fabri aut quaestuarii (quaestuariae) filius, sabbati destructor, Samarites et daemonium habens. Hic est quem a Juda redemistis, hic est ille arundine et colaphis diverberatus, sputamentis dedecoratus, felle et aceto potatus. Hic est quem clam discentes subripuerunt, ut resurrexisse dicatur, vel hortulanus detraxit, ne lactucae suae frequentia commeantium laederentur.

<sup>4</sup> The account of this examination is to be found, according to Kraus ("Das Leben Jesu," p. 4), in Suidas s. v. Iesous, and it is from the same book that the words of Mary, asserting her innocence and representing the Incarnation in much the same manner as it is recorded in the Gospels, are taken.

seem to strike the writers that, had these circumstances been true, and not, as they were, the outcome of a mind diseased with vindictive prejudice. He, who was now become the great object of their attack, was more to be pitied than blamed. In the light of this version of His birth which prejudice had conceived and artfully elaborated the life of Jesus was judged and condemned. The old reason for His miraculous powers, an intimate knowledge of Egyptian magic, was now changed for one calculated to make His memory particularly odious to the mediæval Jew. Christ had committed the great sacrilege of entering the Holy Place and had stolen away out of it the proper form of the Divine Name of Jehovah, the exact pronunciation of which He had then learned, becoming in this way, according to the received superstition of the Jews for centuries, in possession of a talisman by means of which the elements must obey Him and death and sickness be subservient to His will. His sanctity of life, His mighty deeds, His knowledge of the Scriptures, His power over His followers, real as they all of them were acknowledged to have been, were the result of a fraud, which no one, unless perfectly debased in character, could have committed. His intention was the destruction of the Jewish religion. He hated the Rabbins: disobeyed Moses: desired to stand in the estimation of the people the greatest prophet Himself; and even allowed His followers to worship Him. But what could any one expect from one whose birth had been surrounded with circumstances similar to those which had surrounded His? He merited His death. The ancients of Israel had rendered a service to their nation by nailing Him to the Cross.

In the estimation of his countrymen of the Middle Ages, moreover, the Redeemer of the world is made to stand out as the great culprit. He is the single, the unique offender. For a second time He had to "tread the wine-press alone." The Blessed Virgin is mentioned almost invariably with respect, sometimes even with a certain kind of praise. She is modest, virtuous, more sinned against than sinning. Simon Peter is represented as a hero who, in order to spare his people the evils of a terrible persecution at the hands of the Christians, became outwardly a member of the New Faith himself, that being the only condition under which the Christian authorities would consent to show themselves merciful. Even St. Paul is set forth as a Jew who saw in a personal acceptance of Christianity, with which he had no sympathy, merely a means by which peace could be brought to his nation, since by his pretended conversion he would make it his special business to lead the unruly members of the new religion out from the midst of Judaism. The one and only object of attack was Jesus of Nazareth. For Him, and for Him alone, a bitterness is evinced which reminds one of some of the worst passages in which Jewish animosity against Christ is recorded in the pages of the New Testament.

Excepting as testimony for the estimate of our Lord formed by the Jews of the Middle Ages, the Toldoth Jesu, from which the above views have been gathered, is utterly valueless. Only a very slight acquaintance with it is necessary to convince even the most biased that, interesting as the document may be as a literary curiosity, it is completely unhistorical from beginning to end. And the more examination we bestow upon the notorious book the more we are convinced, from the manner in which persons, who, in real life, were separated from one another by even centuries are brought together, as well as from many of the incidents recorded and the expressions sometimes used that here we have to do with a specimen of mediæval folk-lore. The great, central figure, Jesus of Nazareth, is made to appear as a contemporary of the Emperor Constantine. The Blessed Virgin Mary is set forth as a relative of Constantine's mother, Helena. St. Peter lives at the same time as Pope Julius I. St. Paul is not much anterior in time to Nestorius, the author of the Nestorian heresy in the fifth century. If such instances show the complete worthlessness of the Toldoth in the domain of history, many others might be given making it equally clear that the book is really a romance, in some parts of such questionable taste that the Jews themselves preface it with a notice of the unadvisability of allowing young persons to read it; and yet, romance as it is, it is put forth with all the solemnity of serious history and rendered all the more weighty by a generous sprinkling of texts from the Bible.

Powerful as this personal attack upon the character of Christ most certainty was in restraining the members of the mediæval Jewish communities from embracing the religion of Christendom, it, none the less, was certainly the very worst kind of polemics for insuring a peaceful residence of that people in the midst of European nations. Long before the Toldoth was reduced to book

s In some of the mediæval translations of the Toldoth Kraus assures us that he has seen the following notice, which he gives in the original Hebrew: "The following page has been handed down from one individual to another, and it may be written only by hand, but not allowed to be printed. And forasmuch as one will understand how evil the days are, though he see (the contents of this page) he will nevertheless hold his peace. He will hold his peace else long and bitter exile may be the result. And God forbid that he should read it publicly or before young and frivolous women, and least of all before Christians who understand German." (Kraus, "Das Leben Jesu," p. 10.)



form the sentiments of the Jews on this subject had ceased from being confined to the walls of the Synagogue or to the privacy of the home in the Ghetto. In the year 830 Agobard of Lyons mentions many of the calumnies which could have reached his ears only owing to a complete disregard on the part of the Jews to the danger which, by wounding the susceptibilities of the Christians, must most surely have threatened them.6 Had nothing else been said but the serious allegations made against the character of the Blessed Virgin, this itself were quite enough to inflame the Christians with the bitterest hatred for the Jew, a hatred which might at any moment burst forth into a conflagration of the fiercest persecution. At no time as then has so devout an attitude towards the Incarnation been shown. Never, as through the Middle Ages, has so much religious pleasure been felt from the contemplation of the entire sacredness and innocency of all the three persons connected with that great event. Deep and tender devotion to the Mother of Christ in those very days reached its profoundest depths and willingly abandoned itself in unrestrained affection. To attack her honor was worse than an onslaught made upon the honor of one's own mother; and the Christian would hardly have been a Christian at all had he not been moved at these Jewish libels in which the fair fame of Mary was sacrificed for the purposes of controversy. Bitter persecution was undoubtedly the sad lot of the Jew at that time; but in apportioning the blame it were altogether unjust to represent the Christian as one who without provocation invariably ill treated a weak and defenseless race. And his provocations on this subject were very great. At the same time, when once these infamous assertions had been made in book form, no fair-minded person will be hard upon the mediæval Jew for believing them to be genuine. Four and five hundred years ago, and, of course, in the days preceding them, the surest way of giving the most absolute falsehood the perfect appearance of truth was to commit it to manuscript, or, later on, to printing. There is no need even to accuse those authors of bad faith who in Church matters, and quite as much in those relating to States and to courts, have published records and narrations then implicitly believed and now known certainly to be untrue. Writing has always been largely made up of hearsay; and report was as eagerly

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> In doctrinis majorum suorum legunt, Jesum juvenem quemdam fuisse apud eos honorabilem et magisterio Baptistae Joannis eruditum, quamplures habuisse discipulos quorum uni propter duritiam et hebetudinem sensus Cephae, id est, Petrae nomen imposuerit. . . . Ad extremum vero, propter plura mendacia accusatum, Tiberii judicio in carcerem retrusum eo quod filiae ipsius—cui sine viro masculi partum promiserat—lapidis conceptum intulerit. Inde, etiam, velut magnum detestabilem furca suspensum,



seized upon as plain truth then as it is now. Only then the convenient word alleged was unknown, and the writer must frequently have found himself in the predicament of having to treat common hearsay with complete silence or to set down what he had heard simply as a fact. Imagination, prejudice, precipitate conclusions, carelessness in the matter of exactitude, each one of them a cause in itself of errors expressed without the least wish to deceive, were as powerful then as they are to-day, while then there existed no check, as there does now, upon the mistakes liable to result from one or all of them. One thing only may lawfully be laid to the charge of the Jews with regard to the subject under consideration. They desired to be deceived. Their wish produced this crooked view of the character of the Founder of Christianity. But they can answer with truth that they are not the only nation which has welcomed the most extravagant misrepresentation concerning a person who, rightly or wrongly, has been conceived to be detrimental to a nation's welfare, nor is theirs the only religion whose very zeal to defend itself has easily inclined its adherents to believe their opponents guilty of the grossest crimes.

With the revival of learning the Toldoth commenced to lose that universal trust of which for all too long a time it had been the recipient. Its power as a document that had kept alive and perpetuated views and opinions of which in the beginning it was itself merely a record has gradually, since the sixteenth century, been becoming less and less. If we may believe the Rabbi Salman Zebi, a learned Jewish controversialist of the seventeenth century, it had ceased before his time to be read at all by the cultured; at least, he assures us that he had never seen it, and he casts a doubt upon the assertion of Brenz, a convert to Christianity, who maintains, and that with truth, that the poorer Israelites were still accustomed to read the Toldoth secretly in their houses. like individuals fall into disgrace, and no book, once held in high esteem, has suffered so complete reverse of fortune as this Toldoth, the so-called History of Jesus of Nazareth. The wish to lay the blame of its existence at the door of Christian writers seems evident from the assertion of one Jewish writer that "we can now understand why the printed copies of the Toldoth have been written in such wretched Hebrew; they were probably translated by apostates or by Christians from the vulgar tongue for polemical purposes." Feven the fact that the book enjoyed so much as a passing kind of popularity has been denied in the following words: "The unlearned Jew from religious aversion never so much as handled the writing, but the learned considered it as a fiction unworthy

<sup>7</sup> Kraus, "Das Leben Jesu," p. 12.

of even a glance." So that the Toldoth may be said to have reached the worst kind of fate, that of being disowned by its creator and, out of shame, rejected by the ardent admirers of other days.

It will be readily understood, however, that completely as the Toldoth has fallen into disrepute, its contents still continue to exercise some influence over the minds not only of the ignorant lew, but over that of the ordinary Rabbi who, by reason of his occupations, might not have the time, or, because of intellectual limitations, might be without the disposition critically to examine a work which, for so long a period, has been received as authentic by his forefathers. Even Samuel Kraus, whose deep learning and wide reading are apparent on every page of his Leben Jesu (1902), a book written, as it seems, for the express purpose of showing that the absurdities, misstatements and want of historical strength of the Toldoth are not so wide of the mark nor so imperfect as they seem to be, obliges his readers to feel that he is, after all, only a special pleader who finds the old influence too strong for him. He has made up his mind that the Toldoth is not far wrong in its estimate of Jesus, and, consequently, he attempts what to others would appear, and which still remains, the hopeless task of making out the book to be not nearly so bad as it looks. Prejudice dies hard. Enlightenment, sometimes even with the cultured, works but very gradually, and the darkness produced by literature of a controversial and suggestive nature is often proof against the clearest light. Nevertheless, a great change is taking place in Judaism with regard to the person and character of Jesus. The old view, stubborn and loath to move as it is, is certainly losing ground before the advance of a new attitude in which the Founder of Christianity is regarded as a great Jewish hero, even as the finest and most glorious product of the Semitic or of any other race.

Side by side, almost, in the pages of a recent Jewish writer we may see the old spirit and the new—the ancient dislike of the Gallilean and the enthusiastic admiration for Him which is fast gaining a place among the Jews. Harris Weinstock, in his book, Jesus the Jew, describes the sentiment prevailing during his childhood in the following words:

"I recall that, upon one occasion, one of the pupils by some

<sup>8</sup> M. Güdemann, quoted by Kraus, p. 12. The evidence for just the opposite of this assertion of M. Güdemann's is overwhelming. Among much more to be found in Kraus is the following, written by a convert Jew in "Saat auf Hoffnung" (1894), p. 22: "A book which I read in my tenth year ('The Toldoth'), 'The Life of Jesus.' At that time, while engaged in reading that abominable book, frequently was it said to me, 'See, now, this miserable Man gave Himself out to be God, and Christians believe in Him and adore Him,' and I thereupon approved of the ridicule (poured upon Him) by this worthless author,"



chance brought into the religious school a book containing the name of Jesus. I remember how wrought up and excited the Rabbi became when he was aware of its presence in the school-room. 'Sacrilege! Sacrilege!' he indignantly cried, and seemed afraid to touch it. I remember how he delivered an impassioned discourse to his pupils on the terrible sufferings to which the Jews had been subjected because of Jesus. 'How, then,' he concluded, 'can any self-respecting, loyal Jew take into his hand a book containing the name of Jesus? How can the name of Jesus be thought of without connecting it in the mind of the Jew with centuries of inhuman outrage and persecution heaped upon him by the followers of Jesus?'" (Jesus the Jew. Page 12.)

The author assures us that the above expresses his own feelings towards Christ for years. He could not help believing that "the badge of suffering had been placed upon the Jew by the words and the acts of Jesus." It is, however, in the pages of Jesus the Jew that we are allowed to see how far away, both from the mediæval conception of Christ as well as from the violently antagonistic attitude towards Him of much more recent times, the intellectual lew of the present has traveled. Under the pen of Harris Weinstock Jesus becomes "the gentle Nazarene," "the gentle teacher," who "by His simple yet matchless eloquence, by His selfsacrificing spirit and His devotion to the poor, the neglected and the forsaken in Israel created a spiritual wave among His Jewish brethren which was destined to have a far-reaching influence." It is the fact that the Founder of the Christian religion was of Jewish nationality of which the author boasts. Jesus is the glory of the Jewish race. If, on the one hand, He was an instrument of blessing to the Gentiles by making it possible for them to share in "the most important doctrines of Judaism," on the other, He is a great national asset whose glorious character has shed an additional lustre on to the Jewish name. This, the author assures us, is becoming more and more the opinion of modern Judaism. The old sentiment of hatred is "speedily being replaced in the Jewish mind by the keen appreciation of the beauty and the nobleness of the character of Jesus. His wisdom and gentleness, His unselfishness of spirit and His love for humanity . . . are becoming better understood, so that the modern Jew looks upon Jesus as one of the greatest gifts that Israel has given to the world, and He is, therefore, proud to call Jesus his very own; blood of his blood, flesh of his flesh." (Jesus the Jew. Page 34.)

It is impossible not to feel impressed in reading the above passage, and more particularly is this the case when it is remembered that, during the Middle Ages, the Jew showed himself both indignant

and regretful because of the fact that the Nazarene was of the seed of Abraham. The famous meaning of the name of Jesus, "may His name and His memory be blotted out," which the writers of the Toldoth had invented, is now turned, as we see in the passage just quoted, into "Jesus, one of the greatest gifts that Israel has given to the world." The Crucifixion, which no Jew four hundred years ago would dream of disowning and, which, indeed, was regarded as an action of the ancient Rabbins worthy of all praise, is now passionately denied to have been a Jewish operation at all. In A Rabbi's Impression of the Oberammergau Passion Play the real culprits were Pontius Pilate and the Gentile soldiers. Dr. Krauskopf, the author, says:

"It is a serious statement I make when I say that the story of the Jews having persecuted, betrayed, condemned and crucified Jesus . . . is nevertheless historically untrue. . . . To no other conclusion have I been able to arrive than that Jesus, the gentle preacher, and healer of Nazareth, the enthusiastic lover of His country and people, felt Himself called, as did many another unfortunate enthusiast before Him and after, to deliver the Holy Land from the hand of the cruel Roman. . . . He was seized in the dead of night and made to pay the penalty of His love for His country and people by a traitor's death upon the cross at the hand of the cruel Roman." (A Rabbi's Impressions. Page 142.)

The arguments set forth by this writer in his endeavor to prove that the Gentile officials were alone responsible for the Crucifixion are not, it must be confessed, of a very forcible description; but we are impressed by the spirit which prompts him to make the attempt at all. For he resents the burden of blame which the Jews have had to bear in the matter, not merely because of the cruel persecutions of which this accusation has been the cause, but also because Christ Himself was so wonderful and so sublime a personality that no nation ought to settle down covered with the blame and the shame of putting Him to death if it can at all show that, after all, it has been wrongly accused. Expressions of admiration for the character of Jesus are everywhere springing up in Dr. Krauskopf's book. The author writes: "I have before me the kindly yet suffering face of the Nazarene Jew." And again:

"I will yield to none in recognizing the civilizing influence of the Man of Nazareth; I am ready to bestow on Him as high a tribute as any one has yet bestowed; if I cannot say that it was He who made divinity human, I am ready to rank Him among the foremost of those who have made humanity divine." (Page 43. Ibidem.)

While, once more, in the following, we meet with what will appear

to be in complete disagreement with much concerning the insolence of Jesus mentioned in the pages of the Toldoth:

"If ever there was a time when peace was needed among Israel itself, that was the time; and if ever there was a man able to knit the people in closest bond of mutual sympathy and hopefulness in the hour of the country's direct distress, Jesus was that man. Not He to brand the teachers of His people 'hypocrites,' 'scorpions,' 'whited sepulchres;' there was not enough gall in Him to force such words to His lips. He who preached to love the enemy, to bless those that curse, to do good to those that harm, to resist no evil, certainly could not harm or curse them that had not harmed nor cursed." Page 63.

The sentiments of the two foregoing writers were expressed in addresses delivered to Jews. They appear to have caused no commotion. No one was moved to protest, as would most assuredly have been the case one hundred years ago, even could we bring ourselves to imagine that such sentiments could have issued from a Rabbi's lips at that time. Nor must they be regarded as the words of men who had ceased to believe in the religion of their fathers. Their very zeal and enthusiasm for Judaism itself moves them to Israel itself ought no longer to settle down calmly in allowing the Gentile to appropriate as all their own One who was not a Gentile, to begin with, and who, in addition to being a Jew, was the finest specimen of that race. They betray, in fact, a curious disposition to claim Jesus of Nazareth completely for themselves; or, where this is not so, to regard Him as one of the world's greatest and best characters, for the possession of whom the nations ought to manifest some marks of gratitude to the Jew from whose stock He sprang.

Still farther expressions complimentary of the personality of the Founder of Christianity may be met with in that remarkable book, Liberal Judaism, by Claude Montefiore. Here, it is true, very little is said in a direct manner concerning Jesus of Nazareth, but it is not difficult to gather from certain passages on cognate matters that Montefiore regards Him as a distinctly great, wonderful and attractive individual. Of the teaching of Christ this author makes the following statement: "It would seem that He was disposed to make light of some Rabbinic additions to the Pentateuchal law, and in these very points we liberals must admit that He saw clearly and did well. As to the Pentateuch, He seems, in the true spirit of the ancient prophets, to have urged the greater importance of the moral commandments and the comparative unimportance and secondary character of the ritual and ceremonial commandments. Would not Amos, if he had lived again, have done precisely the



same? Jesus seems to have taught that all religion and morality flowed from two or three great and central principles, and that it was well and serviceable to look at religion and goodness from this unifying and centralizing point of view, rather than to split them up into a number of disconnected and heterogeneous enactments. Any philosophical analysis of religion and morality would, I believe, approve of such a procedure." (Liberal Judaism. Page 172.)

According to this writer, Jesus is very similar to and as grand as the ancient prophets of Israel, whose limitations He shared, whose greatness He, perhaps, surpassed. They thought a great deal more of right conduct than of exact ceremonial, and so did He; and while they conceived that there is much of a beneficial and even of a necessary nature in ritual observances, they were, nevertheless, convinced that the eye of the soul must be fixed first of all and irremovably upon the religion of the heart. This, too, says Montefiore, was the view held and preached by the Founder of the Christian faith. He was "a great religious and ethical teacher." And the opinion held by this author concerning the personal holiness of Christ may be inferred from his remarks on the excellence of the New Testament, the relationship of which with our Lord he would, of course, regard as that existing between cause and effect. He says:

"I would venture to say, provisionally, that our conceptions of character and sin, of our duty to the sinner and the outcast, and of religious inwardness and spiritual intensity can be heightened and deepened by a study of the New Testament." (Ibidem. Page 178.)

The author pleads with his people for a more sympathetic reading of this book in which, more than any other subject, the sublime life and the exemplary death of Jesus of Nazareth are described at length. "It would be a mournful and irreligious thing," he says "if a book which, together with much evil, has also done much good, which has had such a gigantic influence, which has formed the religion of so many noble souls, and which the most different sorts of people in every age—believers and unbelievers alike—have agreed in thinking the greatest and most beautiful of all religious books—if such a book contained nothing which was both good and true." (Ibidem. Page 179.)

It is difficult not to feel that the beauty which has impressed all unprejudiced readers of the New Testament has not allowed the author of *Liberal Judaism* to escape its spell, but whence comes that beauty if it does not radiate from the charm of the personality of the Son of God drawn for us in those pages by the hands of four masters of their craft?

Indeed, so intellectual and poetic a race as the Jewish cannot well help being impressed by the wonderful life of Jesus, so soon as it is able to rise superior to the prejudice which many causes have combined together in producing, and many centuries of heredity have had the effect of fixing deeper and deeper in the national mind. That the contemplation of the character of Christ can excite in the breast of the Jew a sentiment of enthusiasm almost bordering on to worship is evident from the pages of Adolf Danziger, another modern Jewish writer. "In writing of Jesus of Nazareth," he says, "I seem to myself to hear a voice such as came to Moses in the desert of old, 'take the shoe from off thy foot, for the place on which thou standest is holy ground." It would be difficult for one while still professing the Jewish faith to place our Lord in a more exalted position than that suggested by the foregoing words, and, nevertheless, they are only a small portion of a chapter, every line almost of which breathes with a spirit of the greatest veneration for the Nazarene. Danziger refuses to be bound down simply to terms which, as in the other writers already mentioned, willingly admit that Christ was a great prophet or a great national hero. He says of Him: "The greatness which can speak in the presence of torture and death as Iesus spoke: which can return good for evil, love for hate, blessing for curses; which not only teaches the law of love, but lives by it and dies for its sake, is a greatness before which all other fades into nothing." Even more, "The man Iesus is the most heroic, the grandest, the noblest personality of all time and age."10

When we consider the quarter from which these sentiments originate and remember, moreover, the bitterness which, in the centuries of the past, both near and remote, has reigned against this wonderful Person in the same quarter, it is impossible not to feel pleasurably surprised. No theological importance can, of course, be attached to them. By no amount of ingenuity can they be exaggerated into an acceptance of the doctrine of the Divinity of Christ. Nevertheless, in fervor, in enthusiasm, it might almost be said in affection for Jesus of Nazareth, the following might have fallen from the pen of an ardent Christian, instead of, as is actually the case, from that of a Jew: "A spiritual light shines there and universal love for man. The fetters that bind Him cannot lower the dignity of His person; the fierce hate of His enemies, who rage for His life, neither daunts Him nor affects the mildness of His words." Or again, "He has made humility honor; He has

<sup>&</sup>quot;Jewish Forerunners of Christianity," p. 52.

<sup>10</sup> Ib., p. 52.

<sup>11 &</sup>quot;Jewish Forerunners of Christianity," p. 50.

carried the highest wisdom to the homes of the lowly and the ignorant of the world; He has carried it beyond all barriers of schools and Temple, and for this He is to die a death of shame. The Redeemer of the poor, the teacher of the ignorant, the friend of all that faint with toil and are oppressed with cares must die on the Cross."<sup>12</sup> Or, finally, the following: "Over the supreme tragedy let the angel of sorrow spread his wings. Veil thy face, sun! Be darkened, sky; let the earth tremble and men mourn in tears! The most angelic of men, the most loving of teachers, the meek and humble prophet, is to die by the death of the Cross."

Such views, expressed with more or less ardor, it can hardly be doubted, are becoming more common in the ranks of Judaism year by year. They are not to be taken as a profession of faith. They manifest no departure, even in thought, of those who give utterance to them from the religion of their fathers. Jews as a body, whether intellectual or ignorant, are, unfortunately, as far removed from orthodox Christianity as they have been at any time of the nation's history. What the expressions are evidence of is this, that even among those who start with the most violent prejudice against the person of the Founder of Christianity, Jesus of Nazareth cannot fail in completely winning the greatest admiration and reverent esteem for Himself, so soon as the story of His life is considered attentively and without bias.

JOHN FREELAND.

Bedford, England.

## Book Reviews

HOMILIES ON THE COMMON OF SAINTS. Being Volumes V. and VI. of the "Homilies For the Whole Year." By Right Rev. Jeromias Bonomelli, D. D., Bishop of Cremona. Translated by Right Rev. Thomas S. Byrne, D. D., Bishop of Nashville. Two volumes, cloth, net, \$2.50. New York: Benziger Brothers.

In this set of two volumes Bishop Bonomelli fulfills the promise he made in the preface to the first four volumes of the "Homilies" when he said: "I propose to give homilies on the Gospels and Epistles of the Masses known as *De Commune*, which are hardly ever explained to the people."

The noted prelate condemns most emphatically the custom which now prevails of giving Conferences rather than Sermons on the several phases of religious teachings. He would have more of positive instruction, explaining the various dogmas of our faith, exhorting the faithful to fulfill the Commandments of God and the Precepts of the Church and exposing the meaning of passages taken from Holy Writ and the Church's liturgy.

In this connection in the Preface to these volumes he says:

"The novel is loved and sought for even in preaching; very well, let us go back to the old models and we shall be novel, so far and so universally have we strayed from them.

"One of the purposes, and not the least, I had in view in writing my Series of Homilies was and is to bring back this kind of preaching to the ancient pattern, such as we find it in the Fathers. The Homilies of St. John Chrysostom, of St. Augustine and St. Bernard, not to mention others, are commentaries on the Sacred Books, in which dogma and morals are woven together with admirable art, and the errors of their age touched upon and refuted as the occasion arose. In as far as my poor abilities permitted, I endeavored to imitate them, taking always for my secure groundwork the Sacred Text. In this way we have as a foundation the doctrine taught by Jesus Christ Himself, which has ever been the same in all past ages and will be for all ages to come; the development of it, of course, will be various, according to place and time and the people to whom we speak."

For those who are familiar with the Homilies for the Sundays, and with the explanations of the Christian Mysteries, no higher recommendation can be given than the assurance that the Homilies on the Common of the Saints are fully equal to the others in the original and in the translation. For those who have not yet become acquainted with Bishop Bonomelli's works, it may be said they

furnish a collection of sermons that have seldom been equaled and rarely, if ever, excelled.

THOUGHTS OF A CATHOLIC ANATOMIST. By Thomas Dwight, M. D., LL. D., Parkman Professor of Anatomy at Harvard. 12mo., pp. 243. New York: Longmans, Green & Co.

The learned author gives us the keynote to his book in this quotation from the Preface:

"If I be not mistaken, there is more or less curiosity on the part of those outside of the Church to know what Catholics of education, especially those who themselves have worked in science, think in their own hearts of the dogmas of the Church on the one hand and of the assertions of modern science on the other. Are not Catholics guilty of dishonesty in appearing to subscribe to beliefs which they do not sincerely hold and which fail to accord with what is accepted by the public as science? The suspicion is perhaps not unnatural, especially on the part of those whose ideas of Catholics are distorted by the misrepresentations of centuries. It may be, too, that this suspicion is somewhat strengthened by the very natural unwillingness of men to wear their hearts upon their sleeves, to tell their most secret and solemn thoughts in the marketplace.

"It is often said by those outside of the Church that they cannot see how a Catholic can be a man of science, and conversely how a man of science can be a Catholic. Indeed, I fear there are many poorly instructed Catholics who are very much of the same opinion. It may be that it is my duty, on account of the position I have the honor to hold, to give to both of these classes such poor help as I can. It is many years since I began this book, which I have thrown aside again and again."

It is, then, the clear and fearless declaration of a learned man of science that there is no contradiction between revelation and reason. This declaration is made so briefly and so simply, in language free from technical phraseology and fortified so strongly with the best authority, that every fair-minded person can easily understand. The contradictions of so-called science are plainly shown, the wide conclusion from narrow premises are indicated and the confusion of theory and fact brought out into the light.

The chapters are entitled "Thought of the Day," "Theories of Evolution," "God," "Religion," "Design and Plan," "Living and Non-Living," "Man," "The Descent of Man," "Variations and Anomalies" and "Adaptations." It is an excellent book for all students, but especially for those who attend secular schools where

an immense amount of falsehood is masquerading under the mantle of science, so skillfully disguised as to deceive almost the elect.

The death of the learned author since the publication of the book adds a pathetic interest to the work.

MISSALE ROMANUM in Small Quarto. Editio XI, post alteram uti typicam a S. R. C. declaratam, Cum approbatione Sacr. Rituum Congreg. Size, 8¼ x 11¼ inches, 1¾ inches thick. New York: Frederick Pustet, 1911.

There has for a long time been a demand for a Missal in size between the regular quarto and octavo. The result is this beautiful book. The handy shape and size, small bulk and bold easy-to-read type make it the Missal "par excellence" for churches and chapels, where the larger ones would not suit. It is embellished with the highly prized, artistic vignettes of Brother Schmalzl, C. SS. R. Besides all the standard features which are always found in all the liturgical publications of Pustet, and which make them reliable beyond question and worthy of the approbation of the Church authorities in Rome and every other part of the world, this Missal has some special features that are worthy of note.

- (1) For greater convenience a collection of prayers for the commemoration of Ferials in Advent, of the Blessed Virgin and of the Holy Spirit, etc., is inserted between the Proper of Time and the Proper of Saints.
- (2) On the Feasts of Saints which have only the Prayer proper the Secret and Postcommunion from the Common are printed with it for greater convenience when the Feast is only commemorated.
- (3) In such cases, however, lest the celebrant should turn from the Common for the Secret and Postcommunion, it is noted that only the Prayer is proper.
- (4) In the Index, Feasts of Our Divine Lord and Feasts of the Blessed Virgin are placed before Feasts of the other Saints.

The addition of these improvements shows the great care which the publisher uses not only to be correct and up-to-date, but also most efficient.

HERDER'S CONVERSATIONS-LEXICON. Dritte Auflage, Reich illustriert durch Textabildungen, Tafeln und Karten. Erganzungsband. St. Louis, Mo.: B. Herder, 1911. Pp. 1,500.

At this particular time when attention is being called, not only to the neglect or inadequate treatment of Catholic subjects in the latest of the English encyclopedias, but also to the unfair and bigoted manner in which they are presented, it is a great pleasure to be able to call attention to Herder's Conversations-Lexicon, and to say here is a model encyclopedia. It is true that these nine volumes cannot be compared to a work in twenty-nine volumes, either in comprehensiveness or in fullness of treatment; but making due allowance for the difference in size, the book before us is perfection compared to the other.

It is well to remember that it is not a Catholic dictionary or encyclopedia treating of Catholic subjects only, or of others in their Catholic bearing only, but it is a general encyclopedia, covering the whole encyclopedic field, treating Catholic subjects with a Catholic pen and seeing other subjects through Catholic eyes, so that the reader gets true knowledge, just as the Catholic child gets true knowledge on all subjects in the Catholic school. the very best general encyclopedia for Catholics, just as education in Catholic schools is the very best for them. The eminent scholars who are the contributors to the book are most competent in their various departments. It is devoutly to be wished that Herder will bring out an English translation of this work. would be a success. It is the right size for practical use, for experience shows that those who consult encyclopedias oftenest use the smaller book most frequently and the larger one rarely. objection which is made to all foreign books of reference, that they give a preponderance of space to foreign subjects, could be overcome easily by careful revision. The supplemental ninth volume contains new articles, corrections and statistics up to date. This whole third edition shows the added perfection that only experience can produce.

The Life and Writings of Bishop Delany have been published at the urgent request of his many friends among the clergy and laity. No attempt has been made at a formal biography. The memoir has been compiled from various sources; from the Bishop's diaries, his home letters, from some of his editorials and public speeches and from articles printed from time to time during his priestly and episcopal career. As much as possible his own words have been used, for they better than any others disclose the dominant idea of his life and the principle that guided him at all times. Several events have been related by his intimate friends and by those who labored with him in his sacred ministry. To these and

THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF THE RIGHT REV. JOHN B. DELANY, D. D., SECOND BISHOP OF MANCHESTER, NEW HAMPSHIRE. By G. C. D. 8vo., pp. 452. Lowell, Mass.: The Lawler Printing Company.

to all who have in any way assisted the present publication sincere and heartfelt thanks are extended.

It is not usual to publish the life and works of so young a man who has occupied the episcopal office for only about two years, but it is the work of a loving sister, and those who read the book will be much edified by the piety and zeal that distinguished the student, priest and Bishop who was called to his reward so early. His Eminence of Boston, who knew him well, thus testifies to his worth:

"What my beloved friend, the sweet record of whose noble life is written here, thought upon the subject of old age I know not. But I do know that when he fell in the thick of the fight for Holy Church he smiled. He was too young not to feel the human pathos of a death so early, so unlooked for. But he loved and trusted his King too completely to even ask Him why.

"He worked all his life as he had seen men work in the busy city where his youth sped by. There in the early morn the bell sounded to labor and again at night to rest. His brain was too active, his mind too vigorous, his heart too happy to ever know what idleness meant.

"As a student he still studied when his task was finished. As a priest he still found or invented other duties when those allotted him were completed. As a Bishop he planned new labors when the end came."

THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. Part I. Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. First number (QQ. I.—XXVI.), 8vo., pp. 361. New York: Benziger Brothers, 1911.

The book is very appropriately begun with the Encyclical of the late Pope Leo XIII. on the restoration of Christian Philosophy, according to the mind of St. Thomas Aquinas, the Angelic Doctor. The impetus given to the study of St. Thomas by the eloquent words of the learned Pope, who was himself a lifelong disciple of the Angel of the Schools, to whom he owed his reputation as a brilliant theologian, was so great as to swell the number of his followers until they formed a strong, continuous chain around the Catholic world. It may be questioned if St. Thomas has ever been so widely known or so extensively studied since his own day as he has since the Encyclical of Leo XIII. appeared.

It was certainly more desirable to extend the circle of his readers still further and to make him accessible not only to classical students of Philosophy and Theology, but also to all classes of students, especially in high schools and universities, and most of all to scientific men. This is done most effectually by the publication of the complete work in the vernacular, under the editorial direction of the sons of St. Thomas. We have had compendiums of the great theologian's "Summa" and commentaries on it before, but the best way to study St. Thomas is to go to him directly.

This book should be in all the seminaries, convents and high schools of the country, as well as in the libraries of students generally. It ought to be in the public libraries, because it is Christian theology in the best form. Catholic readers should create a demand for it in these institutions.

FURTHER NOTES ON St. PAUL: The Epistles of the Captivity; Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, Philemon. By the Rev. Joseph Rickaby, S. J., M. A. 12mo., pp. 203. London: Burns & Oates.

The first words of the title "Further Notes" are explained by the author's previous work, "Notes on St. Paul: Corinthians, Galatians, Romans." The writer informs us that the present volume ends his labors in this field, but we hope that he will complete the work by adding another on the *Thessalonians*, the *Pastorals* and the *Hebrews*.

In order to ascertain the true value of this book we must keep in mind the author's purpose. He did not intend to produce an exhaustive work on the subject, dealing fully with the philosophy, theology, history, archæology and controversy of the epistles, but rather to set down in the form of notes the result of his meditations and study of these sacred writings, which he has reverently and affectionately made throughout the years of his life. The result is most interesting and instructive, as all Father Rickaby's work is. We cannot help thinking that knowledge gained from a book of this kind has a value not found in more strictly technical works, because there is an unction and a personality about it that draws and holds and impresses the reader in a way that conduces to more profitable and permanent results.

The Decree of Pius X. on Betrothal and Marriage has attracted world-wide attention, because it is universal in its application. Its commentators, therefore, include theologians of all countries, and their commentaries, although couched in different languages, are

LOS ESPONSALES Y EL MATRIMONIO SEGUN LA NOVISIMA DISCIPLINA.
COMENTARIO CANONICO—MORAL SOBRE EL DECRETO NE TEMERE, Par
el R. P. Juan B. Ferreres de la Compania de Jesus. 12mo., pp. 460.
Madrid: Admon. de Razon y Fe.

equally instructive for the faithful in all countries. The Commentary of Father Ferreres is exceptionally good, and it has already reached the fifth edition. In it the author first takes up the Decree proper, commenting on each section clearly and fortifying his comments by quotations from the best authorities, and then in a special section introduces a comparison between the former discipline of the Church and the present discipline. This second part is unusually interesting and informing. Altogether, the book is well worthy of the attention of all students and practitioners.

LA CURIA ROMANA SEGUN LA NOVISIMA DISCIPLINA DECRETA PAR PIO X. Par R. P. Juan B. Ferreres de la Compania de Jesus. 12mo., pp. 575. Madrid: Administracion de Razon y Fe.

This second edition, enlarged, called for in the short time which has elapsed since the Constitution Sapienti Consilio was promulgated, indicates an unusual degree of merit. Nor is the indication deceptive. The author not only produces the Constitution, with all the Rules that govern the various Congregations, and a full description of their offices and modes of procedure, but he goes into the history of the subject in a very comprehensive and instructive manner, tracing each Congregation back to its origin, showing its variations and development down to the present time, and extending his labors even to those Congregations that have not been revived. The book is, therefore, not only a commentary, but a history. The extent of the author's labors as well as his learning is shown by the unusually large and complete bibliography that accompanies the book and also by the splendid index, which is a model.

## BOOKS RECEIVED.

- THE CATECHIST; or, Headings and Suggestions for the Explanation of the Catechism of Christian Doctrine (No. 2). With Numerous Quotations and Examples from Scripture, and an Appendix of Anecdotes and Illustrations. By Rev. George Edward Howe, author of "Sermon Plans." Sixth edition. Two vols., 8vo., pp. 658 and 680. New York: Benziger Brothers.
- HISTORY OF POPE BONIFACE VIII. AND HIS TIMES, WITH NOTES AND DOCU-MENTARY EVIDENCE. In six books. By Don Louis Tosti, Benedictine Monk of Monte Cassino. Translated from the Italian by Right Rev. Mgr. Eugene J. Donnelly, V. F., Pastor of St. Michael's Church, Flushing, Long Island. 8vo., pp. 546. New York: Christian Press Association.
- THE CULTURE OF THE SOUL. By the Rev. P. Ryan, author of "Catholic Doctrines Explained and Proved" and the "Groundwork of Christian Perfection." 12mo., pp. 226. New York: Benziger Brothers.
- SOCIAL FRANCE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY. By Cécile Hugon, Sometime Scholar of Somerville College, Oxford. With twelve illustrations. 8vo., pp. 321. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1911.

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